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PREFACE
A

dozen years ago the present editor published a case-book
for law school use on Trial Practice. It was then a subject
unknown in the law school curriculum, and the presumptions
were perhaps, for that reason, generally thought to be against
its usefulness and practicability. But in the years that have
passed the teaching of trial practice has become a common
feature in American legal education. The once prevalent idea
that the subject was primarily local has been quite generally
dispelled, and the principles of trial practice are now seen
Variations found in different juris
to be of wide application.
dictions are mostly on minor points. The major problems,
involving the elements of jurisdiction and the correlation of
functions between judge, jury, attorney and witness, have
been solved by the different American courts along almost
identical lines. The result has been the development of a
systematic and well-ordered body of principles suited to the
Such a subject
needs of modern American courts of justice.
is obviously of the highest importance to those who are being
trained to enter the practice of law, and its place in the law
school course has become secure.
It now seems desirable to take a further step in the same
direction, and to bring the subject of Appellate Practice into
the law school ﬁeld. Every argument made against the teach
ing of trial practice may be equally employed against ex
tending the course into the realm of appellate review. But
the arguments in favor of one are equally cogent in behalf of
There is the same mass of litigation over points
the other.
of practice, and the same uniformity in the fundamental prin
As a matter of statistics, the subject of Ap
ciples involved.
peal and Error ﬁlls a larger section in the current digests
than Trials. And while local statutes play an important part
in determining the minor technical requisites for review,
there is a striking uniformity in those underlying principles
according to which appellate proceedings are instituted and
In making a general study
conducted in American courts.

(iii)

iv

PREFACE.

of the subject with material gathered from many jurisdic
tions, the essential elements necessarily become emphasized
and clariﬁed among the incidental details and the diverse
nomenclature, resulting in a sounder appreciation of funda
mental principles than could well be obtained from a study
of the practice of a single jurisdiction.
The editor's earlier volume on Trial Practice has not been
incorporated in the present book, but that subject has been
entirely reorganized and rewritten. The material on Juris
diction has been greatly extended. Legal Ethics in connection
with trial work has been treated more adequately, new sec
tions on the Verdict and Judgment have been added, certain
topics, such as Instructing the Jury and New Trials, have
been considerably condensed, new cases have been freely used
experience indicated
whenever
the advisability of such
changes, and the whole subject has been annotated more lib
erally than before.
Appellate Practice, which ﬁlls substantially half the present
volume, is doubtless more technical than the practice relating
to trials, and there is more variety and complexity in the
application of the rules. It seemed desirable, however, to
restrict the case material to the main principles involved, and
to exhibit subordinate variations and special applications in
the form of notes. This has required rather heavy annota
tion, but the notes merely amplify the scope of the text or
show its implications and limitations, without undertaking to
present exhaustive lists of authorities.
The two topics, Trial and Review, are in fact but two
aspects of a single subject.
Every trial must be conducted
with a view to a possible appeal, and every appeal is based
upon the proceedings below.
Reviewing cases in appellate
courts has become such common practice that lawyers must
always be prepared to carry their cases through to the highest
courts. This has greatly increased the need for teaching the
principles of appellate review, and the fact that every step
taken in either court relates immediately and vitally to the
procedure in the other, makes it almost indispensable that the
two stages of litigation be studied as counterparts of one
another.
The present book is designed to develop the sub
ject in this way as an organic whole.
.
Since procedural questions are likely to accompany every
kind of case as incidental to problems of liability, it is par

.__ __

_i___

5.T“"l
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V

ticularly necessary in dealing with material of 'this kind to
freely omit portions of the opinions when irrelevant to the sub
ject matter in hand. Such omissions have in all cases been
indicated. But it has been the constant aim of the editor to
preserve in every case a full statement of all facts bearing
upon the procedural problem involved. These are frequently
given in the form of condensed statements by the editor, and
such statements will always be found marked by inclosing
brackets.
Enson R. SUNDERLAND.

Law School,
University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor,
January, 1924.
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PART I.
TRIAL PRACTICE.
CHAPTER I.

JURISDICTION.
JUDICIAL Pownn.

SECTION 1.

SHOULTZ

v.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
79

/

MCPHEETERS.

'

’.)9-‘I’-if

1881.

Indiana, 373.

ELLIOTT, C. J. The civil code of 1881 provides for the
appointment of master commissi0neI's by the judges of the
circuit courts of the State, and invests them with various
Section
powers and imposes upon them important duties.
judge
the
ofﬁce
of
“Whenever
shall become
419 is as follows:
vacant, or, in case of the absence of all the judges competent
to act, or whenever such judge or judges, by reason of inter
est, is or are incompetent to act, or unable by reason of sick
ness, such master commissioner shall have all the power of
any judge in vacation, to grant restraining orders, injunc
tions, writs of habeas corpus, and Writs of ne ea:ea.t, and to
appoint receivers, and hear and determine all motions and
matters. and make all orders concerning the same.” R. S.
1881, section 1404.

This section is in direct conﬂict with the letter and spirit
*

Ii

‘-¥

#

ll

$

*

Q

l

Ill

of the Constitution of the State, and is utterly void.

(1)

'

3

a

is

By the express provision of the paramount law, the whole
judicial power of the State is vested in courts. Blackstone,
deﬁned to be
following Lord Coke, says: “A court
place
Com. 24.
Of
where justice is judicially administered.”

2

TRIAL AND APPELLATE

PRACTICE

[Chap.

1

this statement it was well_ observed by the court, in Hobart v.
Hobart, 45 Iowa, 501: “But this deﬁnition obviously wants
*
*
*
fulness.
In addition to the place, there must be the
presence of the oﬁlcers constituting a court, the judge or
judges certainly.”
there can not be
ig9grt_vv_i‘ch_o1i j_u_dge or judges. Bbuvier says: "The one
common and essential’ feature in all courts is a judge or
judges, so essential, indeed, that they are even called the
court.”
An English book says: “In these courts the sover
eign is supposed in contemplation of law to be always present;
or at least is there represented by the judges, whose power is
but an emanation of the prerogative." 2 Broom & H. Com.
In The Michigan, etc., R. R. Co. v. The Northern, etc.,
21.
R. R. Co., 3 Ind. I239, it was said that the terms court and
judge are generally synonymous.
The predominant idea in
all the deﬁnitions of the courts and the text writers is. that a
court is a tribunal organized for the purpose of administer
ing justice, and presided over by a judge or judges.
“An official assembly, legally met
Webster's deﬁnition is:
together for the transaction of judicial business; a judge or
judges sitting for the hearing or trial of causes.” Our Con
stitution means by the term court judicial tribunals presided
\ over by a judge or judges. Section 2, of article 7, provides
that the Supreme Court shall not consist of less than three
nor more than ﬁve judges. Section 8 directs that the circuit
Section 10 declares
courts shall each consist of one judge.
that the General Assembly may provide by law that the judge
of one circuit may hold the courts of another circuit, and
section 14 makes provision for justices of the peace.
Throughout all the constitutional provisions runs the con
trolling idea that a court cannot exist without a judge. The
Legislature__n1ay_establish courts, but can not vest the judicial
pqwerjn anyother tribunals.
A master commissioner is not a court, and judicial duties
which courts only can exercise, can not be conferred upon
him. This seems so plain upon principle that the support of
But authorities are not wanting.
authority is not needed.
In Hall 'v. Marks, 34 Ill. 358, a statute was held to be uncon
stitutional which attempted to confer authority upon the
clerk to enter judgment in actions upon written contracts
where the amount of the recovery was ﬁxed by the contract,
and in cases where the defendant failed to appear and suf

~plation

I

Sec. 1]

JURISDICTION

3

fered default.

The court there said: “The consideration of
facts,
and the application of the law to those facts, and
the
the conclusion deduced by the court from the law and the
facts constitute a judgment. The power to announce and
have enforced this conclusion has been conﬁded exclusively
to the judiciary of our State government.”
In Chandler v.
Nash, 5 Mich. 409, it was held that a statute, assuming to
confer judicial powers upon a notary public, was unconsti
tutional and void. The court said: “This presents the naked
question whether the legislature possessed the constitutional
power to confer such jurisdiction upon the notary. The pro
ceeding authorized by the statute ﬁrst cited, for dissolving
attachments, is as clearly a judicial proceeding as the trial
of a cause in any court of the State; and the power ‘to hear
and determine’ such application under the statute, is as
clearly a judicial power as that exercised by a justice of the
peace or a judge upon the bench. It is not like a mere refer
ence to take proof or compute amounts to be reported to a
court of record for their judicial action, but it is, ‘to hear
and determine,’ questions both of law and fact. Section 1,
art. vi, of the constitution, declares: ‘The judicial power is
vested in one Supreme Court, in Circuit Courts, in Probate
Courts, and in justices of the peace. Municipal courts of
civil and criminal jurisdiction may be established by the
legislature, in cities.’ This, beyond all controversy, vests the
whole judicial power of the State in the courts and oﬂicers
named in this section, unless there be some further pro
vision in the same constitution, conferring upon some other
court or oﬂicer a part of such judicial power, or authorizing
the legislature to confer it; and in the latter case, it can only
be possessed or conferred by such further provision ex
pressly, or by necessary implication, which would have the
effect to take the case out of the general provision above
quoted. This must be so upon principle, or the constitution

repeal.
It is also well
supported by authority. See 2 Story on Const., secs. 1590 to
1592; State v. City of Rockford, 14 Ill. 420; Gibson v. Emer
son, 2 Eng. 173.” The views expressed in the cases cited
are in harmony with the rule long since declared by this
court. In Flournoy v. The City of Jcﬁersonville, 17 Ind. 169,
it was said: “Judicial acts, within the meaning of the Con
stitution of Indiana, are such as are performed in the exer

itself must

>7

be subject

to legislative

_._

.

--~
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I

III

cise of judicial powers. But the judicial power of this State
is vested in courts. A judicial act, thcn, must be an act per
formed by a court, touching the rights of parties, or prop
erty, brought before it by voluntary appearance, or by the
prior action of ministerial oﬁicers, in short, by ministerial
acts. See Waldo 'v. Wallace, 12 Ind. 569, where the consti
tutional provisions are quoted. The acts done out of court,
in bringing parties into court, are, as a general proposition,
ministerial acts; those done by the court in session, in adjudi
cating between parties, or upon the rights of one in court
3 Black. Comm., p. 25.”
ex parte, are judicial acts.

United States
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Q

v.

KEARNEY.

District Court for

the

District

of

Nez'a.da..

1.917.

241

Federal Reporter,

In Equity.

881,.

Suit by W. C. Bergman, H. B. Alfree, and
John G. Taylor, Incorporated, against W. M. Kearney, as
Decree for defendant.
State Engineer. On ﬁnal hearing.
suit brought by plaintiffs, for themselves and in
This is
behalf of other appropriators of water from the Humboldt
river system, whose rights thereto were acquired prior to the
The purpose
approval of the present water law of Nevada.
permanent injunction, restraining
of the suit is to procure
defendant as state engineer of Nevada, from proceeding to
hear and determine any of the rights or appropriations of
a

a

O

ill

BERGMAN

\‘c
,

A

#

*

it

is

is

undoubtedly true, that there are many cases in which
powers in their nature judicial, may be conferred upon of
ﬁcers and inferior tribunals. Quasi judicial powers may be
conferred upon tribunals which are not courts in the strict
This
well illustrated in the case of The
sense of the term.
United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40. But the section of
the statute here under examination does much more than
this; for
assumes to confer authority to exercise functions
These
and powers, which are purely and strictly judicial.
can only be possessed and ‘exercised by the courts.

Sec. 1]

JURISDICTION

5

plaintiffs, or of any other claimant in and to the waters of
Humboldt river and its tributaries, including the Little Hum
boldt, which were initiated and perfected prior to the pas
sage of the Nevada Water Law, approved March 22, 1913.

In detail, the court is asked to restrain
ing and determining, or-from entering

defendant from hear
any order determin
ing, such rights, from issuing to any one claiming waters of
said stream a certiﬁcate of determination, from making any
order requiring proofs of appropriation to be ﬁled within any
ﬁxed time, and from refusing to receive and ﬁle proofs of
appropriation from the Humboldt river, when such proof is
offered during ofﬁce hours of the engineer, and accompanied
by the proper fees.
#

II

1

Q

Q

Q

i

*

I

#

FARRINGTON, District Judge (after stating the facts as
above). Plaintiffs take the position that they are possessed
of certain property rights in the waters of Humb0ldt.river,
which were perfected prior to the passage of the Nevada
W'ater Law of 1913, and prior to 1902, when the office of
state engineer was created; that there never has been any
general adjudication of the rights, or relative rights, of plain
tiffs, or other appropriators, to the waters of that stream;
consequently the proposed determination by defendant, being
an exercise of something more than administrative authority,
will impair plaintiffs’ vested rights, and is therefore uncon
stitutional. The three main contentions are as follows:

i

$

$
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#

#
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Third, that

the statute, beginning with section 18, and
concluding with section 58, both inclusive, and section 75,
and sections 88a and 88b, is invalid, because thereby it
sought to confer upon a nonjudicial officer judicial powers.
Q

In

1=

¥

Q

i I

#

i

$
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the recent case of Ormsby Cozmty 'u. Kearney, 37 Nev.
314, 142 Pac. 803, on appeal from the district court for Hum
boldt county, the Supreme Court of this state had under con
sideration the Water Law as enacted in 1913. The purpose
of the action was to restrain the state engineer from proceed
ing under that statute, and the result was an order diredting
the district court to modify the temporary injunction, “so as
to only restrain the state engineer from making determina
tions which would in any way impair vested rights”; but
what acts of determination would impair vested water rights

I

6
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was not indicated, otherwise than as the court held that the
act was unconstitutional in so far as it authorized the en
gineer to make decrees which were ﬁnal and conclusive. The
majority of the court were of the opinion that the state, in
the exercise of its police power to prescribe laws for the
general Welfare, could provide for inspection and regulation
of the waters and water courses of the state, and exercise
a superintending control over them; that the Water Law
of 1913, giving the state engineer the right to institute pro
ceedings to determine water rights, if construed as adminis
trative only, and not to impair vested rights, was valid; and
that the state engineer could lawfully take evidence and de
termine water rights for administrative purposes.
In order to understand how and to what extent the court
it will be neces
declared the law of 1913 unconstitutional,
sary to examine the decision and the statute. Section 44 of
the act of 1913 in terms declares that:
“The ﬁnal orders or decrees of the state engineer, in the
proceedings provided by law for the adjudication and deter
mination of rights to the use of the waters in this state,
shall be conclusive as to all prior appropriations, and the
rights of all existing claimants upon the stream or body of
water lawfully embraced in the adjudication, subject, how
ever, to the provisions of law for appeals, rehearings and for
the reopening of the orders or decrees therein."
If the proceedings were reopened, the rehearings could be
had only before the state engineer. The only appeal granted
was to the district court; but as that court, under the Con
stitution, had and could exercise no such appellate jurisdic
tion, the act had the effect of making the determination of
an administrative oﬁicer a ﬁnal adjudication of property
rights, from which there could be no appeal. The court very
properly held the act unconstitutional in this respect.
Ormsby County v. Kearney, supra, 37 Nev. 356, 379, 384, 385,
142 Pac. 803.
*
"‘
"‘
In the amended act, the determination is per
mitted to have no efficiency until it is ﬁled in the district
court; thereafter the division of water must be made in ac
cordance therewith, but this division “may be stayed in whole
or in part by any party upon ﬁling a bond in the court
wherein such determination
is pending.”
After the stay
bond, the order of determination seems to be shorn of all
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efficiency, except that it operates as a pleading, and may be
afﬁrmed by the court, without trial, if no exceptions are ﬁled.
"
"
"
There is no appeal from the determination of
the engineer to the district court, but rather a continuation
in that court of proceedings commenced by and before the
When he has made his determination, he
state engineer.
it,
together
with the original evidence and tran
ﬁle
must
scripts, in the district court; he must then apply to the court
to have the matter set for hearing; he must notify each
The order of
interested party, and ﬁle proof of service.
determination, the statements or claims of claimants, and
the exceptions to the order will constitute the only permis
sible pleadings, and all the proceedings thereunder are had
as nearly as may be in accordance with the rules governing
civil actions. If necessary, the court may employ experts
to investigate and report, or it may refer the case, or any
part of it, to the state engineer for further evidence or de
termination. The proceedings culminate in a decree aiiirm
ing or modifying the determination. The only appeal involv
ing the order of determination provided for in the amended
act is from the decree of the district court to the Supreme
Court. There is no provision in the act of 1915 which de
clares that the determination of the state engineer shall at
any time be in force and effect, save that, pending proceed
ings in court, the water may be distributed in accordance
therewith, unless such distribution is prevented by a stay
bond.
The insistence that the proceedings provided in the statute
as amended, are tantamount to an appeal to the district court,
At
as authorized in the act of 1913, is not well founded.
no stage does the determination possess any of the character
istics of ﬁnality; it cannot be regarded as terminating be
tween the parties litigation on the merits of the case. It
contemplates and provides for further information and tes
timony in the district court, before a ﬁnal decree can be
entered. It operates, not as a judgment, but as a pleading,
or the ﬁndings of a referee. True, it may be affirmed with
out additional testimony, if no exceptions are ﬁled. This is
equivalent to the taking of a decree pro confcsso when the
allegations of the bill are sufiicient to support the decree
Simkins, Federal Equity Suit, p. 388. A similar pro
asked.
ceeding occurs when judgment by default is taken against a

8
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defendant who fails to answer in an action upon contract for
Rev. Laws Nev.
the recovery of money or damages only.
§ 5236.

It is insisted that the amendments of 1915 have failed to
accomplish their purpose and that the act as amended is
still bad, in that it vests judicial power in a nonjudicial
officer. It must be admitted that the amended act imposes
duties on the state engineer which in their nature are ju
dicial, but whether they come within the constitutional
inhibition is the question.
Section 1, art. 3, of the Nevada Constitution, reads thus:
“The powers of the government of the state of Nevada
legis
shall be divided into three separate departments—the
lative, the executive and the judicial; and no persons charged
with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of
these departments shall exercise any functions appertaining
to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly
directed or permitted.”
Section 1, art. 6, is as follows:
“The judicial power of this state shall be vested in a
Supreme Court, district courts, and in justices of the peace.
The Legislature may also establish courts, for municipal
purposes only, in incorporated cities and towns.”
It is argued that the judicial power of the state is thus
completely distributed to the courts mentioned, and conse
quently the Legislature is powerless to create new courts,
except for municipal purposes in incorporated
cities and
towns, and has no reserve of judicial power to confer on an
executive oﬁicer.
It will be noted that a complete and perfect separation of
powers is not made by the Constitution itself.
The veto
power gives the Governor a qualiﬁed negative on all laws
proposed by the Legislature. The Lieutenant Governor pre
Each house
sides over the Senate, and has a casting vote.
of the Legislature is the judge of the qualiﬁcations, election,
and returns of its own members; and the Senate is a high
Thus the Governor and
court for the trial of impeachments.
Lieutenant Governor exercise legislative power, and the
Legislature exercises judicial power.
Again, it is only those functions appertaining either to the
judicial or legislative departments, which an executive officer
Apparently it is not the exer
is prohibited from exercising.

Sec. 1]
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cise of all judicial authority, but the exercise of that
of the judicial authority pertaining or belonging
Apt and
judicial department, which is forbidden.
priate language certainly could have been employed

9

portion

to the
appro
to ex
press complete and absolute segregation, if such had been
the design of the men who framed and adopted the Consti
tution. It was this thought which led our Supreme Court
to say in Sawyer Iv. Dooley, 21 Nev. 390, 396, 32 Pac. 437,

439:

“It

is the state government as created by the Constitution
which is divided into departments. These departments are
each charged by other parts of the Constitution with certain
duties and functions, and it is to these that the prohibition just
quoted refers. "‘ "‘ * It would be impossible to administer
the state government, were the officers not permitted and re
quired, in many instances, to discharge duties in their nature

judicial.”

Hence it was held that executive ofﬁcers might be charged
with the duty of assessing property, and required to act as a
board of equalization; for, notwithstanding the fact that
such a board may act in a judicial capacity, the Constitution
nowhere contemplates that the judicial department, as or
ganized by article 6, shall discharge that duty.
It is impossible to say that all acts judicial in their nature
are within the exclusive province of the judicial department
Numerous instances may be cited in
of the government.
which nonjudicial officers have been required to exercise
functions which in a sense are judicial, and yet statutes im
For
posing such duties have been held to be constitutional.
instance, we have a railroad commission, an industrial com
mission, a public service commission, a tax commission,
boards of equalization, and boards of county commissioners.
Not one of these bodies is a court, and yet under certain cir
cumstances each is authorized to require the presence of wit
nesses, to listen to evidence, to hear argument, to ascertain
facts, to apply existing law thereto, and to enter decisions
seriously affecting the rights of individuals. Such judicial
power exercised by nonjudicial oﬁiccrs is termed quasi ju
dicial, to distinguish it from the judicial power which de
volves upon, and may be exercised only by, the courts.
The ultimate purpose for which the adversary proceedings
are had is a most important factor in determining their

1'0
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At the close of the chapter on Separation of Pow
character.
ers, section 753, in -his work on the Constitution, Willoughby
says:
“There is no constitutional objection to vesting the per
formance of acts essentially judicial in character in the hands
of the executive or administrative agents, provided the per
formance of these functions is properly incidental to the exe
cution by the department in question of functions peculiarly
its own.”
In Landowners v. People, 113 Ill. 296, 309, it is said:
“Judicial power has never been held to apply to those cases
where judgment is exercised as incident to the execution of
a ministerial power, nor has it ever been held the exercise
of ministerial power by the courts, within the meaning of
this article, where they have been compelled to exercise a
ministerial act as an incident to the exercise of judicial
power.”
If a judicial hearing is had before a legislative body to
ascertain facts upon which to base legislation, the hearing
will be quasi judicial, even though it may have been con
ducted in strict accordance with the practice in civil cases;
it is merely preliminary and incidental to the legislative act.
It is in no sense a function properly appertaining to the
judicial department of the state government.
Again, an aggrieved shipper lodges with the Railroad Com
mission a complaint, alleging that certain charges are ex
tortionate, unjust, and discriminatory; interested parties are
notiﬁed; they appear; witnesses are summoned, examined,
and cross-examined; there are arguments by the adverse par
ies; but the Commission—and this is signiﬁcant—must de
ermine that the allegations are true, that the prevailing
ates are extortionate, unjust, or discriminatory, before it
may by order establish and ﬁx, in lieu thereof, rates which
In all this there is no encroaching
shall thereafter prevail.
The authority to determine what is a
on the judicial power.
reasonable rate to be charged by a common carrier, or a pub
lic utility, is legislative, and not judicial, in the constitutional
The Constitution nowhere imposes on the courts the
sense.
duty of making such investigations and determinations pre
paratory to and in aid of legislative acts. Hence they cannot
be regarded as functions appertaining to the judicial de
Southern Paciﬁc C0. v. Bartine (C. C.) 170 Fed.
partment.
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Idaho Power, etc., Co. '0. Blomquist, 26 Idaho, 222,
141 Pac. 1083, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 282.
Similarly, the Industrial Commission has been invested
with authority, and charged with the duty of hearing evi
dence and determining the facts which must be found to
exist before any claim for compensation of injured workmen
may be allowed. .It is held that such a commission is not a
court, but an administrative body, which in the course of its
duties may decide questions of law and fact. In so doing, it
acts quasi judicially, but is not vested with judicial power in
the constitutional sense. Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327,
358, 133 N. W. 209, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 489.
Judicial power, in the constitutional sense, is something
more than authority to hear and determine; it includes the
power to decide ﬁnally and conclusively, and also power to
carry its determination into effect. Judicial power is de
ﬁned by Mr. Justice Miller as the-—
"power of a court to decide and pronounce a judgment and
carry it into effect between persons who bring a case before
it for decision.”
See Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 407,
412, 156 Pac. 491, 493; Muskrat '0. United States, 219 U. S.
346, 356, 31 Sup. Ct. 250, 55 L. Ed. 246; District of Colum
bia v. Eslin, 183 U. S. 62, 65, 22 Sup. Ct. 17, 46 L. Ed. 85;
Gordon v. United States, 117 U. S. 697; Interstate Commerce
Com. v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 481, 14 Sup. Ct. 1125, 38 L.
725, 773;

Ed. 1047.

In Underwood

.

v. McDuﬁ'ee, 15

194, 196, the court

Mich. 361, 368, 93 Am. Dec.

said:

“No action which is merely preparatory to an order or
judgment to be rendered by some different body can be prop
erly termed judicial. A master in chancery often has occa
sion to consider questions of law and of fact, but no one ever
A jury in a court
supposed him to possess judicial power.
of record determines all the facts in a case, but the judicial
power is in the court which enforces the verdict by judgment.
This view is very clearly explained by Kent, C. J., in TilIot
son v. Cheetham, 2 Johns. [N. Y.] 63 (3 Am. Dec. 459),
where it was held that the sheriff himself, when presiding
over a jury of inquest, acted ministerially, because he had no
*
"
power to give judgment.
It is-the inherent author

'

I

)
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ity, not only to decide, but to’ make binding orders or judg
ments, which constitutes judicial power; and the instrumen
talities used to inform the tribunal, whether left to its own
choice or ﬁxed by law, are merely auxiliary to that power,
and operate on persons or things only through its action, and
'
by virtue of it.”
In Ma-Knight v. Grcmt, 13 Idaho, 629, 637, 92 Pac. 989,
990, 121 Am. St. Rep. 287, 290, the Supreme Court of Idaho

says:
“On the other hand, section 13 of article 5 of the Constitu
tion was never intended to prohibit other departments of the
state government than the judicial from exercising some
We think by this pro
judicial or quasi judicial functions.
vision it was rather intended to preserve to the judicial de
partment of the state government the right and power to
ﬁnally determine controversies between parties involving
their rights and upon whose claims some decision or judg
ment must be rendered or determination made.”
It was held, in People ex rel. Morgan 12. Hayne, 83 Cal. 111,
23 Pac. 1, 7 L. R. A. 348, 17 Am. St. Rep. 211, that the
Supreme Court Commissioners
of that state in reporting
facts and conclusions of law, are not exercising judicial
"
power.
In 1792 Congress passed an act requiring the Circuit
Courts of the United States to examine into the pension
claims of disabled veterans of the Revolutionary War, to
determine what amount of pay would be equivalent to the
disability incurred, and to certify the same to the Secretary
of War, who was to place the names on the pension list in
conformity thereto, unless he had cause to suspect imposition
or mistake, in which event he might withhold the pension
The judges were of the
and report the case to Congress.
opinion that, inasmuch as their determination would not be
ﬁnal, but could be suspended by an executive officer, the du
ties imposed could not be deemed judicial. Hayburn’s Ca-se,

Dall. (Pa.) 409, 1 L. Ed. 436.
In United States 12. Ferreira, 13 How. 40, 14 L. Ed. 42, the
District Judge of Florida was authorized by an Act of Con

2

gress to receive and adjudicate certain claims against the
United States. His decisions allowing claims, together with
the evidence on which he acted, were to be transmitted to the
Secretary of War, and, if he was satisﬁed that the same were
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legal and just, he was authorized to pay them.
Court declared:

The Supreme
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“The powers conferred by these acts of Congress upon the
judge, as well as the Secretary, are, it is true, judicial in
their nature. For judgment and discretion must be exercised
by both of them. But it is nothing more than the power ordi
narily given by law to a commissioner appointed to adjust
claims to lands or money under a treaty, or special powers to
inquire into or decide any other particular class of contro
versies in which the public or individuals may be concerned.
A power of this description may constitutionally be conferred
on a Secretary as well as on a commissioner, but is not judicial in either case, in the sense in which judicial power
granted by ‘the Constitution to the courts of the United
States.”

it
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*
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Under our law,
the proceeding for the adjudica
rights
integral;
is one; its preparatory and
tion of water
initial stages are before the state engineer; the ﬁnal steps are
in the district court. It
initiated by an drder of the state
engineer, without waiting for controversies to arise.
He
seeks no legal or equitable relief, either for himself or for the

is

a

is

a

it

it

is

state which he represents. No recovery of the whole or any
part of the rights to be investigated
demanded. He sets up
no title to be established or quieted in himself or in the state;
he alleges no rights which have been infringed or violated.
The purpose of the proceeding is to promote the public wel
fare by regulating the use and preventing the waste of the
waters of the state. His determination, though obtained
judicially, has none of the elements of ﬁnality and conclusive
ness which are the sine qua. non of judicial power. As an
not effective for the
ascertainment of relative rights,
administrative purpose of regulating and controlling distribu
is ﬁled in court. Thereafter, pend
tion and diversion, until
ing the decree, the distribution must be had in accordance
with the determination; but this may be prevented in whole
or in part by any one who ﬁles in the court stay bond, the
amount of which is discretionary with the judge. The pro
No aggrieved
ceedings reach the court as a-ma-tter_o.i_ss2nrse
’claimant, nor all the claimants acting in unison, have any
as much the duty of the engineer
option in this regard. It
to ﬁle his determination with the original evidence, and

—\_’__
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certiﬁed copy of all testimony on which it was based, in the
court, as it was to make investigations, measurements, and
maps, to gather evidence, or to prepare his determination.
Until it is so ﬁled, it has no more force than the ﬁndings of a
referee. It is not a decree or judgment, in the sense that it
terminates the litigation on the merits between parties;
therefore there is nothing to appeal from. When it reaches
the court, there is no necessity for an appeal; there its prin
cipal function is to serve as one of the pleadings.
If no ex
ceptions are ﬁled, the court is justiﬁed in assuming that it
reasonably satisﬁes all parties, and a decree will be entered
aﬂirming the order of determination.
If any exceptions are
ﬁled, there must be a trial in the district court. At the hear
ing the court is not conﬁned to a mere re-examination of the
record and evidence as heard by the engineer, but will in all
its proceedings follow as near as may be the rules governing
civil actions. It may require further evidence or determina
tion from the state engineer, or a report from such experts
as it may employ to make investigations.
I am therefore of the opinion that the act of 1913, as
amended in 1915, in so far as it authorizes the state engineer
to take evidence and determine water rights for administra
tive purposes, is not unconstitutional.
The power exercised
in the ascertainment of water rights for administrative pur
sense;
poses only is not judicial power in the constitutional
nor, in so far as the engineer is authorized to take evidence
and determine water rights for the ﬁnal adjudication of the
titles of various claimants among themselves, is he vested
with judicial power. What he does is merely preliminary,
the initial step in a proceeding which culminates in a ﬁnal
decree by the district court; thus it is not the engineer, but
the court, which exercises the judicial power of the state of
Nevada. " * *1
1See L. R. A. 1916A, p. 425, and L. R. A. 1917D, p. 55, tor notes on
the delegation of judicial power under workmen’s compensation acts.
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On the 11th day of February, 1892, Casper
petition in the Sebastian circuit court for the
Ft. Smith district, by which he sought to compel John F.
Williams, as collector of Sebastian county, to receive certain
county warrants in payment of the county taxes assessed
against his property for the year 1881. He stated, among
resident and taxpayer of the Ft.
other things, that he was
district,
and the owner of certain warrants upon the
Smith
treasurer of Sebastian county.
We infer from the petition, evidence, and the ﬁndings of
the court that the warrants in question were issued upon or
ders or judgments of the Sebastian county court rendered
was sitting at Ft. Smith. The beginning'of each war
while
rant with the name of the court, the term thereof, and the
County warrants
time when allowed, indicates this.
are not allowed by the clerk, but by the county court. Hence
the date of the allowance must have been made to show the
date of the order or judgment upon which they were issued.

Reutzel ﬁled
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every county of this state there
and must be
county
required to erect
At
the county court
good and
sufﬁcient courthouse and jail. The county, circuit, and other
courts held for the county must sit there. There
no other
place designated by law for that purpose. The name “county
seat” indicates the object of its creation. It is, as deﬁned by
the Century Dictionary, “the seat of government of county;
the town in which the county and other courts are held, and
where the county officers perform their functions." When
removed, and the needful public
the county seat of a county
buildings are made ready for the several courts holden at the
county seat and the respective ofﬁcers, the next and succeed
ing terms of the county court and the circuit court and all the
other courts for said county of superior or general jurisdic
tion are required to be held at the new county seat.
It has often been held by this court that “the meeting to
court at the place, but
gether of the judge and officers of
seat.

it
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Court of Arkansas.
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not at the time ﬁxed by law for holding the court, was not a
court,
under our constitution and law, but was a mere collec
I
tion of officers, whose acts must be regarded as coram non
/ judice and void.” Dunn
'0. State, 2 Ark. 252; Brumlcy v.
/
State, 20 Ark. 77; Scott v. State, 22 Ark. 369; Ex parte
Jones,
27 Ark. 349; Chaplin v. Holmes, Id. 414; Graham ~v.
l
Parham, 32 Ark. 687; Grz'mmett v. Askew, 48 Ark. 153. 2 S.
W. 707; Neal 'v. Slzinn, 49 Ark. 227, 4 S. W. 771. This rule
is applicable to the proceedings of a court held at a place not
authorized by law. The object of the law in both cases is the
same.
That object is certainty, and to prevent a failure of
justice by reason of parties concerned or affected not know
ing the time or place of holding courts. The effect, therefore,
of the failure to comply with the rule, in each case, is the
same.
State 12. Roberts, 8 Nev. 239; Dalton 'v. Libby, 9 Nev.
192; Cooper v. Insurance Co., 3 Colo. 318; Wicks v. Ludwig,
9 Cal. 173; Witt 12. Henze, 58 Wis. 244, 16 N. W. 609.
*
*
* Here an election had been ordered by the Sebas
tian county court to determine whether the county scat of
Sebastian county should be removed to Ft. Smith. The elec
tion was held, and it was thereby decided in the negative, ac
cording to the law then in force. The county court so held
About one year after this, and after. the term
and adjudged.
at which the order was made had expired, the court at
tempted to set aside its ﬁnal order made at a previous term,
and declared that the county seat was removed from Green
wood to Ft. Smith. It had no power or authority to do so,
and the order by which it attempted to exercise such juris
diction was null‘ and void; and it was so held by this court in
Patterson v. Temple, 27 Ark. 202.
At the time the orders under which the clerk issued the
|
in question were made, Greenwood was the county
Warrants
I
There was no law authorizing the
seat of Sebastian county.
holding of a county court at Ft. Smith. The warrants are
. consequently void.
The judgment of the circuit court is therefore reversed,
and the petition denied!
'

2See Mahon v. Hnrkreader (1877), 18 Kan. 383, where the judge,
other oﬁicers and parties moved from the court room to a law oilicc
in the same city and tried the case: Scvier v. Teal (1:-56), 16 Tex. 371,
where the court left the county seat because of an in<'ur.~ion of the puulic
enemy; Selleck v. City of Janesville (1898), 100 Wis. 157, where the
judge, jury, sheriff and attorneys went to the home of a sick witness 15
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away to take testimony;—in all of which the change was held
Funk v. Carroll County (1895),
to have no effect on the jurisdiction.
96 Ia. 158, holds contra to last case above cited.
In re Terrill (1893), 52 Kan. 29, holds that where the judge is not
present on the ﬁrst day of the term, there is no ofilcer present capable
later day of the term,
of exercising the judicial power to adjourn to
and therefore the entire term is lost, and a session held on a later day
is without legal validity. A judgment rendered in vacation (Gamble
legal holiday (Hemmens
v. Buffalo County (1898). 57 Neb. 163) or on
v. Bently (1875), 32 Mich. 89) is void.
a

a

we

==;_ ..-

miles
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Supreme
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These cases arise under an act of Congress under
taking to confer jurisdiction upon the court of claims, and
upon this court, on appeal, to determine the validity of cer
tain acts of Congress hereinafter referred to.
{he ﬁrst Question in these cases, as in others, involves_i;he
jurisdiction _of_t.his_co_u1t to entertain the roceedin S‘, an_d
that depends upon whether the jurisdiction conferred 1S with
in the power of Congress, having in view the limitations of
the judicial power, as established by the Constitution of the
United States.
of article
of the Constitution provides:
Section
“The judicial power of the United States shall be vested
in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Con
gress may, from time to time, ordain and establish.”
of the same article provides:
Section
“The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and
equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United
States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other pub
lic ministers, and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and mari
time jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States
shall be party; to controversies between two or more states;
state and citizens of another state; between citi
between
zens of different states; between citizens of the same state
claiming lands under grants of different states, and between
2

1

III

a

k

/

United States,

J.

a

,

UNITED STATES.

Court of the United States.
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a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens,
subjects."

I

It therefore

U

I

Q

U

O

I I

U

1

01

I

becomes necessary to inquire what is meant by
the judicial power thus conferred by the Constitution upon
this court, and, with the aid of appropriate legislation, upon
the inferior courts of the United States.
“Judicial power,”
says Mr. Justice Miller, in his work on the Constitution, “is
the power of a court to decide and pronounce a judgment and
carry it into eﬁ'ect between persons and parties who bring :1
Miller, Const. 314.
case before it for decision.”
As we have already seen, by the express terms of the Con
stitution, the exercise of the judicial power is limited to
“cases” and “controversies.”
Beyond this it does not extend,
and unless it is asserted in a case or controversy within the
meaning of the Constitution, the power to exercise it is no
where conferred.
What, then, does the Constitution mean in conferring this
judicial power with the right to determine "cases" and “con
troversies." A “case” was deﬁned by Mr. Chief Justice Mar
shall as early as the leading case of Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch, 137, 2 L. ed. 60, to be a suit instituted according to
the regular course of judicial procedure.
And what more, if
anything, is meant in the use of the term “controversy?”
That question was dealt with by Mr. Justice Field, at the cir
cuit, in the case of Re Paciﬁc R. Commission, 32 Fed. 241,
255. Of these terms that learned justice said:
“The judicial article of the Constitution mentions cases and
The term ‘controversies,’ if distinguishable at
controversies.
all from ‘cases,’ is so in that it is less comprehensive than the
latter, and includes only suits of a civil nature. Chisholm 1*.
Georgia, 2 Dall. 431, 432, 1 L. ed. 445, 446, 1 Tucker’s Bl.
Com. App. 420, 421. By cases and controversies are intended
the claims of litigants brought before the courts for deter
mination by such regular proceedings as are established by
law or custom for the protection or enforcement of rights, or
the prevention, redress, or punishment of wrongs.
Whenever
the claim of a party under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States takes such a form that the judicial power
is capable of acting upon it, then it has become a case.
The
term implies the existence of present or possible adverse par
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for

ad

judication.”
The power being thus limited to require an application of
the judicial power to cases and controversies, Is the act which
undertook to authorize the present suits to determine the
constitutional validity of certain legislation within the con
stitutional authority of the court? This inquiry in the case
before us includes the broader question, When may this
court, in the exercise of the judicial power, pass upon the
That question
constitutional validity of an act of Congress?
court,
early
history
of the
the lead
has been settled from the
ing case on the subject being M arbury v. Madison, supra.
In that case Chief Justjce Marshall, who spoke for the
court, was careful to point out that the right to declare an
act of Congress unconstitutional could only be exercised when
a proper case between opposing parties was submitted for
judicial determination; that there was no general veto power 3
in the court upon the legislation of Congress; and that the
authority to declare an act unconstitutional sprang from the
requirement that the court, in administering the law and pro
nouncing judgment between the parties to a case, and choos
ing between the requirements of the fundamental law estab
lished by the people and embodied in the Constitution and an
act of the agents of the people, acting under authority of the
Constitution, should enforce the Constitution as the supreme
law of the land. The Chief Justice demonstrated, in a man
ner which has been regarded as settling the question, that
with the choice thus given between a constitutional require
ment and 'a conﬂicting statutory enactment, the plain duty of‘
the court was to follow and enforce the Constitution as the
supreme law established by the people. And the court recog
nized, in Marbury 12. Madison and subsequent cases, that the
exercise of this great power could only be invoked in cases
which came regularly before the courts for determination,
for, said the chief justice, in Osborn v. Bank of United States.
9 Wheat. 819, 6 L. ed. 223, speaking of the third article of
the Constitution, conferring judicial power:
“This clause enables the judicial department to receive
jurisdiction to the full extent of the Constitution, laws, and
treaties of the United States, when any question respecting
them shall assume such a form that the judicial power is
capable of acting on it. That power is capable of acting only
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when the subject is submitted to it by a party who asserts his
rights in the form prescribed by law. It then becomes a case,
and the Constitution declares that the judicial power shall
extend to all cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and
treaties of the United States."
Again, in the case of Cohen v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 5 L.
ed. 257, Chief Justice Marshall, amplifying and reasserting
the doctrine of Marbury 'v. Madison, recognized the limita
tions upon the right of this court to declare an act of Con
gress unconstitutional, and granting that there might be in
stances of its violation which could not be brought within the
jurisdiction of the courts, and referring to a grant by a state
of a patent of nobility as a case of that class, and conceding
that the court would have no power to annul such a grant,

said:
“This may be very true; but by no means justiﬁes the in
ference drawn from it. The article does not extend the ju
dicial power to every violation of the Constitution which may
possibly take place, but to ‘a case in law or equity’ in which a
right under such law is asserted in a court of justice. If the
question cannot be brought into a court, then there is no case
in law or equity, and no jurisdiction is given by the words of
the article. But if, in any controversy depending in a court,
the cause should depend on the validity of such a law, that
would be a case arising under the Constitution, to which the
judicial power of the United States would extend. The same
observation applies to the other instances with which the
counsel who opened the cause has illustrated this argument.
Although they show that there may be violations of the Con
stitution of which the courts can take no cognizance, they do
not show that an interpretation more restrictive than the
words themselves import ought to be given to this article.
They do not show that there can be ‘a case in law or equity’
arising under the Constitution, to which _the judicial power
does not extend.”

in this connection, Chicago & G. T. R. Co. v. Well
man, 143 U. S. 339, 36 L. ed. 176, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 400. On
page 345 of the opinion in that case the result of the previous
decisions of this court was summarized in these apposite
words by Mr. Justice Brewer, who spoke for the court:
“Whenever, in pursuance of an honest and actual antago
nistic assertion of rights by one individual against another,
See also,

a

presented

of any legislature,
sarily rests on the

a

a

lative act."
Applying the principles thus long settled by the decisions

of this court

a

1,

1,

1,

1,

1,

to the act of Congress undertaking to confer
jurisdiction in this case, we ﬁnd that William Brown and Levi
B. Gritts, on their own behalf and on behalf of all other
Cherokee citizens having like interest in the property allotted
1902, and David Muskrat and J.
under the act of July
Henry Dick, for themselves and representatives of all Chero
kee citizens enrolled as such for allotment as of September
1902, are authorized and empowered to institute suits in the
court of claims to determine the validity of acts of Congress
1902, in so far as the same at
passed since the act of July
tempt to increase or extend the restrictions upon alienation,
encumbrance, or the right to lease the allotments of lands of
Cherokee citizens, or to increase the number of persons en
titled to share in the ﬁnal distribution of lands and funds of
the Cherokees beyond those enrolled for allotment as of Sep
1902, and provided for in the said act of July
tember
1902.
The jurisdiction was given for that purpose ﬁrst to the
court of claims, and then upon appeal to this court. That is,
the object and purpose of the suit is wholly comprised in the
determination of the constitutional validity of certain acts of
(fongress; and furthermore, in the last paragraph of the sec
tion, should
judgment be rendered in the court of claims or
this court, denying the constitutional validity of such acts,
then the amount of compensation to be paid to attorneys em
ployed for the purpose of testing the constitutionality of the
be paid out of funds in the Treasury of the United
law is
States belonging to the beneﬁciaries, the act having previous
party,
1y provided that the United States should be made
a

to

w~¢
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question involving the validity of any act
state or Federal, and the decision neces
competency of the legislature to so enact,
the court must, in the exercise of its solemn duties, determine
whether the act be constitutional or not; but such an exercise
the ultimate and supreme function of courts. It
of power
is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between
It never was the thought that, by means of
individuals.
friendly suit,
party beaten in the legislature could transfer
to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legis

is

l

there
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and the Attorney General be charged with the defense of the
suits.
'
It is therefore evident that there is neither more nor less
in this procedure than an attempt to provide for a judicial
determination, ﬁnal in this court, of the constitutional valid
ity of an act of Congress. Is such a determination within the
(judicial determination, ﬁnal in this court, of the constitution
lal validity of an act of Congress.
Is such a determination
within the judicial power conferred by the Constitution, as
the same has been interpreted and deﬁned in the authorita
tive decisions to which we have referred? We think it is not.
That judicial power, as we have seen, is the right to deter
mine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants,
duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction.
The right to
declare a law unconstitutional arises because an act of Con
gress relied upon by one or the other of such parties in deter
mining their rights is in conﬂict with the fundamental law.
The exercise of this, the most important and delicate duty of
this court, is not given to it as a body with revisory power
over the action of Congress, but because the rights of the liti
gants in justiciable controversies require the court to choose
between the fundamental law and a law purporting to be en
acted within constitutional authority, but in fact beyond the
power delegated to the legislative branch of the government.
This attempt to obtain a judicial declaration of the validity of
the act of Congress is not presented in a “case” or “contro
versy,” to which, under the Constitution of the United States,
the judicial power alone extends. It is true the United States
is made a defendant to this action, but it has no interest ad
verse to the claimants.
The object is not to assert a property
right as against the government, or to demand compensation
for alleged wrongs because of action upon its part. The
whole purpose of the law is to determine the constitutional
validity of this class of legislation, in a suit not arising be
tween parties concerning a property right necessarily in
volved in the decision in question, but in a proceeding against
the government in its sovereign capacity, and concerning
which the only judgment required is to settle the doubtful
character of the legislation in question. Such judgment will
not conclude private parties, when actual litigation brings to
the court the question of the constitutionality of such legisla
tion. In a legal sense the judgment could not be executed, and
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amounts in fact 1.0-»l10~J!1QI£.i'.h3.11 an expression of opinion
gpon the validity of the acts in question. Conﬁning the juris
diction of this court \\?1thin*th'e'Ti'mTtations conferred by the
“Constitution, which the court has hitherto been careful to

and whose boundaries it has refused to transcend,
we think the Congress, in the act of March 1, 1907, exceeded
the limitations of legislative authority, so far as it required of
this court action not judicial in its nature within the meaning
of the Constitution.
Nor can it make any difference that the petitioners had
brought suits in the supreme court of the District of Colum
bia to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior from carrying into
effect the legislation subsequent to the act of July 1, 1902,
which suits were pending when the jurisdictional act here in
volved was passed. The latter act must depend upon its ow11
terms and be judged by the authority which it undertakes to
confer. If such actions as are here attempted, to determine
the validity of legislation, are sustained, the result will be
that this court, instead of keeping within the limits of judi
cial power, and deciding cases or controversies arising be
tween opposing parties, as the Constitution intended it
should, will be required to give opinions in the nature of ad
vice concerning legislative action,—a function never con
ferred upon it by the Constitution, and against the exercise of
which this court has steadily set its face from the beginning.
The questions involved in this proceeding as to the validity
of the legislation may arise in suits between individuals, and
when they do and are properly brought before this court for
consideration they, of course, must be determined in the ex
observe,

~s_y1e_have

ercise of its judicial functions.
ﬁfé-t_e.<L. we. are constrainediorhold. that-theseaetions -present
\no_justiciable contr_o_ve!L$JL Wii.i1in.i’.h.(=._3.l.1lZi1_Q)l1llX_Q1I'__t__i1_§j_Ql1.l111,__
acting within the limitationsof the-Constitution-under—which
created. ..As Congress, in passing this act, as a part of
the plan involved, evidently intended to provide a review of
the judgment of the court of claims in this court, as the con
stitutionality of important legislation is concerned, we think
the act cannot be held to intend to confer jurisdiction on that
court separately considered. Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe
Co., 184 U. S. 540, 565, 46 L. ed. 679, 693, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep.
431; Employers’ Liability Cases (Howard v. Illinois C. R.
C0.) 207 U. S. 463, 52 L. ed. 297, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141.
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The judgments will be reversed and the cases remanded to
the Court of Claims, with. directions to dismiss the petitions
for want of jurisdiction.‘
3See Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry. Co. (1920), 211 Mich. 592, in
which the majority of the court assert. and the minority deny that the
But
Muskrat case involves the principle ot the declaratory judgment.
(1922), 109 Kan. 619, Braman v. Babcock (1923),
see State v. Grove
—- Conn. —, 120 Atl. 150, and Blakeslee
v. Wilson (1923), — Cal. -—,
213 Pac. 495, in each of which the court unanimously held that the
declaration of rights was a judicial act even when no coercive relief
could be had.

The constitutionality ot declaratory judgments as involving the ques
tion ot the declaration ot rights as a judicial function, has been dismissed
at length in the following articles:—The constitutionality ot the Declara
tory Judgment, by Wm. G. Rice, Jr., 28 W. Va. L. Quar. 1; Declaratory
Judgment, by James Schoonmaker, 5 Minn. L. Rev. 172. See also The
Declaratory Judgment—A Needed Procedural Reform, by Edwin M.
Borchard, 29 Yale L. Jour. 1, 105; The Law of Declaratory Judgments
and its Progress, by Thomas R. Gordon, 9 Virginia Law Rev. (Jan. 1923);
A Modern Evolution in Remedial Rights-—The Declaratory Judgment, by
Edson R. Sunderland, 16 Mich. L. Rev. 69; A New Function tor Courts
Declaring the Rights of Parties, by Edson R. Sunderland, 88 Cent. L.
Jour. 6; The Courts as Authorized Legal Advisers of the People, by Edson
R. Sunderland, 54 Am. L. Rev. 161.
la-.44 .5‘
_ ’
4
In Bryan v. Kales (1892), 3 Ariz. Lg.
, it was held tha
a court could
not take jurisdiction 01 a case in which the plaintiﬂ! sued himself in
another

capacity.
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This is an original proceeding in this court for
The plaintiff asks a writ to compel the
a Writ of mandate.
defendant, as judge of the superior court, to make an order
appointing a time for the hearing of a petition ﬁled in the
superior court to obtain registration of certain lands, as pro
vided in the act of March 17, 1897, entitled “An act for the
certiﬁcation of land titles and the simpliﬁcation of the trans
fer of real estate,” known as the “Torrens Law.” St. 1897,
The defendant refused to make the order,
p. 138, c. 110.
basing his refusal upon the ground that the act above men
tioned is unconstitutional and void. The validity of the act is
the sole question presented for our consideration.
SHAW,
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The object of the act is well stated in the title. It purports
to establish a system for the registration of title to land,
whereby the official certiﬁcate will always show the state of
the title and the person in whom it is vested, and to provide
that, after the original registration, transfers of the land may
be made in the manner prescribed in detail in the act. As a
foundation for the system it is necessary to have the title
To that end a proceeding is authorized whereby
established.
such title may be settled and declared by a decree of the su
perior court. The title, thus established, is to be certiﬁed by
the county recorder, and the certiﬁcate is made conclusive
evidence of title in the person therein named as the owner.
The principal point urged in opposition to the issuance of the
writ is that the proceeding thus provided for is unconstitu
tional, because, "' "‘ " third, it commits to the judicial
department of the state functions which are not judicial in
character, but purely administrative and executive, contrary
to section 1 of article 3 of the state Constitution, prohibiting
one department of state from exercising functions belonging

to another.

It is

necessary to give a brief statement of the essential
features of the proceeding to establish and register titles.
Any person owning land which he desires to bring within the
operation of the act must avail himself of this proceeding.
He is required to ﬁle in the superior court a veriﬁed petition,
setting forth his name, occupation, residence, and post office
address; whether married or single, and, if married. the name
and residence of the husband or wife; the description of the
land and a statement of his estate or interest in it; that the
land is occupied or unoccupied, as the case may be, and if
occupied, the name and post office address of each occupant
and the interest or estate such occupant has or claims in the
land; the liens and incumbrances thereon and easements
therein, with the name and address of the holder thereof, if
known; whether or not any other person has or claims any
estate or interest of any character in the land, and the name
and address, if known, of every such person and the nature
of the estate or interest owned or claimed by him; and the
names and addresses of all the owners of adjoining lands, so
far as the same can be ascertained. The petition must be ac
companied by a plat of a survey of the land, made by a county
surveyor, or a licensed surveyor, with a veriﬁed or certiﬁed
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abstract of title, made by some person or corporation there
unto authorized as speciallyprovided in the act. Section 6.
The court must examine and determine, from the abstract of
title, whether or not it shows the title to be in the petitioner
as alleged, and, if it so determine, it shall thereupon appoint
a day for the hearing of the petition.
Section 12. Notice of
hearing
the time and place of the
must be given by four
weeks’ publication in some designated newspaper of general
circulation. Notice thereof must also be served in the man
ner prescribed for service of summons in a civil action, either
personal or by publication, as the facts may require, upon all
the parties shown by the petition, or by the abstract of title,
to be interested, and also upon the husband or wife of the
petitioner and upon the owners of the adjoining lands. Sec
tion 13. We construe this provision for service of notice to
mean that the service to be thus made on these persons must
be personal service, except in those cases wherein, under sec
tions 412 and 413 of the Code of Civil Procedure, service may
be made by publication, and that service upon such parties by
publication must be made upon aiﬁdavit and order, as in those
sections provided, and for the period and in the manner there
Upon the hearing, if the court ﬁnds in accordance
required.
with the petition, it must make and enter a decree that the
petitioner is the owner of the land, accurately describing it,
attaching thereto a diagram thereof, and setting forth the
particulars of the liens, incumbrances, and easements, and an
appeal may be taken therefrom as in civil actions.
Section
15. The decree, when it becomes ﬁnal, is made conclusive of
the title and estate therein declared and described, against the
rights of all persons, known or unknown, whether named in
the proceedings or not. Section 17. A certiﬁed copy of the
decree is to be ﬁled with the county recorder, who is desig
nated as “registrar” for the purposes of the act, and upon it
he is to issue a certiﬁcate of title to the person named in the
decree as owner, and enter a duplicate thereof in a book kept
in his oﬂice for that purpose.
The land
Sections 22, 23.
thereupon becomes “registered land,” and the owner named
in the certiﬁcate thereupon holds it free from every claim ex
Subsequent transfers of
cept those noted in the certiﬁcate.
such “registered land” are to be made and entered in the man
ner prescribed in the act, and certiﬁcates thereof are to be
issued by the registrar to the transferee, which shall be con
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clusive evidence of his title as therein stated. Any person
who has been, or would be, defrauded by the decree, and who
had no actual notice of the proceeding, may maintain an ac
tion to establish his right, against the registered owner, at
any time within ﬁve years after the ﬁrst registration.
judicial and not
2.
The propositionthat the proceeding
administrative, that
is properly
matter for the judicial
department, was also fully considered and established in
Title, etc., Company '0. Kerrigan, supra, and the reasons there
given apply here. The claim on behalf of the defendant in
this particular seems to be based on the theory that there
may be
or may be no adverse party to the proceeding; that
had where there is, in fact, no adverse claim, lien, or incum
brance to or upon the land; and hence that
not adversary
may not become adversary in this sense.
in character. That
is, of course, conceded.
It would not necessarily follow that
the proceeding was not judicial. It needs no citation of au
thority to establish the proposition that the power of court
to entertain an action does not depend upon the appearance
of the defendant and his active opposition to the claims of the
plaintiff.
The contention
further made, in this connection, that ju
dicial power can be exercised only to settle existing disputes
none exist, the act of merely
and controversies, and that,
describing and declaring an undisputed title
necessarily ad
ministrative, and cannot be performed by the judicial depart
This argument does not fully meet the case. It may
ment.
be admitted that the existence of controversies which could
not be settled by the interested parties, and the necessity of
some other means of determining such controversies, were the
primal causes for the institution of courts with power to ad
judge between the parties to the strife, and, consequently,
that, originally, the exercise of judicial power implied the ex
istence of an actual present controversy to be determined.
But the reﬁnements of civilized life, and the necessity for the
orderly regulation, determination, and protection of human
affairs and rights of property, have long required the exten
sion of the judicial power beyond the settlement of contro
versies which have actually arisen, so as to include the func
tion of providing security against disputes and claims which
may arise. Hence, in modern times, the power of the courts
may be, and often is, exerted to protect property and rights
*

..-‘.-._..,1q~q

Sec.

1-.

TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE

28

[Chap.

1

~s.

new occasion and provides

a

erely creates

a

a

is

it

it

it

is

‘Iqiient

from possible, though at the time unknown, hostile claims and
pretensions, or to merely declare a status or right, and there
by to forestall and prevent controversies which, but for the
judicial declaration, might arise in the course of future trans
actions or proceedings.
In the case _provided for by the
McEnerney act, the total destruction of all the public records
and muniments of title had endangered all real property, had
exposed land titles to any sort of false claims, and had made
it impossible for any landowner to prove or exhibit his title
in the usual manner, if he wished to dispose of or mortgage
his land, or defend his title in court. It therefore became
necessary to provide for the establishment of a new record
title. In the case of the Torrens law, the plan for a new
method of registering and transferring title made it neces
sary tlgtihe absolute title should ﬁrst be established and de
clared. I_n__each_c_ase a status or right was to_he._established,
declared, and made Qgiclusive, as the foundation for subse
This_was aﬁsufﬁcierit
cause for placing the property to be thus affected within the
jurisdiction of the court as a res, the ultimate right and title
to which could be there adjudicated, after reasonable notice
to all possible claimants to appear and assert their claims.
strictly an exercise of judicial power,
Whether or not this
cannot be denied that
power
as originally instituted,
which,
immemorial,
from
time
has
been commit
of the class
ted to and exercised by the courts. At the time the Constitu
tion was adopted this class of powers had long been usually
exercised by the courts alone. It must be presumed that in
providing therein for the division of governmental power into
three departments, legislative, executive, and judicial, and
declaring that no person charged with the exercise of the
powers belonging to one of them should exercise functions
appertaining to either of the others, this usual power of the
was intended that the courts
courts was in mind, and that
should continue to exercise these quasi judicial powers, as
A law which
hey had previously been accustomed to do.
new procedure

a

j

_If

it

a
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or the exercise of this power cannot be said to transgress
clause of the Constitution.
Furthermore, in such matters, there
always
possibility
hostile claim or dispute as to the right to
that there may be
were necessary to ﬁnd further ustiﬁca
be established.
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tion for classing this power as judicial, this circumstance
would be suﬁicient. A hostile claim being possible, there is,

in

contemplation of law, an adverse claim to be settled, a right
to be protected against the possible claimant, for which a
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lHAYT, C. J. Plaintiffs in error, James J. Gorman et al.,
wefe“ convicted in the court below of riot, and sentenced to
conﬁnement in the county jail of Arapahoe county for the
period of 60 days. By an act approved April 19, 1889, the
court in which the trial of defendants took place was abol
ished. This act contained no emergency clause, and, under
our constitution, went into effect 90 days after its passage,
to wit, on the 18th day of the succeeding month of July.
These defendants were sentenced on the next day, July 19th.
The pretended judgment in this case cannot be allowed to
an office duly created, public policy
stand. Where there
frequently requires that the oﬁicial acts of the person actually
ﬁlling such office and discharging the duties thereof shall not
be questioned on the ground that the incumbent has no title
not for this salutary rule of law, the
to the oﬂice. Were
administration of public affairs might be thrown into the
direst confusion, and the functions of government suspended
pending inquiry into the right to the office. But this rule
no
presupposes the existence of an ofﬁce de jure. There
principle of law under which a de facto court can be sus
Sup. Ct. Rep.
tained. Norton 12. Shelby Co., 118 U. S. 425,
At the time of the imposition of this sentence there
1121.
was no such court in existence as the criminal court of Ara
pahoe county, and the jurisdiction of the C0lE't to enter this
or any other judgment cannot be maintained.

E!

.

4

&

St. Paul Ry. Co.
This is the general rule. Contra, Burt v. Winona
(1884), 31 Minn. 47", State V. Gardner (1896), 54 Oh. St. 24; Lang v.
J. L. 455
Bayonne (1906), 74
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Supreme

v.

HALL.

Court of North Carolina.
142

North Carolina,
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1906.

J. As we view the case there but one question
pres ted for our decision. When he was called upon to an
swer the indictment, the defendant entered what
called
“plea to the jurisdiction of the court," but, in the formal
statement of the grounds of his objection to the further prose
cution of the case, he does not, either in fact or in
technical
sense, attack the jurisdiction of the court, but he denies its
right to proceed against him solely upon the ground that the
court was unlawfully called and organized, or, in other words,
court, never having had any legal existence
was not
that
Jurisdiction, when applied to courts and
under the law.
speaking generally, consists in the power to hear and deter
Pr. 116. It presupposes always and
mine causes. 12 Pl.
court to exercise it, for
of course that there
not
lawfully existing tribunal. It
predicable of anything but
relates to the subject-matter of the controversy or to the per
applied to any question touching the exist
son, and never
It
not conferred until the court
ence of the court itself.
designated to exercise
has been brought into being accord
ing to the mode prescribed by law. The defect here alleged
the court had been properly called and organized,
not that,
not have had the necessary jurisdiction of the
still
would
subject-matter of the prosecution and of the person of the
defendant, but that there was no such court as that which
pretended to indict and try him. This presents
somewhat
right
exception
the
to
of
court ad
different case from an
particular cause. The distinction
mitted to exist, to try
clear. Burt v. Railroad, 31 Minn. 475, 18 N. W. 285, 289.
no such thing known to the science of
We believe there
plea denying the very existence of the court
pleading as
before which the plea is ﬁled, and, in the nature of things,
there cannot be, for no court can pass upon the validity of its
own constitution and organization. It must always decide
court, because the moment
admitted that
that
legal entity, so to
does not exist, and has never existed, as
never had the power to de
at once settled that
speak,
is

it

is

it

it

is
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cide anything, not even the plea denying that it ever was a
court. How can a body having no legal existence, and con
sequently no judicial power or authority, decide/anything?
Therefore it is that jurisdiction, or the right to hear and de
termine, necessarily involves the idea that there is some tri
bunal having legal existence under the law to hear and decide.
This is not by any means a new proposition. It certainly
the full sanction of reason and common sense, as it would be
a legal solecism for a court to deny or disavow its own exist
ence and it is also, we think, supported by high authority. In
Beard '0. Cameron, 7 N. C. 181, the very question was pre
sented to this court. There a plea to the jurisdiction was
ﬁled, and Judge Henderson said: “It is to my mind a very
strange and incongruous proposition that an answer is re
quired to be given by A. B., whether he be a judge, which an
swer he cannot give unless he be a judge. I plead that you
are not a judge. A judge alone can decide the plea; and I call
on you to decide. This certainly cannot be the way of testing
Judge Baker’s appointment.”
And again: “It is said that
the extent of the jurisdiction of all courts is settled by the
courts themselves. This is true, but then it must be remem
bered that, in all such cases, there is a court competent to de
cide, and it is called upon, not to decide whether it is a court,
but the extent of its jurisdiction. The plea must therefore be
overruled.” That was a case in which the defendant pleaded
to the jurisdiction because the judge, as he alleged, had no
authority whatever to preside over the court—not even color
of authority--and that he was no more than a private person,
and consequently there was, in fact, as well as in law, no
court. ' " ' We do not understand that the defendant in
tended to raise any objection to the “jurisdiction of the
court,” using that term in its only legitimate sense, but that
he merely intended to challenge the right of the court to ex
ercise judicial authority under any circumstances, because, in
fact, it was not a court recognized by the law. In either view
the plea was bad and was properly rejected. Again, if there
was no court to hear and determine, how is it that anything

has\

i
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If the proceedings were
has been heard and determined?
void ab initio there was no indictment, no arraignment, no
trial, and no judgment, and it follows logically that there was
nothing to appeal from to this court, and we have, therefore,
This court can ac
no jurisdiction to review the proceedings.
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quire jurisdiction to correct errors only where they have been

\

committed by a court, constituted and organized according to
law, or recognized as having the essential attributes of a
properly constituted tribunal, and competent to exercise jur
isdiction of controversies between litigants. We cannot en
tertain an appeal from anything except a court, or a person
“
"‘
*
such as a judge, who is clothed with judicial power.
As the plea must be overruled, and as all the evidence in
troduced in its support must fall with it, there is nothing left
for us to do but to inspect the record to see if there is any
defect or error therein, and, ﬁnding none, and conﬁning our
selves strictly to the question before us, we must declare that
there was no error in overruling the plea of the defendant.
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JURISDICTION

OVER

THE

GENERAL

SUBJECT

MATTER.

PEOPLE EX REL. GAYNOR
Supreme

v.

MCKANE.

Court of New York, General Term.
78

1894.

Hun, 154.

Application by William J. Gaynor for an injunction against
John Y. McKane, Nicholas J. Johnson, Harlan Crandall,
James H. Cropsey; and Richard V. B. Newton.
From orders
adjudging each defendant guilty of contempt of court, and
imposing on each punishment by ﬁne and imprisonment, de
Afﬁrrned.
fendants appeal.
The appellants were adjudged guilty of resistance willfully
offered to, and willful disobedience of, an injunction order
granted by Justice Joseph F. Barnard on November 6, 1893.
The injunction was granted in an action in which the relator
was the plaintiff, and the appellants, McKane, Johnson,
Crandall, Cropsey, and others, were defendants. In the com
plaint in that action, it was alleged that the plaintiff was an
elector of the state, and entitled to vote in the county of
Kings, and had been nominated for the office of justice of
the supreme court by the Republican party and various
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Democratic bodies, and was to be voted for at the election on
November 7th; that the defendant McKane was chief of
police of the town of Gravesend, in Kings county, and the
other defendants were inspectors of election of the six elec
tion districts of said town, and that they had conspired to
gether to make up a false and fraudulent registry list of the
voters of said town, and, under the color of such false reg
istry list, to permit persons to vote in said town who were
not entitled so to do; that the plaintiff had been prevented
by the defendants from inspecting or copying said registry
lists, and persons sent by him to take such copies had been
arrested, by the direction of said McKane, and committed to
jail, without any opportunity to give bail; that said defend
ants intended to refuse to allow watchers appointed by the
Republican organization to enter the polling booths, or be
present at the voting, or at the counting of the ballots. The
judgment prayed that said defendants be enjoined from pre

venting the persons appointed as such Watchers entering and
remaining in the polling places of the election district 0f
said town to which they should be appointed, and their act

ing as watchers, and performing all
their ofﬁce, including the right to see

duties pertaining to
the ballots given out
and votes cast, and watching and overseeing the canvass of
Upon the complaint duly veriﬁed, and upon
the ballots.
afﬁdavits,
preliminary injunction was
a
accompanying
granted, substantially as prayed for in the complaint.
The
appellants were charged in this proceeding with willful re
sistance to, and disobedience of, said injunction, and have
appealed from the orders adjudging them guilty upon such

charges.

JJ.

Argued before Bsown, P. J., and DYKMAN and PRATT,
BROWN, P. . If the supreme court had jurisdiction of the
subject-matter of the action brought against the appellants,
and if Justice Barnard had jurisdiction to grant the prelim
inary injunction, for disobeying or resisting which the ap
pellants have been convicted, that order must be treated as a
valid and binding order of the court, and, as such, was to
be obeyed, until it was revoked by subsequent order made
in the same action. People 12. Sturtevant, 9 N. Y. 263; Rail
road Co. 'v. Ramsey, 45 N. Y. 644; Mayor, etc., of New York
v. New York & S. I. Ferry Co., 64 N. Y. 624; People v.
Dwyer, 90 N. Y. 402; People 'v. Van Buren, 136 N. Y. 252,
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“Jurisdiction,” in the strict meaning of the
32 N. E. 775.
term, as applied to judicial ofﬁcers and tribunals, means no
more than the power lawfully existing to hear and deter
It is the power lawfully conferred to deal
mine a cause.
with the general subject involved in the action. Bouv. Law
Dict, ; And. Law Dict. It does not depend upon the ultimate
existence of a good cause of action in the plaintiff, in the
particular case before the court. “It is the power to adj udge
concerning the general question involved, and is not de
pendent upon the state of facts which may appear in a par
ticular case.” Hunt 12. Hunt, 72 N. Y. 217. “Jurisdiction
does not relate to the right of the parties, as between each
other, but to the power of the court.
The question of its
inquiry,
existence is an abstract
not involving the existence
of an equity to be enforced nor the right of the plaintiff to
avail himself of it, if it exists. It precedes those questions,
and a decision upholding the jurisdiction of the court is
entirely consistent with a denial of any equity in the plain
tiff, or in any one else.” People v. Sturtevant, 9 N. Y. 263.
The constitution of the state gives to the supreme court gen
eral jurisdiction in equity; and the Code of Civil Procedure
deﬁnes that jurisdiction to be all that was possessed by the
court of chancery of England on the 4th day of July, 1776,
with the exceptions, additions, and limitations created by the
laws of the state. The English court of chancery granted
the equitable remedy of injunction by ﬁnal decree and inter
locutory writ, and the subject-matter
of the action was
But, while
therefore within the jurisdiction of the court.
the power in the supreme court to award the relief by ﬁnal
decree is general, the Code of Procedure has abolished the
interlocutory writ, and substituted in its place a temporary
injunction, to be granted by order, and has prescribed rules
governing the application for, and the granting of, such an
order. In this respect, the jurisdiction of the court or judge
is not general, but limited; and such temporary order must
be made in compliance with the provisions of the Code, or
it will be treated as void. Spears v. Mathews, 66 N. Y. 127.
The question is thus presented whether Justice Barnard ac
quired jurisdiction to grant the temporary injunction.
It is
provided in the Code, inter alia (section 603), that, when the
right to an injunction depends upon the nature of the action,
a temporary injunction may be granted, when it appears
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from the complaint that the plaintiff demands, and is en
titled to, a judgment against the defendant, restraining the
or continuance of an act, the commission or con
tinuance of which during the pendency of the action would
produce injury to the plaintiff. Jurisdiction, under this pro
vision, is made dependent upon the presentation to the court
or judge of a complant setting forth facts upon which
plaintiff claims to be entitled to, and upon which he demands,
equitable relief; but it is not dependent upon the conclusion
which the judge makes upon the facts of the complaint.
Whether they constitute an equitable cause of action, or
judicial ques
case within equitable cognizance,
create
tion to be decided by the judge to whom the application is
His power to decide does not depend upon the cor
made.
rectness of his decision. Jurisdiction is entirely independent
It involves the power to
of the manner of its exercise.
decide either way upon the facts presented to the court.
When Justice Barnard granted the injunction we are now
considering, he had presented to him
veriﬁed complaint,
in which the plaintiff demanded equitable relief, and which
set forth the facts upon which such relief was claimed, and
temporary order was
upon those facts application for
complaint,
became
made. Upon the presentation of such
his duty to consider and decide whether or not to grant the
order asked for. He had power to consider the case, and
decide the application made to him. His determination upon
the facts before him, and the order which he issued, cannot,
therefore, be said to be void. Clothed as he was with the
judicial power to decide, the order made was valid. It may
was not void; and
cannot be
have been erroneous, but
reviewed or questioned in any collateral proceeding, but
must be respected and obeyed until vacated or set aside in
was granted.
The court having
the same suit in which
jurisdiction of the subjecbmatter of the action, and the jus
tice jurisdiction to consider and decide the application for the
was the duty of the appellants to obey
temporary order,
it; and disobedience or resistance to its mandate was an
criminal contempt. Code Civ. Proc.
offense punishable as
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The question whether the complaint contained facts call
ing for the equitable interference of the court, or, in other
valid cause of action in the
words, whether
set forth
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plaintiff, did not arise upon the application to punish for a
criminal contempt, and hence is not before this court for
This rule, which is applicable only to cases of crim
review.
inal contempt, to which class the present proceeding be
longs, is to be distinguished from the rule applied in cases
of civil contempt. In the latter class, it is essential, to sus
tain a conviction, that there shall exist, not only jurisdiction
in the court or oflicer granting the order which has been
disobeyed, but also a valid cause of action in the aggrieved
party; and this results from the fact that a civil contempt
is not an offense against the dignity of the court, but against
the party in whose behalf the mandate of the court has been
issued, and a ﬁne is imposed solely as indemnity to the in
jured party. And, as there can be no injury when there is
no right to maintain the suit, it is essential that this right
should exist, in order to sustain a conviction, and that ques
tion is always open for examination upon appeal. But it is
That offense in
otherwise in a case of criminal contempt.
It is of a public char
volves no element of personal injury.
acter, and indictable.
against
It is directed
the dignity and
authority of the court alone. Hence, in proceedings to
prosecute such an act, the court will look only to the question
of power; and, if there was jurisdiction to grant the order,
it will impose punishment upon those who willfully disobey it,
for the purpose of vindicating its own power and maintain
ing its own dignity, and leave any error as to private rights
to be redressed in the orderly manner provided for by the
And obviously no other rule could prevail,
rules of practice.
of the courts. It would be in
maintain
the
usefulness
and
tolerable if any suitor could question and disregard the
orders and decrees of the courts whenever he considered
As well might the sheriff, who is its
they were erroneous.
officer,
refuse to execute them. Under such a rule,
executive
the administration of the law would fail, and government
The distinction
would break down in one of its vital parts.
between a civil and criminal contempt is plainly stated in
the Code, in sections 8 to 14, inclusive, and has recently been
pointed out by the court of appeals in People v. Court of Oyer
and Terminer of New York, 101 N. Y. 245, 4 N. E. 259.
$1

8|

t

There is a clear distinction between the term “jurisdic
tion,” in its strict meaning, and as generally used in equity
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In its strict meaning, as I have stated, it
jurisprudence.
imports only the power residing in a court to hear and de
termine an action. But, as applied to the power of a court
of equity, it is ordinarily used with more limited signiﬁca
tion, and imports, not the power to hear and decide, but
the cases or occasions when that power will be exercised.
This distinction, while clearly pointed out in the best works
on equity jurisprudence, has not always been observed in
judicial opinions; and the expression “jurisdiction” has been
used when the writers meant only to inquire whether the
facts before the court presented a case for the proper exer
Mr. Pomeroy has
cise of the power of a court of equity.
very clearly pointed out the distinction here referred to. 1
The term “equity jurisdiction,”
Pom. Eq. Jur. §§ 129-131.
he says, “is used in contradistinction to ‘jurisdiction’ in gen
eral, and to ‘common-law jurisdiction’ in particular. "' * *
‘Equity jurisdiction,’ in its ordinary acceptation, as distin
guished from the general power to decide matters at all, and
from the ‘common-law jurisdiction,’ is the power to hear
certain kinds and classes of causes, according to the prin
ciples of the method and procedure adopted by the courts of
chancery, and to decide them in accordance with the rules
"‘
*
*
If- a court clothed with
of equity jurisprudence.
the equity jurisdiction, as thus described, should hear and
decide, according to equitable methods, a case which did not
fall within the scope of equitable jurisprudence, such judg
ment, however erroneous it might be, and liable to reversal,
‘ * “ Equity
would not necessarily be null and void.
jurisdiction may exist over a case, although it is one in
which the doctrines of equity jurisprudence forbid any re
This con
lief to be given, or any right to be maintained.
Yet equity
clusion is very plain, and even commonplace.
jurisdiction is constantly confounded with the right of plain
tiff to maintain his suit, and obtain his equitable relief; thus,
in fact, making the power to decide whether equitable relief
should be granted depend upon the actual granting of such
In the sense here referred to the expression is used
relief."
in the cases cited, and, when the term is used in the opinions
in connection with the facts, it has no reference to the power
of the judge who granted the order, but to the question
whether the facts showed a case for equitable cognizance.
The discussions which appear in the _opinions, in cases of

I
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civil contempt, in reference to the plaintiff's cause of action,
are not, therefore, in any wise inconsistent with, or opposed
to, the rule applied in cases of criminal contempt; and in the
latter class the only inquiry pertinent to the nature of the
alleged contemptuous act is, was the order which has been
disobeyed or resisted made by a court or officer having power
to make it? An examination of the decisions in this class of
cases will show how closely the courts have adhered to this
*
*
rule.
Injunctions which, in effect, anticipate the judgment, or
give some of the relief which it is sought to obtain by the
decree of the court, should be granted with caution, and
only when the necessity is great. Applications therefor call
for great care upon the court to which they are made. But
not only the power to grant them is undoubted, but the re
medial and restraining power of a court of equity would be
greatly impaired if such was not the rule. The conclusions
of the special term upon the facts have ample support in
the evidence, and the orders appealed from are afﬁrmed, with

'

costs.

All concur.‘
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a. number of states statutes have been passed to avoid a dismissal
want
of jurisdiction by providing for a transfer to the proper court.
lfor
Thus. in New Jersey, Laws 1912. ch. 233, as amended by Laws 1915,
13, provide:—
"1.
No civil cause or matter, hereafter pending in any court men
tioned in the above title. which has not jurisdiction of the subject matter.
shall be dismissed for that cause only. but the cause or matter shall be
transferred with the record thereof and all papers ﬂied in the cause.
for hearing and determination to the proper court. which shall there
upon proceed therein, as it the cause or matter had been originally
commenced in that court.
The record shall, when necessary, include
a transcript of all entries and proceedings in the cause.
Such transfer may be made at any stage of the proceedings and
upon, or without, application, and subject to rules. or the special orders.
of court; and upon an appeal being taken in any such cause that had
not been so transferred the appellate court may, subject to rules, hear
and decide such appeal and direct the appropriate
decree or judgment
pronounced thereon to be entered in the court to which such cause ought
to have been transferred."
And in Michigan, Judicature Act, 1915, Ch. XI, Sec.
C. L. 1915,
Sec. 12351, provides:——
"If at any time it appear that suit commenced in equity should have
been brought as an action on the law side of the court. or if
appear
that an action commenced on the law side of the court should have
been brought in equity, it shall be forthwith transferred to the proper
side. and be there proceeded with, with only such alteration in the
pleadings as shall be essential."
This act was liberally construed in Von Hoene v. Barber (1921), 215
Mich. 538, to authorize
transfer on the court's own initiative or on
motion of the defendant. as well as on motion of the plaintiff.
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SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY

L}

Supreme

Court of Florida.
52

39

CO

v.

RAY.

1906.

Florida, 636.

WHITFIELD, J. ' " *
Section 17 of article 5 of the Constitution provides that
“the county judge shall have original jurisdiction in all cases
at law in which the amount demanded or value of property
involved shall not exceed one hundred dollars.”
The jurisdiction of the court in actions of this character
is to be determined by the sum in good faith demanded or
actually put in controversy, and not the amount of the re
covery. Florida Cent. & P. R. C0. v. Seymour, 44 Fla. 557,
33 South. 424; Burr v. Bayne, 10 Watts (Pa.) 299; Dwyer 12.
Bassett, 63 Tex. 274; 11 Cyc. 775 et seq.; 1 Ency. Pl. & Pr.
705, and cases cited.
The same rule is announced in the
L’Engle,
Livingston
11.
27 Fla. 502, 8 South. 728, and
cases of
Wilson v. Sparkman, 17 Fla. 871, 35 Am. Rep. 110.
If the face of the record shows that the amount demanded
in the action brought before the county judge exceeded
$100, then he was without jurisdiction to entertain it, and
any judgment entered by him in the cause, except to dismiss
it, is comm non judice and utterly void. I1;L_3,u_Qh_ca5e__thg__
'
'
'
-of the
judgment
somtuudse awarding <leme.ss$. .WQl_11<l_I1.Qt._hf:.3-xicordilll to
of the law, and should be. quashed »
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The action is brought against the Seaboard Air Line Rail
way for not transporting with reasonable dispatch 366 crates
of cantaloupes committed to it for shipment, by carelessly
and negligently allowing the same to be delayed in transpor
tation, so that the 366 crates deteriorated in value, because
of such negligence and carelessness,“at least 25 cents per
crate, and the plaintiff claims damages for $125 by reason
There is no re
of the said negligence of the defendant.”
any
damages,
alleged
part
of
the
to be at
linquishment of
least 25 cents per crate, and the demand is made

for

$125.

The amount of the demand is the test of the jurisdiction
The demand here is for $125, and the
of the county judge.
particulars of the demand are at least 25 cents per crate

'~
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for 366 crates of cantaloupes. Under this demand the plain
tiff in a proper forum could prove an amount not exceeding
While 25 cents per crate for 366 crates of cantaloupes
$125.
would amount to less than $100, the demand is for at least
25 cents per crate, with a gross demand for $125.
The pre
sumption is that the demand was made in good faith and for
the amount which the terms used will cover.

It

is clear that the demand made by the declaration in this
case is in such terms that proofs can be made to any amount
not exceeding $125, and this excludes the jurisdiction of the
county judge. The fact that a judgment was actually en
tered for an amount within the jurisdiction of the county
judge cannot have the effect of giving jurisdiction retro
spectively, when none existed, to entertain the cause of ac
A court having apparent
tion as stated in the declaration.
jurisdiction of an action as begun may dismiss it afterwards,
if it appears that the amount actually demanded or involved
is less than the necessary jurisdictional amount, and that
the amount demanded in the declaration or complaint which
gave apparent jurisdiction could not have been claimed in
good faith. But. where the amount demanded on the face of
the record is in excess of the amount of which the court has
jurisdiction, no jurisdiction attaches, and the only proper
Brown v. Braun (Ariz.) 80 Pac. 323;
order is a dismissal.
Law,
334.
In
this case the judgment entered was
6 Current
for an amount within the jurisdiction of the county judge;
but. as the cause of action stated in the declaration was not
within his jurisdiction, the entry of any judgment upon the
Gillett
merits of the_ cause is void for want of jurisdiction.
& Jennison 'v. Riclza-rds, 46 Iowa, 652. ,1h_e___a_pp_earance of
the d_efendant.hy demurrer would give jurisdiction of the
_person, but it could not give the county judge jurisdiction of
a subject-matter in excess of the amount limited by the Con

'

stitution.
The judgment of the county judge was entered without
jurisdiction, and not in accordance with the essential require
ments of law.
Therefore the afﬁrmance of the judgment
by the circuit court on writ of error was not according to the
essential requirements of the law, and should be quashed
An order will be entered here quashing the
on certiorari.
judgment of the circuit court which purports to affirm the
void judgment of the court of the county judge.“
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6Waiver by plaintiff of the portion in excess of the jurisdiction of the
court will not confer jurisdiction upon the court:
Reeves v. Gower
(1913), 14 Ga. App. 293: Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. Co. v. Gladish (Tex. Civ.
App. 1915), 175 S. W. 863.

Z

D

6WJ

FOLTZ

V.

United

States

ST. LOUIS & SAN FRANCISCO
Circuit

RAILWAY

Court of Appeals, uEighth

CO.

Circuit.

1894.
60

Federal Reporter, 816;

8

Circuit Court of Appeals. 685.

[In 1883 the appellee railway -company commenced pro
ceedings in the state court in Arkansas for condemnation
of a parcel of land; the appellant Foltz appeared, and the
case was removed to the United States circuit court.
A
judgment of condemnation was rendered, awarding damages
to Foltz and vesting the right to use the land in the railway
The money was paid by
company upon payment thereof.
the railway company and received by Foltz. Later, in 1890,
Foltz brought ejectment against the railway company for
this land, and the present action was brought by the railway
company to‘ enjoin Foltz from prosecuting the action of
ejectment.]
Circuit Judges, and
Before CALDWELL and SANBORN,
THAYER, District Judge.
SANBORN, Circuit Judge. The power of eminent domain
—the right to take the property of the citizen for public
It lies dormant in the
use-—is an attribute of sovereignty.
state until the right to exercise it is granted by the state to
some public or quasi public corporation, or until it is exer
cised by the state itself. It follows that no corporation has
the right to exercise this power unless the state has granted
to it that right; and it is conceded that, under the constitu
tion of the state of Arkansas, a foreign corporation, as such,
cannot have this right. Holbert v. Railroad Co., 45 Iowa, 23,
26; State 12. Scott (Neb.) 36 N. W. 121, 127; Trcster 12. Rail
way Co., Id., 502, 505. The questions presented by this case,
and pressed upon our attention in the brief and argument of
counsel, are:
First. Is the judgment of condemnation of
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March 28, 1884, void—a nullity,—-so that it may be disre
"'
"‘
'
garded on a collateral attack?
Regarding the ﬁrst question, the contention of counsel for
appellant is that, since the appellee was a foreign corpora
tion, and was not one of the parties to whom the right to
exercise the power of eminent domain was granted by the
state, the circuit court was without jurisdiction to render a
judgment of condemnation in its favor, and that judgment
Conceding, but not deciding, that the appellee
is a nullity.
right
no
to
condemn land for public use, let us examine
had
this question. The appellant was properly served with the
statutory notice in the condemnation proceedings, and she
appeared and participated in the jury trial to determine the
amount of compensation she should receive.
In that pro
ceeding a controversy arose between a citizen of Missouri
and a citizen of Arkansas, and the amount in controversy
was such as to give the circuit court jurisdiction.
That
court, therefore, had jurisdiction of the parties.
It goes
without saying that the circuit court had the right and the
power to render a judgment of condemnation in a proper
case in favor of a railroad corporation which had the right
to exercise the power of eminent domain. Kohl v. U. S., 91
U. S. 367, 375; U. S. 11. Oregon Ry. & Narv. C0., 9 Sawy. 61,
The state of Arkansas had granted to many
16 Fed. 524.
corporations the right to exercise this power, and, if the cir
cuit court had rendered a judgment of condemnation in a
proper case in favor of any one of these corporations, its
judgment would unquestionably have been valid.
The con
nullity
is
an
absolute
in
this case, because
tention is that it
the court entered such a judgment in favor of a corpora
Stripped of argument and
tion which had not that right.
verbiage, the position is that this judgment is void because
the appellee had not legal capacity to sue for it, although
there were many parties that had such capacity, in whose
favor the circuit court had ample power to enter such a judg
ment. But the question of the legal capacity of the plaintiff
to prosecute condemnation proceedings, like that of the
necessity for the condemnation, and that of the public or
private purpose of it, is a question that the trial court must
necessarily hear and determine in every condemnation pro
ceeding.
Is every judgment in which the court committed
in
error
the decision of one of these questions, without
an
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the jurisdiction of the court, a nullity, and only those in
which it has made no mistake valid? Jurisdiction of the
subject-matter is the power to deal with the general abstract
question, to hear the particular facts in any case relating
to this question, and to determine whether or not they are
sufficient to invoke the exercise of that power.
It is not
conﬁned to cases in which the particular facts constitute a
good cause of action, but it includes every issue within the
scope of the general power vested in the court, by the law
of its organization, to deal with the abstract question. Nor
is this jurisdiction limited to making correct decisions.
It
empowers the court to determine every issue within the
scope of its authority according to its own view of the law
and the evidence, whether its decision is right or wrong, and
every judgment or decision so rendered is ﬁnal and conclu
sive upon the parties to it, unless reversed by writ of error
or appeal, or impeached for fraud. Insley v. U. S., 14 Sup.
Ct. 158; Cornett v. Williams, 20 Wall. 226; Des Moines Nav.
& R. Co. 'v. Iowa Homestead Co., 123 U. S. 552, 8 Sup. Ct.,
217; In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 221, 8 Sup. Ct. 482.; Skill
erns v. May’s Ea:r’s, 6 Cranch, 267; McCormick v. Sullivant,
10 Vi/'heat. 192; Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N. Y. 217; Colton v. Beards
ley, 38 Barb. 30, 52; Otis v. The Rio Grande, 1 Woods, 279,
Fed. Cas. No. 10,613; Hamilton v. Railroad Co., 1 Md. Ch.
107; Evans v. Haefner, 29 Mo. 141, 147; State '0. Weatherby,
45 Mo. 17; Rosenheim v. Hartsock, 90 Mo. 357, 365, 2 S. W.
473; State v. Southern Ry. Co., 100 Mo. 59, 13 S. W. 398;
Hope v. Blair, 105 Mo. 85, 93, 16 S. W. 595; Musiclc v. Rail
way Co., 114 Mo. 309, 315, 21 S. W. 491. Wherever the right
and the duty of the court to exercise its jurisdiction depends
upon the decision of a question it is invested with power
to hear and determine, there its judgment, right or wrong,
is impregnable to collateral attack, unless impeached for
fraud. In Colton v. Beardsley, 38 Barb., 30, 51, 52, the New

York court said:

“\Vhen the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal depends
upon a fact which such tribunal is required to ascertain and
determine, such decision is ﬁnal until reversed in a direct
proceeding for that purpose. The test of jurisdiction in such
cases is whether the tribunal has power to enter upon the
inquiry, and not whether its conclusion in the course of it is
right or wrong.”

v
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Iowa Homestead Co., supra,
judgment of the United States circuit court was collaterally
attacked because it appeared on its face that the plaintiff and
ome of the defendants were citizens of Iowa, and hence that
hat court appeared to have no jurisdiction of the action.
But Chief Justice Waite, delivering the opinion of the su
preme court, said:
Whether, 1n such a case, the suit could be removed, was a
question for the circuit court to decide when it was called on
If it kept the case when it ought to
to take jurisdiction.
v.

¥

have been remanded, or if it proceeded to adjudicate upon
matters in dispute between two citizens of Iowa when it
ought to have confined itself to those between citizens of
Iowa and citizens of New York, its ﬁnal decree in the suit
could have been reversed, on appeal, as erroneous, but the
decree would not have been a nullity. To determine whether
the suit was removable in whole or in part, or not, was cer
tainly within the power of the circuit court. The decision
of that question was the exercise and the rightful exercise
of jurisdiction, no matter whether in favor of or against
taking the cause.”
In Evans o. Haefner and Hamilton o. Railroad Co., supra,
judgments of condemnation were collaterally attacked on
the ground that the uses for which the lands were con
It goes without
demned were private and not public uses.
property
cannot
private
be condemned for private
saying that
use; but the courts of Maryland and Missouri held that the
judgments were conclusive of this question on a collateral
attack.
There are three questions that the trial court must deter
mine in every condemnation proceeding, viz.:
First. Has
the plaintiff corporation legal capacity to exercise the power
Second. Is it necessary for the plain
of eminent domain?
tiﬁ' to take the land it seeks to condemn?
Third.
Does it
Every judgment of condemnation
seek it for a public use?
is necessarily an affirmative decision of each of these ques
If either of them is erroneously decided, the judg
tions.
ment may be reversed by a writ of error for that purpose;
but to hold that either of these questions can be tried (le nova
in an action of trespass or of ejectment, or in any other
collateral proceeding, would be counter to our views of jus
tice, of the reason of the case, and of the uniform decisions

F
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and reasonable that one who con
tests the right of a railroad company to take his land should
carry his contest to an end before he takes his award, and
before the railroad company incurs the expense of improving
the property for railroad purposes.
It would work great
injustice and produce much confusion of rights to permit
these judgments of the courts to be disregarded, and the
questions they decide to be retried in collateral actions, in
which judges and juries might have very different views
The
from those which resulted in the original judgments.
referred,
courts,
of
the
to
some
of
which
we
have
decisions
leave no doubt that it was the right and the duty of the
circuit court to hear and determine the very question
whether or not the appellee had the right to exercise the
power of eminent domain before it entered its judgment in
the condemnation proceeding, and that judgment is conclu
sive evidence that it did determine that question in favor of
the appellee. The judgment was strictly within the powers
conferred upon that court by the law of its organization. It
had authority to condemn lands for public use in a proper
case presented to it. If that judgment was erroneous, it
might have been reversed by a writ of error; but the de
cision of the question that is now admitted to be presented
anew was the exercise of jurisdiction, and the rightful ex
ercise of that jurisdiction, and, whether right or wrong, it
cannot be successfully attacked in a collateral proceeding.
\Ve have not failed to examine carefully the authorities
cited by the counsel for the appellant. They are not in con
ﬂict with the views we have expressed. The line of demar
cation which separates the case before us from those cited
by appellant’s counsel is that which marks the limits of the
Judgments
powers of the courts to hear and determine.
within the scope of the power to hear and determine vested
in a court by the law of its organization are not void in the
face of a collateral attack, whether right or wrong, and such
is the judgment before us; but judgments rendered in cases
which are not within the scope of this power are nullities.
The following cases, cited by appellant’s counsel, are illus
trations of this rule: In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 8 Sup.
Ct. 482, in which the police judge of the city of Lincoln,
Neb., brought suit against the mayor and councilmen of that
city, in the federal court, to enjoin them from enforcing a
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judgment against him for misfeasance in olﬁce. It was not
within the power of the federal court, sitting in equity in
any case, or under any circumstances, to determine such
a controversy and to grant the injunction there sought, and
its decree to that effect was therefore held to be a nullity.
Whitehead v. Railroad Co., 28 Ark. 460, in which a judgment
of condemnation of land was rendered under an unconstitu
tional law. As the law which vested the court with the only
power it had to render the judgment was void, the judgment
itself was so. The stream could not rise higher than its
source. Lessee of Hickey '0. Stewart, 3 How. 751, in which
a decree by a state court of chancery establishing the valid
ity of a Spanish grant, over which no power had ever been
conferred upon that court, was held void, and its exercise of
jurisdiction declared to be a mere usurpation of judicial
power. Again, a judgment or decree of a court in excess of
the power to hear and determine granted to it by the law
of its organization may be void for such excess, although
the court may have jurisdiction of the parties and of the
subject-matter.
Illustrations of this rule are Bigelow v.
Forrest, 9 Wall. 339, 351, in which a judgment of condem
nation and sale of the fee to land, when the court was ex
pressly prohibited by act of congress from condemning any
rights outlasting the life of Forrest, was held void for the
excess above the life estate; Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163,
176, in which the statute authorized the punishment of a
criminal by ﬁne or imprisonment, and after the court had
imposed a sentence of ﬁne and imprisonment, and the crim
inal had paid the ﬁne, the trial court vacated its judgment
and sentenced him to imprisonment, and the supreme court
declared the latter judgment void, because it was not within
the power of the court, in any case, to punish the criminal
twice for the same offense; Day 12. Micon, 18 Wall. 156; and
U. S. v. Walke-r, 109 U. S. 258, 266, 3 Sup. Ct. 277. In all
these cases, which are cited by appellant's counsel, the judg
ments or decrees were beyond the powers conferred on the
*
courts by the laws of their organization. "‘ *
The re
sult is that the judgment of condemnation of March 28, I884,
was ﬁnal and conclusive between the parties to it, and could
not be successfully attacked in an action of ejectment. " "‘ "
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This was awcreditorsiliill, brought by the re
spondents against the_appellants.
There were the usual
allegations of the recovery of a judgment at law against the
defendants, Barry and Howland, issuing and return of exe
cution, etc. The answers admitted the existence of the judg
ment at law as alleged, and the issue and return of the
cution thereon. But at the trial the defendants offered evi
dence to show that there was no judgment ever rendered, for
the reason that the record was not signed, as this court held
necessary; (5 Wis., 138) ; the decision having, however, been
made after the answers were put in. This evidence was re
jected, and the principal question argued here by the appel
lant’s counsel, was as to its admissibility. He urged that the
existence of the judgment, which the bill was ﬁled to aid,
was essential to the jurisdiction of the court, and that being
so, the answer of the defendants admitting the judgment did
not deprive them of the right to object to the jurisdiction
for that cause, upon the ground that when the court has no
jurisdiction of the subject-matter consent cannot confer it.
But we think the counsel has misapprehended the applica
applies only where the
tion of this principle; and that
court has no authority to adjudicate upon the subject-matter
at all, and not where its general jurisdiction over
con
ceded; and the only question
whether in‘ the particular
case such facts exist, as bring that case within this general
is

is

it

it

exe/

PAIN!-3,

jurisdiction.

it

a

a

a

a

it

if

court has only civil jurisdiction, and if
should
crime, even though he went before
party for
sentence
nullity;
and consented to be tried, its judgment would be
because the consent could not confer the jurisdiction.
But,
try
him for that crime, and
the court had authority to
guilty, and to
proper indictment he
to sentence him
should plead guilty, he could not afterwards, upon that state
of pleadings, claim the right to prove that he was not guilty.
For although the power of the court to inﬂict the sentence
not upon the ab
depends on the guilt of the party, yet
Thus,

is

it

a

if

_if

.
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stract question of guilt, but whether the guilt has been made
legally apparent in the suit; and, therefore, the party hav
ing admitted it according to an authorized method of pro
ceeding in such suit, he could not, without withdrawing his
plea of guilty, object to the power of the court to render
judgment upon the ground that he was really not guilty.
So, if a court has authority to entertain suits upon promis
sory notes if such a suit is brought, and the existence of the
note averred, if the defendant in his answer admitted it, he
could not upon that pleading be permitted to disprove the
existence of the note.
And, neither in the criminal case supposed, would the
offer to prove innocence, nor in the last, the offer to prove non
existence of the note, raise any question as to the jurisdiction
of the court.
For although in one case guilt, and in the
other, the note, constituted the entire ground of action, and
was essential to authorize a judgment; yet that goes only
to the cause of action, and not to the jurisdiction of the
court.
For if the court has authority to render a judgment
for the cause of action set forth in the complaint, then it has
jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the suit, and whether
the cause of action exists or not, is the very question it is to
try. And this, of course, should then be tried according to
the established rules and methods of proceeding. Where issue
is taken upon a fact, it is to be tried upon the evidence;
where it is admitted by the pleadings, that establishes it for
all the purposes of the suit. If a party, therefore, admits a
cause of action set up against him in a suit before a court
which has lawful authority to render a judgment for that
cause of action; this is not conferring jurisdiction by con
sent upon the court, even though the cause of action does
not exist; but is simply admitting by the pleadings facts
which it would otherwise have been necessary to establish
by evidence. The power of the court to try the case being
conceded, the parties are as much bound by admissions of
facts in pleading, as they would be by a verdict establishing
them upon the trial.
We think these considerations dispose of the question pre
sented here. The general jurisdiction of the circuit courts
Undoubtedly the ex
in suits by creditors’ bill is conceded.
istence of the judgment at law constitutes the whole founda
tion of the right of action in such a suit. But the power of

-
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the court to entertain the suit and give proper relief, if such
judgment is shown, being conceded, the question of its ex
istence becomes a mere question of fact, relating to the cause
of action, and is to be determined either upon the pleadings,
or the evidence, in the same manner and by the same rules
that such questions of fact are determined in all other cases.
The answers, therefore, having admitted the existence of
the judgment, the defendants could not introduce evidence
to disprove it. They were estopped by their pleadings. And
it was not contended that it could be done, except for the
purpose of disproving jurisdiction over the subject-matter.
But we think, as already stated, that such proof would not
raise that question. To determine that, the facts stated in
the complaint must be taken as true. If they then present
a case which authorizes a judgment, the court has juris
It is conceded here that the
diction of the subject-matter.
complaint‘ did present such a case. The very question which
the court had_ jurisdiction to try was whether the cause of
action really existed; and the proof offered tended only to
show that it did not exist, and not to show that the court
had no jurisdiction to determine it, and render a judgment
if it did exist. Disproving a cause of action is not show
ing that the court has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter.
The question therefore, of conferring jurisdiction by consent
was not presented because there was no attempt to submit
to the court any question, which by law it had no authority

to determine.

Suppose the existence of the judgment had been denied
by the answers, and the court had tried the question and
found its existence and rendered judgment; could the judg
ment have been attacked collaterally, on the ground, that
there was no jurisdiction over the subject-matter? Clearly
not; as little could be done, if admitted by the pleading.
But it might be done in either case, if there was no jurisdic
tion of the subject-matter.
We do not think the essential facts constituting the cause
of action here are to be considered jurisdictional facts,
within the rule so frequently and often so rigidly applied to
the action of inferior tribunals and oﬁicers. But, even if they
were, the same result must follow. For even if the exist
ence of the judgment was a jurisdictional fact, it was a fact
triable in that suit. And if triable, it must be tried accord
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ing to established rules.
If denied, it must be proved; if
admitted, it would have been legally ascertained for all the
purposes of the suit.
But
do not mean by this to say that the judgment of
every tribunal as to its own jurisdiction is conclusive.
That
I have always denied.’ If the court decides that it has
the power to try a case and render judgment, which by law
it has not, such decision does not give it the power. Its judg
ment may be questioned anywhere for want of jurisdiction.
But if the tribunal is authorized to act upon a certain state
of facts, and also to try whether the facts exist, then if they
are properly alleged before it, and the parties are legally
notiﬁed and have opportunity to contest them, the ﬁnding of
such a tribunal upon those facts would be the ﬁnding of a
competent tribunal, and ought to be conclusive until reversed
in a direct proceeding.
I think there is a clear distinction between the ﬁnding
of such facts and the decision of a court, that as a matter
of law it has jurisdiction where it has none. Because in the
one case it has authority to try the facts; in the other it has
no authority at all, though it decides that it has.
And
although the authorities upon this subject are full of uncer
tainty, this distinction is recognized, and seems to me to rest
upon solid reasons. It is recognized on Brodhead v. McCo'n
nell, 3 Barb., 187-8; and in Betts 'v. Bagley, 12 Pick., 582-3;
also, in Brittain 22. Kimwrd, 1 Brod. & Bing., 432; which is
In that case the magistrate
the leading case on the subject.
gunpowder
in any boat on the river
jurisdiction
to
seize
has
Under that authority he seized and condemned a
Thames.
a vessel with masts, which was admitted not to be a boat
within the act. He was sued in trespass, but the court held
his ﬁnding, that it was a boat, conclusive.
And this case establishes what I believe to be the true
rule, that although such facts have been treated as jurisdic
tional, yet that, strictly speaking, they are not so. Because,
while conceding the vessel seized was not a boat within the
act, yet they held that the magistrate had jurisdiction; be
cause he had power to decide whether it was a boat or not,
as a part of the offense charged, and this power constituted
All suits and ju
the jurisdiction and not the actual fact.
try
proceedings
questions
are instituted to
of fact, and
dicial
when they are instituted with proper allegations before a

I
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tribunal authorized to try them, it is not sound logic to say
that the jurisdiction of the tribunal depends on the actual
existence of the facts alleged. And the neglect of this dis
tinction, growing out of the great strictness with which the
proceedings of inferior tribunals have been regarded, has
think, given rise to much confusion and inaccuracy, and has
led courts in many instances, to hold facts jurisdictional
which were not so. The true rule would seem to be in all
cases, that where the allegations are so made that the tri
bunal has authority to proceed and try them, and to render
judgment according to its ﬁnding, it has then jurisdiction

I

of

I

the subject-matter.

have thus alluded to what

I

con

ceive to be the true rule in respect to the so called jurisdic
tional facts, for the purpose of showing that even if the ex
istence of the judgment here had been such a fact, it was
still competent for the court below to have tried and deter
mined it conclusively, unless directly reversed, and that
therefore it was triable by the same rules that govern the
trial of all other questions.
When looking into the evidence as to the other matters
alleged, we think it sustains the ﬁnding of the court below.
The judgment is aﬁirmed with costs.’
'lSee Lltz v. Rowe
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the year 1872 the Hope Mutual

l)‘,

Life Insurance Co.,

New York Corporation, reinsured its risks with the New
Jersey Mutual Life Insurance Co. a New Jersey corporation,

a

and the latter company took its assets and assumed its lia
bilities. In 1877 the New Jersey company failed, and Joel
Parker was appointed receiver in New Jersey and ancillary
receiver in New York. Prior to the reinsurance the New
York company had deposited $100,000 in securities with the

V

,
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New York superintendent of insurance as security for policy
holders, and this fund was retained by him. After the ap
pointment of Parker as receiver and ancillary receiver, an
action was commenced in New York by Reynolds and other
policy-holders and stockholders of the New York company
to seize and appropriate to the claims of the plaintiffs the
securities in the fund held by the New York superintendent
of insurance.
The parties defendant were the custodian of
the fund, the New York company, the New Jersey company
and the Receiver.
The prayer of the petition, following the
allegations, asked for no relief other than the appropriation
of the said fund. A decree was made distributing the fund,
and a further judgment was subsequently rendered in the
same action against the New Jersey company and its re
ceiver for $1,010,496.29, ordering this money to be brought
into court and distributed according to the original decree
of the court. When this judgment was presented to the New
Jersey court of chancery, it declined to recognize it as an
adjudication against Stockton, who had become receiver, or
against the assets in his hands.]

*
*
BREWER, J. *
We are of opinion that the decision of the chancery court
of New Jersey, as sustained by the court of errors and
appeals of that state, is correct, and must be aﬂirmed.
The
ﬁrst and obvious reason is that the judgment of the supreme
court of New York was not responsive to the issue presented.
The section of the federal constitution which is invoked by
plaintiffs is section 1 of article 4, which provides that “full
faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public
acts, records, and judicial proceedings‘ of every other state.”
Under that section the full faith and credit demanded is
only that faith and credit which the judicial proceedings had
in the other state in and of themselves require. It does not
demand that a judgment rendered in a court of one state,
without the jurisdiction of the person, shall be recognized
by the courts of another state as valid, or that a judgment
rendered by a court which has jurisdiction of the person, but
which is in no way responsive to the issues tendered by the
pleadings, and is rendered in the actual absence of the de
fendant, must be recognized as valid in the courts of any
*
Take an extreme case:
other state. * *
Given a
jurisdiction,
general
court of
over actions in ejectment as
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complaint in replevin for the
possession of certain speciﬁed property, personal service
upon the defendant, appearance, and answer denying title.
Could (there being no subsequent appearance of the defend
judgment there
ant and no amendment of the complaint)
after rendered in such action for the recovery of the pos
Surely not, even in
session of certain real estate be upheld?
the courts of the same state. If not there, the constitutional
provision quoted gives no greater force to the same record
in another state.
We are not concerned in this case as to the power of
amendment of pleadings lodged in the trial court, or the
effect of any amendment made under such power, for no
amendment was made or asked. And, without amendment
judgment for the recovery of the posses
of the pleadings,
sion of real estate, rendered in an action whose pleadings
claim for the possession of personal property,
disclose only
cannot be sustained, although personal service was made
The invalidity of the judgment de
upon the defendant.
in no manner responsive to the
pends upon the fact that
This idea underlies all
issues tendered by the pleadings.
emphatic
language
litigation.
judgment, to be
Its
is that
conclusive upon the parties to the litigation, must be re
Nor are we concerned
sponsive to the matters controverted.
with the question as to the rule which obtains in
case in
which, while the matter determined was not, in fact, put in
apparent from the record that the
issue by the pleadings,
defeated party was present at the trial and actually litigated
case the proposition so often af-_
that matter. In such
ﬁrmed, that that
to be considered as done which ought to
done,
may
have weight, and the amendment which
been
have
ought to have been made to conform the pleadings to the
Here there
evidence may be treated as having been made.
was no appearance after the ﬁling of the answer, and no par
ticipation in the trial or other proceedings. Whatever may
be the rule where substantial amendments to the complaint
are permitted and made, and the defendant responds thereto,
appears that he takes actual part in the litigation
or where
of the matters determined, the rule is universal that, where
he appears and responds only to the complaint as ﬁled, and
conclusive
made thereto, the judgment
no amendment
determines matters which by the pleadings
only so far as
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are put in issue. And this rule, which determines the con
clusiveness of a judgment rendered in one court of a state,
as to all subsequent inquiries in the courts of the same state,
enters into and limits the constitutional provision quoted, as
to the full faith and credit which must be given in one state
to judgments rendered in the courts of another state.
In the opinion of the court of errors and appeals, the case
of Munday v. Vail, 34 N. J. Law, 418, is cited. In that case,
the proposition stated in the syllabus, and which is fully
sustained by the opinion, is, that “a decree in equity, which
is entirely aside of the issue in the record, is invalid, and
will be treated as a nullity even in a collateral proceeding.”
*
*
*
We quote from the opinion: “The inquiry is, had
the court jurisdiction to the extent claimed?
‘Jurisdiction’
may be deﬁned to be the right to adjudicate concerning the
subject-matter in the given case. To constitute this there
First, the court must have cognizance
are three essentials:
of the class of cases to which the one to be adjudged belongs;
second, the proper parties must be present; and, third, the
point decided must be, in substance and effect, within the
issue. That a court cannot go out of its appointed sphere,
and that its action is void with respect to persons who are
strangers to its proceedings, are propositions established by
A defect in a judgment arising
a multitude of authorities.
from the fact that the matter decided was not embraced
within the issue has not, it would seem, received much ju
dicial consideration.
And yet I cannot doubt that, upon gen
eral principles, such a defect must avoid a judgment.
It is
impossible to concede that because A. and B. are parties to
a suit that a court can decide any matter in which they are
interested, whether such matter be involved in the pending
litigation or not. Persons, by becoming suitors, do not place
themselves for all purposes under the control of the court,
and it is only over these particular interests which they
choose to draw in question that a power of judicial decision
arises." And again: “A judgment upon a matter outside
of the issue must, of necessity, be altogether arbitrary and
unjust, as it concludes a point upon which the parties have
not been heard.
And it is upon this very ground that the
parties have been heard, or have had the opportunity of a
hearing, that the law gives so conclusive an effect to matters
adjudicated.
And this is the principal reason why judg
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ments become estoppels. But records or judgments are not
estoppels with reference to every matter contained in them.
They have such eﬁicacy only with respect to the substance
of the controversy and its essential concomitants.
Thus,
Lord Coke, treating of this doctrine, says: ‘A matter alleged
that is neither traversable nor material shall not estop.' Co.
Lit. 352b. And in a note to the Duchess of Kingst0n’s Case,
2 Smith, Lead. Gas. 435, Baron Comyn is vouched for the
proposition that judgments ‘are conclusive as to nothing
which might not have been in question or were not material.’
For the same doctrine that in order to make a decision con
clusive not only the proper parties must be present, but that
the court must act upon ‘the property according to the rights
that appear’ upon the record, I refer to the authority of Lord
Redesdale.
Giﬁard v. Hort, 1 Schouler & L. 408. See, also,
Gore v. Stackpool, 1 Dow, 30; Colclough v. Sterum, 3 Bligh,
Reference is made in the opinion to the case of Cor
186."
withe v. Griﬂing, 21 Barb. 9, in respect to which the court
in partition, in their distribution,
“Commissioners
said:
embraced land other than that contained in the petition, and

the court conﬁrmed their report, and it was held that such
judgment was a nullity, as the jurisdiction was conﬁned to
the subject-matter set forth and described in .the petition.
In this case the court had jurisdiction in cases of partition,
and the decision was upon the ground that the decree was
void, as it was aside from the issue which the proceedings
This case is very much in point. We regard
presented.”
the views suggested in the quotation from the opinion as
correct and as properly indicating the limits in respect to
which the conclusiveness of a judgment may be invoked in
a subsequent suit inter partes. * * *
This proposition determines this case, for, as has been
shown, the scope and object of the suit in the New York
court was the subjection of the fund in the hands of the
superintendent of the insurance department of that state
to the satisfaction of claims against the New York company.
The cause of action disclosed in the original complaint was
not widened by any amendment; and there was no actual
appearance by the receiver, Parker, or the New Jersey com
No valid
pany, subsequently to the ﬁling of their answer.
judgment could therefore be rendered therein which went
beyond the subjection of this fund to those claims.
Q
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FOCHT.

Court of Oklahoma.
67 Oklahoma,

1918.

275.

Action by Jesse James Welch, a minor, by O. L. Clark, his
guardian, against Adam Focht and others.
Demur
rers to petition sustained, action dismissed, and plaintiff
brings error. Affirmed.
RAINEY, J. "' “
The plaintiff's action was instituted to recover the pos
session of and to quiet the title to a tract of land allotted to
The petition in this action
him as a newborn freedman.
alleged that the title of the several defendants was based
upon or deraigned through a certain pretended guardian’s
deed purporting to have been executed by one C. O. Potter,
as the guardian of the plaintiff, Jesse James Welch, to one
Lee Patrick; that the sale proceedings (which are fully set
out in the petition) were had in the county court of McIn
tosh county; and that these proceedings were absolutely null
and void on account of various alleged errors and irregular
"‘
"
"
ities appear-ing on the face thereof.
The most serious question in the case, and the one most
vigorously insisted upon by the plaintiff, is that the petition
ﬁled in the county court of McIntosh county for the sale
of the land in controversy was insufficient to confer author
ity or jurisdiction upon the county court of McIntosh county,
Okla., to order a sale of the plaintiff's land, in that said
petition for the sale of said land failed to disclose the con
dition of the estate of the ward, and failed to show facts dis
closing the necessity or expediency of the sale; and on ac
count of the alleged insufficiency of the petition it is urged
that the county court of McIntosh county was without juris
diction to make the order of sale, and that all the subsequent
*
*
*
proceedings are therefore null and void.
Before we proceed further, it might be well here to call
attention to the fact that there is quite a conﬂict in the au
thorities on the question as to what constitutes jurisdictional
defects in the proceedings for the sale of a Ward's real estate.
As was observed in Eaves '0. Mullen, 25 Okl. 679, practically
all of the courts agree that there are many defects in the
legal

'
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sale proceedings of a ward’s real estate which will not ren
der the proceedings void. Some courts hold that practically
all of the statutory steps are jurisdictional; but we have
adopted the other rule, and there are many compelling rea
sons, unnecessary to be stated at this time, why we should
not at this late date depart therefrom. But the ﬁling of a
petition praying for a sale of the ward’s land is jurisdic
tional. This is necessary to invoke the jurisdiction of the
court and to set the judicial mind in motion.
We come, then, to the question as to whether the fact that
the petition for the sale defectively alleges the statutory
grounds for a sale, or fails to allege any of the statutory
grounds defeats the jurisdiction of the court on collateral
attack. Let us ﬁrst inquire into the rule obtaining where
the judgments of courts of general jurisdiction, other than
probate courts, are collaterally assailed. We ﬁnd the gen
eral rule obtaining to be that, where the court is one having
power to grant the relief sought and having the parties be
fore it, the fact that the petition defectively states a cause
of action, or states it not at all, does not make the judgment
void on collateral attack, but, on the contrary, if the relief
demanded by the petitioner can be ascertained from the
allegations in the petition, no matter how defective they
are, or how many necessary ones are omitted, the judgment
is not void on collateral attack. Chivers 11. Board of County
Commissioners of Johnston County, 161 Pac. 822, L. R. A.
1917B, 1296; 15 Ruling Case Law, § 339, p. 864; Altman v.
School Dist. N0. 6, 35 Or. 85, 56 Pac. 291, 76 Am. Rep. 468;

Freeman on Judgments, § 116-118.
Judge Van Fleet is recognized by many courts as the best
authority on the subject. In his excellent work on Collateral
Attack, he says:
“There is no connection between jurisdiction and suﬁicient
allegations. In other words, in order to ‘set the judicial
mind in motion,’ or to ‘challenge the attention of the court,’
it is not necessary that any material allegation should be
sufficient in law, or that it should even tend to show facts
that are sufficient. If that were the rule, the absence of any
material allegation would always make the judgment void,
because
tendency

it cannot

be said

that such

a complaint

"

‘

"

has any
When the

to show a cause of action.
allegations are suﬁicient to inform the defendant what relief
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demands, the court having power to grant it
in a proper case, jurisdiction exists, and the defendant must
"'
‘ Allegations immaterial and wholly
"
defend himself.
insufiicient in law may be suﬁicient ‘to set the judicial mind
in motion,’ and to give a wrongful but actual jurisdiction
which will shield the proceedings from collateral attack.”
the plaintiff

1

1

i i

1|

I

1

i i l

In the case of Bryan v. Bauder, 23 Kan. 95, in an opinion
by Chief Justice Horton, the Supreme Court of Kansas held
that whether the petition for the sale was in proper form,
or set forth sufficient facts, were matters for the determina
tion of the probate court in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
We quote from the opinion:
“It is well established that, when a court has jurisdiction
of the subject-matter and of the parties in an action, the
orders and judgment of the court are not void on account
of mere defects in the pleadings or irregularities in the sub
sequent proceedings.
In selling the real estate of decedent,
complete jurisdiction is acquired by ﬁling the petition pray
ing the court to make an order, which, under the statute,
the court is competent to make, and giving the notice of the
time and place of the hearing of the petition.
The ﬁling of a
petition and giving notice to the heirs are jurisdictional
acts. The action of the court is upon the petition.
All par
ties interested, after due notice, are required to come in and
oppose the application.
The statute contemplates a hearing
of parties, and an adjudication upon the subject of the peti
tion.
Whether the petition is in proper form, or sets forth
sufﬁcient facts, are matters for the determination
of the
jurisdiction.
course,
in
court
the exercise of its
Of
if a mere
blank paper is ﬁled as a petition, jurisdiction would not at
tach, because there would be nothing for the court to act
upon; but when a petition contains sufﬁcient matters to chal
lenge the attention of the court as to the merits, and such
a case is thereby presented as authorizes the court to de
liberate and act, although defective in its allegations, the
cause is properly before the court, and jurisdiction is not
wanting. This principle underlies all judicial proceedings.”
*
*
"’
Inasmuch as the sale of plaintiff's land in this
case was within the general class of cases of which the
county court of McIntosh county had jurisdiction, although
the petition was very defective, and although it did not af
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ﬁrmatively allege statutory grounds for the sale, we are of
the opinion that it was suﬁicient to invoke the jurisdiction

of the court, and to call upon it to decide

as to whether

the

order of sale should be entered. Since the court, after a full
hearing, adjudicated the existence of statutory grounds for
the sale, as conclusively appears from the decree, reciting as
it does that the sale of the real estate mentioned in the peti
tion was “necessary for the purpose of properly maintaining,
supporting, and educating the plaintiff, the father of said
minors being wholly unable to do so, and that it was for the
best interest of said ward,” the court in the determination of
said matters, and in entering the decree of sale, was acting
within the jurisdiction conferred upon it by law, and the sub
sequent proceedings based on said order are not void in this
collateral assault made thereon.

I

#

i

i

i i

Q

i

#

$

The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed.

All

the Justices concur.
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Supreme

SWEPSTON.

Court of Tennessee.
127

J.

v.

1918.

Tennessee, 693.

This case is before us upon petition of the
defendant, Swepston, for writs of certiorari to the judgment
of the Court of Civil Appeals. The only question for deter
mination is whether the cause of action asserted by the dec
laration against the defendant is local or transitory.
A brief statement of the case made in the declaration is
that the plaintiffs bought a boundary of timber in Crittenden
county, Ark., from one Maudlin. The contract of purchase
gave the plaintiffs ﬁve years in which to cut and remove the
timber, and also granted to them a right of way over ad
jacent lands of Maudlin, for the purpose of hauling the tim
ber, when cut, over Maud1in’s lands to the railroad. The
plaintiffs entered into the possession of the land and cut
and manufactured timber under their contract for about one
year, when Maudlin leased the lands over which plaintiffs
LANSDEN,
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had acquired the right of Way to the defendant, Swepston.
Maudlin did not expressly reserve plaintiffs’ right of way in
his contract with Swepston, but Swepston knew of plaintiffs’
rights in the premises at the time he made his contract of
lease.
Soon after acquiring the leasehold estate from Maud
lin, Swepston obstructed the roadway over which plaintiffs
had the easement, and by threats of violence maintained the
obstruction and prevented plaintiffs from using the right of
way.
As a result of this interference upon the part of
Swepston, the plaintiffs were unable to cut and remove the
timber purchased from Maudlin. They defaulted in the per
formance of certain contracts for delivery of the timber,
made after the purchase from Maudlin, and as a result of
which they were forced into bankruptcy. They allege that
they are damaged $4,000 in the loss of the timber and the
breach of contracts, and $3,500 resulting from a sacriﬁce
sale of their milling plant in the bankruptcy proceedings.
Swepston was found in Shelby county and sued there upon
the foregoing facts.
He interposed a plea that the cause of
action was local and the venue was in Crittenden county,
Ark., and not in Shelby county, Tenn.
This plea was sus
tained by the trial judge and the suit dismissed, and his judg
ment was reversed by the Court of Civil Appeals and the case
remanded for further proceedings.

i

A true

Q

#

#

#

*
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Q

1

I

statement of the test between a local and a transi
tory action is whether the injury is done to a subject-matter
which, in its nature, could not arise beyond the locality of its
situation, in contradistinction to the subject causing the in
jury. The Supreme Court of Maryland, in Gunther 1). Dran
bauer, 86 Md. 1, 38 Atl. 33, has stated the test as follows:
“There must be a test by which it may be determined
whether a particular cause of action sounding in damages
is local or transitory; and an unerring one inheres in the
nature of the subject of the injury as differing from the
means whereby and the mere place at which the injury was
inﬂicted.
If the subject of the injury be real estate, or an
easement, such as a right of way, whether private or public,
obviously the action must be local, for the reason that the
injury to that particular real estate or easement could not
possibly have arisen anywhere else than where the thing
injured was actually situated.
But if the subject of the

l
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injury

be an individual, then an injury to that individual’s
person, no matter by what means occasioned or where in
ﬂicted, is essentially an injury to a subject not having a
ﬁxed, stationary, immovable location; and an action to re
cover damages therefor would necessarily be transitory.”
The most typical illustration of a local action is an injury
to real estate, and of a transitory action an injury to the
An easement of way is an interest in land. Nun
person.
nelly '0. Iron Co., 94 Tenn. 413, 29 S. W. 361, 28 L. R. A.
421; Long 12. Mayberry, 96 Tenn. 378, 36 S. W. 1040. The
wrong of the defendant which conferred a corresponding
right upon plaintiffs was the obstruction of the way over
which plaintiffs had the right to travel.
But plaintiffs’
right to use the way does not arise in privity of title with
Maudlin, but it exists in privity of contract alone. The
easement claimed by plaintiffs does not exist separately from
their right to remove the timber purchased of Maudlin. It
is merely an appurtenance to the right to cut and remove
the timber and place it upon the market. A thing appurte
nant is “a thing used with and related to or dependent upon
another thing more worthy, and agreeing in its nature and
J
quality with the thing whereunto it is appendant or appur
tenant.” 3 Washburn’s Real Property, 336; Lucas 11. Bishop,
15 Lea, 167, 52 Am. Rep. 364, note; 4 Am. & Eng. Enc. of

Law

&

Pr.

1237.

In this view the tortious conduct of defendant in forcibly

preventing the plaintiffs from enjoying the easement of way
purchased of Maudlin is an injury to the business of plain
tiffs, because their easement of way cannot exist separately
from the purchase, manufacture, and sale of the timber.
While it is true that the right of way which the plaintiffs
aver over the lands of Maudlin is an interest in the lands,
it does not necessarily follow from this postulate that the
conduct of the defendant in preventing the use of the way
was an injury to the land. The right of way is an incorpo
real hereditament which, while appurtenant to the land, does
not exist as a separate right of the plaintiffs. It, of course,
cannot have existence separate from the land, but the right
itself may exist in the plaintiffs by a contract which does
not confer upon them any privity in title with Maudlin to
the land, so as to localize the cause of action for a wrongful
The plaintiffs’ cause of action
interference with its use.
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consists, not alone of the wrongful conduct of defendant, but
it also embraces the rights of plaintiffs, acquired under the
contract with Maudlin, to cut the timber and haul it to mar
ket over Maudlin’s lands; and based upon these rights are
the contracts which plaintiffs made for the sale of the tim
ber, and which were destroyed by the misconduct of the
These facts must be taken together as compos
defendant.
ing the entire rights of the parties, in order to determine
whether the cause of action is local or transitory.
It is well settled that, where an action on covenant broken
is founded on privity of contract between the parties, it is
transitory; but, where it is on privity of estate, it is local
(State v. District Gtmrt, 94 Minn. 370, 102 N. W. 869, 3
Ann. Cas. 726, and cases cited), because the latter covenants
run with the land and the former do not.
This case is very different from a case of injury to real
estate. It is also different from a case of injury to an ease
ment of way existing separately and not appurtenant to the
main thing to which the injury is done through it as an
instrumentality. It would be a reﬁnement beyond the point
of practical justice to hold that the injury which plaintiffs
have suffered was an injury to real estate in Arkansas, for
which they must bring their suit there. The defendant by
his personal act injured the plaintiffs’ business, although he
adopted as a means of doing so the obstruction of a road on
Maudlin’s land. This road did not belong to the plaintiffs,
and their right to use it is not founded on privity of estate
with Maudlin, but is founded solely upon contract. The main
thing of the contract out of which the right grows is not the
easement, but is the timber and the right to remove it and
place it upon the market for sale.
The Court of Civil Appeals is affirmed.
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STATE EX REL. HUNT

v.

GRIMM.

Supreme Court of Missouri.
248

1912.

Missouri, 667.

GRAVES, J. Action in prohibition, purpose of which is to
determine the right of Hon. Hugo Grimm, one of the judges
of the circuit court of the city of St. Louis, to proceed further
with a case pending in his court entitled, Greer Real Estate
& Investment C0., Plaintiﬂ‘, v. Daniel D. Hunt and Mabel R.

Hunt, Defendants. * * *
I. A reading of the petition on ﬁle in the court over which

respondent presides shows beyond doubt that the action is one
to annul and cancel a deed, and thereby remove the apparent
cloud upon the plaintiffs’ alleged title to the real estate de
It is true the prayer of the petition
scribed in the petition.
asks for the impounding of the alleged forged deed, but this
does not change the legal effect of the petition.
Impounding
a deed already of record would avail plaintiff nothing.
But
we need not pursue this further at this point. The only fair
interpretation of the petition and its purpose is as above in
The question, then, is, Has the circuit court of the
dicated.
city of St. Louis jurisdiction to hear and determine a case, the
purpose of which is the cancellation, for alleged fraud. of a
deed to lands in the state of Virginia? This question we dis
cuss next.
II. The petition in respondent’s court states a cause of
action, but
goes further, and states facts which show that
not cognizable by the courts of this
cause
of
action
such
state.
A_court of equity i1LMissonri_has
is

i't

~l

~.
~_

a

is

r

_

_

is

is

a

a

a

in

Virginia. Nor
to lillltls
th£%.te__o_f
has such court any greater right to cancel such dee<T5ecause
fraudulent change in the name of
there is an allegation of
the grantee. Fraud of any kind, if proven, obviates and viti
ates the deed, but the hearing of the question of fraud or no
fraud, forgery or no forgery, must be in a court having juris
diction of the particular case.
We say “forgery or no forgery” because the changing of
not only
fraud, but by
grantee in
deed
the name of
forgery.
deed. is anach
law
real
estate.
Such
cancellation
which affects the title to
the
c_a_1_1_c_el_for
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destruction of a muniment of title.
It involves directly the
title to real estate. The decree annulling the deed acts di
rectly upon the land and the title thereto. A cloud upon the
title as alleged in this petition is “a title or incumbrance ap
parently valid, but in fact invalid." 7 Cyc. 256. In such case
the courts of one state have no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the suit, where it is alleged in the petition that the
land to be affected lies within the jurisdiction of another
state. The jurisdiction of the subject-matter of such action
is in the proper court of the state wherein the land is situ
ated. And this is true notwithstanding the general rule that
This exception to the gen
courts of equity act in personam.
eral rule is recognized by statutes in many states, as well as
by the common law.
In Brown on Jurisdiction, p. 32, it is said: “There are
three classes of actions known to the common law, namely,
personal actions, mixed actions, and real actions, or actions
that are local. Ordinarily, at common law, real actions and
mixed actions are local, and personal actions are transitory.”
And the same author on page 171 further says: “The stat
utes of the different states usually provide that actions shall
be brought in the county or district where the defendants, or
But in general the
some of them, if more than one, reside.
statute provides that real actions, or actions relating to real
property, shall be brought in the county where the property
lies. If the statute does not provide, the action would be local
by common-law rules, which are usually adopted in this coun
try by general consent. In order, therefore, to commence an
action, local by common law, it is necessary to. see that the
statute makes express provision for the trial of it as a transi
tory one. Where the action is local, the venue must be laid in
the county in which the land is situated, unless it is otherwise
provided by statute.”
In Story on Conﬂict of Law (8th Ed.) § 545, p. 760, it is
said: “But even in England the Court of Chancery will not
act directly upon lands in the plantations, so as to affect the
title, or the possession, or the rents and proﬁts thereof."
Without statutory provisions the common-law rule prevents.
In 22 Encyc. of Plead. & Prac. p. 790, it is said: “In the ab
sence of statutory provisions to the contrary, the original di
vision of actions into transitory and local still prevails in the
states of the Union, and the venue of a particular action must

r
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determined by the old common-law rules as to venue.”
The statutes of the different states, like the common law, have
made actions touching the title to real estate local.
Speaking
of such statutes in 22 Encyc. of Plead. & Prac. p. 792, it is
said: “Another common provision as to venue is to the effect
that certain actions must be tried in the county where the sub
ject-matter of the action or some part thereof is situated,
subject in some states to the power of the court to change the
place of trial. Under this division are classed the following
actions: Those which are for the recovery of real estate or
which are brought on account of injuries thereto; actions of
ejectment; for dower; for waste; for partition; to foreclose
mortgages upon real estate, or to foreclose a mortgage upon
chattels real. In short, as it is often expressed in these stat
utes, all actions to recover or to procure a judgment estab
lishing, determining, deﬁning, forfeiting, amending, or other
wise affecting an estate, right, title, lien, or other interest in
real property come under this classiﬁcation, and are to be
tried in the county where the subject-matter of the action or
a part thereof is situated.”
In Missouri the statute has made the action stated in this
petition a local action. Under our statute, the St. Louis cir
cuit court is without jurisdiction to hear and determine an
action affecting the title to real estate, unless such real estate
was within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
This
statute is but expressive of the common-law rule.
It but
makes a local action out of what was already a local action by
the common law; so that, whilst the circuit court of the city
of St. Louis has jurisdiction to hear and determine real ac
tions of the general kind here involved, yet there is a limita
tion to that power; i. e., that the real estate to be affected
must be within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The
petition before the circuit court disclosed that the court had
no jurisdiction, because that disclosed that the real estate
sought to be affected was in the state of Virginia. In oral
argument counsel for respondent admitted that, if title to
real estate was involved, then the respondent was without
jurisdiction. In the face of that admission we can see
nothing left, except to declare that respondent is without
jurisdiction, and the preliminary rule in prohibition should be
made absolute.
Counsel argues that the subject-matter of the suit is the
be
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alleged forged deed, and that as the alleged forged deed was
in the city of St. Louis, and the defendants were found there,
the circuit court had jurisdiction of both the subject-matter
and the person, and therefore the jurisdiction was complete.
The trouble is counsel misconceives his own petition. It is
clearly an action to cancel a deed upon the ground of fraud,
and to thereby remove a cloud upon the title to lands in Vir
ginia. Incidentally it asks for the impounding of the forged
deed, _but what of it?
Standing alone, that allegation would
come to naught, for no court of equity would impound and
hold an alleged forged deed. If the bill only asked for such
relief, it would be without merit. The only thing which could
be of any value to plaintiff is the cancellation, by decree of
court, of this alleged forged deed, so that the cloud occasioned
by its record might be removed. This is what the bill seeks,
but, as stated above, a Missouri court of equity is without
power to grant such relief. It is clear to our minds that the
respondent is without power to hear and determine the cause
now pending before him, and the writ of prohibition should
go. It is so ordered. All concur, except LAMM and KENNISH,
JJ., who dissent in opinion by LAMM, J.
LAMM, J. (dissenting). My vote is to deny the writ and
quash the preliminary rule in prohibition; hence this dissent
from the opinion of my learned Brother GRAVES.
The bill in the equity suit sought to be prohibited is loosely
drawn. It certainly has allegations looking to clearing away
a cloud on the title of the Greer Investment Company to lands
in the state of Virginia. It~may be conceded that an equity
court in this state could not by its decree affect the bare legal
title to land in a sister state, or clear up such title. To that
extent the bill was too broad, too redundant and rambling in
allegation.
If the jurisdiction of a circuit court of St. Louis
depended alone on those allegations, it would have none. But
giving the bill the grace of a liberal construction, as we are
bound to do, it states a cause of action in equity to avoid a
real estate transaction for fraud and to have a certain deed
declared void as a conveyance. If inartiﬁcially drawn, never
theless it was amendable.
We are not ‘to sit to prohibit a
lower court from proceeding
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that were so, we have, indeed, at last em
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True, also, the prayer of the bill in part
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a recorded deed—a vain and useless thing—for the mischief
was consummated when the deed was spread of record. But
the demurrer below could not strike at the mere prayer in the
bill, unless a prayer is demurrable—a proposition strange to
the law. The same prayer asked general relief. The Greer
Investment Company was in St. Louis, Mo., the Hunts were
there, and by due summons the court obtained jurisdiction of
their persons. Now, a court of equity is par excellence a
court of conscience. In administering that ghostly oflice, the
chancellor’s own conscience being moved, he acts directly by
his decree on the consciences of the parties litigant. In eguity
are conclusively-pre
the rule is, I think, that all
consciences,
whatever the real fact maybe, If
sumed to have
the land be in Virginia, and if a Missouri decree cannot act
extraterritorially and by its own vigor affect the bare title
to Virginia land, yet does that fact oust jurisdiction to lay a
burden on the consciences of the Hunts? Or are their con
sciences also in Virginia, where their treasure is, and there
fore not to be bound by a Missouri decree? If their con
sciences are once bound by a decree, are they loosed across the
state line? Hardly; the right doctrine being, once bound al
ways bound. Conceding, therefore, that a decree in St. Louis
could not act in rem or on the bare legal title, yet that does
not oust jurisdiction; for a decree in equity acts in personam.
It, as said, binds their consciences here and in Virginia.
McCune 12. Goodwillie, 204 Mo., loc. cit. 336, 102 S. W. 997,
ante and post. It is familiar doctrine that speciﬁc perform
ance may be decreed in a court of equity in one state, although
the land is situated in another. Olney v. Eaton, 66 Mo., loc.
cit. 567. Now, a decree making void a transfer or rescinding
it for fraud is but the converse of speciﬁc performance, and
if a court of equity, having jurisdiction of the person, may
bind the conscience of such person to speciﬁc performance,
why may not the same court rip up the transaction by oper
ating on the same conscience wherever it may be found? If
the deed had not been recorded, but had been delivered, would
not this action lie in Missouri if the Hunts had been found
there? Or must a wronged grantor lie by until the fraudu
lent grantee puts his deed of record? The mere record of the
deed is not material to the action, nor does such record de
stroy the action.
Statutes of Missouri relating to the bringing of real actions
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and conferring jurisdiction on the circuit court of the county
where the land lies have no bearing here. They affect real
actions in our own state, local in character, and in my opinion
were never intended to affect the general jurisdiction of a
court of equity in such an action as this.
KENNISH, J., concurs in these views.‘
Effect of the Equitable Decree, by W. T.
8See The Extra-territorial
Barbour, 17 Mich. Law Rev. 527; Enforcement of 8. Foreign Equitable
Decree, by Herbert F. Goodrich, 5 Ia. Law Bul. 230, with bibliography
and cases.
Compare Carpenter v. Strange
Matson (1919), 186 Ia. 607.

/~
I

X:

JACOBUS

(1890),

v.

141

U. S. 87, 105;

Matson

v.

COLGATE.

Court of Appeals of New York.

1916.

217 New York, 235.

J

CARDOZO, . This case comes here on a demurrer to a com
plaint. The plaintiff's assignors were the owners of a milling
plant in Kansas.
More than 33 years ago, in August, 1882,
defendant,
according
the
to the averments of the complaint,
“willfully and wantonly” set ﬁre to the plant and destroyed
the mill and its contents. In December, 1913, the owners of
the plant assigned their cause of action to the plaintiff, who
is a resident of this state. In January, 1914, the summons

was served.

The ﬁrst question to be determined is whether the courts of
New York have jurisdiction of the action. For the moment
we lay aside the allegations of injury to the contents of the
mill and view the action as one for injuries to the building
only.
There is no doubt that until 1913 our courts had no
jurisdiction of actions for injuries to real property lying
without the state. Brisbane '0. Penn. R. R. Co., 205 N. Y. 431,
98 N. E. 752, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 274, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 593.
Nothing inconsistent with that view was held in Sentenis v.
Ladew, 140 N. Y. 463, 35 N. E. 650, 37 Am. St. Rep. 569. All
that was there determined was the power, Where other juris
diction fails, to award judgment for the costs. Gaines r. City
of New York, 215 N. Y. 533, 109 N. E. 594. In 1913, how
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ever, the Code of Civil Procedure was amended by adding the
following provision (section 9822.) :
“An action may be maintained in the courts of this state
to recover damages for injuries to real estate situated with
out the state, or for breach of contracts or of covenants relat
ing thereto, whenever such an action could be maintained in
relation to personal property without the state.”
The trespass complained of here occurred in 1882. We
must therefore say whether the statute has any application
to wrongs committed before its passage.
The general rule is that statutes are to be construed as pro
spective only. 27 Halsbury’s Laws of England, p. 159. It
takes a clear expression of the legislative purpose to justify
a retroactive application. Isola v. Weber, 147 N. Y. 329, 41
N. E. 704; O’Reilly v. Utah, N. & C. Stage Co., 87 Hun, 406,
412, 34 N. Y. Supp. 358; Matter of Protestant Episcopal Pub.
School, 58 Barb. 161; United States v. Heth, 3 Cranch, 399,
413, 2 L. Ed. 479. Changes of procedure—i. e., of the form
of remedies-—are said to constitute an exception (Lazarus v.
Met. E. R. Co., 145 N. Y. 581, 40 N. E. 240; Laird 12. Carton,
196 N. Y. 169, 89 N. E. 822, 25 L. R. A. [N. S.] 189), but that
exception does not reach a case where before the statute there
was no remedy whatever (Kelley 12. B. & M. R. R. Co., 135
Mass. 448; Reinhardt v. Fritzsche, 69 Hun, 565, 23 N. Y.
Supp. 958; Shipman '0. Treadwell, 208 N. Y. 404, 415, 102 N.
E. 634; Germania Savings Bank 11. Village of Suspension
Bridge, 159 N. Y. 362, 54 N. E. 33). To supply a remedy
where previously there was none of any kind is to create a
right of action. We need not dwell upon the question whether
before this amendment of the Code, a trespass on foreign
lands was recognized by our law for any purpose as consti
tuting a wrong. Dicey, Conﬂict of Laws (2d Ed.) pp. 31, 32.
If we recognized it as a wrong, we gave no redress for it. If
the injured owner had suffered an impairment of his right,
he had none the less no right of action. He may have had
He had
one under the laws of some other state or country.
none under our laws. His cause of action till then was local,
and limited by the boundaries of the state where the wrong
was done. It has now become transitory, giving rise to “an
ubligatio, which like other obligations follows the person, and
may be enforced wherever the person may be found.” Slater
1;. Mex. Nat. R. R. Co., 194 U. S. 120, 126, 24 Sup. Ct. 581, 48
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L. Ed. 900. When the cause of action was local, it was not in
this jurisdiction a cause of action at all. It became a cause
of action by force of the statute which made it transitory.
A “ ‘cause of action’ is the right to prosecute an action with
effect.”
Patterson v. Patterson, 59 N. Y. 574, 578. 17 Am.
Rep. 384; People err rel. Pells u. Supervisors of Ulster Co., 65
N. Y. 300, 308. “It is not possible for one at the same time
to have a cause of action, and not to have the right to sue.”
Walters v. City of Ottawa, 240 Ill. 259, 263, 88 N. E. 651, 653.
We are reminded by Holland (Jurisprudence [11th Ed.]
p. 318) of the deﬁnition of the Institutes (Lib. IV, tit. VI) :
“Actio autcm nihil aliud est quam jus persequendi judicio
quod sibi debetur.”
In any community which has developed beyond the stage of
self-help, a violated right gives rise to a right of action. Hol
land, supra. The primary or antecedent right may be distin
guished in analysis from the right of action for its infringe
ment, but the normal exercise of the state’s power is through.
the agency of the courts, and hence a right which. when vio
lated, does not create a right of action, is shorn of most of
the incidents that make a legal right of value. Holland (11th
Ed.) p. 318; 1 Cooley on Torts, p. 20. For this reason it is
that statutes which take away every remedy for past wrongs,
as distinguished from statutes which merely change the rem
Parmenter v. State
ed_v, are condemned as unconstitutional.
1035;
Y.,
166,
135
Y.
N.
E.
154,
N.
31
Gilbert v. Acker
of
_N.
mau, 159 N. Y. 118, 53 N. E. 753, 45 L. R. A. 118; Soper v.
Lawrence Bros. C0., 201 U. S. 359, 370, 26 Sup. Ct. 473, 50 L.
Ed. 788; Mulvey u. Boston, 197 Mass. 178, 83 N. E. 402, 14
Ann. Cas. 349. The destruction of every remedy destroys the
By parity of reasoning the grant of a rem
cause of action.
edy where none of any kind was available is equivalent, in
substance, to the creation of a cause of action.
We do not
say that statutes of the latter class are unconstitutional be
To discuss the limits of constitutional
cause retroactive.
power in that regard would lead us far aﬁeld. What we em
phasize now is the distinction between statutes which merely
change the procedure for the enforcement of a right and stat
utes which supply a remedy by which a right for the ﬁrst time
becomes

enforceable.

This distinction was recognized by the House of Lords in
a leading case in which the jurisdiction of the English courts
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in actions for trespass on foreign lands was considered with
the amplest learning. In British South Africa Co. v. Com
panhia de Mocambique, [1893] L. R. A. C. 602, the question

to be determined was the effect of rules of court adopted un
der the Judicature Acts of 1873, which abolished the techni
cal rule of local venue. The holding was that the abrogation
of that rule did not enlarge the jurisdiction in respect of in
juries to foreign lands. The rule of local venue,
was held,
was arule of procedure. It determined the county or section
of the realm in which the suitor must proceed. It assumed
that jurisdiction was present, but deﬁned the manner of its
On the other hand, the rule that, where the matter
exercise.
was local and arose outside the realm, there was no remedy
in the courts of England, was held to be in the fullest sense a
rule of jurisdiction. The House of Lords held that the Judi
cature Acts were not intended to confer upon the owners of
foreign lands “a right of action in this country which they
~would not otherwise have possessed.” Lord Herschell pointed
out in his opinion that “a person whose lands situate in this
right of action in
country were trespassed upon always had
respect of the trespass,” and then he added in words pre
cisely applicable here:
“But in respect of trespass to lands situated abroad there
was no right of action, for an alleged right which the courts
would neither recognize nor enforce did not constitute any
right at all in point of law.”
See, also, Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co., 158 U. S. 105,
15 Sup. Ct. 771, 39 L. Ed. 913; Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.
S. 657, 669, 13 Sup. Ct. 224, 36 L. Ed. 1123.
criticized in the dis
This conception of right of action
senting opinion. We are told that:
“VVhen one without permission enters upon the property of
foreign state, “and wrongfully sets ﬁre to the
another” in
buildings thereon and destroys them,
is evident that
wrong has been done, and that the right of the owner has
been violated, and the owner has a right to redress.”
But that is precisely what the owner did not have until the
you please,
moral
amendment of the statute. He had,
right to redress, but he had no legal right to redress. except
in the state where the wrong was done. To give him a right
to redress in this state was the very purpose of the amend
ment. Even now the wrong has not been transformed into an
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1

our laws. The foreign has not been trans
formed into a domestic tort. Slater v. Mex. National R. R.
Co., 194 U. S. 120, 126, 24 Sup. Ct. 581, 48 L. Ed. 900. The
statute does not “vindicate a pre-existing right” under our
law; it does not redress a pre-existing wrong. IlIh.e_nn'm.a.i:y_
wrong is still the liolation of the law of the state where the
v. Eyre, L. R. (4 Q. B.) 225, 239;
a er o. Mex. National R. R. Co., supra; Wooden 'v. Western
N. Y. & P. R. R. Co., 126 N. Y. 10, 14, 26 N. E. 1050, 13 L. R.
A. 458, 22 Am. St. Rep. 803; Wharton, Confi. Laws, § 478b.
Out of the foreign tort there once grew a right of action ter
ritorial and local which our courts would not enforce. Out of
the same tort there now grows a transitory right of action
which our courts will enforce.
merely been chan e_d_; so far as our law is concerned it has
offense against

~

~PIzilli;>s

1:.-.-;.ra~'.;"‘_‘
aged,B11t1;h“emw'ii_ron_g,_
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deﬁned by the.fQI.6i£n_1ilWhold,.t.here£o.ne.,. that section 982a of the Code is not
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(dissenting).
SEABURY,
The development of the law in relation to local and transi
tory actions shows the nature of the technical rule which
operated to deny redress to one whose real property situated
in another jurisdiction was injured. The common law orig
inally regarded all actions as local. The early rule required
that the venue should be correctly stated. In other words,
the place where the fact in issue arose was required to be
alleged. This rule arose out of the early practice which re
jury of the vicinage who were
case to be tried by
quired
presumed to have knowledge of the facts and the parties.
When there were several issues, and the facts alleged in rela
tion to them arose in different places, each issue would be
tried by a jury summoned from the place in which the facts in
British South Africa
dispute were stated to have arisen.
Company 11. Com-panhia de Mocambique, [1893] L. R. A. C.
602, 617.
When‘juries ceased to be drawn from the place
where the fact took place and from among those who were
supposed to be familiar with the circumstances, “the law be
gan to discriminate between cases in which the truth of the
venue was material and those in which
was not so.”
British South Africa Case, supra, page 618. The discrimina
tion resulted in the distinction between transitory and local
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actions and the rule that the pleader should lay the venue
held to relate only to local actions.
To meet the
diﬁiculty which arose when the local matter occurred out of
the realm the courts invented the ﬁction which permitted the
pleader to lay the venue in any county in England. This ﬁc
tional averment having been made, the courts determined
when the defendant should be permitted to put it in issue.
For some time there was uncertainty whether this ﬁctional
averment was traversable in an action for injuries to foreign
real estate, but the courts ﬁnally concluded that it was trav
ersable in this character of cases because such an action was

truly was

not intended to be protected by the ﬁction. British South Af
rica C0. Case, supra; Livingston T). Jefferson, 1 Brock. 203,
Fed. Cas. No. 8,411; Little v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis
& Omaha Ry. Co., 65 Minn. 48, 50, 67 Minn. 846, 33 L. R. A.
423, 60 Am. St. Rep. 421.

Chief Justice Marshall, in Livingston v. Jefferson, supra,
made it clear that authority was the only support of the rule,
and he frankly said:

“I have not yet discerned a reason, other than a technical
one, which can satisfy my judgment.”
This artiﬁcial and technical rule, working injustice as it
often did, did not escape the efforts of Lord Mansﬁeld to cor
rect it. Thus in Mostyn 1;. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 160, 2 Smith's
L. C. 916, an effort was made to bring the rule of law in ac
cord with reason and justice, but the effort proved futile when
the decision of Lord Mansﬁeld was overruled in Doulson 1.‘.
Matthews (1792) 4 Term. R. 503, which reaffirmed the old
Speaking of this futile effort of Lord Mansﬁeld,
distinction.
Chief Justice Marshall said:

“One of the greatest judges who ever sat on any bench, and

who has done more than any other to remove those technical

"‘.

impediments which grew out of a different state of society,
and too long continued to obstruct the course of substantial
justice, was so struck with the weakness of the distinction,
between taking jurisdiction in cases of contract respecting
lands and of torts committed on the same lands that he at
tempted to abolish it.” Livingston 'v. Jefferson, supra.
In this state the rule which Chief Justice Marshall adopted
with reluctance, solely in deference to authority, became the
It was to remedy this defect in the
settled rule. ' *

~*'|}I}r>
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that the Legislature of this state
*
"‘
enacted section 982a.
The questions certiﬁed to us turn upon whether this statute
is retroactive in its effect. The answer to these questions de
pends in turn upon the answer to the question whether this
section creates a right or prescribes a cause of action or rem
edy for the violation of an existing right. If the statute re
lates to the law of procedure and merely prescribes a remedy,
it is to be given retroactive effect. Lazarus v. Metr. E. R.
Co., 145 N. Y. 581, 40 N. E. 240; Laird 12. Carton, 196 N. Y.
169, 89 N. E. 822, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 189. It is conceded that
the statute creates a remedy and authorizes a cause of action.
The question to be determined is whether it does only this,
or whether, in addition to this, it also creates a right which
did not exist before. When it is read in the light of its his
tory, which has been brieﬂy referred to above, I think that it
is apparent that it merely creates a remedy for an antecedent
right. Nothwithstanding the technical rule relating to the
law of venue that existed before this statute was enacted, the
right of the person whose property was injured to redress
was recognized, although the defect in our law of procedure
precluded the person injured from seeking redress in the
courts of this state. Thus in Serztenis 11. Ladew, 140 N. Y.
463, 465, 35 N. E. 650, 37 Am. St. Rep. 569, it was held that,
notwithstanding the general rule that an action for injuries
to real property must be brought in the forum rei sitae, a
judgment in an action to recover damages for injuries to real
property in another state was neither void nor voidable for
want of jurisdiction, and was binding and conclusive upon
the parties, when the Supreme Court of this state acquires
jurisdiction of the parties, and the defendant appears, an
swers, and goes to trial without objecting to the jurisdiction
of the court. The decision in this case recognizes that the
plaintiff in a case of this character has a right to redress, and
that the rule against entertaining such an action was merely
a requirement of the law of procedure which might be waived
by consent of the parties.
The decision of this court in
Ladew,
supra,
v.
cannot
be disposed of on the theory
Sentemls
that it merely determined as to an award of costs, because in
the opinion of Judge Maynard, in which all the court con _
curred, it is said:
“We entertain no doubt that the Supreme Court had juris

law of procedure,
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diction to render the judgment awarded in this action. Un
has general jurisdiction in law and
der the Constitution
equity, and of the class of actions to which this cause belongs.
It is not prohibited by any statute from entertaining juris
diction of
suit for damages for injuriesA to real property in
another state.”
When one without permission enters upon the property of
another and wrongfully sets ﬁre to the buildings thereon and
destroys them,
wrong has been done, and
is evident that
that the right of the owner has been violated, and the owner
right to redress. It may be that the law of procedure
has
of a particular jurisdiction fails to give remedy when ob
jection is made to the jurisdiction of the court, but the exist
case seems to me to be
ence of the right to redress in such
There is a manifest and important differ
apparent.
new statutory right
statute which creates
ence between
action,” or remedy
a
“cause
of
prescribes
which
a
statute
and
for an existing right. For example, a statute such as Lord
Campbell’s Act, which gave to the widow and next of kin of
a person killed by the wrongful act of another the right to
right
recover damages from the wrongdoer, conferred
also prescribed
which did not exist at common law, and
The present
remedy by which that right might be enforced.
The statute now under consid
different.
statute
existing defect in our law
the
correct
attempted
to
eration
of procedure by providing that “an action may be maintained
case. In so providing
in the courts of this state” in such
did
created a remedy or authorized a cause of action, but
right.
substantive
not create
* " As the statute creates only
remedy or cause, of
principles
well-settled
be given
action,
should under
re
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troactive effect.

W1u.AR1) BARTLETT, C. J., and Hiscocx, COLLIN, and Ho
GAN, JJ., concur with CARDOZO, J. SEABURY, J., reads dissent
ing opinion, and CHASE, J., concurs.
Order reversed, etc.“
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1914.

United States, 354.

LAMAR, J. Wiley George, the defendant in error, was an
engineer employed by the Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad
Company at its steel plant in Jefferson county, Alabama.
While he was under a locomotive repairing the brakes, a de
fective throttle allowed steam to leak into the cylinder, caus
ing the engine to move forward automatically, in consequence
of which he was seriously injured. He brought suit by at
tachment, in the city court of Atlanta, Georgia, founding his
action on § 3910 of the Alabama Code, which makes the mas
ter liable to the employee when the injury is “caused by rea
son of any defect in the condition of the ways, works.
machinery, or plant connected with or used in the business of
the master or employer.”
The defendant ﬁled a plea in abatement in which it was set
out that § 6115 of that Code also provided that “all actions
under § 3910 must be brought in a court of competent juris
diction within the state of Alabama, and not elsewhere.”
The defendant thereupon prayed that the action be abated
because “to continue said case of said statutory cause of ac
tion given by the statutes of Alabama, and restricted by said
statutes to the courts of Alabama, would be a denial so far
as the rights of this defendant are concerned of full faith
and credit to said public acts of the state of Alabama in the
state of Georgia, contrary to the provisions of art. 4, § 1 of
A demurrer to the
the Constitution of the United States.”
judgment for the
and
the
was
sustained
plea in abatement
plaintiff thereafter entered was affirmed by the court of ap
peals. The case was then brought to this court.
The record raises the single question as to whether the full
faith and credit clause of the Constitution prohibited the
courts of Georgia from enforcing a cause of action given by
the Alabama Code, to the servant against the master, for in
juries occasioned by defective machinery, when another sec
tion of the same Code provided that suits to enforce such
liability “must be brought in a court of competent jurisdiction
within the state of Alabama, and not elsewhere.”
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There are many cases where right and remedy are so
united that the right cannot be enforced except in the manner
and before the tribunaldesignated by the act. For the rule
is well settled that “where the provision for the liability is
coupled with a provision for the special remedy, that remedy,
Pollard 'v. Bailey, 20
and that alone, must be employed.”
Wall. 527, 22 L. ed. 378; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. 'v. Wal
lace, 223 U. S. 490, 56 L. ed. 522, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 205; Stew
art 1:. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 168 U. S. 445, 42 L. ed. 537, 18
Sup. Ct. Rep. 105; Fourth Nat. Bank '0. Francklyn, 120 U. S.
753, 30

L.

ed. 828, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 757.

But that rule has no application to a case arising under the
Alabama Code relating to suits for injuries caused by defec
For, whether the statute be treated as pro
tive machinery.
hibiting certain defenses, as removing common-law restric
tions, or as imposing upon the master a new and larger
liability, it is in either event evident that the place of bring
ing the suit is not part of the cause of action,—the right and
the remedy are not so inseparably united as to make the right
dependent upon its being enforced in a particular tribunal.
The cause of action is transitory, and like any other transi
tory action can be enforced “in any court of competent juris
diction within the state of Alabama * "' *.” But the owner
of the defective machinery causing the injury may have re
moved from the state, and it would be a deprivation of a ﬁxed
right if the plaintiff could not sue the defendant in Alabama
because he had left the state, nor sue him where the defend
ant or his property could be found because the statute did not
permit a suit elsewhere than in Alabama. The injured plain
tiff may likewise have moved from Alabama, and for that, or
other, reason may have found it to his interest to bring suit
by attachment or in personam in a state other than where the

injury

was inﬂicted.
The courts of the sister state, trying the case, would be
bound to give full faith and credit to all those substantial
provisions of the statute which inhered in the cause of action,
or which name conditions on which the right to sue depend.
cannot create
13ut_Y.enue is no
transitory
cause of action and at the same time destroy the
a
right to sue on that transitory cause of action in any court
having jurisdiction. That jurisdiction is to be determined by
the law of the court's creation, and cannot be defeated by the

p~state
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operation of a statute of another state, even
though it created the right of action.
The case here is controlled by the decision of this court in
Atchison, T. &- S. F. R. C0. 1:. Sowers, 213 U. S. 55, 70. ‘ " ‘
It is claimed, however, that the decision in the S0lt‘€7'8 Case
is not in point because the plaintiff was there seeking to en
force a common-law liability, while here he is asserting a new
“
"
and statutory cause of action.
The decision in the Sowers Case, however, was not put upon
the fact that the suit was based on a common-law liability.
The court there announced the general rule that a transitory
cause of action can be maintained
in another state even
though the statute creating the cause of action provides that
the action must be brought in local domestic courts.
In the present case the Georgia court gave full faith and
credit to the Alabama act and its judgment is affirmed.
HOLMES, ., dissents.1°

extraterritorial

'

J

note in L. R. A. 1916D

§:.

1° See

GILLEN

v.

68S.

ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
137

CO.

1910.

Kentucky, 375.

a

a

a

HOBs0N, J. Cora L. Gillen brought this suit in the Mc
Cracken circuit court against the Illinois Central Railroad
Company.
She alleged in her petition that in September and
October of 1908 the defendant negligently permitted combust
ible material to be upon its track and right of way, and thus
started
ﬁre which spread upon certain lands owned by her
adjoining the right of way, destroying her fences and timber,
to her damage in the sum of $800. The petition was ﬁled on
April 24, 1909. On May 18th the defendant ﬁled answer,
which was
traverse of the petition.
On May 27th the
plaintiff ﬁled an amended petition charging that the defendant
negligently failed to have its engines equipped with proper
spark arresters and negligently operated its engines.
The
defendant thereupon asked
continuance of the case at the
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plaintiff's cost which was ordered.

At the next term of the
court, the defendant offered to confess judgment for $165,
which was refused.

A jury

was then called and the trial
was begun. A number of witnesses were examined on behalf
of the plaintiff, and, it appearing from the evidence that no
part of the land lay in McCracken county, the defendant ten
dered an amended answer pleading this fact. The court al
lowed the amended answer to be ﬁled, and thereupon dis
missed the action without prejudice for want of jurisdiction.
The plaintiff appeals.
Section 62 of the Civil Code of Practice is in these words:
“Actions must be brought in the county in which the subject
of the action, or some part thereof, is situated—-(1) For the
recovery of real property, or of an estate or interest therein.
(2) For the partition of real property except as is provided
in section 66. (3) For the sale of real property under title
10, chapter 14, or under a mortgage, lien or other encum
brance or charge, except for debts of a decedent.
(4) For an
injury to real property.”
The ground of the court's ruling is that the action is for an
injury to real property; and therefore, under this section, the
"‘
*
"‘
i\IcCracken circuit court is without jurisdiction.
It is also insisted for the plaintiff that the objection to the
jurisdiction of the McCracken circuit court in the case was
waived by the defendant answering to the merits, and going
into the trial without making the question. A determination
of this matter turns on the proper construction of the pro
visions of the Code when read in connection with the statutes
regulating the jurisdiction of courts. * * "'
In Johnson v. Johnson, 12 Bush, 485, the court had before
it an action for divorce not brought in the right county, as
required by section 76; but no objection was made until after
the proof was taken and the case was submitted. It was held
that the objection was waived. This ruling was followed in
Tudor v. Tudor, 101 Ky. 530, 41 S. W. 768, 19 Ky. Law Rep.
747. In Norton 11. Marksberry, 9 Ky. Law Rep. 424, the court
had before it a judgment in an action for the distribution of a
decedent's estate, which it was urged had not been brought
in the proper county as required by section 66. The judgment
was held valid. The court said: “As before stated, the Grant
circuit court had general jurisdiction of the subject of the
actions, and if Hannah Norton, as administratrix, and the
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children, had the right to have said actions localized. as a
personal right, under the provisions of the Code, they cer
tainly had the right to waive and did waive that right by ap
pearing, without objection and defending the actions upon
their merits, and seeking personal relief by cross-actions.
Therefore the judgments, rendered in these actions, are
.
valid.”
A like question has often arisen where actions against a
carrier under section 73, or against a corporation under sec
tion 72, were brought in the wrong county; and it has been
uniformly held that the objection was waived by answer to
C., O. & S. W. R. Co. 'v. Heath, 87 Ky. 659, 9 S.
the merits.
W. 832, 10 Ky. Law Rep. 646; I. C. R. R. C0. v. Glover. 71 S.
W. 630, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 1447; Royer Wheel C0. v. Dunbar,
" "‘
"
76 S. W. 366, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 746.
The Supreme Court of Texas, in De La Vega v. League, 64
Tex. 214, under a statute similar to section 62 of the Code.
had before it the question whether an objection of this sort
Disposing of it, the
was waived by a trial on the merits.
“Every
district
court
in
the
state has cognizance
court said:
of such suits. The requirement as to the county in which the
suit may be brought is a mere personal privilege granted to
the parties, which may be waived like any other privilege of
this character.”
In Blackford '0. Lehligh Valley Railway Company, 53 N.
J. Law, 56, 20 Atl. 735, the court had before it an action
brought in the wrong county for an injury to land, where no
objection was made until a trial on the merits. The objection
The same conclusion was reached in
was held waived.
Pennsylvania. Magee 1;. Penn., etc., R. R. C0., 13 Pa. Super.

Ct. 187.
In Gay, etc., 'v. Brierﬁeld Coal & Iron C0., 94 Ala. 303, 11
South. 353, 16 L. R. A. 564, 33 Am. St. Rep. 122, an action
was brought to foreclose a mortgage on land in a county in
which the land did not lie. The defendant appeared and con
sented to a change of venue. It was held that he thus waived
his objection to the action having been brought in the wrong
In Snyder 11. Pike, 30 Utah, 102, 83 Pac. 692, and
county.
Burton v. Graham, 36 Colo. 199, 84 Pac. 978, it was held that
the defendant waived his objection, that an action was not
brought in the proper county to enforce a lien on land, by
appearing and defending. In Lyon v. Waggoner, 37 Tex. Civ.
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W. 46, the venue was changed by consent, and
it was held that the plaintiff was not thereafter entitled to
have the action transferred to the county in which the land
lay. Q # I
The purpose of sections 62-77 of the Code is not to regulate
the jurisdiction of courts.
The Code of Practice does not
treat of the jurisdiction of courts or attempt to regulate it.
It simply regulates the procedure in civil actions. The pur
pose of these sections of the Code, as shown in the title, is to
regulate the county in which the action may be brought; or,
in other words, the venue of actions. If an action under any
of these sections for the recovery of money within the juris
diction of the court is not brought in the proper county, it
may be dismissed if the objection is properly taken; but, if
the defendant does not object to the venue, the matter is
'
waived.
For these reasons, we conclude that the McCracken circuit
court was not without jurisdiction of the subject of the action,
and that the objection to the venue of the action had been
waived.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for further pro
ceedings consistent herewith.“
205, 83 S.

11 Accord:
Miller v. Kern County Land Co. (1901), 134 Cal. 586;
Fletcher v. Stowell (1891), 17 Colo. 94; Smith v. Barr (1899), 76 Minn.
513. notwithstanding a statute which declared that courts in other
counties “shall have no jurisdiction of said action"; Stark v. Ratcliff
(1904), 111 Ill. 75; Cole v. Potter (1884), 135 Mich. 1; Wolit v. McGaugh
'
(1912). 175 Ala. 299.
regulating
however,
the statutes
venue have been held
In some states.
Jacks v. Moore (1878),
to be jurisdictional and not subject to waiver:
33 Ark. 31; Orcutt v. Hanson (1887), 71 Ia. 514; Loeb v. Mathis (1871),

37

Ind.

306

Local venue has been practically abolished in England. The English
rule on venue is as follows: “Order 36, Rule 10. There shall be no local
venue for the trial of any action, except where otherwise provided by
Statute. but in every action in every division the place of trial shall be
ﬁxed by the Court or a Judge. In ﬁxing the place for the trial of any
action, cause, issue or matter, the court or judge shall have regard to
the convenience of the parties and their witnesses and the date at which
the trial can -take place, and when a view may be desirable the locality
of the object to be viewed; and to the other circumstances of the case,
including (inter alia) the wishes of and expense to the parties, the
relative facilities for trial in Middlesex or at the assizes and the burden
imposed on jurors."
in Ontario the plaintiff is required, in his statement of claim, to name
Where the
the place at which he proposes that the action shall be tried.
cause of action arose and the parties all reside in the same county, he
must name the county town of that county, and in actions for posses
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sion of land he shall name the county town in the county where the
The action shall he tried at the place named unless
land is situated.
otherwise ordered upon the application of either party.
Such applica
tion must show that the balance of convenience is against the place
named by the plaintiff.
Ontario/Rule 245, and notes.
Compare the elaborate American statutes prescribing in detail where
the various kinds of actions shall be commenced and tried, such as
Michigan, C. L. 1915, Sec. 12340.
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COFRODE

ax)?

Supreme

ovER TI-IE PERSON.

v.

CIRCUIT JUDGE.

Court of Michigan.
79

.

1890.

Michigan, 382.

Relators applied for mandamus to vacate an order strik
ing a case from the trial docket.
CHAMPLIN, C. J. On the 7th day of December, 1889, the
relators commenced suit in the circuit court for the county
of Wayne by ﬁling a declaration against Walston H. Brown,
Columbus R. Cummings, Samuel Thomas, and William B.
Howard. * * "‘ The circuit judge on January 13, 1890, of
his own_ motion made an order striking the cause from the
docket on the ground that all the parties to the suit were non
residents.

*

*

i

“‘

The plzgtiffs are both residents ,of_ the state of Pennsyl
Threeﬂof the defendants are residents of New York;
vania.
T
Tine, of Illinois.
‘__The controversy respecting which suit is brought arises
wider a contrac1Qg_i)n_i_ld_in_g_ a railroad in this state in’ the
upper peninsula.

*

*

*

The relators pray that a writ of mandamus issue to said
circuit judge, directing him to vacate the above order strik
ing the case from the docket. In showing cause why the
mandamus should not be granted, Judge Gartner sets out
the opinion rendered by him at the time he ordered the case
struck from the docket, as follows:
“* * * The affidavit of counsel "‘ " "' stated:

\
bee. 3]

"

*

83

JURISDICTION

No process ever issued out of this court in said
matter, nor was service had, and it is appa§e:1t_tl1at this
.forum_\_v_hg;j_ei_n_ tolitigate and determine this controversy"i§
by consent of counsel, and selected for conveniéiice.’ * “‘ *”
-"‘

1

x

4--rs i;_£’;1:;__1_5_!/

He summarizes his reasons for striking the cause from
the docket as follows:
“(1) That the said circuit court
has no jurisdiction of the said alleged cause.
(2) That the
consent of parties and their attorneys does not and cannot
confer jurisdiction upon said court, inasmuch as all parties,
both the alleged plaintiffs and the alleged defendants, are
non-residents of this state. (3) That, if jurisdiction can be
conferred by consent of parties and attorneys, it does not
become obligatory upon the court to entertain jurisdiction,
but whether the same shall be entertained or not by the court
is a matter which rests in the sound discretion of the court;
and that public convenience and interest are paramount to
That it is ap
the private convenience of the parties.
(4)
parent from the facts set out that the said alleged suit is
brought into the circuit court for the county of Wayne for
the convenience of the parties and their attorneys only.”
I shall consider these reasons in the order named by the

circuit judge.
As to the jurisdiction
1.

of the circuit court.
The
several circuit courts in this state are courts of general juris
The cause of action stated in the declaration is
diction.
transitory. It is an actiomof asszmipsit, arising out of a con
tract claimed to have been performed in this state; and the
circuit court for the county of Wayne has recognizance of
suits upon contracts like the one sued upon irrespective of
the locality of their origin, provided the parties, by service
of process or otherwise, are before the court. Thompson v.
Association, 52 Mich. 522, 18 N. W. Rep. 247. Were the
parties properly before the court? The suit was not com
me’ "ed by either of the two methods authorized by section
7291, How. St. The petition asserts that the suit was com
menced by the ﬁling of a declaration, (and a copy is attached
to the petition.) In so doing the plaintiffs submitted them
selves to the jurisdiction of the court, as a party to the rec
ord, (People v. McCaffrey, 75 Mich. 115, 42 N. W. Rep. 685;)
and the defendants, by appearing and pleading to the dec

___7_ ___
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county where he could be found, he could not be sued at all.
In that case the plaintiff was
lion-resident of the county
brought,
the
suit
was
and
the defendant was
non
where
resident_of the state. The action was transitory, and we
held the court had complete jurisdiction.
Whether courts ought to take jurisdiction in suits between
foreign country,
aliens, when the cause of action arose in
were,
should be
is not the question in dispute here. If
willing to follow the views expressed by Chief Justice Marsh
Cranch. 240.
In that case
all in Mason v. The Blaireau,
the want of jurisdiction was urged, and in delivering his
opinion he said: “These doubts seem rather founded on the
idea that, upon principles of general policy, this court ought
case entirely between foreigners,
not to take cognizance of
On weighing
than from any positive incapacity to do so.
the considerations drawn from public convenience, those in
a

:__________

it

_____

_

a

it

is

a

is

is

a

\

iby

it

a

it

is

laration, voluntarily submitted themselves likewise to the
jurisdiction of the court.
2.
While
true that no consent of parties can give
court jurisdiction of the subject-matter of
suit which
the court did not possess without such consent,
equally
true that a court can obtain jurisdiction over the person
the consent of such person; andservice of process
always treated as waived by
general appearance in the
cause, and pleading to the merits.
And this
so although
the defendant
a non-resident,
and suable only in
particular place. Thompson v. Association, 52 Mich. 522,
18 N. W. Rep. 247.
There is no claim or pretense that
suit,
this
ﬁctitious
or that
is not brought in good faith,
to determine a genuine controversy, of vital interest to the
parties concerned. Section 7547 of Howell’s Statutes enacts
that issues of fact in actions upon contracts shall be tried in
the county where one of the parties shall reside at the com
mencement of suit, unless for the convenience of parties and
their witnesses, or for the purposes of
fair and impartial
trial, the court shall deem
necessary to order such issues
to be tried in some other designated county. This provision,
however, applies only to residents.
We held in Atkins v.
Borfster, 46 Mich. 553,
N. W. Rep. 850, that the statute
does not apply to non-resident defendants, nor to
resident
plaintiff suing
non-resident defendant, from the necessity
non-resident could not be sued in any
of the case; that, if

I.
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the jurisdiction appear much to overbalance those
against it, and it is the opinion of this court that, whatever
doubts may exist in a case where the jurisdiction may be
objected to, there ought to be none where the parties assent
to it.” In suits between foreigners, brought in our courts,
They
the courts are not obliged to entertain jurisdiction.
may and usually do so upon principles of comity, and seldom
decline, except through a fear that they may not be capable
of doing full and exact justice through a want of knowledge
of the laws of the place where the cause of action arose,
which enter into and make a part of the contract, or affect
In Railway Co. v.
the rights and remedy of the parties.
Miller, 19 Mich. 305, the plaintiff was a resident of Canada,
and brought suit against the railroad company in Wayne
circuit court, in Michigan, for a trespass to his person com
mitted in Canada. The defendant appeared voluntarily. It
was objected that the court erred in taking and exercising
jurisdiction. This court said: “The voluntary appearance
of the defendant below renders any discussion of the sub
ject of the yevenue unnecessary. There can be no doubt that
the locality of the trespass does not of itself oust the juris
diction, where the court has lawfully obtained control over
the parties. But where the parties are not residents of the
United States, and the trespass was committed abroad, the
right of action in our courts can only be claimed as a matter
of comity, and they are not compellable to proceed in such
" " The case of McCormick v. Railroad Co.,
cases."
49 N. Y. 303, was a case where a non-resident of the state of
New York sued a foreign corporation upon a cause of action
which was transitory in its nature, and arose in another
The defendant had appeared voluntarily by attorney.
state.
Mr. Justice Folger said: “We hold that, where the court
has the jurisdiction of the subject-matter or cause of action,
that consent may confer jurisdiction of the person, and that
such consent may be expressed by a foreign corporation by
appearing by attorney and answering generally in the action."
The next reason given by the circuit judge is that if
3.
jurisdiction is conferred by consent it does not become obliga
tory upon the court to entertain jurisdiction. The correctness
of this position must depend upon the right of the plaintiff to
seek redress in the courts of the state. If a party has a right
to plant his suit in a circuit court of this state, the circuit

'
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judge has no discretion to exercise in the matter. He cannot
say to one suitor, “I will retain your suit," and to another,
“I will dismiss it.” It is among the fundamental rights of a
people under one government that they may be secured in
the acquirement, possession, and enjoyment of property, and
for this purpose courts are instituted as part of the organic
law, in which every person shall have his remedy by due pro
cess of law.
It is secured as a privilege to which every
citizen of the United St-ates is entitled.
The redress of
wrong and the means of enforcing contracts are of the great
est consequence to the citizens of every state.
$

$

i i

#

Q

Q

ll

i i

The right to bring suit in the several courts of this state
having jurisdiction is a privilege of every citizen of this
state. Especially is this true with reference to the enforce
A citizen of another state may come into
ment of contracts.
this, and acquire and enjoy property. He may inherit and
transmit property. He may enter into contracts, to the same
extent that a citizen of this state can do so, and in this his
rights are guarantied by the above provision of the consti
tution; and I think that his right to bring suit in this state,
in any case where a citizen of the state may, is also guar
antied and protected by this provision of the constitution.
This right does not depend upon the fact of the defendant’s
having property in this state which can be reached by exe
cution. There are many cases where, in a suit between citi
zens of this state, there can be no property found out of
which to satisfy an execution; nevertheless the plaintiff has
a right to plant his suit, litigate his claims, and obtain judg
Wilson o. Fire-Alarm Co., (Mass.) 20 N. E. Rep.
ment.
318.
4.

The fourth reason set out by the circuit judge affords no
None of the rea
excuse for his declining to hear the case.
sons alleged appear to me to be valid reasons for refusing
to hear the case, or for striking it from the docket. No court
or judge has a lawful right to deny to suitors the privilege
of bringing and prosecuting their suits, upon the ground
that to entertain them will entail expense upon the county.
The parties were rightfully before the circuit court for the
county of Wayne.
The court had full jurisdiction of the
parties and the subject-matter, and the circuit judge was in
error in holding that the court had no jurisdiction, or that

'-Ir":
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it had a discretion whether to entertain the suit or not.

A

mandamus must issue as prayed for, directing Hon. George
Gartner, circuit judge for the county of Wayne, to reinstate
'
said cause upon the calendar of said court.

Monss and GRANT,

JJ
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*

"
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J.

"‘

.,’

concurred.
(dissenting.)
CAMPBELL,
The jurisdiction, in
my view, depends entirely on the policy of the statutes of
Michigan.
Without passing on the point directly,
am in
clined to think that, if the suit had been begun in the statu
tory way, the controversy might be litigated in our courts
somewhere against the parties reached. But the controversy
is fairly presented, not whether our courts can entertain
proceedings between non-residents, but whether this suit
brought at such
way that the Wayne
place and in such
circuit court is legally hound to hear it, and has no option on
the subject. If not legally bound to do so, we have no right
to review its discretion in declining to hear it.
“
When
suit has been so far instituted as to ﬁx
the jurisdiction against any defendant, although the author
usually no obstacle to
ities are not entirely clear, there
waiver of strict procedure by voluntary action under appear
But
have found no support anywhere fdr the doc
ance.
trine that jurisdiction itself can be given in any way or in
any case not provided for by law; and there is no provision
in statute or common law which allows jurisdiction to depend
on the mere will of parties.
When we look at the judiciary laws, we shall ﬁnd them as
precise in their directions as the common-law practice, but
simpliﬁed in details. They provide both where and how suits
shall be begun, and of what the courts shall have cognizance.
It is declared that the circuit courts shall have power, and
shall be their duty, to hear and determine all such matters
It is further
as may be lawfully brought into said courts.”
declared that the rules regulating their practice “shall gov
ern the practice and proceedings in the circuit courts, until
Sec
altered by the supreme court, or by their authority.”
tion 6467.
*

is

is

a

is

a

a

it

‘

‘

impossible to hold that
Under our statutes
jurisdiction
without either process or
any circuit court has
Those are the only methods recog
service of declaration.
pending, no attorney has official au
suit
Until
nized.
actually
client, and when
suit
thority to appear for
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No court
pending no party can answer for any other party.
can be compelled to assume the burden or authority of juris
diction, unless in cases authorized by law. It is not in the
power of private persons, whether citizens or not, to impose
The
duties on courts, except by following the legal rules.
public officers, judicial or otherwise, cannot have duties laid
“
on them by private action.

'

‘“

19 An express waiver 0! service
of process in a suit confers jurisdic
tion over the defendant making such waiver. even though it is made
But a mere admission
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
or acceptance ot the fact of service outside the jurisdiction will not
amount to such a waiver.——Jones v. Merrill (1897), 113 Mich. 433.

()
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RIVER PAPER

~ASHUA
Supreme

CO. v.
CO.

HAMMERMILL PAPER

Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
223 Massachusetts,

1916.

8.

J.

The question is whether, in a contract be
tween a manufacturer and its sales agent, a provision is valid
to the effect that:
“No action at law, equity or chancery shall be instituted
or maintained by the corporation in any court of any state of
the United States or in any Circuit or District Court of the
courts of the United States against the company other than
in the courts of the common pleas of the state of Pennsyl
vania.”
This stipulation occurs in an ordinary commercial contract
between a corporation domiciled in this commonwealth and
another corporation incorporated under the laws of Pennsyl
RUGG,

C.

vania.

It

necessary to review some of the cases.
Nute
v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 6 Gray, 174, was an action upon
a policy of insurance, one stipulation of which, incorporated
in the contract by reference to the by-laws of the company,
was in substance that any “action shall be brought at a
proper court in the county of Essex.” It was held that this
stipulation was not binding, and that an action could be
becomes

P
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brought in any county where the venue properly might be
laid. The general principle on which this decision was made
to rest was that it was not within the province of parties to
enter into an agreement concerning the remedy for a breach
of a contract, which is created and regulated by law. Con
siderations of public policy were adverted to as supporting
the conclusion, but not given decisive weight. Chief Justice
Shaw, in concluding the discussion, said:
“The greatest inconvenience would be in requiring courts
and juries to apply different rules of law to different cases,
in the conduct of suits, in matters relating merely to the
remedy, according to the stipulations of parties in framing
and diversifying their contracts in regard to remedies.”
In Hall 'v. People’s Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 6 Gray, 185, the pro
vision of the contract of insurance was explicit to the effect
that no action should be brought upon the policy except in
the county of Worcester.
Chief Justice Shaw, in giving
the opinion of_the court, after adverting to Nute 12. Hamilton
Mut. Ins. C0. as substantially deciding the question said:
“The court were of opinion that a stipulation in an orig
inal contract, that in case of breach the suit shall be brought
in a particular county, or, in other words, that a suit shall
not be brought in a county in which it is directed by law to
be brought, is not a proper matter of contract.
After a con

tract has

been made and broken, the remedy is regulated

by

law, and of course must be governed by the law of the forum
where the remedy is sought. "' * * It is a well settled
maxim that parties cannot, by their consent, give jurisdic
tion to courts, where the law has not given it; and it seems
to follow, from the same course of reasoning, that parties
cannot take away jurisdiction, where the law has given it.”

I

It

ﬂl

I

#

i

#

3

i i i

was held in Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445, 22
L. Ed. 365, that a statute making it a condition precedent to
a foreign corporation doing business within a state, that it
would not remove suits from state to federal courts, was un
constitutional and a contract to that effect was invalid. It
there was said, at page 451:
“A man may not barter away his life or his freedom, or
his substantial rights. " * “ In a civil case he may sub
mit his particular suit by his own consent to an arbitration,
or to the decision of a single judge. So he may omit to exer
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cise his right to remove his suit to a federal tribunal, as
often as he thinks ﬁt, in each recurring case.
In these as
pects any citizen may no doubt waive the rights to which he
may be entitled.
He cannot, however, bind himself in ad
vance by an agreement, which may be speciﬁcally enforced,
thus to forfeit his _rights at all times and on all occasions,
whenever the case may be presented.”
This point was reaffirmed expressly in Doyle 12. Continen
" "
tal Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 535, 24 L. Ed. 148.
It was held in Benson v. Eastern Building & Loan Ass’n,
174 N. Y. 83, 86, 66 N. E. 627, in substance that parties can
not in the ordinary case by contract deprive courts of compe
tent jurisdiction of their power to adjudicate causes on the
ground that that jurisdiction is prescribed by law and it can
In
not be increased or diminished by agreement of parties.
Mills,
Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass’n v. Cleveland Woolen
82
Fed. 508, at page 510, 27 C. C. A. 212, at 214, it was said
by Lurton, J.:
_
"
" " contained a stipula
“The policy [of insurance]
tion that no suit in law or equity should be brought upon it
except in the Circuit Court of the United States. This pro
vision intended to oust the jurisdiction of all state courts is
clearly invalid. Any stipulation between contracting par
ties distinguishing between the different courts of the coun
try is contrary to public policy and should not be enforced.”

'

1!

Q

i

#

#

#

i

#

Q

i

So far as we are aware, the current of authority (with the
exceptions presently to be noted) is unbroken in support of
the principle laid down in Nate v. Hamilton Mat. Ins. Co., 6
Gray, 174, although that principle is followed by compulsion
of authority and under protest by Judge Hough in United
States Asphalt Reﬁning Co. 11. Trinidad Lake Petroleum C0.
(D. C.) 222 Fed. 1006. There are two of our own cases
where the principle was not applied and which appear to be
exceptions to it. In Daley 1;. People’s Building, Loan & Sar.
Ass’n, 178 Mass. 13, 59 N. E. 452, an action was brought by
a citizen of this commonwealth which involved the construc
tion of a condition contained in his certiﬁcate of membership
in the defendant corporation, to the effect that:
“Any action brought against this association by any
shareholder shall be brought "‘ * * in the county of On
tario. state of New York.”
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was held that this condition of the contract should be
enforced. After stating that it was not meant to overrule
Nute v. Hamilton Mutual Insurance Co., 6 Gray, 174, the
court said:
“Here we are dealing with a New York corporation, most
of whose members would live in New York, and the greater
part of whose dealings and contracts naturally would take
place also in New York. There, we take it from Greve v.
.~Etna Live Stock Ins. Co., 81 Hun, 28 [30 N. Y. Supp. 668],
which was put in evidence, the condition would be an answer
to an attempt to sue in another county. "‘ "‘ *”
It is obvious that the assumption based upon Greve v.
.~7.‘tna Live Stock Ins. Co., 81 Hun, 28, 30 N. Y. Supp. 668,
that such a contract would be valid under the laws of New
York, was an important factor in the reasoning of the court.
The Daley Case was decided in February, 1899. It was held,
however, in Benson 12. Eastern Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 174 N. Y.
83, 86, 66 N. E. 627, decided in March, 1903, that Greve v.
;Etna Live Stock Ins. C0. did not state correctly the law of
New York, and precisely the same condition that was before
this court in Daley v. People's Bldg., Loan & Sav. Ass'n was
If this case
there adjudged to be invalid and unenforceable.
had been decided before the Daley Case, and the law of New
York had been proved, as there declared ﬁnally and con
clusively, instead of the erroneous view put forward in the
decision of the Greve Case by an inferior court, an important
link in the chain of reasoning by which the conclusion in the
Daley Case was reached would have been wanting. The bind
ing force of such a decision is open to question. "‘ ‘ "‘
In Mittenthal v. Mascagni, 183 Mass. 19, 66 N. E. 425, 60
L. R. A. _812, 97 Am. St. Rep. 404, the parties were both
nonresidents. The action was on a contract made in Flor
ence, Italy, \vhere the defendant, a subject of the king of
Italy, had his home and where the plaintiffs, citizens of New
York, elected a domicile by a provision of the contract. It
related to a concert tour through the various states of this
country, and was partly to be performed in Florence, and
contained the provision that the courts of Florence, Italy,
should have exclusive jurisdiction of any difference between
the parties, except that the defendant reserved a right of
action in New York for a payment of his recompense due
under the contract. It was held that under the circumstances
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of hurried travel through many different jurisdictions, it
was reasonable that the parties should ﬁx upon the jurisdic
tion of the domicile of the defendant as the one where dis
putes should be adjusted.
As both the parties were nonresi
dents, they had no standing in the courts of this state as
matter of strict right, but only as matter of comity. " ' '
The Daley and Mittenthal Cases as to the points adjudi
cated, while not extending the doctrine of the Nute Case, do
not overrule it and are not inconsistent with it. All three
of these cases may be treated as stating the law applicable
to the several states of facts presented to the court.
The
Nute Case lays down the general principle. The other two
cases stand as sound upon their several states of facts.
To
extend them to the present case involves overruling the Nute
Case. That case, as has been pointed out, states a general
principle which has been adopted and prevails in all federal
courts by reason of the binding decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, in Home Ins. Co. '0. Morse, 20 Wall.
445, 22 L. Ed. 365; and Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94
U. S. 535, 24 L. Ed. 148. The same rule prevails generally
in all states where the question has arisen. It relates to a
matter as to which uniformity of decision and harmony of
law among the several jurisdictions of this country is de
sirable.
It would be unfortunate if contracts touching a sub
ject of general commercial interest and which may be broadly
operative as to jurisdiction, should be held valid in one state
All these circumstances bring us
and invalid in all others.
to the conclusion that the clause in the contract here in ques
tion is unenforceable and that, therefore, the action can be
'
maintained in the courts of this commonwealth.
The plaintiff's demurrers to the defendant's answer in
abatement and answer in bar must be sustained.
The de
fendant has leave to answer to the merits.
So ordered."
note to this case in L. R. A. 1916D 696.
As to the right of a state, by various devices, to prevent removal of
cases to federal courts by foreign corporations,
see Harrison Y. St. Louis
& San Francisco R. R. Co. (1913), 232 U.‘ S. 318; Herndon v. Chicago,
R. I. & Pac. Ry. Co. (1909), 218 U. S. 135.
18 See
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Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
67 West

1910.

Virginia, 321.
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POFFENBARGER, . The sole question in this cause, namely,
whether Joseph Ramsey, Jr., George J. Gould, and William
E. Guy, non-resident defendants, proceeded against by order
of publication, appeared herein, in the court below, by attor
neys, so as to enable that court to render
personal decree
against them grows out of the operations of what
styled in
an agreement, and popularly known, as “the Little Kanawha
Syndicate,” which agreement
dated December
1901, and
was signed by said Ramsey, Gould, Guy, and others.
That syndicate seems to have been formed for the purpose
of purchasing the Little Kanawha Railroad, large areas of
coal lands, and other properties in this state.
In anticipation of the launching of this enterprise, Mr.
Edward D. Fulton had acquired an option on the Little
Kanawha Railroad as well as the title to, and options upon,
large areas of coal and coal lands and other property in the
Under certain
counties of Braxton, Gilmer, and Lewis.
agreements, and with intent to dispose of the same to the
syndicate, he assigned the option on the railroad, at the
option price, and assigned his coal and coal land options,
and conveyed his coal and coal lands, at certain prices named
in the assignments and deeds, to the St. Louis Union Trust
Company, to hold as trustee for the syndicate.
For some
reason, the syndicate concluded to abandon its plan and sell
failed to carry out its con
all its property. Accordingly,
templated arrangements with Fulton, and he brought this
suit, in the Circuit Court of Braxton county to compel spe
ciﬁc performance of his alleged contract with the syndicate.
8

O

Q

a

On the 1st day of December, 1908, the following order,
general appearance,
relied upon by Fulton as showing
“This day R. W. McMichael and John B.
was entered:
Morrison, attorneys practicing in this court, appeared and
asked the court to permit them to appear specially for
Gould, and William E. Guy,
Joseph Ramsey, Jr., George
as managers of the Little Kanawha Syndicate, and ask

a

J.

.--pt-.v,Qi.|

Sec.

94

TRIAL AND APPELLATE

PRACTICE

[Chap.

1

continuance of this cause for thirty or sixty days to enable
them to prepare their defense, or to determine whether the‘:
would desire to appear generally, and stating that they did
not desire to appear generally for said parties at this time,
but that they desired to move the court to continue the cause
without appearance other than specially for the purposes
of the continuance. The plaintiff, by his counsel, resisted the
said motion to continue the hearing, and thereupon said
counsel for said defendants Ramsey, Gould, and Guy, an
nounced that it was their desire to withdraw and not appear
to the case, and thereupon counsel for plaintiff and while
said counsel for defendants were present, asked that the
cause be submitted for hearing and accordingly the said
“
*
"'
cause was submitted for hearing.”
IF

Ii

i

#

1

I

ii

#

i i

We think the order was nothing more than an inquiry,
addressed to the court, for information as to what could be
done by way of obtaining a postponement of action in the
cause, without submitting to the jurisdiction of the court
for all purposes, or a conditional, not an absolute and un
The motion, as re
qualiﬁed, motion for a continuance.
corded, if it can be regarded as a motion, signiﬁed a desire
for a continuance, if it could be had without a waiver of
service of process upon the defendants, but distinctly de
clared unwillingness to ask or to take a continuance if it
involved such a waiver. It does not say in express terms
that a motion to continue was made.
On the contrary, it
says McMichael and Morrison asked the court to permit
them to appear specially for their clients and ask a continu
ance, to enable them to determine whether they would desire
to appear generally, and stated that they did not desire to
appear generally at that time. It then says counsel for plain
tiff resisted “said motion to continue.” That means the mo
tion or request made. It was not in terms a motion, and.
read in the light of the protest, submitted along with it, it
cannot be regarded as anything more, in substance and ef
fect, than an offer to move for a continuance, if it could be
done without waiving process, accompanied by a declaration
of intent not to move at all, if such action involved waiver,
and an immediate declaration of determination not to say or do
anything more, after having been informed that a motion for
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a continuance, so made and described upon the record, would
be in law a submission to the jurisdiction of the court.

a
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a

"
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party has
No instance can be found in which
impliedly
submission,
bound himself to
been held to have
without having asked or received some relief in the cause
or participated in some step taken therein. Mere presence
in the court room when the case is called, or examination
ﬁled in the clerk's office, is not enough.
of the papers in
Nor could conversation with plaintiff's counsel or the judge
3

of the court, about the case, be regarded as an appearance.
Cyc. 504.
No decision goes that far. Under this text in

it
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a

&

a

it

a

it

a

a

a

&:

a

a

a

a

a

“A.ny action on the part of defendant, except to object to
the jurisdiction, which recognizes the case as in court, will
general appearance,”
long list of decisions is
amount to
cited, but, in every one of them, something was done in the
cause--some affirmative act was done to delay, speed, or de
In every instance the conduct, deemed
fend the cause.
waiver, amounted to more than
mere inquiry or conversa
test,
according
to
late decision of the
about
it.
The
tion
Federal Supreme Court (Merchant's Heat & Light C0. 'v.
Sons, 204 U. S. 286, 27 Sup. Ct. 285), is whether
Claw
the defendant became an actor in the cause. The instances
suit disclosed by
of the assumption of the role of actor in
continu
the federal decisions, are such as the taking of
ance; ﬁling
demurrer to plaintif'f’s pleadings, without lim
iting
plea of
to the question of jurisdiction; ﬁling
intervention, pleading to issue or to the merits in the ﬁrst
instance; or ﬁling sets-oﬂ’, counter-claims or notices of re
coupment.
Broad as is this doctrine of waiver,
does not
defendant.
He may talk even to the
cover all acts done by
court about the merits of the cause without subjecting him
Trust C0. v. Railroad Co.,
self to it. In Citizens’ Saiv.
205 U. S. 46, 27 Sup. Ct. 425, argument upon the merits of
the cause was indulged in, at the hearing upon the suﬂiciency
of the pleas to the jurisdiction, and this was relied upon as
general appearance; but Mr. Justice Harlan,
constituting
too harsh an inter
speaking for the court, said: “This
in
the
court
below.
There was
pretation of what occurred
no motion for the dismissal of the bill for want of equity.
The discussion of the merits was permitted or invited by the
might be informed on that question in
court in order that
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the event it concluded to consider the merits along with the
question of the sufficiency of the pleas to the jurisdiction.
We are satisﬁed that the defendants did not intend to waive
the beneﬁt of their qualiﬁed appearance at the time of ﬁling
"
"‘
the pleas to the jurisdiction.”
These precedents
amply sustain the view that something substantially bene
ﬁcial to the defendant or detrimental to the plaintiff, relating
to or affecting the progress of the cause, asked, done, or ac
cepted by the former, is essential to the establishment of a
waiver of process or service thereof.
There must be some
thing more than a mere pretext for the claim of jurisdiction
over him. He must either enter an appearance, ask some re
lief in the cause, accept some beneﬁt as a step therein or do
something from which the necessary implication of submis
sion to the jurisdiction of the court over his person arises.
“The principle to be extracted from~ the decisions on the
subject as to when a special appearance is converted into a
general one is that, where the defendant appears and asks
some relief which can only be granted on the hypothesis
that the court has jurisdiction of the cause and the person,
it is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court as com
pletely as if he had been regularly served with process,
whether such an appearance, by its terms, be limited to a
special purpose or not.”
2 Ency. Pl. & Pr. 625.
“The ex
pression ‘for any purpose connected with the cause,’ how
ever, is not to be taken as wholly unrestricted in meaning.
The appearance must have some relation to the merits of the
controversy, and the purpose must be to invoke some action
on the part of the court having direct bearing in some way
upon the question of the judgment or decree proper to be
entered.” Bank: 11. Kmxv, 133 Iowa, 443, 446, 109 N. W. 201.
The general principle, upon which we rely, was applied by
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Lowrie v. Castle, 198
Mass. 82, 83 N. E. 1118, under circumstances even more
unfavorable to the defendant than those presented here.
The non-resident defendant in that case, within 10 days after
the return day of the writ, applied to the court for an ex
tension of the time within which he could appear, in order
that he might decide whether to waive the lack of proper
service and voluntarily appear, or to insist upon his rights
and the court allowed such extension.
as a non-resident,
After the expiration of the 10 days, but within the period of

'
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the extension allowed, he moved to dismiss the action, stating
in his motion that he appeared only for the purpose of mov
The appel
ing a dismissal, and the motion was sustained.
late court held it to be within the inherent power of the
trial court to grant such an extension, without prejudice to
the right to except to the jurisdiction, and aﬁirmed the judg
In delivering the opinion of the court,
ment of dismissal.
Hammond, Judge, said: “It is to be borne in mind that this
is not a case where a defendant, upon whom process has been
duly served, and who, therefore, is within the jurisdiction of
the court and liable to default if he does not seasonably
appear, asks for delay. It is a case where a non-resident.
defendant who, for lack of service upon him, is not within
the jurisdiction and cannot be brought within it, fearing
lest the court may regard the service sufficient and default
him, comes into court, and says, in substance, that ~he is in
doubt whether to waive proper service and voluntarily ap
pear, or to insist upon his rights as a non-resident, and ask
for time to decide. Certainly it is a part of the inherent
power in a court to set a time within which the non-resident
must make up his mind and act accordingly, and that was
all the court did. The motions for dismissal were properly
before the court.” Against this express decision of a repu
table and able court, under a state of facts less favorable
to the defendant than those presented here, and other de
cisions, showing that something substantial must be asked
or done by the defendant, relating to or affecting the merits
of the cause, we have nothing but a generalization, founded
upon, and, therefore, to be interpreted by, facts falling far
short of those disclosed here, for the proposition that [a
defendant who makes]" a mere offer to move for a con
tinuance provided it can be done without a waiver of serv
ice, accompanied by his declaration of intention not to appear
generally nor to ask or take such continuance, if it involved
such waiver, and signiﬁcation of his desire and determina
tion to withdraw the request, for nothing but a request had
been made, on being informed that such a motion would be
We feel amply jus
a general appearance, is bound thereby.
upon
reason
and principle,
well
as
authority
as
tiﬁed, upon
in withholding our assent to it, and saying such action did
"‘
*
"'
not constitute a general appearance.
[BRANNON

and Wmnmms,

JJ.,

Aﬂirmed."
dissent.]
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14 There appears to be a misprint in the published
opinion, which is
inclosed
in
by introducing the words
here sought to be corrected
brackets.
15 The question is further discussed at some length in Western
indem
nity Co. v. Rupp (1914), 235 U. S. 261.
_/
The Texas statute by which a special appearance. made solely to
contest the jurisdiction ot'tlie court over the person of the defendant,
is converted into a general appearance and submission to the juriscii-rtion
of the court, does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment which iorhids
a state to deprive any person of lite, liberty or property without due
process of 1aw,—York v. Texas (1890)_, 137 U. S. 15; but such a statute
will not be followed by a federal court sitting in Texas,—Mexican Cen
tral Ry. Co. v. Pinkney (1892), 149 U. S. 194.
In Perrine v. Knights Templar, etc., Indemnity Co. (1904), T1 Neb.
267, it was held that an objection to the jurisdiction of the court over
the subject matter of the action constituted a general appearance.
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CHESAPEAKE
Circuit

&

OHIO RAILWAY co.

Court of Appeals, Seventh

Circuit.

1899.

Federal Reporter, 898; 87 Circuit Court of Appeals, 129.

Before WOODS and JENKINS, Circuit Judges, and BUNN,
District Judge.
BUNN, District Judge. ‘ " ‘ The summons issued by
the Superior Court of Cook county was returned with an
indorsement of service as follows:
“Served this writ on the within-named Chesapeake & Ohio
Railway Company, a corporation, by delivering a copy
thereof to U. L. Truitt, the Northwestern passenger agent
of said corporation, this 12th day of April, 1898. The presi
dent of said corporation not found in my county.
“JAiviEs PEAsE, Sheriff.
“By B. Gilbert, Deputy.”
After this return was made, and the declaration ﬁled, the
defendant proceeded to remove the case to the United States
Circuit Court for the northern district of Illinois, and, when
so removed, entered its special appearance for the purpose
of moving to set aside the return of the summons on the
ground that U. L. Truitt, the person on whom it was served,
was not the defendant’s agent, or a person on whom proper
service of summons could be made. The motion to set aside

F
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was founded upon the affidavits of Ulysses L. Truitt and
H. W. Fuller, the general passenger agent of the defendant,
setting forth that at the time of the service Truitt was in
the employ of the defendant company for the purpose of
inﬂuencing persons who might be desirous of travelling from
Chicago and vicinity to points east of Cincinnati and Lexing
ton to patronize those railway lines leading out of Chicago
that made connections with defendant's road at Cincinnati
and Lexington; that Truitt had no other connection with the
defendant, and had no power or authority from said de
fendant, either express or implied, to make any contract or
rates for transportation over the railway of the defendant,
and that his authority was strictly limited to conveying in
formation concerning existing rates as established by the
officials of the defendant company, and concerning the con
nections and time made and facilities possessed by the de
fendant in and about its passenger traffic, and had no other
authority whatever; that the defendant was a resident of
the state of Virginia, having its principal office at Richmond,
in that state, and was not operating any railway in said
county of Cook, and had no place of business therein.
Upon
these affidavits (no counter affidavits being ﬁled) the court
below, by its order, set aside the service of the summons, to
which ruling the plaintiff duly excepted. "‘ * *
The contention is that the practice adopted to get rid of
the service by motion to quash and set aside was irregular
and unjustiﬁed in law, and that instead of proceeding by
motion, the defendant should have ﬁled a plea in abatement,
and had a trial of the question by a jury. This is an im
portant and radical contention, and the ground upon which
it is sought to support it is that it is the practice in such
cases recognized and established by the Supreme Court of
the state of Illinois. That court ﬁrst made such a ruling in
Railway Co. v. Keep, 22 Ill. 9, and has in numerous decisions
since adhered to it, and it is contended that this court shoul
follow the state practice. But this contention cannot be su
'
ported, either upon reason or authority.
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Under these decisions, it is evident that
reasonable discretion in the federal courts
given case how far they will feel bound to
tice or decisions of the state courts. There

1

the law vests a
to judge in any
follow the prac
can be no doubt
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that the rule upon this question of practice prevailing in
the Illinois state courts is contrary to the general rule on
the subject in this country, as well as in England. There is
no more reason for requiring a plea in abatement and a
jury trial to test the question of a sufficient service of a sum
mons than there would be to require the same proceeding,
including a jury trial in all cases where now a motion is
held to be the proper remedy.
The constitutional right to
a

jury trial obtains whenever there is any question at issue

involving the life, liberty, or property of the citizen.
But
summons,
a motion to quash a service of
or any other process
or order, for insufliciency in the service, involves no such
substantial right. The setting aside of service does not af
Another
fect the writ or the status of the action in court.
service can be made, and the action proceed. If the original
process were exhausted, a new summons could be issued.
If the objection were to the writ itself, a plea in abatement
would be the proper remedy, the office of which is to give the
plaintiff a better writ. 1 Chitty Pl. 446-457. But here the
plaintiff still has his writ. The order only sets aside the
service, as being unwarranted and insufficient in law.
No
right
by
substantial
is affected
the decision. There are many
matters pending in the progress of a case which are daily
determined upon motion that are much more important in
affecting substantial rights than a motion to set aside an
irregular service of process. Take, for instance, the motion
for a new trial upon newly discovered evidence after the
plaintiff has recovered a substantial verdict. The court, in its
discretion, may set aside the verdict upon a motion. Whether
the plaintiff will ever be able to obtain another is uncertain,
and yet no one would think of objecting to trying such a
question before the court upon motion supported and op
posed by affidavits.
The practice in the United States Circuit Court for this
circuit was fairly well established by precedent when this
So that if the defendant had resorted
action was begun.
abatement,
instead of making a motion, he
to a plea in
would have subjected himself to the criticism that he was
departing from the usual practice adopted in such cases.
In Fairbank & Co. v. Cinci1mat2', N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co., su
pra, [9 U. S. App. 212, 4 C. C. A. 403, 54 Fed. 420] a sim
ilar motion was made and heard before Judge Blodgett at
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circuit court without question as to the propriety of the
practice, and an order made quashing the service. Judge
Blodgett delivered an opinion, holding the service insufficient,
which was affirmed by this court, where no question was
made as to the proper practice being by motion.
In Ameri
can Cereal Co. 'v. Eli Pettijohn Cereal Co., 70 Fed. 276, the
same practice was adopted, and the service set aside upon
motion; Judge Showalter delivering an opinion justifying the
practice, and giving good and sufficient reason for it, as fol
the

'

lows:
“The determining consideration is that the matter at issue,
If found
however it may result, will not end the suit.
against the defendant, the defendant is in court and must
plead; if in favor of the defendant, the return of the writ
is vacated or quashed, and the suit remains pending; whereas
a plea, either in abatement or in bar, if made out by proofs,
puts an end to the proceeding. The view that a motion to be
determined upon affidavits is the proper practice in such
cases is sustained by English decisions,”-citing Hemp o.
Warren, 2 Dow]. (N. S.) 758; Preston '0. Lamont, 1 Exch.
Div. 361.
In the last of the above-named English cases, Amphlett,
B., in a concurring opinion, gives the reason for having the
question of service determined summarily upon motion, in
stead of by plea, as follows:
“The decision of the judge at chambers can be contested
on appeal, and, if necessary, in the house of lords.
There
is convenience in this because it is a speedy and inexpensive
mode of determining that question before any expense is
incurred upon the merits of the action, whereas, if the ques
tion may be raised by plea, all the expenses of the action
*
*
"‘
Convenience and justice,
may be thrown away.
L think, require that this question should not be the subject

of

a plea.”

In the state courts in this country, while some
has been made as to the conclusiveness of the sheriff's _re
turn, it has generally been held, that it is only prima facie
true, and that the truth or falsity of the return may be
The rule in
determined upon motion supported by affidavit.
England at the common law was that the sheriff’s return
was conclusive and could not be disputed, and the defend
ant's only remedy was by an action against the sheriff fo
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a false return.
But in this country, where we have so
many different codes of practice, and so many kinds of sub
stituted service, such a rule would be inconvenient, unjust,
Upon examination of a great many
and impracticable.
American cases, we believe the general rule in this coun
try, with some dissenting cases like those in Illinois, to
be this:
That the sheriff's return stands in the ﬁrst instance
subject to be disputed
the affidavit of the sheriff, but
part
by affidavits on the
of the defendant showing to the
satisfaction of the court, upon motion to quash, that the re
turn is not true in point of fact, or, as in the case at bar, is
'nsufficient in law. Carr v. Bank, 16 Wis. 50; Bond v. Wil
son,
Kan. 228; Crosby v. Farmer, 39 Minn. 305, 40 N. W.
71; Walker 11. Lutz, 14 Neb. 274, 15 N. W. 352; Wendell v.
Mugridge, 19 N. H. 109; Stout v. Railroad Co.,
McCrary
Fed. 794; Van Rensselacr ti. Chadwick,
How. Prac.
297; Wallis v. Lott, 15 How. Prac. 567; Watson 1*. Watson,
In this case
Conn. 334; Rowe v. Water Co., 10 Cal. 442.
the sheriff returned that he had made service upon U. L.
Truitt, Northwestern passenger agent of the defendant. If
this return had been true, the service would have been good.
very clear from the affidavits ﬁled that
But
was not
Truitt was not Northwestern passenger agent of the
true.
cer
company, or any other agent, but
mere employe for
tain purpose. The sheriff was mistaken, and there was no
plea in abatement
need to resort to the clumsy method of
and
trial by jury to ascertain this fact.
It has been suggested that, allowing the practice by mo
tion to be correct and preferable, still, in analogy to the
plea in abatement of giving the plaintiff‘
practice under
writ,
the defendant should state in his affidavits
better
on whom the summons may be properly served, or,
there
district,
to state that fact.
be no such person in the
No
rule, and we have searched in
authority
cited for such
precedent to Warrant it.
vain for
There
no
suggestion in any of the adjudicated cases that this doc
trine has any application to
motion to set aside service.
plea in abatement where the objection
It only applies to
is to the writ itself.
The judgment of the circuit
court
affirmed.
WOODS, Circuit Judge (dissenting).
agree that
was
practice
question
to
try
the
proper
of service by affidavits,
a
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think the showing defective because it was not made to
appear that there was in Cook county, or elsewhere in Illi
nois, or the Northern District of Illinois, no agent on whom
but

/.

an effective service could be made. If there is no precedent
the subject, it is a good time to make one. The analogy of
the motion to set aside the return of service to a plea in
The writ issued. as it
abatement of the writ was strong.
was, out of the county court had been exhausted, and, the
service thereof having been set aside, the plaintiff needed a
new or alias writ as well as a new service. “ "‘ *
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WABASH WESTERN RAILWAY

)0,/by Supreme

v.

BROW.

§_

A

3

1896.

u "Q

9,,

Court of the United States.
164

United States, 271.

Joseph Brow commenced suit in the Circuit Court of
Wayne County, Michigan, against the Wabash Western Rail
way to recover the sum of twenty thousand dollars for per
sonal injuries, caused, as he alleged, by defendant’s negli
gence, by the service, September 24, 1892, of a declaration
and notice to appear and plead within twenty days, on Fred
and notice
. Hill, as agent of the company, which declaration
subsequently
ﬁled
in
that
court.
On
the
7th
of
were
October
defendant ﬁled its petition and bond for removal in that
court, and an order accepting said bond and removing the
cause to the Circuit Court of the United States for the East
ern District of Michigan, and directing the transmission of
a transcript of record, was entered.
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The record having been ﬁled in the Circuit Court of the
United States for the Eastern District of Michigan,
motion
to set aside the declaration and rule to plead was made in the
cause in these words and ﬁgures: “And now comes the Wa
bash Western Railway, defendant (appearing specially for
the purpose of this motion), and moves the court, upon the
ﬁlcs and records of the court in this cause, and upon the affi
Hill, ﬁled and served with this motion, to set
davit of Fred
aside the service of the declaration and rule to plead in this
cause, and to dismiss the same for want of jurisdiction of the
.

J
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person of the defendant in the state court from which this
cause was removed, and in this court.” The affidavit was to
the effect that Hill, on September 24, 1892, was the freight
agent of “the Wabash Railroad Company, a corporation
which owns and operates a railroad from Detroit to the Mich
igan state line, and was not an agent of the Wabash Western
Railway, defendant in this suit;” " " "
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FULLER, C. J. This was not a proceeding in rem or quasi
in rem, but a personal action brought in the Circuit Court of
Wayne county, Michigan, against a corporation which was
neither incorporated nor did business, nor had any agent or
property, within the state of Michigan; and service of decla
ration and rule to plead was made on an individual who was
-"';ot, in any respect, an ofﬁcer or agent of the corporation.
The state court, therefore, acquired no jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant by the service. Did the application
for removal amount to such an appearance as conceded juris
diction over the person?
We have already decided that when in a petition for re
moval it is expressed that the defendant appears specially and
for the sole purpose of presenting the petition, the applica
tion cannot be treated as submitting the defendant to the
jurisdiction of the state court for any other purpose. Goldey
v. Morning News, 156 U. S. 518.
The question “how far a petition for removal, in general
terms, without specifying and restricting the purpose of the
defendant's appearance in the state court, might be consid
ered, like a general appearance, as a waiver of any objection
to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the de
fendant,” was not required to be determined, and was, there
fore, reserved; but we think that the line of reasoning in that
case and in the preceding case of Martin v. Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad, 151 U. S. 673, compels the same conclusion on the
question as presented in the case before us.
In Goldey '0. Morning News, Mr. Justice Gray, speaking
for the court, observed: “The theory that a defendant, by
ﬁling in the state court a petition for removal into the Circuit
Court of the United States, necessarily waives the right to
insist that for any reason the state court had not acquired
jurisdiction of his person, is inconsistent with the terms, as
well as with the spirit of the existing act of Congress regu
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lating removals from the court of a State into the Circuit
Court of the United States.
' To use the language of Judge Drummond _ in
Atchison v. Morris, 11 Fed. Rep. 582, we regard it as not open
to doubt that “the party has a right to the opinion of the
Federal court on every question that may arise in the case,
not only in relation to the pleadings and merits, but to the
service of process; and it would be contrary to the manifest
intent of Congress to hold that a party, who has the right to
remove a cause, is foreclosed as to any question which the
Federal court can be called upon, under the law,~to decide.”
1
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Moreover the petition does not invoke the aid of the court
touching relief only grantable in the exercise of jurisdiction
of the person. The statute imposes the duty on the state
court, on the ﬁling of the petition and bond, “to accept such
petition and bond and proceed no further in such suit,” and,
if the cause be removable, an order of the state court denying
ineffectual, for the petitioner may, notwith
the application
standing, ﬁle
copy of the record in the Circuit Court and
that court must proceed in the cause.
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appeared
is conceded that
defendant had stated that
making
application,
the
that
specially for the purpose of
would have been sufficient; and yet when the purpose for
the single
which the applicant comes into the state court
purpose of removing the cause, and what he does has no
is not apparent why he should be
relation to anything else,
his sole purpose;
called on to repeat that this

a

We are of opinion that the ﬁling of a petition for removal
general appearance, but to a special ap
does not amount to

BREWER and PECKHAM,

JJ.,
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pearance only.

dissented."

The Supreme Court ot Illinois, in Greer v. Young (1887), 120 Ill.
184, explains and justiﬂes the common law rule as follows:-—
"Where the objection is founded upon extrinsic facts the matter must
so that an issue may be made thereon, and
be pleaded in abatement,
jury,
like any other issue of fact. If the plaintiff
desired,
by
a
if
tried.
is quod rccuperct.
It is
upon such issue, the judgment
is successful
valuable right to have the issue thus made up and
ihereiore to him
a
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To permit the defendant to try an issue of this kind on affidavit,
tried.
as was done, gives him a decided advantage, for if he fails. his motion
would be simply overruled. and he would still have a right to a trial
To permit a party to thus speculate on the chance of
on the merits.
succeeding on a purely technical ground, without incurring any risk.
to the plaintiff in case of failure. is
and without any compensation
contrary to the spirit of the common law, and is in direct conﬂict with
the decisions of this court."
See also Mayﬂeid v. Barnard (1870), 43 Miss. 270.

7”
65/

NEOSHO VALLEY INVESTMENT CO v CORNELL.
Supreme Court of Kansas.
60 Kansas,

1899.

282.

SMITH, J. On January 15, 1897, judgment was rendered
in the district court of Bourbon county in favor of plaintiffs
below, Carrie A. Cornell and others, against the Neosho Val
ley Investment Company, for the sum of $5665, with interest
at the rate of ten per cent. per annum and costs, declaring
the same to be a ﬁrst lien upon certain real estate located in
Upon the summons
said county, and directing foreclosure.
in the cause was indorsed the following return:
“Received this summons May 17, 1896; executed it by de
livering to the Neosho Valley Investment Company, by
delivering a true and certiﬁed copy of the within summons
to L. M. Bedell, its cashier and treasurer; the president or
other chief officer not found in my county. May 19, 1896.
“J . W. Bennett,
“Sheriff Labette County, Kansas."
The judgment was rendered by default, the investment
company making no appearance. On April 19, 1897, the in
vestment company ﬁled its petition for a new trial of the
foreclosure case, under section 6-06 of chapter 95, General
Statutes of 1897 (Gen. Stat. 1889, § 4671), wherein it at
tacked the service of summons in the cause, and alleged that
L. M. Bedell, mentioned in the return of the sheriff, was not
during the month of May, 1896, nor had he ever been, the
cashier of the company, and that the vice-president, secretary
and treasurer of the company, during the month of May,
1896, had resided in the city of Chetopa, in Labette county,
Kansas.

Sec.

JURISDICTION

3]

107

Coupled with this attack on the service was an allegation
in the petition for a new trial in substance as follows: * * "‘
that the judgment was taken in fraud of the rights of the
" "
company.
[Proceedings under this petition for a new trial were ap
parently dropped, and when the sheriff was about to sell the
land upon which the judgment was a lien, this action was
commenced by a petition alleging the same facts as the peti
tion for a new trial, an injunction being prayed for. Trial
was had and judgment went against the company.]
Our view of this case renders it unnecessary to consider
the questions raised on the sufficiency of the service of the
That question has been put past our considera
summons.
tion by the act of the plaintiff in error. In the petition for a
new trial the investment company was not content with an
attack upon the service of summons only, but sought to im
peach the validity of the judgment on other grounds not jur
This appeal to the court for relief
isdictional in character.
against the judgment, for reasons other than that the court
failed to obtain jurisdiction over the person of the party de
fendant, involved the admission that the judgment was valid,
and the plaintiff in error by this act treated it as such. In
one paragraph of the petition for a new trial it is alleged that
the court was without jurisdiction by reason of a fatal defect
In another paragraph the judgment is at
in the service.
tacked on the ground that there was no consideration for the
note sued on, etc.
In Adolph Cohen '12. C. B. Trowbridge, 6 Kan. 385, it is held
that the ﬁling of a motion to set aside a judgment, based part
ly on lack of jurisdiction and partly on error in the judgment
itself, is a general appearance.
(2 Encycl. Pl. & Pr. 632).
Where a party voluntarily appears in court it is unnecessary
to inquire what, if any, process has been served upon him.
(Carr 1:. Catlin, 13 Kan. 393.) In Mez'.reZl v. Kirkpatrick, 29
Kan. 679, a party ﬁled a demurrer to the petition upon several
grounds, some jurisdictional and some not, claiming that the
court had no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, that
the petition did not state facts constituting any cause of ac
tion, and that several causes of action were improperly
joined.
This demurrer was sustained on the ground that
several causes of action were improperly joined.
Justice
Brewer, speaking for the court, said:

'
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“When served with the summons, he (the defendant) ap
peared and ﬁled a demurrer, which, while it alleged a lack of
jurisdiction, presented also a number of other defenses, and
defenses on the merits. Such plea, by the prior adjudications
of this court, was equivalent to an appearance. A party who
denies the jurisdiction of a court over his person must ﬁrst
present this single question. He may not mingle with his plea
to the jurisdiction other pleas which concede jurisdiction, and
thereafter insist that there was error in overruling his plea
to the jurisdiction.
As heretofore stated, the defendant by
his demurrer raised a number of questions other than those
which were jurisdictional, and invoked the judgment of the
court thereon. By such other pleas he submitted himself and
his rights to the jurisdiction of the court, and can no longer
be heard to say that it had no jurisdiction.”
The plaintiff in error earnestly contends that this petition
for a new trial, being ﬁled after judgment, cannot be con
strued into an entry of appearance in the cause, for the rea
son that the judgment was originally based upon void service
and was wholly inoperative to affect any rights or property
of the defendant below. This contention cannot be sustained
under the authorities.
The case of Life Association v. Lemke,
40 Kan. 142, 19 Pac. 337, is substantially ‘similar in its facts
to the case at bar. There, after judgment, defendant ﬁled a
motion on jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional grounds to
set the judgment aside, and it was held that he entered a gen
eral appearance to the action.
#

#

#
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#
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For the reasons above stated, the judgment of the district
court is affirmed.

»/
OUISVILLE

HOME

TELEPHONE

CO.

V.

ADM’X.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
1.25

BEELER’S

1907.

Kentucky, 366.

This action was instituted by
SPECIAL JUDGE CLAY.
Beeler,
administratrix of her deceased husband, E.
Maggie

F
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C. Beeler, against the Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph
Company and the Louisville Home Telephone Company, to re
cover damages for the death of her husband, which occurred
in Louisville, Jefferson county, Ky., and which is alleged to
have resulted from the joint negligence of the two companies.
In addition to the allegations of negligence, the petition states
that decedent was a resident of Bullitt county, and that each
of the defendants was a common carrier, and passed into
Bullitt county. Summons was served upon the Home Tele
phone Company by delivering a true copy thereof to its presi
dent, and also by delivering copies to parties who were stated
in the return to be agents of said company, residing in Bullitt
' "‘ " The defendant Louisville Home Telephone
county.
Company ﬁled an answer in three paragraphs.
In the ﬁrst
paragraph defendant raised the question of jurisdiction by
setting forth that its residence was in Jefferson county, that
it did not have any oﬂice or agent in Bullitt county, and that
it did not pass into said county. In the second and third
paragraphs defendant, without waiving its objection to the
jurisdiction of the court pleaded to themerits of the case.

I I

1

[The Bullitt Circuit Court held that the plea to the merits
was a waiver of the plea to the jurisdiction; a trial was had,
and verdict and judgment were rendered against the Home
Telephone Company.
From an order overruling its motion

for a new trial the Company appeals.]
At the outset there is presented for our consideration the
question, did the Bullitt circuit court have jurisdiction of the
In passing
appellant, Louisville Home Telephone Company?
upon this point, we should ﬁrst discuss the question whether
or not appellant entered its appearance by ﬁling its answer
‘ "' *
both to the jurisdiction and to the merits.
Among the cases relied upon by appellee is the case of City
of Covington 'v. Limerick, 107 Ky. 680, 19 Ky. Law Rep. 330,
39 S. W. 836, in which the court, after holding that the cir
cuit court undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the person of
“But, in addition to the
the defendant, added the following:
plea of jurisdiction, the answer of the defendant goes to the
merits of the controversy, and is a waiver of any objection
This is
to the jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
the common law doctrine, and was held to be the law in this
State in the case of Baker '0. L. & N. R. R. Co., 4 Bush 623.”
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In the case of Baker v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 4 Bush 623, we
ﬁnd, however, that the defendant ﬁrst answered to the merits
without suggesting any objection to the jurisdiction, and trial
was then had, resulting in a verdict which was set aside and
a new trial ordered.
Next came a hung jury. About a year
and a half thereafter the defendant attempted to plead to the
jurisdiction of the court. The court very properly held that
its appearance had been entered long before.
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Now, in the case under consideration, defense could not
demurrer to the jurisdiction because the petition
stated facts sufficient to show jurisdiction.
Nor could de

be made by

fense be made by motion to quash the summons, because, if
the court had jurisdiction at all, the summons had been
served upon the proper oﬁicer, the president of the corpora
tion.
Under the circumstances, therefore, the only kind of
a defense that could be_made by appellant, Louisville Home
Telephone Company, was by answer.
This method is pro
vided for by section 118, which is as follows: “A party may,
by an answer or other proper pleading, make any of the ob
jections mentioned in section 92, the existence of which is not
shown by the pleadings of his adversary; a failure so to do
is a waiver of any of said objections except that to the juris
An answer
diction of the court of the subject of the action.”
being the only kind of defensive pleading that could be ﬁled,
the question arises, what sort of an answer should be ﬁled?
Should a party be required to ﬁle ﬁrst an answer to the juris
diction, and afterwards an answer to the merits, or should he
There is cer
have the right to ﬁle both at the same time?
tainly no authority in the Code for ﬁling one answer and then
another answer; any answer subsequent to the original an
While in every case, no
swer must be an amended answer.
doubt, the trial court would permit an answer to the merits
to be ﬁled after an answer to the jurisdiction had been passed
upon, yet the right to ﬁle an amended answer has always been
held to be a matter within the sound discretion of the court.
That being the case, would it not be the better practice to
join all defenses in the same answer? There is certainly
nothing in section 118 to the contrary. All that that section
requires is that the party shall not answer to the merits with
out ﬁrst making objection to the jurisdiction of the court.
This view is not without authority to sustain it. Maxwell on
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“At common law
Code Pleading, p. 394, speaks as follows:
pleas must be pleaded in their order; that is, dilatory pleas
must be made and disposed of before a plea in bar could be
determined.
Under the code, however, all the defenses which
a defendant may have are to be pleaded at one time, and in
Therefore, matter in abatement may be joined
one answer.
with a plea to the merits.”
1

i
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The New York court of appeals has taken the same view.
Sweet v. Tuttle, 14 N. Y. 465, we have the following:
“The ﬁrst question is whether a defendant along with other
defenses may set up in his answer the non-joinder of other
parties who ought to have been sued with him. Under the
former practice the non-joinder of defendants could be
pleaded only in abatement, and could not be joined with a plea
in bar; but, under the Code, there is no classiﬁcation of an
swers or defenses corresponding with the distinction be
The distinction is
tween pleas in abatement and in bar.
entirely gone, with the system to which it belongs. The de
fendant now answers but once, and he may set forth as many
defenses as he thinks he has, but must state them separately
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And in the
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of Little v. Harrington, 71 Mo. 390, we ﬁnd
the following: “It is evident from these statutory provisions
that only one answer is contemplated, and this is to contain
whatever defense or defenses the defendant may have, thus
dispensing with the common law rule that a plea in bar
waives all dilatory pleas or pleas not going to the merits.”
case
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In view of the foregoing authorities,

#
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we have
reached the conclusion that a defendant may in one answer
plead both to the jurisdiction and to the merits.
It neces
sarily follows that a plea to the merits that recites that the
defendant does not waive his objection to the jurisdiction of
the court is not a waiver of the plea of the jurisdiction.
We
,
therefore, hold that appellant s answer did not enter its ap-,
A
.
pearance
_"
'

‘~'
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Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial
consistent with this opinion."
iJThe

same practice

obtains

in Michigan under

a.

statute

passed in
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1915, whereby all defenses, in abatement as well as in bar, may be raised
simultaneously by notices given under the general issue, but the former
defenses may be brought up for determination in advance of the trial
C. L. 1915, § 12456.
on tour days notice by either party.
But the principle does not apply where defendant becomes an actor
by ﬁling a counterclaim. This constitutes a general appearance.
Linton
v. Heye (1903), 69 Neb. 450, aiﬂrmed by the Supreme Court of the United
States in 194 U. S. 628.

§

‘Q

FISHER, SONS

29%Supreme

&

co.

v.

onowrnv.

Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
57 West Virginia,

1906.

812.

The defendants moved to quash the
summons. After the motion was overruled and an exception
taken, a plea of non assumpsit was tendered. Judgment for
the plaintiffs. Defendants assign err0r.]
[Action of assumpsit.

__¢.-—-——"

'"'

'4‘ “‘

‘

POFFENBARGER, J. " "' ‘ It has been suggested that, by
tendering the plea of non assumpsit after the motion to quash
had been overruled and making other defenses, the defendants
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, waiving
*
the defect in the writ. "' “
No decision of this court
holds that there is a waiver of a defect in a summons by pro
ceeding to trial after an adverse ruling on a motion to quash
and an exception taken thereto.
Sears v. Starbird, 78 Cal.
225, and Desmond 11. Superior Court, 59 Cal. 274, so hold, but
they are not in accord with the more carefully considered
cases of Lyman '0. Milton, 44 Cal. 630, and Deidesheimer v.
Brown, 8 Cal. 339, neither of which is noticed in the opinion
in the two subsequent inconsistent cases. "‘ * "
Against this doctrine of waiver in cases of defective service
stand the decisions of many states and the high authority of
the Supreme Court of the United States. Harlmess v. Hyde,
98 U. S. 476, holds that “]llegality in the service of process
by which jurisdiction is to be obtained is not waived by the
special appearance of the defendant to move that the service
be set aside: nor after such motion is denied, by his answer
ing to the merits.
Such illegality is considered as waived
only when he, without having insisted upon it, pleads in the
‘ "
lﬁrst instance to the merits.”

'
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He has a perfect right to remain out of court until regular
ly and legally brought in, and, if an attempt is made to bring
him in irregularly, he has a perfect right to object, on the
ground of irregularity, in proper time, and manner. To force
him to waive it, by saying, if he does not do so, he can make
no defense on the merits, is a palpable denial of a legal right.
He must then determine whether he will risk his whole case
on the question of insufficiency of the writ or return, as the
case may be, however full and complete he might be able to
make his defense on the merits, or waive the defect and sub
mit himself to a jurisdiction not lawfully obtained, in order
to prevent his being forever deprived of his defense in case
his objection to the writ or return should prove to be not
A test of the court's jurisdiction could never be
tenable.
made except at great peril, a result of which would be that
no attempt to do so would ever be made in a case in which
defense on the merits could be made. In order to do so it
would be necessary to suffer a judgment by default. then go
back to the same court with a motion to set it aside for in
sufficiency of process, vainly ask the court to reverse itself,
suffer the same adverse ruling, and then, if possible, obtain
a writ of error from this Court and reverse the judgment for
the defect in process alone, and, on failure of that, to be for
For the court to
ever barred of any defense on the merits.
present to a party the alternative of waiving a jurisdictional
defect or giving up his defense, and compel him to choose, is
not to allow a voluntary submission to its jurisdiction, but to
coerce such submission or a relinquishment of the defense on
the merits, however ample and just it may be, and give to the
plaintiff what he is clearly not entitled to—the appearance of
the defendant without process or relinquishment of defense
in that action. How can the action of a court. in arbitrarily
taking from one man a right, trivial and unimportant though
it be, and conferring it upon another, be justiﬁed, either legal
ly or morally? Is the right to stay out of court until legally
brought in worth nothing? Is process a mere idle formality?
If so, why allow a default judgment to be set aside for want
of it? That this will be done all admit, and, in admitting,
confess that the acquisition of jurisdiction by process is a
matter of substance and not of form. To say in the same
breath that a man may not test it without surrendering his
defense to the merits is squarely and ﬂatly inconsistent, con
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tradictory of the admitted nature of the right, and violative
of law in that it forcibly deprives the citizen of a substantial
legal right. To say that the oﬁice of process is to bring the
defendant into court and that, after his appearance, it is
wholly unimportant and may be disregarded, falls far short
of justifying the ruling. His appearance is involuntary. He
must come or risk everything on the question of insufficiency
of the process. If he does not, a judgment by default goes
against him, forever precluding any defense, be it a release,
payment, fraud or what not, unless he can have it set aside
for the defect in the process or some other error. It puts him
The court
under compulsion from the moment of service.
has laid its powerful hand upon him and will render judg
ment against him without a hearing if he does not bring to its
attention the defect in its process and ask to be discharged.
For the court to say, upon such compulsory appearance and
protest against jurisdiction, now that you are here, you must
stay, no matter how you were dragged in, is but bitter mock
ery, utterly inconsistent with the principles of the law, eulo
gized in these days of enlightenment for their justice and
fairness even in those periods in which society was compara
tively crude and barbarous.
.
Ii
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For the foregoing reasons, the judgment must
the summons quashed and the action dismissed,
both in this court and the court below.

be reversed,

with costs
Reversed.

SANDERS, Judge, dissented in part.

CORBETT

v.

PHYSICIANS’ CASUALTY

ASSOCIATION.

_

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
185 Wisconsin,

1908.

505.

Action to recover on an accident insurance policy issued on
*
"‘
"'
The answer stated
the mutual assessment plan.
follows,
in effect:
three defenses, as
(1) The defendant is
a Nebraska corporation which has never complied with the
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laws of this state authorizing service of process upon it by
serving upon the commissioner of insurance and the only
service made was of that character; (2) without waiving the
plea to the j urisdiction'of the court the defendant shows that
it never qualiﬁed to do business in this state and, therefore,
the making of the insurance contract was prohibited by sec.
1978, Stats. (1898), and is not enforceable in the courts of
this state; (3) without waiving any right under the fore
going, the allegations of the complaint as to the assured being
a member in good standing of the association at the time he
was injured are denied. "' * “‘
The plea to the jurisdiction was tried ﬁrst and overruled.
Defendant by its counsel excepted to the ruling. No speciﬁc
objection was made to then proceeding to a trial upon the
merits, which was done. "‘ * “
Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, from
l
which this appeal was taken.
MARSHALL, J. At the threshold in the consideration of this
case is presented the question of whether a defendant can
challenge the jurisdiction of the court in which he is cited
to appear, upon the ground that the summons in the action
was not efficiently served, and failing in that can submit to
a trial upon the merits and in case of an adverse decision can,
on appeal, have the beneﬁt of the objection made at the start.
1

$

Q

As we view the

follow and endeavor to
answer counsel's argument in detail on the jurisdictional
question, because it is ﬁrmly settled in respondent’s favor by
numerous decisions of this court. Lowe v. Stringham, 14
Wis. 222; Grantier v. Rosecrance, 27 Wis. 488; Blackwood p.
Jones, 27 Wis. 498; Anderson v. Coburn, 27 Wis. 558; Ins. Co.
of N. A. '0. Swineford, 28 Wis. 257; Alderson v. White, 32
Wis. 308; Dikeman u. Struck, 76 Wis. 332, 45 N. W. 118.

I

U

case we need not

U

Stringham, supra, " * "‘ the doctrine which
has from the start prevailed here, was thus plainly stated in
these words:
“We think it is also a waiver of such a defect for the party,
after making his objection, to plead a11d go to trial on the
merits. To allow him to do this, would be to give him this
After objecting that he was not properly in
advantage.
court, he could go in, take his chance of a trial on the merits,

In Lowe

1).
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and if it resulted in his favor, insist upon the judgment as
good for his beneﬁt, but if it resulted against him, he could
set it all aside upon the ground that he had never been prop
erly got into court at all. If a party wishes to insist upon the
objection that he is not in court, he must keep out for all pur
poses except to make that objection."
We recognize that there are very respectable authorities to
the contrary of the foregoing, among which are the follow
ing: Harkness 12. Hyde, 98 U. S. 476; Miner v. Francis, 3 N.
D. 549, 58 N. W. 343; 2 Ency. Pl. & Pr. 629, 630, and note 1.
However, it is believed that the great weight of authority, or
at least the better reasoning, is the other way.
$

i

1

Q

I I

I

1

O

U

By the Court-The judgment is affirmed."
Ia See Preserving

L. Rev.

396,

by E. R. Sunderland,
a. Special Appearance,
in which the cases pro and con. are fully set out.
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ELDRED

v.

Mich.

BANK.

>8

/

%.

Supreme Court of the United States.
17 Wallace,

1873.

5./,5.

Error to the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Wis
consin.

“

"

a

"'

*

a

&

*

*

*

*

The Michigan Insurance Bank, on the 14th of
August, 1861, sued Anson Eldred, Elisha Eldred, and Uri
Balcom, in the court of Wayne
Balcom, trading as Eldreds
promissory note for
County, Michigan, as indorsers on
Publication-notice under the laws of Mich
$4,000.
igan was given.
The defendant Anson Eldred, ﬁled
a plea of non-assumpsit, with notice of set-off, December 27th,
1861, and demanded
trial.
On the 22nd of April, 1862, as the record of the case stated,
the cause came on to be heard, and the plea of the defendants
theretofore pleaded by them was withdrawn, and the default
of Elisha Eldred and Uri Balcom entered, and on the 10th day
of May the said default was made absolute. On the 13th of
May, the record continues:
*

1;

5

9

Sec. 3]

JURISDICTION

117

“The plea of the defendant, Ans,oz|.- Eldred, heretofore
pleaded by him, having been withdrawn, and the default of
the defendants, Elisha Eldred and Uri Balcom, having been
duly entered, " * * therefor, it is considered that said
plaintiffs do recover against said defendants their damages
aforesaid, together with their costs aforesaid to be taxed, and
that said plaintiff have execution therefor."
In this state of things the bank brought this, the present
suit, in the court below, on the same note against the same
*
*
"'
Anson Eldred, Elisha Eldred, and Uri Balcom.
Anson Eldred, who alone was served or appeared, pleaded the
general issue; and the case came on for trial. "‘ * "' The
* * "' then offered in evidence the record of the
defendant
above mentioned suit on the same note in the Wayne County
Court:
1st.

*

2nd.

As being

*

1

#

this note in suit.

i

#

#

i

ll

i

a bar to recovery on
$

1|!

*

O

I

I

i
i

l

Q

Q

$

Q

Judgment having gone accordingly for the bank, Anson
Eldred brought the case here on error; the error assigned be
ing the refusal of the court to instruct the jury that the
judgment was a bar.
is

is

a

is

it

a

if

a

a

a

J

MILLER, . It
argued by the counsel of the defendant in
withdrawal
of the plea of Anson Eldred left
error that the
the case as to him as though he had never ﬁled the plea, and
that never having been served with process he was not liable
to the personal judgment of the court.
We do not agree to this proposition. The ﬁling of the plea
was both an appearance and a defense. The case stood for
the time between one term and another with an appearance
plea. The withdrawal of the plea could not have the
and
effect of withdrawing the appearance of the defendant, and
requiring the plaintiff to take steps to bring that defendant
Having with
again within the jurisdiction of the court.
condition to demur, to move to
drawn that plea he was in
dismiss the suit if any reason for that could be found, or to
he chose, either with the other
new and different plea
ﬁle
He was not, by the with
defendants jointly, or for himself.
plea,
out
of
court.
Such
doctrine would be
of
the
drawal
very often, the
very mischievous in cases where, as
party
appearance
the
of
the
ﬁrst and only evidence of
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ﬁling of his plea, answer, or demurrer.
The case might rest
on this for a long period before it was ready for trial when,
if the party could obtain leave of the court to withdraw his
plea (a leave generally granted without objection), he could
thereby withdraw his appearance, the plaintiff is left to begin
rle novo.
We are of opinion that the record of the suit in Michigan
shows a valid personal judgment against Anson Eldred, and
that that judgment was a bar to recovery in the present suit.

I I I I I

U

I I I I

Judgment reversed, but without costs to either party in
this court, and a new trial granted in the Circuit Court."
In Insurance Trust and Agency v. Failing (1903), 66 Kan. 144, the
said:—
“The court has no more right to permit a withdrawal of such appear
ance conferring jurlsdiction, than it would have to set aside service of a
summons regularly made."
But see McArthur v. Leﬂler (1886), 110 Ind. 526, where it was held
that the court had power to allow the withdrawal of a defendant's appear
19

court

ance.

HAMILTON

“\%“.i. C ourt

v.

WRIGHT.

of Appeals of New York.

1868.

87 New York, 502.

This was an action of ejectment, brought in the name of
the appellants [Hamilton and Livingston] and one Gleason,
to recover possession of certain lands in the town of Shand
*
"'
“
aken, Ulster county.
Judgment in favor of the
defendant for his costs, was rendered against all of the plain
tiffs, and was afﬁrmed on appeal to the General Term.
Hamilton and Livingston moved at the Poughkeepsie Spe
cial Term that the judgment against them be vacated, or, in
case Gleason failed to pay the costs, that William Lounsbury,
plaintiffs’ attorney, should pay the judgment, upon the
ground that the use of their names as plaintiffs was unau
thorized and unknown to them. The special Term denied the
motion with costs.
From this order denying the motion,
Hamilton and Livingston appealed to the General Term,

'
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where the order was modiﬁed, directing that the judgment
be in the ﬁrst instance collected, if collectible, of W. S.
Gleason, their co-plaintiff, who caused the action to be
brought, and that the question of the liability of plaintiffs’
attorney to Hamilton and Livingston, in case they are to pay
the judgment, be left open: neither of the parties to have
costs, as against the other, upon such appeal. From this last
order, Hamilton and Livingston appealed to this court.
WOODRUFF, J.
The general rule, that an appearance by
attorney, whether for the plaintiff or the defendant, if there
be no collusion, may be recognized by the adverse party as
authentic and valid, I deem important to the safe administra
tion of justice, and well founded in the scheme and plan of
such administration in England and this country ever since
such officers were commissioned to represent litigants in the
courts.

Receiving their authority from the court, they are deemed
its oﬁicers. Their commissions declare them entitled to con
ﬁdence, and, in a just sense, their license is an assurance, not
only of their competency, but of their character and title to
conﬁdence.

The direct control of the courts over them as officers, by
way of summary discipline and punishment to compel the
performance of their duty, or to suspend or degrade them, is
retained and exercised as a guaranty of their ﬁdelity. It is no
denial of the rule that, where there are special circumstances
calling for its relaxation, the courts may and do relieve from
its rigid application. The exception arising from such special
circumstances strengthens, as well as recognizes the rule
itself.
Hence, when an appearance is entered by an attorney with
out authority, the inquiry, whether such attorney is of suffi
cient responsibility to answer for his unauthorized conduct
And it may be
to the party injured thereby, is entertained.
proper always to inquire, whether the injury to the party is
irremediable unless such appearance be set aside, and the
proceedings founded thereon vacated.
In exercise of their general equitable control over their
own judgments, the court may and should consider whether
they can relieve the party for whom an unauthorized ap
pearance is made, without undue prejudice to the party, who
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has in good faith relied upon such appearance and the official
character of the attorney who appears.
But it would be at variance with the scheme and plan upon
which we universally administer the law, if a defendant could
be prosecuted by a responsible attorney, in full authority to
practice in our courts, and after having successfully and in
good faith defended, as the case might be, through all the
tribunals of justice, and to ﬁnal judgment in the court of last
resort, be required to submit to an order setting aside the
proceedings, and be left to be again prosecuted for the same
cause of action, on the mere ground that the plaintiff's attor
ney had no authority from the plaintiff to bring the action.
The law which gives to attorneys their commissions, must be
deemed to guarantee to defendants protection against such a
result. And, at the same time, the rule should yield to equi
table considerations, where they arise, and should permit
the courts to give relief when they can thereby prevent ir
remediable wrong to either party.
And if it be asked, why should the party for whom he ap
pears be left to seek his remedy against the attorney ?—why
should not the party who has been subjected to an unauthor
ized litigation pursue that remedy, rather than cast that haz
ard and burden on one who has done nothing to deserve it?—
the answer lies in the suggestion already made, that the law
warrants a party in giving faith and conﬁdence to one who,
by law, is authorized to hold himself out as a public otﬁcer,
clothed with power to represent others in the courts.
And
besides this, the consequences of the contrary rule would often
Evidence would be lost; witnesses
be altogether disastrous.
die; the statute of limitations bar claims; and death of par
ties themselves might often happen. In various ways, to set
aside proceedings at the end of a protracted litigation would
be to work inevitable wrong to the party who had relied upon
an appearance.
It may be said that proof of the authority of the attorney
to appear and prosecute should be demanded, if the party
ould be safe. If such demand could in all cases be insisted
pon, it would be only one step toward safety. It might often
'
5
Ea: parte evidence of authority
e practically ineffectual.
might be produced, and yet, if the party might afterward im
peach it, the question would again arise, in all its force. Be
sides, it is not the practice to require attorneys to produce
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their authority, except in special cases. No doubt there is
power in the courts to order it: it has sometimes been done Z
(Ninety-nine Plaintiﬁs 'v. Vanderbilt, 4 Duer, 632.)

/

When, pending a litigation, the authority of the attorney to
appear is denied, and application is made in due season, the
court, if probable cause appears, would, in general, protect
the party applying. Still, the general rule remains, that a re
tainer will be presumed; and the adverse party, having no
notice or ground of suspicion, may act on that presumption.
(3 Merivale, 12; 2 Mylne & Keen, 1; 1 _V es. 196; 6 Johns. 297;
And in general where there are no circum
9 Paige, 496.)
stances of suspicion, of facts indicating fraud, and no evi
dence of bad character discrediting the appearance, the
courts do not require a respectable and responsible attorney
to exhibit his authority to appear.
(6 Johns. 34; 5 Duer,
D
643.)

It

is, however, suggested, that, as in ejectment, the defend
ant is authorized by statute to require the attorney for the
plaintiff to produce his authority (2 R. S. 306), this action
should be deemed an exception to the general rule, and it be
held that the defendant's own laches have caused his mis
fortune, if it afterward appear that the plaintiff did not au
thorize the suit. But it is obvious that the statute itself does
It only makes the produc
not furnish complete protection.
authority,
apparent
written
of
sustained by affidavit,
tion
presumptive evidence. And if the authority do not actually
exist, the same question will arise in ejectment as in other
actions: How far is the plaintiff bound by the appearance
of an attorney for him‘? And, as respects an appearance for
a defendant, the statute makes no provision.
do not think, therefore, that the omission of the defend
ant to demand the production of authority, where he has
nothing to put him on his guard, awaken his suspicion, or to
lead him to distrust the good faith of the attorney who prose
cutes the action, should affect his right to insist upon his
judgment, when it is not claimed that the attorney is not of
full and sufficient responsibility to answer to the plaintiff for
any costs or other damage he may have sustained.
Q

i

1
1

I I l i I

i
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Judgment aﬂirm ed.
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RAIL

ROAD CO. v. RHODES.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
180

1897.

Pennsylvania State, 157.

Appeal by plaintiff from order striking off warrant of at
torney.

David C. Harrington, for appellant.
George L. Crawford, for appellee.
WILLIAMS, J. On the seventh day of June, 1892, D. C.
Harrington, Esq., an attorney at law regularly admitted to
practice in the courts of Philadelphia ﬁled the bill in equity in
this case as the attorney of the plaintiff.
On the eighteenth day of the same month a rule was en
tered in the minutes by the prothonotary, on the direction of
Crawford 8: Laughlin, attorneys for Rhodes et al. and the D.
H. and W. Railroad Co., requiring D. C. Harrington to ﬁle
his warrant of attorney.
No aﬁidavit or statement of facts
tending to throw doubt upon his authority was ﬁled and no
application whatever was made to the court of which Har
rington was a sworn officer. On the twenty-ﬁfth of the same
month Harrington ﬁled a warrant of attorney in due form
executed by the corporation under its seal. This was a com
pliance with the rule and it should regularly have been dis
charged. The court however without any formal disposition
of the warrant of attorney, and without even a suggestion on
the record that it was not what it purported to be, granted a
rule on Harrington to show cause why the warrant should
This rule it subsequently
not be struck from the records.
made absolute and the warrant was struck off. For what
reason this rule was granted, or for what reason it was made
absolute, it is impossible to tell so far as the records in this
Having thus disposed of the attorney of
case are concerned.
the plaintiff, a rule was at once granted requiring the plaintiff
to show cause why the bill should not be struck from the rec
This was soon after made absolute. The cause was
ords.
sent out of court, after the attorney, in a novel and peremp
tory manner.' The record shows no reason whatever. given
by Messrs. Crawford & Laughlin, for asking either of these
rules, and none given by the court below for making them
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We know of no authority for such a practice.
absolute.
is elementary law that an attorney is an oﬂicer of the court in
which he is admitted to practice. His admission and license
to practice raise a presumption prima facie in favor of his
right to appear for any person whom he undertakes to repre
sent. When his authority to do so is questioned or denied
the burden of overcoming this presumption in his favor rests
on him who questions or denies his authority, and such per
son must show by affidavit the existence of facts tending to
overcome the presumption before he can be called upon to
ﬁle his warrant of attorney: Weeks on Attorneys at Law,
387 to 400.
The established practice in this country and England is to
apply to the court by petition stating the facts relied on to
overcome the presumption and asking a rule upon the attor
ney to ﬁle his warrant. When he has complied with the rule
by ﬁling a warrant sufficient in form and in the manner of
its execution, the rule has been complied with and is functus
oﬁicio. If the warrant is alleged to be defective, or forged, or
in any manner insufficient to justify the court in treating it
as authority for the appearance of the attorney, the defect
should be_ pointed out by exceptions and its sufficiency passed
If the court holds the warrant sufficient
upon by the court.
If
proceeds.
it is held insufficient proceedings there
case
the
in will be stayed or in a proper case the suit may be dismissed.
In Campbell v. Galbreath, 5 Watts, 423, Justice Kennedy dis
cusses the practice to some extent and says at page 430, that
after it is ascertained that the attorney for the plaintiff’ has
no authority to appear for him in the suit pending, the de
fendant may proceed to have it dismissed. The same practice
prevails in the United States courts and in those of most of
" *
the states.
[Order affirmed on other grounds.]

'
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By Service.

The Notice Served.

EGGLESTON
Supreme

[Chap.

v.

WATTAWA.

Court of Iowa.

1902.

117 Iowa, 676.

Action on a judgment recovered by default in the circuit
court of South Dakota in and for Brule county. Defendant
demurred on the ground that the summons in the action on
which the judgment was recovered was not sufficient to give
The trial court sustained this de
the court jurisdiction.
murrer, and, on plaintiffs election to stand on his petition,
rendered judgment for defendant, from which plaintiff ap
peals.--Aﬁirmed.
MCCLAIN, J.—Although the action on which the judgment
was rendered in South Dakota was entitled in the¢'.. circuit
I‘
to answer the com
__gourt, the summons required defendant
plaint of N. W. Eggleston, plaintiff, which will be ﬁled in the
office of the clerk of the_di_str_ictZ court wi_thin and for said
Brule county, at Chamberlain, Brule Co., S. D., and to serve a
copy of your answer to the said complaint on the subscriber
at the office in the city of Chamberlain, S. D., in said county
and state, within thirty days after the service of this sum
mons exclusive of the day of service, or the plaintiff will ap
ply to the court for the relief demanded in the complaint,
This summons was served on January 9,
besides costs."
1892- The.c0m_p_l_'<_1_int on which judgment was rendered by the
_girc11it.c0u1'i. 0§.BI_'ule county was not ﬁled until December_9,
L892, and judgment by default was entered on that day. The
provisions of the statutes of South Dakota, set out by plaintiff
in his petition, provide, with reference to the summons, that
it shall require defendant “to answer the complaint and serve
a copy of his answer on the person whose name is subscribed
to the summons, at a place within the state to be therein speci
ﬁed, in which there is a postoﬁice, within 30 days after the
service of the summons, exclusive of the day of service.”
It
is evident that under such statutory provision the summons
'i~1'1_q1§ti_on

wasfatally defective in not corréctlfnaming the
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court in which the complaint would be ﬁled. The statutes of
the state do not, so far as made to appear in this record, spe
ciﬁcally require that the court in which the defendant is to
appear shall be named, but certainly that is essential to such
a notice as would be sufficient to constitute due process of
law. Moreover, it is required by the statutes of that state, if
a copy of the complaint is not served with the summons, that
“the summons must state where the complaint is or will be
ﬁled.” The summons in question did not state that essential
fact, for no complaint was ever ﬁled in the “district court.”
There was in fact no such court then in existence, the “dis
trict court” as known under the territorial government, hav
ing been replaced by the “circuit court” by the provisions of
the constitution under which the state was admitted.
This
change of courts is pleaded in the case by plaintiff as an ex
cuse for the mistaken description, but the fact remains that
defendant was not notiﬁed that the complaint would be ﬁled
in the circuit court, in which the judgment was rendered, but
was advised that it would be ﬁled in another court, which in
fact did not exist. Under such circumstances we think de
fendant was justiﬁed in assuming that no valid judgment
could be rendered against him. The circuit court acquired no
jurisdiction, and the judgment on which this action is based
was therefore void. See, as bearing in general on the ques
tion, Lyon 'v. Vanatta, 35 Iowa 521. Other questions are ar
gued, but, as they involve the construction of statutes of an
other state, their decision would be of no advantage to any
one.

The demurrer was rightly sustained, and the judgment is
aﬁfrmed."
aoAs suggested in this case, the requisites of a summons are to be
found both in the common law conception of due process and in the
A.further differentiation must be
statutes in force in the jurisdiction.
made between the directory and mandatory provisions oi the statutes.
It will he apparent from this and succeeding cases that the question oi
the suﬂlciency of a summons is not a simple one, but depends upon the
elements just named coupled with the further problems of waiver grow
of the stage in the proceedings when the
ing out of a consideration
objection is raised. This of course carries one eventually into the field
of direct and collateral attack on judgments.
Due process consists essentially of notice and an opportunity to be
McGehee on Due Process of Law, p. 76 ct seq.
heard.
In King v. University oi Cambridge (1723), 1 Strange 557, 567,
Fortesque, J., says:-“The laws oi God and man both give the party
I remember to have
an opportunity to make his defense, it he has any.
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his N

heard it observed by a. very learned man upon such an occasion. that
even God Himself did not pass sentence upon Adam, before be WHS
‘Adam,’ says God, ‘where art thou?
called upon to make his defense.
I-last thou eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded that thou shouldest
not eat?’ And the same question was put to Eve also."

Q

LYMAN

v.

MILTON.

Supreme Court of California.

1872.

44 California, 630.

a

a

a

J.

BELCHER,
The plaintiff seeks by this action to enforce
resulting trust.
the execution of
complaint
The
names as defendants, Martha Ellen Milton,
administratrix of the estate of Daniel Milton, deceased.
Martha Ellen Milton, and Ida May Milton. It alleges the
death of Daniel Milton, leaving him surviving as his only
heirs at law his widow, Martha Ellen Milton, and his daugh
ter, Ida May Milton, an infant of about the age of three years,
and that Martha Ellen Milton had been duly appointed the
administratrix of his estate.
Upon the complaint
summons was issued, entitled: “W.
Lyman, plaintiﬁ, v. M. E. Milton (administratrix, etc.) et al.,
It was addressed to “M. E. Milton, adminis
defendants.”
tratrix et al., defendants,” the name of Ida May Milton no
where appearing in it. This summons was served upon both
defendants, and afterwards, upon application of the plaintiff,
the adult defendant was appointed the guardian ad litem of
The said Martha Ellen accepted the
the infant defendant.
guardian
and, thereupon, before ﬁling an
litem,
trust of
ad
swer, or otherwise appearing, appeared in court by counsel,
stating to the court that she appeared on behalf of said infant
for the purpose only of moving to quash the summons. The
court refused to permit such an appearance. and refused to
recognize counsel, or hear anything they might have to say on
behalf of the infant, unless they entered an unqualiﬁed ap
pearance for the general purpose of defense. Having duly
entered an exception to this ruling, counsel then, in obedience
thereto, stated without qualiﬁcation that they appeared on be
half of all the defendants. Thereupon they submitted
writ
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ten motion on the part of the said infant and her guardian,
that the summons be quashed on the ground, among others,
that the same is radically defective in not stating the parties
The court overruled this motion and the de
to the action.
fendants excepted.
Afterwards, upon answers ﬁled in behalf of each defend
ant, the case was tried by the court and judgment entered in
,
favor of the plaintiff.
The statute (Practice Act, Sec. 24) provides that “the
summons shall state the parties to the action, the Court in
which it is brought, the county in which the complaint is
ﬁled, the-cause and general nature of the action, and require
the defendant to appear and answer the complaint within the
time mentioned in the next section after the service of the
summons, exclusive of the day of service, or that judgment
by default will be taken against him according to the prayer
of the complaint, brieﬂy stating the sum of money or other
relief demanded in the complaint.”
It is manifest that the summons in this case did not state
the parties to the action. M. E. Milton, in her representative
capacity of administratrix, was but one of three parties de
fendant. The words “et al.,” in the connection in which they
They indicate, at most, that
are used, are of no signiﬁcance.
there are still other parties who are not named.
Without
them, so far as a compliance with the statute is concerned,
the summons would have been as complete as with them.
Is a summons, in which one defendant only is named, when
in fact there are several defendants to the action, a good sum
\mons to the defendants not named in it? Must one who is
served with a summons to which he does not appear to be a
party take notice at his peril that he is really a party to the
action? To hold so we must hold that the section of the stat
ute referred to is only directory in its requirements.
But if
it be directory and not mandatory, why may the summons
not omit to state the court in which the action is brought, or
the county in which the complaint is ﬁled, or the cause and
general nature of the action, or the time within which the de
fendant is required to appear, or the amount of money or
other relief demanded in the complaint, or all of them to
gether, and still be held good? All of these things are stated
in the complaint, except the time within which the defendant
must appear, and that is a matter regulated by law, which
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every one is presumed to know.
If notice only is required,
the party has that when he sees a copy of the complaint and
himself named in it as a defendant. And yet no one would
contend that a summons which omitted to state the several
matters required by the statute could be held good.
The summons is the process by which parties defendant are
brought into Court, so as to give the Court jurisdiction of
their persons. Its form is prescribed by law; and whatever
the form may be it must be observed, at least substantially.
It may be that a summons under our system is required to
state more than is necessary for the information of the de
fendant; that a copy of the complaint served by the Sheriff
or the attorney would have been all that is needful.
If that
be so it is a matter for the legislature and not for the Courts.
We entertain no doubt that a summons must contain all that
is required by the statute, whether deemed needful or not,
and, among other things, must state the parties to the action.
It may be that when the defendant moved to quash the
summons for insufficiency the Court might have entertained
a counter motion to have it amended by inserting the omitted
names of the defendants, and, on its being so amended, might
'
have denied the original motion.
In Polack 12. Hunt, 2 Cal. 193, it was held that the court
had power to amend the summons so as to make it conform
to the law, when it operated no hardship or surprise to the
defendants.
No such counter motion, however, was made in
this case, and we cannot pass upon that question.
A defendant has a right to appear for the purpose of mov
ing to dismiss a defective summons, and it is error in the
Court to refuse him that privilege. Nor does the fact that
he afterwards appears and answers waive his right or cure
the error.
(Deidesheimer v. Brown, 8 Cal. 339; Gray 12.
Hawes, id. 569.)
For the error named the judgment must be reversed and
cause remanded for further proceedings, and it is so or

dered."
£1 In Saddler v. Smith (1907), 54 Fla. 671, 45 So. 718, the court said:
“Where there are several parties defendant it would not be sufficient
to give the name of one defendant in the body of the subpoena or copy,
followed by the words et al. Lyman v. Milton, 44 Cal. 630. And so we
have held that in a writ of error or appeal, all parties thereto must be
‘ ' ' While the
named and cannot be included in the words et al.
standing
in the place of the names of parties
words ct al. are incapable of

-
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required by law to be stated in a subpoena or writ of error, they may
used in endorsing the title of the cause on the copy of subpoena
where there is no statute or rule requiring the names of the parties to be
indorsed thereon."
Since the defendant can always ascertain the nature of the cause of
action from the plaintiffs pleading, it is seldom required that this should
appear in the writ of summons, and when the statute does contain such
statement will be deemed sutflcient.—
a requirement a very general
Bewick v. Muir (1890), 83 Cal. 368. The original writ at common law
contained a full statement of the nature of the cause of action, but this
was probably due to the fact that the writ gave the court jurisdiction to
The Formulary System,
try the particular case there described.—See
being Section 1 of Chapter
1, Sunder1and's
Cases
on Common Law
'
Pleading.
Sometimes a copy of the complaint is required to be served with the
summons, and in Dunnett v. Thornton (1900), 73 Conn. 1, the court said
be

the

writ

3

it

was void

g

‘

there was no complaint.

LAWYER LAND

/,1 Vi/»Q/Supreme

Court of Washington.
41

HADLEY,

J.

*

'

F

18

STEEL.

CO. v.

Washington,

411.

*

t

t

U

1

Q

I

This appeal is from an order quashing
service thereof.

1906.

#

1

a summons and the

The essential part of the summons reads as

follows:
“You and each of you are hereby summoned to appear
within twenty days after the service of this summons. exclu

sive of the day of service, if served within the state of Wash
ington, and within sixty days if served out of the state of
Washington, and defend the above entitled action in the court
aforesaid, and answer the complaint of the plaintiff and serve
a copy of your answer on the person whose name is sub
scribed to this summons at Spokane, Spokane county, state of
Washington, and in case of your failure so to do, judgment
will be rendered against you according to the demand of the
complaint which will be ﬁled with the clerk of said court, a
copy of which is herewith served upon you.”
The summons and complaint were personally served upon
respondents in the state of North Carolina. The affidavit of
Bal. Code,
service is in all respects regular and sufficient.
4879,
provides
as
follows:
Section
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“Personal service on the defendant out of the state shall be
equivalent to service by publication, and the summons upon
the defendant out of the state shall contain the same as per
sonal summons within the state except it shall require the
defendant to appear and answer within sixty days after such
personal service out of the state."

It

is argued by respondents,

and such seems to have been

I

1

1

i
i

i

I

i

Q

1

it

it

it

\the

view of the superior court, that inasmuch as the summons
was so drawn that it contemplated that a service might be
made either within or without the state, it is fatally defective.
It is contended that the duty was upon appellant in advance
to determine whether service was to be made within or with
out the state, and that the summons should have been drawn
with reference to one or the other only. It seems to us that
the essential inquiry is, Was the summons by its terms con
lfusing or misleading to respondents?
We cannot see that
lwas. It plainly told them that, if they were served without
ithe state, they were required to appear within sixty days.
That portion relating to service within the state became mere
surplusage in view of the service that was made, and
was
‘so manifestly such that
was in no sense confusing. We
therefore think the court erred in quashing the summons and
its service. Under the above statute, the service was equiv
alent to service by publication.
is

The judgment quashing the summons and service
there
fore reversed, and the cause remanded, with instructions to
vacate that part of the order appealed from and proceed with
the action."

a

88 Return Day.
In Clough v. McDonald, (1877) 18 Kan. 114, the statute
required that the summons should be served and returned by the officer
within ten days from its date. The summons was in fact made returnable
in six days. and was served on the day before the return day. The court
summons of this kind we think is never void.
said: “Now
It might

however, if the oﬁicer should take the whole time (ten days)
given him by law within which to serve
upon the defendant, for in that
case the time given to the defendant within which to answer or demur
would be shortened.
But when the officer serves the summons before
the return day thereof, as in this case, we do not think that either the
summons or the service is either void, or voidable.
In such a case the
defendant has lost nothing.
He has his full twenty days after the return
day of the summons within which to answer or demur, and that is all
that the law gives him in any case.
It is the time of the oﬂlcer, and
not that of the defendant, that is shortened, by making the return of
the summons less than ten days from its date."

it

be voidable
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Where the return day and appearance day are the same, as in some
states. the argument just quoted would of course not apply.
See, also, Morris v. Healy Lumber Co., (1903) 33 Wash. 451, 74 Pac.
662.

sometimes provide
that
Statutes
Indorsment of Amount Claimed.
when an action is brought for money only there shall be indorsed on the
writ the amount for which judgment will be taken in case of default.
In such case, where there is no indorsement a judgment on default for
money only is sometimes held void,—Eimer v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co.,
voidable,—Lawton v. Nichols, (1903)
(1905) 75 Neb. 37; sometimes only
12

Okla.

~l

550.

3

LOWE v. MORRIS.
Supreme Court of Georgia.

1858.

18 Georgia, 147.

Motion to dismiss writ of error.
Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

LUMPKIN, J., concurring.
Is a writ of error a nullity without a seal?
My ﬁrst impression was, t'hat"this defect was fatal.
on reﬂection,

my ﬁnal conclusion is, the other way.
Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

"

Up

"

‘

Q

a seal to be, wax with an impression,
“Sigillum” says he, “est certa impressa, quia

Lord Coke deﬁnes

(3 Inst. 169.)
cera sine impressione non est sigillum.” And this has been
adopted as the Common Law deﬁnition of a seal. Perk. 129,
But it is a curious
2 Leon. 21.
134, Bro. tit. Faits. 17, 30.
fact that there is neither an Act of Parliament nor an ad
judged case, up to Lord Coke's day, to bind the courts as to
what constitutes a seal. His opinion was probably founded
on the practice of the country in his day.
New York, and most of the States North, have held that
upon wax, wafer or some other
a seal is an impression
5. John.
tenacious substance, capable of being impressed.
Rep.
Pick.
417.
But in
21
Rep. 239, 2 Caine’s Rep. 262.
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and the Southern and Western
States generally, the impression upon wax has been disused,
and a circular, oval, or square mark, opposite the name of
the signer, is held to have the same effect as a seal, the
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shape of it being altogether indifferent. It is usually writ
ten with a pen, sometimes printed. 2 Serg. & Rawle, 503.

Dall. 63. 1 Walls, 322, 2 Halst, 272.
The truth is, that this whole subject, like many others, is
founded on the usage of the times, and of the country.
A scroll is just as good as an impression on wax, wafer, or
parchment, by metal, engraved with the arms of a prince,
potentate, or private person.
Both are now utterly worth
less, and the only wonder is, that all technical distinctions
growing out of the use of seals, such as the Statute of Lim
itations, plea to the consideration, etc., are not at once uni
versally abolished. The only reason ever urged at this day,
why a seal should give greater evidence and dignity to writ
ing is, that it evidences greater deliberation, and therefore
Practically
should impart greater solemnity to instruments.
we know that the art of printing has done away with this
argument.
For not only are all official and most individual
deeds, with the seals appended, printed previously, and ﬁlled
up at the time of their execution, but even merchants and
1

business men are adopting the same practice, as it respects
their notes.
Once the seal was everything, and the signature was noth
ing.
Now the very reverse is true: the signature is every
*
*
"
thing, and the seal nothing.
So long as seals distinguished identity, there was pro
priety in preserving them. And as a striking illustration
see the signatures and seals to the death warrant of Charles
They are 49 in num
the First, as late as January, 1648.
But to recognize the waving,
be‘r, and no two of them alike.
oval circumflex of a pen, with those mystic letters to the
uninitiated, L. S. imprisoned in its serpentine folds, as
equipotent with the coats of arms taken from the devices en
graven on the shields of knights and noblemen; shades of
Eustace, Roger de Beaumont, and Geoffry Gifford, what a
The reason of the usage has ceased; let the
desecration!
custom be dispensed with altogether.
1

I

*

I I

Ik

IR

I

*

I I

With these desultory remarks I am content to leave the

law, learning and logic of the case to my brother Warner,
to whom it legitimately belongs, and who, I have no doubt,
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justice to the argument, and with whom
cur, in retaining the writ of error."
do ample

S

3

il

1

#

$

1

#

$

I

con

*

l8'l"he entire opinion, only a. small part of which is given here, is
with wit and learning, and a reading of it will afford both enter
tainment and proﬁt.
Contra, Insurance Co. v. Hallock (1867), 6 Wall. (U. S.) 556; Choate v.
replete

Spencer

(1893),

13 Mont.

127.

The style of process is often prescribed by constitution or statute, as
“The State of . . . . . . . ." v. “The People of the State of . . . . . . . .," or other
(1898), 24 Nev. 311,
wise.
See Brooks v. Nevada Nickel Syndicate
holding that a notice or summons which does not issue from the court
is not process within such a provision, and need not conform thereto.
The Teste and Signature of the writ are usually prescribed by statute.
See Ambler v. Leach (1879), 15 W. Va. 677, for exhaustive consideration
of the effect of errors in these matters.

3.9:

—-?

E

BEN KRESS NURSERY
Supreme

J.

OREGON NURSERY CO.

Court of Montana.
./,5

HOLLOWAY,

CO. v.

M cmtana,

.

1912.

491,.

Plaintiff commenced this action on Octo

ber 13, 1910, against the Oregon Nursery Company and the
Bitter Root Valley Irrigation Company. Service was made
upon each defendant; but on October 25th, before the time
for appearance had expired and before any appearance had
been made by either defendant, the plaintiff ﬁled an amended
complaint and served a copy of it upon defendant Bitter
Root Valley Irrigation Company, but did not serve the de
The Bitter Root Valley
fendant Oregon Nursery Company.
Irrigation Company interposed a demurrer to the amended
The plaintiff was given
complaint, which was sustained.
time to plead, but apparently took no further steps as against
that defendant, or at all, until September 12, 1911, when the
default of defendant Oregon Nursery Company was entered
“for failure to appear or answer”; and, proof having been
made, a judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the de
fendant Oregon Nursery Company was rendered and entered.
On October 6, 1911, the Oregon Nursery Company appeared
specially and moved the court to set aside the judgment, and

134
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in support of the motion tendered affidavits to the effect that
the amended complaint was never served upon it. Upon the
argument of the motion counsel for plaintiff admitted the
truth of this statement. The motion was overruled, and the
Oregon Nursery Company has appealed from the judgment,
and from the order refusing to vacate the judgment.
i
The amended complaint was ﬁled by the plaintiff as a
matter of right under section 6588, Revised Codes. The time
for appearance had not expired, and neither defendant had
By ﬁling the amended complaint, the original
K appeared.
complaint was superseded and became functus oﬂicio. " “ "
Section 6518, Revised Codes, provides that a copy of the
original complaint need not be served upon every defendant
where there are two or more residing in the same county,
but the same rul'e does not obtain in the case of the amended
complaint, and for the very obvious reason:
In commenc
ing an action a copy of the summons must be served upon
every defendant, and this constitutes the notice to him’; but,
where an amended complaint is ﬁled, summons is not served,
and, unless the defendant receives a copy of the amended
pleading, he is without notice.
The provisions of section
7149, Revised Codes, do not apply to a case of this character,
where the amendment is made before the time for appear
ance expires, and before any appearance has been made.
Sec
tion 6588 above in no uncertain terms requires that a copy
of the amended pleading must be served.
The question before us is not a new one. It has arisen
in many instances, and the authorities are practically
unanimous in holding that, until the amended pleading is
served and the statutory time for appearance thereafter has
expired, the adverse party cannot be adjudged in default.
Elder 12. Spinks, 53 Cal. 293; Linott v. Rowland, 119 Cal.
452, 51 Pac. 687; Nodine 1;. Richmond, 48 Or. 527, 87 Pac.
775; Watson v. Miller, 69 Tex. 175, 5 S. W. 680; Merrill
"‘
*
“
'0. Thompson, 80 App. Div. 503, 81 N. Y. Supp. 122.
If plaintiff is put in a disadvantageous position, it cannot
blame any one but itself. There is not any reason apparent
for ﬁling the amended complaint; but plaintiff exercised a
right given by statute, and must assume the burdens which
accompany it.
This judgment could not be based upon the original com
plaint, which has ceased to perform the function of a plead
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upon the amended com

plaint, of which the Oregon Nursery Company did not have
In Linott 21. Rowland, above the Supreme Court of
notice.
California disposed of a like question as follows:
“An
amended complaint must be served on all the adverse parties
who are to be bound by the judgment, whether it materially
affects them or not (Elder '0. Spinks, 53 Cal. 293), and, as
the amended complaint herein was not served upon the ap
pellant, there was no pleading upon which the judgment
"‘
*
"
against him can be sustained.”
The judgment and order are reversed, and the cause is
remanded, with directions to vacate the judgment.
Reversed and remanded.“

.ii.~

See also Gallup v. T. B. Jeffery Co. (1912),
Mowder (1916), 89 N. J. L. 306.

84

v.

3A
pg
mg)

86 Conn.

308 and

Drake

1

.

Personal Service.

E

PHILADELPHIA
Supreme

J.

READING RAILWAY

MCKIBBEN.

Court of the United States.
248

BRANDEIS,

&

CO. V.

1916.

United States, 264.

A foreign corporation is

amenable to pro

liability, in the absence of consent,
only if it is doing business within the state in such manner
and to such extent as to warrant the inference that it is
And even if it is doing business within the
present there.
state, the process will be valid only if served upon some au
thorized agent. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. 1:. Alerander,
227 U. S. 218, 226, 57 L. ed. 486, 488, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 245,
Ann. Cas. 1915B, 77. Whether the corporation was doing
business within the state, and whether the person served
was an authorized agent, are questions vital to the jurisdic
tion of the court A decision of the lower court on either
question, if duly challenged, is subject to review in this
court; and the review extends to ﬁndings of fact as well as
cess to enforce a personal
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to conclusions of law.
Herndon-Carter Co. v. James N.
Norris & Co., 224 U. S. 496, 56 L. ed. 857, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep.
550; Wetmore 'v. Rymer, 169 U. S. 115, 42 L. ed. 682, 18
Sup. Ct. 293. The main question presented here is whether
the plaintiff in error—defendant below—was doing business

in New York.
The Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company, a Penn
sylvania corporation, operated a railroad in that state and
in New Jersey. McKibben, a citizen and resident of New
York, was a brakeman in one of its New Jersey freight
yards.
For injuries sustained there, he brought this action
in the United States district court for the southern district
of New York. The summons was served on defendant's
president, while he was passing through New York, engaged
exclusively on personal matters unconnected with the com
pany’s affairs.
The defendant appeared specially in the
cause for the sole purpose of moving to set aside the service
of the summons; and invoked the provisions of the Federal
Constitution guaranteeing due process of law. The motion
was denied “upon the sole ground that upon the facts stated
in the affidavits said defendant is doing business within the
state of New York, so as to be subject to service of process
within said state.” Under a right reserved in the order, the
objection to the jurisdiction was renewed in the answer, and
insisted upon at the trial before the jury. The motion to
dismiss was again heard upon the afﬁdavits originally pre
sented, and was denied.
A
Exceptions were duly taken.
verdict was rendered for the plaintiff; judgment entered
thereon; and the case brought here on writ of error; the
question of jurisdiction being certiﬁed in conformity to § 238
of the Judicial Code [36 Stat. at L. 1157, chap. 231, Comp.

l

is

iof

Stat. 1913, § 1215.]
No part of
The affidavits established the following facts:
the Philadelphia & Reading’s railroad is situated within the
It has no dock, or freight or passenger
state of New York.
ticket office or any other office or any agent or property
Like other railroads distant from New York, it
therein.
sends into that state, over connecting carriers, loaded freight
cars, shipped by other persons, which cars are, in course
per
time, returned.
The carriage within that state
connecting
carriers,
by
such
which
receive
wholly
formed
that portion of the entire compensation paid by the shipper
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therefor; and the Philadelphia & Reading receives only that
portion of the compensation payable for the haul over its
own line. The Central Railroad of New Jersey is such a con
necting carrier, and has a ferry terminal at the foot of West
23d St., New York City. It issues there the customary cou
pon tickets over its own and connecting lines, including the
Philadelphia & Reading and the Baltimore & Ohio.
The
ticket,
whole
in each case, is issued by the Central Railroad
of New Jersey; and each coupon so recites. In these tickets
there is a separate coupon for the journey over each of the
connecting railroads; and the coupon for the journey over
each such railroad bears also its name. Each coupon is de
clared thereon to be “void if detached.”
The Philadelphia
& Reading receives in ultimate accounting between the car
riers, that portion of the fare which is paid for the journey
over its own line. Passengers for points on the Philadelphia
& Reading or on the Baltimore & Ohio, or beyond, may reach
these railroads over the Central Railroad of New Jersey. At
various places in and on this ferry terminal are signs bear
ing the name “Philadelphia & Reading,” “P. & R.,” or “Read
ing,”—and also like signs of the “Baltimore & Ohio," or “B.
& O.” In the New York Telephone Directory there are in
serted the words -“Phila. & Reading Ry., ft. W. 23d St.
Chelsea 6550."
These signs on the terminal, this insertion
in the telephone directory, and the information given in re
sponse to inquiries at the ticket office or over the telephone,
are all designed to facilitate and encourage travel and for
Neither the Philadelphia &
the convenience of the public.
Reading nor the Baltimore & Ohio has any oﬁice or any
employee at the terminal. The Philadelphia & Reading did
not direct the insertion of its name in the telephone book.
Chelsea 6550 is the number of the trunk line of the Central
Railroad of New Jersey; and that company pays the whole
expense of the telephone service.
An aﬂidavit ﬁled on plaintiff's behalf, states that the names
of the Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Company and of
the Philadelphia & Reading Trans. Line, Towing Dept., ap
pear in the telephone directory as at 143 Liberty street, tele
phone number 5672 Cortlandt; and upon information and
belief alleges, that these are subsidiary companies of the
Philadelphia & Reading, and “tow the cars of said company
from the Jersey points to the city of New York.”
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The ﬁnding that the defendant was doing business within
the state of New York is disproved by the facts thus estab
lished.
The defendant transacts no business there; nor is
any business transacted there on its behalf, except in the
Obviously the sale by a local carrier
sale of coupon tickets.
of through tickets does not involve a doing of business within
the state by each of the connecting carriers. If it did, nearly
every railroad company in the country would be “doing busi
ness” in every state. Even hiring an office, the employment
by a foreign railroad of a “district freight and passenger
" "
"‘
agent
passengers
to solicit and procure
and
freight to be transported over the defendant’s line," and hav
ing under his direction “several clerks and various traveling
passenger and freight agents,” was held not to constitute
"doing business within the state.” Green '0. Chicago, B. &
Q. R. Co., 205 U. S. 530, 51 L. ed. 916, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep.
Nor would the fact, if established by competent evi
595.
dence, that “subsidiary companies” did business within the
state, warrant a ﬁnding that the defendant did business
there. Peterson 11. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 205 U. S. 364,
51 L. ed. 841, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 513.
As the defendant did no
business in New York, we need not consider its other con
tention, that it could not be sued there on a cause of action
arising in New Jersey, and in no way connected with the
business alleged to be done in New York. On this proposition
we express no opinion.
On behalf of the plaintiff‘ it was also urged that an ar
rangement between counsel by which service of the sum
mons had been facilitated operated as a waiver of all objec
tions to the jurisdiction of the court. We ﬁnd this contention
to be unfounded.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the
cause remanded to that court with directions to dismiss it for

want of jurisdiction.
Reversed."
86 See Flexner v. Farson
(1918), 248 U. S. 289. holding that the rule
does not apply to a resident agent of a nonresident natural person,
because the state has no power to exclude such person from local busi
ness.
See Jurisdiction
over nonresidents
Doing Business within a State, by
Austin W. Scott, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 871.
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BECKER.

nu?

/"'C'ourt

of Civil Appeals of Texas.

218

1920.

Southwestern Reporter, 541.

[Action to set aside a personal judgment rendered against
plaintiff upon personal service made upon him pursuant to
a Texas statute, while he was temporarily out of the state.
_He was a resident of Texas.]
Mounsum), J. ‘ * *
Appellant complains of the overruling of his special ex
ception by which he attacked the right of the court to render
a personal judgment against him upon notice served upon
him outside of the state, contending that this violated the
due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the federal Constitution, and also article 1, § 19, of the Con
stitution of this state.
_

1

U

i

1

l

#

I

1

I

#

However, we conclude there is no merit in the appellant's
At the time of the alleged service upon appel
contention.
lant he was a citizen of Texas, and the statutes of this state
authorized the kind of service complained of. Our decisions
uniformly support the validity of the personal judgment
rendered upon such service upon citizens of Texas.
The
contention is prompted by expressions in the opinion of the
federal Supreme Corut in the case of McDonald v. Mabee,
243 U. S. 90, 37 Sup. Ct. 343, 61 L. Ed. 608, L. R. A. 1917F,
In that case it was held that service by publication
458.
upon a citizen of Texas, who had left the state intending
to make his home in another state, but whose family was
still residing in Texas, would not support a personal judg
ment. The court did not hold that when a citizen is absent
from his state the courts thereof are as powerless with re
spect to the rendition of a personal judgment against him
On the contrary, the lan
as if he resided in another state.
guage used is rather persuasive to the effect that the court
would have upheld the service had it been such as is under
consideration in this case. Articles 1869 to 1873, R. S. 1911,
are not violative of the due process of law clauses of the
federal and state Constitutions in so far, at least, as they
authorize the rendition of a personal judgment against a
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of this state upon personal service of process upon
him while temporarily absent from the state. This conclu
sion is not contradicted by anything in the opinion in the
case of McDonald v. Mabee, and of course is fully supported
\
by our decision.
citizen

I

BURKE

3 8’

gay

i

¥

O

Q

‘ ‘

Q

INTER-STATE SAVINGS
CIATION.

v.

Supreme

Court of Montana.

l

O

&

LOAN ASSO

1901.

25 Montana, 815.

Action by John Burke against the Inter-state Savings &
Loan Association for an accounting and to quiet title. From
Affirmed.
a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.
PIGGOTT,

J.

*

‘ '

To establish its title to the land, the defendant intro
duced in evidence the judgment roll in a cause entitled “Mor
The roll disclosed that on
itz Conhaim 12. John Burke.”
October 16, 1893, Conhaim caused to be ﬁled in the district
court of Cascade county, Mont., his complaint in an action
upon a promissory note alleged to have been made by Burke
to him, and that on the same day a summons in proper form
was issued; that thereafter the summons was returned and
ﬁled, together with the proof of service indorsed thereon as
follows:
_
5
“State of Montana, County of Cascade. J. M. Burlin
game, Jr., being duly sworn, says that I received the within
summons on the 16th day of October, A. D. 1893, and per
sonally served the same on the 13th day of November, A. D.
1893, upon John Burke, being the defendant named in said
summons, by delivering to said defendant, personally, in the
James M.
said county of Cascade, a copy of said summons.
Burlingame, Jr.
2.

“Service, $1.50.
“Subscribed and sworn to before me at Great Falls, Mont.,
F. B. Wilcox, Notary
this 13th day of November, 1893.

Public.”
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The judgment roll further disclosed that the default of

Burke was duly entered, and that

November 24, 1893,
judgment by default was rendered and entered for the
amount of money stated in the complaint and summons; the
judgment reciting, among other things, the following:
“In
action,
defendant,
Burke,
having
this
the
John
been regu
larly served with process, and having failed to appear and
answer the plaintiff’s complaint ﬁled herein, the legal time
for answering having expired, and no answer or demurrer
having been ﬁled, the default of the said defendant, John
Burke, in the premises having been duly entered accord
ing to law, upon application of said plaintiff to the court
judgment is hereby entered against said defendant, in pur
*
"‘
*
suance of the prayer of said complaint.
To the
introduction of the judgment roll the plaintiff objected upon
*
"'
“
Second, because the court had no
two grounds:
jurisdiction over the defendant in that action, for the rea
son that he never appeared, “and the summons therein was
not served by an officer or a person over the age of eighteen
not a party to the action, and for the further reason that the
afﬁdavit constituting the proof of attempted service of sum
mons does not state that the afﬁant was of the age of eight
een, or any other age, at the time of such attempted service.”
Plaintiff excepted to the overruling of the objections, and
speciﬁes the action of the court in that regard as error.
$

$

i

Q

i

#

¥

i

III

#

on

if

is

is

served the court
From the time the summons
deemed
to have jurisdiction of the defendant, and hence jurisdiction
of the defendant in Conhaim against Burke was acquired,
acquired at all, by the fact that service was made upon him,
he was personally served with
not by proof of such fact.
summons within the state of Montana, jurisdiction was ac
quired. Sections 71, 78, 79, and 80 of the First Division of
the Code of Civil Procedure of the Compiled Statutes of 1887
provide that the summons may be served by the sheriff, or
party to
by any other person over the age of 18 years, not
the action; that summons must be served by delivering
copy thereof to the defendant personally; and that proof of
the service, when made by any person other than the sheriff,
must be by his aﬁidavit showing the time and place of serv
ice; and from the time of service of summons the court is
deemed to have acquired jurisdiction of the parties or prop

a

a
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erty, as the case may be, and to have control of all subse
quent proceedings.
The omission from the affidavit of Bur
lingame of the statement that, at the time he served the
summons upon the defendant, he (Burlingame) was over the
age of 18 years, is the defect which the plaintiff in the case
at bar urges as fatal. He contends that thereby the judg
ment roll shows that the summons was not served by a com
petent person, and that therefore the judgment is void upon
its face. The plaintiff fails to distinguish between a want
of jurisdiction and an irregularity in obtaining it. Says Mr.
Freeman in his work on Judgments:
“There is a difference
between a want of jurisdiction and a defect in obtaining
" The fact that defendant is not given
*
jurisdiction.
all the time allowed him by law to plead, or that he was
served by some person incompetent to make a valid service,
or any other fact connected with the service of process, on
account of which a judgment by default would be reversed
upon appeal, will not ordinarily make the judgment vulner
able to a collateral attack.” Section 126. Upon this subject,
Mr. Black, in section 224 of his Treatise on the Law of
Judgments, says: “Although the service of process in an ac
tion may have been characterized by some defect or irregu
larity, it does not necessarily follow that the ensuing judg
ment will be void. For, if the party would take advantage
of such a matter, he must do so in the action itself, by some
proper motion or proceeding. It is only when the attempted
service is so irregular as to amount to no service at all that
In any other
there can be said to be a want of jurisdiction.
case there may be error in the subsequent proceedings, but
they will be sustained against a collateral attack.”
And in
“We have already seen that de
section 263 he remarks:
fects or irregularities in the process, or in the manner of its
service, are not sufficient to render the judgment void, unless
the ﬂaw or omission is so serious as to make the process
equivalent to no process at all, or the service entirely nuga
tory, in which case the judgment fails for want of jurisdic
It follows that the judgment of a court of general
tion.
jurisdiction cannot be attacked collaterally when there has
been some service of notice, although such service of notice
*
*
*
may be materially defective.”
Inspection of the judgment roll in Conhaim against Burke
does not disclose a want of jurisdiction of the defendant in

'
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that action, and therefore the judgment may not be declared
void on collateral attack. Assuming the Burlingame affidavit
to have been the only proof of service, the court merely erred
in adjudging the service regular.
3. From what has thus far been said it is not to be in
ferred that we tacitly assume the judgment would be void
if the roll affirmatively disclosed that Burlingame was less
than 18, years_of age when he served the
q£on,<1irect attack by suit in equity that fact were estab
nor can such an inference reasonably be
When Burlingame, who was not a party to the
deduced.
action, delivered to Burke personally a copy of the summons,
the latter was thereby notiﬁed of the pendency of the action,
and of the fact that, unless he appeared, judgment would go
against him. He was put upon inquiry, and such delivery
was suﬂicientlto subject Burke to the jurisdiction of the
court, despite the fact that Burlingame was not of the age
prescribed. The service, though irregular or defective, suf
ﬁced to accomplish the substantial purpose and object which
the law designs the summons to perform. We are of the
opinion that even if the judgment roll should exhibit the in
competency of Burlingame in the respect mentioned, or such
incompetency were otherwise shown, the judgment for that
reason would not be either void, or subject to any attack
save that by appeal. A judgment rendered by a court hav
ing jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties, and
keeping within the limits of its power, though it may be
voidable, is never void.
Jurisdiction of a defendant, when
irregularly acquired, may be renounced as the result of suit
able proceedings seasonably taken in the action itself, or on
appeal from the judgment; but Jurisdiq¢iQ1L_irresu_1ady_Qb=
tained is nevezftheless_juris(_licﬁQn.—the power to hear. g1_e

~;

“_EE¢e_,__—wa7ri'c‘l/_ia1djudge,—and

cannot*_be_vQiAd_.__This

~if

the judgment‘
conclusion inevitably results from the
in the former part of the opinion.
wh_e_r_1__this_Qi__sts

principles announced
Were it not for the case of Hauswirth v. Sullivan, 6 Mont.
203, 9 Pac. 798, we should content ourselves with the fore
going observations, and affirm the judgment appealed from
without further remark; but that case, when tested by these
principles, seems to us to be so manifestly wrong that we
deem it not improper to indicate our views upon the prin
cipal point there cited. In the Hauswirth Case the supreme
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court of the territory of Montana decided that the service
of a summons on Sunday was void, and that a judgment by
default against the defendant, founded upon such service,
was a mere nullity, although the sheriff's return stated that
It was held that the
the service was n/fade on Saturday.
defendant might maintain a suit in equity to have the judg
ment set aside on the ground that the service was made on
Sunday.
We are satisﬁed that the doctrine there announced
is erroneous. Service of summons on Sunday is not a nullity,
but a mere irregularity with respect to the time or day on
which it was made, and a judgment based upon it is
*
"
So with the service of the sum
not void.
The defendant in that
mons in Conhaim against Burke.
right
to
move
that
the
had
the
service
be set aside, and
case
the motion, if made, should have been granted, unless the
afﬁdavit were amended, or a new one ﬁled, stating that Bur
lingame was over 18 years old at the time of service; and,
perhaps, on appeal from the judgment, relief would have
been obtained, although no such motion had been interposed.
But Burke cannot otherwise, either upon collateral or direct
attack, successfully impeach the judgment because of the
irregular service, or because of the defect in the proof of
service.

'

Q

#

lr

Q

ii

#

I

Q

i

F

The other assignments of error are without merit.
The
judgment will be affirmed, and it is so ordered. Remittitur
may issue forthwith.
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A ﬂirmed.

6-\""" WALLACE v. UNITED ELECTRIC co.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
211

BROWN,
discovery.

A

decree

J.

"

Pennsylvania State,

1,78.

The ﬁrst prayer of appellant's

*

*

for discovery is a personal

1905.

one

bill is for full
to be enforced

against the person decreed to make it; and, if the appellee
was properly brought within the jurisdiction of the court be
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low personally, a decree that it make discovery could be en
forced against it personally by the appellant as his ﬁrst move
to obtain the ultimate relief asked for. In view of this, the
proceeding must, as was held by the learned judge below, be
regarded as in persona/m as to the appellee; and the question
whether the Act of April 6, 1859, P. L., 387, even if it does
authorize extra-territorial service of process from a court of
this state, is effectual to acquire jurisdiction over the person
of a defendant residing and served in another state, is not an
open one.

Before the passage of that act, Chief Justice Gibson, in
discussing the attempt to acquire jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant by the extra-territorial service of process,
said in Steel 'v. Smith, 7 W. & S. 447: “Jurisdiction of the
person or property of an alien is founded on its presence or
situs within the territory. Without this presence or situs, an
exercise of jurisdiction is an act of usurpation. An owner of
property who sends it abroad subjects it to the regulations in
force at the place as he would subject his person by going
The jurisdiction of either springs from the voluntary
there.
performance of an act, of whose consequences he is bound to
take notice. But a foreigner may choose to subject his prop
erty, reserving his person; and it is clear that jurisdiction of
property does not draw after it jurisdiction of the owner's
person; consequently, there can be no rightful action by the
tribunals on the foundation of jurisdiction acquired by the
attachment of property, which reaches beyond the property
itself. ‘ ‘ ' What, then, is the right of a state to exercise
authority over the persons of those who belong to another
jurisdiction, and who have, perhaps, not been out of the
boundaries of it? ‘The sovereignty united to domain,’ says
Vattel, ‘establishes the jurisdiction of the nation over its ter
ritories or the countries which belong to it. It is its province,
or that of its sovereign, to exercise justice in all places under
its jurisdiction, or the country which belongs to it; to take
cognizance of the crimes committed and the differences that
‘On the other hand,’ adds Mr. Justice
arise in the country.’
14,
Story (Conﬂ. Ch.
§ 539), no sovereignty can extend its
process beyond its own territorial limits, to subject other per
Every exertion of
sons or property to its judicial decisions.
authority beyond these limits is a mere nullity, and incapable
of binding such persons or property in other tribunals.’ And
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for this he cites Picquet v. Swan (5 Mason, 35-42). Not to
multiply authorities on a point so plain, it will be sufficient to
add the name of Mr. Burge (1 Conﬂ. 1), who says it is a
fundamental principle, essential to the sovereignty of every
independent state, that no municipal law, whatever its nature
or object, should, proprio vigore, extend beyond the territory
of the state by which it has been established.’ And again (3
Burge Conﬂ. 1044), ‘that the authority of every judicial
tribunal, and the obligation to obey it, are circumscribed by
the limits of the territory in which it is established.’
Such is
the familiar, reasonable and just principle of the law of na
tions; and it is scarce supposable that the framers of the
constitution designed to abrogate it between states which
were to remain as independent of each other, for all but na
Certain
tional purposes, as they were before the revolution.
ly it was not intended to legitimate an assumption of extra
territorial jurisdiction which would confound all distinctive
principles of separate sovereignty; and there evidently was
such an assumption in the proceedings under consideration.”
Speaking of the act of 1859, under which the court made the
order for the extra-territorial service of process upon the ap
pellee, Sharswood, J., in Coleman’s Appeal, 75 Pa. 441, in
stating that it has not been the policy of our jurisprudence to
bring non-residents within the jurisdiction of our courts, un
less in very special cases, said: “In proceeding against them
for torts, even property belonging to them cannot be reached
by process, and in cases of contract nothing but the property
can be affected unless the defendant voluntarily appear and
We may congratulate ourselves
submit to the jurisdiction.
that such has been the policy, for nothing can be more unjust
than to drag a man thousands of miles, perhaps from a dis
tant state, and in effect compel him to appear and defend un
der the penalty of a judgment or decree against him pro con
The act of 1859 ought, therefore, to receive a con
fesso.
struction in harmony with this policy. There exists no good
reason why courts of equity should be invested with a more
enlarged jurisdiction against non-residents than courts of
law.” This was followed by the case of Scott '0. Noble, 72 Pa.
115, in which we held that Noble was not bound by process
directed to be served upon him by the supreme judicial court
of Massachusetts outside the state, though he had accepted
service of the writ in the state of Pennsylvania. By the Act
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of March 13, 1815, P. L. 150, regulating proceedings in di

provides for service upon the respondent
“wherever found,” but in Ralston’s Appeal, 93 Pa. 133, we
said of that act: “It declares ‘upon due proof at the return
of the said subpoena that the same shall have been served
personally on the said party wherever found, or that a copy
had been given to him or her ﬁfteen days before the return of
the same,’ a divorce may be decreed. It is contended in case
the libellee in divorce is not found within the bailiwick of the
sheriff, the latter may, under this act, depute some person to
a legal service could
make the service in another state.
thus be made in Delaware it can be in California. Such can
The language
not be a true construction of the statute.
‘wherever found’ cannot be so construed as to give to a court
of this state extra-territorial power to bring within its juris
diction the person of a citizen and resident of another state.
The property found within this state of a non-resident may
be reached and charged and sold in the enforcement of a debt
resting on a contract without any personal service on the
In the case of an ordinary debt, the person of a non
debtor.
resident defendant not found within the state cannot be
reached by any process issued by a court of common law. In
cases where the language of the statute would seem to give
extra-territorial power this court has denied its exercise.
Thus the 16th section of the Act of 13th June, 1836, relating
to the removal of paupers, authorizes them to be removed ‘at
the expense of the district to the city, district or place where
he was last legally settled, whether in or out of Pennsylvania.’
It has, however, been held the provision for a removal into
another state is of no force or effect: Overseers of Limestone
v. Overseers of Chillisquaque, 6 Norris 294. The ﬁrst section
of the Act of 6th April, 1859, authorizes any court of this
having equity jurisdiction, in any suit in
commonwealth
equity instituted therein concerning property within the jur
isdiction of the said court, to order and direct that any
subpoena or other process to be had in such suit be served on
any defendant therein ‘then residing or being out of the juris
diction of said court wherever he, she or they may reside or
It further provides for the proof of service both
be found.’
within and without the limits of the United States. It was
held in Coleman's Appeal, 75 Pa. 41, that process thus issued
in this state and served in another state on a resident thereof
vorce,

the

act
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could not give jurisdiction of the person thus served.” In the
By a statute of
federal courts the same view is entertained.
the state of Oregon provision was made for service upon a
non-resident by publication. In Pennoyer 11. Neﬁ, 95 U. S.
714, it appeared that judgment had been entered against Neff
on process which the plaintiff undertook to have served upon
him extra-territorially, by publication, in conformity to the
Judgment was entered in the proceeding against
statute.
him, and, in holding that he was not bound by it, through Mr.
Justice Field, it was said: “Where the entire object of the
action is to determine the personal rights and obligations of
the defendants, that is, where the suit is merely in personam,
constructive service in this form upon a non-resident is in
effectual for any purpose. Process from the tribunals of one
state cannot run into another state, and summon parties there
domiciled to leave its territory and respond to proceedings
against them.” In the Circuit Court of the United States, for
the western district of this state, in the case of McHenry 'v.
New York P. & O. R. R. Co., 25 Fed. Repr. 65, the Court of
Common Pleas of Westmoreland county had made an order
of service on aliens in pursuance of the act of 1859, but it was
“It is, indeed, true that pursuant
said by the Circuit Court:
to an order of the Court of Common Pleas, claimed to be au
thorized by the Pennsylvania Act of April 6, 1859, P. L. 387,
process has been served on those defendants in England,
where they reside, but, clearly, such extra-territorial service
was ineffectual to bring them within the jurisdiction of the
court or make them parties to the suit: Pennoyer 1'. Neﬂ’,
95 U. S. 714.”
The service upon the appellee was ineffectual to bring it
into this jurisdiction, and the order of the court below setting
it aside was properly made. That order is now affirmed and
this appeal dismissed at the costs of appellant.

'|
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BOGGS v. INTER-AMERICAN MINING & SMELTING CO.
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
105

J

1907.

Maryland, 371.

The ﬁrst of the cross appeals in this case
is by William R. Boggs, the plaintiff below, from an order of
the Superior Court of Baltimore City striking out upon terms
a ﬁnal judgment theretofore rendered in his favor against
"‘
"‘
“
the Inter-American Mining and Smelting Company.
The Mining Company was incorporated in the District of
Columbia, but for some time prior to March 7th, 1906. its of
ﬁce, where its records were kept and from which its general
business was transacted was in the Calvert Building in Balti
more, and during that time H. C. Turnbull,
r., who did busi
ness in Baltimore City and resided in Baltimore County, was
president of the corporation. During the time that the com
pany was thus located in Baltimore City, its president, pur
porting to act in its behalf, employed the plaintiff, Boggs, as
a mining engineer at a salary of $200 per month and personal
and traveling expenses.
On May 28th, 1906, Boggs sued the company in the Supe
rior Court to recover his salary and expenses for October,
November, and December, 1905, and January, 1906, amount
ing in the aggregate to $1,188. The suit was brought under
and in conformity to the Rule Day Acts in force in Baltimore
City, and the defendant having been returned summoned, and
having failed to appear to the action or plead, judgment by
default was entered against it on June 27th, 1906. On the
same day the judgment by default was duly extended for
SCHMUCKER,

.

J

$1,188 and costs.

‘

' ‘
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P. M. Gober, a deputy sheriff of Baltimore City,
then testiﬁed that having been directed to serve the writ in
the case upon Mr. Turnbull he went over to the Calvert Build
ing and asked Turnbull if he was one of the officers of the
company, and he replied that he was not, but had formerly
To the best of witness’ recollection Turn
been its president.
bull said that he knew the plaintiff Boggs and would like to
The deputy reported this in
see him get what was due him.
sheriff,
who told him to serve the writ on
terview to the
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Turnbull, as he was one of the directors and the deputy went
back to do it but Turnbull shut the door in his face and would
not let him serve it. The deputy further swore that he_ ex
plained his object to Mr. Turnbull and the latter saw the writ,
and said he was doing what he could to get Mr. Boggs righted
in the matter, or something to that effect. He, the deputy,
did not read the writ to Mr. Turnbull, but he explained it to
him- and Turnbull looked at the writ.
Thatcher Bell, another deputy sheriff, testiﬁed that he was
told by the sheriff to go over. to the Calvert Building and
serve the writ on Mr. Turnbull, that Gober had not been able
to get a service. Witness went over to Turnbull’s office with
the copies ready to serve and said to Turnbull, “I have a paper
to serve on you.”
Turnbull said, “I know what you have,”
and started to go out. Witness reached for Turnbull with the
copies and when the latter kept running, he commenced to
read them, but Turnbull got into the next room and slammed
the door. Witness then laid the copies on the table and re
turned to the sheriff’s office. He left the copies of the narr.,
notice to plead, and writ in this case on the table in Turn
bull’s oﬂice. Mr. Turnbull was put on the stand and his ac
count then given of the visits of the two deputy sheriffs to
him substantially corroborated their testimony except he de
nied that he said to the deputy Bell that he knew what he had
or that he (Turnbull) saw or looked at the writ. There was
also evidence tending to show that Mr. Turnbull never re
ported the service of the writ on him to the company or took
any steps himself looking to a defense of the action, and that
the motion had been promptly made by the company when
it learned of the suit and judgment.
Assuming that Turnbull was a proper person upon whom
to serve the writ and other papers, we are indisposed to con
sume much time in discussing the sufficiency of the service.
It is apparent from the evidence that Turnbull was fully in
formed as to the institution of the suit by Boggs against the
company and the desire of the sheriff to summon the company
by serving the papers on him as one of its directors and knew
that the deputy was about to make that service when he at
tempted to elude him and evade the service by running out
of the room and slamming the door in the ofiicer’s face.
Neither he nor the company he represented, if he did repre
sent it for the purpose of the service, can be permitted to set
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up such a state of facts in support of the motion to strike out
the judgment. He might as well have remained in his office
and put his ﬁngers in his ears while the deputy read the writ.
to him, and then claim to be without information as to its
Defendants have frequently sought to
contents or purpose.
evade or defeat service of process upon them by ﬂight or re
fusal to accept the process handed them by the serving officer
but the courts have held such efforts futile. Davison -v.
Baker, 24 How. Prac. 42; Slaught v. Robbins, 13 N. . L. 349;
Borden '0. Borden, 63 Wis. 377; Baker '0. Carrecton, 32 Me.
334.
The laws of this state do not prescribe precisely how a sum
The
mons shall be served upon an individual defendant.
service must be a personal one, 2 Poe, Pleading and Practice,
section 62, but the sheriff is not required to read the writ to
the defendant, although it is usual for him to read it or ex
plain its nature and leave a copy of it with the person served.
Secs. 409 to 412 of Art. 23 of the Code provide for service of
process upon corporations.
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The court below in our opinion acquired jurisdic
tion over the defendant in this suit by the service of the
process upon its resident director, Mr. Turnbull.
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Order striking out the judgment reversed with costs.
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BRADLEY, . The principal question in this case is whether
the defendant, the city of Watertown, was served with process
in the suit so as to give the court below jurisdiction over it.

t

Q

Q

"

"

"

I

On the 23d of December, 1882, the marshal made
“Served on
return of service of said summons as follows:
the within-named, the city of Watertown, by delivering to
Wm. H. Bohr, last mayor of said city; Henry Bieber, city
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clerk; Chas. H. Gardner, city attorney, and Thomas Baxter,
last presiding officer (or president or ch’m’n) of the board
of street commissioners of said city of Watertown, each per
sonally a copy of the within summons, and by showing each of
them this original summons, this 23d day of December, 1882.
the office of mayor of said city being vacant, and there being
no president of the common council, or presiding officer thereof, in office.”
Q

"

3

l I

Q

I

1

l
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The question then arises whether the attempted
service in December, 1882, was a sufficient and legal service.
The court below held that it was not. We have already
quoted the return of the marshal on that occasion. It appears
from this return that he made the attempted service by de
livering a copy of the summons to William H. Rohr, the last
mayor of the city; a copy to Henry Bieber, city clerk; a copy
to Charles H. Gardner, city attorney; and a copy to Thomas
Baxter, the last presiding oﬁicer of the board of street com
missioners of the city of Watertown; the office of mayor being
vacant, and there being no president of the common council,
nor presiding officer thereof, in office.
Was this such a
service upon the city as the law requires? It clearly was not,
unless by the law of Wisconsin, the circumstances of the case
were such as to dispense with a literal compliance with the
charter. The charter requires service on the mayor of_the
city. No su€h service was made. There was no mayor in
office at the time. The last mayor had resigned, and his resig
nation had taken effect. Service on him was of no more avail
The case is different from
than service on an entire stranger.
those in which we have held that a resignation of an oﬁicer
did not take effect until it was accepted or until another was
In those cases either the common law prevailed,
appointed.
or the local law provided for the case, and prevented a
vacancy. “‘ * *
The question then is reduced to this: Whether, in case the
mayor has resigned, and there is no presiding officer of the
board of street commissioners, ( a body which seems to take
the place of the common council of the city for many pur
poses,) service of process on the city clerk, and on a conspicu
ous member of the board, is sufficient.
\If the common law
(which is common reason in lnatters of justice) were per;
mitted to prevail, there would be no difficulty.
In the absence
"'

"'

Hip}
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of any head oﬂicer, the court could direct service to be made
on such oﬂicial persons as it might deem sufficient. But when
a statute

intervenes,

and displaces the common law, we are

brought to a question of words, and are bound to take the
words of the statute as law. The cases are numerous which
decide that where a particular method of serving process is
pointed out by statute, that method must be followed, and the
rule is especially exacting in reference to corporations.
Kibbe v. Benson, 17 Wall. 624; Alernandria v. Fairfax, 95 U.
S. 774; Settlemier v. Sullivan, 97 U. S. 444; Evans v. Railway
Co., 14 Mees. & W. 142; Walton v. Salvage Co., 16 Mees. & W.
438; Brydolf v. Wolf, 32 Iowa, 509; Hoen v. Railroad Co., 64
M0. 561; Insurance Co. v. Fuller, 81 Pa. St. 398. The courts
of Wisconsin strictly adhere to this rule. Cougar v. Railroad
Co., 17 Wis. 478, 485; City of Watertown v. Robinson. 59 Wis.
513, 17 N. W. Rep. 542; City of Watertown v. Robinson, 69
Wis. 230, 34 N. W. Rep. 139. The two cases last cited related
In the ﬁrst case
to the charter now under consideration.
service was made upon.the city clerk and upon the chairman
of the board of street commissioners while the board was in
session, in the absence of the mayor, who could not be found
after diligent search. The court, after referring to the pro
visions of the charter and the Revised Statutes on the subject,
say: “The question whether the Revised Statutes control as
to the manner of service is not a material inquiry here, be
cause both the charter and general provision require the
services to be made upon the mayor, but no service was made
upon that ofﬁcer, as appeared by the return of the sheriff.
The principle is too elementary to need discussion that a court
can only acquire jurisdiction of a party, where there is no ap
pearance, by the service of process in the manner prescribed
by law.” In the last case (decided in 1887) service was made
in the same manner as in the previous one, and the court say:
“\Vhen the statute prescribes a particular mode of service,
that mode must be followed ita lex scripta est. There is no
chance to speculate whether some other mode will not answer
as well. ‘ * "‘ This has been too often held by this court to
require further citations. * *1 "' When a statute designates
a particular ofﬁcer to whom the process may be delivered, and
with whom it may be left, as service upon the corporation, no
" *
other officer or person can be substituted in his place.
The designation of one particular oﬂicer upon whom service

'
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The temporary
may be made excludes all others.
inconvenience arising from a. vacancy in the oﬂice of mayor
affords no good reason for a substitution of some other oﬁicer
In his place, upon whom service could be made, by unwarrant
It is un
able construction not contemplated by the statute.”
necessary to look further to see what the law of Wisconsin is
on this subject.
It is perfectly clear that by that law the
service of process in the present case was ineffective and
void.
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On the 4th of May, 1888, the plaintiffs recovered a judg
ment against the defendants in the Supreme Court of New
Zealand, Wellington District, for the sum of 764 l. and costs.
This judgment, as to 244 Z. was satisﬁed in New Zealand, but
as to the remainder the plaintiffs allege it is still unsatisﬁed.
The present action was brought to recover the sum of 633
the remainder alleged to be due upon this judgment of the
New Zealand court, and the damages for the nonpayment of
the above sum.

a

a

a

One of the defendants was on
visit to New Zealand early
in the year 1885, and he opened negotiations with one O’Shea,
with
view to shipments of wool being made by O’Shea from
New Zealand to the defendants in England.
On the 31st
July, 1885, the defendants whose representative had then re
turned to England, wrote from England to O’Shea in New
letter, in which they said that if O’Shea agreed to
Zealand
certain terms proposed in the letter they would be prepared
to accept bills against documents.
The letter ended as fol

letter, but

if

lows:
“Should these terms suit, we will send you out necessary
not too late you can commence operations,

and
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this letter will authorise any bank to negotiate your drafts on
the basis of the ﬁgures above named."
_
O’Shea made several shipments of wool and negotiated with
the plaintiffs, who were not bankers, drafts on the defend
ants, which were accepted and paid by the defendants.
The
plaintiffs took those drafts on the faith of the letter of the
31st July. On the 19th Nov. 1885, the defendants wrote to
O’Shea, limiting his credit to 5000 l. O’Shea got that letter
on the 4th Jan. 1886, and afterwards, in fraud of both plain
tiffs and defendants, negotiated with the plaintiffs drafts in
excess of the limit, the plaintiffs being shown the letter of the
31st July and not the letter of the 19th Nov. The defendants
refused to accept the drafts, and the plaintiffs brought an ac
tion in New Zealand, against the defendants claiming the
amount of the drafts. The writ and statement of claim in
that action were, by leave of the court in New Zealand, served
on the defendants or some of them in England with notice
that judgment would be given in default of defense. The de
fendants did not appear, and judgment in default of appear
ance was given and execution levied, and part of the judg
ment satisﬁed in New Zealand, for the balance of which the
present action was brought on the New Zealand judgment.
The defendants are not natives of New Zealand, nor have
they or any of them ever been domiciled or resident there, nor
was any of them there when the drafts in question were nego
tiated, or when the action was commenced, or since that time,
nor has any of them in any manner submitted, or contracted
to submit to the jurisdiction of the New Zealand court, un

it‘

less the matters above stated can be held to amount to a sub
mission or contract to submit to that jurisdiction, or to create
an obligation to submit.
WRIGHT, J. (after stating the facts above set out) pro
It appears to me to be plain that no submission by
ceeded:
the defendants to the jurisdiction of the New Zealand court,
or contract or obligation is made out. There was no submis
sion in fact. There was not even any contract made by the
defendants through O’Shea, for he negotiated the drafts in
fraud of his express instructions. The liability, if any, of
defendants must depend on a representation or estoppel de
pending on their having enabled O’Shea, a native of New
Zealand, and subject to its laws, to obtain credit as their
agent on the faith of the letter of the 31st July. But, even

156

TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRAcTIcE

[Chap.

1

there was a contract between the defendants and the plain
tiffs made through O’Shea as the defendant’s agent, I am
clearly of opinion that this is not enough. In any particular
case a court of a State may, ﬁrstly, have jurisdiction in such
sense that in conformity with general jurisprudence and ordi
nary international law or usage the courts of other States
will regard its judgments as binding, and will, with certain
exceptions, enforce the judgment within their own States.
Jurisdiction of this kind ordinarily depends on the allegiance
of the party or his consent, or on some fact which is held to
be equivalent to allegiance or consent. Or, secondly, the court
of a State may have jurisdiction in such sense that its judg
ment will bind courts and persons and govern rights within
that State, but will not be enforced by the courts of other
States; or, what is another form of the same case, it may have
given judgment without any jurisdiction, but by reason of
lapse of time or otherwise there may be no means of question
ing the judgment in the local courts. Or, thirdly, (though in
strictness this is not a third case, but is one as to which
doubts may often exist as to whether it ought to be treated
as of the ﬁrst or as of the second kind), the jurisdiction may
exist locally by virtue of some local law which empowers or
binds the local court to act as if it had jurisdiction in cases
in which upon ordinary principles of jurisprudence it has
none. Such are some of the cases provided for by such legis
lation as is now in England embodied in Order XI of the
Rules of the Supreme Court, and by the practice or legisla
tion of many States. “ “‘ " In the present action the only
question argued was whether the jurisdiction exercised by
the New Zealand court was of the ﬁrst or the second kind,
though I think it was assumed on both sides, and is probably
the fact, that the jurisdiction was exercised under statutes
or rules made or authorised by the New Zealand Legislature,
and bringing the matter within the third case above stated.
This, however, does not appear to me to help the plaintiffs.
Such statutes or rules, if made or authorised by the Imperial
Parliament, might bind the courts of this country to give effect to the judgment, but that kind of authority was not sug
gested, and merely local statutes or rules could not possibly
give to the local court jurisdiction of the ﬁrst kind in a case
in which jurisdiction of that kind cannot otherwise exist.
This appears to be involved in the judgments in Russell o.

I
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Cambefort (61 L. T. Rep. N. S. 751; 23 Q. B. Div. 526). I
think that on ordinary principles of jurisprudence the judg
ment of the New Zealand court was wholly without jurisdic
No merely local statute
could, in my opinion, enable the court to entertain the action
against the absent Englishman, who was neither a native of
New Zealand nor domiciled there, nor present there when the
action was begun or at any time during its continuance. and
who has not appeared or in any way submitted to the juris
diction. It may be that for want of a right of appeal or
otherwise the local effect of the judgment cannot now be
avoided, but that in no way affects this court. It was, indeed,
suggested that the facts that the defendants had an agent in
New Zealand, and made a contract to be wholly or partly
performed there, or did something which estopped them from
denying such a contract, amounted to a submission to the
jurisdiction; but the cases cited (Buchanan v. Rucker, 1
Camp. 62; 9 East, 192; Gavan 'v. Stewart, 1 Stark. 525) are
far from supporting the contention. Some dicta may, indeed,
be found, as in Lord Romilly’s judgment in Coolcney 'v. An
derson (32 L. J. Ch.) at p. 308, to the eifect that, if a contract
is made within the local jurisdiction of a court, that fact may
of itself give jurisdiction over parties to the contract, but I
doubt if there is anywhere any decision to that effect, and
also whether the dicta mean more than that in such a case
the contract must prima facie be construed according to the
local law. Schibsby 'v. Westenholz (L. Rep. 6 Q. B. 155) ap
pears to me to govern this case. The only difference between
that case and the present one is that in that case the defend
ant had notice and knowledge of the proceedings and an op
portunity of defending (p. 158), but had not been served with
process, whereas in the present case the defendants were
served in England with the writ or notice of it. But. if there
was no jurisdiction in the New Zealand court, that difference
must be immaterial. I should add that the principles laid
down in Schibsby '0. Westenholz (ubi sup.) and Russell 11.
Cambefort (ubi sup.) are in accordance with the authorities
collected in Story’s Conﬂict of Laws, pp. 760-770, 808, &c.
Judgment for the defendants."

tion even within the colonial limits.

3cThe English rules are as follows:—
Service out of the Jurisdiction.
Onm-za XI.
Service out ot the jurisdiction of a writ of summons
1-

or notice of
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a writ of summons may be allowed by the court or a judge Whenever (a.) The whole subject-matter of the action is land situate within
the jurisdiction (with or without rents or proﬁts), or the perpetuation
or
of testimony relating to land within the jurisdiction;
(b.) Any act, deed, will, contract, obligation. or liability affecting
situate within the jurisdiction, is sought to be
land or hereditaments
construed, rectiﬁed, set aside, or enforced in the action; or
(c.) Any relief is sought against any person domiciled or ordinarily
resident within the jurisdiction; or
(d.) The action is for the administration of the personal estate of
any deceased person, who at the time of his death was domiciled within
situate within
the jurisdiction. or for the execution
(as to property
of the trusts of any written instrument, of which the
the jurisdiction)
person to be served is a trustee, which ought to be executed according
to the law of England; or
The action is brought against a defendant not domiciled or
(e.)
ordinarily rcsiirlcnt in Scotland to enforce, rescind, dissolve, annul or
otherwise affect a contract or to recover damages or other relief for
or in respect of the breach of contract
(i) made within the jurisdiction, or
(ii) made by or through an agent trading or residing within the
jurisdiction on behalf of a principal trading or residing out of the
jurisdiction, or
(iii) by its terms or by implication to be governed by English law.
or is one brought against a defendant not domiciled or ordinarily resi
dent in Scotland or Ireland, in respect of a breach committed within
the jurisdiction of a contract wherever made, even though such breach
was preceded or accompanied by a breach out of the jurisdiction which
rendered impossible the performance of the part of the contract which
ought to have been performed within the jurisdiction.
(f.) Any injunction is sought as to anything to be done within the
jurisdiction, or any nuisance within the jurisdiction is sought to be
prevented or removed, whether damages are or are not also sought in
respect thereof; or
(g.) Any person out of the jurisdiction is a necessary or a proper
party to an action properly brought against some other person duly
served within the jurisdiction.
(h.) The action is by a mortgagee or a mortgagor in relation to a
mortgage of personal property situate within the jurisdiction and seeks
relief of the nature or kind following, that is to say, sale, foreclosure,
delivery of possession by the mortgagor, redemption,
re-conveyance.
delivery of possession by the mortgagee; but does not seek (unless and
except so far as permissible under sub-head (e) of this rule) any per
or order for payment of any moneys due under the
sonal judgment
mortgage.
In this sub-head the expression personal property situate within the
jurisdiction means personal property which, on the death of the owner
thereof intestate, would form subject-matter
for the grant of letters of
administration to his estate out of the Principal Probate Registry; the
expression mortgage means a mortgage charge or lien of any descrip
tion; the expression mortgagee means a party for the time being en
titled to or interested in property subject to a mortgage.

This procedure has been adopted in a number of the British dominiuns
similar procedure is familiar in countries not administering the
See Piggott on Foreign Judgments and The
English Common Law.

and
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Practice as to Parties out of the Jurisdiction
(2nd Ed.) where the
English practice is fully explained (Chap. VIII), and the laws of British
Colonies (Chap. XII) and of European nations (Chap. XIII), are sum
marized.
Compare Grubel v Nassauer (1913) Z,].il..N-¥.....1-.i9, where the court
refused to recognize the validity of a German judgment obtained in
Germany by publication against a German citizen outside the jurisdic-Z
Z
tion.
'1
In Phillips v. Batho [I913], 3 K. B. 25, 29, the court said:—
"It is diﬂlcult to explain the position and practice of the English
courts. Under our Order XI we constantly serve out of the jurisdiction,
give judgment against absent foreigners,
and enforce that judgment
against their property within the jurisdiction.
But when we are asked
to enforce the judgment of a foreign court against an Englishman served
in the same way, we decline to do so on the ground that such procedure
The reason may be
is contrary to the principles of international law.
that our English procedure is imposed on us by statute, the justice of
which it is useless to question, while the foreign procedure is not so
If the matter were open for consider
imposed and is open to question.
ation, it is clear to any one who compares our English procedure and
the judgment of the Privy Council in Ashbury v. Ellis [I893], A. C. 339,
with the judgment of Wright, J., in Turnbuil v. Walker (1892), 67
L. T. 767, and of the Privy Council in Sirdar Gurdyal Singh v. Rajah
oi’ I-‘arldkote [1894] A. C. 670, that there is abundant room for argument."
In Smith v. Brady (1887), 68 Wis. 215, the court refused to recognize
the validity of an Ontario judgment based on personal service in Wis
consin without appearance.

~i

Kg:/at

Substituted

(3)

BRYANT

v.

Service.

SHUTE’S EXECUTOR.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
147

1912.

Kentucky, 268.

[Action in Kentucky upon a personal judgment by default
rendered in Massachusetts.
Service in the Massachusetts
case was made by the nominal attachment of a chip as the
property of the defendant and by leaving a copy of the writ
at the defendants last and usual place of abode.
The court
below rendered judgment for the plaintiff]

J. ‘

"

“

It

is clear from the evidence and the
opinions of the court of last resort of Massachusetts that the
service upon the defendant Helen A. Bryant is a valid service,
and will support a personal judgment so far as the laws and
SETTLE,
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judicial opinions of that state are concerned, and it remains
to inquire whether such service is “due process of law” re
quired by the Constitution.
In Knowles v. Logansport Gaslight Co., 19 Wall. 58, 22 L.
Ed. 70, the court said: “We do not mean to say that personal
service is in all cases necessary to enable a court to acquire
jurisdiction of the person. Where the defendant resides in
the state in which the proceedings are had, service at his resi
dence, and perhaps other modes of constructive service, may
be authorized by the laws of the state.
But in the case of
nonresidents, like that under consideration, personal service
cannot be dispensed with, unless the defendant voluntarily
" ‘ * In Earle v. McVeigh, 91 U. S. 503,
appears.”
~23 L.
Ed. 398, the validity of substituted service by posting or tack
ing the summons to the front door of a residence was recog
nized, but it was held that where the defendant had left his
residence more than six weeks before, leaving no one at the
house, it was insuﬁicient.
In Pennoyer v. N eﬁ, 95 U. S. 714.
24 L. Ed. 565, it was held that service against a nonresident
by publication is insufficient to sustain a personal judgment,
but there is nothing in the opinion that could be construed as
holding or indicating that substituted service by leaving a
copy at the residence of the defendant would be an invalid
“
"‘
*
service for the purpose of personal judgment.
While this court has been unable to ﬁnd any case decided by
the Supreme Court wherein the service by leaving the writ or
summons at the defendant's residence without an attachment
of property has been held valid, yet there are none to the con
trary, and from what was said in the several cases cited we
are led to the conclusion that such service upon a resident is
suﬁicient and is due process.

In Biesenthall

Williams,

Duv. 329, 85 Am. Dec. 629, a
suit was brought to enforce a judgment obtained in the state
of Ohio upon process served by leaving the writ at the resi
Our court held the judgment valid
dence of the defendant.
and enforceable in this state.
To the same effect, see
Guenther v. American Wheel Co., 116 Ky. 580, 76 S. W. 419,
Substituted service against a resident
25 Ky. Law Rep. 795.
by leaving a copy at the residence of the defendant has been
held sufficient to sustain a personal judgment in the other
states. Continental Bank of Boston v. Thurber, 74 Hun, 632.
26 N. Y. Supp. 956; Elliott '0. McCormick, 144 Mass. 10, 10 N.
'v.

1

JURISDICTION

Sec. 3]

161

Thomas, 55 Conn. 181, 10 Atl. 556, 3 Am.
St. Rep. 43; Lucas v. Wilson, 67 Ga. 356; Burbage 1*. Am. Nat.
Bank, 95 Ga. 503, 20 S. E. 240; Moye v. Walker, 96 Ga. 769,
22 S. E. 276; Atchison County 22. Challis, 65 Kan. 179, 69 Pac.
173; Abbott 12. Abbott, 101 Me. 343, 64 Atl. 615; Park Land
& Imp. Co. o. Lane, 106 Va. 304, 55 S. E. 690; Missouri Trust
C0. v. Norris, 61 Minn. 256, 63 N. W. 634; Bickerdike 12.
Allen, 157 Ill. 95, 41 N. E. 740, 29 L. R. A. 782; Sanford 'v.
Edwards, 19 Mont. 56, 47 Pac. 212, 61 Am. St. Rep. 482;
Walker 11. Stevens, 52 Neb. 653, 72 N. W. 1038; Blake 1:.
Smith, 67 N. H. 182, 38 Atl. 16; Rogers '0. Jerman, 3 N. J.
Law, 527; Harrison '0. Farrington, 35 N. J. Eq. 4; Robbins v.
Clemmons, 41 Ohio St. 285; Hunter v. Hunter, 1 Bailey (S.
C.) 646; Powell 'v. Nolan, 27 Wash. 318, 67 Pac. 712, 68 Pac.

E. 705; Hurlbut

389.

12.

must, of course, follow that, if the statute is followed in
matter
of making the service by leaving a copy at the
the
residence of the defendant, the fact that the defendant did
not receive actual notice, or that actual notice of the action
was not thereby brought to him, does not affect the validity
If it were allowed to do so, such process
of the judgment.
would be of no effect, and it would have been useless to pre
scribe it. Hurlbut 'v. Thomas, 55 Conn. 181, 10 Atl. 556, 3
Am. St. Rep. 43; Lucas v. Wilson, 67 Ga. 356. The court has
been unable to ﬁnd any decision, state or federal, which holds
that such service against a resident is not sufficient to sustain
a personal judgment, or that the judgment would be invalid
because of the fact that that mode of process had proved in
effectual in the particular case to bring notice to the de
fondant.
't is effectual, however, _as_pr_oc_ess,___the statute must
foe strictly complied wit . 4\/Vhere the statute requires it to
be left at the defendant's residence or place of abode, it does
not satisfy the statute if it is left at the defendant's place of
business, or at the house of another, or at a house or hotel
where the defendant is temporarily stopping, or in leaving it
at his former dwelling after his removal therefrom, or in
leaving it in defendant's berth in a steamer upon which he
has "taken passage, or in leaving it in a part of the house
which he does not inhabit or frequent, or at any other place,
and the judgment will be void. Hitch v. Gray, 1 Marv. (Del.)
400, 41 Atl. 91; Smith '0. Bryan, 60 Ga. 628; Stout v. Harlem,

It
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Ind. App. 200, 48 N. E. 235, 50 N. E. 492; Winchester v.
Cox, 3 G. Greene (Iowa) 575; Lambert v. Sample, 25 Ohio St.
336; Dyre’s Case, 1 Browne (Pa.) 299; Mayer v. Grijﬁn, 7
Wis. 82; Halsey v. Hurd, Fed. Cas. No. 5,966; Boyland v.
Boyland, 18 Ill. 551; White r. Primm, 36 Ill. 416; Hennings 1'.
Cunningham .(N.
Sup.) 59 Atl. 12; Kline 'v. Kline, 104 Ill.
App. 274; Matter of Norton, 32 Misc. Rep. 224, 66 N. Y.
Supp. 317; Craig v. Gibson, 13 Gray (Mass.) 270; Perry v.
Perry, 103 Ga. 706, 30 S. E. 663; Fisk v. Bennett, 69 Hun,
272, 23 N. Y. Supp. 471; Phelps v. McCollam, 10 N. D. 536, 88
N. W. 292; Kibbe v. Benson, 17 Wall. 624, 21 L. Ed. 741.
C
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#
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Judgment affirmed."
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common law insisted on personal service, and this required
personal delivery of the writ or a copy to the defendant himself; merely
leaving
copy at his house or place of business was not sufficient.
Chitty Gen. Prac. (1836) 266-8. In 1832, by
William IV, C. 39, s.
it was provided that where a defendant could not be personally served,
Writ of Distringas to be
should be lawful for the court to order
issued, which should be personally served if possible but otherwise left
Pollock and
at the place where the Distringas should be executed.
Maitland call attention to the tedious forbearance of the common law.
“Very slowly it turns the screw which brings pressure to bear upon
the defendant.”
Hist. of Eng. Law, 591. The distringas must be
preceded by three attempts to secure personal service, and “it is ad
to deliver at the defendant's residence to his wife or
visable
other member of his family or servant there, who would, under ordinary
circumstances,
be most likely to forward the communication
to the
defendant,
full statement of the particular object, and desire personally
to serve the defendant (and this even with a copy of the process on
the ﬁrst attempt, though not absolutely necessary to be left until the
last call) in order afterwards to show to the court that the defendant
probably has received instruction through such relative of the object
Chitty Gen.
in view and that he wilfully avoids personal service."
Prac. (1836) 302.
The English tradition for personal notice is maintained
under the
present rules which authorize the court to make an order for substituted
or other service by advertisement or otherwise when prompt personal
service cannot be had. Three calls must be made, at reasonable hours
and on different days, by appointment if possible, and full inquiry should
be made at each call as to the whereabouts
of the defendant, where he
is likely to be found and when he is likely to return. Annual Practice,
Order 10, Essential Proceedings.
In framing the order “the primary
consideration is as to how the matter can be best brought to the personal
attention of the person in question himself,"—Re McLaughlin (1905) A. C.
347. Service by advertisement
is ordered only when there is some reason
for believing that it will come to the defendant's knowledge.
Annual
Practice, Order 10, note on "Order for Substituted Service of Writ."
Substituted service is
less violent departure from the common law
conception of due process of law than constructive service by publication,
and
was said in McDonald v. Mabee (1916), 243 U. S. 90, 92:
“Mabee,

A
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although technically domiciled in Texas, had left the state intending
Perhaps in view of his technical posi
to establish his home elsewhere.
tion and the actual presence of his family in the state a summons left
at his last and usual place of abode would have been enough.
But it
appears to us that an advertisement in a local newspaper is not sufﬁcient
notice to bind a person who has left a state intending not to return."

9y

(4)

Supreme

Court of the United States.
95

J

Service.

jenstructive
PENNOYER v. NEFF.

United States, 714.

1877.
»

FIELD, . This is an action to recover the possession of a
tract of land, of the alleged value of $15,000, situated in the
The plaintiff asserts title to the premises
State of Oregon.
by a patent of the United States issued to him in 1866, under
the Act of Congress of Sept. 27, 1850, usually known as the
Donation Law of Oregon. The defendant claims to have ac
quired the premises under a sheriff's deed, made upon a sale
of the property on execution issued upon a judgment recov
ered against the plaintiff in one of the circuit courts of the
State. The case turns upon the validity of this judgment.
It appears from the record that the judgment was rendered
in February, 1866, in favor of J. H. Mitchell, for less than
$300, including costs, in an action brought by him upon a
demand for services as an attorney; that, at the time the ac
tion was commenced and the judgment rendered, the defend
ant therein, the plaintiff here, was a non-resident of the State;
that he was not personally served with process, and did not
appear therein; and that the judgment was entered upon his
default in not answering the complaint, upon a constructive
service of summons by publication.
The Code of Oregon provides for such service when an
action is brought against a non-resident and absent defend
ant, who has property within the State. “ "' ". The au
thority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the ter
ritorial limits of the State in which it is established. Any
attempt to exercise authority beyond those limits would be

164

TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRAcTIcE

[Chap.

1

in every other forum, as has been said by this court,
an illegitimate assumption of power, and be resisted as mere
abuse. D'Arcy 'v. Ketchum et al., 11 How. 165. In the case
against the plaintiff, the property here in controversy sold
under the judgment rendered was not attached, nor in any
way brought under the jurisdiction of the court.
Its ﬁrst
connection with the case was caused by a levy of the execu
tion. It was not, therefore, disposed of pursuant to any ad
judication, but only in enforcement of a personal judgment,
having no relation to the property, rendered against a non
resident, without service of process upon him in the action,
or his appearance therein. * "‘ "
deemed

#

l

¥
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i
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Substituted service by publication or in any other author
ized form, may be suflicient to inform parties of the object of
proceedings taken where property is once brought under the
control of the court by seizure or some equivalent act. The
law assumes that property is always in the possession of its
owner, in person or by agent; and it proceeds upon the theory
that its seizure will inform him, not only that it is taken into
the custody of the court, but that he must look to any pro
ceedings authorized by law upon such seizure for its condem
nation and sale. Such service may also be sufficient in cases
where the object of the action is to reach and dispose of prop
erty in the State, or of some interest therein, by enforcing a
contract or a lien respecting the same, or to partition it
among different owners, or, when the public is a party, to
condemn and appropriate it for a public purpose.
In other
words, such service may answer in all actions which are sub
stantially proceedings in rem. But where the entire object of
the action is to determine the personal rights and obligations
of the defendants, that is, where the suit is merely in per
sonam, constructive service in this form upon a non-resident
is ineffectual for any purpose. Process from the tribunals of
one State cannot run into another State, and summon parties
there domiciled to leave its territory and respond to proceed
ings against them. Publication of process or notice within
the State where the tribunal sits cannot create any greater
obligation upon the non-resident to appear. Process sent to
him out of the State, and process published within it, are
equally unavailing in proceedings to establish his personal
liability.
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The want of authority of the tribunals of a State to ‘adj u
dicate upon the obligations of non-residents, where they have
no property within its limits, is not denied by the court below;
but the position is assumed, that, where they have property
within the State, it is immaterial whether the property is in
the ﬁrst instance brought under the control of the court by
attachment or some other equivalent act, and afterwards ap
plied by its judgment to the satisfaction of demands against
its owner; or such demands be ﬁrst established in a personal
action, and the property of the non-resident be afterwards
seized and sold on execution. But the answer to this position
has already been given in the statement, that the jurisdiction
of the court to inquire into and determine his obligations at
all is only incidental to its jurisdiction over the property. Its
jurisdiction in that respect cannot be made to depend upon
facts to be ascertained after it has tried the cause and ren
dered the judgment. If the judgment be previously void, it
will not become valid by the subsequent discovery of property

oHM®mmmmMMmwmmmwWmmd&‘**
I I I I I I I I I I

Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution, the validity of such judgments may be
directly questioned, and their enforcement in the State re
sisted on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to
determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over
whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due
Whatever difficulty may be experienced in
process of law.
giving to those terms a deﬁnition which will embrace every
permissible exertion of power affecting private rights, and
exclude such as is forbidden, there can be no doubt of their
They then
meaning when applied to judicial proceedings.
mean a course of legal proceedings according to those rules
and principles which have been established in our systems of
jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private
rights. To give such proceedings any validity, there must be
a tribunal competent by its constitution—that is, by the law
of its creation—-to pass upon the subject-matter of the suit;
and, if that involves merely a determination of the personal
liability of the defendant, he must be brought within its juris
diction by service of process within the State, or his voluntary
appearance.

I I I I I I I I I I
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It follows from the views expressed that the personal judg
ment recovered in the State court of Oregon against the plain
tiff herein, then a non-resident of the State, was without any
validity, and did not authorize a sale of the property in con
troversy.
HUNT, J., dissenting.
I am compelled to dissent from the opinion and judgment
of the court, and, deeming the question involved to be im
portant, I take leave to record my views upon it.
#

C

i i l

F

O

l

8

Q

The result of the authorities on the subject, and the sound
conclusions to be drawn from the principles which should
govern the decision, as I shall endeavor to show, are these:
1.
A sovereign state must necessarily have such control
over the real and personal property actually being within its
limits, as that it may subject the same to the payment of
debts justly due to its citizens.
2.
This result is not altered by the circumstance that the
owner of the property is non-resident, and so absent from the
State that legal process cannot be served upon him personally.
3.
Personal notice of a proceeding by which title to prop
erty is passed is not indispensable; it is competent to the
State to authorize substituted service by publication or other
wise, as thecommencement
of a suit against non-residents,
the judgment in which will authorize the sale of property in
such State.
4.
It belongs to the legislative power of the State to deter
mine what shall be the modes and means proper to be adopted
to give notice to an absent defendant of the commencement of
a suit; and if they are such as are reasonably likely to com
municate to him information of the proceeding against him,
and are in good faith designed to give him such information,
and an opportunity to defend is provided for him in the event
of his appearance in the suit, it is not competent to the judi
ciary to declare that such proceeding is void as not being by
due process of law.
5.
Whether the property of such non-resident shall be
seized upon attachment as the commencement of a suit which
shall be carried into judgment and execution, upon which it
shall then be sold, or whether it shall be sold upon an execu
tion and judgment without such preliminary seizure, is a
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matter not of constitutional power, but of municipal regula
tion only.
To say that a sovereign State has the power to ordain that
the property of non-residents within its territory may be sub
jected to the payment of debts due to its citizens, if the prop
erty is levied upon at the commencement of a suit, but that it
has not such power if the property is levied upon at the end
of the suit, is a reﬁnement and a depreciation of a great gen
eral principle that, in my judgment, cannot be sustained.
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V.

CHICAGO, BURLINGTON & QUINCY RAIL
ROAD CO.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
225

Illinois,

1907.

197'.

J.

The appellant, Lars R. Nelson, on the 21st day
ﬁled a przecipe in the office of the clerk of
of April,
the Circuit Court of Kane county for a summons in an action
on the case against the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Rail
way Company, an Iowa corporation, and the Chicago, Burl
ington & Quincy Railroad Company, an Illinois corporation.
HAND,‘

1906,

A summons was issued against both companies and delivered
to the sheriff of said county to serve, which summons was
returned by said sheriff not served as to the railroad com
pany, because the president or any other of the officers or
agents of said railroad company with whom the statute pro
vides a copy of the summons may be left to effect service
of process on the company, could not be found by him in said
county.
The praecipe and summons were then amended and
the case discontinued as to the railway company, and the
railroad company was served with process by publication and
mail, as in chancery cases, as is authorized by paragraph 5
of the Practice Act (Hurd’s Stat. 1905, Chap. 110), and a
declaration was ﬁled against the railroad company.
‘ *
The railroad company entered a special appear
ance and moved to quash the service of process had upon
it by publication and mail, which motion was sustained, and

'
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the appellant electing to stand by the service of process and
refusing to proceed further, the court dismissed the suit, and
the appellant has prosecuted this appeal.
It is " "‘ " contended by the railroad company that
" ‘ " if service of process by publication and mail is
authorized by said paragraph 5 upon a defendant railroad
company that has its principal office in this state in a suit
where a judgment in personam is sought against the rail
road company, the statute is unconstitutional and void, as
such service of process, it is said, does not constitute due
process of law.

l

Q

i

Q

8

I

1

Q

l I

The law provides for two methods of service of process;
Actual service
the one actual and the other constructive.
reading
original
by
process
the
to the
of process is made
defendant or by delivering to him a copy thereof; and con
structive service of process, which is a substituted service of
process, is made by leaving a copy of the process at the de
fendant’s residence when he is absent, or by posting or pub
lishing notice of the pendency of the suit, and mailing a
copy of the notice posted or published to the defendant, if
It is held that the service
his postoffice address is known.
of process, either actual or constructive, upon a nonresident
defendant outside the limits of the state where the action
or proceeding is pending will not authorize the rendition
of a personal judgment or decree against a defendant, but
that such service of process is sufficient upon which to base
a decree changing the marital status in a proceeding for
divorce, or a judgment or decree disposing of property situ
ated within the jurisdiction of the court wherein the action
or proceeding is pending. It is also held that each state may
determine for itself in what method process may be served
upon its citizens within its own boundaries, and while such
legislation will have no force outside the state, service of
process within the state in the manner pointed out in the
statute regulating the method of obtaining such constructive
service of process, if the method of service of process pro
vided for is such as to amount to due process of law, as
these terms are used in the State and Federal constitutions,
will be sufficient to authorize the courts of the State within
whose jurisdiction the service of process is had to pronounce
a personal judgment or decree against a defendant so served

58¢ 3]

JURISDICTION

169

I

with process, although

cases may arise in practice upon such
constructive service of process where a personal judgment
or decree might be obtained against a defendant without
such defendant having received actual notice of the pend
ency of the action prior to judgment or decree. Constructive
service of process, it is said, is authorized in a certain class
of cases, such as when the defendant has gone out of the
State, or when he cannot be found, or when he conceals him
self so that process cannot be served upon him, as the result
of necessity—that is, such constructive service of process is
substituted for actual service of process when actual service
In this case
of process cannot be had upon a defendant.
actual service could not be had upon the defendant although
the suit was properly brought in the court from which the

process was issued and the defendant was a resident of, and
was in the State, and the question here is narrowed to this:
Can the legislature provide a constructive or substituted
service of process by publication and mail, in lieu of actual
service of process, in a case where the process cannot be
actually served upon the defendant in the county where the
statute expressly authorizes the suit to be commenced, al
though the defendant resides and is in the State?
The case of Bimeler v. Dawson, 4 Scam. 536, was an ac
tion of debt upon a judgment rendered by the Court of
Common Pleas of Stark county, in the State of Ohio, against
There was service of process upon
Welch and Dawson.
Dawson only, and he pleaded nul tiel record and that he
was not personally served with process. The record showed
personal service upon Welch and service on Dawson by leav
ing a copy of the summons at his residence, and the ren
dition of a judgment by default against both defendants.
The trial court held that for want of personal service upon
Dawson the judgment was not evidence of indebtedness
against him, and rendered judgment in his favor. Upon an
appeal to this court the judgment was reversed, and in an
opinion prepared by Justice Treat, on page 542, it was said:
“The laws of the several states provide different modes of
bringing parties into court. In some states personal service
of process is required, while in other states that mode is not
indispensable, but a party may be required to appear and
defend an action on notice by publication or by the leav
It is doubtless competent
ing of process at his residence.
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for each state to adopt its own regulations in this respect,
which will be binding and obligatory on its own citizens. We
cannot doubt the right or power of the State of Ohio to pro
vide that the kind of service which it appears was made in
this case shall be sufficient to authorize its courts to take
jurisdiction of the person of a defendant and proceed to hear
A judgment thus rendered
the case and render judgment.
against one of its citizens would be binding and conclusive
on him, for owing allegiance to the State, he is bound by its
law and amenable to its judicial tribunals. That State, how
ever, cannot in that way get jurisdiction over the people
of other States. Its laws can only operate within its own
They cannot be made
territory and on its own citizens.
to operate extra-territorially, or on the citizens of other
States unless they go voluntarily within its limits."
And in Welch 11. Sykes, 3 Gilm. 197, on page 201, it was
said: “It is competent for each State to prescribe the mode
for bringing parties before its courts. Although its regula
tions in this respect can have no extra-territorial operation,
they are nevertheless binding on its own citizens."
In Smith o. Smith, 17 Ill. 482, on page 484, it was said:
“A State may undoubtedly provide for bringing its own
citizens or subjects before its tribunals by constructive no
tice, which may not in all cases come to the actual knowledge
of the party; still the presumption is that he has actual
notice, or might have such notice by the exercise of proper
care and diligence.”
It

t

*

*
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Q
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What is due process of law in all instances is not easily
deﬁned, but as applied to this case it clearly means pro
ceeding according to the course of the common law, and
the common law has from time immemorial required that a
defendant be personally notiﬁed of the pendency of an action,
if he was within the jurisdiction of the court and could be
found, before judgment or decree was rendered against him.
The common law, however, never required actual service
of process in all cases, but has always provided for a con
structive service of process when actual service thereof could
not be had, such as the leaving of a copy of the summons
at the defendant’s residence, and latterly a posting or pub
lishing of notice of the pendency of the suit or proceeding,
when the defendant was out of the State or upon due inquiry
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could not be found, or when he concealed himself so that
process could not be served upon him.

In Barclwell

Anderson, 9 L. R. A. 152, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota said (p. 154): “We think that from
the earliest period of English jurisprudence down to the
present, as well as in the jurisprudence of the United States
derived from that of England, it has always been considered
a cardinal and fundamental principle that in actions in per
sonam proceeding according to the course of the common
law, personal service (or its equivalent as by leaving a copy
at his usual place of abode), of the writ, process or sum
mons must be made on all defendants resident and to be
found within the jurisdiction of the court. We do not mean
that the term ‘proceeding according to the course of the
common law,’ as used in the books, is to be understood as
meaning, necessarily and always, personal or actual serv
ice of process, for although service by publication is of
modern origin, there has always been some mode by which
jurisdiction has been obtained at common law by something
amounting to or equivalent to constructive service, where
the defendant could not be found and served personally;
but what we do mean to assert is, that the right to resort
to such constructive or substituted service in personal ac
tions proceeding according to the course of the common law
rests upon the necessities of the case, and has always been
limited and restricted to cases where personal service could
not be made because the defendant was a nonresident, or
had absconded, or had concealed himself for the purpose
of avoiding service. As showing what means were resorted
to as amounting or equivalent to constructive service, and
how strictly it was limited to cases of necessity by both
courts of common law and courts of chancery, reference
need only be had to 3 Blackstone's Com. 283, 444.”
While the authorities are not in entire harmony upon the
subject, the Illinois cases and the greater weight of author
ity clearly establish, we think, the proposition that a per
sonal judgment in an action at law may be rendered against
a defendant residing in and who is in the State where the
suit or proceeding is pending, who has been notiﬁed of the
service of process,
pendency of the suit by constructive
where it appears actual service of process could not be had
v.

upon the defendant,

if

the constructive

service provided

for
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to be had in such manner that the reasonable
probabilities were that the defendant would receive notice
of the pending action or proceeding before judgment or de
cree was rendered against him.
was required

i i l I I l

Q

I

Reversed

Q

I

and remanded."

38 It might be questioned
whether the facts bring this case under the
rule .laid down by the court as having the sanction of common law
practice, for here the condition warranting constructive service, viz.,
that "actual service of process could not be had upon the defendant,"
is not really present, since personal service was entirely possible in
some other county in the state. At common law, if service could not be
had in one county the alias writ was sent into some other county where
1 'I‘idd's Prac. Ch. VIII.
the defendant was thought to be.
So that the
common law contemplated personal service if possible within the realm
and not merely if possible within the county.
The decision in this case is expressly conﬁned to the case of “a de
fendant residing in and who is in the State where the suit is pending,"
but in the recent case of Mabee v. McDonald (1915). 107 Tex. 139, the
Supreme Court of Texas, in a learned and exhaustive opinion. held that
the State had the same power over such of its citizens as were absent
from the State.
Mabee v. McDonald, (supra) was reversed by the
United States Supreme Court, McDonald v. Mabee (1916), 243 U. S. 90,
but the brief opinion, written by Justice Holmes. goes off on an inter
pretation of the facts substantially different from that shown in the
Texas opinion. The want of jurisdiction to render a personal judgment
was expressly based on the fact that the defendant had left the state
“intending not to return."
In the Texas opinion such intention was
not found, but the court assumed that he was only temporarily absent.
What the Supreme Court of the United States held was that the technical
domicile of an absent defendant in the state is not enough to authorize
a personal judgment against him on service by publication when he has
in fact left the state intending not to return.
In Bardwell v. Collins, (1890) 44 Minn. 97, quoted above, the
statute authorized service of summons by publication, in actions to fore
close mortgages, as to all pariics to the action against whom no personal
judgment was sought.
The court held (1) that such actions were not
in rem but in personam, since they determined the rights and equities of
the parties interested in the mortgaged premises;
(2) that such actions
proceeding
according
were strictly judicial in character,
to the due
course of the common law; (3) that it is a cardinal principle of “due
process of law" that in actions in persondm proceeding according to the

course of the common law, personal service of process must be had upon
defendants resident and to be found within the jurisdiction of the court;
(4) the statute is unconstitutional in so far as it attempts to authorize
service by mere publication upon resident defendants capable of being
personally served.
See Roberts v. Roberts (1917), 135 Minn. 397, L. R. A. 1917C, p. 1140,
and note at page 1143 on constructive service on resident in personal
action.
See notes to Bryant v. Chutes Ex'r., supra, as to the common law
theory of service.
To prevent some of the injustice which so commonly results from
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American systems of constructive service, California provides by statute
that any person, ﬂrm or corporation may ﬁle with the county recorder
a certiﬁcate as to the place where service may be made, and service
by pubﬁcaﬁon cannot be had untﬂ it ﬁrst appears that such a cen
tiﬂcate has not been ﬁled or that the defendant cannot be found at the
address given therein.—Ca1. Civ. Code, 5 1163 and Code Civ. Pro. § 412.

1/ Q
INDIA~ANSAS

LUMBER
BRINKLEY.

United

States

&

Circuit Court of Appeals,

MFG. CO. v.
Eighth Circuit.

1908.

16!, Federal Reporter, 963;

91

Circuit Court of Appeals, 91.

to remove a cloudpfrom title, created by a sale under
a decree of the chancery court of St. Francis county in an
action brought under the Act of 1893 by the St. Francis
Levee District to sell land to payltaxes. Complainant chal
lenged the jurisdiction of the court on the ground, among
others, that no warning order directed to any of the defend
ants in that action was ever made or published, but the order
was directed only to “Brinkley Heirs, Heirs of R. C. Brink
The complainant was one of the Brinkley
ley, Deceased.”

[Bill

heirs.]
Before SANBORN and HOOK, Circuit Judges, and AMIDON,
District Judge.
'
SANBORN, Circuit Judge. " ' "
The proceeding under the act of 1893, before its amend
ment, was not a proceeding in rem, or a proceeding in the
nature of a proceeding in rem, as were the proceedings un
der the amendment of the act which were considered in
Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U. S. 241, 27 Sup. Ct. 261, 51 L. Ed.
461, Id., 74 Ark. 174, 85 S. W. 252, but it was a suit_in. chan
it. "‘ " "
c_ely in persmmm and it bound
The basic principle of the jurisprudence of the English
speaking nations is that no person shall be deprived of his
life, liberty, or property without due process of law; that is
to say, without notice and an opportunity to be heard before
the decision respecting the justice of the disposition of his
life, liberty, or property that is sought. Const. U. S. Amend.

~o
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14; Const. art. 2, § 21; 2 Kent's Comm. 13; Alexander v.
Gordon, 101 Fed. 91, 96, 98, 41 C. C. A. 228. In the absence
of legislative power to proceed otherwise, there is but one
way to make a person a party to a suit or to direct to him
an adequate notice of a proceeding to deprive him of his
property or to bring his person within the jurisdiction of a
court, and that is to direct the notice to him by his name
and to serve it upon him in person. And where the author
ity is granted by a statute to notify him otherwise on certain
conditions, those conditions must be fulﬁlled, the method pre
scribed must be substantially followed or the court fails to
obtain jurisdiction of his person, and its decree against him
is ineffectual and void.
There was a provision of the stat
utes of Arkansas that, upon condition that it appeared in the
complaint that the heirs of a deceased person or the owners
of property to be disposed of in a suit were unknown, a
warning order might be made by the clerk against such un
known heirs or owners.
But there was no other provision
in the legislation of Arkansas whereby the heirs of a de
ceased person might be brought within the jurisdiction of
one of its courts in a personal action without making them
parties to the suit by name. The expression of one method
of obtaining constructive service of such parties is the ex
clusion of all others, and this legislation was a denial of au
thority to obtain jurisdiction of unknown heirs or owners
by constructive service in any other way than that there
prescribed.
The plaintiff in the suit to enforce the levee
assessment either knew, or he did not know, who the heirs
of R. C. Brinkley were. If he knew, there was but one way
in which he could bring them within the jurisdiction of the
court, and that was by making them defendants by their
true names both in his complaint and in his warning order,
and by directing the order to them by those names, for there
was no authority granted by statute, by the common law,
or by the practice of the courts to obtain jurisdiction of a
defendant, whose name was known, in a personal suit in any
There was no statutory or other authority to
other way.
jurisdiction
of such a defendant in a personal suit by
obtain
publishing a notice to a class of which he might be a member
If, on the other hand, the plaintiff
without naming him.
did not know the names of those heirs, there was only one
way in which he could bring them within the jurisdiction

Sec. 3]

JURISDICTION

175

of the court, and that was by averring that fact in his com
plaint and procuring a warning order directed to them as
unknown heirs.
He pursued neither course.
He did not
make the defendant, or the other heirs of R. C. Brinkley,
deceased, defendants by their names, and the court acquired
no jurisdiction of them if their names were known to him,
and he did not allege in his complaint that their names were
unknown to him, and the court acquired no jurisdiction of
them if their names were not known to him. The inevitable
conclusion is that where, in a suit in personam in chancery,
the only authority to obtain jurisdiction of persons by pub
lishing a warning order directed to heirs of a deceased per
son without naming them is conditioned by the appearance
in the complaint of the averment that their names are un
known, the court acquires no jurisdiction of them by the
issue and publication of such an order in the absence of the
requisite averment.”
I9 Harness v. Cravens (1894), 126 Mo. 233, is an interesting example of
strictness with which statutory methods of making constructive
service are insisted upon. There the statute required: For publication
against non-residents,——Shou"ing of non-residence and impossibility oi
service in the petition or ajllziarit, and an order of publication based
of summons and
thereon: For publication against residents,—Issuance
return of not found. and an order or publication based thereon. Where
the defendant was sued as a non-resident, and a proper showing made
by petition and afﬁdavit, but instead of having the order of publication
issued on such showing the plaintiff had a summons issued and returned
not found and secured an order oi publication based on such return,
it was held that the service was void.
the

(hf

-

v.

Court of Appeals

New York.

182

of

4*XKKENNEDY

LAMB.
1905.

New York, 228

VANN, J. The purchasers at the sale in this action, which
was brought to partition lands in the borough of Brooklyn,
refused to complete their purchase upon the ground that the
title was defective. By an order, made at Special Term and
affirmed by the Appellate Division, they were directed to
comply with the terms of sale and they now appeal to this
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court for relief from what they consider an unlawful com
mand. They claim that the court which rendered the judg
ment in partition did not acquire jurisdiction of several
persons, each a necessary party defendant, because they were
not personally served with process and the effort to serve
them by publication was void, owing to a vital defect in
the affidavits upon which the order to publish was made.
From the aﬁidavits presented to the justice _who granted
the order of publication, one made by the plaintiff and the
other by his attorney, itiappeared that six of the defendants
resided in the State of New Jersey, four at Jersey City and
The only attempt to show compliance
two at Plainﬁeld.
with the command of the statute in reference to “due dili
gence to make personal service of the summons” was an
allegation in the affidavit of the attorney that “the plain
tiff will be unable with due diligence to make personal serv
ice of the summons within the State as appears by the affi
davit of Peter J. Kennedy hereto annexed.”
The affidavit
thus referred to contains nothing whatever upon the sub
ject of diligence, discloses no effort to serve the summons
in this state, and gives no reason for not making the effort,
It does not ap
aside from the bare fact of non-residence.
pear that the summons had been issued or that it was placed
in the hands of anyone for service upon the defendants
named, and for aught that appears they could have been
They were nephews
served in this state without difficulty.
and nieces of the plaintiff and had visited and corresponded
with him “for several years past,” as he stated in his aﬂi
He did not state how recently they had visited him,
davit.
when he last heard from them, nor where he himself resided.
Four of them lived just across the state line and two of them
but a short distance therefrom. All may have been engaged
in business in the State of New York and in daily attendance
there for that purpose, as is the case with so many residents
of the State of New Jersey. The affidavit did not state that
they were not in New York or that they were actually in
New Jersey when the affiant swore to it.
An order may be made for service by publication upon a
defendant who is a non-resident of the state, provided “the
plaintiff has been or will be unable with due diligence to
make.personal service” within the state.
(Code Civ. Pro.
The bare fact of non-residence is not
Sections 438, 439.)
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enough to authorize the order, for the plaintiff must also
show due diligence to make personal service, or state facts
tending to show why personal service cannot be made. The
statute now in force differs from the one which formerly
governed the subject when some of the cases cited were
decided, in.that the latter authorized service by publication
when the person to be served could not “after due diligence
be found within the State.”
(Code of Pro. Section 135.)
The old statute was satisﬁed with due diligence to ﬁnd the
defendant, while the present statute requires either due ef
fort to serve, or sufficient reasons for not making the effort.
In the case now before us there was no attempt to make
personal service and no reason was given for not trying to
Even if
serve personally, except the fact of non-residence.
foreign
country
in
permits
a
residence in a distant state or
the inference that the person to be served cannot be found
in this State, residence in an adjoining state, just across the
line, with no evidence that the non-resident is not in busi
ness in this state, or that he does not sojourn here, and no
explanation whatever for not trying to serve him here, is
As was said by this court in Carleton v.
not sufficient.
Carleton, (85 N. Y. 313, 315):
“It is a well known fact
that many persons who are residents of one state have places
of business and transact such business in a state different
from that in which their residence is located. They are
frequently in the latter state, and pass most of their time
there. Such persons could be readily found in the state
where they do business if due diligence was used for that
purpose, and non-residence of itself does not necessarily
show that they cannot be found within the state, or raise a
presumption that due diligence has been used, or that it was
not required.”
In a later case it was said: “Where the proof of non
residence is clear and conclusive, and that the defendant is
living out of the state and in a distant state, there may be
strong reasons for holding that proof of diligence is not
required ;” and as it appeared that the defendant resided
in Maryland, and that the summons, which had been duly
issued and some effort made to serve it, could not be served
owing to that fact, the affidavit was held sufficient.
(Ken
nedy v. New York Life Ins. & Trust Co., 101 N. Y. 487).
In McCracken v. Flanagan, (127 N. Y. 493), it appeared
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that a summons had been issued against the defendant and
“that defendant is a non-resident of this state, nor can be
found therein, but has a place of residence at Matewan, in
the state of New Jersey.”
After a careful review of the
leading cases it was held that the affidavit, which was made
when section 135 of the Code of Procedure was in force, was
insufficient to give jurisdiction.
The court said:
“Some
degree of diligence must be exercised to ﬁnd the party, and
what is a due degree depends upon circumstances surround
ing each case, and the simple averments in the affidavit that
the defendant is a non-resident and cannot be found within
the state are not alone sufficient to support an order fbr
the service of a summons by publication. Those facts do
not imply that any diligence has been exercised to ﬁnd and
serve the defendant personally with process.
It needs no
argument to show that the averment in the affidavit that
the defendant cannot be found in the state does not tend to
prove the exercise of due diligence to ﬁnd the defendant,
for the statute in question not only requires that it be stated
in the affidavit that the defendant cannot be found, but ex
pressly requires the averment that he cannot be found after
due diligence."
In Fetes v. Volmer, (28 N. Y. St. Rep. 317), the court said:
“Though a non-resident, the defendant may be at the time
temporarily in the state to the knowledge of the plaintiff,
and within easy reach of personal service of the summons.
No such proof was made by the plaintiff in this case. The
affidavit of his attorney, upon which the order was procured,
states only that the action has been commenced, that a sum
mons has been issued, and that the two defendants named
are non-residents of the state and that they reside at Marion,
Washington County, Iowa. The affidavit was, in this respect,
plainly insufficient and the county judge was without juris
diction to grant the order."
While any evidence having a legal tendency to show com
pliance with the statute, even if inconclusive, would war
rant the exercise of judgment and thus confer jurisdiction
to make the order, in this case there was no evidence as to
the use of diligence, or to excuse the omission of effort tc
serve in this state. Even if a judge reached a wrong con
clusion upon the facts presented, so that his order would be
set aside on direct attack by motion to vacate, still if he
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had some legal evidence to act upon, the order would be
protected from collateral attack after the entry of judg
There was no evidence presented to the justice who
ment.
made the order now before us which authorized him to act
judicially or to decide that the plaintiff would be unable
with due diligence to make personal service in this state.
An affiant who simply repeats the words of a statute merely
states his opinion upon a proposition to be proved. Proof
requires that facts be stated from which the conclusion
sought may be logically drawn. We ﬁnd no case in this
court and no well considered case in any court which sus
tains an order founded simply on proof of non-residence in
an adjoining state with no effort made to ﬁnd or serve, and
no reason given why such effort if made would be useless.
The purchasers were entitled to a marketable title, free
from reasonable doubt and they were justiﬁed in refusing
to complete their purchase because the affidavits upon which
the order of publication was based were insufficient to con
fer jurisdiction.
The order of the Appellate Division, as well as that of
the Special Term should be reversed and the motion denied,
with costs in all courts.
Order Reversed.

/
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Privilege from Service.

PARKER

v.

MARCO.

Court of Appeals of New York.
136

1893.

New York, 585.

MAYNARD, J. The defendant is a resident of South Car
olina and an action had been brought there against him in
the Federal Circuit Court, by the plaintiff, who is a resi
dent of this state. On April 6, 1892, the defendant came
to the city of New York at the instance of the plaintiff to
attend an examination of the plaintiff and his witnesses be
fore a notary public, which by the agreement of the counsel
for the respective parties had been set down for that date.

180

TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE

.

[Chap.

1

The plaintiff procured the defendant’s assent to the examin
ation upon the statement that he desired to be in readiness
to try the cause at the ensuing April Circuit, to be held at
When the time for taking the testi
the city of Charleston.
mony arrived the defendant was informed by plaintiff's
counsel that he had abandoned his intention to take the evi
dence as proposed, for the reason that on account of sick
ness in his, the coun-sel’s family, the plaintiff would not be
prepared to go to trial at the April Circuit, and he expected
to be able to produce his witnesses in court when the trial
should take place at a subsequent term.
It was then late
in the afternoon and the defendant returned to his hotel
and remained over night, and the next morning started for
He was intercepted at the
his home in South Carolina.
ferry by a process server, who served him with a summons
in this action brought by the plaintiff in the supreme court
of this state for the same cause of action at issue in the
The defendant had no
Federal Court in South Carolina.
business in New York except that which related to the pro
The defendant has appealed from an
posed examination.
order of the General Term, reversing an order of the Spe
cial Term, which set aside the service of the summons upon
the ground that, when served, he was privileged from serv
Ice.

Under Section 863 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States the plaintiff had an absolute right to take the testi
mony of his witnesses in this state to be used upon the
trial of the action in South Carolina upon giving reason
The compulsorycharacter of
able notice to the defendant.
the proceeding was not affected by the waiver of notice
and the ﬁxing of the time by the agreement of parties.
(Plimpton v. Winslow, 9 Fed. R. 365.)
The same section
provides that a person may be required to appear and tes
tify before the notary in the same manner as witnesses in
open court, and section 915 of our own Code authorizes any
state judge to issue a subpoena to compel the attendance of
In the trial of the action the
a witness in such a case.
notary thus becomes the arm of the court, and, as was held
In re Rindskopf (24 Fed. R. 542) represents the court pro
hac vice.

The privilege of a suitor or witness to be exempt from
service of process while without the jurisdiction of his resi
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dence for the purpose of attending court in an action to
which he is a party or in which he is to be sworn as a wit
ness is a very ancient one.
(Year Book 13, Hen. IV., I. B.
“Privilege.”)
Viner's Abr.

It

has always been held to extend to every proceeding

of
duly
a
con
stituted tribunal which directly relates to the trial of the
It is not simply a personal privilege, but
issues involved.
it is also the privilege of the court, and is deemed neces
sary for the maintenance of its authority and dignity and
in order to promote the due and efficient administration of
justice.
(Person v. Grier, 66 N. Y. 124; Matthews v. Tufts,
At common law a writ of privilege or protec
87 id. 568.)
tion would be granted to the party or witness by the court
in which the action was pending, which would be respected
by all other courts. We cannot ﬁnd that the power to issue
such a writ has been abrogated by legislation, and it doubt
less exists, and the writ may still be granted by courts pos
sessing a common law jurisdiction; but while the granting
of the writ is proper, it is not necessary for the enjoyment
of the privilege, and the only office which it can perform
is to afford “convenient and authentic notice to those about
to do what would be a violation of the privilege, and to set
(Bridges v.
it forth and command due respect to it.”
The tendency has been not to re
Shieldzm, 7 Fed. R. 44.)
strict but to enlarge the right of privilege so as to afford
full protection to parties and witnesses from all forms of
civil process during their attendance at court and for a
reasonable time in going and returning.
(Larned v. Griﬂin,
12 Fed. Rep. 592.)
Hearings before arbitrators, legislative committees, reg
isters and commissioners in bankruptcy, and examiners and
commissioners to take depositions, have all been declared to
be embraced within the scope of its application.
(Bacon's
Abr. “Privilege”; Sandford v. Chase, 3 Cow. 381; Mat
thews v. Tufts, supra; Hollender v. Hall, 18 Civ. Pro. 394;
19 id. 292; Thorp v. Adams, id. 351; Bridges v. Sheldon;
Plimpton v. Winslow; and Larned v. Griﬂin, supra.) It has
even been extended to a suitor returning from an appoint
ment with his solicitor for the purpose of inspecting a paper
in his adversary’s possession in preparation for an examin
ation before a master, (Sidgier v. Birch, 9 Ves. 69) and

a judicial nature taken in or emanating from
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while attending at the registrar’s office with his solicitor to
settle the terms of a decree (Newton v. Askew, 6 Hare,
319); and while attending from another state to hear an
argument in his own case in the Court of Appeals (Pell's
Case, 1 Rich. L. 197.)
No good reason can be perceived why
the privilege should not be extended to a party appearing
upon the examination of his adversary’s witnesses, where
the testimony is taken pursuant to the authority of law, and
can be read upon the trial with the same force and effect
as if it had been taken in open court.
It is a proceeding
rights, and the
materially
cause,
which
affects
his
in the
necessity for his attendance is quite as urgent as it would
But we do not
be if the examination was had at the trial.
think that the question of the necessity of his presence is
material. It is the right of the party, as well as his privi
to be present whenever evidence is to be taken in the
action, which may be used for the purpose of affecting its
ﬁnal determination.
It is essentially a part of the trial, and
should be so regarded as far as it may be necessary for the
protection of the suitor. There have been many analogous
cases in the Federal Courts where the right to the privilege
has been upheld.
In Bridges v. Sheldon, (supra), the action
was pending in the U. S. Circuit Court for Vermont.
A
reference had been ordered to a master to take and state
an account. The master on motion of the plaintiff had made
an order for the taking of a deposition before a commis
sioner in the state of Iowa. The defendant, while attending
before the commissioner in Iowa, was served with process
in a suit brought by the plaintiff for the same cause of action
Judge Wheeler, in very strong
as in the Federal court.
terms, condemned the procedure, and held that the defendant
was absolutely privileged from service, and that the conduct
of the plaintiff in causing such service to be made was a
contempt of court, and could be punished as such. It seems
that in such a case a party has a two-fold remedy. He may
move in the court, whose privilege has been violated, to pun
ish the party in that court who has been guilty of such
violation, or he may move in the court out of which the
process has been improperly issued to vacate it, and the
motion will be granted.

It
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may be assumed that the plaintiff acted in entire good
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faith, and that his procedure was not a device to secure the
presence of the defendant within the territorial jurisdiction
of the courts of this state. In the view we take of the privi
iege of the defendant, the plaintiff's motive is of no im
portance.
The order of the General Term should be reversed, and
the order of the Special Term affirmed, with costs.
All concur except GRAY, J., dissenting.
-

Order reversed.“

80“Since the obvious reason of the rule is to encourage voluntary
upon courts and to expedite the administration ot justice,
attendance
that reason fails when a. suitor or witness is brought into the jurisdic
tion of a court while under arrest or other compulsion of law. Such a
suitor or witness does nothing to encourage or promote voluntary sub
He comes because he cannot do other
mission to judicial proceedings.
wise. That seems to be the basis for the exception to the general rule
of privilege which is illustrated in cases where persons are brought into
the jurisdiction of a court under extradition from other states or foreign
countries."—Netograph Mtg. Co. v. Scrugham
(1910), 197 N. Y. 377,
But where a witness came voluntarily from Germany to New York
380.
to testify, the service upon him after arrival in New York of a sub
poena in the same action for which he came to testify as a witness, did
not render his subsequent presence involuntary during the life of
the subpoena so as to make him subject to service of process in another
suit:—Bunce v. Humphrey (1915), 214 N. Y. 21.
In Greer v. Young (1887), 120 Ill. 184, the court held, on full con
sideration that the common rule of exemption applied only to arrest
and not to the service of summons, and that it would not extend that
rule. The court said: "The mere service of a summons upon a non
resident, when in another state for the purpose of taking depositions
to be used in an action to which he is a party in his own state, imposes
no greater hardship on him than to be served with process out of his
own state when attending to any other kind of business.
In either
case he is usually aﬂorded ample time to prepare his defense, if he has
any. Parties thus circumstanced have no difficulty in getting a temporary
postponement
or continuance of the causes, when necessary to the at
tainment of justice, or to avert any serious loss or inconvenience."
The
court also held that any rule oi exemption applied only to witnesses
before a lawful tribunal having jurisdiction of the cause, which would
include a master or magistrate or other person taking testimony under
the order of a court in which the cause was pending, but it would not
include a notary public, who, the court said, “can in no sense be regarded
as an instrument or agency of the court in which the suit is pending."
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SOFGE v LOWE

4%

Supreme

Court of Tennessee.
181

1915.

Tennessee, 626

WILLIAMS, J. Sofge, plaintiff in error in this case, in
1913 brought suit in the United States District Court at
Helena, Ark., against Lowe on the same cause of action at
tempted to be asserted in the pending case.
Lowe was and
is a resident of the state of Massachusetts, and went from
there to Helena to attend a trial of the federal court case as
a suitor and necessary witness in his own behalf.
While returning from that place and while passing
through Memphis, Tenn., en route to his home, Lowe was
served with process in this suit. He ﬁled his plea in abate
ment on the ground that he was exempt from the service of
such process while so returning from attendance upon court
at Helena, and this plea was sustained by the trial judge.
The Court of Civil Appeals has affirmed the judgment of the
circuit court, and the case is before us on a petition for cer
tiorari.
The point relied on and pressed by appellant Sofge is that
the exemption from service of process is conﬁned as to en
forcement to the jurisdiction within which was held the
court attended by Lowe; that only the courts of Arkansas,
into which he was drawn by the Helena litigation, will con
cern themselves with his protection from the service of pro
cess.
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The question whether such a suitor is entitled while pass
ing through an intermediate state, in going from or return
ing to his home, to be protected from service in a suit begun
therein, has been decided, it seems, in but two cases. In both
of these the exemption was denied. The authority of these
cases is weakened by the fact that in neither was the decision
by a court of last resort.
The ﬁrst case was that of Holyolce, etc., Co. o. Ambden (C.
C.) 55 Fed. 593, 21 L. R. A. 319, decided by Carpenter, Dis
trict Judge. There Ambden, a citizen of Vermont, was sued
in Massachusetts While journeying through that state to at
tend court in Connecticut.
It was there said:
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“The second contention of the defendant is that the serv
ice of this writ is in violation of the policy of the law which
exempts from service parties and witnesses going to and
from court on the business of the court. An examination of
the cases shows that it has been held that parties to a suit
are exempt from arrest, and in some cases from suit by
summons, while within the jurisdiction of the court on the
business of the court, and that this exemption has in some
cases been extended to witnesses. In none of them however,
has it been held that a party or witness is exempt from serv
ice in any other jurisdiction than that in which his attend
I cannot see any
ance as a party or as a witness is required.
reason for further extending this rule. It is established by
courts to protect their own process and their own suitors,
by the assurance that the court in which the party has
brought his action, or into which he has been summoned,
‘ “ * will not permit its own process, or that of other
courts in the same jurisdiction, in another action,.to em
It seems to me that evils greater
barrass the proceedings.
than these sought to be remedied would arise if the courts
of one state should assume so to guard and protect all the
other courts in the country. The rule is in derogation of
common right, and restrains the plaintiff from suing, lest a
greater evil may arise than that involved in the temporary
suspension of his right to bring his demand into a court of
justice having jurisdiction to determine it. The rule there
fore ought to be extended with great caution, and to extend it
beyond the jurisdiction immediately concerned seems to me
to be unnecessary and mischievous.”
This federal decision was quoted and followed by the court
of common pleas of Susquehanna county, Pa., in the case of
Cronlc 'v. Wheaten, 23 Lancaster Law Rev. 206, 15 Pa. Dist.
Rep. 721, where it was said:
“The researches of diligent counsel have been unable to
ﬁnd and cite any case in any state in which it has been held
that this privilege from arrest or summons on a civil process
extends beyond protecting the party or witness in attendance
upon a court of the state in which the process issued from
which the exemption is claimed. ‘ ‘ "’
Notwithstanding these authorities, we are persuaded that
the true rule was announced by the trial judge and the Court
of Civil Appeals in the instant case.

186

TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE

[Chap.

1

In cases which have had under consideration

the protec
tion of a suitor or witness going from one county in a state
to another and subjected to service in a suit in an interme
diate county-—a closely related point—it has been held that
Tyrone Bank 'v.
there existed the privilege of exemption.
Doty, 2 Pa. Dist. R. 558, 12 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 287; Hoﬁman v.

Judge of Circuit Court, 113 Mich. 109, 71 N. W. 480, 38 L
1
R. A. 663, 67 Am. St. Rep. 458.
A state court will, by way of comity, enforce the privilege
of a witness or suitor who, while attending a federal court,
has been sued in the state court. Sewanee, etc., Co. 11. Wil
lzkims, 120 Tenn. 339; Powell v. Pangborn, 161 App. Div.
See, also, Plimpton '0. Winslow
453, 145 N. Y. Supp. 1073.
(0. 0.) 9 Fed. 365, 20 Blatchf. 82.
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The privilege of immunity from service rests upon grounds
of public policy, and of such policy as it relates to a matter
of supreme importance—the administration of justice. In
order that causes may be fully heard and a just result
reached, and that an orderly and unhampered administra
tion of justice may be assured, the law has announced the
If parties to a pending case, or their
rule of exemption.
witnesses, are liable to be thus sued, they may be intimi
dated and prevented from complying with the foreign court's
mandate, if actually summoned or subpoenaed, or from at
tending voluntarily as is their privilege.
It is against pub
lic policy to permit them to be deterred by fear of being
subjected to suit while attending, or so going or returning.
The principle of public policy is common to Arkansas and
Justice, in such connection, is to be conceived
Tennessee.
of as a thing integral and not partible by state or jurisdic
tional lines; all courts must be presumed to interest them
selves alike in promoting and keeping unhampered its fair
administration. The courts of this state cannot be uncon
cerned in respect of the embarrassment in that regard to be
experienced by the courts of Arkansas if the courts of this
and the other states which surround that state deny to
suitors and witnesses returning to their homes from her
courts this exemption from suit. Of what considerable avail
is it that Arkansas extends her own protection, if the other
states refuse any exertion of their sovereign power through
their courts to the same end?
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The courts of this state will see to it that their processes
are not used to thus embarrass the administration of justice
in a sister state, and we shall expect the courts of- other
Thus, by a species of comity,
states to rule in reciprocation.
a common end will be served. It may be that this cannot
be demanded of us or of other courts, or asked to be extended
except by way of that courtesy which is really comity. Rea
sons of convenience, expediency, and public interest prompt
us to announce this doctrine for our state. A liberal inter
pretation in favor of the privilege is manifested in the au
thorities, state and federal, and we deem our rulings to be
in accord with that trend.
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Since the rule is based upon public policy in the protection
of the administration of justice, and has been extended and
liberalized from time to time on that account, the privilege
is held not to be invokable unless the person’s sole business
in the foreign jurisdiction be to attend upon such litigation.
If with that affair other business be intermingled the pro
Further, under his plea in abatement, the
tection is gone.
burden is on the person sued to establish that his purpose,
and only purpose, in the jurisdiction to or jurisdictions
through which he was called to go or return was that inci
dent to a particular pending litigation which called him from
his home. Finucane v. Warner, 194 N. Y. 160, 86 N. E.
1118; Chaﬁee v. Jones, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 261; Sm;/the v
Banks, 4 Dall. 329, 1 L. Ed. 854.
Content as we are with the rulings of the lower courts, the
writ of certiorari is denied.

,9

GREENLEAF
Supreme

.

v.

PEOPLE'S BANK OF BUFFALO.

Court of North Carolina.
138

1903.

North Carolina, 292.

J., concurring.

The defendant Morey was
served with summons in this case while at a hotel in this
He contends that because he was a lawyer, resident
State.
in another State, and was attending court in this State as
CLARK,

C.
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counsel in a cause therein pending, the service should be
struck out. The proposition is a novel one in a land where
equality before the law is the ruling principle and where
special privilege to any class of our citizens is not only not
recognized by law but is prohibited by the Constitution. A
careful examination shows no ground for the alleged exemp
There is no
tion of lawyers from service of summons.
England
proposition,
and none
precedent in
to sustain the
in this country save a single case, a very recent one-—H0_ﬁ
man v. Circuit Judge, 113 Michigan, 109; 38 L. R. A. 663;
67 Am. St. Rep., 458—which holds that a lawyer, resident
in the same State is privileged from service of a summons
while attending the Supreme Court of the State or going
or returning therefrom, but none of the authorities cited in
The reason given in
that opinion sustain its contention.
the opinion is that while by statute in that State the pro
hibition of the arrest of counsel in a civil suit is restricted
to the actual sitting of a court at which he is engaged, that
this does not repeal the common-law exemption of counsel
from service of summons. But, on the other hand, the most
eminent lawyer which that State (Michigan) has produced,
Judge Cooley, in a note to his work on Constitutional Limi
“Exemption from arrest
tations (5th Ed.), p. 161, says:
is not violated by the service of citation or declaration in
civil cases.” Besides, there was at common law no exemp
tion of lawyers from service of process other than arrest,
and the reason for the latter was that it would be an injury
to clients whose cause had been prepared for trial by such
counsel to suddenly deprive them of his services, but service
of a summons does not have that effect.
In Robbins 12. Lincoln, 27 Fed. Rep., 342 (United States
Circuit Court for Illinois), it is well said: “Inasmuch as
resident attorneys may be served with summons while in
attendance upon court, an attorney from another State has
no greater privilege.” This is exactly in point here. It is
Well known that no lawyer in this State has ever in its his
tory been privileged, or contended even that he was priv
ileged, from service of summons While attending court.
If
Constitution,
were,
as the
he
Art. IV., sec. 22, now provides
that “the courts are always open,” no lawyer or judge could
ever be served with summons. In England, Blackstone says
(3 Bl. Com., 289), that lawyers could not be arrested on

1
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served with a bill, without arrest, which was equivalent to
service of a summons. The same is stated in 8 Bacon's Abr.
“Privilege” B., with the modiﬁcation that if an attorney is
sued with another (as in this case), “he is not privileged
from arrest, even though it is during his attendance in
court,” the evident reason being to prevent class discrim
ination.
The exemption of lawyers from arrest, it seems,
has now been repealed in England. In this State the Eng
lish privilege of exemption of lawyers from arrest has never
It is well known that one of the most
been recognized.
distinguished lawyers and judges of this State, whose por
trait now hangs on the walls of this chamber, was arrested
and imprisoned for debt, and long prevented from attending
This barbarous proceeding of imprisonment
upon court.
for debt, handed down from the common law, should have
been repealed long before it was, but while it was in force
our predecessors applied it impartially, and the bench did
not hold their own members or their ‘profession exempt.
There was not at common law, and has not been in this State,
any exemption of any one from service of summons, and the
exemption from arrest under our statute is conferred only
upon witnesses and jurors‘. The Code, secs. 1367 and 1735.
And even witnesses and jurors are not exempted from serv
ice of summons, since such service would not deprive the
court of their presence. There is no reason why lawyers
should be privileged from either arrest or service of sum
mons any more than other oﬁicers of the court, as sheriﬁs,
clerks, criers and the like, and the legislative power has
therefore seen ﬁt to make the exemption apply only to wit
nesses and jurors, and, as to them, to make the exemption
extend to freedom from arrest only.
As to non-residents, in Cooper 22. W3/man, 122 N. C., 784
this Court held that non-resident witnesses and suitors com
ing into this State solely for the purpose of litigation were
exempt from service while here for that purpose only. This
was put upon the ground of necessity, because the State
could not compel their presence, and that since no one else
could ﬁll their functions it was in the interest of justice to
give them “a safe conduct.”
But this reasoning has not
obtained in some States, notably Illlinois, which holds that
Greer v.
neither are exempt from service of summons.
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In Nichols v. Good
Young, 120 Ill. 184, citing authorities.
5 Ill. App., 574, it was held that a defendant involun
tarily in the State, by virtue of criminal process, is not ex
empt fmm service of summons, citing Williams v. Bacon,
10 Wend. (N. Y.) 636.
Other States hold that the rule is
heart,

witnesses only.
Shearman 12. Gunlatch, 37
Minn., 118. Other States extend the exemption to parties
also since they have become competent as witnesses (Mitch
ell v. Huron, 53 Michigan, 541), and our State has adopted
that rule, but restricts the exemption to those two—“non
resident witnesses and parties.” An exhaustive brief of all
the authorities, showing that the privilege extends only to
non-resident witnesses and parties, will be found in the notes
(eighteen pages) to Mullen v. Sanborn, 25 L. R. A., 721-738.
No court whatever has in any case extended the exemption
"‘
"
"
to non-resident lawyers.
The United States Constitution, Art. I, sec. 6, prohibits the
arrest of a member of the House of Representatives or a
Senator during the session, except for treason, felony and
breach of the peace.
There is a similar provision as to the
members of the Legislature in Nebraska.
The numerous
and uniform authorities that such privilege from arrest does
not exempt from service of process without arrest are col
lected in a very recent and able opinion (1903) in Berlet 11.
Weary, 93 N. W., 238 (Neb.); 60 L. R. A., 609; and in
Rhodes v. Walsh, 55 Minn., 542; 23 L. R. A., 632; Gentry v.
Griﬁith, 27 Tex., 461.
For a stronger reason this is so
where, as in most States as well as in, this, lawyers are not
exempt even from arrest.
In Lg/all v. Goodwin, 4 McLean,
29, a service of a summons from a United States Court upon a
judge of the State Supreme Court, in his own court and
while actually on duty, was set aside because being a sup
posed indignity to the court and interference with its busi
ness.
Even if this can be sustained and extended to counsel,
neither the dignity of the court nor the despatch of business
in this case could be interfered with by the service of sum
mons upon Morey at the hotel.
Nor, in the nature of things, is there any reason why a
non-resident lawyer, coming here for a consideration in the
pursuit of his profession, should be exempt from the serv
ice of summons any more than a non-resident physician or
minister or a member of any other calling. The plaintiff
restricted

to

Sec. 3]
sues

JURISDICTION

191

for services rendered to the defendants in this State
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at their request. If Morey is exempt from service because
here in the exercise of his profession, a “commercial tour
ist” is by the same right exempt from being served with
summons in an action for a hotel bill incurred while prose
secuting his calling. Indeed, his ground for exemption would
be more plausible, for he is engaged in interstate commerce
and the lawyer is not. Service of summons upon neither will
interfere with the dignity of the courts or their despatch of
Our State extends no preference to non-resident
business.
lawyers over those living here. The Code, secs. 18 and 19;
Manning v. Railroad, 122 N. C., p. 828.
As far back as 1769 (10 George III., ch. 50), England
passed a statute conﬁrming the ruling of Sir Orlando Bridge
man in Benyon v. Evelyn Tr., 14 Car., 2 C. B. Roll, over a
century before (1661), and cited in Knowles’ Case, 12 Mod.,
at p. 64 (1694), that the privilege which members of Parlia
ment enjoyed of being exempt from arrest did not exempt
them from being sued or from service of ordinary process
without arrest. The privilege was deemed too invidious a
class privilege even for that age and country, and the claim
was denied by Parliament itself and the contention put at
rest. Cassidey v. Stewart, 2 Man. & G. 437. * * "‘
Equally unfounded is the claim that service upon the
defendant, the officer of a corporation (Jester v. Steam
Packet Co., 131 N. C., 54), was invalid because made when
he was attending a sale of land under a decree of court
Such sale may, like other acts, come before a court for re
view, but the sale itself is not a judicial proceeding, and no
exemption from service of process extends to it. Such ex
emptions are restricted to non-resident witnesses and parties,
and are permitted, not on their own account or for their own
beneﬁt, but for the beneﬁt of the court in obtaining evidence
at a trial, when the court cannot compel the presence of those
who can testify to facts in issue in the litigation. This can
party at
sale,
have no application to the attendance of
cause,
his
own
for
in
the
convenience
or
decree
bene
under
.

The judgment setting aside the service of summons must
be reversed.
DOUGLAS,

J.,

concurs in the above concurring opinion.

TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE

192

Rs

v.

1

Return of Service.

(d)

JONES

[Chap.

BIBB BRICK COMPANY.
p

Supreme Court of Georgia.
'

1904.

120 Georgia, 321.

Motion to set aside judgment. Before Judge HODGES. City
[Judgment set aside.
October 17, 1903.
Court of Macon.

Plaintiff excepted.]
$

LAMAR,

J.
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A summons of garnishment directed to the

Bibb Brick Company
\ty*nic>f*the

was served, August 23, 1902, the re
9ﬁicer__si1_owing that he had served the summons

on_‘LBihb__liIick__C9;,l>y handing thQ_$.amP...t.o Johnlllr-Moore,
*
*
*
The motion to set
._its secI3t_a§y__al1d__treasurer.”
this judgment aside is veriﬁed by Moore, and does not deny
that he was in charge of the office or of the business of the
"‘
"
"
company in the county.
We are therefore to deal
officer, who had made
the
with a case in which the return of
good service, was incomplete and defective in its failure to
allege that Moore, “secretary and treasurer,” was “in charge
of the office or business” of the garnishee at the time the
summons was handed to him in person.
1-7.
Process and service are essential.
But the return,
only
being
evidence of what the officer has done in serving
Still it is manifest that a
the writ, is not jurisdictional.
court ought not to proceed without having a legal return of
record to show that its process had been actually served,
and that it had acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
‘
If there is an entire absence of a return, or if
defendant.
the return made is void because showing service on the
wrong person, or at a time, place, or in a manner not pro
vided by law, the court cannot proceed. Ca-llaway v. Doug
lasville College, 99 Ga. 623. If, however, the fact of service
appears, and the officer’s return is irregular or incomplete,
‘
it should not be treated as no evidence, but rather as furnish
The irregularity
T ing-defective proof of the fact of service.
by
may
cured
an
amendment
which
be
does
not make or
\
state a new fact, but merely supplies an omission in the state
Where there has been valid
ment as to an existing fact.
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service and no return, the deﬁciency may be supplied before
taking further steps in the cause. If there has been service
and a voidable or defective return, it may be amended even
after judgment, so as to save that which has been done
under service valid in fact but incompletely reported to the
court . For in its last analysis it is the fact of service, rathe r
than the proof thereof by the return, which is of vital im-/ I
Ordinarily service is either good or bad. But
portance.
process and return existing in writing may vary between
void, voidable, and perfect. If either is void, the judgment
predicated solely thereon is a nullity. Where process and
return are not void, some classes of defects therein are cured
by judgment. For many things are sufficient to prevent a
judgment from being rendered which would be insufficient
to set aside a judgment actually rendered. Hence the Civil
Code, section 5365, declares that “a judgment cannot be ar
rested or set aside for any defect in the pleadings or record
that is aided by verdict, or amendable as matter of form.”
This right to amend a “return” so as to make it conform to
the facts is allowed on general principles and by our statute.
If the officer is in commission and liable on his bond, he may
make this amendment voluntarily. Civil Code, section 5116.
If he is dead or out of commission, or refuses to make the
return which the facts require, then the amendment may be
ordered by the court nunc pro tunc. " “ ‘
*
"
*
In Hargis v. E. T. Va. & Ga. Ry. Co., 90 Ga. 42,
was
attacked before judgment; there was no
the return
offer to amend, and no proof that the agent was in charge,
or that service upon him would have bound the company.
The court therefore properly declined to enter judgment
In Southern Ry. Co. v. Hagan, 103
against the garnishee.
Ga. 564, the original record shows that the process was
void, and the garnishee attacked the judgment not on the
ground that the return was defective but because it had
never been served with a summons of garnishment.
But
none of these cases determine what would have been the
effect of valid process and perfect service, with an incom
plete or defective return where the judgment rendered
thereon was attacked and the motion to set aside and evi
Such was
dence thereunder showed valid service in fact.
the case of Third National Bank v. McCullough, 108 Ga.
249, where the service was perfect, but the return failed to
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recite that Hawkins, president, was in charge; and yet the
judgment against the garnishee by default was allowed to
stand, there being no allegation in the attack thereon that
Hawkins was not in fact the agent of the bank, in charge
of its affairs in the county. ' " '
Under the authorities, therefore, it is evident that the de
fective return might have been amended to conform to the
facts, and that such amendment when made would have
related

back so as to make the record

complete and the

judgment perfect. But it may be claimed that here the de
fect was never cured, since no amendment was ever made.
None was necessary. Whatever may be the rule in ordinary
cases, both the allegations and the silence of this motion make
it certain that the garnishee had been duly served.

I I I I I I I I I I

Judgment reversed.

All

the justices concur."

Return is not jurisdictional, and an amendment may be allowed
sustain a judgment:
Schmidt v. Stoiowski (1905). 126 Wis. 55;
Herman v. Santee (1894), 103 Cal. 519, overruling Reinhart v. Lugo
(1890), 86 Cal. 395, 21 Am. St. Rep. 52, note; Ferguson's Ad'm. v. Teel
(1886), 82 Va. 690; Brown v. Atwater (1879), 25 Minn. 520.
81

<,I,i~"

to

BRADLEY MFG.
Supreme

CO. v.

BURRHUS.

Court of Iowa.
185

1907.

Iowa, 824.

‘said

is

it

Action‘ on a promissory note. The note was executed by
Daniel Arnold to plaintiﬂ’, and on the back thereof appears
the name of defendant Burrhus as guarantor of payment.
Both Arnold and Burrhus were named as defendants in the
petition, and Arnold was personally served with notice. As
to Burrhus,
the return of the serving officer that the
notice was served “by leaving a copy thereof at the house of
A. P. Burrhus, in Liberty township, Buchanan county,
with Mrs. Burrhus, his wife,” etc. Arnold appeared and ﬁled
answer and counterclaim.
Burrhus did not appear, and he
adjudged
default,
was
to be in
and judgment was entered
against him for the amount due on the note. In this situation,

Sec. 3]

JURISDICTION

195

plaintiff dismissed as to the defendant Arnold. Thereafter
Burrhus appeared and moved that the default and judgment
against him be set aside, on this, among other grounds:
“That the court had no jurisdiction to enter judgment against
this defendant; there having been no proper service and re
turn of notice of the action upon him.” With the motion, the
defendants presented a joint answer denying liability on the
note, and the defendant Arnold repleading, and insisting upon
his counterclaim and demand for a judgment in his favor.
The motion to set aside was sustained on the ground stated,
and from such ruling plaintiff appeals.
Aﬂirmed.
BISHOP, J. The motion was supported by an affidavit to the
effect that the residence of Burrhus at all the times in ques
tion was in the incorporated town of Quasqueton, a town situ
ated within the boundary lines of Liberty township, in Bu
The fact thus set forth was not denied by
chanan county.
plaintiff, and on such affidavit, and the matters of record in

"
‘ " Plaintiff
the case, the motion was submitted.
ﬁled resistance based on the grounds: First, that the return
second, that de
of service * "‘ ‘ was sufficient * *
"
"'
"
_
actL1_§l.k_n9wledge>of_thc-service-of-the
fendant
had
" "' "
> original notice upon his

';

The ﬁrst question, then, with which we have to deal is,
stated generally: Did the court have jurisdiction in fact to
render the default judgment? While the question is not alto
gether free from difficulty, we are agreed that it should be
answered, as it was answered by the court below, in the nega
tive. To begin with, it is clear that essential to authority to
proceed to judgment there must be not only service of notice,
but a return of service. 18 Ency. of Pl. & Pr. 905. Now, as
provided by statute, one method of making service of notice
is by substitution; that is, by leaving a copy at the usual place
of residence of the defendant with some member of his fam
ily, etc., when the defendant is not found within the county of
his residence. Code, § 3518. And in respect of the required
return, it must state at whose house the copy was left, “and
that it was the usual place of residence of the defendant, and
the township, town or city in which the house was situated,
the name of the person with whom the same was left," etc.
Code, § 3519. These provisions of statute must be considered
The method of procedure is extra
mandatory in character.
ordinary in character, and allowable only because speciﬁcally
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authorized; and, in common with other legislative acts which
mark a departure from the ordinary, the provisions must be
strictly construed in the sense, at least, that the operation
Bell
thereof may not be abridged or extended by the courts.
'v. Stevens, 116 Iowa, 451, 90 N. W. 87.
Now, it will be observed that on its face the return of
service indorsed on the notice here in question made showing
that all the requirements of the statute had been complied
with. This being true, we have a case of false return, and
not a case of defective or incomplete return, as argued by
counsel for appellant.
And the return is confessedly false, in
that the place of residence of the defendant and the place of
making service was therein incorrectly stated. From this.
Is the failure of an
the question takes on this speciﬁc form:
officer to correctly state the facts respecting a substituted
service made by him fatal to jurisdiction?
As ground for
question in the validity of a judgment, a direct attack upon
the return of an officer is proper to be made under the rule of
this court. Wyland 1). Frost, 75 Iowa, 209. 39 N. W. 241:
Browning '0. Gosnell, 91 Iowa, 448, 59 N. W. 340. And it
would seem that a denial of jurisdiction ought to follow
where, under an attack coming thus, it is made to appear that
the false statement was of and concerning any matter made
material by the statute to perfect service. Under the statute,
substituted service can be made in but one place, and that the
If made elsewhere, it is
place of residence of the defendant.
void. And this was regarded of such materiality that the re
quirement was included that the officer must not only certify
to the fact of service as having occurred at the place, but he
must certify to the township-, town or city in which such
As said in Le Grand 11.
place is located and can be found.
Fairall, 86 Iowa, 211, 53 N. W. 115: “The statute is the only
authority for a substituted service, and the facts to justify it
It is not enough, therefore, that the copy of
must appear.”
the notice was left at the right place, and with a proper per
The return must show the facts, and show them truth
son.
fully. It is the return upon which authority to proceed de
pends, and as the court would not enter a judgment upon a
false return, if advised in advance, it should be free to set
aside, as between the parties, at least, when subsequently the
*
*
*
falsehood is made to appear.
But counsel for ap
pellant seem to think that the false statement of the return
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should not be regarded as fatal, inasmuch as the town of
Quasqueton was situated within the limits of Liberty town
ship, and hence in the material sense the service was in that
township. In view of the language of the statute, this can
not be accepted as correct. As we have seen, the statute de
mands strict compliance, and an officer is not at liberty to act
otherwise than as directed either as to service or return.
Now, towns and townships are distinct entities, and it must
be considered that the Legislature had a purpose in requiring
that a return must state speciﬁcally in what particular town
ship, town, or city service was made. We need not stop for
It is enough
extended inquiry in respect of such purpose.
that in authorizing an extraordinary proceeding the material
requirements to valid action are set forth, and it is not for us
to say that any one of these requirements so made material
may be dispensed with without infraction of the legislative
purpose and intention.
Coming to the second question as made in the case, it need
only be said that, as the statute prescribes the method of
bringing a party into the court, it can be done in no other
way; and the cases are uniform to the effect that his knowl
edge, otherwise acquired, of the pendency of the proceedings,
is matter of no moment. He is not chargeable until he be
comes a party, and he can be made a party only by proper
service of notice or by voluntary appearance.
On the considerations thus expressed, we reach the conclu
sion that the ruling of the trial court should be, and it is,

affirmed."
Co. v. Paciﬁc Selling C0.
as Return is jurisdictional:-—Albright-Pryor
(1906), 126 Ga. 498; Wood v. Callaway (1904). 119 Ga. 801, where there
was good service but the return did not show it; Brown v. Langlois
(1879), 70 Mo. 226; Johnson v. Delbridge (1877), 35 Mich. 436; Rosen
berger v.
Ore. 41.

Gibson

(1901),

165

Mo.

16;

Harris

v.

Sargeant

(1900),

37
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1910.

51 5.

KEITH, P. The People’s Bank ﬁled its bill in the circuit
court of Dickenson county to enforce the lien of a judgment
against J. E. L. Sutherland, Newton Sutherland, S. F. Suther
land, and S. J. T. Powers upon a note in which J. E. L. Suther
land was the maker and the others indorsers in the order
named.
Process was regularly served upon all of the de
fendants in person, except J. E. L. Sutherland, and as to him
the sheriff's return states that on the 13th day of February,
1909, he executed “by leaving a copy of the within summons
posted at the front door of his usual place of abode in Dick
enson county, Va., he, the said J. E. L. Sutherland, not being
found at his usual place of abode, and neither his wife nor
any member of his family over 16 years of age being found
at his usual place of abode on whom service of process could
be had.”

J. E. L.

Sutherland has ﬁled neither plea nor answer in the
case, but his codefendants pleaded that the judgment to en
force which the bill was ﬁled was obtained upon a negotiable
note executed by J. E. L. Sutherland and indorsed by the
other defendants in the order named, and that, if paid by any
one of the indorsers, such indorser so paying it would be en
titled to subrogation against the prior indorsers and against
the maker of the note; that the said J. E. L. Sutherland has
never been summoned as required by law to answer the bill;
and that the return by the sheriff upon the process against
the said J. E. L. Sutherland is false, because the sa.id-Suther
land'has’had'n'o’"usuai‘place of abode in said county at any
time since the institution of this suit, all of which the defend
ants were ready to verify. “Wherefore, for as much as the
said J. E. L. Sutherland is not yet before this court with these
defendants so that satisfaction can be paid out of his property
ﬁrst, or complete justice be done all the parties defendant to
said bill, these defendants pray judgment whether this court
can or will take any further cognizance of the cause afore
said, and pray judgment of the said writ and return thereon,
and that the same be quashed. "- " - ""’
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To this plea in abatement, which it is proper to say was
ﬁled within the time prescribed by law, the plaintiff de
murred, and contends that the sheriif’s return as to all it con
tains is conclusive, and cannot be contradicted by evidence
aliunde; * "‘ *
*
*
*
The court sustained the demurrer.
The principal contention in this case arises upon the return
of the sheriff on the process issued against J. E. L. Suther
land.
Q

Min. Inst. pt.

Q

#

I

¥

1

¥

#

$

i

p. 1042, states the law as follows:
“The
better opinion is believed to be that the officer's return upon
process, although it be false, is still conclusive in the suit, the
remedy for the party aggrieved by the false return being an
action for damages against the officer and his sureties. It is
no doubt a hardship upon one against whom a judgment is
rendered upon such false return, he having had no knowledge
of the pendency of the suit, and no opportunity to defend him
self; but, on the other hand, it would occasion delays and
hindrances in the administration of justice, which would
work still greater mischiefs, if it were allowed to impeach the
returns of sworn officers and so annul the proceedings
founded thereon.”
The question has been considered and decided in the fol
lowing cases from the Supreme Court of West Virginia, a
state whose statutes upon the subject are similar to. if not
identical with, our own: Rader '0. Adamson, 37 W. Va. 582,
16 S. E. 808; McClung v. McWh0'rter, 47 W. Ya. 150, 34 S. E.
740, 81 Am. St. Rep. 785; Talbott v. Southern Oil Co., 60 W.
Va. 423, 55 S. E. 1009, where it is said that “if a return of
service of a summons commencing a suit is sufficient on its
face, such facts stated therein as it was the duty of the officer
to set forth in it cannot be put in issue by either a plea in
abatement or a motion to set aside a judgment by default.
For reasons of public policy, contradiction of such returns is
not permitted in any form, except upon allegations of fraud
4

or collusion.”

In

1,

‘

law is thus stated: “The question of
the conclusiveness of the return is one upon which there is
The English
an utterly irreconcilable conﬂict in authority.
common-law rule, which is also the rule in many American
states, is that, as between parties and privies, the return of
32 Cyc. p. 514, the
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an officer is to be taken as true, as to all matters which are
properly the subject of a return by the officer, and it can be
controverted only in an action against the officer for a false
return, unless it is contradicted by other matters appearing
of record in the case, or unless the false return was procured
or induced by plaintiff, or resulted from the mistake of the
officer, except where the return forms the basis for a foreign
'
judgment, in which case it is prima facie evidence only."
In Tillman v. Davis, 28 Ga. 494, reported also in 73 Am.
Dec. 786, the syllabus states that “the sheriff's return of
service on writ cannot be traversed by parties or privies, ex
cept for fraud or collusion"; and in the course of the opinion
Judge Lumpkin says:
“I have investigated carefully and
traced the question to its fountainhead, and ﬁnd it well settled
that by the common law no averment will lie against the sher
iff"s return, and one reason assigned amongst others is that
he is a sworn officer, to whom the law gives credit."
It is conceded by appellants that such is the law where, as
in Preston 1:. Kindrick, 94 Va. 760, 27 S. E. 528, a bill was
ﬁled asking for relief against a decree by default, or, as in
Ramsburg 'v. Kline, 96 Va. 465, where the relief was asked
against a judgment by default; but it is earnestly contended
that the law is otherwise where the attack is made upon the
return of a sheriff in a pending suit by proper plea in abate
ment.
The cases which we have cited make no such distinction,
and the reasons of public policy upon which they rest seem to
apply equally to.both classes of cases.

i

U

i

¥

i

Q

$

i

Q

1

Upon the whole case we are of opinion that there is no er

ror to the prejudice of appellants, and the decree of the cir
cuit court is affirmed.
Aﬁirvmerl.”
88In Miedreich v. Lauensteln (1913), 232 U. S. 236, it was
was not a
the rule making the sheriffs return conclusive
due process of law.
A federal court sitting in a state which adheres to this
Mechanical Appliance C0. v. Castleman (1910),
not follow lt:
437.

held that
denial of
rule.

will

215 U. S.
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1888.

Minnesota, 805.

Appeal by the plaintiff from an order of the municipal
court of St. Paul, setting aside a judgment by default.
MITCHELL, . Judgment by default was rendered against
defendant in the municipal court of St. Paul, upon the return

J

of a police officer that

he had served the summons upon de

fendant in the city of St. Paul, Ramsey county, by leaving a
copy at his last usual abode, with a person of suitable age
and discretion then resident therein. Subsequently the judg
ment was vacated, on motion of defendant made on affidavits
showing that he was not and never had been a resident of
Ramsey county, but at the time of the alleged service was and
ever since has been a resident of Steele county. The plaintiff
presented no counter-affidavits, but relied on the conclusive
ness of the officer's return,—contending that it could not be
impeached; that, if false, defendant’s only remedy was by ac
tion against the officer.
This question has never been squarely decided by this court,
-—at least as to a return on original process. " * "
" The rule of the English common law is that, as
between the parties to the process or their privies, a sheriff’s
return is conclusive, and that the court will not try the truth
of it on motion to set aside the proceedings, or allow any aver
ment against it to be taken in pleading; that, if false, the only
remedy is against the sheriff by action. Com. Dig. tit.
“Re
torn" F 2 and G. The reason usually given for the rule is
that it is necessary to secure the rights of the parties, and
give validity and effect to the acts of ministerial officers. In
England, process could only be served by the sheriff, who was
the only ministerial officer known to the courts for that pur
pose. Moreover, under the common law practice which ob
tained there, it was almost impossible for judgment to be
rendered against a party without actual personal notice to
him. Under such a system, the rule might be convenient, and
without much danger of working injustice.
But, under the practice which obtains in this and other
states, most of the old safeguards have been removed; and

' '
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the necessity for modifying the rule, and adapting it to the
changed condition of the law, has been often felt and fre
quently acted upon, especially in the case of original process
by which the court acquires jurisdiction.
In the district court
a summons may be served by any person not a party to the
action, and his affidavit of service is placed virtually on the
same footing as the return of the sheriff.
In the municipal
court of St. Paul the summons may be served by any police
man. The remedy by action for false return, under such a
system, would often be inadequate or wholly fruitless. Again,
the manner of service has been in other respects so materially
changed that actual personal service is unnecessary, and the
ofﬁcer making service must often return as to facts not within
his personal knowledge, but in the determination of which he
must frequently rely upon information received from others.
For example, service may be made by leaving a copy of the
summons at the house of defendant's usual abode, with a
person of suitable age and discretion then resident therein.
In case of corporations service may be made, not only on cer
tain speciﬁed general officers, but also, in certain cases, upon
a managing or general agent. or even upon an acting ticket
or freight agent. In case of minors under 14 years, the
service must be both on the minor personally, and also upon
his father, mother, or guardian, or, if none, upon the person
having the care or control of the minor, or with whom he
resides, or by whom he is employed. How can a sheriff de
termine where a man resides, or who resides with him, or
who is the ticket or freight agent of a railway company, or
who has the care or control of a minor, or by whom he is em
ployed, except upon information?
And why should his re
turn as to these facts be conclusive?
If the oﬂicer makes a
mistake, why should the defendant be compelled to allow the
judgment against him to stand, and resort to his suit against
the ofﬁcer, instead of being permitted to apply in a direct pro
ceeding in the action to set aside the false return? We can
see no good reason why the plaintiff should have a sum of
money to which he is not entitled, and the officer be compelled
to pay the defendant a like sum for making what ma_v have
been an honest mistake.
If somebody must suffer loss for the
mistake, it is right it should fall on him who made it; but, if
discovered in time to prevent loss to anyone, why should not
the mistake be corrected on motion?
There are very good

\
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reasons why the return of a ministerial ofﬁcer should be held
conclusive in all collateral proceedings, but we can see none,
either upon principle or considerations of policy, why it may
not be impeached for falsity in direct proceedings in the ac
tion; assuming always, of course, that no rights of third par
Any evils or inconvenience which can
ties have intervened.
possibly arise from permitting this to be done would, in our
judgment, be greatly outweighed by the injustice that would
often result from prohibiting it. The general tendency, es
pecially in states having a Code practice like ours, is to allow
the return to be impeached by an affidavit, on motion or other
direct proceedings to vacate. Bond 12. Wilson, 8 Kan. 228;
Walker 'v. Lutz, 14 Neb. 274, (15 N. W. Rep. 352) ; Wendell
v. Mugridge, 19 N. H. 109; Carr v. Commercial Bank, 16 Wis.
52; Stout v. Sioux City & Paciﬁc Ry. Co., 3 McCrary, 1, (8
Fed. Rep. 794); Van Rensselaer 12. Chadwick, 7 How. Prac.
297; Wallis 1;. Lott, 15 How. Prac. 567; Watson. 12. Watson, 6
Conn. 334; Rowe 'v. Table Mt. Water Co., 10 Cal. 442.
Some of the cases seem to make a distinction between
mesne and ﬁnal process and the original process, like a sum
mons, by which the court acquires jurisdiction of the defend
ant. We confess that we cannot see at present why there
should be any such distinction; but, without deciding that
question, we are of opinion that, upon a motion made in the
action to vacate a judgment by default on the ground of no
service of the summons, the return of the oﬁicer may be im
peached by aﬁidavits, as was done in this case.

Order aﬂirmed.“

:4 See The Sheriffs Return, by E. R. Sunderland, 16 Columbia L. Rev.
281, where the origin and present status of the rule prohibiting the
It is
falsiﬁcation of the sheriff's return on direct attack are discussed.
there shown that the great majority of the American states have more
or less completely abandoned the common law rule that the sheriffs
return could not be falsiﬁed.
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WOODRUFF v. TAYLOR.
Supreme

Court of Vermont.
20 Vermont,

1847.

65.

[Trespass for taking certain personal property. Defend
ant pleaded that he commenced a suit against one Phelps
Smith in the court of King’s Bench, in Montreal, Canada, and
recovered a judgment, and the property in question was levied
upon at his instance as the property of Smith and sold after
due notice; that at the time of these proceedings it was the
custom and law in Montreal that any person claiming any
interest in property levied upon and sold on execution, must
enter his appearance in court when the proceeds of the sale
are returned, or be forever barred from asserting any title to
said goods; that the present plaintiff did not appear in said
court, and distribution of the proceeds was made to the pres
ent defendant and others. To this plea plaintiff replied that
he was at all times mentioned therein a citizen and resident
of the United States and that he had no notice of the proceed
ings. A demurrer to this replication was sustained]
HALL, . A second argument having been directed in this
case, it has perhaps assumed an importance in the eyes of
the counsel, which its intrinsic diﬁiculties may not seem to
warrant; but which may, nevertheless, justify a more ex

J

tended opinion, than would otherwise have been deemed’ nec
essary.
The question raised by the pleadings is, what is to be the
effect of the proceedings in the King's Bench in Canada upon
one not personally amendable to its tribunal_.—when
those
proceedings are used here, in another and foreign jurisdic
tion? It is insisted, in behalf of the defendant, that the rec
ord pleaded, in connection with the custom and law of Canada
set forth in the plea, is to be considered as conclusive evi
dence, that the matter now in controversy between the plain
tiff and defendant has been adjudicated by a competent tri
bunal, and that therefore the plea is a good bar to the action.
This renders it necessary to inquire into the nature of those
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proceedings, in reference to their sufficiency to constitute a
record of estoppel.
Judgments, in regard to their conclusive effects as estop
pels, are of two classes ;-judgments in personam and judg
ment in rem. The judgment pleaded in this case cannot be
supported as a judgment in personam, because the court ren
dering it has no jurisdiction of the person of the plaintiff, he
being a citizen of another government and having no notice
of the suit. As a proceeding against his person, the judgment
was coram non judice, a mere nullity. This is too plain to
need argument, and is, indeed, conceded by the counsel for
the defendant, who insist, that it is an estoppel as a proceed
ing in rem,—that although not binding on the person, it is
binding on the property in controversy and concludes its title.
A judgment in rem I understand to be an adjudication. pro
nounced upon the status of some particular subject matter, by
a tribunal having competent authority for that purpose.
It
this,
differs from a judgment in personam in
that the latter
judgment is, in form as well as substance, between the par
ties claiming the right; and that it is so inter partes appears
by the record itself. It is binding only upon the parties ap
pearing to be such by the record and those claiming by them.
A judgment in rem is founded on a proceeding instituted, not
against the person, as such, but against or upon the thing or
subject matter itself, whose state, or condition, is to be deter
mined. It is a proceeding to determine the state, or condi
tion, of the thing itself; and the judgment is a solemn decla
ration upon the status of the thing, and it ipso facto renders
it what it declares it to be.
The probate of a will I conceive to be a familiar instance of
a proceeding in rem in this state. The proceeding is, in form
and substance, upon the will itself. No process is issued
against any one; but all persons interested in determining the
state, or condition, of the instrument are constructively noti
ﬁed, by a newspaper publication, to appear and contest the
probate; and the judgment is, not that this or that person
shall pay a sum of money, or do any particular act, but that
It deter
the instrument is, or is not, the will of the testator.
subject
proceeding.
status
matter
of
the
mines the
of the
The judgment is upon the thing itself; and when the proper
steps required by law are taken, the judgmeht is conclusive,
least so
and makes the instrument, as to all the world,
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property of the testator within this state is con
cerned,) just what the judgment declares it to be. This is
one instance of a proceeding upon a written instrument, to
determine its state, or condition; and that determination, in
its consequences, involves and incidentally determines the
rights of individuals to property affected by it.
But proceedings in rem may be and often are upon personal
chattels, directly declaring the right to them. In such cases
the proceeding is for the supposed violation of the property,
so to speak, of some public or municipal law, or regulation,
by which it is alleged the title of the former owner has be
come divested.
The property being seized, a proceeding is
then instituted against it, upon an allegation stating the cause
for which it has become forfeited; upon which public notice
is given, in some prescribed form, to all persons to appear and
It is by no means certain, that all per
contest the allegation.
sons having an interest in the property have actual notice of
the proceeding; but if the thing itself, upon which the pro
ceeding is had, be within the jurisdiction of the court, all
as the

persons interested are held to have constructive notice; and
the sentence, or decree, of the court, declaring the state, or
condition, of the property, is held to be conclusive upon allvthe
world. A sale of the property, under such sentence, passes
the right absolutely; and farther, in the case of judgments of
courts of admiralty, they are also held to be conclusive evi
dence of the facts stated in the decree to have been found by
And perhaps the judg
the court, as the basis of the decree.
ments of municipal courts, acting in rem, within the sphere
of their jurisdiction, would have the same effect.
These proceedings, that have been mentioned, are purely
in rem. But, besides these, there is another class of cases,
which may perhaps be considered, to some extent, proceed
ings in rem, though in form they are proceedings inter partes.
An attachment of property in this state, where the court has
jurisdiction of the property, but not of the person of the de
fendant, and a sale of it (or a levy upon it, if it be real es
tate,) on execution, is in the nature of a proceeding in rem.
The judgment, if the defendant have no notice, would be
treated as a nullity out of our jurisdiction, so far as the per
son of the defendant was concerned; though it would be held
binding, as between the parties, so far as regarded the prop
erty, as a proceeding in rem. The defendant would not, I ap
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prehend, be allowed to recover back his property in another
jurisdiction.
The status of the property, as between the
defendant,
plaintiff and
would be held to have been deter
mined by the proceeding.
But the proceeding would not in
way
any
affect the status of the property as to any other per
sons, than the parties to the record and those claiming by
them.
Our proceeding of foreign attachment partakes, perhaps
still more, of the nature of a proceeding in rem; but its opera
The suit is inter
tion as such is also of a limited character.
partes, and, as a proceeding in rem, it must be conﬁned to
such parties. A process is issued in favor of a plaintiff, de
claring against his debtor residing in another government,
and alleging, also, that another person here, named in‘ the
process and styled a trustee, has goods in his hands belong
ing to the plaintiff's debtor, or is indebted to him, and pray
ing that the goods or debt found here may be declared for
feited to the plaintiff, or in other words, that the property
here may be applied in payment of the plaintiff's demand. I
conceive the court here has jurisdiction of the property in
the hands of the trustee, or the debt due from him,—it being
found in our jurisdiction,--and that the court may proceed
After publication, by which the debtor is
upon it in rem.
constructively notiﬁed of the proceeding against his property.
the court adjudicates upon the property and declares that it
shall be delivered, or paid, to the plaintiff, to be applied upon
his debt. I think such adjudication changes the status of the
property, or debt, and deprives the principal debtor of all
title to it; that such adjudication should be held binding and
conclusive upon all the parties to the proceeding; that the
foreign creditor of the trustee, having placed his property, or
his credit, within this jurisdiction, should be bound by its
forfeiture, declared by our courts; and that he should be
barred, in any other jurisdiction, from prosecuting his claim
against the trustee. But the operation of this proceeding in
rem must be limited to the parties to it, and cannot in any
manrer affect the right or interest of any other person, hav
ing an independent and adverse claim to the goods, or debt,
which was the subject matter of the suit. The court does not
pretend to notify such adverse claimant, either constructively,
or otherwise; nor does the proceeding profess to determine
the rights of any other persons, than those who are parties of

A
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it can, consequently, affect the rights of no

The distinction between proceedings purely in rem and
those of a limited character, which have been mentioned, I
think is strongly and plainly marked. The object and pur
pose of a proceeding purely in rem is to ascertain the right of
every possible claimant; and it is instituted on an allegation,
that the title of the former owner, whoever he may be, has
become divested; and notice of the proceeding is given to the
whole world to appear and make claim to it. From the nature
of the case the notice is constructive, only, as to the greater
part of the World; but it is such as the law presumes will be
most likely to reach "the persons interested, and such as does,
in point of fact, generally reach them. In the case of a seiz
ure for the violation of our revenue laws, the substance of
the libel, which states the grounds on which the forfeiture is
claimed, with the order of the court thereon, specifying the
time and place of trial, is to be published in a newspaper, and
posted up a certain number of days; and proclamation is also
made in court for all persons interested to appear and contest
the forfeiture. And in every court and in all countries, whose
judgments are respected, notice of some kind is given. It is,
indeed, as I apprehend, just as essential to the validity of a
judgment in rem, that constructive notice, at least, should
appear to have been given, as that actual notice should ap
pear upon the record of a judgment in personam. A proceed
ing professing to determine the right of property, where no
notice, actual, or constructive, is given, whatever else it might
be called, would not be entitled to be digniﬁed with the name
of a judicial proceeding. It would be a mere arbitrary edict,
not to be regarded anywhere as the judgment of a court.
Bradstrcct 12. Neptune Ins. Co., 3 Sumn. 607.
The limited proceedings in rem, before mentioned, are not
based on any allegation, that the right of property is to be
determined between any other persons than the parties to the
suit; no notice is sought to be given to any other persons; and
the judgment being only as to the status of the property as
between the parties of record, it is, as to all other persons, a
mere nullity.
If we apply these principles to the record pleaded in bar in
this case, I think it would be impossible to maintain, that, as
\ to the plaintiff Woodruff, it was a proceeding in rem. There
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was no allegation, that the status of the property, levied upon
as the property of Phelps Smith, or the avails of it, when paid
into court, was to be adjudicated as to him, and there was no
notice, actual, or constructive, to him, to appear and make any
claim to it. The judgment was rendered in a suit inter
partes, in which Taylor was plaintiff and Phelps Smith de
fendant; and though it bound the property as between them,
it could affect the rights of no other person. It is precisely
the case of the levy of an execution, in this state, upon per
sonal property, as that of the judgment debtor, of which prop
erty some third person claims to be the owner. If such third
person were to bring trespass against the judgment creditor
for making the levy, I do not perceive why such creditor, with
the same propriety as the defendant in this case, might not
plead his levy and sale in bar as a proceeding in rem. The
record in this case, indeed, shows, that the levy was made in
the presence of a Recors, which a levy in this state would not;
but I apprehend the high standing or official character of the
witnesses to a trespass would not purge its illegality, or bar
a right of recovery.
But the record of the judgment in the King’s Bench wholly
fails to show, that the right of the plaintiff in this suit to the
property was attempted to be adjudicated; and there is no
The plea
averment in the plea, that it was adjudicated.
states, in substance, that, by the law of Canada, it would have
been adjudicated, if the plaintiff had appeared in the court
And by the facts set forth
and made claim to the property.
in the plea we are given clearly to understand, that it was not
adjudicated, because the plaintiff did not so make his claim.
It would therefore be impossible to maintain this plea, as fur
nishing evidence that the matter in controversy in res adjudi
cata, even if the plaintiff had had notice of theproceeding.

If

the plea could, under such circumstances, be sustained,
even in the courts of Canada, it would not be because the
matter had been adjudicated, but because the plaintiff, hav
ing neglected to have his claim adjudicated at the time and
in the manner pointed out by the laws of that province, was
thereby barred of any other remedy. The plea does not aver,
that the property of the plaintiff, being found in the posses
sion of Phelps Smith, in Canada, might for that reason, or
for any other reason, be legally levied upon and sold as the
property of Smith. It in effect admits, that the original levy
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upon the plaintiff’s property was wrongful, but proceeds upon
the ground, that, by reason of the subsequent proceedings, the
wrong cannot now be redressed. The original right of action
of the plaintiff is conceded, but it is insisted, that, by some
thing arising ex post facto, his remedy is gone. It is not a
bar to the right that is relied upon, but a bar to the redress.
This ground of defense would therefore seem to rest upon a
local law of the province of Canada, which affects the plain
tiff’s remedy only, but which, by the well settled doctrine of
the common law, can be of no avail, when a remedy is sought
in another jurisdiction.
But it is unnecessary to consider farther, what might have
been the effect of the defendant’s plea, if the plaintiff. at the
time, had been a resident of Canada; because it seems quite
clear, that it can have no effect whatever upon the cause of
action of one who was, during the whole proceeding, a resi
dent citizen of another government, not subject to the law of
the province, and who had no notice of the proceeding.
Story’s Conﬁ. of Laws, 487.
The result is, that the judgment of the county court is re
l
versed, the replication is held sufficient, and the case is re
manded to the county court for the trial of the issue of fact."
85

Quoted with approval

in Windsor v. McVeigh (1876),

93 U.

S. 274,
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BEAN,
.
This is a suit to set aside a conveyance from A.
C. and Laura R. Richardson to their minor children of certain
lands in Benton county, on the ground that it was made for
the purpose of defrauding creditors, and especially this plain
tiff. The complaint avers, in effect, that on April 21, 1894,
the plaintiff commenced three actions in the circuit court for
Multnomah county—one against the defendant A. C. Richard
son, another against him and his wife, Laura R. Richardson,
and the third against him and one J. T. Dook—to recover
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upon promissory notes of the respective

defendants, and
caused the real property, in question to be attached in each o1’
suchvactions; that such proceedings were had therein that the
plaintiff recovered judgments against the defendants, where
in it was ordered that the property attached be sold, and the
proceeds applied to the payment thereof; that a few days
before the commencement of such actions, and after the in
debtedness upon which they were based had accrued, the de
fendants A. C. and Laura R. Richardson, with intent to in
jure and defraud the plaintiff, and without any consideration,
conveyed the premises in question to their minor children,
who are made defendants in this suit. The answer puts in
issue the material allegations of the complaint, and alleges
that the conveyance referred to was made for a valuable con
sideration, and in payment of a debt due from the grantors to
the grantees. At the time the several actions referred to in
the pleadings were commenced and the judgments therein
rendered, the Richardsons were nonresidents of the state, and
service of the summons was had upon them by publication.
The plaintiff, at the trial, to maintain the issues on its part,
and to prove the existence of the several judgments and or
ders of sale as alleged, offered in evidence copies of the com
plaint, affidavit, and undertaking on attachment, writ of at
tachment and return thereon, affidavit and order for publica
tion of summons, proof of publication and of deposit in the
post office, and the judgment in each of such actions, to the
admission of which the defendants objected for the reasons
that (1) it does not affirmatively appear in either case, except
in the affidavits for an order of publication, that a summons
was issued at the time or before the writ of attachment;
‘ " "' These objections were overruled, and the records ad
mitted in evidence, and of this ruling the defendants com

plain.
The argument in support of the ﬁrst objection is that, the
judgments in question having been rendered against nonresi
dents of the state upon service of the summons by publication,
the facts essential to the jurisdiction must affirmatively ap
pear upon the face of the record, and, since an attachment of
the property of a nonresident is, under the doctrine of Pen
no)/er v. Neﬂ’, 95 U. S. 714, a necessary preliminary jurisdic
tional step in such cases, the record must affirmatively show,
even on a collateral attack, that all the requirements of the
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statute in reference to the issuance and levy of attachment
have been strictly complied with; and, _as the writ cannot
regularly issue before the summons (White v. Johnson, 27 Or.
282, 40 Pac. 511), it is claimed that the judgments in question
are void, because it does not affirmatively appear from any
competent evidence tliat the summons had, in fact, been is
sued at the date of the writ.
If this question was here on appeal from the judgments
1.
of the circuit court of Multnomah county, we might not ﬁnd
it easy to affirm them on satisfactory grounds; but we occupy
no such position.
The records are introduced collaterally as
evidence to sustain the allegations of the complaint in the suit
now pending, and we cannot, therefore, disregard them, or
refuse to give effect to the judgments, on any other ground
than a want of jurisdiction in the court which rendered them.
Any errors or irregularities in the records are of no avail in
this proceeding unless they be such as show that the court
had no jurisdiction.
Our inquiry, therefore, must be conﬁned
to the question as to whether the error alleged affects the
jurisdiction of the court, and in its consideration it is proper
to bear in mind that there is no statute of this state making
the seizure under an attachment or otherwise of the property
of a nonresident an essential or necessary jurisdictional pre
requisite in,an action against him. We are not called upon,
therefore, to consider the effect of the failure of the record
in such an action to affirmatively show that all the statutory
jurisdictional requirements have been complied with, al
though even in such case the presumptions in favor of juris
diction will often be suﬂicient to sustain the judgment when
collaterally assailed. Applegate '0. Mining Co., 117 U. S. 255,
6 Sup. Ct. 742.
The rule requiring the property of a nonresident in an
2.
action on a money demand to be seized under a writ of at
tachment, and thus brought under the control of the court,
before any steps are taken looking to the publication of the
summons, is wholly a judicial, and not a legislative, require
ment.
By the ruling in Pennoyer 12. Neff, supra, the proceed
3.
ings in such an action, even if they conform strictly in every
particular to the requirements of the statutes of this state,
are ineffectual unless some property of the defendant in the
state is brought, at the inception of the case, under the con
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trol of the court, and subject to its disposition by a writ of
attachment or other process adopted for that purpose; and
then only to the extent of adjudging that the property so
seized is liable for the satisfaction of plaintiff's demand. In
other words, the effect of that decision is that an action
against a nonresident, who is not personally served with pro
cess within the territorial limits of the court, or does not ap
pear in the action, is substantially and to all intents and pur
poses a proceeding in rem, and therefore the property to be
affected by the adjudication must be brought under the con
trol of the court in the ﬁrst instance by an attachment, or
some other equivalent act. The soundness of this doctrine is,
of course, not to be questioned, but, in our opinion, its re
quirements are satisﬁed, and the court acquires sufficient
jurisdiction of the rem to protect its proceeding from collat
eral attack, when the property of the defendant has been ac
tually brought within the power and control of the court by
a seizure under a lawful writ of attachment issued in the ac
tion, although there may be irregularities, or even error, in
‘
the attachment proceedings.
4.
Under our system an attachment is merely auxiliary,to
the main action, and there is no difference in the proceedings
thereon in an action brought against a nonresident, upon
whom service is necessarily made by publication, and in one
brought against a resident of the state, in which personal
service is had. In either case the proceedings on attachment
have nothing to do with the merits of the cause of action or
the jurisdiction of the court to try and determine the contro
versy between the parties.
If personal service is had, the
cause becomes a mere action in personam, with the added in
cident that the property attached remains liable for any judg
ment the plaintiff may recover. But, if service is had by pub
lication, and there is no appearance for the defendant, the
action is practically a proceeding in rem against the attached
property, the only effect of which is to subject it to the pay
ment of the amount which the court may ﬁnd due the plain
tiff. Where no personal service is had, the res is brought
within the power and control of the court by a seizure under
a writ of attachment.
is/}
It is the
acquired only by the publicat,,i_011-~0£-the-summons.
substituEd servicefand not the seizure, which gives the court
jurisdiction to establish by its judgment a demand against
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the defendant, and to subject the property brought within its
custody to the payment of that demand. In other words, the
authority to hear and proceed to judgment depends upon the
service of the process and the actual seizure of the thing to be
concluded by the judgment, and not upon the regularity of
the proceedings by which the control of the property was ac
When, therefore, the court has the de facto custody
quired.
of the property by virtue of a de facto writ of attachment,

§

a

it

is

3

gw,

and a right to determine whether such property shall be sub
ject to the payment of plaintiﬁ"s demand by virtue of con
structive service of process, it has full and complete jurisdic
tion in the premises, and subsequent errors or irregularities
in the proceedings will not be available on collateral attack.
A judgment founded on service of process by publication is.
of course, ineffectual unless it is an adjudication concerning
property which the court has in its custody under some lawful
process, because there is nothing upon which it can operate;
but where the property has been actually seized and brought
within the control of the court by some process authorized by
and the right to determine its liability for the demands
of the plaintiff is subsequently acquired by publication, an
error of the court in determining the status of the property
r its liability, or the \8.l1d1l'.y of the attachment can, it seems
o us. no more affect the jurisdiction under a statute like ours
han an erroneous decision as to the amount of plaintiff's de
and, or any other error in the case. Van Fleet, Coll. Attack,
§§ 257, 838; Paul 'v. Smith, 82 Ky. 451; Barelli 77. Wagner
(Tex. Civ. App.) 27 S. W. 17; Thompson v. Eastburn, 16 N.
J. Law, 100; Diehl o. Page, N. J. Eq. 143.
5.
There
much conﬂict in the authorities generally as
to whether the statutory prerequisites to the issuance of writs
of attachment are jurisdictional, and must affirmatively ap
pear, to protect the proceedings from collateral attack, or
whether, in the absence of any showing in the record to the
contrary,
will be presumed that the steps necessary to vest
the court with jurisdiction were taken.
Mr. Waples states
with apparent conﬁdence that all the statutory requirements
are jurisdictional, and are not to be presumed after judgment,
even on
collateral attack, and cites a large number of cases
which more or less directly support the text (Wap. Attachm.
625); while Mr. Works, with equal conﬁdence, says that,
while there are authorities holding that such proceedings are
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special, and that no presumptions in favor of the jurisdiction
of the court can be indulged, “the clear weight of authority
and reason
to the contrary” (Works, Courts
ur. p. 547)
Fleet,
and this seems to be the view of Judge Van
as will be
seen by reference to the citation from his work on Collateral
Attack, already made. An examination of the cases cited,
however, will show that they are based largely, if not entirely,
upon the peculiar provisions of the statute under considera
therefore practically impossible to
tion by the court, and
deduce from them any general rule upon the subject. And
is unnecessary for us in this case to attempt to do so. for, as
we have already intimated, the necessity for an attachment,
an action brought in this state against
in the ﬁrst instance,
the outgrowth entirely of
a nonresident,
decision of the
supreme court of the United States, and not of any statute
law or decision of this state; and we therefore feel justiﬁed
in following the adjudications of that court to the effect, as
we understand them, that the judgment of a superior court
against a nonresident cannot be attacked collaterally for any
defect in the attachment proceedings where such proceedings
are not made, by statute, jurisdictional, unless the record
affirmatively shows
want of jurisdiction.
In the leading case of Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350, in which
it is held that, where a judgment of superior court relating
to a matter falling within the general scope of its powers is
produced, jurisdiction will be presumed in the absence of an
aﬁirmative showing to the contrary, but if, in rendering the
judgment, the court was not proceeding according to the
against
non
course of the common law, or the judgment
resident, who was not personally served within the territo
rial limits of the court, and did not appear in the action, the
authority for its rendition must appear upon the face of the
record, Mr. Justice Field says (page 371):
“The qualiﬁca
tion here made that the special powers conferred are not ex
im
ercised according to the course of the common law
portant. When the special powers conferred are brought
into action according to the course of that law—-that is, in the
usual form of common-law and chancery proceedings-by
personal judg
regular process and personal service, where
asked, or by seizure or attachment of the
rnent or decree
in rem
judgment
sought, the same pre
where
property
sumption of jurisdiction will usually attend the judgments of
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Again, in Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308, where
writ of attachment, as well as the pre
in an affidavit for
mature issuing of the writ, was set up to defeat the title to
judgment in an action against nonresidents
land sold under
was
who had been served with summons by publication,
held that jurisdiction of the res was attained by the levy of
the writ, and that the errors and irregularities pointed out
collateral attack. Mr. Justice Miller,
were of no avail on
after discussing the essential principles underlying the juris
diction of the courts in proceedings by attachment against
nonresidents who are not served with process within the ter
ritorial limits of the courts, and do not appear in the action,
says: “Now, in this class of cases, on what does the jurisdic
tion of the court depend? It seems to us that the seizure of
the property, or that which, in this case, is the same in effect,
the levy of the writ of attachment on it, is the one essential
unquestionably
requisite to jurisdiction, as
in proceed
this,
in
purely
ings
rem. Without
the court can proceedlno
further; with it, the court can proceed to subject that property
to the demand of plaintiff. If the writ of attachment
the
lawful writ of the court, issued in proper form under the seal
by the proper officer levied upon prop
of the court, and
erty liable to the attachment, when such
writ
returned
into court the power of the court over the res
established.
the preliminary to issuing the writ.
The affidavit
It may
be a defective affidavit, or possibly the officer whose duty
to issue the writ may have failed in some manner to observe
all the requisite formalities; but, the writ being issued and
levied, the affidavit has served its purpose, and, though
re
visory court might see in some such departure from the strict
direction of the statute sufficient error to reverse the judg
ment, We are unable to see how that can deprive the court of
the jurisdiction acquired by the Writ levied upon defendant’s
property.” This case has been often quoted and approved by
said in Matthews '0. Densmore, 109
the supreme court, and
Sup. Ct. 126, to be conclusive in regard to the
U. S. 216, 219,
validity of such proceedings when collaterally assailed. To
Wall. 328; Ludlow v.
the same effect, see Harvey v. Tyler,
Ramsey, 11 Wall. 581; Grign0n’s Lessee v. Astor,
How. 319.
that the objection that
The result of these cases
6.
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does not aﬁirmatively appear that a summons was issued in
the action brought by the plaintiff against the Richardsons in
Multnomah county at or before the issuance of the writ of at
tachment is of no avail in this suit.
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BAKER, ECCLES &
of the United States.

Afﬁrmed.

CO.
1917.

United States, 894.

PITNEY, J. The Federal question presented in this record
is whether the court of appeals of Kentucky gave such faith
and credit to certain judicial proceedings of the state of Ten
nessee as were required by art. 4, § 1, of the Constitution. and
the act of Congress passed in pursuance thereof (Act of May
26, 1790, chap. 11, 1 Stat. at L. 122, Rev. Stat. § 905, Comp.
Stat. 1913, § 1519).
The facts are as follows: Charles Baker died in Septem
ber, 1912, the owner of certain real and personal property in
Hardin county, Tennessee, and of 270 shares of stock of
Baker, Eccles, & Company, a Kentucky corporation, of the
par value of $27,000, and a claim of several thousand dollars
against that corporation for surplus proﬁts. He left a widow,
Josie C. Baker, now plaintiff in error, and a mother, Augusta
H. Baker, one of the defendants in error. He appears to have
left no children or descendants, nor any considerable indebt
edness, and the personal estate, if distributable according to
the laws of Tennessee, would go entirely to the widow; if dis
tributable according to the laws of Kentucky, it would go one
half to the widow, the other half to the mother. The place of
his domicile, admittedly determinative of the law of distribu
tion, was in controversy.
Shortly after his death the widow applied to the county
court of Hardin county, Tennessee, for letters of administra
tion. The proceedings were ex parte, and her application was
granted, the order of the court appointing her administratrix
reciting that at the time of his death the residence of Charles
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Baker was in that county. Afterwards, and in December,
1912, the widow presented to the same court a settlement of
her accounts as administratrix, and an order was made recit
ing that it appeared from proof that Charles Baker died in
testate, and at the timeof his death was a resident of Hardin
county, Tennessee, and that he left no children or descendants
of such surviving, but left surviving his widow, the said Josie
C. Baker, and under the laws of Tennessee she, as widow, was
entitled to all of the surplus personal property; whereupon it
was ordered that she, as administratrix, transfer and deliver
to herself, as the widow of the deceased, all of the personal
estate in her possession, including the stock in the Kentucky
corporation, the certiﬁcates for which she held. Subsequent
ly, and on December 28, 1912, the widow, individually and as
administratrix, ﬁled in the chancery court of Hardin county,
Tennessee, her bill of complaint against Mrs. Augusta H.
Baker, the mother, as a nonresident of Tennessee and a resi
dent of the state of Kentucky. " "' " Upon the ﬁling of the
bill an order of publication was made, citing Augusta H.
Baker as a nonresident to make defense upon a day named,
and, she having failed to appear, the bill was taken for con
fessed against her, and eventually a decree was made “that
the said Charles Baker at the time of his death was a citizen
of and had his domicile at Savannah, Tennessee, and that
as his widow, is his sole distributee,
the complainant,
and as such entitled to all of the personal estate of the said
Charles Baker, after payment of such debts as were owed by
him at the time of his death,” and also that the title to the
stock of Baker, Eccles, & Company was in complainant, and
that she was entitled to have a new certiﬁcate or certiﬁcates
in her own name issued by the corporation in lieu of the
certiﬁcates issued to said Charles Baker, and was entitled to
receive from the corporation the amount of the accumulated
proﬁts and surplus and other amounts due from it to the
decedent.

i
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In June, 1913, the widow, individually and as administra
trix of Charles Baker, began a suit in equity in- the McCracken
county circuit court, which resulted in the judgment now un
Baker, Eccles, & Company was made defendant.
der review.
The widow's petition, after setting up the orders and judg
ments of the Tennessee courts and alleging her sole owner
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ship of the personal estate of the deceased by virtue thereof,
prayed that the corporation be required to transfer to her
individually the 270 shares of stock adjudged to her by the
Tennessee chancery decree, and also prayed judgment for
$11,429.17, the alleged indebtedness due from the corporation
to her husband at the time of his death. Baker, Eccles, &
Company ﬁled an answer putting in issue all the averments
of the petition. Mrs. Augusta H. Baker, the mother, came
into the suit by an intervening petition, in which she averred
that Charles Baker died a resident of the state of Kentucky,
and that, under the laws of that state, she was entitled to
one half of the shares of stock and of the debt sued for,
‘ * ‘ She further put in issue the validity. of the orders
and judgments in both the Tennessee courts, averring
that so far as they determined that Charles Baker died a
resident of that state, and that his widow was entitled to
the.wh0le of his personalty after payment of his debts, they
were void, because neither of the Tennessee courts had juris
The pleadings
diction to make such orders or judgments.
having been made up, evidence was taken on the issue of fact
as to the domicile of Charles Baker at the time of his death.
Upon this evidence, the records of the judicial proceedings
above mentioned, and a showing of the pertinent Tennessee
law, the case was submitted for hearing, and it was adjudged
that the widow's petition be dismissed. The widow appealed
to the Kentucky court of appeals, and that court "‘ * *
held that the judgments of both Tennessee courts were in
valid as against the mother because entered without process
of law as against her; and then, passing upon the question of
fact as to the domicile of Charles Baker, found upon the evi
dence that he was domiciled in the state of Kentucky and his
personalty was distributable according to the laws of that
state, and affirmed the judgment, with a modiﬁcation direct
ing the lower court to enter a judgment that Charles Baker
died a resident of Kentucky, that his mother and his widow
were each entitled to one half of his personal estate situate
in Kentucky at the time of his death, after the payment of
his debts, that Baker, Eccles, & Company should cancel all
certiﬁcates of stock issued to Charles Baker, and reissue one
half of these to the widow and the other half to the mother,
and that the lower court embody in the judgment such other
matters as would, after the payment of debts, distribute
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equally between the widow and the mother all other personal
estate situate in Kentucky of which Charles Baker died pos
sessed.
162 Ky. 683, L. R. A. 1917C, 171, 173 S. W. 109. To
review this judgment upon the Federal question, the widow
brings the case here upon writ of error.
No question is made by defendants in error but that the
Tennessee courts had general jurisdiction over the subject
matter, nor that the proceedings were in conformity with the
The sole question is
Tennessee statutes respecting practice.
whether they were entitled, under the Constitution of the
United States and the act of Congress, to recognition in the
courts of Kentucky as adjudicating adversely the mother's
asserted right to share as distributee in the personal property
situate in Kentucky, or as conclusively determining the fact
of the domicile of the decedent as affecting that right, in view
of the failure of the Tennessee courts to acquire jurisdiction
over her person or over the corporation, Baker, Eccles, &
Company.
It is the fundamental contention of plaintiff in error that
the personal estate of an intestate decedent is a legal unit,
having its situs at the owner’s domicile; that the title to the
whole of it, wherever situate, is vested in the duly qualiﬁed
domiciliary administrator, and not in the distributees, and
that its distribution is governed by the law of the domicile of
Wilkins v. Ellett, 9 Wall. 740, 19 L. ed.
the deceased owner.
586, 108 U. S. 256, 27 L. ed. 718, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 641.
Con
ceding that such is the general rule of law, it is so not because
of any provision of the Federal Constitution, but only because
the several states, or most of them, have adopted it from the
common law into their respective systems. And the question
remains, How is the fact of decedent’s domicile to be judicially
ascertained as a step in determining what law is to govern
Obviously, if fundamental principles of
the distribution?
justice are to be observed, the ascertainment must be accord
ing to due process of law; that is, either by a proceeding in
rem in a court having control of the estate, or by a proceeding
in personam after service of process upon the parties to-be
affected by the judgment.
We have no concern with the effect of the Tennessee judg
ments upon the distribution of so much of decedent's person
alty as was situate within that state. The present action af
fects only the ownership of shares of stock in a Kentucky cor
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poration having no situs outside of its own state, so far as
appears, and a claim of indebtedness against the same cor
poration. For the purpose of founding administration, it is
commonly held that simple contract debts are assets at the
domicile of the debtor, even where a bill of exchange or prom
issory note has been given as evidence. Wyman v. Halstead
(W1/man v. United States) 109 U. S. 654, 656, 27 L. ed. 1068,
1069, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 417. The state of the debtor’s domicile
may impose a succession tax. Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S.
189, 205, 47

L.

ed. 439, 444, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 277.

It

is equal

ly clear that the state which has created a corporation has
such control over the transfer of its shares of stock that it
may administer upon the shares of a deceased owner and tax
the succession. See Re Bronson, 150 N. Y. 1, 9, 34 L. R. A.
238, 55 Am. St. Rep. 632, 44 N. E. 707 ; Re Fitch, 160 N. Y.
87, 90, 54 N. E. 701; Greves v. Shaw, 173 Mass. 205, 208, 53
N. E. 372; Kingsbury v. Chapin, 196 Mass. 533, 535, 82 N. E.
700, 13 Ann. Cas. 738; Dixon v. Russell, 79 N. J. L. 490, 492,
76 Atl. 982; Hopper v. Edwards, 88 N. J. L. 471, 96 Atl. 667;
People v. Griﬂith, 245 Ill. 532, 92 N. E. 313. The rule gen
erally adopted throughout the states is that an administrator
appointed in one state has no power virtute oﬂicii over prop
erty in another. No state need allow property of a decedent
to be taken without its borders until debts due to its own citi
zens have been satisﬁed; and there is nothing in the Constitu
tion of the United States aside from the full faith and credit
clause to prevent a state from giving a like protection to its
own citizens or residents who are interested in the surplus
after payments of debts. All of which goes to show, what
plaintiff in error in effect acknowledged when she brought her
present action in a Kentucky court, that the Tennessee judg
ments had no effect in rem. upon the Kentucky assets now in
controversy. ' "' "
So far as the case for plaintiff in error depends upon the
adjudication of domicile by the county court of Hardin county,
Tennessee, for the mere purpose of appointing an administra
trix, it is controlled by Thormann v. Frame, 176 U. S. 35-0.

L.

ed. 500, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 446, and Overby v. Gordon, 177
214, 227, 44 L. .ed. 741, 746, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 603. But,
S.
U.
it is pointed out, in this case the county court went beyond
the bare appointment of an administratrix, and proceeded to
a settlement and distribution of the estate. Moreover, plain
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tiff in error relies not merely upon this judgment, but upon
the decree in the chancery court of the same county, which in
form speciﬁcally determined her exclusive right to the Ken
tucky personalty. It results, however, from what we have al
ready said, that this right could not be conclusively estab
lished by any Tennessee court as against a resident of Ken
tucky who was not served with process and did not appear
therein, and that the Kentucky courts did not go counter to
the Federal Constitution and the act of Congress in refusing
to give faith and credit to the Tennessee judgments.
In many forms, and with much emphasis, the plaintiff in
Starting from
error presses the argument ab inconvenienti.
proposition
personalty
the
that the entire
of an intestate de
cedent, wherever in fact located, is a unit, having its legal
situs at the owner's domicile, and that its distribution ought to
be in accordance with the law of that domicile, it is argued:
How is it possible to judicially determine that domicile under
the theory of the Kentucky court of appeals in the case of an
intestate entitled to personalty in several states having dif
ferent laws of distribution, and with parties claiming to be
Assuming a
distributees residing in different jurisdictions?
lawful grant of_administration in each state wherein part of
the personalty is located and some of the possible distributees
reside, how, it is asked, is any one of these administrators, or
any one of the claimants of a share in the whole estate, to
have the place of the intestate’s domicile settled authoritative
ly and the lawful distributees ascertained?
The answer is
clear: Unless all possible distributees can be brought within
the jurisdiction of a single court having authority to pass
upon the subject-matter, either by service of process or by
their voluntary appearance, it must in many cases be impos
sible to have a single controlling decision upon the question.
In some cases, the ideal distribution of the entire personal
estate as a unit may thus be interfered with; but whatever in
convenience may result is a necessary incident of the opera
tion of the fundamental rule that a court of justice may not
determine the personal rights of parties without giving them
an opportunity to be heard.

Judgment aﬂirmed.
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United States, 215.

[Balk sued Harris in North Carolina for $180. Both par
ties resided there. Harris pleaded in bar a judgment ren
dered against him as garnishee for the same debt in an action
brought by one Epstein against Balk in Baltimore, Md.]
PECKHAM, J. The state court of North Carolina has re
fused to give any effect. in this action to the Maryland judg
ment; and the Federal question is whether it did not thereby
refuse the full faith and credit to such judgment which is
required by the Federal Constitution. If the Maryland court
had jurisdiction to award it, the judgment is valid and en
titled to the same full faith and credit in North Carolina that
it has in Maryland as a valid domestic judgment.
The defendant in error contends that the Maryland court
obtained no jurisdiction to award the judgment of condemna
tion, because the garnishee, although at the time in the state
of Maryland, and personally served with process therein, was
a nonresident of that state, only casually or temporarily with
in its boundaries; that the situs of the debt due from Harris,
the garnishee, to the defendant in error herein, was in North
Carolina, and did not accompany Harris to Maryland; that,
consequently, Harris, though within the state of Maryland,
had not possession of any property of Balk, and the Maryland
state court therefore obtained no jurisdiction over any prop
erty of Balk in the attachment proceedings, and the consent
of Harris to the entry of the judgment was immaterial. The
plaintiff in error, on the contrary, insists that, though the
garnishee were but temporarily in Maryland, yet the laws of
that state provide for an attachment of this nature if the
debtor, the garnishee, is found in the state, and the court ob
tains jurisdiction over him by the service of process therein;
that the judgment, condemning the debt from Harris -to Balk,
was a valid judgment, provided Balk could himself have sued
Harris for the debt in Maryland. This, it is asserted, he could
have done, and the judgment was therefore entitled to full
faith and credit in the courts of North Carolina.
The cases holding that the state court obtains no jurisdic
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tion over the garnishee if he be but temporarily within the
state proceed upon the theory that the situs of the debt is at
the domicile either of the creditor or of the debtor, and that it
does not follow the debtor in his casual or temporary journey
into another state, and the garnishee has no possession of any
property or credit of the principal debtor in the foreign state.
We regard the contention of the plaintiff in error as the
correct one. The authorities in the various state courts upon
They have been col
this question are not at all in harmony.
lected by counsel, and will be found in their respective briefs,
and

it is not necessary to here enlarge upon them.

Attachment is the creature of the local law; that is, unless
there is a law of the state providing for and permitting the
attachment, it cannot be levied there. If there be a law of the
state providing for the attachment of the debt, then, if the
garnishee be found in that state, and process be personally
served upon him therein, we think the court thereby acquires
jurisdiction over him, and can garnish the debt due from him
to the debtor of the plaintiff, and condemn it, provided the
garnishee could himself be sued by his creditor in that state.
We do not see how the question of jurisdiction vel non can
properly be made to depend upon the so-called original situs
of the debt, or upon the character of the stay of the garnishee,
whether temporary or permanent, in the state where the at
tachment is issued. Power over the person of the garnishee
confers jurisdiction on the courts of the state where the writ
issues. Blackstone '0. Miller, 188 U. S. 189-206, 47 L. ed. 439
If, while temporarily there, his
445, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 277.
creditor might sue him there and recover the debt. then he is
liable to process of garnishment, no matter wher the situs of
the debt was originally. We do not see the materiality of the
expression “situs of the debt,” when used in connection with
attachment proceedings. If by situs is meant the place of the
creation of the debt, that fact is immaterial. If it be meant
that the obligation to pay the debt can only be enforced at the
situs thus ﬁxed, we think it plainly untrue. The obligation of
the debtor to pay his debt clings to and accompanies him
wherever he goes. He is as much bound to pay his debt in a
foreign state when therein sued upon his obligation by his
creditor, as he was in the state where the debt was contracted.
We speak of ordinary debts, such as the one in this case. It
would be no defense to such suit for the debtor to plead that
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was only in the foreign state casually or temporarily. His
obligation to pay would be the same whether he was there in
It is nothing but
that way or with an intention to remain.
obligation
This
pay
garnished
or
attached.
to
which is
the
obligation can be enforced by the courts of the foreign state
after personal service of process therein, just as well as by
If the debtor
the courts of the domicile of the debtor.
foreign
a judgment
state without appearing,
leave the
by default may be entered, upon which execution may
issue, or the judgment may be sued upon in any other
state where the debtor might be found. In such case the situs
is unimportant. It is not a question of possession in the for
eign state, for possession cannot be taken of a debt or of the
obligation to pay it, as tangible property might be taken pos
Notice to the debtor (garnishee) of the com
session of.
mencement of the suit, and notice not to pay to his creditor,
is all that can be given, whether the garnishee be a mere
casual and temporary comer, or a resident of the state where
the attachment is laid. His obligation to pay to his creditor
is thereby arrested, and a lien created upon the debt itself.
Cahoon v. Morgan, 38 Vt. 236; National F. Ins. Co. v. Cham
bers, 53 N. J. Eq. 468, 483, 32 Atl. 663. We can see no reason
why the attachment could not be thus laid, provided the credi
tor of the garnishee could himself sue in that state, and its
laws permitted the attachment.
There can be no doubt that Balk, as a citizen of the state of
North Carolina, had the right to sue Harris in Maryland to
recover the debt which Harris owed him. Being a citizen of
North Carolina, he was entitled to all the privileges and im
munities of citizens of the several states, one of which is the
right to institute actions in the courts of another state. The
law of Maryland provides for the attachment of credits in a
case like this.
he
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The judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina
must be reversed, and the cause remanded for further pro
ceedings not inconsistent with the opinion of this court.
HARLAN and DAY,

JJ.,

Reversed.
dissented [without opinion].
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IRVINE, C. December 17, 1889, Thomas Wolfe commenced
an action against Joseph Blahak and another, in the county
court of Butler county, to recover the sum of $282.60 on
promissory note. He caused an attachment to be issued
against Joseph Blahak, on the ground of
fraudulent removal
and sale of the latter’s property. The attachment was levied
on certain corn, as the property of Blahak. The summons in
1890, returned “Not found,” and,
the case was, January
down to the trial of the present action, no further steps had
been taken in the attachment case. February 15, 1890, Mack,
the defendant in error, commenced the present action in re
plevin against Darnell, the sheriff who held the corn under
the writ of attachment.
The case was tried in 1891 to the
jury, and there was
court, without the intervention of
ﬁnding and judgment for the plaintiff, from which the sheriff
prosecutes error.
The plaintiff claimed the property by virtue of a chattel
mortgage from Blahak. The defendant undertook to justify
under the writ of attachment.
" there having been
It is, however, contended that
no service of process, either actual or constructive, upon the
defendant in the attachment case, the attachment was void,
and the officer therefore showed no right against the plaintiff.
We presume that the ﬁnding of the district court was based
on this theory, and such a ﬁnding was warranted by the cases
of Westcott v. Archer, 12 Neb. 345, 11 N. W. 491, 577, and
Grebe v. Jones, 15 Neb. 312, 18 N. W. 81. The course of the
decisions in this state has been somewhat peculiar, and calls
for attention.
Crowell v. Johnson,
Neb. 146, was an action of ejectment,
in which the plaintiff claimed by deed from one Dawley, and
judgment in
sale made under
the defendant by virtue of
an action wherein the land had been attached as the property
The court held that jurisdiction had been ac
of Dawley.
quired by the levy of the order of attachment, and that
fail
nonresident,
ure to publish notice,—the defendant being
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while it rendered the proceeding voidable, did not render it
void. The title under the judicial sale was therefore sus
tained. In Wescott v. Archer, supra, the facts were the same,
and the form of action the same. The majority of the court,
without referring in any way to Crowell '0. Johnson, held di
rectly to the c0ntrary,—that is, that the judgment was void
The chief defect
because the published notice was defective.
in the notice was that it did not describe the property at
tached. Judge Lake dissented. In Grebe v. Jones, supra, the
court had rendered judgment in an action in which land had
been attached,—the defendants being nonresidents, the pub
lished notice not properly describing the lands attached. The
district court, on motion, set aside the judgment. From that
order, proceedings in error were prosecuted. The majority
of the court, although that was a direct proceeding to vacate
the judgment, and not a collateral attack, held that the notice
was suflicient, and overruled Wescott v. Archer, in so far as
it held a speciﬁc description necessary, but took occasion to
express its continued belief that notice was necessary to the
jurisdiction of the court. “ * *
Judge Drake expressed himself, without qualiﬁcation, in
favor of the doctrine that, so far as the attached property is
concerned, jurisdiction attaches by virtue of the levy of a
lawfully issued writ, but that a judgment without service of
process upon or notice to the defendant is erroneous, although
not void. Drake, Attachm. § 436, et seq. In a later work
(Waples, Proceedings in Rem, § 593 et seq.), the position
seems to be taken that by the levy of the writ the court ob
tains lawful custody of the attached property, but is without
In 1 Wade, Attachm.
jurisdiction to proceed to judgment.
6,
44,
45,
distinction
between
jurisdiction,
the
so far as
§§
acquiring the lawful custody of the res, and jurisdiction for
the purpose of rendering ﬁnal judgment disposing of the res,
is denied. The argument is largely in the form of a criticism
of Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308. * "‘ ’ In the,two
works cited, while the authors express opinions opposed to
the authority of the court to proceed, they practically admit
that the weight of authority is against their opinions, but
hold that certain well-considered cases support their views.
Of the cases cited by them, we ﬁnd none which support the
view that a judgment rendered in such proceeding is without
jurisdiction, so far as it affects the attached property, except
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Haywood v. Collins, 60 Ill. 328, and King v. Harrington, 14
Mich. 532. To these may be added Wescott v. Archer, supra.
We will not burden the opinion by reviewing the other cases
cited by them, to show their inapplicability.
Some of them
were direct proceedings to reverse such a judgment, where
the question was one, not of jurisdiction, but of error in the
proceedings.
Others were where such a judgment had been
rendered in one state, the attached property exhausted, anal
action brought in another state on the judgment as if it were
Still others were under statutes which ﬁxed
one in personam.
a deﬁnite time within which, after the issuance or levy of the
attachment, process must be served upon the defendant, with
a provision for vacating the attachment if this were not done.
A valuable case of this class, although not cited by the text
writers, is Trust Co. 1). Keeney, 1 N. D. 411, 48 N. W. 341.
On the other hand, we have, in the ﬁrst place, Cooper -v.
Reynolds, supra, in which the supreme court of the United
States, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Miller, clearly elucidated
the peculiar character of actions accompanied by attach
ments, saying: “If the defendant appears, the cause becomes
mainly a suit in personam, with the added incident that the
property attached remains liable, under the control of the
court, to answer to any demand which may be established
against the defendant by the ﬁnal judgment of the court.
But if there is no appearance of the defendant, and no service
of process on him, the case becomes, in its essential nature,
a proceeding in rem, the only effect of which is to subject the
property attached to the payment of the demand which the
The court then
court may ﬁnd to be due to the plaintiff.”
proceeds to hold that the jurisdiction depends upon the law
ful seizure of the property, and that subsequent defects may
To the same
render the judgment erroneous, but not void.
effect is Paine v. Mooreland, 15 Ohio, 435; In re Clark, 3
Denio, 167; Beach 'v. Abbott, 6 Vt. 586; Williams v. Stewart,
3 Wis. 678; Field 7). Dortch, 34 Ark. 399; Hardin 21. Lee, 51
Mo. 241.

*

*

*

Attachment is, it is true, in this state, a remedy merely an
cillary to the personal action, where the defendant is within
the jurisdiction of the court and lawfully summoned. At the
same time, even in such cases, there is a distinction between
personal jurisdiction, so as to permit an adjudication of the
principal action, and jurisdiction of the attached property
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for the purpose of placing it in the lawful custody of the court
pending the main action. For the purpose of the attachment,
an action is commenced when a petition is ﬁled and a sum
mons issued, with the bona ﬁrle intention that it shall be
served (Coﬁman v. Brandhoejfer, 33 Neb. 279, 50 N. W. 6),
although jurisdiction of the person of the defendant had not
In the case of a defendant beyond the
been then obtained.
jurisdiction of the court, the action is analogous to a proceed
ing in rem.

Substituted service cannot confer personal juris
diction, and, although the requisites for such service be
strictly pursued, jurisdiction attaches no further than to per
mit the court to subject the attached property to the satisfac
tion of any claim found due.
a judgment rendered in such a case, without substituted
service upon the defendant, is erroneous merely, as we now
hold, and not void, then it follows that the property is
throughout in the lawful custody of the court, and that the
sheriff’s possession under the levy of the attachment remains
lawful, so long as the proceedings are pending. If, on the
contrary, we should follow the doctrine of Wescott v. Archer,
one of two courses must be taken: We must hold either that,
becausQ of the failure of the plaintiff to take proper steps to
obtain substituted service, all the proceedings became void,
and that the sheriff was, like the famous “six carpenters,” a
trespasser ab initio, or else that jurisdiction attached on the
levy of the writ, and his custody was then lawful, and that it
The ﬁrst
was lost at some point pending the proceedings.
unreasonable
unjust
be
as
as
it
would
be
would
and
course
impracticable. The sheriff, when he receives a valid writ of
attachment, is bound to levy it. We cannot permit him to in
quire then, for his own protection, whether the plaintiff will
properly proceed with the subsequent stages of the case. We
cannot subject him to liability for performing his clear duty
because the plaintiff, entirely independent of his control,
neglects such subsequent steps. Nor do we think that the
second course is open. If the writ levied before process is
served is valid, and if a judgment rendered in pursuance of
such levy without process is absolutely void, there must be
some point between levy and judgment at which jurisdiction
is lost, and where it becomes the duty of the sheriff, without
an order of the court, to surrender the attached property.
Our statutes provide for no such procedure, and we know no
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possible way in which the court can determine the point down
to which jurisdiction over the attached property extends, and
after which it is lost, unless we say that jurisdiction attaches
for a reasonable time, to permit the plaintiff to publish notice.
How is such reasonable time to be determined?
An attach
ment is allowed (Code, § 198), not only when the defendant is
a nonresident of the state, or has absconded or left the coun
try to avoid service of summons, but also where he conceals
himself so that a summons cannot be served upon him, and in
such cases (Code, § 77) service may be had by publication.
There may be many actions aided by attachment where the
plaintiff is not only justiﬁed, but required, if he have a due
regard for his oath, to make investigations, after the com
mencement of the action, to ascertain the whereabouts of the
defendant; and in such cases the law never contemplated that
the continuance of the court’s jurisdiction should depend
upon the hour or the day when the plaintiff elected between
actual and constructive service, and proceeded to have process
executed. There is in such case a plain remedy always open,
where property is unreasonably detained in custody without
taking steps to authorize a ﬁnal adjudication. The court in
such case may, on the motion of an interested party, or on its
own motion, dismiss the case for want of prosecution; and,
with the dismissal of the case, there is no doubt that the at
tachment would fall with it, and further jurisdiction over the
attached property cease. In'the case before us, no defect is
pointed out in the institution of the suit, or the issuance or
While it had not proceeded
levy of the writ of attachment.
proof of an indebted
there
was
uncontradicted
judgment,
to
ness to the attachment plaintiff on the cause of action alleged.
We hold, therefore, that the sheriff was lawfully entitled to
possession, as against the plaintiff, unless the plaintiff estab
Reversed and re
lished the bona ﬁdes of his mortgage.
manded.
POST, C. ., not sitting.“

J

86

McDonald v. Mabee (1916), 243 U. S. 90, where the court
“The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power."

Compare

said:
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Umted States.

1900.

United States, 898.

This was an action instituted July 14, 1894, by the plaintiff
Roller in the district court of Limestone county, Texas, to

recover a judgment against Stephen Holly and William
Holly upon ﬁve promissory notes for $228 each, dated Janu
ary 1, 1890, payable to plaintiff, for the purchase price of a
tract of 114 acres of land in that county, sold by him to them,
and also to foreclose

a vendor’s

lien upon the land to the

amount of such notes.
Roller, the
BROWN, J. Brieﬂy stated, the case is this:
plaintiff, who was a resident of Virginia, bought this land
in January, 1887; gave a note in part payment for $216.17,
which passed into the hands of McClintic & Proctor, who
brought suit thereon for a personal judgment against the
plaintiff and for the foreclosure of a vendor’s lien upon the
land; served plaintiff with notice of the suit in Virginia, De
cember 30, 1890, to appear in Texas January 5, 1891; and
took judgment against him by default January 9, 1891, for
Upon a sale in
$276.65, and for a foreclosure of the lien.
pursuance of this foreclosure, March 3, 1891, the land was
struck off to Williams and Jackson, and by them sold to
Peoples.

Meantime, however, and on January 1, 1890, a year before
the McClintic & Proctor suit was begun, plaintiff sold the
land to the Hollys, who went into possession, and took from
them ﬁve notes of $228 each, and also reserved a vendor’s
lien, which he sought to foreclose in this suit.
Williams,
Jackson, and Peoples, who purchased the land under the
sheriff's sale in the McClintic & Proctor suit, were made
parties defendant, and now aver that the plaintiff’s title
passed to them, which plaintiff denies upon the ground that
no process was served upon him within the state of Texas,
or within a reasonable time before he was required to appear
and answer.
The question in dispute, then, islwhether a notice served
upon the plaintiff in Rockingham county, Virginia, December
30, 1890, to appear in Limestone county, Texas, on January

TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE

232

[Chap.

1

the foreclosure suit is due process of law
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment?
The
Hollys, who bought this land and went into possession a year
before the McClintic & Proctor suit was begun, were not
made parties to that suit, probably because the deed from the
plaintiff to them was not on record in Limestone county at
the time of the institution of the suit, and their rights are
not involved here. It is conceded that the McClintic & Proc
tor judgment is invalid as a personal judgment against the
plaintiff under the case of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 723, 24
L. ed. 569, and other cases in Texas of the same import.
1.
The position of the plaintiff that, as there was no
statute in Texas authorizing a suit against a nonresident to
enforce an equitable lien for purchase money, and as there
had been no seizure in rem of the lands, nor any notice to
Roller’s vendees, the Holly’s who were in possession, the
jurisdiction of the Texas courts could not attach, and the
whole proceeding was void, is unsound.
5, 1891, to answer

ll

In Arndt

$

i

I

Q

U

i i l

U

Griggs, 134 U. S. 316, 33 L. ed. 918, 10 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 557, it was held directly that a state may provide
by statute that the title to real estate within its limits shall
be settled and determined by a suit in which a nonresident
defendant is brought into court by publication.
It appeared
in that case that a suit had been begun by a party alleging
that he was the owner and in possession of the land in con
troversy, by virtue of certain tax deeds, against defendants
claiming to have some title or interest in the lands by patent
from the United States, which title, as was alleged, was di
vested by the tax deeds, and was unjust, inequitable, and a
cloud upon plaintiff’s title, and that the suit was brought
for the purpose of quieting such title. The defendants were
brought in by publication, and a decree entered in favor of
plaintiff quieting his title. The question was whether that
decree was a bar to an action in ejectment between the gran
tees of the respective parties to the proceedings to quiet title.
In other words, as put by the court: “Has a state the power
to provide by statute that the title to real estate within its
limits shall be settled and determined by a suit in which the
defendant being a nonresident, is brought into court only
by publication?” The question was answered in the affirma
In delivering the opinion of the court Mr. Justice
tive.
v.
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“The question is not what a court of
equity, by virtue of its general powers and in the absence of
a statute, might do, but it is, What jurisdiction has a state
over titles to real estate within its limits, and what juris
diction may it give by statute to its own courts, to determine
the validity and extent of the claims of nonresidents to such
real estate? If a state has no power to bring a nonresident
into its courts for any purpose by publication, it is impotent
to perfect the titles of real estate within its limits held by
its own citizens; and a cloud cast upon such title by a claim
of a nonresident will remain for all time a cloud, unless such
nonresident shall voluntarily come into its courts for the
But no such imperfections
purpose of having it adjudicated.
attend the sovereignty of the state. It has control over
property within its limits; and the condition of ownership
of real estate therein, whether the owner be. stranger or
citizen, is subjection to its rules concerning the holding, the
transfer, liability to obligations, private or public, and the
It cannot bring the
modes of establishing titles thereto.
person of a nonresident within its limits—its process goes
not out beyond its borders—but it may determine the extent
of his title to real estate within its limits; and for the pur
may provide any reasonable
pose of such determination
"‘
"‘
*
Mortgage liens, me
method of imparting notice.
chanics’ liens, materialmen’s liens and other liens are fore
closed against nonresident defendants upon service by pub
‘ication only. Lands of nonresident defendants are attached
and sold to pay their debts; and, indeed, almost any kind
of action may be instituted and maintained against nonresi
dents to the extent of any interest in property they may have
in Kansas, and the jurisdiction to hear and determine in this
kind of cases may be obtained wholly and entirely by publi
cation.” "' “ "‘
‘ * If the plaintiff be in possession, or have a lien
- ‘
upon land within a certain state, he may institute proceed
ings against nonresidents to foreclose such lien or to remove
a cloud from his title to the land, and may call them in by
personal service outside of the jurisdiction of the court, or
by publication, if this method be sanctioned by the local law.
In suits for the foreclosure of a mortgage or other lien
upon such property, no preliminary seizure is necessary to
The cases in which it has been
give the court jurisdiction.
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held that a seizure or its equivalent, an attachment or execu
tion upon the property, is necessary to give jurisdiction, are
those where a general creditor seeks to establish and fore
close a lien thereby acquired.
Of this class Cooper '0. Rey
nolds, 10 Wall. 308, 19 L. ed. 931, is the most prominent
In that case a plaintiff in an action for false im
example.
prisonment had attached the property of Reynolds in cer
tain lands, which were sold upon execution to Cooper, who
Reynolds, the orig
was put in possession by the sheriff.
inal owner, brought ejectment against him, and it was held
by this court that Reynold’s title to the land had been di
vested by the attachment proceedings, upon the ground that
in this class of cases, the levy of the attachment gave the
court jurisdiction.
But the object of such attachment is
merely to give a lien upon the property which the courts
may enforce; and if a lien already exists, whether by mort
gage, statute, or contract, the court may proceed to enforce
the same precisely as though the property had been seized
upon attachment or execution.
It is true there is no statute of Texas specially authorizing
a suit against a nonresident to enforce an equitable lien for
purchase money, but article 1230 of the Code of Texas,
*
*
"‘
contains a general provision for the institution
of suits against absent and nonresident defendants, and lays
down a method of procedure applicable to all such cases.
*
"
“
Unless we are to hold it to be wholly inoperative,
it would seem that suits to foreclose mortgages or other
In any event,
liens were obviously within its contemplation.
this was the construction given to it by the court of civil
appeals, and apparently by the supreme court of the state,
and is obligatory upon this court as a construction of a state
statute. Battle 'v. Carter, 44 Tex. 485; Oswald v. Kampmann,
28 Fed. Rep. 36, a Texas case; Martin v. Pond, 30 Fed. Rep.
15.

We are therefore remitted to the principal question in
dispute between these parties, namely, the sufficiency of the
notice given to the plaintiff of the McClintic & Proctor suit.
In this connection our attention is called to certain articles
of the Texas Code, the ﬁrst one of which (art. 1228, Sayles'
Tex. Civ. Stat.) provides generally for the service of process
by giving ﬁve days’ notice, exclusive of the day of service and
of the return day.
2.

I I I

IF

I I I I I I
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From these requirements it appears that the time for serv

i
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t

*

¥
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ice of process in the courts of Texas was ﬁve days, exclusive
of the day of service and return, and that there is no dis
tinction in this particular between defendants living in the
town where the court is sitting and defendants living in
In short, for
other states, or even in a foreign country.
aught that appears here, parties may be called from the ut
termost parts of the earth to come to Texas and defend
suits against them within ﬁve days from the day the notice
"'
*
"'
is served upon them.
"‘
*
*
What shall be deemed a reasonable notice admits
of considerable doubt. * “ “
While, as before stated, there is but little in the way of
judicial authority upon the question, in the statutes of the
several states regulating proceedings against absent and non
resident defendants, there is a consensus of opinion, which
is entitled to great weight in passing upon the question of the
reasonableness of such notice.
1

It

B

a

is

is

may be said in general, with reference to these statutes,
required to be given at
that in cases of publication notice
least once a week for from four to eight weeks, and in case
of personal service out of the state, no notice for less than
twenty days between the service and return day
contem
plated in any of the states except Mississippi, where
per
days
ten
seems
to be sufficient.
While, of
sonal notice of
course, these statutes are not obligatory here, they are en
titled to consideration as expressive of the general sentiment
of legislative bodies upon the question of reasonableness of
notice.

J

>?II\_»-L»

a

is

Without undertaking to determine what
reasonable
notice to nonresidents, we are of opinion. under the circum
stances of this case, and considering the distance between
the place of service and the place of return, that ﬁve days
was not a reasonable notice, or due process of law; that the
judgment obtained upon such notice was not binding upon
the defendant Roller, and constitutes no bar to the prosecu
tion of this action.
FULLER, C. J. and BREWER, ., dissented [without opinion].
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MCVEIGH.

Court of the United States.
98

[Chap.

United States,

1876.

271,.

J.

This was an action of ejectment to recover
property
in the city of Alexandria, in the State
certain real
of Virginia. It was brought in the corporation court of that
city, and a writ of error from the court of appeals of the
State to review the judgment obtained having been refused,
the case was brought here directly by a writ of error from
Authority for this mode of procedure will be
this court.
found stated- in the case of Gregory 22. McVeigh, reported in
the 23d of Wallace.
The plaintiff in the corporation court proved title in him
self to the premises in controversy, and consequent right to
their immediate possession, unless his life-estate in them had
been divested by a sale under a decree of condemnation ren
dered in March, 1864, by the District Court of the United
States for the Eastern District of Virginia, upon proceed
ings for their conﬁscation.
The defendant relied upon the
grantor
executed by the marshal of the district
deed to his
FIELD,

U

upon such sale.
The proceedings mentioned were instituted under the act
f Congress of July 17 1862, “to suppress insurrection, to
umsh treason and rebellion to seize and conﬁscate the prop
rty of rebels, and for other purposes."
E In July, 1863, the premises in controversy were seized by
the marshal of the district, by order of the district-attorney,
In
acting under instructions from the Attorney-General.
August following, a libel of information against the property
was ﬁled in the name of the United States, setting forth that
the plaintiff in this case was the owner of the property in
question; that he had, since the passage of the above act,
held an office of honor and trust under the government of the
so-called Confederate States, and in various ways had given
aid and comfort to the rebellion; that the property had been
seized in pursuance of the act in compliance with instruc
tions from the Attorney-General, and, by reason of the prem
ises, was forfeited to the United States, and should be con
It closed with a prayer that process of monition
demned.
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might issue against the owner or owners of the property and
all persons interested or claiming an interest therein, warn
ing them at some early day “to appear and answer” the
libel; and, as the owner of the property was a non-resident
and absent, that an order of publication in the usual form
Upon this libel the district judge ordered
be also made.
process of monition to issue as prayed, and designated a day
and place for the trial of the cause, and that notice of the
same, with the substance of the libel, should be given by
publication in a newspaper of the city, and by posting at
The process of monition and
the door of the court-house.
Both de
notice were accordingly issued and published.
seizure,
its
and
the
land
and
mentioned
named
the
scribed
day and place ﬁxed for the trial. The monition stated that at
the trial all persons interested in the land, or claiming an
interest, might “appear and make their allegations in that
The notice warned all persons to appear at the
behalf."
trial, “to show cause why condemnation should not be de
creed, and to intervene for their interest.”
The owner of the property, in response to the monition
and notice, appeared by counsel, and ﬁled a claim to the
property and an answer to the libel. Subsequently, on the
10th of March, 1864, the district-attorney moved that the
claim and answer and the appearance of the respondent by
counsel be stricken from the ﬁles, on the ground that it ap
peared from his answer that he was at the time of ﬁling the
same “a resident within the city of Richmond, within the
On the same day the mo
Confederate lines, and a rebel."
tion was granted, and the claim and answer ordered to be
stricken from the ﬁles. The appearance of the respondent
The court immediately entered its sen
was by his answer.
tence and decree, condemning the property as forfeited to
the United States, reciting that, the usual proclamation hav
ing been made, the default of all persons had been duly
The decree ordered the issue of a venditioni ex
entered.
poms for the sale of the property, returnable on the six
At the sale under this
teenth day of the following April.
writ the grantor of the defendant became the purchaser.
The question for determination is, whether the decree of
condemnation thus rendered, without allowing the owner of
the property to appear in response to the monition, inter
pose his claim for the property, and answer the libel, was
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of any validity. In other words, the question is, whether the
property of the plaintiff could be forfeited by the sentence of
the court in a judicial proceeding to which he was not al
lowed to appear and make answer to the charges against
him, upon the allegation of which the forfeiture was de
manded.
Q

1

$

Q

l I I

U

O

I

That there must be notice to a party of some kind, actual
or constructive, to a valid judgment affecting his rights, is
admitted.
Until notice is given, the court has no jurisdic
tion in any case to proceed to judgment, whatever its author
ity may be, by the law of its organization, over the subject
matter.
But notice is only for the purpose of affording the
party an opportunity of being heard upon the claim or the
charges made; it is a summons to him to appear and speak,
if he has anything to say, why the judgment sought should
A denial to a party of the beneﬁt of a
not be rendered.
notice would be in effect to deny that he is entitled to notice
at all, and the sham and deceptive proceeding had better be
It would be like saying to a party, Ap
omitted altogether.
pear, and you shall be heard; and, when he has appeared,
saying, Your appearance shall not be recognized, and you
In the present case, the District Court
shall not be heard.
not only in effect said this, but immediately added a decree
of condemnation, reciting that the default of all persons had
It is diﬂicult to speak of a decree thus
been duly entered.
rendered with moderation; it was in fact a mere arbitrary
edict, clothed in the form of a judicial sentence.
The law is, and always has been, that whenever notice or
citation is required, the party cited has the right to ap
pear and be heard; and when the latter is denied, the former
*
"
"
is ineffectual for any purpose.
The position of the defendant’s counsel is, that, as the
proceeding for the confiscation of the property was one in
rem, the court, by seizure of the property, acquired juris
diction to determine its liability to forfeiture, and conse
quently had a right to decide all questions subsequently aris
ing in the progress of the cause; and its decree, however
erroneous, cannot, therefore, be collaterally assailed.
In
supposed support of this position, opinions of this court in
several cases are cited, where similar language is used re
specting the power of a court to pass upon questions aris
ing after jurisdiction has attached.
But the preliminary
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proposition of the counsel is not correct. The jurisdiction
acquired by the court by seizure of the res was not to con
demn the property without further proceedings.
The physi
cal seizure did not of itself establish the allegations of the
libel, and could not, therefore, authorize the immediate for
feiture of the property seized. A sentence rendered simply
from the fact of seizure would not be a judicial determina
tion of the question of forfeiture, but a mere arbitrary edict
of the judicial officer. The seizure in a suit in rem only
brings the property seized within the custody of the court,
and informs the owner of that fact. The theory of the law
is, that all property is in the possession of its owner, in per
son or by agent, and that its seizure will, therefore, operate
to impart notice to him. Where notice is thus given, the
owner has the right to appear and be heard respecting the
charges for which the forfeiture is claimed. That right must
be recognized and its exercise allowed before the court can
The jurisdiction
proceed beyond the seizure to judgment.
pass
upon
acquired by the seizure is not to
the question of
forfeiture absolutely, but to pass upon that question after
opportunity has been afforded to its owner and parties inter
ested to appear and be heard upon the charges. To this end
some notiﬁcation of the proceedings, beyond that arising
from seizure, prescribing the time within which the appear
Such notiﬁcation is usually
ance must be made, is essential.
given by monition, public proclamation, or publication in
some other form. The manner of the notiﬁcation is imma
terial, but the notiﬁcation itself is indispensable.

a

a

is

a

it

a

The doctrine invoked by counsel, that, where
court has
right to decide every
has
once acquired jurisdiction,
question which arises in the cause, and its judgment, how
ever erroneous, cannot be collaterally assailed,
undoubt
general proposition, but, like all general
edly correct as
propositions, is subject to many qualiﬁcations in its applica
tion. All courts, even the highest, are more or less limited
in their jurisdiction: they are limited to particular classes
of actions, such as civil or criminal; or to particular modes
of administering relief, such as legal or equitable; or to
transactions of special character, such as arise on navigable
waters, or relate to the testamentary disposition of estates;
or to the use of particular process in the enforcement of
their judgments. Norton 12. Meador, Circuit Court for Cali
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Though the court may possess jurisdiction of a
of the subject-matter, and of the parties, it is still
limited in its modes of procedure, and in the extent and
It must act judicially in all
character of its judgments.
things, and cannot then transcend the power conferred by
fornia.
cause,

If, for instance, the action be upon a money de
the law.
mand, the court, notwithstanding its complete jurisdiction
over the subject and parties, has no power to pass judgment
If
of imprisonment in the penitentiary upon the defendant.
tort,
personal
the court cannot
the action be for a libel or
If
order in the case a speciﬁc performance of a contract.
the action be for the possession of real property, the court is
'
In
powerless to admit in the case the probate of a will.
stances of this kind show that the general doctrine stated by
The judgments
counsel is subject to many qualiﬁcations.
mentioned, given in the cases supposed, would not be merely
erroneous: they would be absolutely void; because the court
in rendering them would transcend the limits of its au
"
"
*
thority in those cases.
The doctrine stated by ,counsel is only correct when the
court proceeds, after acquiring jurisdiction of the cause, ac
cording to the established modes governing the class to which
the case belongs, and does not transcend, in the extent or
character of its judgment, the law which is applicable to it.
The statement of the doctrine by Mr. Justice Swayne, in the
case of Cornell v. Williams, reported in the 20th of Wallace,
is more accurate.
“The jurisdiction,” says the justice, “hav
ing attached in the case, everything done within the power
of that jurisdiction, when collaterally questioned, is held
conclusive of the rights of the parties, unless impeached for
fraud.”

It

20

Wall. 250.

was not within the power of the jurisdiction of the
District Court to proceed with the case, so as to affect the
rights of the owner after his appearance had been stricken
out, and the beneﬁt of the citation to him thus denied. For
jurisdiction is _the right to hear and determine; not to de
And where, as in that case, no
termine without hearing.
appearance"was‘a.lloWed, there could be no hearing or oppor
tunity of being heard, and, therefore, could be no exercise of
By the act of the court, the respondent was
jurisdiction.
excluded from its jurisdiction.

m

MILLER, BRADLEY and HUNT,
.
ion].

JJ

.,

Judgment affirmed.
[without opin

dissented

CHAPTER II.
PROCEEDINGS BASED ON THE RECORD.

w

SECTION

1,.

if

SUMMARY

1.

RAY

JUDGMENT.

BARKER

v

of Appeal, England.

1879.

27 Weekly Reporter, 745.

Appeal of the defendant from an order of Pollock, B., and
Hawkins: J., reversing an order of Stephen, J.
The action was brought to recover £62 17s., the price
of certain articles of jewelry alleged to have been sold to the
defendant.
The writ was specially indorsed, and the plaintiff on the
19th of May took out a summons under order 14, r. 1, to sign
ﬁnal judgment.

i i

$

#

i

Q

i

U

U

C

The master made an order that the plaintiff should be at
liberty to sign ﬁnal judgment unless the amount claimed was
paid into court within a week to abide the event.
On appeal, Stephen, ., rescinded the master’s order, and
gave the defendant leave to defend unconditionally, and on
further appeal the Exchequer Division rescinded the order
of Stephen, J., and directed that the master’s order should
stand, the defendant to have four days to pay the money into
court.
The defendant appealed.

J

Q

i l i
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BRAMWELL, L. J. I am of opinion that this appeal must
fail. I believe order 14 to be a-most useful one, but I cannot
help thinking that it is considerably misunderstood.
Courts
of law, and of common law especially, are not only for the
purposes of litigation, but are also debt collectors; and that,
(241)
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not the most important, is a very important part of their
I think that this order was intended to facilitate
the operation of the High Court of Justice in debt collecting;
but it should be always remembered that the order should
not be applied simply because it exists, but should be ap
plied most carefully and only in very clear cases.
The words of rule 1 of the order are—“The court or judge
may thereupon, unless the defendant, by affidavit or other
wise, satisfy the court or judge that he has a good defense
on the merits, or disclose such facts as may be deemed suf
ﬁcient to entitle him to be permitted to defend the action,
make an order empowering the plaintiff to sign judgment

functions.

accordingly.”
Where it is doubtful whether the defendant has a good
defense on the merits, or whether he has disclosed such facts
as justify his defending, an order ought not to be made.
Rule 6 of the same order says, “Leave to defend may be
given unconditionally or subject to such terms as to giving
security, or otherwise, as the court or a judge may think ﬁt.”
The only way to interpret these rules is, that under rule
1, leave to sign judgment may be either absolutely refused,
or may be given subject to the condition of the defendant
giving security, if the court or a judge thinks ﬁt. Rule 1
should in fact be read thus: “The court or judge may there
upon, unless the defendant, by affidavit or otherwise, satisfy
the court or judge that he has a good defense to the action
on the merits, or disclose such facts as may be deemed suf
ﬁcient to entitle him to defend the action either uncondition
ally or subject to such terms as to security or otherwise as
the court or judge may think ﬁt, make an order empowering
the plaintiff to sign judgment accordingly.” In other words,
rule 6 is to be put in conjunction with rule 1, and rule 6
would then read thus: “Where the defendant discloses such
facts as may be deemed sufficient to entitle him to defend
the action, leave to defend may be given unconditionally, or
conditionally on the defendant giving security or otherwise,
as the court or judge may think ﬁt.”
If that is so, the ﬁrst question here is whether such facts
are disclosed as show the defendant has a good defense on
I cannot say that they are. Then do they dis
the merits.
close such facts as are sufficient to entitle him to defend?

Paocssnmcs
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but the matter
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is doubtful.
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The plaintiff ought not, therefore, to be allowed to sign
judgment. As to whether his application to do so should
be dismissed unconditionally or conditionally on the defend
ant giving security, all I can say is that the master and the
judges of the Exchequer Division have exercised their dis
cretion, and expressed an opinion that the defendant ought to
give security, and I consider the case, both as to the law and
the facts, so doubtful that I do not feel capable of overruling
the opinion that they have expressed.
BREPT, L. J. It seems to me that the construction of
order 14 r. 1, is that where the plaintiff can and does make
an affidavit stating that in his belief there is no defense to
the action, and applies for leave to sign judgment, there
must be a summons calling on the defendant to show cause
before the court or judge, and if the defendant by affidavit,
or otherwise, satisﬁes the court that he has a good defense
on the merits, then the court or judge would be bound not to
make an order empowering the plaintiff to sign judgment
accordingly; but the rule contains an alternative to “a good
defense on the merits,” viz., “or disclose such facts as may
That must
be deemed sufficient to entitle him to defend.”
mean something less than “a good defense on the merits,”

for if

he shows that, not only must the defendant be entitled
to defend, but he has an absolutely good defense. The facts,
therefore, sufficient to entitle the defendant to defend, are
facts clearly not a good defense on the merits but less, and
if he shows such facts, then, it appears to me, that rule 6
gives the court or judge a discretion as to the terms on
which he is to be allowed to defend, and that leave to defend
may be given unconditionally, or subject to such terms as
the court or judge may think ﬁt.

o4#=r‘tct#o:

Appeal dismissed."
rl'I‘he ﬁrst part

of Order 14, Rule 1 is as follows:—
“Where the defendant appears to a writ of summons specially indorsed
under Order 3, Rule 6, the plaintiff may. on affidavit made by himself,
or by any other person who can swear positively to the facts, verifying
the cause of action, and the amount claimed (if any), and stating that
in his belief there is no defense to the action, apply to a judge for
liberty to enter ﬁnal judgment for the amount so indorsed, together
with interest, if any, or for the recovery of land (with or without rent
or mesne proﬁts), as the case may be, and costs."
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The cases in which a specially indorsed writ of summons may be used,
as speciﬁed in Order 3, Rule 6, are actions for debt or liquidated clam
ages arising on contract, bond, statute, guaranty or trust, and actions
for the recovery of land by a landlord against a tenant whose term has
expired.
The Michigan summary judgment act provides that in any action on
contract, judgment or statute, the plaintiff may, upon the same show
ing as in English Order 14, have a judgment unless the defendant shall
Penalty for a false affidavit
"make and ﬁle an affidavit of merits."
of merits made in bad faith is an award of double costs against such
defendant.
C. L. 1915, Sec. 12581.
The New Jersey act allows a summary judgment in the same cases,
“unless the defendant by affidavit or other proofs shall show such facts
as may be deemed, by the judge hearing the motion, suﬂicient to en
Laws 1912, Chap. 231, Schedule A, Rule 57.
title him to defend."
Similar statutes are found in several other jurisdictions.
See Illi
nois Stat., Chap. 110, Sec. 55; Rule 73 of the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia, construed in Booth v. Arnold (1906), 27 App. D. C.
287.
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LAMPHEAR
Supreme

v.

BUCKINGHAM.

Court of Errors of Connecticut.
33 Connecticut,

1866‘.

287.

Action on the 544th section of the statute with regard to
(Revision of 1866, page 202,) which provides
that in case the life of any passenger on a railroad who is in
the exercise of reasonable care shall be lost by the negligence
of the railroad company, the company shall be liable to pay
damages not exceeding ﬁve thousand dollars and not less
than one thousand dollars, to be recovered by the executor or
administrator in an action on the statute, for the beneﬁt of
the husband or widow and heirs of the deceased.
The declaration alleged that Madison Lamphear, the in
testate, on the 9th of March, 1865, was a passenger in the
cars of the New Haven and New London railroad, which
was in the possession and use of the defendants as trustees
for the holders of the ﬁrst mortgage bonds of the railroad
company, and that, while the deceased was being transported
across the Connecticut river by the ferry boat of the com
corporations,

/
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pany in the night time, and while in the exercise of reason
able care, he fell overboard and was drowned, by reason of
the negligence of the defendants in not providing proper
guards at the ends of the boat to prevent passengers from
going overboard, and from the defective and improper con
dition of the boat; claiming ﬁve thousand dollars damages.
The defendants demurred to the declaration, and the de
murrer was overruled and the case heard in damages. Upon
the hearing the court found the following facts.
On the 9th day of March, 1865, the defendants were trus
tees for the beneﬁt of the holders of the ﬁrst mortgage bonds
of the New Haven and New London Railroad Company, and
as such trustees, were legally in possession of the railroad,
and its trains, cars, engines, ferry boats and other property,
and were operating the road and carrying passengers
On that day Madison Lamphear was a passenger
thereon.
on the railroad from New Haven to New London, and on his
way lost his life by falling from the ferry boat into the Con
necticut river, which boat was then run by the defendants in
connection with the train at the crossing of the river be
tween the towns of Old Saybrook and Old Lyme on the line
of the railroad. At the time of the accident he was in the
exercise of reasonable care and no fault of his contributed
essentially and proximately to occasion his death. There
.survive him no widow or children, but two brothers and two
sisters. The plaintiff at the time of the bringing of the
action was his lawful administrator and still continues such.
The defendants in the running of their train, and in the
construction, condition, lighting and management of their
ferry boat, were also at the same time in the exercises of rea
sonable care and skill and without material negligence or

fault.

.

Upon these facts, under the pleadings, the court found
the issue for the plaintiff, and if the law was so that the
plaintiff could not recover a less sum in damages than one
thousand dollars, then the court found for the plaintiff to
recover that sum; but if the law was so that the plaintiff
could recover a less sum than one thousand dollars the court
found and assessed nominal damages only, and ﬁxed the dam
ages at

ﬁfty dollars.

The question whether, under the statute on which the
action was brought, the court had power to assess the dam
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was reserved

for the advice of this court.
BUTLER,

J.

"'

"

“

The defendants insist, in the third place, that if the
demurrer admits a statutory cause of action it admits no
speciﬁc facts as facts, and therefore admits no statutory neg
ligence, and no right except the mere right to recover nomi
nal damages. This involves an inquiry into the nature and
effect of a demurrer.
There has been much discussion re
specting them in this court and elsewhere during the last
few years, and still they do not seem to be clearly understood.
The defendants certainly have misapprehended them. The
misapprehension has probably arisen from the inaccuracy of
Strictly
the usual expression, “a demurrer admits,” &c.
speaking a demurrer does not admit anything, and in order
to express more clearly, and so that they cannot be misunder
stood, the views held by this court, it seems necessary to
recur to ﬁrst principles.
Every action at law to redress a wrong or enforce a right,
if properly instituted, is a syllogism, of which the major
premise is the proposition of law involved, and the minor
premise the proposition of fact, and the judgment the con
clusion.
Blackstone states it thus:
(Com. Vol. 3, page
“The judgment, though pronounced or awarded by
396:)
the judges, is not their determination or sentence, but the
determination or sentence of the law.
It is the conclusion
that naturally and regularly follows from the premises of
law and fact, which stand thus :—against him who hath rode
over my corn I may recover damages by law; but A. hath
rode over my corn; therefore I shall recover damages against
A.” Usually the major premise is not set out in the declara
tion, but the proposition claimed is implied from or involved
in the facts stated. The plaintiff in an action of tort, for
instance, summons the defendant to answer, for that at a
certain time and place he committed in a certain manner a
certain wrong, to the plaintiff’s damage, &c., and by so doing
impliedly claims that the law is so that he is entitled on
those facts to recover. To this syllogism the defendant must
answer according to the rules of law.
If he expressly ad
mits on the record the law and the fact, both premises, he
3.

consents to the conclusion, the judgment,
nically expressed, “Confesses judgment.”

or as

If

it is tech

he declines or

n
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omits to appear pursuant to the summons, or appearing
declines or omits to answer when called upon to do so, he
impliedly admits both propositions or premises to be true
by his default, and judgment follows technically as a judg
ment by default, pursuant to a necessary rule of law stated
broadly by Mr. Taylor (Ev. 669,) thus :—“Whenever a ma
terial averment well pleaded is passed over by the adverse
party without denial, whether it be by pleading in confession
and avoidance, or by traversing some other matter, or by
demurring in law, or by suffering judgment to go by default,
it is thereby, for the purpose of pleading if not for trial
before the jury, conclusively admitted.”
So the defendant
may traverse or expressly deny the facts or the minor
premise, and will be held on the same principle to have
admitted the major, and, if the minor is found true, judg
ment—the conclusion—is awarded on the verdict.
And so
he may deny the major premise, the proposition of law in

volved, by a demurrer, and failing thereby to deny and pass
ing over the facts, if well pleaded and suﬁicient to constitute
a premise, he defaults as to them, and thereby and by the
same rule is holden to have admitted them; and if the issue
in law is found true, ﬁnal judgment passes for the plaintiff.
The facts if well pleaded and sufficient are admitted, not
because the demurrer admits them expressly or by force of
any oﬁice it performs, but because the defendant has not
denied and has defaulted them. A defendant therefore who
demurs to a declaration admits, not by his demurrer but by
his omission to deny them, all the material well pleaded facts
alleged in it; and when his demurrer is overruled the case
is in the same condition precisely that it would have been if
All the dif
he had suffered a default and not demurred.
is,
that in one case he denied the
ference between the two
major premise of law and it has been found true, and, the
minor having been admitted by a failure to deny, both are
to be holden true; in the other he denied neither, and there
fore both are to be holden true.
The condition of a case before the court after demurrer
overruled and after default being precisely the same, and the
effect of demurring or defaulting being precisely the same
in admitting the facts, the question as to both is answered
by what the law is as to either. What then is the effect of
a default? What facts does it admit? It has been said by

""—nI|'I
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some writers and judges that it admits the cause of action,
Mr.
and by others that it admits a cause of action merely.
Roscoe in his work on evidence states the proposition broadly
thus—“Suffering a judgment by default is an admission on
The true rule is that it
the record of the cause of action.”
admits the cause of action as alleged, in full, or to some ex
tent, according to the nature of the action.
As it admits
all the material facts well pleaded, if a distinct, deﬁnite, en
tire cause of action is set forth, which entitles the plaintiff
to a sum certain Without further inquiry, it admits the cause
of action in full as alleged. If by the rules of law further
inquiry is to be had to ascertain the amount due, or the extent
of wrong done, and of the damage‘ to be recovered, then it
admits the cause of action, but not to the extent alleged,
Thus, if it be debt on bond
and subject to such inquiry.
for a sum certain the whole is admitted, and no further
inquiry is had, and so if assumpsit on a note or bill, and
there are no indorsements entered on it, and the defendant
does not move for an inquiry, the cause of action and the
The note must be produced
amount claimed are admitted.
but need not be proved. Breene 7.’. H earne, 3 T. R., 301; Ros
But in actions of tort for unliquidated
coe Ea, 10 ed., 71.
damages a different rule is necessarily applied.
In such
actions the plaintiff does not declare for a speciﬁc thing but
has an unlimited license in declaring, and may allege as
much of wrong and injury, and demand as much damage as
he will, and recover by proving any amount however small
if sufficient to sustain an action. A defendant therefore in
an action. of tort is not holden to have admitted by his de
W fault the ezttent
of the injury.
It is assumed that, as the
plaintiff may allege more than is true, he probably has done
so, and the defendant by his default is considered as admit
ting the wrong to some extent, leaving that extent to be in
quired into to enable the court to ﬁx the damages, because
such an inquiry is always and necessarily had in such cases.
But he admits the wrong, and consequent right of the plain
tiff to recover to some extent. By our practice this inquiry
is not by writ of inquiry, or by reference, but made by the
court on a hearing in damages. On that hearing, it results
from the very nature of the inquiry, that any evidence tend
ing to belittle or mitigate the inquiry complained of and
admitted, and any evidence tending to aggravate it, is admis

\
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sible. If in proving the extent to which he was in
the defendant prove that he was not in default at all, and
that the injury occurred through the fault of the plaintiff,
the plaintiff cannot complain.
The evidence does not de
prive him of his right to judgment; it merely shows that,
as he is not in fact entitled to any damages, he can only have
such as the law gives him by reason of the admission on the
record. In the light of these elementary principles we may
see how far the various dicta cited in the argument are true.
that “a demurrer admits no facts as facts.”
One of them
That, as applicable to chancery practice,
true, for in chan
cery, when
demurrer is overruled, the respondent can
is
answer over and show the averments to be untrue; but
not true at law. It admits, or rather the party, by demur
ring only, admits, all or so much of the facts as facts as
Again,
may be necessary to sustain
judgment.
said
rule of evidence.” If any
“a demurrer admits nothing as
thing more was intended by the author of that expression
does not admit facts alleged in the declaration,
than that
so that they could be used as evidence on the inquest, ref
an unintelligible and un
erence or hearing in damages,
Of course on the inquest or hearing,
fortunate expression.
object
ascertain
the extent to which the facts
where the
to
alleged are true,
would be absurd to offer the facts alleged

in evidence, as fully admitted by the pleadings to

be true,

,_

is

on the facts as admitted.
Applying these principles to this case, we are satisﬁed
entitled to recover the sum of one thousand
the plaintiff
dollars. The defendant by his demurrer and his omission

l

a

'

a

a

is

it

to prove themselves true. Such an inquiry would be sense
Again,
is said that a demurrer
less and unnecessary.
admits the facts alleged for the sole purpose of testing their
This too
an attempt to use at law
legal sufficiency.
rule in chancery. In chancery practice as we have said, the
facts are not admitted by being passed over, but are sup
posed to be true, for the purpose of testing their legal suf
ﬁciency.
At law they are, each and all that are material,
ﬁnal
admitted to be true to some extent, as the basis of
judgment. And so of the claim that “a demurrer admits
mere right to recover nominal damages.” It admits no right.
It admits or the party by demurring admits, the facts as true
to some extent. The law bases the right and the judgment
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to deny the facts, admitted the cause of action and every
aterial element of it, and negligence was one of them. If
he damages had been ﬁxed by the statute at a single sum
of $1,000 or $5,000, no hearing in damages would have been
necessary or proper.
No evidence which the defendant could
offer,
properly
and no fact which the court could properly
ﬁnd, would affect the right of the plaintiff to recover that
sum. And this is true whether the statute be regarded as
giving a new right of action or regulating the amount of
damages and their disposition in an old one.
The statute
gives the court a discretion as to the amount of the dam
age above the sum of $1,000 and up to $5,000, and to that
extent the court could properly inquire and were bound to
inquire. It is of no importance that the court have found
there was no negligence in fact.
The existence of sufficient
negligence to give a right of recovery on the statute, if it
gives a new action, was a material fact, a material element
of the cause of action, and was conclusively admitted. And
so of every other material element of a cause of action under
the statute which was alleged, for all the allegations neces
sary to bring the plaintiff’s case within the statute and give
him the right of action provided by the statute, were ma
terial, and were of course admitted by the omission to tra
verse them.
We advise judgment for the sum of $1,000.

~.i.

///
vi»

BUENA VISTA FREESTONE

Supreme

CO. v.

PARRISH.

Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
8!, West

1891.

Virginia, 652.

BRANNON,
In 1889 the Buena Vista Freestone Com
justice in Cabell county
pany instituted an action before
against M. F. Parrish and H. M. Maloney to recover
debt
due on a note for $120.
On the return-day of the summons
the defendants appeared, and obtained
continuance.
On
the day to which the case had been continued the defendants
appeared, and ﬁled
plea that the note sued on, which had
been ﬁled with the justice, "had been obtained by fraud, and
a

a

a

a

J.

aii

éy
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one of failure of consideration; but the plaintiff did not ap
pear, and the defendants demanded and obtained a jury,
which tried the case, and rendered a verdict for the de
fendants, and the justice rendered judgment for the defend
ants. " ‘ “ The plaintiff then obtained a writ of cer
tiorari from the circuit court of Cabell county, and that
court reversed the judgment of the justice. * * “
The only question in this court is whether there was any
error committed by the justice justifying the circuit court
in reversing his judgment; and this depends on these ques
tions: What was the proper course for the justice when the
plaintiff failed to appear, and the defendants ﬁled their plea?
Should he have allowed a jury trial, or should he have dis
missed the case for failure of the plaintiff to appear and
prosecute his suit, without prejudice to another suit? Ac
cording to the practice in courts of record at common law,
if the defendant appear and ﬁle his plea, and the plaintiff;
does not appear to reply to it, or do what is necessary
bring the cause to issue, there is judgment against him by
defendant does not appear, there
non prosequitur. Where
default; or
by
against
him
he appears, and
is judgment
judgment against him by
says nothing in defense, there
nil dicet; in both cases the judgment conceding to the plain
tiff the relief called for by his action. Or, where he fails
to answer any pleading of the plaintiff during the process
of the pleading conducing to the issue, such judgment goes
taken to confess the alle
against him. In these cases he
It might seem that
gation to which he makes no reply.
defense,
and the plaintiff fails
where the defendant files his
to appear, the defendant ought to have the right to have his
defense passed on by judgment, to give ﬁnality and rest to
him, so that he may not be again harassed by
second suit;
but the law contents itself with simply entering judgment
of non prosequitur, commonly called in our practice “n0n
suit,”—a term here covering judgment by non prosequitur,
nolle prosequi, and technical nonsuits, as also judgments of
Minor, Inst.
nonsuit entered under the statute at rules.
That there is this difference between defendant and
865.
Bl. Comm. 316, says:
“Therefore,
plaintiffs is settled.
in the course of pleading, if either party neglects to put in
his declaration, plea, replication, rejoinder, and the like,
within the time allotted by the standing rules of_ the court,
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the plaintiff, if the omission be his, is said to be nonsuit, or
not to follow and pursue his complaint, and shall lose the
beneﬁt of his writ; or, if the negligence be on the side of
defendant, judgment may be had against him for such his
270;
default.” 4 Minor, Inst. 864 et seq.; 2 Tuck. Bl. Comm.
'
2 Bouv. Law Dict. 303, “Non Pros."
Speaking of default of the parties to prosecute or defend,
1 Bouv.
Law Dict. 494, under the word “Default,” says:
“When the plaintiff makes default, he may be nonsuited§ and,
when the defendant makes default, judgment by default is
rendered against him.” This judgment as against defend
ant would be forever ﬁnal; but the judgment of nonsuit
against plaintiff would not be ﬁnal, but would allow another
suit. Com. Dig. “Pleader,” E. 42, B. 11; Bouv. Law Dict.
tit., “Judgment by Default,” 7 Vin. Abr. 429; Doct. Plac.
Thus, had the case been in a circuit court, no jury trial
208.
could have taken place. All that the defense could have had
wasa nonsuit. * ‘
It is true, this case was in a justice’s court, and no formal
Still, those courts are gov
pleadings are there required.
method;
rule
and practice in them, where
by
and
some
erned
not otherwise provided, ought to be assimilated to ordinary
"‘
*
"
legal procedure.
For this error for failing to enter the only judgment to be
entered,—one of dismissal for plaintiff's failure to appear,
and the trial of the case by a jury, and ﬁnal judgment
thereon, I think the circuit court properly reversed the judg
ment, and ought to have done so had there been no such mo
tion before the justice. * "‘ "

'

Q6‘

LEONARD
Supreme

’

v.

SIBLEY.

Court of Vermont.
76

1904.

Vermont, 254.

judgment rendered for the de
in error at the March term, 1903, Washington

Writ of error to review
fendants
County, STAFFORD,

J.,

a

presiding.

The assignments of error are:

(1)

That the court should
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not have continued the original suit for assessment of dam
ages, since the said suit was for a sum certain the action
being debt on judgment
(2) That the court should not
have entered judgment against the defendants in the original
suit at the September Term, 1902 since Judgment by default
had alread y been ente r ed at th"
e M arc h t erm, 1889.
(3)
That the court should not have granted execution against
the defendants at the September Term, 1902
WATSON
This case is here on writ of error
The orig
V
against
plaintiffs
by
pro
action
the
in
error
was
trustee
inal
.
of debt on Judgment ’ and was re
C ess, with a declaration
to
and
entered
in the county court at the Decem
turnable
ber term, 1889. At that time the plaintiffs in error made
judgment was rendered against
I1 o appearance, whereupon
them by default a claimant of the funds in the hands of the
trustee entered in the suit, and a commissioner was ap
pointed to determine and report to the court the liability of
The cause was
the trustee and the right of the claimant.
then continued for the assessment of damages and as to the
trustee and the claimant. _It was so continued from term to _
rm until the September term, 1902, _i_vhen ﬁnal iiidgmeni;
'
or was__or4151‘EILJN ith-leav e —te—take~'
ggains t t e p ain i
The damages were assessed, ﬁnal
out execution fofthwith.
judgment ren ere , a d execution issued accordingly.
The errors assigned are that, since the action was debt on
judgment, it was for a sum certain, and that the continua
tion of the cause after the March term, 1889, for the assess
ment of damages, the rendering of judgment against the
plaintiffs in error at the September term, 1902, the grant of
leave to issue execution on said judgment, and issue of the
same were contrary to and without authority of law. It is
urged that when the judgment by default was rendered it
was for a sum certain, to be computed by the clerk of the
court, and that it was a ﬁnal judgment.
Also that the ren
term,
September
1902, was error,
at
the
judgment
dition of
for the reason that the former judgment was still in force,
and at most nothing remained to perfect it but the assess
ment of the damages, which it is contended should have been
inserted in the records nunc pro tunc. Was the judgment of
1889 ﬁnal, or was it only interlocutory?
From the fact that a declaration is debt on judgment it
does not necessarily follow that a judgment by default is

J
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ﬁnal.
Under the common law of England, where the action
was brought on a judgment, the plaintiff was generally con
sidered entitled to a writ of inquiry, after a judgment by
default, to recover interest by way of damages for the de
tention of the debt. 1 Tidd’s Prac. (3d Am. Ed.) 573. Ye.
it was not the universal practice to award such a writ. In
some instances a reference was made to the secondary or to
the prothonotary to assess the damages, and in later years
Holdipp '0.
this seems to become the prevailing practice.
Otway, 2 Saund. 106, and notes; Webb t‘. Webb, 16 Vt.
636; Smith v. Vanderhorst, 1 McCord, 328, 10 Am. Dec. 674.
“A ﬁnal judgment is
Black on Judgments, § 21, says:
such a judgment as at once puts an end to the action by de
claring that the plaintiff has or has not entitled himself to
"'
‘ * A judg
recover the remedy for which he sues.
ment which is not ﬁnal is called ‘interlocutory.’
That is,
if the amount of the recovery or damages remain to be ascer
tained by a writ of inquiry or other judicial methods of com
putation, then the judgment is merely interlocutory until
such amount is settled and entered on the record."
Bouvier’s Law Dictionary says: “Interlocutory judgments
are such as are given in the middle of a cause upon some
plea, proceeding, or default which is only intermediate, and
Any judg
does not ﬁnally determine or complete the suit.
ment leaving something to be done by the court before the
rights of the parties are determined, and not putting an end
to the action in which it is entered, is interlocutory.”
In Collins v. Paddington, 5 Q. B. 368, it is said by Baggal
lay, L. J., that where any further step is necessary to per
fect an order or judgment it is not ﬁnal, but interlocutory.
By statutory provision, when judgment is rendered other
wise than on the verdict of a jury, the judges of the court
may by themselves, by the jury in court, by report of the
clerk, or by the report on oath of a person appointed by the
court, ascertain the sum due. Rev. Laws 1880, § 1178; V. S.
In the case under consideration the court directed an
1411.
assessment by the clerk, and in connection therewith ordered
that the cause be continued for assessment of damages, and
as to the trustee and claimant.
As regards the damages, the
effect of this order was that they should be ascertained by
the clerk at the term to which the case was thus continued,
unless there should be a further continuance for the purpose.
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the damages were so assessed, it then devolved upon
the court to give ﬁnal judgment thereupon at such time as
the circumstances of the case should require.
Hence the
action was not ﬁnally determined or completed in that re
spect.
Further judicial action of the court was necessary
to be directed to the question before ﬁnal judgment could be
entered of record.
Our holdings here are consonant to the rules of law gov
erning the practice in actions by trustee process before laid
In such action the judgment against
down by this court.
the principal defendant in the suit, even though it be~for
a sum certain, does not make a ﬁnal end of the case as to
him, so that an execution can issue against him before the
case has been determined as to the trustee. _
In Jones v. Spear, 21 Vt. 426, the action was assumpsit
for money had and received, and the trial was by the court.
At the trial the plaintiff sought to recover only on a promis
sory note for $100, with interest. Judgment was rendered
for the plaintiff to recover the amount due upon the note.
At a subsequent term the trustee moved to be discharged for
the reason that judgment had been rendered against the
principal defendant, and that the suit was thereby ended, as
to the defendant, at the former term. The motion was over
ruled and on exception by the trustee the case was heard
in this court. Upon a careful consideration of the decisions
of this court hitherto made bearing upon the question, it
was held that the case was not ended as to the principal
defendant, nor could he be considered as out of court, or dis
connected with the case, by having judgment rendered
against him; but that such judgment must lie until the case
It is not
should be legally determined as to the trustee.
judgment
by default in an action of debt
conceivable how a
on judgment can be more speciﬁcally for a sum certain than
was the judgment in that case for the amount due on the
note. See, also, Hapgood v. Goddard, 26 Vt. 401.
We think it clear that the judgment of 1889 was merely
interlocutory; that, considering the status of the case as to
the trustee and claimant, the continuance from term to term
for assessment of damages was peculiarly ﬁtting; and that
at the September term, 1902, ﬁnal judgment was properly
rendered of that term. It is equally clear in practice in this
state that, when ﬁnal judgment against the principal debtor
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has been entered, execution may issue thereon by special
leave of the court while the action is still pending and unde
termined as to the trustee. Spring v. Ayer, 23 Vt. 516; Bank
v. Beattie, 32 Vt. 315.
The judgment is affirmed."
88 Damages.—At common
law the assessment of damages in default
cases devolved upon the judge, and the jury. when called upon, served
only to aid the conscience of the court:—Deane v. Williamette Bridge
Co. (1892), 22 Ore. 167; Dyson v. Rhode Island Co. (1904). 25 R. I.
600;
Bruce v. Rawlfns, (1770), 3 Wiis. 61; Beardmor v. Carrington
(1764), 2 Wils. 244; Raymond v. R. R. Co. (1876), 43 Conn. 596.
Statutes
sometimes authorize a default judgment
for the amount
claimed, without proof, in actions on contract for the recovery of money
Cooper v. Brinkrnan (1888), 38 Kan. 442; Schobacker
only.
V. Ins.
Co. (1883), 59 Wis. 86; Cole v. Hoeburg (1887), 36 Kan. 263.

~_

é .\

/FRENCH

M
19

V.

CENTRAL CONSTRUCTION

Supreme

Court of Ohio.

CO.

1907.

76 Ohio State, 509.

J

CREW, . The motion to require plaintiff to elect whether
he would prosecute his action against the defendant Edward
S. Hatch or against the defendant the Central Construction
Company was properly sustained by the court of common
pleas. To maintain an action jointly against two or more
defendants, whether such action rests upon contract or in
tort, the plaintiff must allege and show a joint liability.
#

*

It

Q

is, however, suggested in argument by counsel for plain
in
error that the misjoinder of parties defendant, if the
tiff
fact of such misjoinder was to be relied upon in this case,
should have been taken advantage of by demurrer in the
court of common pleas, and it is claimed that, the question
not having been there raised by answer or demurrer, defend
ants must be held to have waived their right to object on
that ground, as well as any right they may have had to
require plaintiff to elect whether he would prosecute his
action against the defendant Hatch or against the defendant
The answer to this is
the Central Construction Company.
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that the fact of misjoinder does not affirmatively appear
on the face, or from the allegations, of plaintiff's petition,
but such fact was, for the ﬁrst time, disclosed by the evi
dence which was introduced on behalf of the plaintiff.
The
plaintiff having wholly failed by this evidence to establish or
show a joint liability upon the part of the defendants for
the wrongful and negligent act complained of, and it clearly
appearing from the evidence offered that plaintiff's cause of
action, if any he had, against the defendants _or either of
them, was a several and not a joint cause of action, the
motion interposed by the defendant Hatch at the conclusion
of the testimony, and after plaintiff had rested his case, ask
ing that plaintiff be then required to elect against which of
the defendants he would further proceed, was made in time,
was well taken, and the same was therefore properly sus
tained, and an order was properly made by the court requir
ing the plaintiff to make such election. The plaintiff having
refused to comply with or obey this order, the court, under
the authority of subdivision 5 of section 5314, Rev. St. 1906,
Said sec
properly dismissed the action without prejudice.
may
“An
action
provides
as follows:
be dismissed with
tion
By the
out prejudice to a future action. * * *
(5)
plaintiff
by
the
of
an order concern
court for disobedience
ing the proceedings in the action.”
Finding no error in this record to the prejudice of the
plaintiff in error, the judgment of the circuit court will be
aﬁirmed.”
89Compare Thompson v. Selden (1857), 20 How. (U. S.) 194. Accord,
v. Investment Co. (1905), 71 Kan. 121; Plummet v. Well (1896),
15 \Va8h. 427.
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JUDGMENTS on DEMURRER 0R MOTION.

,5

/ ~Supreme

STATE

v

PECK

Judicial Court of Maine.
60

1872.

Maine, 498.

DANFORTH, J. This case has once been before the law
court upon a_/special de_murre_r__t_o_t_he plaintiff's replication,
58 Maine, 123.
The demurrer was overruled, the replication held, good.
and the case sent back for ﬁnal judgment, unless the defend
ants were permitted to withdraw their demurrer and plead
anew under the provisions of the R. S., c. 82, § 19. At. the
term subsequent to the announcement of the decision, the
defendants’ counsel moved for leave to withdraw said de
murrer, without the consent of the plaintiff and without com
plying with the provisions of the statute, and to plead to the
This motion was denied and judgment ordered for
issue.
To this the defendants except, and now claim
the plaintiff.
If the judgment
the allowance of the motion as of right.
upon the issue as made up, should have been r_e_s_p,on.deat
ouster, the defendants are right in their claim, otherwise

\

/n*a.—
Previous to the several acts embodied in the revision above
ﬁnal judgment would have
on a general demurrer,
court,
and entered as of the preced
been ordered by the law
ing, instead of at the following term.
The demurrer was
not to a plea in abatement but to a replication, which pre
sented the full merits of the case. The party had his option
l
to plead or demur. By electing the latter “he shall be taken
he has no ground for denial or traverse."
l to admit that
Stephen on Pl. 143.
The result of this principle is the well established rule,
“that a demurrer admits all such matters of fact as are suffi
ciently pleaded.”
It must be conceded that the replication
contains all the facts necessary to maintain the plaintiff’s case,
and the court have decided that it is sufficient in form. Hence
a ﬁnal judgment must necessarily follow. The authorities are
l
to the same effect. Stephen, in his work on pleading, treat
1
ing of judgments for the plaintiff says, on pages 104, 105,
cited,

Paocssnmos
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in law, arising on dilatory plea, the judg
*
"‘
*
ment is only, that the defendant answer over.
Upon all other issues in law, and in general all issues of
fact, the judgment is that the plaintiff recover.”
Also in
note on page 144, “On demurrer to any pleadings which go
to the action, the judgment for either party is the same as
it would have been on an issue of fact, joined upon the same
pleading and found in favor of the same party.” Clear
water v. Meredith, 1 Wallace, 25, 43; McKeen v. Parker, 51
Maine, 389; Mc/ltlister 12. Clark, 33 Conn. 258, and in Parlin
5 Maine, 413; Inhabitants of Washington 11.
'0. Macomber,
Eames, 6 Allen, 417, ﬁnal judgment was ordered by the law
court. But without denying the correctness of these prin
ciples when applied to a general demurrer, it is contended
that they are not applicable to a special one, and it is said
that none of the authorities so lay down the law. While this
may be true, it is also true that in Parlin v. Macomber above
cited, the court applied the law to a special demurrer, and
also in Washington 12. Eames, though in Massachusetts, un
der their practice act, all demurrers must be special. No
authority has been cited, or fallen under notice, in which
any distinction between the two kinds of demurrer, in re

\

be an issue

spect to the judgment, has been alluded to, which, to say the
least, is a little singular if any such difference exists.
Nor are we able to perceive any such distinction from the
principles involved.
#

l l I l

1

8

O

1

840

5‘:/[LC

40"On demurrer in law, the justices may award damages for the
party by their discretion, or award a writ to inquire of damages at
7 Vin. Abr. 301.
their election."
The judgment for the defendant on a demurrer to a plea in abatement
is that the writ be quashed.—Cushman v. Savage (1858), 20 Ill. 330.

éN

MARTIN

Su~rt

v.

SHERWOOD.

1

of Errors of Connecticut.

74 Connecticut,

PRENTICE,
the defendant

J.

1901.

202.

This action was originally brought against
Upon the motion of the defendant
receiver.
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The
the town of Winchester was cited in as a codefendant.
defendant receiver then answered, incorporating in his an
swer a statement of facts in the form of a complaint charg
ing liability upon the defendant town. The town thereupon
This de
demurred to both the complaint and said answer.
murrer was sustained by memorandum ﬁled July 13, 1900.
In October a trial to the jury was had of the issues between
the plaintiff and the defendant receiver, and a verdict for
On December 15,
$500 rendered in favor of the former.
1900, the court rendered judgment for damages and costs
against the defendant receiver, and also that the defendant
town be dismissed from the case, with certain costs against
The receiver immediately ﬁled his notice of
said receiver.
appeal from said judgment, and thereupon proceeded to per
fect his appeal. The defendant town pleads in abatement
in this court, for the reason that the appeal proceedings, as
It is contended
against it, were not seasonably taken.
only
urged
contention
in the brief in sup
and this is the
port of the plea—that the action of the court in sustaining
the town's demurrer was a ﬁnal judgment in its behalf, and
that, therefore, the right of appeal therefrom was lost by
failure to take any action looking to an appeal until some
months later. This contention, we think, is not well founded.
the town’s demurrer.
This
‘\The court simply sustained
did not amount to ﬁnal judgment dismissing the town
It might furnish the foundation for such a
ﬁlone
rom the case.
judgment if amendment should not be made. The rights of
he parties as against the town were not ﬁnally foreclosed
The town was still in
by the ruling upon the demurrer.
Judgment might
ourt. The case against it was still open.
against
upon
it
pleadings.
amended
As
Etill be rendered
relating
right
amendment,
to
the
of
of
statutes
our
result
p.
and under our modern practice, for reasons sufficiently in-,
dicated above, judgment does not necessarily, and as a mat
ter of course, follow decisions upon demurrer. There is no
judgment—not even a defeasable one, such as_counsel for
the town ingeniously suggests—until one is expressly ren
In this case judgment was never asked for in the
dered.
The judgment
town’s behalf until after the jury's verdict.
word was never spoken until the judgment ﬁle of December
Clearly, therefore, there was no ﬁnal judgment in
15th.
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favor of the town from which an appeal might
until that date.
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be taken

The report of the state referee is accepted, and the plea
The other judges concurred.“

in abatement overruled.

-~

41 If the demurrant does not ask leave to plead over after his demurrer
is overruled, he is deemed to stand on his demurrer and ﬁnal judgment
will tollow.—Ga.mmon v. Bunnell, (1900) 22 Utah, 421 (on re-hearing,

p. 428).

v

KENEFICK

COBB v. WM.

<5;

me

CO.

Court of Oklahoma.
23 Oklahoma,

1909.
~

440.

DUNN, J. This action was begun in the United States
court for the Western District of the Indian Territory, at
Muskogee, by the Wm. Keneﬁck Company, defendant in
error, against S. S. Cobb, City National Bank of Wagoner,
Ind. T., First National Bank of Wagoner, Ind. T., W. B.
Kane, and J. W. Wallace, to enforce payment of two notes
given by S. S. Cobb to the said company to cover a sub
scription made by him to secure the construction_ of a rail
road to the city of Wagoner under the terms and conditions
A demurrer to the liability
as shown by the pleadings.
charged against the other parties named who signed the
notes was sustained by the court, from which no appeal
Hence they are eliminated from the case,
was prosecuted.
have
but
to deal with the controversy existing be
we
and
On the ﬁling
tween the appellant Cobb and the appellee.
plaintiff
answer,
ﬁled
a
motion
of the amended
for judg
ment on the pleadings, which was sustained by the court,
from which appeal was prosecuted to the United States
Court of Appeals of the Indian Territory, and the case now
comes to us for review by virtue of our succession to that
court.
$

l I

U

#

I

#

i

Q

1

As a preliminary question, counsel for appellant in their
brief contend that such a motion as was ﬁled by appellee,
for judgment on the pleadings, is unknown to our Code.

->7’-1,
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While this is, strictly speaking, true, yet the practice is well
established by the procedure adopted in the courts and meets
nearly, if not quite, uniform approval.
Black on Judgments,
vol. 1, sec. 15; Ency. Pleading & Practice, vol. 11, pp. 1044,
1045; Hutchison 'v. Myers, 52 Kan. 290, 34 Pac. 742.
In the case of Hutchinson 1). Myers, supra, Justice Johns
ton in the consideration thereof, speaking of the motion for
judgment on the pleadings, has this to say:
“Complaint is next made of the action of the court in
entertaining a motion for judgment upon the pleadings, and
in allowing judgment against Hutchinson without testimony.
The motion for judgment on the pleadings was equivalent
to a demurrer to Hutchinson’s answer, and is a common and
If the averments of the petition were
permissible practice.
sufficient, and the answer did not allege a defense, and no
amendment was asked for or allowed, plaintiff was certainly
'
entitled to a judgment.”
The general rule is stated in 23 Cyc. 769, as follows:
“This is'a form of judgment not infrequently used in
practice under the reformed Codes of Procedure.
It is ren
dered on motion of plaintiff, when the answer admits or
leaves undenied all the material facts stated in the com
plaint; but such a judgment cannot be given where the
pleadings of defendant set up a substantial and issuable de
fense or where the suit is for unliquidated damages and the
answer states matters in mitigation.”
And, say the authorities, in the consideration thereof, “the
pleadings objected to as insufficient will be liberally construed,
and the motion will be denied, Where there is any reasonable
11 Ency. of Pleading &
doubt as to their insufficiency.”
Practice, 1047; McAl-lister '0. Welker, 39 Minn. 535, 41 N.
W. 107; Kelly v. Rogers, 21 Minn. 146; Giles Lithographic &
Liberty Printing Company 'v. Recamier Manufacturing Com
pany, 14 Daly (N. Y.), 475. In the case of Malone et al. 'v.
Minnesota Stone Company, 36 Minn. 325, 31 N. W. 170, the
court in the syllabus says: “Upon such motion every reason
able intendment is in favor of the sufficiency of the pleading
objected to.”
Now with this rule, requiring, as we have seen, the liberal
construction of the answer ﬁled in the case, the question
arises: Do the complaint and the answer, taken together,
considering those portions of the former admitted or un

Paocsnnmos BASED on THE Racoan
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denied, in conjunction with the averments of the answer,
leave the case in such a situation and present such a state
ment of facts as will justify an afiirmance of this judgment?
This question will necessitate an analysis of the pleadings
ﬁled, to the end that we may ascertain the precise facts
If the complaint states a cause of action
shown thereby.
which is undenied by the answer, and there is no new matter
pleaded in the answer under the rule above noticed, sufficient
to deny plaintiff the right to the relief demanded, then the
judgment should be sustained; otherwise it should be re
"‘
"‘
*4”
versed.
4-8In Sternberg v; Levy, (1901) 159 Mo. 617, it is said that a motion
for judgment differs from a demurrer in that ft is not a part of the
record and hence can be brought before an appellate court only by a bill
This would seem to be a matter depending on local
of exceptions.
practice.
The admissions on such a motion are the same, and for the same
on a demui-rer.—Hale
purposes, as the admissions
v. Gardiner, (1921)
186

Cal. 661, 200 Pac. 598.

,

// (W(J

~i

CONWAY v. SEXTON.

#‘§/@7116

Court of Izzmm.
248

J

1909.

Illinois, 59.

CARTER, . This is a proceeding in the county court of St.
Clair county to contest the election of trustees of a sanitary
district. “ "‘ * The petition alleges that certain votes were
counted for various of the ﬁve candidates on the Taxpayers’
ticket which should have been counted for appellant, and that,
if these votes so wrongfully counted had been properly
counted for appellant, he would have been elected; and the ap
pellant prays that there may be a recount of all the ballots,
Jones,
and that he may be declared duly elected trustee.
Gray, and Sexton moved to dismiss the petition because the
court was without jurisdiction, in law, to hear and determine
the subject-matter of the petition, and because the petition
was insufficient in that certain necessary persons were not
made parties. On a hearing of these motions the petition
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was dismissed, and judgment for costs entered against ap
pellant.
From this judgment this appeal was taken.
Under this statute ﬁve trustees were to be elected. Each
candidate was opposed to every other candidate who was
running for the office of trustee. Neither candidate was run
ning for any particular one of the ﬁve places to be ﬁlled, but
under the law the ﬁve candidates that received the highest
number of votes at this election were elected to the ﬁve posi
tions.
It is quite possible, from anything that is shown in
the record, that Gray, Jones, and Sexton, who were declared
elected and who are parties to this proceeding, might have re
ceived more votes on the recount than either Tarlton or
Leyden, and appellant might also have received more votes
than Tarlton and Leyden, and yet, as the two latter were not
made parties to this proceeding, the court could not declare
petitioner elected. We think Tarlton and Leyden, as well as
all other persons who were candidates for trustee at the elec
tion in question, should have been made parties.
Appellant, however, insists that this question should have
been raised by a plea in abatement in the court below, and not
by motion to dismiss.
The defect of proper parties appears
here on the face of the proceedings, and the court could deter
mine from an inspection of the petition that certain necessary
parties were not in court. The motion to dismiss under such
a state of facts, is proper, even in common-law proceedings.
Holloway v. Freeman, 22 Ill. 197; Windett v. Hamilton, 52
Ill. 180; McNab 12. Bennett, 66 Ill. 157. Section 116 of the
election law (Hurd’s Rev. St. 1908, p. 929, c. 46) provides that
a proceeding of this kind “shall be tried in like manner as
This court, in discussing this statute in
cases in chancery.”
Dale 7). Irwin, 78 Ill. 170, said on page 175: “The proceeding
to contest such an election is to all intents and purposes a
chancery proceeding, and subject to all the rules governing
"‘
*
*
them."
In discussing the method of raising the question of the
lack of parties in chancery proceedings in Prentice v. Kim.
ball, 19 Ill. 320, 323, this court said: “It is the usual and bet
ter practice, where the want of proper parties is apparent on
the face of the bill, to take advantage of it by demurrer or
motion to dismiss, or, if not patent, by plea or answer.
Where the parties omitted are mere formal parties, and not
indispensable to a decision of the case upon its merits, it will

I
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be too late to make the objection at the hearing; but where
the rights of the parties not before the court are intimately
connected with the matter in dispute, so that a ﬁnal decree
cannot be made without materially affecting their interests,
"
" " the objection may be taken at the hearing, or on ap
peal, or on error. Courts will, ex oﬂicio, take notice of such
omission and rule accordingly.” “ * “
The motion to dismiss was therefore properly sustained,
because proper and necessary persons, indispensable to a de
cision of the contest upon its merits, were not made parties to
the proceeding.
At the time this order was entered, May 13,
1909, it was too late, under the statute, to bring in new par
ties to the contest.
The motion to dismiss is not set out in full in the abstract.
it was so worded that it raised the insufficiency of the alle
gations of the bill, it could properly be treated as a demurrenl
Smith 'v. Kochersperger, 173 Ill. 201, 50 N. E. 187; 2 High on
Injunctions (4th Ed.) § 1706. So treated, the bill was insuffi
cient for the further reason that, even if all its allegations
are admitted to be true, it does not show that appellant would
have been elected as one of the ﬁve trustees, even provided all '
of the votes he claims should have been counted for him were
so counted; for, as has been heretofore stated, the petition
does not set out how many votes were received by any of the
It is quite possible, from anything found in the
candidates.
record, that the difference in votes between appellant and ap
pellees was so great that the proper counting of the votes
alleged to have been counted improperly would not have
changed the result.
The conclusions reached herein on the questions already
discussed make it unnecessary for us to consider and decide
whether section 98 of the election law (Hurd’s Rev. St. 1908,
p. 928, c. 46) gives the county court jurisdiction to hear this
election contest. This decision ends the contest, as it is now
too late to make the proper persons parties within the 30
days provided by section 106 of the election law.
The judgment of the county court will be affirmed.

If

Judgment affirmed.“
48“A motion to dismiss is the equivalent of a general demurrer, and
may be made at the trial term if the petition is fatally defective, but
such a motion cannot reach mere defects in pleading, such as may be
Lumber Co. v. Hobbs,
cured by appropriate a.mendment."—Minnes0ta
(1904) 122 Ga. 20.
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SANDERS v. PIERCE.

Supreme

Court of Vermont.

1896.

Vermont, 468.

6'8
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THOMPSON, J. This
an action of trespass vi et armis,
brought originally in the county court. The ad damnum of
the writ
$5. The defendant appeared, pleaded the general
issue, and
trial by jury was had, resulting in verdict for
the plaintiff for $8.32 damages.
After verdict, and before
judgment, the defendant moved to dismiss the suit for want
of jurisdiction. His motion did not specify the precise ground
upon which he based his claim that the county court had no
alleged that such ground
jurisdiction of the action; but
appeared from the writ, to which reference was made. The
court below overruled this motion, to which ruling the de
1040, that a jus
fendant excepted. It
provided by V. S.
tice shall have jurisdiction of an action of this kind, where
1009, pro
the matter in demand does not exceed $200. Id.
vides that the county court shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction of all original and civil actions, except those made
cognizable by
justice. From the provisions of these two
apparent that the county court
sections of the statutes,
had no jurisdiction of this case. Jurisdiction cannot be con
ferred by the consent of the parties. The court before which
pending will dismiss it, at any stage of it, when
cause
is discovered that such court has no jurisdiction.
An objec
tion to jurisdiction over the subject-matter
never out of

"4

&

44 Want of jurisdiction
over the person is also ground for non-suit on
Co., (1894) 95 Ga. 58, Nye v. Liscombe.
motion.—Graham v. Marks
(1838) 21 Pick. (Mass.) 263.
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T0 EVIDENCE

DEMURRER.

NEW ENGLAND INSURANCE

Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

\
22

Pickering, 135.

CO.

1839.

_

This was assumpsit on a policy of insurance, whereby the
defendants insured the sum of $2,500 on the brig Adams, at
and from Wilmington to Jamaica and at and from thence to
her port of discharge in the United States. It was alleged,
that the vessel was totally lost upon a coral reef near the Isle
of Pines, while on her voyage from Jamaica to Wilmington.
Plea, the general issue.
The plaintiffs, in order to maintain the issue on their part,
introduced the policy, the register of the vessel, the written
abandonment of their interest, and the depositions of three
witnesses, which had been taken on behalf of the defendants,
detailing the circumstances attending the loss of the vessel.
They also examined a witness viva voce, and his testimony
was reduced to writing. The defendants, “confessing all said
evidence to be true, and admitting every fact and every con
clusion which the evidence thus given by the plaintiffs con
duces to prove,” say that the matters thus shown in evidence
are not sufficient in law to maintain the issue on the part of
the plaintiffs, and pray judgment that the jury may be dis
charged from giving any verdict upon such issue, and that the
plaintiffs may be barred from having their action against
them. The plaintiffs joined in the demurrer.

J

3

i

1

Q

Q

Q

i

1

*

#

.

MORTON, . This is assumpsit on a policy of insurance on
It is alleged, that the brig was totally lost
the brig Adams.
upon a coral reef near the Isle of Pines on the coast of Cuba.
The admissions of the parties reduced the case to the simple
question, whether the loss was caused by any of the perils in
To prove the affirmative the plaintiffs intro
sured against.
testimony
of four witnesses, and here submitted
duced the
their case. The defendants believing this evidence to be in
sufficient to support the action, demurred to it. The plaintiff
joined in the demurrer; and the case has been argued upon
the evidence thus brought before us.

i

U

Q

i

Q

I

U

C

U

I
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There are undoubtedly cases, though they are rare, in
which a demurrer to evidence may be safely and properly
taken. Where all the evidence in a case consists of written
instruments, and these are introduced by the party having
the affirmative, his opponent may safely demur to the evi
dence, and be sure thereby to bring the merits of his case be
fore the court. As it would be the province of the court to
determine the construction and legal operation of the instru
ments, they would have, by the concession of the parties, all
the materials necessary to enable them to determine the legal
rights of the parties in the action. The facts being thus be
fore them they, in applying the law to them, are in the exer
cise of their appropriate duty.
But a demurrer is not conﬁned to written evidence. Where
witnesses positively testify to certain deﬁnite facts, and there

a

it

a

it

it

it

it

it

a

a

kositions

is no discrepancy between them, and no other evidence to be
offered, a demurrer will properly bring these facts before the
court, and enable them to judge whether they will sustain the
action or defence which they are introduced to support.
But it not infrequently happens, that the plaintiff or party
having the affirmative, attempts to support the issue on his
art by indirect and circumstantial evidence
And when the
are to be established by inferences from many other
facts, it is difficult if not impracticable, to admit
demurrer
It may be well here to consider the effect of demurrer to
with the more care, because we
evidence. And we shall do
apprehend, that
was not duly considered or perfectly under
stood by the counsel on either side. It seems to have been
supposed to be an admission of the truth of the evidence; and
the Court have been called upon, supposing
all to be true,
to determine what inferences may be drawn from it, and
would be competent for the jury upon
whether
to ﬁnd
verdict for the plaintiffs. And
has been argued, that if we
verdict found for the plaintiffs on this evi
would set aside
dence, we must render judgment for the defendants, on the

is

a

it

a

demurrer.
But we think this is
mistaken view of the subject and
give
fails to
to the demurrer its legal effect. It leaves
to
the court to draw inferences from the circumstances proved
and to judge of the weight of the evidence; which would be
trenching upon the province of the jury. The effect of
not only to admit the truth of the
demurrer to evidence,

269

evidence, but the existence of all the facts which are stated
in that evidence or which it conduces to prove. Hence that
most acute and learned pleader, Mr. Justice Gould, says, that
this demurrer, “though called a demurrer to evidewzce, is es
sentially a demurrer to the facts shown in eviclence.” Gould
on Pleading, 47, 48, 49. As a demurrer to a declaration asks
the opinion of the court upon the facts properly pleaded, so a
demurrer to evidence asks their opinion upon the facts shown
in evidence. In both cases the decision is purely a matter of
law, and cannot involve any questions of fact on the evidence.
The true question always raised by this kind of demurrer
is, not what it is competent for the jury to ﬁnd, but what"the
evidence tends to prove. This view is fully sustained by a
most clear and elaborate opinion given by the very learned
Lord Chief Justice Eyre, in pronouncing the judgment of the
House of Lords in the case of Gibson v. Hunter, 2 H. Black
stone, 187. This case contains a most lucid and able discus
He says, the precise operation of
sion of the whole subject.
is,
to
to
take from the jury and refer to
a demurrer
evidence
the judges the application of the law to the fact.
In the
things
of
are
ﬁrst
to
be
the facts
nature
Where
ascertained.
the evidence is written or, if in parol, is positive, deﬁnite and
certain, the party offering the evidence is bound to join in
demurrer. But the reason of the rule “does not apply to
parol evidence which is loose and indeterminate, which may
be urged with more or less effect to a jury; and least of all
will it apply to evidence of circumstances, which evidence is
meant to operate beyond. the proof of the existence of those
circumstances, and to conduce to the proof of the existence
of other facts. And yet if there be no demurrer in such
cases, there will be no consistency in the doctrine of demur
rers to evidence, by which the application of the law to the
fact on an issue is meant to be withdrawn from a jury and
transferred to the judges. If the party who demurs, will ad
mit the evidence of the fact, the evidence of which fact is
loose and indeterminate, or in the case of circumstantial evi
dence, if he will admit the existence of the fact, which the
circumstances offered in evidence conduce to prove, there. will
then be no more variance, in this parol evidence, than in a
matter in writing, and the reasons for compelling the party
who offers the evidence to join in demurrer, will then apply,
and the doctrine of demurrers to evidence will be uniform and
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See also Middleton v. Baker, Cro. Eliz. 753.
consistent.”
This doctrine seems to be founded upon and well supported
by the case of Wright 'v. Pindar, reported in Style, 34, and
also in Aleyn, 18. "‘ 4‘ ‘
The same principles are recognized by the Supreme Court
of the United States, in Young '0. Black, 7 Cranch, 565. Mr.
Justice Story, in giving the judgment of the court, says, “the
party demurring is bound to admit as true not only all the
facts proved by the evidence introduced by the other party,
but also all the facts which that evidence may legally conduce
to prove.”
¥

#

#

Q

I i l

t

Q

I

In this case, Fowle v. Common Council of Alexandria, 11
Wheaton, 320, the learned judge says, “It is no part of the
object” of a demurrer to evidence “to bring before the court
an investigation of the facts in dispute, or to weigh the force
of testimony, or the presumptions arising from the evidence.
That is the proper province of the jury. The true and proper
object of such a demurrer is to refer to the court the law
arising from the facts. It supposes, therefore, the facts to
be already ascertained and admitted, and that nothing re
mains but for the court to apply the law to those facts.”
Judge Gould expresses the same doctrine in a little differ
He says, § 47, “The object of a demurrer is
ent language.
to bring in question on the record, the relevancy of the evi
dence on one side, and to make the question of its relevancy,
the sole point on which the issue in fact is to be determined.”
He adds, § 51, “that evidence is always relevant to any issue
it conduces in any degree to prove. And as its relevancy is
the only point of which the court can judge, it follows, that it
can never be safe for a party to demur to evidence which is
clearly relevant to the whole issue, viz. which clearly con
duces in any degree to prove the whole affirmative side of the
issue.”
The result of these authorities is, that a demurrer to evi
dence admits not only all the facts directly stated in it, but
also all the facts which the evidence in any degree tends to
prove.
Where the evidence consists of written documents or of di
rect and positive testimony of witnesses, there can be no
diificulty in demurring to it and of raising the question of
law on the facts. But where the evidence is circumstantial
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is not easy or safe to frame a demurrer upon it, or a rejoinder
thereto.

It will

not be sufficient to demur to the evidence

generally and leave the court to ascertain what it tends to
prove, or what inferences may be drawn from it. But in re
citing the evidence, in the demurrer, the party demurring
must state distinctly the facts which the evidence tends to
prove, and which he thereby admits, that the court may read
ily perceive the facts upon which they are to decide. '
Judge Gould, adopting the language of Lord Chief Justice
Eyre, says, “Where the evidence is circumstantial, the party
demurring must distinctly admit upon the record every fact
and every conclusion, in favor of the opposite party, which
the evidence conduces to prove; otherwise he is not bound to
join in the demurrer, because without such admission the
weight as well as the relevancy of the evidence would be re
ferred to the court."
And Mr. Justice Story, in the case before cited, uses this
language: “No party can insist upon the others joining in
the demurrer, without distinctly admitting, upon the record,
every fact and every conclusion, which the evidence conduces
This is exactly the doctrine of Gibson o. Hunter.
to prove.”
the defendants
demur Vgenerally
Now_ in the case
to
bar,______
>
>_ at
>

mMence1.1hi¢h_~
__

And

so

far from reciting the facts and conclusions which the

evidence tends to prove, and which they intend to admit, they
refer generally to all the evidence as it exists in the form of
depositions, consisting of a great variety of interrogatories
and cross interrogatories, and the answers to them, which
This we think
are neither direct and positive nor consistent.
To quote again the language of
to be clearly irregular.
Judge Story, “The defendants have demurredlnot t2_t_l_1e__f§._§ts
to
ere cir

~sr@':e¢mss@.n§‘1>ui

~mmr.mm’L
in this
The

case tends to show, and un
evidence offered
doubtedly does show, that the brig insured, in a squall, (not a
severe one to be sure,) ran upon a coral reef and was totally
lost. This proof, by itself, clearly would support the plain
tiffs’ action. But the defendants contend that the testimony
of the same witnesses tends to show, that the vessel was run
on shore intentionally or through the gross incapacity of
Now these are distinct substantive facts, which
the master.
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a

a

is

édmit

the defendants wish to establish. It is true the evidence tends
strongly, very strongly, to prove them. But the defendants
cannot avail themselves of these grounds of defence on a
demurrer to the evidence. If the plaintiff's evidence does not
show a prima facie case, the defendants may demur. But if
they wish to set up any facts in defence, they must resort to
the jury to have them established.
The depositions intro
duced by the plaintiffs were taken by the defendants, and
thus th'e facts may be presented in an order and a form most
avorable to the latter. The defendants too, by demurring,
the facts which the evidence conduces to prove for the
laintiffs, and cannot avail themselves of such as it tends to
how for the defendants.
The plaintiffs, by joining in the
demurrer, did not admit the truth of that part of the testi
mony which
favorable to the defendants, much less any in
ferences which may be drawn from it.
If the defendants
wish to set up any facts to exonerate or discharge them, they
must look to the jury to establish them. The Court cannot
examine, compare and weigh the different parts of the evi
It would be performing a duty which the law has not
dence.
imposed upon them, and which they uniformly refuse to ac
cept from the agreement of the parties themselves.
further examination of the evidence.
Without going into
we are fully convinced that the demurrer was not properly
tendered, that the evidence did not present
proper case for
demurrer, that the plaintiffs ought not to have joined in it,
but to have prayed the judgment of the court whether the
\1efendants should be admitted to it.
The Court have an important discretion in allowing or dis
allowing demurrers to evidence. Although
demurrer
matter of right and the opposite party may be compelled to
join in it, when properly presented, yet he should always be
contains the proper admissions before
careful to see that
whole, we are satisﬁed that the de
in
it.
On
the
joins
he
murrer was tendered and joined without fully examining and
duly considering the nature and effect of the measure.
And we think, not as Lord Chief Justice Rolle said, “that
both parties have misbehaved themselves,” but in the lan
guage of the Supreme Court of the United States, “that the
demurrer has been so incautiously framed, that there
no
manner of certainty in the state of facts upon which any
Under such a predicament, the
judgment can be founded.

a

is

is

it

a

a

\
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settled practice is to award a new trial, upon the ground
the issue between the parties has not been tried.
This wa
done in the analogous cases of Wright '0. Pindar, and Gibso
1:. Hunter, by the House of Lords, and in Fowle '0. Commo
Council of Alexandria, by the Supreme Court of the Unite
States.

_Y~award_e*d.}f

to evidence cannot be made a part of the record by
It is as much a part of the record proper as the
demurrer to the pleadings or the verdict of the jury."—Chesapeake
Ency. Pl.
Ohio Ry. Co. v. Sparrow's Adm’r, (1900) 98 Va. 630, quoting
and Pa. 457; Loefiier v. City of West Tampa, (1908) 55 Fla. 276; Lindley
v. Kelley, (1873) 42 Ind. 294.
By the demurrer to the evidence the case is irrevocably taken from
the jury and submitted to the court for ﬂnal judgment.--Galveston,
Harrisburg
San Antonio Ry. Co. v. Templeton,
(1894) 87 Tex. 42;
Eberstadt v. State, (1898) 92 Tex. 94; Gluck v. Cox, (1889) 90 Ala.
331; Coleman v. Bennett, (1903)'111 Tenn. 705. But this rule is some
times changed by statute.—Michigan, C. L. 1915, Sec. 12628; Kansas,
G. St. 1909, Sec. 5879; Georgia, Levy v. Simmons, (1871) 42 Ga. 53.
The demurrer to the evidence does not amount to an impairment of
the constitutional right of trial by jury.—Hopkins v. Railroad, (1895)
&

6

&

45 “A demurrer
bill of exceptions.

96

Tenn.

A

409.

for a. directed verdict is often loosely referred to as a
v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., (1911)
demurrer to the evidence.—Mathews
156 Mo. App. 715; Dunn v. Bozarth, (1899) 59 Neb. 244; County Comm’rs
v. Wise, (1891) 75 Md. 38.
Comparison with Special Verdict. “The case made for a demurrer
to evidence is. in many respects, like a special verdict. It is to state
facts. and not merely testimony which may conduce to prove them. It is
to admit whatever the jury may reasonably infer from the evidence,
ground of presumption.
and not merely the circumstances which form
The principal difference between them is, that, upon a demurrer to evi
court may infer, in favor of the party joining in demurrer,
dence.
every fact of which the evidence might justify an inference; whereas,
upon a. special verdict, nothing is intended beyond the facts found."—
Fowle v. Common Council of Alexandria, (1826) 11 Wheat. (U. S.) 320.
“Where, the parties being at issue in assumpsit, a demurrer
Damages.
was joined upon the evidence, and the jury discharged, without assessing
the damages; and afterwards judgment was given for the plaintiff, and
of damages awarded;
the court held, that though
a. writ of inquiry
the same jury might have assessed the damages conditionally, yet it
writ of inquiry of damages, when the de
may as well be done by
determined;
and
the
most usual course is, when there is
is
murrer
demurrer upon evidence, to discharge the jury without further inquiry."
Tidd's Prac. 575.

a

a

a

a
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/'

PLUNKETT

7

ﬂ~

M/'“°

v.

[Chap.

Non OBSTANTE VEREDICTO.
\

DETROIT ELECTRIC RAILWAY

Supreme Court of Michigan.
140

2

CO.

1905.

Michigan, 299.

J.

Plaintiff, a city ﬁreman, was pipeman
P
on a hose truck, which was proceeding west on High street
j
gut:/_; at 7:45 p. m., February 2, 1900, when it was struck at Hast
..
ings street by a north-bound Hastings street car belonging
P
Plaintiff was thrown and injured. Plaintiff
to defendant.
brought this action to recover for the injuries sustained, and
on the trial, under a charge submitting the question of de
fendant’s negligence, and that of the contributory negligence
of the plaintiff, to the jury, a verdict was rendered in favor
Defendant thereupon entered a
of the plaintiff for $2,500.
motion for judgment in its favor non obstante veredicto, for
MONTGOMERY,

the reasons:
“F‘i'rst. For that under the evidence given in said cause a
verdict should have been directed by the court in favor of the
defendant at the conclusion of the trial thereof.
“Second.
For that this court charged said jury, in sub
stance and effect, that the said plaintiff by and through the
persons with whom he was riding, was guilty of contributory
negligence.”
This motion was granted, and judgment non obstante vere
dicto was entered for defendant.
Plaintiff brings error.
The defendant and the court below mistook the practice.
At the common law, judgment non obstante veredicto could
be entered only when the plea confessed the cause of action
and set up matters in avoidance which were insufficient, al
though found true, to constitute a defense or bar to the ac
tion. The rule was later relaxed, and made to apply in favor
of the defendant, so that it is now generally held that the de
fendant is entitled to a judgment non obstante veredicto
when the plaintiff’s pleadings are not sufficient to support a
judgment in his favor. 11 Enc. Pl. & Prac. 912 et seq. So,
too, if there be both a general and special verdict, and the
latter be inconsistent with the former, judgment may, in
some cases, be based upon the special verdict, disregarding
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the general verdict.
But we know of no case in which it is
proper practice to enter a judgment non obstante veredicto,
unless it appears on the record that the verdict of the jury
cannot be supported as matter of law. In all other cases the
proper practice is to move for a new trial, or review the case
on writ of error and exceptions. There must be either a gen
eral or special verdict to support a judgment, or the plead
ings must authorize its entry. This question is ruled by
Central Sav. Bank v. O'Connor, 132 Mich. 578. See also,
Schmid '0. Village of Frankfort, 134 Mich. 619, and County
of Montmorency v. Putnam, 135 Mich. 111. Counsel for ap
pellant has presented the case upon the assumption that the
circuit court had power to consider the question which he as
sumed to pass upon, and has 'pointed out that the court
mistook the rule as to imputed negligence, and that his hold
ing is at variance with the ruling of this court in McKernan
v. Railway Co., 138 Mich. 519.
Defendant’s counsel contend that there are other reasons
why the verdict should have been for the defendant.
We
must decline to enter upon a consideration of these questions.
The judgment is reversed, and the case will be remanded,
that the plaintiff may move for judgment on the verdict.
Plaintiff will recover costs.“
.
“Damages
“The writ

2 'l‘idd’s Prac. 920.
are assessed on a writ of inquiry.
ot inquiry is directed to the sheriﬁ ot the county where
the venue is lald....; . . . . . . ..the sheriff is commanded, that by the
oath of twelve honest and lawful men of his county, he diligently in
quire the same [plaintiffs damages], and return the Inquisition into

court."

~l

1

Tldd's Prac.

573.
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SECTION 6.

PELICAN ASSURANCE

/W"

ARREST
CO. v.

[Chap. 2

or JUDGMENT.

AMERICAN FEED AND

GROCERY CO.

A /

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

1909.

122 Tennessee, 652.
BEARD,

In the

J

.

*

‘ ‘

bar errors are assigned upon the action of
the trial judge in admitting over objection incompetent testi
mony, in overruling a motion for peremptory instruction, in
giving certain instructions to the jury, and failing to grant
requests that were submitted.
It will be observed that these
errors if committed, occurred in the trial of the cause, and
would have constituted grounds of a motion for a new trial,
made in the court below, to the end that a retrial might be
obtained, or, failing in this, then to preserve the same in the
record, so that the ruling of the trial judge in declining the
motion might be preserved to the plaintiff in error. Railroad
Resting upon mat
12. Johnson, 114 Tenn. 633, 88 S. W. 169.
ters extrinsic to the technical record, they could only be pre
served for review in this court by a properly ﬁled bill of ex
ceptions. If as is contended by counsel for plaintiff in error,
they can here be made the subject of investigation, by reason
of the motion in arrest having been overruled, then we can
see no distinction between that and a motion for new trial;
for the very errors that are now made the subject of com
plaint are those which would have been properly raised on
this latter motion. It is apparent that, to secure a reversal
on account of these errors, it would be necessary to look be
yond the “face of the record” into the evidence introduced.
This cannot be done. It is well settled by the authorities that
a motion in arrest of judgment lies alone for some error
which vitiates the proceeding, or is of so serious a character
that judgment should not be rendered. It “can only be main
tained for a defect upon the face of the record, and the evi
dence is no part of the record for this purpose.”
Bond '0.
Dustin, 112 U. S. 604, 5 Sup. Ct. 296, 28 L. Ed. 835; Van
Stone v. Stillwell E. T. C. Co., 142 U. S. 128, 12 Sup. Ct. 181,
35 L. Ed. 961; 23 Cyc. 825.
case at
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Applying this rule of correct procedure to the present
it follows that the judgment must

ARD
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case,

be affirmed.

RUTLAND RAILROAD co.

v.

S’up{eme

277

Court of Vermont.
80 Vermont,

1907.

462.

ROWELL, C. J. Case for negligently injuring the plaintiff
by a collision of trains, on one of which he was a passenger.
Plea, the general issue, anditrial by jury. Verdict and judg
ment for the plaintiff. The defendant conceded the right of
recovery, but denied the claim for damages, both in charac
ter and extent, in manner and form alleged.

l

#

1-

ll

i

*

i

1‘

#

#

The defendant moved in arrest, for that “the verdict is
largely based on facts not in issue under the declaration and
concessions of the defendant made on trial and accepted by
the plaintiff, and varies materially from the issue made on
trial, and ﬁnds facts foreign to such issue, and is for entire
damages, without discrimination between facts made material
and immaterial by the issue, and is insufficient.”
It is conceded that when the motion goes to defects in the
pleadings, an inspection of the record alone is to govern, and
that the evidence cannot be looked into. But it is contended
that when the motion goes to defects in the verdict. as this
motion does, the rule is different; that the verdict is a part of
the record, but any defect in it is not apparent on its face;
that it is not a pleading, and if a motion in arrest will lie for
defects in it, it follows that it must be looked into to discover
those defects, and that this necessitates an examination of
the evidence upon which it rests.
That a judgment may be arrested for defects in the verdict
is clear. But a motion for that purpose stands like a motion
in arrest for defects in the pleadings, and like that, must be
tested by what appears on the face of the record, of which the
verdict is a part. Mr. Gould says, in speaking of Lord Mans
ﬁeld’s disapprobation of the rule, that when there are good
and bad counts, and a general verdict for the plaintiff for en
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tire damages, without discriminating between the counts, no
rule appears to be more clearly warranted by the original
principles of the law than that the judgment, which is only
an interference of law from the facts ascertained upon the
record, must always be formedfrom the face of the record
itself, and from that alone; and as the jury must be presumed
to know nothing of the sufficiency or the insuﬁ"Iciency_ of
counts, the conclusion seems perfectly just, in legal theory,
that the damages are as likely to have been assessed in whole
or in part on the bad count as on the good count. Gould’s Pl.
c.

X, sec. 58, n. (7).
Mr. Tidd says that the only ground for arresting judgment

at this day is, some matter intrinsic, appearing on the face
of the record, that would render the judgment erroneous and
reversible; for though it seems to have been otherwise for
merly, yet it is now settled that judgment cannot be arrested
for extrinsic or foreign matter not appearing on the face of
the record, but that courts are to judge upon the record it
self, that their successors may know the grounds of their
"‘
" *
2 Tidd’s Pr. "‘(918).
judgment.
The defendant contends, as we have seen, that if the testi
mony cannot be looked into when the ver<‘**t does not show
the defect on its face, there can be no remedy in such a case
by motion in arrest. And that is true if, as here, if any
where, the defect appears only in the testimony, for that is
not a part of the record, and the court must judge upon the
record, and upon that alone. But the verdict being a part of
the record, if the record as a whole shows the defect, it is
enough. And it will show it, and must show it, if it is a de
fect that the law recognizes as ground for a motion in arrest.
Thus, if the verdict varies substantially from the issue, as if,
instead of ﬁnding the matter in issue, the jury ﬁnds some
thing foreign to the issue, the judgment must be arrested, for
the court cannot tell for which party judgment should be
Here the verdict does not show the defect on its
rendered.
face, but taken with the rest of the record, which shows what
the issue was, the record as a whole shows the defect on its
face. The same is true when the verdict ﬁnds only part of
the matter in issue, omitting to ﬁnd either way another mate
rial part. These instances are sufficient to sho\v how defects
in a verdict not apparent on its face are made to appear for
the purposes of a motion in arrest.

Judgment affirmed.
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PERRILL.

V.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

1880.

Indiana, 153.

73

J

ELLIOTT, . The questions presented by this appeal arise
upon the ruling of the court sustaining the appellee’s motion
in arrest of judgment.

i

¥

I I I

Q

I

C

i

¥

Appellant argues that, as the court had overruled demur
rers to the complaint, it could not afterwards rightfully sus
tain a motion in arrest. We do not think that the court, by
ruling wrongly upon the demurrers, precluded itself from
If,
afterwards ruling rightly upon the motion in arrest.
when the motion was presented, the court deemed the com
plaint so clearly bad as not to be sufficient to sustain a j udg-_
ment, it was right to arrest the proceedings at that stage,
notwithstanding the fact that at an earlier stage the court
had entertained a different opinion.
A complaint fatally defective is vulnerable to attack, even
upon appeal, and there can certainly be no error in declaring
a fatally defective complaint bad on motion in arrest, al
though demurrers may have been previously overruled.
It is
the duty of the court not to permit a judgment to be entered
upon a complaint which is so clearly insufficient as to afford
There can be no valid judgment
the judgment no foundation.
without a sufficient complaint, and, where a party’s complaint
is incurably bad, he cannot justly complain of any ruling
which prevented him from obtaining a judgment based upon

it.

.

1

8

#

#

i i

1

Q

1

l

Judgment aﬂirmed."
To the same effect see Turnpike Co. v. Yates, (1901) 108 Tenn. 428,
S. W. 69; Field v. Slaughter,
(1808) 1 Blbb. (Ky.) 160; Griffin v.
The Justices, (18.35) 17 Ga. 96. In Iowa this practice is expressly au
thorized by statute. Frum v. Keeney, (1899) 109 Ia. 393, 80 N. W. 507.
The common law rule was contrary.—Chicago & Alton R. R. Co. v.
Clausen, (1898) 173 Ill. 100. “The reason is, that the matter of law
having been already settled, by the solemn determination of the court,
they will not afterwards suffer anyone to come as amicus curiae, and
tell them that the judgment which they gave on so mature deliberation
is wrong; but it is otherwise after judgment by default, for that 18 not
2 Tidd’s Prac. 918.
given in so solemn a manner."
4'!
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STATE EX REL. BOND

7

Supreme

v.

'

'

Mzssourz,

2

FISHER.

Court of Missouri.
280

[Chap.

1910.

825.

[On January 16, 1904,
relator, Henry W. Bond,
upon a foreign judgment
of Tennessee. Henry W.

Sallie Bond ﬁledia suit against the
in the circuit court of St. Louis,
rendered against him in the state
Bond ﬁled defenses to this action,
and on June 21, 1907, the cause came on for trial. The court
made a ﬁnding against the defendant, Henry W. Bond, where
upon, at the same term, he ﬁled his motion in arrest of judg
ment, which motion was continued, and thereafter, on June

said motion was sustained, for the stated reason
that the ﬁnding was not responsive to the issues. Neither
party took any steps to appeal from or review this order of
Nothing further was done for a year, when
the trial court.
was
set for trial for the 5th day of October,
said
cause
the
Relator at once ﬁled a motion to strike the cause from
1909.
docket,
on the ground that the order in arrest of judgment
the
had put an end to the cause, which motion was overruled.
Relator then ﬁled a petition in the Supreme Court for a writ
of prohibition restraining the Hon. D. D. Fisher, judge of the
circuit court of St. Louis, from proceeding further with said
cause. A preliminary rule was issued requiring respondent
to show cause why a permanent writ of prohibition should
not issue.]
WOODSON,
.
This is an original proceeding instituted in
seeking
court,
to prohibit the respondent, as judge of
this
the circuit court of the city of St. Louis, from taking and fur
ther exercising jurisdiction over the parties to and the sub
ject-matter involved in the case of Sallie Bond against this
relator, pending therein.
22,

1908,

J

I

I I I I I I I I I

There are but two legal propositions presented by this
record for determination: First, what is the legal effect of
an unappealed from order of the circuit court of this State
sustaining a motion in arrest of judgment; and, second,

I.

I I I
We

will dispose of these propositions in the order stated.

At common law an unconditional order sustaining

a mo
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tion in arrest of judgment was a ﬁnal disposition of the cause,
that is, it prevented the rendition of a subsequent ﬁnal judg
But, if the order was made conditional upon
ment therein.
an amendment, or such other action as would ‘remove the
cause of arrest, and the condition complied with, then a renire
facias de novo should be awarded, in which case the order in
arrest would not constitute a bar to the entry of a ﬁnal judg
ment therein.
In Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, vol. 23, p. 836, the
doctrine is stated thus: “The granting of a motion in arrest
of judgment prevents the entry of a ﬁnal judgment in the
cause, unless it is made conditional upon an amendment, or
such other action as will remove the cause of arrest. And if
it does not award a venire facias de nouo, it operates as a
discontinuance and dismisses defendant without day.”
In Encyclopedia of Pleading and Practice, vol. 2, p. 820,
“In civil cases the sus
the rule is stated in this language:
taining of a motion in arrest of judgment has the effect of
putting an end to the case.”
The rule is tersely and clearly stated by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania in the case of Butcher 12. Metts, 1 Miles 233,
.
in the following language:
“An arrest of judgment is in effect nothing more than su
perseding a verdict-for some cause apparent upon the record,
which shows that the plaintiff is not entitled to the beneﬁt of
It is often followed by a judgment for the de
the verdict.
fendant, that he go without day, but it is not of itself a
judgment for the defendant. The court may, after an arrest
of judgment, award a repleader or a venire de novo without
Which of these courses is the proper one, de
a repleader.
pends upon the nature of the defect for which the judgment
is arrested. If it appears by the record that the plaintiff has
no cause of action, the court will give judgment, after the ar
rest of judgment on the verdict, that the plaintiff take
nothing by his writ, and that the defendant go without day.
If issue be joined upon an immaterial point, there being a
sufficient cause of action alleged in the declaration, the proper
If the pleadings be sufficient
course is to award a repleader.
but
the
verdict is imperfectly found,
joined,
and the issue well
it is usual to award a venire de novo; and this it is said may
be done upon the motion of the defendant, without a motion

in arrest of judgment.
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“The venire de novo is an ancient proceeding of the com
mon law. It was in use long before the practice of granting
new trials. It follows, of course, upon the granting of a new
trial; but as a distinct proceeding it is commonly adopted af
ter a bill of exceptions or after a special verdict imperfectly
found, but always for some cause apparent on the record, and
if granted when it should not be, it is error, and the award of
it may be reversed.
“A new trial, on the other hand, is commonly granted after
a general verdict for some cause not apparent on the record,
and it is not assignable for error.
(Hambleton v. Veere, 2
Saund. 169 (n. 1) ; Goodtitle v. Jones, 7 T. R. 43, 48; Witham
v. Lewis, 1 Wils. 48, 56; Com. Dig., tit. Pleader, R. 18; 1
Sellon’s Practice, ch. 11, sec. 3 (C. D.); Miller v. Ralston, 1
Serg. & Rawle 309; Ebersoll v. Krug, 5 Binn. 53; Lessee of
Pickering 12. Rutty, 1 Serg. & Rawle 515.)
“In this case the fault was in the verdict. Of course it
appears upon the record. A oenire facias de novo is there

fore proper.
_
“In regard to the objection that the defendant is no
longer in court on this action, it should be observed that the
judgment was arrested at this term, and no judgment has
He is therefore still in court
been entered for the defendant.
and bound to take notice of the further proceedings in the
But if the term had been allowed to elapse after the
cause.
arrest of judgment, and the cause had not been continued by
a curia adv. vult, according to strict notions of practice, the
action would have been discontinued, and the defendant with
out day in court. Venire de novo awarded.”
And the Supreme Court of Indiana in the case of Raber 12.
Jones, 40 Ind. l. c. 441, in discussing this question used this
language:
“The complaint does not aver that the judgment
It is
against the corporation was recovered upon the policy.
a clear principle of pleading, that in declaring upon a statute,
the averments must be sufficient to bring the case within the
statute. The complaint was, therefore, radically defective, in
not stating facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and
the court properly arrested the judgment.
“When the judgment was arrested, however, there should
have been an end of the case. No judgment for the defendant
The arrest of judgment ends the case.
should have followed.
Each party pays his own costs, and the plaintiff is at liberty
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393, note u."
to proceed de novo in a fresh action. 3 Bl.
Com.
The case of Kauﬁman '0. Kauﬁman, 2 Wharton (Pa.) 139,

l. c. 147, announces the same doctrine.
The authorities seem to be uniform upon this proposition.
The only modiﬁcation that has been made of that common
law rule is contained. in section 804, Revised Statutes 1899.
That section reads as follows: “When a judgment shall be
arrested, the court shall allow the proceedings in which the
error was, to be amended in all cases when the same amend
ment might have been made before trial, and the cause shall
again proceed according to the practice of the court.”
Under the provisions of this statute, the order of the court
sustaining a motion in arrest of judgment does not necessa
rilyl result in a new trial, any more than it did at common
law. Such an order has that effect only in those cases where
the motion is sustained for an error which could have been
cured by an amendment made before the trial occurred. This
was so held by this court in the case of Stid '0. Railroad, 211
Mo. l. c. 415, where Lamm, ., in speaking for the court, used
“Speaking with precision, a motion in arrest
this language:
If granted, it does not neces
is not a motion for a rehearing.
sarily result in a new trial. If an amendment be allowed, the
cause by statutory command proceeds ‘according to the prac
tice of the court.’
(R. S. 1899, sec. 804.)”
This construction of that statute is in harmony with the
spirit of our legislation upon the subject of nonsuits and ar
rests of judgments, as expressed in section 4285, Revised
Statutes 1899, which, insofar as is material, reads as follows’;
“If any action shall have been commenced within the time
respectively prescribed in this chapter, and the plaintiff there
in suffer a nonsuit, or, after a verdict for him, the judgment
be arrested, or, after a judgment for him, the same be re
versed on appeal or error, such plaintiff may commence a
new action from time to time, within one year after such non
suit suffered or such judgment arrested or reversed.”
The only remaining matter to be determined in this con
nection is, was the motion in arrest sustained for an error
which might have been cured by a timely amendment before
the trial was had in the circuit court of the city of St. Louis?
The order sustaining the motion in arrest speciﬁcally sets out
the reason for the c0urt’s actions in that regard, namely, for
the reason that the judgment was not responsive to the issues,

J

284

TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRAcTIcE

[Chap.

2

Clearly, this was not an error which could have been cured
by an amendment before the trial was had in the circuit court
of the city of St. Louis, within the meaning of said section
804, for the obvious reason that the judgment could not in the
very nature of things have been rendered until after the trial
was had therein.
And since the order of the court sustaining
the motion in arrest was unconditional, unappealed from, and
the term at which it was entered having long ago elapsed, it
absolute and ﬁnal, and, therefore, constitutes
plete bar to all further proceedings in said cause.
became

Q

Q

I

U

U

¥

Q

I l

a com

U

We are of opinion that the preliminary rule heretofore
sued should be made permanent.
It is so ordered. All concur."

is

48 Waiver of right to ask for New Trial.
A motion in arrest of judg
ment is at common law a waiver of the right to ask for a new trial,
Cincinnati, I., St. L. & C. Ry. Co. v._Case. (1889) 122 Ind._§1_0; Hail
v. State, (1903) 110 Tenn. 365; Hall v. Nees, (1862)_2‘TTlT.
411; Craig
v. Miss. Mills, (1882) 12 Mo. App. 585.—as to grounds for new trial
known at the time of the motion in arrest,—2 Tidd Pr. '913. Contra,
Jewell v. Biandford, (1838) 7 Dana (Ky.) 472; London v. Coleman,
(1878) 62 Ga. 146. In some states the two motions can be made together.
-—Pope v. Latham, (1833) 1 Ark. 66; Contra, State v. Mann, (1854) 13
Te'x. 61. Compare People v. Clement, (Cal. 1894) 35 Pac. 1022.
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SECTION 1.
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"

NEVEN

Supreme

CONTINUANCE.
v.

NEVEN.

Court of Nevada.
38 Nevada, 541.

1915.
.

MCCARRAN, J. This was an action for divorce, commenced
in the district court of Washoe county by respondent. Judg
ment having been rendered for respondent, a decree of the
court was rendered in her favor, in accordance with the
prayer of her complaint. Appeal is taken to this court from
the order denying appellant's motion for a new trial.
One question only is presented to this court for determina
tion, namely, Was it an abuse of discretion for the trial court
to deny appellant's motion for a continuance of the trial of
the case?
The record discloses that on the 21st day of March, 1914,
the attorneys for the respective parties being in court, the
trial of the case was, by consent of said attorneys, set for
Thursday, the 26th day of March, 1914, at 10 o'clock a. m. It
further appears that on the 26th day of March, 1914, at the
hour at which the case was set for trial, the plaintiff appeared
in court, with her attorneys and witnesses, to proceed with
the trial. The defendant, at that time," through his attorneys
presented the affidavit of a physician in furtherance of his
motion for a continuance. The affidavit of the doctor was to
the effect that appellant was in ill health and unable to be
present at the trial. Upon motion of counsel for appellant,
the case was continued, and on Saturday, the 28th day of
March, 1914-—calendar day in the district court—appellant
and respondent and their respective attorneys being in court,
(285)
I

286

TRIAL AND APPELLATE

PRACTICE

[Chap.

3

the cause was, by and with the consent of all parties, set for
trial for Saturday, the 4th day of April, 1914, at 10 :30 o'clock
a. m. of that day. On Saturday, the 4th day of April, 1914,
at the hour set for the commencement of the trial, the plain
tiff appeared in person and with her attorneys and witnesses.
The defendant was not present, and one of his attorneys pre
sented a telegram from defendant in furtherance of a verbal
motion for continuance.
The telegram, admitted and ﬁled in
motion,
furtherance of the
is as follows:
“Elko, Nev., Apl. 4, 1914.
“Sweeney & Moorehouse, Reno, Nevada:
Detained here
unavoidably.
Guardianship matter Le Roy Neven.
J. H. Neven. 832AM.”
The motion of appellant being resisted by respondent in
the court below, the respondent herself took the stand and
testiﬁed, with reference to appellant- going to Elko, as fol

lows:
Do you know what he went to Elko for? A. Well,
some matter pertaining to the estate of Roy Neven.
Q. His
nephew? A. Yes. Q. Was it going to be heard in court, or
A. Well, he talked
did he just go to consult with attorneys?
with me about it Thursday, and he said, ‘Will you go up to
Elko with me and have Judge Taber cross-question you?’ I
said, ‘When?’ He said, ‘To-night. You can come back Friday
night.’ I said, ‘No, I wouldn’t take any chances on coming
back Saturday night, because,’ I said, ‘you know our affair
I said, ‘Is it necessary for you to go
comes up Saturday.’
to-night?’ He said, ‘No, it is not; but I will have to go some
“Q.

time soon.’
The motion of appellant's attorney for continuance being
denied, the court proceeded to the trial of the case. At the
conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the attorneys for appellant
*
*
"‘
again renewed their motion for a continuance.
The motion for continuance was again denied, and no evi
dence being offered on behalf of defendant, appellant herein,
Appellant
the court rendered judgment for the plaintiff.
later moved the court for a new trial, and, in furtherance of
his motion, ﬁled his affidavit setting forth the reason for his
A portion of
absence on the date of the trial of the cause.
follows:
is
as
his affidavit
“James H. Neven, being ﬁrst duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he is the defendant in the above-entitled action. That
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on Thursday, the 2d day of April, 1914, defendant had very
important business to attend to in Elko, county of Elko. Nev.
That he took the train from Reno for Elko on the evening of
Thursday, Aprﬁ 2d, with full intent and purpose of returning
not later than Friday evening, April 3d. That he knew that
the action above entitled, as against him was set for trial at
10:30 o'clock a. m. of the 4th day of April, 1914. That he in
tended to go to Elko on April 2d and return to Reno on the
evening of April 3d, so as to be ready for participating in the
trial and defending himself in the aforesaid action on Satur
day, April 4th, at 10:30 a. m. of that day. That upon his ar
rival in Elko he had certain conversations and business deal
ings with the attorneys of Le Roy Neven, whose estate during
his monority was under the control of afﬁant as guardian, and
his business dealings with these people, to wit, the attorneys
for Le Roy Neven, was to enable them to ﬁx up the accounts
necessary to be reported by aﬁiant and obtain the discharge
of afﬁant as guardian of the said Le Roy Neven. That he had
no purpose, design, or intent in going to Elko, Nev., to inter
fere with the trial of this cause in the court on the 4th day of
April, but with good faith and with good intent he thought
he would ﬁnish the business he had in Elko, Nev., and return
on the evening of April 3d, so as to be ready for trial the
morning of April 4th. That train No. 5 of the Southern
Paciﬁc Railroad Company from Elko, which is due in Reno
at 8 :50 a. m., April 4th, was 6 hours and 45 minutes late, ren
dering it impossible for defendant to appear in court and par
ticipate in defending said cause and having a hearing of said
That it was
cause on the 4th day of April as aforesaid.
through no fault or neglect of this defendant that he was not
present at the trial and would be prepared to defend the said
action, but, by reason of the fact that train No. 5 was 6 hours
and 45 minutes late, aﬂiant did not arrive in Reno until after
3 o'clock p. m. of Saturday, Aprit 4th. That realizing that he
could not return by reason of the fact that the said train, over
which he had no control, was 6 house and 45 minutes late, he
(aﬁiant) sent a telegram to H. V. Morehouse, one of his
counsel, stating that he was unable to be present and was un
avoidably detained, hoping thereby that his counsel (the said
H. V. Morehouse) would be enabled to obtain a continuance
of this cause at least for the purpose of taking the testimony
0
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which would be offered by the defendant in person and by his
witnesses.”
It is needless for us to cite authority in support of a propo
sition that has become almost universally recognized:
That
a motion for continuance is addressed to the discretion of the
court. The reason for this rule is manifest.
The trial court
is apprised of all the circumstances concerning the case, and
the previous proceedings, and has before it the parties, from
whose conduct and utterances it has opportunity to judge as
to whether or not the motion is made in good faith, or as to
whether or not deception and fraud are being perpetrated on
the court with a view to delaying the proceedings.
It is for
these reasons that courts of review generally have taken a
position that the action of a trial court, in granting or deny
ing a motion for continuance, will not be reversed, except for
the most potent reasons.
The rule has been laid down by some courts (and, in our
judgment, advisedly so) that a greater degree of liberality
should be accorded in matters of continuances in divorce
cases than in any other civil actions; the reason for this being
that the public, as well as the parties to the action, are inter
However this may be, we con
ested in the result of the suit.
cur in the expression of the Supreme Court of California, in
the case of Barnes v. Barnes, 95 Cal. 171, 30 Pac. 298, 16 L. R.
A. 660, that a defendant must be held to the exercise of good
faith and diligence, and cannot be heard to complain if the
failure to present his defense results from an attempt to sub
ordinate thebusiness of the court to his own business engage
ments and convenience.
The statement of appellant, made in his affidavit, makes no
attempt to establish that appellant was required. either by
court process or the pendency of court proceedings, or even
by urgent or imminent business engagements, to be in Elko
either on April 2d, 3d, or 4th. The record fails to disclose
that any proceedings were pending in any court in Elko, or
elsewhere, in which appellant was directly or indirectly con
cerned. The most that can be said for the affidavit of appel
lant is that it attempts to set forth that he had very impor
tant business to attend to in Elko; that upon arrival in Elko
he had certain conversations and business dealings with the
attorneys of Le Roy Neven, whose estate, during his minor
ity, was under the control of affiant as guardian; that his
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business dealings in this respect with these people. to Wit, the
attorneys for Le Roy Neven, were to enable them to ﬁx up the
accounts

necessary to be reported

by afﬁant and obtain the

discharge of afﬁant as guardian of said Le Roy Neven.
Nothing in the aﬁidavit indicates, even inferentially, that this
business transaction with the attorneys of Le Roy Neven was
a matter imminent, urgent, or pressing, or one which de
manded or required the presence of appellant upon either the
2d, 3d, or 4th day of April, or, in fact, upon any other par
ticular date. Nothing appears in the record which tends to
contradict the testimony of Mrs. Neven, the respondent here
in, wherein she states that she cautioned appellant, prior to
his departure for Elko, and said, “Is it necessary for you to
go to-night?” to which he replied, “No, it is not; but I will
have to go some time soon.” Counsel for appellant, in their
brief, urge that this business in Elko was a court proceeding,
in which appellant was an interested party, but this is no
where supported by the record, nor even by the affidavit of
appellant.
The record discloses that appellant was present in court on
the 28th day of March, with his attorney; that on that date,
by his consent, the case was set for trial on April 4th. If a
visit to Elko was urgent or pressing, he should have brought
such matter to the attention of the court, or at least made
some effort to have this case set at a date more convenient to
him; and even though it was a court proceeding in Elko at
which, by reason of his interest therein, he was required to

be present, if those proceedings had been set prior to the 28th
day of March, he must have been cognizant of that fact, and
should have urged that matter at the setting of this case. If
it was a court proceeding in Elko, in which his presence was
urgent, and the date of that proceeding was set after the 28th
day of March, he was bound by the ﬁrst notice of trial, and
the requirement for his presence at the trial of this cause
would have been reasonable ground for a continuance in the
Elko proceeding. Finar v. Fillmore et al., 1 Mich. N. P. 172.
It is unnecessary for us to dwell upon such rules and ob
servations as have been made by either this or other courts
upon the subject of the absence of witnesses as a ground for
Such rules and observations are
continuance in civil cases.
not strictly applicable to l.l.J matter at bar. In this case, the
absent witness was the party defendant himself; and he is
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bound by a different rule from that which might be appli
cable if the absent witness were one in no wise interested in
the suit, in that, as a general proposition, a stricter showing
of good cause is required. Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 551.
“A party who is a material witness in his own behalf,” says
the Appellate Court of Illinois, “must have his testimony
ready for use at the trial, unless prevented from so doing by
some obstacle which, by the exercise of reasonable diligence,
he cannot overcome. and the obstacle should not be one which
he has created by his own voluntary act.
If he allows con
regard
for his own
siderations of business or pleasure or even
health to call him away at a time when his suit is liable to
be called for trial, and he thereby loses the beneﬁt of his own
testimony, he must, ordinarily, suffer the consequences."

Schlesinger '0. Nunan, 26 Ill. App. 525.
The expression of the Supreme Court of California in the
Barnes Case, supra, was again referred to approvingly in the
case of the Estate of Kasson, 141 Cal. 33, 74 Pac. 436, and is
Ruling
generally cited as a leading case upon the subject.
1914B,
Law,
551;
Ann.
Cas.
360.
6,
p.
vol.
Case
It must be observed that the telegraphic communication
from appellant to his attorney, ﬁled in the district court in
furtherance of the motion for continuance on the 4th day of
April, made no mention of the delayed train as being the
The telegram was ﬁled
cause of the absence of appellant.
at Elko at 28 minutes after 8 on the morning of the 4th day
of April, and makes no intimation that appellant was or
would be on the delayed train No. 5. It says: “Detained
Guardianship matter Le Roy Neven.” If
here unavoidably.
the lateness of train No. 5 had been the real cause of the ab
sence or delay of appellant, it would have been a simple mat
ter to make mention of that fact in the telegram. Moreover,
in the motion for continuance made by the attorneys for ap
pellant on April 4th, there was no mention of appellant being
on this delayed train, or that he would arrive on the delayed
train or within any reasonable time. A showing to this ef
fect, made properly and in good faith, might have been at
least a reasonable ground to warrant the trial court in con
But
tinuing the hearing until the arrival of the defendant.
in the record we ﬁnd no assurance given that the defendant
would be able to attend the
The aﬁidavit of appellant,

trial at any designated time.

ﬁled in furtherance of his mo

1
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tion for a new trial, and made the basis of his appeal in this
case, states that his object in sending this telegram was the
hope that thereby his counsel would be enabled to obtain a
continuance of this cause, at least for the purpose of taking
the testimony which would be offered by defendant in person
In this respect, the record discloses
and by his witnesses.
that no witnesses were in attendance upon the trial, by sub’
paz-na or other process of the court, on behalf of appellant.
If, however, witnesses on behalf of appellant had been present
at the time of trial,the absence of appellant would not have
precluded his attorney from introducing such testimony,
bearing upon the case, as might be adduced from those wit
The record discloses neither the presence of any
nesses.
witnesses on behalf of defendant, nor that any witnesses were
placed upon the stand in his behalf, nor testimony of any
kind or character offered, either in contradiction of the alle
gations of respondent’s complaint or in support of appellant’s
Moreover, the counsel for appellant who
cross-complaint.
made his statement under oath in furtherance of his motion
for continuance, at the conclusion of respondent’s case, made
no intimation that any witnesses were present on behalf of
appellant.
From the record as it is before us, we ﬁnd nothing that
would support appellant's contention that it was an abuse of
discretion for the trial court to deny the motion for continu
ance. It follows that the order denying appellant’s motion
for a new trial should be aﬁirmed.
It is so ordered.“
49Agreem¢-nt.
“A case may be postponed by the agreement of the
parties acting tor themselves, or through their attorneys, and with the
consent

of the court,

but an agreement

if

by the parties

that

the cause

shall be postponed does not operate as a postponement, without the
sanction of the court, and does not ot itself bind the court."—Moulder
v. Kempﬂ, (1888) 115 Ind. 469, 462.
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CO.

1.909.

Montana, 81.

BRANTLY, C. . ‘ * "
Contention is made that the court erred in refusing to
grant to defendant a postponement of the trial because of the
absence of one Wendorf, a witness who was expected to be
present and testify in defendant’s favor.
The application
was made upon aﬁidavit by defendant’s counsel. Besides set
ting forth the facts to which the witness would testify, the
affidavit shows that the witness was a resident of the state of
Idaho; that he was then in that state and had been for some
months; that he was the only witness who could testify to the
facts set forth; that the defendant expected to have him
present, but that, after the cause was set for trial, counsel
ascertained that he was ill at his home and was unable to
attend; and that, if granted a postponement, he could secure
However meritori
the attendance of the witness in person.
ous the application may have been in other respects, it was
properly denied, because it wholly failed to show diligence
by defendant in its efforts to secure the evidence of the wit
ness.
The cause had been at issue for several months. The
witness was a non-resident of the state of Montana, and be
yond the jurisdiction of the court. If the defendant chose to
rely upon his promise to attend—if he did 'make such prom
ise—it did so at its own risk. Under the circumstances, the
only safe course to pursue was to take the deposition of the
The refusal to grant a continuance was, under the
witness.
circumstances, not such an abuse of discretion as to call for
interposition by this court. The case of State '0. Metcalf, 17
Mont. 417, 43 Pac. 182. cited by counsel, is not in point.
Though the application there made showed that the witness
resided in the state of Kansas, it appeared that the defendant
knew nothing of his whereabouts until within so short a time
before the trial that it was impossible to take his deposition,
and the postponement was asked in order that the defendant
might be given time to take it.
II

*

#

i

#

*

1!

*

*

Let the judgment and order be affirmed.

#
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1908.

Kentucky Law Reporter, 444.

LASSING,
.
In a collision between appellee, a 16-year old
boy, on a bicycle and appellant’s automobile appellee was in
jured. Conceiving that his injuries were the direct result of
appellant’s negligence in operating his machine, appellee,
through his father as next friend, instituted suit to recover
damages.
Appellant denied liability, and pleaded that the
injuries, if any, to the boy were the result of his own care
lessness and negligence. Upon the issues thus joined a trial
was had, which resulted in a verdict in favor of appellee for
$500. To reverse this judgment this appeal is prosecuted.
Appellant relies upon four grounds: * * "; second, be
cause the trial court erred in refusing him a continuance on
his showing, made at the time of the trial, that the witness
Dr. Geo. W. Leachman, was absent from the state, and that
his testimony could not be procured at that time; " "' "‘
ii

II

$

t

t

#

Q

$

$

$

Appellant's second ground for reversal is not well taken for
First, it is not shown that he used any dili
two reasons:
gence whatever to secure the presence of this witness at his
trial. The record shows that his answer was ﬁled on the 15th
day of December, 1906. The reply was ﬁled on the 22nd day
of December, 1906, completing the issues. The case was
called for trial the 26th of March, 1907, or more than 90 days
after the issues were made up. During all of this time, save
about two weeks prior to the date of the trial, as shown by the
affidavit, the witness, Dr. George W. Leachman, was within
the jurisdiction of the court, and could have been subpoenaed,
This was not done, and the fact
and his attendance procured.
that appellant did not know he was going to leave offers no
excuse for his failure to have a subpoena issued for this wit
ness at a time when he knew he was within the jurisdiction
of the court and could have been served. The court did not
err in refusing to continue the case because of the absence of
this witness for the further reason that it is shown that his
He was in the
evidence would have been merely cumulative.
automobile with the witness John Straus, and the facts to
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which he would have testiﬁed, if present, as disclosed by the
affidavit, were testiﬁed to by the witness John Straus. The
ruling of the trial judge, in permitting this affidavit for con
tinuance to be read as the deposition of the absent witness,
was certainly as favorable to appellant as he could ask.

I I I I I I I I I I

Perceiving no error in the conduct of the trial prejudicial to
the rights of appellant, the judgment is affirmed.

PITTSBURGH, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO
RAILWAY CO. v. GROM.
Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
"
A

Z‘

,4’

1./,2

ST.

&

LOUIS

1911.
I

Kentucky, 51.

WM.

CLAY, Commissioner.
Appellee,
ROGERS
William
brought
Grom,
this action against the appellants, Pittsburg,
Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company and Penn
sylvania Railroad Company, to recover damages in the sum
of $1,999 for personal injuries, alleged to have been due to
the negligence of the railroad companies while he was a pas
senger on their lines of railroad. The jury awarded him a
verdict for the full amount sued for, and the defendants have
appealed.
The facts, brieﬂy stated, are as follows:
Appellee bought
a ticket from Louisville to Atlantic City and return. The ac
cident occurred between Pittsburg and Altoona, in the State
of Pennsylvania. At the time of the accident appellee was
sitting in the middle of the sixth seat from the front end of
the car. He was struck by some hard and heavy substance
over the left eye. The frontal bone was fractured and his
eye so seriously injured that the sight thereof is permanently
impaired.
At the time of the accident a freight train was
passing.
Just before and after the injury, witnesses heard
something rattling against the side of the car. It sounded
like a chain. Indentations were found on the side of the car
which looked as if they had been made by an irregular object
in the form of a chain. One of the witnesses saw the passing
shadow of the object that struck appellee, and it looked like
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Immediately
after the injury several persons
searched the car, and.nothing was found ‘therein which could
have caused the injury. Appellant’s testimony was to the ef
fect that on the freight trains ordinarily used there are no
chains in a position to be swung out so as to strike or enter
a train on an adjacent track, and, even if there were such,
they would hang by the side of the car by reason of their
own weight, and would not swing out from the car by reason
of the velocity of the train. The witnesses, however, had no
knowledge of the condition of the particular train in question,
that there were nu
and they admit, on cross-examination,
merous chains in and about freight cars.

a chain.

i i

$

*

i

*

I i

Q

I

At the conclusion of the evidence for appellee, appellant’s
senior counsel ﬁled his affidavit and moved for a continuance
on the ground of surprise. In this affidavit counsel stated, in
substance, that he had had sole charge of the defense of the
action that was being tried; that theretofore he had made a
most thorough investigation of the facts of the case and had
had submitted to him full reports made by the agents of ap
pellants as to all facts connected with the injury. He had
never heard until the day before the trial that any attempt
would be made to show that appellee was struck by a chain,
when he was then informed in a general way by appellee’s
In all the investiga
counsel that he would show that fact.
tions made and in the reports submitted to him, it had never
been suggested that the accident could have happened in that
way. He was, therefore, taken completely by surprise, as
were the appellants, by the evidence introduced by appellee,
and he was not then prepared to rebut such evidence. He had
taken the deposition of the train conductor, but did not ask
him about a chain, because he had never heard it suggested
or thought it possible that a chain could have anything to do
with the accident. If allowed an opportunity to do so he
could and would procure testimony of witnesses—all residing
would prove (1) that
in the state of Penns_vlvania—which
appellee was injured
marks
on
the
car
on
which
no
were
there
indicating that it had recently been struck by anything; (2)
that all the persons who were in the coach and near appellee
were asked by the conductor and brakeman as to the cause
of the accident, and none of them could give any explanation
of it, and none of them said anything about hearing a chain
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or seeing a chain, and none of them suggested that a chain
had anything to do with the accident; (3) that at the time
there were no chains upon or attached to appellants’ engine or
cars, or forming any part of the equipment thereof that were
long enough to reach into the window of a passenger coacli
on an adjacent track and strike a passenger, as appellee was
struck; (4) that all chains connected with such equipment
were, however, short chains, and in the event of their break
ing they would drag on the ground, and could not swing out
in a horizontal position so as to come in contact with a train
on an adjacent track; that such a thing is a physical impossi
bility; (5) that “shortly after the accident to plaintiff the con
ductor caused telegraphic notice to be given of it and instruc
tions were immediately given to inspect all westbound freight
trains that had met plaintiff’s train to see if anything was at
tached to or projected from them that could have caused the
accident, and such investigation was made and nothing found
to explain the cause of the accident;” that these facts could
be established by the testimony of several witnesses (naming
them) and could not be established by any witnesses living in
the State of Kentucky. Did not anticipate, nor did the rail
road companies anticipate, and no one could have reasonably
anticipated, that appellee would attempt to prove that his in
juries were caused in such an unusual or unheard-of manner
If the railroad companies had
as being struck by a chain.
known in time that such proof would be offered, they could
and would have met it by showing facts to the contrary.
The foregoing affidavit was not ﬁled until appellants’ mo
tion for a peremptory instruction, at the conclusion of ap
Before asking for a
pellee’s evidence, had been overruled.
continuance on the ground of surprise, therefore, counsel for
appellants ﬁrst took the chance of appe1lee’s failing to make
out his case. Though apprised of the fact in a general way
on the day before the trial that appellee would attempt to
show that he was struck by a chain, he did not ask for a con
tinuance of the case when it was called for trial. At the time
of the trial the law of Pennsylvania was in proof. Counsel
knew that under that law upon mere proof of injury, unac
companied by any facts tending to show a collision or a defect
of cars, track, roadway, machinery or other negligence ap
The deposition of the conductor
pellee could not recover.
nothing the matter with the
absolutely
was
showed that there
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on which appellee was a passenger.
A search was made
to ﬁnd whether or not the object which had struck appellee
Knowing the law of
was in the car, and nothing was found.
Pennsylvania, counsel should have anticipated that appellee
would attempt to prove facts tending to show negligence in
the operation or mechanical appliances of the passing train,
as appellee could not recover by merely showing that he was
injured by some object, without showing the source from
which it came. Furthermore, counsel admits in his affidavit
that immediately after the accident, the conductor caused
telegraphic notice of the fact to be given, and instructions
were immediately sent out to inspect all westbound freight
trains that had met the train on which appellee was a passen
ger, to see if anything was attached to, or projected from
them that could have caused the accident and such investiga
tion was made and nothing found to explain the cause of the
accident. This being true, counsel should have taken the dep
ositions of witnesses acquainted with such facts, and should
not havegone into the trial in the hope that appellee would
fail to make out his case, and, in the event that he did make
out his case, appellants would be granted a continuance and
a further opportunity to prove facts which they could have
established before the trial. We, therefore conclude that the
court did not err in failing to grant the continuance asked for.

train
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Judgment aﬂirmed."

6’

1

'20

lie

may be granted are inﬁnitely
50 The grounds upon which a continuance
varied. They include, beside surprise at the trial and absence or death
of witness or party or attorney, want of preparation, pendency of an
other action, necessity for taking depositions, change in issues due to
amendment, and such other matters as may show a reasonable and just
ground for delay.

LOUISVILLE AND NASHVILLE RAILROAD
Supreme Court of Tennessee.

CO. V. VOSS.

1902.

1

109 Tennessee, 718.

is

J

an action for personal injuries, brought
SHIELDS, . This
by the defendant in error against the plaintiff in error in the
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circuit court of Lawrence county, resulting, on a trial, in a
verdict and judgment against the plaintiff in error, which it
has brought before this court for review.
When the case was called for trial in the circuit court, the
plaintiff in error moved the court for a continuance on ac
count of the absence of three witnesses, and in support of its
motion presented a special affidavit, stating the names of the
absent witnesses, the facts which plaintiff in error expected
to prove by them, and all other facts necessary to constitute
an affidavit showing good grounds for a continuance.
The
plaintiff below, conceding that the affidavit stated a good
cause for a continuance, proposed to agree that the absent
witnesses would testify as stated, and that the affidavit be
read in evidence in behalf of the plaintiff in error on the trial
of the case as the depositions of those witnesses, and there
upon the court refused the continuance, and required the
plaintiff in error to go to trial. This action of the court is
now assigned as error, the contention of the plaintiff in error
being that it was entitled to have its witnesses before the
court and jury in person, and that nothing short of a direct
and absolute admission of the truth of the facts which it
claimed its witnesses would testify to would authorize the
court to deny it this right, and disallow its application for a
continuance of the case.
This contention is sound, and the
action of the court in requiring plaintiff in error to go to trial
upon the agreement of the plaintiff below that the witnesses
would swear as stated in the affidavit, and that the affidavit
be read as their depositions, was, nothing else appearing, re
versible error. The plaintiff in error had the right to have
its witnesses before the court, and nothing short of an abso
lute and unqualiﬁed admission of the truth of the facts pro
posed

to be proven by the absent witnesses, by the opposite

*

*

#

#

1!

i

#

Q

III

party, justified the court in refusing the continuance and re
quiring the plaintiff in error to go to trial.
#51

it

51Accord:-Murphy v. Murphy, (1861) 31 Mo. 322; Cheney v. Smith,
(1871) 42 Ga. 50; Seward v. Mayor, (1896) 16 Del. 375; Horwitz v.
La Roche, (Tex. Civ. App. 1908) 107 S. W. 1148.
called,
Contra, requiring only an admission that the witness would.
testify as stated in the affidavit for contlnuance,—Pate v. Tait, (1880)
Utley v. Burns, (1873) 70 Ill. 162; Crane V. Hall, (1915)
72 Ind. 450;
165 Ky. 827; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Hammond,
(1907) 41 Colo. 323:
Goldstein v. Morgan,
(1903) 122 Ia. 27; Terrapin v. Barker, (1910) 26
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Okl. 93; State v. Bartley, (1892) 48 Kan. 421; Territory v. Emilio, (1907)
14 N. Mex. 147.
In many jurisdictions the rule is ﬁxed by statute.
A distinction in this regard between civil and criminal cases has been
asserted (See 4 Encyc. Pl. & Pr. 865 et seq.) but the cases do not seem
to support it.

'5

~_
J
MAUND

%»¢J'.2/‘/
Supreme Court

v.

LOEB.

of Alabama.

87 Alabama,

1888.

374.

CLOPTON, J. The continuance of a case is in the discre
tion of the court, and such terms may be imposed, under the
rule of practice, as to the court may seem proper.
At the
Fall term, 1888, of the Circuit Court, defendant obtained
a continuance, upon payment of all the costs as a condition
precedentf to be paid in ninety days, or judgment to go
against him at the next term. The costs were not paid until
the ﬁrst day of the next term, and after the case was called
for trial, which was more than ninety days from the time
Defendant having applied for, obtained, and
of the order.
accepted the continuance, we must infer that he consented
It was no excuse,
to the terms upon which it was granted.
furnished, when
bill
of
costs
had
an
itemized
not
been
that
it is not shown that defendant offered to pay the costs, or
applied for such bill; and the court was not bound to ac
cept payment after the expiration of the prescribed time,
as a compliance with the condition upon which the continu
The court was authorized to render
ance was obtained.
against
defendant.
Waller ,v. Sultzbacher,
judgment nil dicit
38 Ala. 318.
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The Right to a

|7>

Supreme
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Missouri,

T1-an.

CO. v.

Court of Missouri.
18!,

3

TI-IE JURY.

~e>'J*’/
\ H H E EX REL. RAILWAY
I
u

[Chap.

SLOVER.

1896‘.

607'.

[This was an application for a writ of prohibition to pre
vent the respondent from drawing a special jury, on the
ground that the statute under which the respondent proposed
to draw the special jury was unconstitutional because it pro
vided identical methods for drawing both common and spe
cial juries. This, it was claimed, deprived the relator of its
right to a special jury as at common law.]
GANTT, J. "‘ " "‘ Inasmuch as the learned judge of
the circuit court conformed his practice to the statute, the
only point for serious consideration is the constitutionality
of the act itself. Has the legislature the power and right
to deﬁne the qualiﬁcations of jurors, whether on the regu
lar panels or summoned for a special case? Has it the right
to prescribe and regulate the mode of selecting and summon
ing jurors? By “the right of trial by jury as heretofore
enjoyed” in our organic law is meant that the people of this
commonwealth shall not be denied the essential features of
the jury system as understood and practiced at the common
law, chief among which have been esteemed the right to
have a jury composed of 12 men, that they should be unani
mous in their verdict, that they should be impartial, and
that the case triable by a jury at common law should con
tinue to be so tried in this state. With these great essentials
preserved, the legislature is not deprived of the power to
regulate the manner of the selection or the qualiﬁcation of
jurors.

In Vaughn

Judge Scott says:

“The
term ‘trial by jury’ was well known and understood at the
common law, and in that sense it was adopted in our bill of
rights.
Of course, the nonessentials of that institution,
such as concern the qualiﬁcation of jurors, the mode of sum
moning them, and many other such matters, were left to the
12.

Sca-de, 30 Mo. 600,

Sec. 2]

Paocsnomcs

BASED

ON

TRIAL or Issuns

301

regulation of law. The constitution is preserved in retaining
the substance of that form of trial as it was known and
practiced among those from whom we derived it.”
Unquestionably, under the guise of regulation, legislation
which, in effect, would destroy the great feature of the com
mon-law jury, would not be tolerated; but no reason can be
given why the people in their sovereign capacity may not
improve the method of selecting a jury by excluding from
the list those unﬁt by crime or immorality, or by repealing
the freehold qualiﬁcation of the common law, or any prop
Nor can we perceive how the impartiality
erty qualiﬁcation.
of the jury can be lessened by the fact that the duty of
selection is no longer conﬁded to one man,—the sheriff or
coroner,—but a list of all qualiﬁed citizens is placed in a box
or wheel, well mixed, and the panel drawn therefrom by the
clerk in the presence of the court or judge. It would seem,
The system
on the contrary, to insure absolute impartiality.
jury
packing
in
opportunity
of
a
the interest
removes all
of either party or of permitting those who solicit the duty
from disgracing the system. “ "‘ " In Hayes v. Mis
souri, 120 U. S. 68, 7 Sup. Ct. 350, Mr. Justice Field, in dis
cussing sections 1900, 1902, Rev. St. Mo. 1879, allowing the
state in a murder case 15 peremptory challenges in St. Louis
and only 8 in the counties of the state, said: “The constitu
tion of Missouri, and, indeed, every state in the Union, guar
antees to all persons accused of a capital offense or of a
felony of a lower grade the right to a trial by an impartial
jury, selected from the county or city where the offense is
alleged to have been committed; and this implies that the
jurors shall be free from all bias for or against the accused.
' " ' To secure such a body, numerous legislative direc
tions are necessary, prescribing the class from which- the
jurors are to be taken, whether from the voters, taxpayers,
and freeholders, or from the mass of the population indis
criminately; the number to be summoned from whom the
trial jurors are to be selected; the manner in which the
selection is to be made; the objections that may be offered
to those returned, and how such objections shall be pre
sented, considered, and disposed of; the oath to be adminis
tered to those selected; the custody in which they shall be
kept during the progress of the trial; the form and presen
tation of their verdict and many other particulars. All these,
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in general, are matters of legislative dis
But to prescribe whatever will tend to secure the
impartiality of jurors in criminal cases is not only within
the competency of the legislature, but is among its highest
be said,

cretion.

duties.”

See, also, Com. v. Dorsey,

103 Mass. 412; State v.

Wilson, 48 N. H. 398.
Now, it is the historical jury of 12 that is guaranteed by
the constitution and bill of rights, and we have seen that
when the essentials are preserved, all other matters looking
to their selection are conﬁded to the legislature.
The special jury was not a matter of right at common law,
but was within the discretion of the court; nor has it been,
in this state, an absolute right, save when prescribed by
If it is competent for the legislature to change the
statute.
qualiﬁcations and prescribe new methods for selecting the
constitutional jury, how can it be maintained it may not also
determine in what cases a special venire may be had, and
how it should be selected; and what obstacle is there to the
abolition of the special jury system absolutely?
The historical 12 was an absolute legal right. It was this
“right” which our constitution secures; but a special venire
was not a legal right, but rested in the discretion of the
court, and hence has not passed into a constitutional right;
and, in the absence of limitation upon the people in their
legislative capacity, they can abolish the right to a special
jury altogether. Whether we construe this act of April 1,
1891, as abolishing all distinction between common and spe
cial juries, or as conferring upon a party the right to a jury
different from the regular panel, and special only in that
sense, or as prescribing the qualiﬁcations
and method of
jury/when
selecting a special
allowed by the court in its dis
cretion, in neither case is it obnoxious to the charge of being
unconstitutional. The right to an impartial jury does not
vest in any suitor the right to select his own jury. We dis
cover nothing in_ the act that is calculated to abridge or deny
any essential of a jury trial as understood at common law,
and hold that its various provisions were clearly within the
province and discretion of the legislature.
The writ of pro
hibition is denied.
BRACE, C. J., and MACFARLANE, BURGESS, and Rosmson,

JJ.,

concur.
BARCLAY,

SHERWOOD,

J.,

concurs,

J.,

dissents.

referring to his dissenting opinion
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in the recent Withrow prohibition case from St. Louis (State
v. Wiithrow [Mo. Sup.] 36 S. W. 43)."
I58 Special Juries.
“Special juries were originally
Blackstone says:
introduced in trials at bar. when the causes were of too great nicety for
the discussion of ordinary freeholders; or where the sheriff was sus
pected of partiality, though not upon such apparent cause as to warrant
an exception to him. He is in such cases, upon motion in court and a rule
granted thereupon, to attend the prothonotary or other proper officer
with his freeholder’s book; and the officer is to take indifferently forty
eight of the principal freeholders in the presence of the attorneys on
both sides; who are each of them to strike off twelve, and the remaining
twenty-four are returned upon the panel."—3 Com. *357.
In King v. Wooter, (1817) 1 Barn. & Aid. 193, 204, Lord Ellenborough
“The practice certainly has been within the city of London to
said:
take such only as came within that description [merchants], and in
counties, those who come within the description of esquires or persons
of higher degree; that has been the mode in which the officers have at
all times exercised their judgment as to the class from which special

jurors are to be
In the United

selected."
States the manner of selection is usually regulated by
statute,—-Atlantic & Danville R. R. Co. v. Peake, (1890) 87 Va. 130.
While the statutes are quite varied in their provisions, the general pur
pose is to obtain a specially selected list from which the parties are
given a liberal right of exclusion.
The Michigan statute, which is
fairly representative of the type, is as follows, the sections being taken
from C. L. 1915:
When it shall appear to the circuit court that a fair
Sec. 12615.
and impartial trial will be more likely to be obtained in any cause
pending therein. by having a struck jury, such court shall order a special
jury to be struck for the trial of such cause.
Sec. 12616. The party obtaining such order, shall give notice eight
days previously, of the time when he will attend before the clerk of
the county in which the venue in such action is laid, for the purpose
of having such jury struck.
Sec. 12617. At the time appointed the clerk of the county shall attend
at his olllce, with the original lists of grand and petit jurors returned
to him who are then liable to serve, and in the presence of the parties
or their counsel, shall proceed to strike a jury as follows:
l. The clerk shall select from such list the names of forty-eight per
sons, whom he shall deem most indifferent between the parties, and
best qualiﬁed to try the cause;
2.
The party on whose application such struck jury was ordered, or
his attorney shall then ﬁrst strike out one of the said names and the
opposing party or his agent or attorney, shall strike out another of
such names, and so alternately until each party shall have stricken out
twelve names;
If either party shall fail to attend at the time and place of striking
3.
such persons. or shall neglect to strike out any names according to the
foregoing provisions, the clerk shall strike out such names for such

party;

The clerk shall thereupon make out a list of the names of the
-I.
twenty-four persons not stricken out, and certify the same to be the
persons drawn to serve as jurors, pursuant to the order of the court. and
shall deliver such list, so certiﬁed, to the sheriff of the county.
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The sheritf shall summon the persons whose names are
Sec. 12618.
contained on the list so delivered to him by the clerk, in the same
manner as other jurors are required to be summoned, and shall return
the names of those summoned to the court, at which they are required
to appear as jurors.
Sec. 12619.
A jury shall be formed in the manner directed by law
in respect to other juries, from the persons so summoned and appearing,
who shall try the cause in which such struck jury shall have been
ordered; but the court shall have the same power to excuse or discharge
any such juror, as in other cases.
Sec. 12621.
The expense of striking a jury shall be paid by the party
applying for the same, and shall not be taxed in the costs of the suit,
and the struck jurors shall be paid as in other cases.
See People v. Dunn, (1899) 157 N. Y. 528, for a careful consideration
of the constitutional features of the struck jury act.
Unanimity.
Many state constitutions allow a verdict by less than
See the following:
twelve.
Calif.. Art. 1, Sec. 7; Idaho. Art. 1. Sec. 7;
Missouri. Art. 2. Sec. 28; Kentucky. Stat. 1909, Sec. 2268, authorized
by Const.
Sec. 248; Ohio, Art. 1, Sec. 5; Oklahoma,
Art. 2, Sec. 19;
South Dakota, Art. 6, Sec. 6; Nevada, Art. 1, Sec. 3; Texas. Art. 5,
Sec. 13; Utah, Art. 1, Sec. 10; Washington. Art. 1, Sec. 21. The most
usual provision is for a verdict by three-fourths of the jury. See Max
well v. Dow, (1899) 176 U. S. 581, holding that the Utah provision did
States.
not offend against the Constitution of the United
See also
Unanimity of Juries, by Francis Lieber, 6 Am. Law Rev., N. S., T27.
The advantages of less than unanimous verdicts are said to be two.
viz., a reduction in the number of disagreements, and a reduced possi
bility of jury ﬁxing.
In England the use of juries in civil actions has quite largely dis
appeared.
Order 36, rule 2, provides that “in every action, cause. matter
or issue, unless under the provisions of rule 6 of this Order a trial with
a jury is ordered, the mode of trial shall be without a jury:
Provided
that * " "
(bl the court or a judge may at any time order any
action, cause, matter or issue to be tried by a judge with a jury or a
judge sitting with assessors or a special referee with or without as
sessors."
Rule 6, above referred to allows a jury, on application within
14 days after the close of the pleadings, in cases of fraud, libel. slander.
false imprisonment, seduction
malicious prosecution,
and breach of
And there are certain other cases where a jury may be
promise.
See Annual Practice, 1923.
demanded.

i.i~
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TURNES
Supreme

v.

BRENCKLE.

Court of Illinois.

1911.

249 Illinois, 894.
C. J.
The appellant William J. Turnes, doing
William J. Turnes Company, ﬁled a bill in chan
cery in the circuit court of Cook county to establish and
VICKERS,

business as
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enforce a mechanic’s lien against certain real estate owned by
"‘
*
*
appellee, Elizabeth Brenckle.
By an amendatory
act (Amending Laws 1895, p. 225), which went into effect
July 1, 1903, it is provided as follows: “And in event that
the court shall ﬁnd, in any proceeding in chancery, that no
right to a lien exists, the contractor shall be entitled to re
cover against the owner as at law, and the court shall render
judgment as at law for the amount which the contractor is
entitled to, together with costs in the discretion of the court.”
Hurd’s Rev. St. 1909, c. 82, § 27. The court below held the
foregoing statute unconstitutional, and refused to enter judg
ment as at law for the amount that might be due appellant.
The constitutionality of a statute being thus involved, the
court below allowed an appeal direct to this court.

l

1

Q
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The constitutional provision relating to a jury trial does
not apply to the trial of issues of fact in equitable actions.
If it did, a court of equity could exercise no discretion but
would be compelled to grant a jury trial, when demanded,
in all cases where the same issue would be triable by a jury
in a common law action. In Barton 12. Barbour, 104 U. S.
“The
126, the court, on page 133 (26 L. Ed. 672), said:
argument is much pressed that by leaving all questions re
lating to the liability of receivers in the hands of the court
appointing them persons having claims against the insolvent
corporation or the receiver will be deprived of a trial by
jury. This, it is said, is depriving the party of a constitu
"
"
"‘
But those who use this argument
tional right.
principle that the right of
sight
the
fundamental
of
lose
trial by jury, considered as an absolute right, does not ex
If it be conceded or
tend to cases of equity jurisdiction.
clearly shown that a case belongs to this class, the trial of
questions involved in it belongs to the court itself, no matter
See, also, 24
what may be its importance or complexity.”
Cyc. 111, and cases there cited.
Under the Constitution a party is entitled, as a right, to a
trial by jury according to the course of the common law, and
to a verdict which is not merely advisory but is binding upon
the court upon controverted questions of fact. Whether the
right to a jury trial exists in any given case depends upon
the nature of the controversy rather than upon the form of
A statute passed by the Legislature of Florida
the action.

>771;
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in 1889 (Laws 1889, c. 3884) provided “that courts of chan
cery shall entertain suits by any person or persons claiming
any timbered lands in this state to enjoin trespasses on said
lands by the cutting of trees thereon or the removal of logs
therefrom, or by boxing or scraping said trees for the pur
pose of making turpentine, or by the removal of turpentine
therefrom; and in such suits the said courts shall cause an
account to be taken of the damage to the complainant from
any of said trespassing before or after the institution of the
suit, and decree payment of the amounts shown due upon
such accounting by the defendant or defendants."
The title
of the act was “An act to extend powers of courts of chan
cery.”
bill was ﬁled for an injunction
Under this statute
to prevent trespassing upon timber lands and for the assess
ment of damages for trespasses already committed.
The
Supreme Court of Florida, in Wiggins
Johnson v. Wil
liams, 36 Fla. 637, 18 South. 859, 30 L. R. A. 754, held that
that portion of the act which authorizes the court to assess
damages for trespass committed upon timber lands was un
deprived the defendant
constitutional and void because
jury trial in
matter wherein such right
of a right to
existed at common law previous to the adoption of the Con
stitution of that state. The constitutional provision of that
jury trial
right of
similar to the
state in relation to
In the course
corresponding provision of our Constitution.
of the opinion the Supreme Court of that state said: “A
principle has been established in the jurisprudence of this
country that new rights unknown to the common law pro
cedure of trial by jury may be created, and provision made
jury, without
for their determination in the absence of
violating the constitutional provision we are considering.
may be competent for the Legislature to create
But, while
new tribunals without common law powers to adjudicate
jury, the mere change, in form, of an
new rights without
action, will not authorize the submission of common law
made to secure
court in which no provision
rights to
further said: “A stat
trial by jury.” In the same case
any
claiming title to
Michigan
person
provided
that
ute in
lands through the Auditor General’s deed, executed upon
bill in chan
sale thereof for nonpayment of taxes, may ﬁle
It
cery to quiet his title without taking possession thereof.
right
gave
ﬁle
the
bill
the
to
was claimed that the statute
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against one in possession of the land, although at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution under which the act was
passed trials of titles to lands were at law. It was held that
the statute did not have such meaning, but, if it did, the
Legislature was powerless to enact it. Judge Cooley, speak
ing for the court in Tabor v. Cook, 15 Mich. 322, said: ‘The
present is one of those cases where a right to a trial by jury
existed when the Constitution was formed, and this right
must therefore remain.
Whatever proceeding the Legisla
ture authorizes for the determination of adverse claims, the
right of the party in possession to a jury trial must be kept
in view and some mode pointed out by which he can demand
it. In civil cases at law, including ejectment suits, provision
is made by statute and rule whereby either party may obtain
a jury; but there is no such provision for cases in chancery,
and it is only in special cases, where the court desires the
verdict of a jury for its own guidance, that issues in chan
cery can go before a jury at all. A defendant in chancery,
therefore, cannot waive a jury by failing to demand it, be
cause no mode is provided by which any such demand can
be made, and a statute which should authorize a bill in the
nature of an ejectment bill, without at the same time pro
viding some means by which a jury could be had at the
option of defendant, would be in palpable disregard of the
provisions of the Constitution which we have quoted.’ ”
Our conclusion is that the statute under consideration is
unconstitutional * " * for the reason that it deprives
a defendant of the right to a trial by jury.
The court below properly dismissed the bill for want of
equity, and its decree will be affirmed.
’
Decree aﬂirmed."
FARMER and DUNN, JJ., dissenting.
“Compare Grand Rapids & Indiana R. R. Co. v. Sparrow, (1888) 36
Fed. 210, where a statute extending the jurisdiction of a court of equity
to quiet title to unoccupied lands, was held valid and not subject to
See also Ward v. Farwell, (1881)
the objection made in Tabor v. Cook.
97

Ill.

593, pp.

611-614.
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1898.

United States, 1.

8, 1896, the Capital Traction
corporation in the District of
presented to the supreme court of the District a
petition for a writ of certiorari to a justice of the peace, to
prevent a civil action to recover damages in the sum of $300
from being tried by a jury before him.

GRAY,
Company,
Columbia,

On

a

September

street-railway

I

I

I I I I I I I I

The petition further averred that the only method in which
Hof’s claim against the petitioner could be tried by a jury
according to the common law and the constitution was by
removing his suit from the justice of the peace into the
supreme court of the District of Columbia; that, if this was
not done, the petitioner -would be deprived of its constitu
*
"
"
tional right to a trial by jury.

I I I I I I I I I I

3.
“Trial by jury,” in the primary and usual sense of the
term at the common law and in the American constitutions,
is not merely a trial by a jury of 12 men before an ofﬁcer
vested with authority to cause them to be summoned and
impaneled, to administer oaths to them and to the constable
in charge, and to enter judgment and issue execution on their
verdict; but it is a trial by a jury of 12 men in the presence
and under the superintendence of a judge empowered to
instruct them on the law and to advise them on the facts,
and (except on acquittal of a criminal charge) to set aside
their verdict, if, in his opinion, it is against the law or the
evidence. This proposition has been so generally admitted,
and so seldom contested, that there has been little occasion
Yet there are unequivocal state
for its distinct assertion.
ments of it to be found in the books.

I

I

I I I I I

jury of

I

I

I

justice of the peace,
fhaving been unknown in England or America before the
lDeclaration of Independence, can hardly have been within
contemplation of congress in proposing, or of the people
I

A trial by

‘the

a

12 men before a
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in ratifying, the seventh amendment to the constitution of
the United States.
Another question having an important bearing on the
5.
validity and the interpretation of the successive acts of con
gress concerning trial by jury in civil actions begun before
justices of the peace in the District of Columbia is whether
the right of trial by jury secured by the seventh amend
ment to the constitution is preserved by allowing a common
law trial by jury in a court of record, upon appeal from a
judgment of a justice of the peace, and upon giving bond,
with surety, to prosecute the appeal, and to abide the judg
ment of the appellate court.
The question considered and decided by this court in Cal
lan v. Wilson (1888) 127 U. S. 540, 8 Sup. Ct. 1301, though
somewhat analogous, was essentially a different one.
$

All

$

1

1

1

$

#

i

Q

l

the other cases cited at the bar in which the constitu
tional right of trial by jury was held not to be secured by
allowing such a trial on appeal from a justice of the peace
or from an inferior court were criminal cases. Greene 12.
Briggs (1852) 1 Curt. 311, 325, Fed. Cas. No. 5,764; Saco
v. Wen-tworth (1853) 37 Me. 165; In re Dana. (1872) 7 Ben.
.
1 Fed. Cas. No. 3,554.
On the other hand, the authority of the legislature, con
sistently with constitutional provisions securing the right of
trial by jury, to provide, in civil proceedings for the recov
ery of money, that the trial by jury should not be had in the
tribunal of ﬁrst instance, but in an appellate court only, is
supported by unanimous judgments of this court in two
earlier cases, the one arising in the District of Columbia, and
*
"‘
" Bank
the other in the state of Pennsylvania.
of
246;
Livingston
235,
'v.
Columbia. v. Okely (1819) 4 Wheat.
Moore (1833) 7 Pet. 469.
A long line of judicial decisions in the several states, be
ginning early in this century, maintains the position that the
constitutional right of trial by jury in civil actions is not
infringed by a statute which sets the pecuniary limits of the
jurisdiction of justices of the peace in actions at law higher
than it was when the particular constitution was adopted,
allows a trial by jury for the ﬁrst time upon appeal from the
judgment of the justice of th_e peace, and requires of the
appellant a bond, with surety, to prosecute the appeal, and
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to pay the judgment of the appellate court.
The full extent
and weight of those precedents cannot be justly appreciated
without referring to the texts of the statutes which they up
held, and which have not always been fully set forth in the
reports.
The leading case is Emerick v. Harris (1808) 1 Bin. 416,
which arose under the statutes of Pennsylvania. " "
The provincial statute of March 1, 1745, gave a justice of the
peace jurisdiction of actions to recover the sum of 40 shil
lings and upwards, and not exceeding £5, and authorized
any person aggrieved by his judgment to appeal to the court
of common pleas, “ﬁrst entering into recognizance, with at
least one sufficient security, at least in double value of the
debt or damages sued for, and sufficient to answer all costs,
to prosecute the said appeal with effect, and to abide the
order of the said court, or in default thereof to be sent by
mittimus to the sheriff of the county, by him to be kept un
til he shall give such security, or be otherwise legally dis
charged.”
1 Dall. Laws Pa. 304, 307.
The statute April 5,
1785, enlarged the summary jurisdiction of a justice of the
peace to sums not exceeding £10, and, for the avowed pur
pose of conforming to the constitution of the state, gave an
appeal to th'e court of common pleas, upon the like terms as
by the statute of 1745.
And the statute of March 11, 1789,
conferred upon the aldermen of the city of Philadelphia the
jurisdiction of justices of the peace. 2 Dall. Laws Pa. 304,
305, 660.
The statute of April 19, 1794, extended the juris
diction of justices of the peace, as well as of the aldermen
of Philadelphia, to demands not exceeding £20 with a
right of appeal, after judgment, if the amount exceeded £5,
to the court of common pleas, “in the same manner, and
subject to all other restrictions and provisions,” as in the
In support of
statute of 1745.
3 Dall. Laws Pa. 536-538.
a writ of certiorari to quash a judgment for £11, 6s. ren
dered in the aldermen’s court of Philadelphia upon default
of the defendant, it was argued “that the constitution, by
directing that trial by jury should be as heretofore, and the
right thereof remain inviolate, had interdicted the legisla
ture from abolishing or abridging this right in any case in
which it had existed before the constitution; that a prohibi
tion to do this directly was a prohibition to do it indirectly,
either by deferring the decision of a jury until one, two, or

'
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more previous stages of the cause had been passed, or by
clogging the resort to that tribunal by penalties of any kind,
either forfeiture of costs, security upon appeal, or delay;
that the power to obstruct at all implied the power to in
crease the obstructions until the object became unattainable;
and that, the instant the enjoyment of the right was to be
purchased by sacriﬁces unknown before the constitution, the
right was violated, and ceased to exist as before.” But the
supreme court of Pennsylvania held that the statute of 1794
was a constitutional regulation of judicial proceedings by
legislative authority. 1 Bin. 424, 428. See, also, McDonald
v. Schell (1820) 6 Serg. & R. 240; Biddle 'v. Com. (1825) 13
Serg. & R. 405, 410; Haines '0. Levin (1866) 51 Pa. St. 412.
Soon after the decision in Eme-rick v. Harris, a similar
decision was made by the supreme court of North Carolina.
*
"
*
Keddie v. Moore (1811) 2 Murphy, 41, 45; Wilson
.
v. Simonton (1821), Hawks, 482.
Barnes (1835)
[The court then quoted from Morford
Yerger (Tenn.) 444, 446, and Beers 22. Beers (1823)
Conn.

7

Md.’ 511, 512.

is

it

a

if

is a

a

a

is

it

it

7

535, 538-540, to the same effect.]
Md. 500, the court of
In Steuart v. Baltimore (1855)
appeals of Maryland, speaking by Judge Eecleston, said:
was declared
“In the third section of the old bill of rights,
‘that the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the com
mon law of England, and the trial by jury, according to the
Notwithstanding this, the legislature
course of that law.’
times, extending the jurisdiction
different
passed laws at
of justices of the peace in matters of contract, and giving
jurisdiction in matters of tort where they had none previ
ously.
These laws, of course, made no Provision for trials
jury
except on appeal to the county courts, and yet they
by
were constantly acquiesced in, and not considered as being
repugnant to the bill of rights.” The court then referred
to Morford o. Barnes, Beers v. Beers, and McDonald 11.
Schnell, above cited, and added: “These cases fully establish
the principle that, where a law secures a trial by jury upon
constitutional provision for
no violation of
an appeal,
guarding that right, although such law may provide for
jury. This
primary trial without the intervention of
proper, can
he
thinks
party,
that
the
ground
upon the
ﬁnally settled."
jury before
have his case decided by

u
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To the like general effect are the following:
St. Ky.
30, 1812, §§ 4-6 (2 Moreh. & B. Dig. pp. 893, 894);
Pollard "v. Holeman (1816) 4 Bibb. 416; Head v. Hughes
(1818) 1 A. K. Marsh. 372; Feemster v. Anderson (1828) 6
T. B. Mon. 537; Steamboat Co. v. Foster (1848) 5 Ga. 194,
208; Lincoln v. Smith (1855) 27 Vt. 328, 361; Lamb v. Lane
(1854) 4 Ohio St. 167, 180; Norton v. McLeary (1858) 8
Ohio St. 205, 209; Reclmer v. Warner (1872) 22 Ohio St.
275, 291, 292; Cooley, Const. Lim. (6th Ed.) 505; 1 Dill.
Mun. Corp. (4th Ed.) § 439.
t $ l I O O I l O I5}

Jan.

54Many courts hold that a right of appeal to a court employing a
law jury safeguards the constitutional right to a jury trial in
criminal cases.—Zelle v. McHenry, (1879) 51 Ia. 572; Sprague v. Inhab
itants of Androscoggin County, (1908) 104 Me. 352; Jones v. Robbins,
(1857) 8 Gray (Mass) 329; State v. Tate, (1915) 169 N. C. 373; Brown
common

v. Epps,

(1895) 91 Va. 726.
v. Wilson, (1887) 127 U. S. 540, the oourt quotes with
approval the statement made in Dillon on Municipal Corporations (Vol.
1, Sec. 433) that “violations of municipal by-laws proper, such as fall
within the description of municipal police regulations, as, for example,
markets, streets, water-works, city officers, etc., and
those concerning
which relate to acts or omissions that are not embraced in the criminal
legislation of the state, the legislature may authorize to be prosecuted
in a summary manner, by and in the name of the corporation, and
need not provide tor a. jury trial."

In Callan

BROWN

‘3,,\.

1'-\§

6‘

Supreme

v.

CIRCUIT JUDGE.

Court of Michigan.
75

1889.

Michigan, 274.

a

a

a

a

CAMPBELL, J. Relator represents that in April, 1888,
bill in chancery was ﬁled in Kalamazoo county by Sarah E.
Field, to set aside
deed made to relator by Thomas B. Lord,
who was father of both parties, upon the grounds generally
set up in such cases, of fraud, undue inﬂuence, and inca
Issue being joined, the complainant made claim un
pacity.
of 1887 for trial by jury. This demand was
the
statute
der
allowed, and certain issues were submitted, which to some
very tangible way,
extent covered the charges, but not in
and the jury gave answers to the speciﬁc questions.
The
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circuit judge, acting entirelyon these answers, made a de
cree in favor of complainant, cancelling the deed, and refused
to exercise his own judgment in the case. A mandamus is
asked to require him to set aside the decree, and to hear
the cause and decide it himself. It is due to the circuit judge
to say that he took this course to enable the validity of the
statute to be passed upon in this court, inasmuch as this
question has been raised in several parts of the state, and
needs to besettled in order to procure uniformity of prac
tice.

*

8

*

8!

8

$

U

l

C

#

The statutory provision now in controversy consists of
a recasting of a section of the old Compiled Laws, intended
*
"‘
*
to give an opportunity of trial in open court.
In
1887 this section was sought to be radically changed by con
verting a chancery hearing to something meant to resemble
a

trial at law.

“

"

‘

As Michigan had a long territorial experience, its judicial
system naturally became fashioned in close analogy to that
of the United States, and so recognized and perpetuated in
their essentials the classiﬁcation of legal and equitable rights
as involving the necessity of separate administration in im
portant particulars. The constitution of the United States
recognized the division of ordinary civil jurisprudence into
cases at law and cases in equity, and it has been held by the
supreme court of the United States that this recognition puts
it beyond the power of congress to make any serious change
*
*
"‘
in that classiﬁcation.
The statute of 1887 (Laws 1887, p. 358) undertakes to
provide that “either party shall also be entitled to the right
to a jury, to be demanded in the same manner as in a suit at
law, and the verdict of such jury on any question of fact
shall have the same force and effect in the circuit [court]
in chancery, and in the supreme court on appeal, as the ver
dict of a jury in an action at laW.” * " "
When any matter becomes involved in a chancery suit, the
necessities of justice and equity require that all persons and
all things concerned in the controversy shall be brought be
fore the court to have their respective interests charged or
protected, and to end the controversy once for all. Speciﬁc
relief is generally required, and usually more or less of the
defendants have conﬂicting interests to a greater or less ex
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tent, which require different issues and different treatment;
and these difficulties frequently become known or developed
during the course of the investigation.
1

¥

i I

Q

$

0

Q

1

Q

When a case is tried by a common law jury one verdict
settles the whole issue, and, unless set aside, furnishes the
complete basis of a judgment which cannot in anything de
part from it; and there is and can be no issue which the
jury do not dispose of. The judgment follows as a matter
of course, and, if taken to an appellate court, the verdict can
not be altered, and must stand completely good or completely
A verdict on part of the issues and a disagreement
bad.
on the rest, is no verdict.
It is not possible to have one
equity
which shall decide the whole con
verdict in a suit in

troversy. ‘ "' "‘
This leads to the inquiry whether it is competent for legis
lation to bring about any such radical changes as are here
attempted. We think it is not. The decisions of the United

States supreme court before referred‘ to do not bind state
practice, but they nevertheless to some extent indicate the
That tribunal did not decide that under the
real difficulty.
United States constitution there could be no change in equi
table procedure, because the whole body of Chancery prac
tice has been repeatedly amended and simpliﬁed by that
Their rulings mean neither more nor less than that
court.
there are various kinds of interests and controversies which
cannot be left without equitable disposal without either de
stroying them or impairing their value.
It is within the
power of a legislature to change the formalities of legal pro
cedure, but it is not competent to make such changes as to
impair the enforcement of rights. In rude times, when there
is no business, and no variety of property rights, very sim
ple remedies are sufficient. But where the ordinary remedies
have become inadequate to deal with more extended or pe
culiar interests, such as multiply in all civilized countries,
different methods and different tribunals become necessary.
The universally recognized basis of equitable jurisprudence
found in statutes and constitutions, as well as in the reports
and text-writers, is the inadequacy of the common law to
A principal basis of that inade
deal with these subjects.
was
of
the
tribunal passing on the facts. In
quacy
the nature
common law issues fact and law can be readily separated;
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but in the great majority of equity proceedings it is im
possible to make'any such separation.
The functions of
judges in equity cases in dealing with them is as well settled
a part of the judicial power, and as necessary to its admin
istration, as the functions of jurors in common law cases.
Our constitutions are framed to protect all rights. When they
vest judicial power they do so in accordance with all of its
essentials, and when they vest it in any court, they vest it
as eﬁicient for the protection of rights, and not subject to

~es

~ﬁy

or made inadequate.
dealt with by equitable methods is asjacredjs
Whatever may be the machinery
testimony
gathering
enforcing decrees, the facts and
or
for
the law must be decided together, and when a chancellor de
sires to have the aid of a jury to ﬁnd out how facts appear
to such unprofessional men, it can only be done by submit
ting single issues of pure fact, and they cannot foreclose
him in his conclusions unless they convince his judgment.
The very wise provision of our constitution, which by
section 5 of article 6 directs the legislature to abolish dis
tinctions between law and equity proceedings, is carefully
worded, and requires it to be done only as far as practicable.
It does not blend legal and equitable interests, although no
doubt it does favor the removal of such distinctions between
those as are nominal, rather than real. The purpose of the
constitution has been very liberally carried out, and there
is now hardly any distinction left that is merely formal. But
the clause referred to was suggested, as all men know, by the
then recent attempts in other states to abolish systems of
and provide
procedure which had become overtechnical,
-In doing
forms of remedy of a more simple character.
legal
in
name
between
equitable
and
distinction
this the
But it very soon became manifest
remedies was abolished.
class
of rights which, for want of a
jurists
that
the
to all
better deﬁnition, were loosely called “equitable,” and which
had only been included under that name because the common
law methods were not adapted to enforce them, differed from
other rights in their essential nature, and not in form only,
and that, by whatever name they were called, they could only
be efficiently protected and made available by the means
known as “equitable.”
be distorted
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Juries cannot devise speciﬁc remedies, or safely

deal with complicated interests, or with relief given in suc
cessive stages, or adjusted to varying conditions. _The0ry
The
\za._mounts to nothi_n_g__i_n~tl_1e history_o_f__j_urisp1'udence.
jurisprudence has been developed as
carefully and as judiciously as any part of the legal system,
and the judicial power includes it, and always must include
it. Any change which transfers the power that belongs to
a judge to a jury, or to any other person or body, is as plain
a violation of the constitution as one which should give the
courts executive or legislative power vested elsewhere. The
cognizance of equitable questions belongs to the judiciary
as a part of the judicial power, and under our constitution
must remain vested where it always has been vested hereto

sy~ery

fore.
The case in which relator seeks our interference has never
been heard by the court as it should have been, and a man
damus must be allowed to direct the circuit judge to rescind
his decree, and allow the case to be brought to a hearing
before the court for ﬁnal disposal on pleadings, and on proofs
to be properly taken. The other justices concurred“!
Compare In re Atchlson (1922) 284 Fed. 604, where a statute requir
a jury in contempt cases was held unconstitutional, and The Nyack
(C. C. A. 1912) 199 Fed. 383, where a statute providing for a jury trial
in admiralty cases was construed so as to make the verdict only advisory
on appeal, with a suggestion of doubt as to its binding effect on the trial
court.

.1
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(b)

The

ULLMAN

Jury Panel.
v.

STATE.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
124 Wisconsin,

1905.

602.

Plaintiff in error was duly informed against

as having
of August, 1902, at Dodge County, Wiscon
sin, made an assault on Ida Ullman with
loaded revolver
Ullman,
her,
to
kill
intent
the
said
Ida
and
with
murder.
In
on the 3rd day

a

,|
,
'"
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due time and form he entered a plea of not guilty, and was
tried in October, 1903, in the circuit court for Dodge county.
#

Q

I

1

i l i

Q

i I

MARSHALL, J. Before the impaneling the jury for the
trial was commenced, counsel for the accused said he de
sired to “ﬁle a challenge to the array of jurors,” accom
panying such statement by presenting a paper in that
regard, which was placed on ﬁle. Such paper was not in
corporated into the bill of exceptions, neither does the bill
show in any formal way the grounds of the challenge.
The
proceedings had in respect to the matter show pretty clearly
what such grounds were. The point is made by the attorney
general that such a challenge must be made in writing, stat
ing speciﬁcally the grounds thereof, and that the writing
must be embodied in the bill of exceptions in order to en
able this court to review the decision of the trial court in
If that be correct, whether the decision
respect thereto.
overruling the challenge to the array was proper or not, is
not before us.
At common law a challenge to the array was required to
be made in writing, stating speciﬁcally the grounds relied
on. An issue of law or fact was then formed in respect
thereto, which was tried by the court, if one of law, and by
triers appointed by the court, if of fact. Under our statu
tory system for selecting and returning jurors there is no
challenge to the array in the strict common law sense.
The
Code was designed to be as complete for the trial of crimi
It makes no provision
nal as for the trial of civil cases.
for a challenge to the array, or for any equivalent proceed
ing.
One is liable to fall into confusion in respect to the
matter by failing to note the fact that most of the decisions
in this country in Code states, where it is said that a chal
lenge to the array must be in writing, are based on statu
In Iowa, where there is an express
tory requirements.
provision for a challenge to the entire panel, it is said that
the common law challenge to the array does not exist.
It is said in cases decided
State v. Davis, 41 Iowa, 311.
in New York, California, Texas, Michigan, Minnesota, Mis
sissippi, and other states that might be mentioned, that a
challenge to the array must be in writing, but it will be
found on investigation that such decisions merely follow
The ancient method of trying is
statutory requirements.
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sues of fact raised on such challenge
All
obsolete.
sues, Whether of law or fact, on an objection to the entire
anel of jurors are now triable summarily by the court.
hether the making of the challenge
regulated by statute
or
mere matter of practice regulated by the court.
Trial courts have inherent authority, and
is their duty,
permit and give consideration to objections seasonably
properly made to the entire panel of jurors, based upon
grounds speciﬁcally stated, which, if true, indicate that the
statutory method of selecting jurors was prejudicially de
parted from. The motion or objection may properly be, as
commonly has been in this state under the Code, called
challenge to the array. Sta-te 1». Cameron,
Pin. 490; Con
key v. Northern Bank,
Wis. 447; Perry v. State,
Wis.
19.
But that does not imply that
must be regarded as
having all the common law characteristics.
It has only such
of them as are appropriate to our judicial system. It is
said in 12 Ency. Pl.
Pr. 426: “At common law
chal
lenge to the array was required to be in writing, and where
this requirement has not been abrogated by statute the rule
of the common law
still in force,” citing authorities from
regu
seven states, in each of which, however, the matter
lated by statute.
neither any statute nor rule of court nor de
There
cisions in this state regulating deﬁnitely the practice as to
objecting to the entire panel of jurors. The right to make
such an objection, however, has always been recognized,
It makes no very
and exists by well established practice.
great difference how the question of the validity of the
panel is raised so long as the grounds thereof are brought
deﬁnitely to the attention of the court.
It may be in the
motion to
form of an objection to the entire panel, or
quash the return thereof, or be made in the set phrase of
challenge to the array. Mere form
of little consequence
when not necessary by statute. The spirit of the Code, gen
erally speaking, is that the substance of things only is ma
Were the practice to make the objection only
terial. If
by any particular name, and
in writing and to denominate
violation thereof and enter
the trial court were to permit
appeared that the
tain the matter nevertheless, unless
thereby
prejudiced
the
error would be
party
was
adverse
regarded as harmless under sec. 2829, Stats..1898.
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While it is good practice to make a challenge to the ar
ray, so called, in writing, since there is no statute requiring
it to be so made, and a stenographer is now a part of the
regular machinery of a trial court, who is expected to take
down accurately everything that occurs in the course of a
trial, the reason, in the main, for the common law rule as
to the manner of presenting the challenge, no longer exists.
It should therefore be deemed entirely sufficient if the chal
lenge is stated deﬁnitely at the bar of the court and taken
down by the stenographer.
It was early held here in harmony with the common law
rule that the grounds of a challenge to the array should be
Conkey 'v. Northern Bank, 6 Wis. 447.
speciﬁcally stated.
Though
That should be regarded as the settled practice.
the trial court has some discretion as to how speciﬁcally
the grounds of challenge must be stated, the statement
should be sufficiently full and deﬁnite to inform the trial
court and the adverse party reasonably of the precise de
partures from the legal requirements relied upon. The right
of challenge should be exercised before commencing to 1m
panel the jury, otherwise it should be deemed waived.
12
Ency. Pl. & Pr. 424. No departure from that rule is permis
sible except for extraordinary reasons.
In this case the practice as to the time of making the
objection, motion, or challenge and the manner thereof, ex
cept in that the speciﬁc grounds relied on do not appear in
the bill of exceptions, the writing in respect thereto being
The practice of the court
absent therefrom, was proper.
also in treating the grounds assigned for the challenge, not
admitted by the adverse party, as at issue and.summarily
trying the issues, was proper. Since such grounds were not
formerly stated, taken down by the stenographer, and pre
served in the bill, and the writing ﬁled was not so preserved
However,
we might properly omit consideration thereof.
questions
by
appears
challenge
the
raised
the
it
that
since
were fully tried and the grounds with reasonable clearness
appear from the evidence, we have concluded to treat the
matter.
The evidence taken upon the trial of the issues involved in
the challenge indicates that the grounds relied on were as
First, whereas the statute provides that the jury
follows:
shall furnish the clerk of the circuit court
commissioners

\

J

\
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one list of names of persons qualiﬁed to serve as jurors, to
be drawn from the body of the county, each commissioner
proposed and furnished a partial list, and such lists were
treated as satisfying the statute.
Second, the commission
ers did not furnish the clerk of the circuit court a complete
list of names veriﬁed or certiﬁed in proper form. Third,
the clerk did not make a copy of the lists ﬁled and deliver
the same to the commissioners or any one of them. Fourth,
the names furnished to the clerk as aforesaid were not writ»
ten upon separate slips of paper, and the slips folded and
put into a box by the clerk or his deputy, as the law requires.
The facts appear to be these: Each commissioner made a
list and submitted it to the three for consideration.
They
lists,
approved of such three
which in the aggregate included
the requisite names, as the one list which the statute re
quired, and delivered the same to the clerk of the circuit
court.
Such clerk did not make a copy of the lists so fur
nished and deliver the same to at least one of the commis
sioners, as the law requires, but each of the commissioners,
to the knowledge of the clerk, preserved a copy of the list
proposed by him. The law does not require the commission
ers to make any veriﬁcation or formal certiﬁcation of the
list furnished to the clerk. While neither the clerk nor his
deputy wrote the names of the persons appearing upon the
lists furnished, as aforesaid, on separate slips of paper, and
it is not certain that either one of them folded the slips after
the names were written thereon, and placed the same in a
box in the presence of the commissioners, as the law re
quires, the names were so written by a person acting under
the direction of the clerk in his presence and in the presence
of the deputy and the commissioners, and the slips were then
by the direction of the clerk, in his presence and in the
presence of the commissioners, either by the deputy clerk
or the person who wrote the names, placed in the box. The
names so written upon slips of paper and put in the box were
the identical names on the list furnished by the commis
sioners.
There is an entire absence in the record of any
showing or prejudicial departure from the letter of the stat
The mere fact that each commissioner proposed a list
ute.
of names for a part of the entire list to be agreed upon, and
the several partial lists were approved and in that form
handed to the clerk, instead of the three lists being trans
\

\
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ferred to one and in that form delivered, is of no consequence
whatever.
The fact that the physical acts of writing the
names on slips of paper and folding such slips ready for the
box and putting them therein, if such be the fact, in the
whole, is likewise of no consequence, since it appears that
such person acted under the immediate direction of the clerk,
in his presence and in the presence of the commissioners,
and there is not only no indication that there was any preju
dicial departure from the statute in the matter, but
is conclusive affirmative evidence to the contrary. The gen
eral rule as to irregularities in executing the statutory
method for selecting jurors is that they are to be deemed
immaterial, unless it appears probable that the person seek
ing to.take advantage thereof may be prejudiced thereby.
Proffatt, Jury Trial, Sec. 154; Thompson & Merriam, Juries
Pr. 277.
Sec. 134; 12 Ency. Pl.
The point is made by the attorney general that in any
case the challenge to the array was waived by the failure to
whole, reliance being placed on Jack
object to the jury as
son v. State, 91 Wis. 253, 267, 64 N. W. 838. The rule in
seems cannot reasonably be,
voked has never been, and
applied to objection to the entire panel of jurors. It only
When an exception
goes to objections to individual jurors.
ruling on an objection to the
is once properly saved to
subsequent
jurors
will
be
available upon
panel
of
entire
review of the ﬁnal result without further calling the matter
to the attention of the trial court.

,./

sr. LOUIS RAILWAY
IIE¥rnERsoN
co. v. SCHWAB.
&
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By the Court.-Judgment is affirmed.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
127

1907.

Kentucky, 82.

& a

J.

Appellee, alleging that she was injured in a
CARROLL,
freight train operated by appellant Louis
collision between
St. Louis Railway Company and one of
ville, Henderson
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the cars of appellant Louisville Railway Company, caused
by the negligence of the companies, brought this action to
recover damages from each of them. A trial was had before
a jury, and a verdict rendered against both appellants.
The principal error assigned by appellants is the failure
of the trial court to sustain the motion made by them at the
beginning of the trial to discharge the panel for miscon
duct of the jury commissioners in failing to select the jurors
in the manner prescribed by the statute, “in that the com
missioners did not write the name of each juror on a slip
of paper and place them in the drum wheel but merely
checked off names on the assessor’s book and employed
others not under oath to do the really important work of
writing off the names and putting them in the wheel; the
persons so employed not being under the direct supervision
of the commissioners, who did not know whether they did
"
"
the work assigned to them right or wrong.”

I I I I I I I I I I

'

Ky. St. 1903, section 2241, provides in part that “the cir
cuit judge of each county shall at the ﬁrst regular term of
circuit court therein after this act takes effect, and annu
ally thereafter, appoint three intelligent and discreet house
keepers of the county, over twenty-one years of age, resid
ing in different portions of the county, and having no action
in court requiring the intervention of a jury, as jury com
missioners for one year, who shall be sworn in open court
They shall hold their
to faithfully discharge their duty.
meetings in some room to be designated by the judge, and
while engaged in making the list of juries and selecting
the names, writing and depositing or drawing them from
the drum or wheel case, no person shall be permitted in said
They shall take the last returned asses
room with them.
sor’s book of the county and from it carefully select from
the intelligent, sober, discreet and impartial citizens, resi
dent housekeepers in different portions of the county, over
twenty-one years of age, the following number of names of
such persons, to-wit: (then follows the number that shall
be selected from each county, graded according to the’popu
Each name so selected they shall write in plain
lation.)
handwriting on a small slip of paper, each slip of paper
being as near the same size and appearance as practicable;
and each slip with the name written thereon shall be by

C/L7
N)
0-7
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small case made of paper or other ma
them enclosed in
terial and deposited unsealed in the revolving drum or wheel
case hereinafter provided for.”
said
In answer to the argument made for appellants,
for appellee that the record does not show that the sub
stantial rights of appellants were prejudiced by the action
of the court in overruling the challenge to the array;
" "
The record does not disclose that the members of
the panel from which the jurors were selected to try the
case were in any respect objectionable, and in this particu
lar the substantial rights of appellants were not prejudiced
by the rulings of the trial court; but, in
matter that
very
system
foundation
of
our
of selecting
at
the
strikes
material or necessary that any
jurors, we do not deem
sub
prejudicial error shall be made to appear, other than
stantial one committed in failing to select the juries in the
probable that the
manner pointed out in the statute. It
jurors selected to and that did try this particular case were
men who possessed all the statutory qualiﬁcations; and
may also be conceded that they were entirely acceptable to
the
counsel and parties on both sides. But back of this
more important question that litigants have the unqualiﬁed
right to demand that juries shall be selected in the manner
prescribed in the statute, and in passing on this right the
individual qualiﬁcation of the juror or the fact that he may
be entirely acceptable to the parties is not to be considered.
the contention of appellee was sound, the careful and
elaborate scheme devised for selecting juries would be nulli
dead letter, and no inquiry could
ﬁed, the statute would be
be made into the manner in which jurors were originally
chosen, if those selected to try the particular case possessed
the statutory qualiﬁcations and were personally satisfactory.
popular demand that
The Legislature, in obedience to
radical change be made in the manner of selecting juries,
after long delay and much discussion, enacted the statute
now in force; and this court in more than one case has given
to this law the sanction of its approval and declared that
its eﬂiciency shall not be impaired or destroyed by the fail
ure of public ofﬁcers to observe its reqirements.
Thus, in Curtis v. Com., 23 Ky. Law Rep. 267, 62 S. W.
motion was made to discharge the entire panel of
886,
petit jurors, because the names of the jurors were not drawn
a

a

a

a

If
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from the jury wheel as they should have been, but were
selected from a list regularly summoned in a previous month.
This being a criminal case, this court had no power to review
the action of the trial court in overruling the challenge to
the array, but in the course of the opinion said:
“These
men so selected may have been, and doubtless were, of the
very best citizenship in the county; but they were not drawn
impartially from the body of legally qualiﬁed jurymen of
the county.
The mode provided by law for the selection of
qualiﬁed and impartial jurymen was ignored, and the jury
were selected by the judge of the circuit court himself.
This was clearly erroneous. He may have done this with the
very best of motives, but it was not the method provided by
law, and should not have been done.” In Covington & Cin
cinnati Bridge C0. v. Smith, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 2292, 88 S.
W. 440, in discussing this jury law, the court said: “The
statutes quoted provide an elaborate system for the selection
monthly in courts of continuous session of impartial jury
men fresh from the body of the people. If these provisions
are enforced, each litigant is guaranteed that the best ef
fort possible has been made to secure for the trial of his case
an impartial jury. It is not believed that the requirements
in the statute in regard to the selection of juries would have
been set forth with such minute particularity and detail, if
it had been intended that the court might nullify the mani
fest intention of the Legislature by ignoring them.” In Ris
ner v. Com., 95 Ky. 539, 26 S. W. 388, 16 Ky. Law Rep. 84,
the jury commissioners did not put in the wheel the number
“While it is not
of names required, and the court said:
made to directly or certainly appear that appellant was
thereby substantially prejudiced, still he had the right to
insist upon being tried by only a jury obtained according to
the statute, which was passed for the purpose of securing
fair and impartial jurors; and, to more effectually accom
plish that end, the names of at least 200 persons should
have been placed in the drum or wheel case. This provision
cannot be disregarded in any substantial particular with
out defeating one of the principal purposes of the statute.
(‘antral Kentucky Asylum for the Insane 1*. Hauns, 21 Ky.
Law Rep. 22, 50 S. W. 978, to which our attention is called
by counsel for appellee, is not in point; nor is it in conﬂict
with the authorities cited. There the objection to the man

'
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ner in which the jury was selected was not made until after
the trial was completed, and hence came too late to be avail
able.

If

the methods avowed to have been adopted in this case
by the commissioners are upheld, all the safeguards thrown
around the selection of juries will be virtually abolished,
and the effort of the legislative department to improve and
elevate the jury system a failure.
The juries are almost
entirely composed of men selected by the commissioners,
and this power conﬁded to them cannot be delegated in
whole or in part to others. No minor ofﬁcers connected with
the administration of justice have more important duties
Upon their
to perform than do the jury commissioners.
judgment and discretion in the selection of intelligent, sober,
discreet, and impartial citizens and housekeepers of the
county depends in a large measure the pure and impartial
administration of justice in the conduct of jury trials, and
this valuable privilege ought not and will not be frittered
away merely because delay or inconvenience to the court
or litigants may result from sustaining a challenge to the
array because of substantial irregularity in the selection of
It is inﬁnitely better that there should be some
the juries.
delay in the trial of cases or inconvenience suffered by in
dividuals than that a statute intended to safeguard the
rights of all litigants should be totally disregarded.
If the
mistake or irregularity was a minor one, we would not re
gard it as material; but, if the avowals made are true, the
The
statute was violated in several substantial particulars.
provisions disregarded are not directory, but mandatory.
They constitute the very substance and life of the law, and
may not lightly be ignored or disobeyed . No fraud or im
proper purpose can be imputed to these commissioners, nor
is it necessary that it should be. Doubtless they acted in
good faith, but nevertheless in open disobedience of the law
under which they were selected, and their conduct can
neither be overlooked nor approved.
For the error mentioned, the judgment must be reversed;

l
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Challenges of jurors, based upon an allegation of bias,
favor or partiality, were, at the common law, divided into
two classes, viz., principal challenges and challenges to the
favor. A principal challenge was grounded on such mani
fest presumption of partiality, that if the fact alleged was
proved to be true, the disqualiﬁcation of the juror followed
as a legal conclusion, incapable of being rebutted.
In case
of a challenge to the favor, on the other hand, the disquali
ﬁcation arose as a conclusion of fact to be determined by the
triers, the evidence adduced in support of the challenge lead
ing to no presumption which might not be overcome by other
'
evidence.
Among the various matters which, at common law, were
held to be principal cause of challenge, that is, cause from
which bias or partiality would be inferred as a legal con
clusion, were these: consanguinity or affinity of the juror
with either of the parties within the ninth degree; that the
juror was god-father to the child of either party, or e con
verse; that the juror was of the same society or corporation
with either party; or was tenant or “within the distress”
of either party; or had an action implying malice depend
ing between him and either party; or was master, servant,
counsellor, steward or attorney for either party; or after
he was returned, he ate and drank at the expense of either
party; or had been chosen as arbitrator by either party. By
most of the authorities it was held to be ground of prin
cipal challenge, that the juror had formed and declared his
5 Bac. Abridg.
opinion touching the matter in controversy.
353; 3 Black Com. 363; 2 Tidd’s Prac. 853; Coke Litt. 155;
3 Burns’ Justice of the Peace (28th Ed.) 519; 21 Viner’s
Abridg. 252; 1 Chit. Crim. Law, 541; 3 Chit. Gen. Prac. 794;
Pringle 12. Hulse, 1 Cow. 436, note 1; People 11. Bodine, 1
According to these authorities and others like
Denio, 304.
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them, where the matter alleged was held to be ground for
principal challenge, all the challenging party was called, upon
to do was, to prove the existence of the fact alleged by him
as a ground of challenge, and that being shown, the incom
petency of the juror followed as a necessary legal conse-,
quence, and in such case, no inquiry was permitted as tol
whether, notwithstanding the fact shown, he could sit as a
juror and render a fair and impartial verdict.
The law,
from the fact proved, conclusively presumed bias, and per
mitted no further inquiry.
In this State, triers are not appointed, according to the
mode of procedure at common law, all challenges, by our
practice, being determined by the court.
Nor has the com
mon law distinction between principal challenges and chal
lenges to the favor been kept up in this State, still many of
the principles growing out of that distinction have been
habitually recognized and enforced.
Indeed, most of the
jurors
which
at
objections to
common law were held to be
ground of principal challenge, are held with us to be ab
solute disqualiﬁcations, that is, upon mere proof of the fact
alleged, the disqualiﬁcation follows as a legal conclusion, and
evidence is not admitted to show that, notwithstanding the
fact proved, the juror is really impartial.
1

1?
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34,11-K
(KUMLI
v. SOUTHERN
PACIFIC
Supreme

Court of Oregon.

CO.

1892.

21 Oregon, 505.

BEAN, J.—This is an action to recover damages for in
juries alleged to have been received by plaintiff while a pas
senger on one of defendant's passenger trains which was
wrecked by the falling of the bridge or trestlework across
the marsh known as Lake Labish, in Marion county, in No
vember, 1890. The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment
in favor of plaintiff for the sum of ﬁfteen hundred dollars,
from which defendant appeals, assigning as error the action
of the court in overruling its challenge for actual bias, to the
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jurors Kennedy, Harriott, Cooley, and Iler, and in refusing
t'o set aside the verdict of the jury, because it is so excessive,
and so disproportionate to the amount of plaintiff's injury
as to indicate passion or prejudice on the part of the jury.
These assignments of error will be noticed in the order in
dicated.
As to the overruling of the challenge to the jurors: It
1.
unnecessary
is
to state the facts, as disclosed by the exam
ination of any of the jurors, or their voir dire, except the
juror Iler, whose examination presents as strong a case
for the defendant as any in the record. The juror Iler, in
his examination in chief by defendant's counsel, said that
he did not know the plaintiff; had heard nothing about this
case; had heard considerable talk about the wreck; read
of it in the newspapers, and heard persons talk about it
who claimed to have looked at and examined the wreck;
from what he had heard the persons say who had examined
the wreck, and what he saw in the newspapers, he had
formed and expressed an opinion as to whether or not the
railroad company was to blame for the wreck; he had that
opinion then; did not know that it was a particularly ﬁxed
opinion; it is one that would require some evidence to re
move. He could not say how many persons he had heard
talk about the wreck, who had examined and looked at it, but
supposed, perhaps, a half dozen; they said what they sup
posed caused the wreck; they were persons whom he had re
spect for.
From what they said, and what he had read in
the newspapers, he had formed an opinion as to the cause
of the wreck; he had heard the various theories put forth
through the newspapers, as to whether the wreck was caused
by a defective structure, or by a rail being removed from
At the conclusion
the track by some evil-disposed person.
of his examination by counsel, the juror, in response to
questions by the court, said that what he had heard about
the transaction was not from any of the witnesses in the
case, but just from persons who had gone to view the wreck;
that no opinion he had formed would inﬂuence his judgment
in the trial of the case, but he should try the case impar
tially, according to the law and the evidence; that he could
disregard what he had heard about the wreck, and would
be governed by the evidence altogether; would not regard
what he had heard, as it was only hearsay; would pay no
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attention to what he had been told, but would simply be
guided by the testimony given in court.
The challenge was
thereupon overruled by the court, defendant excepting.
There is much conﬂict in the adjudged cases as to when
an opinion touching the merits of the particular case will
disqualify a person called as a juror. The Standard of Lord
Mansﬁeld, in Myliclc 22. Saladine, 1 W. Bl. 480, that “a juror
should be as white as paper, and know neither plaintiff or
defendant, but judge of the issue merely, as an abstract
proposition upon the evidence produced before him,” has
long since been discarded as impracticable.
The courts are
agreed, that with the present popular intelligence and wide
dissemination of current events, through the medium of the
press, a juror’s mind cannot reasonably be expected to be
“as white as paper,” and it is no longer regarded as an ob
jection, per _se, to a person called as a juror, that he has
heard of the particular case, or even formed or expressed an
opinion touching the merits thereof.
“Were is possible,” said Mr. Chief Justic'e Marshall, “to
obtain a jury without any prepossessions whatever, respect
ing the guilt or innocence of the accused, it would be ex
tremely desirable to obtain such a jury; but this is perhaps,
impossible, and therefore not required.
The opinion which
has been avowed by the court is, that light impressions,
which may fairly be supposed to yield to the testimony that
may be offered, which may leave the mind open to a fair
consideration of that testimony, constitute no sufficient ob
jection to a juror; but that those strong and deep impres
sions which will close the mind against the testimony that
may be offered in opposition to them, which will combat
that testimony and resist its force, do constitute a sufficient
objection to him.”
(Trial of Aaron Burr, Vol. 1, 416; 1
Thomps. Trials, sec. 79.)
The rule laid down by this distinguished jurist in a trial
which at the time attracted universal attention, has become
substantially the settled law of this country, and it is now
generally considered that if the juror’s opinion will readily
yield to the evidence presented in the case, he is not incom
petent to sit upon the trial of the issue.
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While the rule is generally recognized, that the disquali
fying opinion of a juror must be of a ﬁxed and determined
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character, its application is frequently a matter of great
nicety, and the courts have struggled, apparently in vain,
to establish some judicial test, by which the question can
In order to avoid the uncertainty in the
be determined.
decisions, as well as the supposed inﬂexible rules of law, by
which the courts were driven, in many instances, to the illit
erate and hopelessly ignorant portions of the community for
jurors, the legislature of this, as well as many other states,
has enacted a statute by which the competency of a person,
called as a juror, shall be determined, on the trial of a chal
lenge, for having an opinion touching the merits of the par

ticular case.
By section 187, Hill's Code, it is provided, that on the
trial of a challenge for actual bias, “although it should ap
pear that the juror challenged has formed or expressed
an opinion upon the merits of the cause from what he may
have heard or read, such opinion shall not of itself be sufﬁ
cient to sustain the challenge, but the court must be satisﬁed
from all the circumstances that the juror cannot disregard
such opinion, and try the issue impartially.”
This statute
is but a recognition of the fact that, at the present day,
railroads, and telegraphs have made
when newspapers,
easy,
and when the important transac
intercommunication
tions of today in all their details are published to the world
tomorrow, the advance of popular intelligence and wide
dissemination of knowledge of current events, have under
the former rules of law, rendered it impossible to secure
a jury of intelligent men for the trial of causes which have
excited much public attention and have resulted in the ne
cessity of trying such cases before juries composed of the
illiterate and ignorant. Statutes of this character have been
held not unconstitutional as invading the right of trial by
jury. (Stokes v. People, 53 N. Y. 164; 13 Am. Rep. 492;
Jones v. People, 2 Colo. 351; Cooper 1:. State, 16 Ohio St.
328.)

This statute does not deny the principle, which has its
foundation in natural justice as well as law, that jurors
should be impartial and free from any existing bias which
But it assumes, and we think
may influence their judgment.
correctly, that a man may be a fair and impartial juror, al
though he have an opinion touching the merits of the cause
on trial, and that he may, notwithstanding, be able to set

Sec. 2]

Paooaaomos BASED on TRIAL or Issues

831

aside and disregard such opinion and decide the case from
the evidence independently thereof and uninﬁuenced thereby.
We think human experience teaches that it may not un
frequently happen that persons who have formed an opin
ion touching the merits of a cause from reports verbal or
written, may, as jurors, lay aside their prepossessions, and
not only honestly and conscientiously endeavor, but in fact
be able to hear and decide the case upon the evidence, un
inﬁuenced by such prepossessions.
Whether a person called
juror
as a
can do so or not depends largely upon his gen
eral intelligence, manner, tone, appearance, personal peculi
arities, and sources of information from which his opinion
is formed, its strength, the fact whether he exhibits any
pride of opinion which may lead him to give too little or too
much weight to the testimony for or against either party,
and many other circumstances, diﬁicult if not impossible to
suggest.
The determination of his competency, therefore,
necessarily becomes primarily a question for the trial court,
keeping ever in view, as it should, that the ultimate object
to be attained is a trial before a fair and impartial jury.
The question is wisely left largely to the sound discretion of
that court, and its ﬁndings upon a challenge to a juror for
actual bias, where there is any reasonable question as to his
competency, ought not to be reviewed by an appellate court
unless it clearly appear that such discretion has been arbi
trarily exercised. (State v. Tom, 8 Or. 177; State 12. Saund
ers, 14 Or. 300.)
In the case before us, we think the challenges to the jurors
Such opinions as they had
were each properly overruled.
were formed from newspaper reports and casual conversa
They evi
tions with persons who had visited the wreck.
dently had no prejudice against the defendant, -and had
taken no particular interest in the case. It is apparent that
they had nothing but loose, ﬂoating, hesitating opinions; and
as far as we can see, there was no such prejudgment of the
case as would prevent them from sitting as fair and im
partial jurors. The language of their examination is quali
ﬁed and considerate, and is not that of positive men, hasty
to judge and prompt to condemn, but rather that of honest,
careful conscientious men, fair, open, and candid, with an
obvious purpose to conceal nothing and suppress nothing.
They each was conscious that they could disregard all they
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had heard about the case, and try it on the evidence as pro
duced, uninﬂuenced by any opinion or impression they then
had. We cannot think this is such a manifestation of par
tiality or prejudice as left nothing to the conscience or dis
cretion of the trial court.
1!
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The judgment is aﬂirmed.“

"/V

65 See
People v. Garner, (1921) 216 Mich. 178, for conﬂicting views
expressed in majority and minority opinions, as to whether the previously
formed opinion of a juror as to the guilt or innocence of the accused is
good ground for challenge.
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ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF SPRINGFIELD
v.
Supreme

SEARLE.

Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
208 Massachusetts,

1909.
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Two ACTIONS or TORT; the ﬁrst action by George Everett
Searle against the Roman Catholic Bishop of Springﬁeld. who
corporation sole under St. 1898, c. 368, held the title to
as
certain real estate in the town of Easthampton, which was
bought as
church ediﬁce, alleging the conversion
site for
one story and
half wooden building
by the defendant of
alleged to be personal property and to be the property of the
plaintiff, having been built for the plaintiff by one Charles
W. Smith, with the consent of Delia A. Strong, who then was
the owner of the land; and the second action by the defendant
in the ﬁrst case against the plaintiff in the ﬁrst case and cer
tain other persons, for damages alleged to haye been caused
by an attempt to remove the building from the real 'estate, of
part, seeking also equitable relief
was alleged to be
which
by way of injunction.
KNOWLTON, C.
The question at the trial was whether
building erected on land of the defendant in the ﬁrst action,
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who will hereinafter be called the defendant, was personal
property belonging to Searle, who will hereinafter be called
the plaintiff, or was real estate owned by the defendant.
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Exception was taken by the defendant to the ruling of the
judge at the request of the plaintiff, that no person of the
juror in these cases.
Roman Catholic faith should sit as
Under this ruling two jurors were excluded from the panel.
one
resident of Northampton and the other
resident of
South Hadley.
The ruling was made on the ground that the
defendant
the Roman Catholic Bishop of Springﬁeld,
cor
poration sole under the St. 1898, c. 368, who holds the title to
the real estate in trust for the Roman Catholic church, and
that these excluded jurors have an interest in the suit analo
gous to that which taxpayers have in
suit against the city
or town in which they reside. It is not contended and
could
holding
religious
successfully
not
be contended that
the same
belief as one of the parties, or afﬁliation with him in the same
church, would disqualify
juror in
person from sitting as
his case. The application of such a doctrine would be unjust
and impracticable.
Commonwealth v. Buzzell, 16 Pick. 153;
Purple v. Horton, 13 Wend. 1; Barton v. Erickson, 14 Neb.
164; Smith '0. Sisters of Good Shepherd, 27 Ky. Law Rep.
1170.
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in the town of East
The real estate held by the defendant
site for
church ediﬁce.
hampton, and
was bought as
The excluded jurors were not taxpayers in that town, and
may be assumed that they were not members of the parish
that was expected to use the church. The ruling applied to all
jurors of the Roman Catholic faith, without reference to their
residence or to any close afﬁliation with the local church.
Has every person of the Roman Catholic faith in the diocese
pecuniary interest, of which
of the bishop of Springﬁeld
the court can take notice, in every church owned by the de
,4
fendant in every part of the diocese?
opinion that
he has no_t_.__ It does not appear, and we have noaiieason to
suppose, that every Roman Catholic living in a remote part
small loss or
of the diocese can be affected pecuniarily by
gain of the bishop as owner, in connection with the erection
Roman Catholic church in Easthampton.
of
Under the St. 1898, c. 368, the defendant's holding of prop
erty
“for the religious and charitable purposes of the Ro
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man Catholic Church.” In the R. L. c. 36, sec. 44-46, it is
strongly implied that there is a difference in the trusts, and in
the beneﬁciaries, among churches in different places, and that
the members of a particular parish and those directly con
nected with the church therein have different pecuniary rela
tions to the church there from those of the same faith who
Upon the record
live in a different part of the same diocese.
before
this ruling of the judge appears to be wrong. See
'0.
Burdine
Grand Lodge of Alabama, 37 Ala. 478; Delaware
Lodge 'v. Allmon, 1 Penn. (Del.) 160.
The remaining question is whether the error was preju
dicial to the legal rights of the defendant.
The Inanner of
impaneling jurors is prescribed by the R. L. c. 176, sec. 25.
The names of those summoned as jurors are written on bal
lots and placed in a box, and, after the ballots are shaken up,
the clerk draws them one by one in succession until twelve
Apart from challenges, “the twelve men so
are- drawn.
drawn * "‘ * shall be the jury to try the issue,” etc. The
order of the judge was a violation of the statutory provision,
and of the defendant’s right to have the excluded men sit as
jurors unless challenged by the plaintiff.
The case was tried by other qualiﬁed jurors, and it is ar
gued that the defendant was not injured by the order. Under
the R. L. c. 176, sec. 32, no irregularity in the drawing, sum
moning, returning or impaneling of jurors is sufficient to set
aside the verdict, unless the objecting party was injured
thereby. In general it may be assumed that all duly qualiﬁed
jurors, against whom there cannot be a successful challenge
for cause, will consider and try a case properly. But a man
may have affiliations and friendships or prejudices and hab
its of thought which would be likely to lead him to look more
favorably for the plaintiff, or less favorably for him, upon a
case of a particular class, or upon one brought by a particu
lar person or a member of a particular class of persons, than
would the average juror, even though his peculiarities are
not sufficiently pronounced to disqualify him for service. It
is in reference to these peculiarities that the parties are given
While they have
a limited number of peremptory challenges.
no direct right of selection, this right of peremptory chal
lenge gives to each party a restricted opportunity for choice
among qualiﬁed persons. _A_nyt.hing_which, renders this statu
tory right of peremptory challenge materially less valuable
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is an

injury to a party, within the
We do not inﬁmate tlfafany juror would consciously allow
feelings of friendship or prejudice, or unusual and peculiar
habits of thought, to affect his conduct in the jury room;
much less that a party has a right to have the beneﬁt of the
peculiar views or special feelings of a particular juror in the
trial of his case. But the right of peremptory challenge in
the impaneling of jurors cannot be disregarded as of no value
to the parties. In the case at bar, a class of persons qualiﬁed
as jurors, whom the plaintiff thought in such relations of re
ligious affiliation with the defendant that they would be likely
to hear his defense in an attitude of special friendship, was
withdrawn from the list of jurors. The order of the judge
rejecting these men, at the request of the plaintiff, gave him
at the outset an additional power of choice, and made his
right of peremptory challenge relatively more valuable, while
the defendant's similar right was made relatively less valu
able. We are of opinion that this was an injury to the de
fendant which entitles him to a new trial. The number of
persons summoned as jurors that belonged to this class does
not appear. It only appears that the names of two of them
happened to be drawn from the box.
Our decision seems to be in accordance with the weight of
authority, although some of the cases depend upon local stat
utes. Hildreth v. Troy, 101 N. Y. 234; Welch '0. Tribune Pub
lishing Co., 83 Mich. 661; Scranton 12. Gore, 124 Penn. St.
595; Montague 12. Commonwealth, 10 Gratt. 767; Kunneen v.
State, 96 Ga. 406; Bell v. State, 115 Ala. 25; Danzey v. State,
126 Ala. 15.
"
‘ ‘ Whether an error of law like that in the present
case, if it arose only in determining the qualiﬁcations of a
single juror, should be held so far to injure an objecting
party as to require the verdict to be set aside, we do not ﬁnd
it necessary to determine; but when, as in the present case,
the ruling applies to a class of persons, we feel constrained
to say that there was an injury of which the law should take
notice.

Exceptions sustained.
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Appellate Court'of Indiana.
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1909.

Indiana Appellate, 642.
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MYERS, .—Action by appellant to recover damages for per
sonal injuries alleged to have been sustained by him while in
the service of appellee. The issues were formed by the com
plaint and answer of general denial. The cause was tried by
judgment
a jury and
verdict returned for appellee. From
in favor of appellee appellant has appealed to this court, as
signing as error the overruling of his motion for
new trial.
The reasons assigned in support of the motion relate solely
to the -action of the court in sustaining the objections of ap
pellee to certain questions, propounded by appellant to the
persons called to act as jurors, touching their competency and
qualiﬁcations so to act. These questions called for informa
tion as to whether they were acquainted with any of the offi
cers or agents of the Travelers Insurance Company. whether
any of them ever had any business relations with that com
pany, whether they were then or ever had been the agents or
in the employ of that company, or whether they were then ac
Preliminary to
quainted with any agent of that company?
these questions appellant offered to introduce evidence to the
court tending to show that the Travelers Insurance Company
was interested in the result of the suit, and this offer was re
fused.
From the objections made to the various questions pro
pounded by appellant to each of the jurors, and from the rul
appears that the
ings of the court as disclosed by the record,
court proceeded upon the theory that, as appellee was the only
defendant of record, the latitude of appellant’s inquiry did
not extend to elicit the suggested information.
The matter of impaneling jury must, to great extent, be
left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and only in
clearly shown will
cases where an abuse of that discretion
judgment
disturb
the
of that court.
tribunals
appellate
Courts of last resort having to do with questions, in principle,
not unlike the one here presented, with almost one accord,
have held that where parties are acting in good faith consid
com
erable latitude should be allowed along lines touching the
_ ,1. __ ._ ___.‘_._
.
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petency of persons called as jurors to
investigation, as al%‘for the purpose of furnishing a basis
upon which the court and parties may proceed intelligently,
to the end that a fair and impartial jury may be obtained.

t

$

i

In M. O’C0nn0r & C0.

Gillaspy (1908), 170 Ind. 428, it is
said: “Parties litigant in cases of this class are entitled to a
trial by a thoroughly impartial jury, and have a right to make
such preliminary inquiries of the jurors as may seem reason
ably necessary to show their impartiality and disinterested
ness. In the exercise of this right counsel must be allowed
some latitude, to be regulated in the sound discretion of the
trial court, according to the nature and attendant circum
The examination of jurors
stances of each particular case.
on their _'v_0ir_dz'J;e is not only for the purpose of exposing
grounds of challenge for cause, if any exist, but also to elicit
such facts as will enable counsel to exercise their right of
peremptory challenge intelligently. Questions addressed to
this en_d are not barred though directed to matters not in
issue, provided they are pertinent, and made in good faith. It
does not appear from the record that an accident or indem
nity insurance company was in any manner interested in this
action, but the laws of this state authorize the incorporation
of companies for indemnifying employers against liability for
accidental injuries to employes, and it is a matter of common
knowledge that numerous companies are engaged in such in
surance in this State.”
In the case at bar the Travelers Insurance Company was
not a party to the record, and for aught that appears from the
complaint was not interested in the result of the suit, but the
record shows that appellant offered to introduce evidence to
the court tending to show that it was present in court by
hired counsel actively engaged in defending the action; and
that it had issued a policy of insurance to appellee. This evi
dence was admissible only in the discretion of the court, and
for its sole use in determining counsel’s good faith in pursu
ing the inquiry. Therefore, meeting the question, does the
record before us show a.n abuse of that discretion lodged with
the trial court as will authorize this court to set aside the
judgment? Limiting our inquiry to the particular informa
tion desired by appellant, as indicated by the questions pro
pounded to each juror, and to which objections were sus
'v.
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tained, it seems to us quite clear that the questions should
For, in case the insurance coinpany
have been answered.
was pecuniarily interested in the litigation, a person in its
employ or otherwise interested in it, naturally would be more
liable to be unduly inﬂuenced to grant an advantage on the
side of his employer or in the protection of a private interest
than one having a single purpose—-returning
a verdict ac
"
"‘
cording to the law and the evidence.
The weight of authority affirms the right of parties to ex
amine persons called as jurors on their coir dire, as counsel
sought to do in this case.
He was denied that right. The
information indicated ‘by the questions does not appear in the
record as having been furnished in any other manner.
Whether any or all of the jurors who tried the case had any
interest in the insurance company, which counsel for appel
lant offered to show to the court was ﬁnancially interested in
The action of
the result of the litigation, nowhere appears.
the court in refusing to permit counsel for appellant to ex
amine the persons called as jurors along the line suggested in
this opinion was error, and, in the absence of a showing that
it was harmless, entitled appellant to reversal of the judg
ment without ﬁrst showing that some disqualiﬁed juror sat
‘ "
in the case.

'

'

Judgment reversed."
58 Statutory restrictions.
In some states the character and scope ot
See Com
the questions to be asked a juror are prescribed by statute.
v. Warner, (1899) 173 Mass. 541, 54 N. E. 353; Common
monwealth
wealth v. Poisson. (1893) 157 Mass. 510, 32 N. E. 906; State v. Bethum,
(1910) 86 S. C. 143, 67 S. E. 466: State v. Roberts, (1910) (Del.) 78 Atl.
305; Woolfoik v. State, (1890) 85 Ga. 69. 11 S. E. 814.
In Massachusetts the court shall examine the jurors or permit the
parties or attorneys to do so under its direction.——R. S. 1902, Ch. 176,
Sec. 28.
In South Carolina the examination must be by the court on motion
And the same rule prevails
of either party,—1 Code 1902, Sec. 2944.
Code 1907, Sec. 7270.
in Alabama.-3
In Georgia, in trials for felony, any juror may be put on his coir dire
2 Code, 1911, Sec.
and four statutory questions put to him.
1001.

-
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STEWART.

England.

18./,5.

Cox’s Criminal Cases, 174.

it

it

it

it

a

l.,

a

The prisoners were indicted for larceny, under the follow
ing circumstances: They passed for husband and wife, and
having taken
house at Tunbridge Wells, Mrs. Stewart went
to the shop of the prosecutor, selected the goods in question
to the amount of 10
and ordered them to be sent to her
home. The prosecutor accordingly despatched the goods by
one Davies, and gave him strict injunctions not to leave them
without receiving the price. Davies, on arriving at the house,
told the two prisoners he was instructed not to leave the
goods without the money, or an equivalent.
After vain at
tempt on the part of K. Stewart to induce Davies to let him
have the property on the promise of payment on the morrow,
he, Stewart, wrote out a cheque for the amount of the bill
to Davies, requesting him not to present
until
and gave
Bank,
day.
It
was
drawn
on
the
London
Joint
Stock
the next
Prince’s street, London, and Davies having left the goods, re
It was presented
turned with the cheque to his employers.
was dis
at the bank, in London, the next morning, when
proved,
of
effects.
It
was
also
that al
honoured for want
though the prisoner had opened an account at the said Bank,
had been some time before overdrawn, and several of his

I

is

I

a

B.-It

is

a

a

At the com
cheques had been subsequently dishonoured.
juryman
case,
and as each
came into the
mencement of the
box,
C. JONES, Serjt., for the prisoners, asked him whether he
certain association for the prosecution of
member of
was
committing
frauds upon tradesmen.
parties
Clarlcson and Bremridge, for the prosecution, objected to
this proceeding.
ALDERSON,
quite a new course to catechise a jury
in this way.
right, my lord, to challenge, and
Jones, Serjt.—I have
submit that am entitled to ask for information that
neces
sary to enable me effectively to exercise that right. At all
events, your lordship will perhaps intimate to the jury, that
such of them as are members of this association had better
retire from the box.
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B.—I cannot allow you to cross-examine

the
jury, nor will I intimate to them any thing on the subject you
mention.
If you like to challenge absolutely you may do so.

i i
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5'1 The same practice obtain-s in Canada, Justice William R. Riddell, of
Ontario says:—-"I have never, in thirty years’ experience, seen it take
more than half an hour to get a jury even in a. murder case, and never
but once heard a juryman asked a question."
The Courts of Ontario, 64
Univ. of Penn. L. Rev. 17, 32.

POINTER

v.

UNITED STATES.

Supreme Court of United States.
151

1894.

United States, 896.

J. At

1

Q

I

#

i

#

#

i
l

Q

the February term, 1892, of the Circuit
Court of the United States for the Western District of
Arkansas, the grand jury returned an indictment against
John Pointer for the crime of murder.
HARLAN,

y

/by

it

it

j

a

a

The entire panel of the petit jury was called and the jurors
were examined as to their qualiﬁcations, and, the journal en
try states, thirty-seven in number were found to be generally
qualiﬁed under the law, that is, in the words of the bill of ex
ceptions, “qualiﬁed to sit on this case." The defendant and
list of the
the government were then furnished, each, with
thirty-seven jurors thus selected, that they might make their
respective challenges, twenty by the defendant and ﬁve by the
government, the remaining ﬁrst twelve names, not chal
lenged, to constitute the trial jury. The defendant at the
ury: “1st, because
time objected to this mode of selecting
according
prescribed
by the laws of the
the
rule
to
was not
was not the rule practiced
State of Arkansas, 2d because
courts;
3d, because the defendant could not
common law
know the particular Jurors before whom he would be tried
until after his challenges, as guaranteed by the statutes of the
United States, had been exhausted 4th because the go\ ern
before whom
ment did not tender to the defendant the jui
he was to be tried, but tendered seventeen men instead of
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twelve, and made it impossible for defendant to know who the
twelve men before whom he was to be tried were until after
his right to challenge was ended.”
At the time this objection was made the defendant’s coun
sel saved an exception to the mode pursued in forming the
jury, and said: “The point we make is, that the government
must offer us the twelve men they want to try the case." The
“They offered you thirty-seven.” “We un
court observed:
derstand," counsel said, “but we want to save that point.”

he cannot be compelled to make

a

a

4

;”

3

a

is

is

a

given number of jurors without
The right to challenge
showing cause
one of the most important of the rights se
cured to the accused. “The end of challenge,” says Coke, “is
to have an indifferent trial, and which is required by law; and
to bar the party indicted of his lawful challenge
to bar him
principal matter concerning his trial.”
of
Inst. 27, c. 2.
He may, if he chooses, peremptorily challenge “on his own
dislike, without showing any cause
he may exercise that
right without reason or for no reason, arbitrarily and capri
Bl. Com. 353; Lewis v. United States,
ciously, Co. Lit. 156 b;
jury that
146 U. S. 376. Any system for theempanelling of
prevents or embarrasses the full, unrestricted exercise by the
accused of that right, must be condemned. And, therefore,
peremptory

challenge un

brought face to face, in the presence of.~the
til
court, with each proposed juror, and an opportunity given
required
for such inspection and examination of him as
for the due administration of justice.
‘Were his rights in these respects impaired or their exer
cise embarrassed by what took place at the trial? We think
not. The jurors legally summoned for service on the petit
jury were, as we have seen, examined in his presence as to
their qualiﬁcations, and thirty-seven were ascertained, upon
such examination, to be qualiﬁed to sit in the case. Both the
accused and the government had ample opportunity, as this
is

he has been

examination progressed, to have any juror who was disquali
A list of all those found
ﬁed, rcjected altogether for cause.
law,
subject to challenge for
the
and
not
under
qualiﬁed
be
to
cause, was furnished to the accused and to the government,
each side being required to make their challenges at the same
time, and having notice from the court that the ﬁrst twelve
unchallenged would constitute the jury for the trial of the
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It is apparent, from the record, that the persons name-.1
in the list so furnished were all brought face to face with the
prisoner before he was directed to make, and while he was
making his peremptory challenges.
Was the prisoner entitled, of right, to have the government
make its peremptory challenges ﬁrst, that he might be in
formed, before making his challenges, what names had been
stricken from the list by the prosecutor?
In some jurisdic
tions it is required by statute that the challenge to the juror
case.

shall be made by the State before he is passed to the defend
ant for rejection or acceptance. Such is the law of Arkansas,
and the court below was at liberty to pursue that method.
Mansﬁeld’s Digest, sec. 2242. And such is regarded by some
courts as the better practice, even where no particular mode
of challenge is prescribed by statute. State v. Cummings, 5
La. Ann. 330, 332. But as no such provision is embodied in
any act of Congress, it was not bound by any settled rule of
criminal law to pursue the particular method required by the
local law. The uniform practice in England, as appears from
the observations of Mr. Justice Abbott, afterwards Lord
Tenterden, in Brandeth's Case, 32 Howell's St. Tr. 755, was
to require the accused to exercise his right of challenge before
calling upon the government. He said: “Having attended, I
believe, more trials of this kind than any other of the judges,
I would state that the uniform practice has been that the
juryman was presented to the prisoner or his counsel, that
they might have a view of his person; then the officer of the
court looked ﬁrst to the counsel for the prisoner to know
whether they wished to challenge him; he then turned to the
counsel for the crown to know whether they challenged him.”
In the same case, Lord Chief Baron Richards said
p. 771.
he
conceived
it to be clear that “it is according to the
that
practice of the courts that the prisoner should ﬁrst declare
Mr. Justice Dallas
p. 774.
his resolution as to challenging.”
expressed his concurrence in those views. pp. 774, 775. But
the general rule is, that where the subject is not controlled by
statute, the order in which peremptory challenges shall be ex
Commonwealth 'v.
ercised is in the discretion of the court.
Piper, 120 Mass. 185; Turpin '0. State, 55 Maryland, 464;
Jones '0. State, 2 Blackford, 475; State 12. Hays, 23 Missouri,
287; State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 406; State u. Shelledy, 8 Iowa,
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(Law), 407;

v. State, 20 Ohio St. 233.

In some jurisdictions the mode pursued in the challenging
of jurors is for the accused and the government to make their
peremptory challenges as each juror, previously ascertained
to be qualiﬁed and not subject to be challenged for cause, is
presented for challenge or acceptance. But it is not essential
that this mode should be adopted. In Regina v. Frost, 9 Car.
& P. 129, 137, (1839), the names of jurors were taken from
the ballot-box, and each was sworn on the 'v0ir dire as to his
qualiﬁcations before being sworn to try. When the govern
ment peremptorily challenged one who had been sworn on the
voir dire as to his qualiﬁcations, it was objected that the chal
lenge came too late, because the juror had taken the book into
his hand to be sworn to try. In disposing of this objection
Chief Justice Tindal said: “The rule is that challenges must
be made as the jurors come to the book and before they are
sworn. The moment the oath be begun it is too late, and the
oath is begun by the juror taking the book, having been di
rected by the officer of the court to do so. If the juror takes
the book without authority, neither party wishing to chal
lenge is to be prejudiced thereby.”
These observations, it is
apparent, had reference only to the question whether a per
emptory challenge could be permitted after the juror had, in
fact, taken the book into his hand for the purpose of being
sworn to try. At most, in connection with the report of the
case, they tend to show that the practice in England. as in
some of the States, was to have the question of peremptory
challenge as to each juror, sworn on his roir dire and found
to be free from legal objection, determined as to him before
another juror is examined as to his qualiﬁcations.
But there
is no suggestion by any of the judges in Frost’s case that that
mode was the only one that could be pursued without embar
rassing the accused in the exercise of his right of challenge.
The authority of the Circuit Courts of the United States to
deal with the subject of empanelling juries in criminal cases,
by rules of their own, was recognized in Lewis v. United
States, subject to the condition that such rules must be
adapted to secure all the rights of the accused. 146 U. S. 379.
We cannot say that the mode pursued in the court below,
although different from that prescribed by the laws of
Arkansas, was in derogation of the right of peremptory chal
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lenge belonging to the accused. He was given, by the statute,
the right of peremptorily challenging twenty jurors.
That
right was accorded to him. Being required to make all of his
peremptory challenges at one time, he was entitled to have a
full list of jurors upon which appeared the names of such as
had been examined under the direction of the court and in
his presence, and found to be qualiﬁed to sit on the case.
Such a list was furnished to him, and he was at liberty to
strike from it the whole number allowed by the statute, with
knowledge that the ﬁrst twelve on the list, not challenged by
either side, would constitute the jury. And after it was as
certained, in this mode, who would constitute the trial jury, it
was within the discretion of the court to permit them to be
again examined before being sworn to try.
But no such
suggested,
course was
and the record discloses no reason why
a further examination was necessary in order to secure an
impartial jury. The right of peremptory challenge, this court
said, in United States o. Marchant, 12 Wheat. 480, 482, and in
Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, 71, is not of itself a right to
select, but a right to reject, jurors.
It is true that, under the method pursued in this case, it
might occur that the defendant would strike from the list the
But that cir
same persons stricken off by the government.
cumstances does not change the fact that the accused was at
liberty to exclude from the jury all, to the number of twenty,
who, for any reason, or without reason, were objectionable to
him. No injury was done if the government united with him
in excluding particular persons from the jury. He was not
entitled, of right, to know, in advance, what jurors would be
excluded by the government in the exercise of its right of
He was only entitled, of right, to
peremptory challenge.
twenty
from the list of impartial jnrymen
the
names
of
strike
furnished him by the court. If upon that list appeared the
name of one who was subject to legal objection, the facts in
respect to that juror should have been presented in such form
that they could be passed upon by this court. But it does not
appear that any objection of that character was made, or
could have been made, to any of the thirty-seven jurors found,
upon examination, to be qualiﬁed.
Thus, in our opinion, the essential right of challenge to
which the defendant was entitled was fully recognized. And
there is no reason to suppose that he was not tried by an im
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partial jury.

The objection that the government should have
tendered to him the twelve jurors whom it wished to try the
case, or that he was entitled to know before making his chal
lenges the names of the jurors by whom it was proposed to
try him, must mean that the government should have been re
quired to exhaust all of its peremptory challenges before he
peremptorily challenged any juror. This objection is unsup
ported by the authorities, and cannot be sustained upon any
sound principle.
#

#

i i

U
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Q
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¥

We perceive no error in the record to the prejudice of the
substantial rights of the plaintiff in error.
Judgment aﬁirmed.
v
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STATE
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v.

MYERS.

Supreme Court of Missouri.
198

1906.

Missouri, 225.

J

“De)

GANTT, . * * *
2.
It is next insisted that the court erred in overruling the
defendant’s challenge to the Jurors Lancaster, Golden, Cos
sett, Borgnier, Wharton, Miller, Soper and Capps for the rea
son that the said jurors on their voir dire examination testi
ﬁed that they had formed opinions as to the guilt or innocence
of the defendant from having read a copy of the confession
of Frank Hottman published in the Kansas City newspapers.
To this assignment of error the State makes two answers:
First, no speciﬁc ground of challenge was stated by the de
fendant to either or all of said jurors; * ‘ * The record
discloses that upon the close of the examination of each of thc
said jurors, the defendant made the general challenge,
fendant challenged this juror;” no speciﬁc ground of chal
lenge was given in either case. Were the challenges sufficient
to preserve the error now complained of for review by this
court? In Kansas City v. Smart, 128 Mo. l. c. 290, it was
said: “The grounds of challenge to a juror must be stated
when it is oifered and tested on his voir dire. The trial court
is entitled to know the reason for the challenge.
(State v
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Brownﬁeld, 83 Mo. 453, 454; Thompson & Merriam on Juries,
sec. 253, and cases cited; 1 Thompson on Trials, sec. 98.)” In
State v. Taylor, 134 Mo. 142, Judge Sherwood, speaking for
this court, reviewed the authorities on this point and said:
“"‘
" Nothing is better settled than that challenges for
*
cause must be speciﬁcally stated. The particular cause must
be set forth.
(People 12. Reynolds, 16 Cal. 128; Mann v.
Glover, 14 N. J. L. 195; Powers v. Presgroves, 38 Miss. 227;
Southern Paciﬁc Co. 12. Rauh, 49 Fed. 696; Drake v. State, 20
Atl. 747; 2 Elliott’s Gen. Prac., sec. 530, and other cases there
The facts constituting the cause of complaint were
cited.)
not given in this instance; the challenge simply amounted to
the statement of a legal conclusion.
The rule should be the
same here as it is where general objections are taken to the
evidence, that it is incompetent, immaterial, etc., and where it
is held that general objections amount to nothing more than
saying, ‘I object.’ Indeed, there seem to be more cogent rea
sons why speciﬁc objections should be urged in a case of this
sort, where the question is as to the admission of a juryman,
than where it is as to the admission of a piece of evidence.
At any rate, in either case, fairness to the court and to ad
verse counsel alike demand the grounds of the challenge for
cause to be particularly set forth.” * "‘ "
Counsel for the defendant, however, insists that in this case
the ground of the challenge was so apparent to the court and
the opposite counsel that they could not have been misled as to
the ground of the challenge. We are unable to concur in this
view. These jurors had been fully examined as to their com
petency, and among other things as to their opinions formed
If the objection was in
from reading newspaper reports.
tended to be based speciﬁcally upon the ground of opinions
formed or expressed, it should have been so stated and tho
matter properly preserved for our review.
*

IF

#

i i i i

*

IF

1

The judgment of the Circuit Court must be and is afﬁrmed,
and the sentence which the law pronounces is directed to be
carried into execution.
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STATE.

upreme Court of Indiana.
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347

1909.

Indiana, 393.

J

Appellant was convicted on an indictment
.
charging him and another with conspiring for the purpose
and with the intent unlawfully, feloniously and designedly to
defraud the Adams Express Company. "' * *
The questions sought to be presented arise upon alleged er
ror in refusing the peremptory challenge of a juror on his
'v01'r dire, and in giving instructions.
The evidence is not in
the record. A bill of exceptions discloses that in impaneling
MYERS,

the jury, when the jury had been passed back to the defend
ant’s counsel for re-examination for the third time, and de
fendant had used but three peremptory challenges, being en
titled to ten, the defendant peremptorily challenged a juror
who had been in the jury box from the time the impaneling of
the jury began, and the challenge was disallowed, “for the
reason that, under a rule of said court, which had been in
existence for many years, the defendant’s peremptory chal
lenge was made too late,” said rule was stated by the court at
“That each side, the defendant and the
the time as follows:
State, is entitled to examine each juror twice, and challenge,
if desired, but cannot challenge a juror after the jury has
been passed twice with each juror in the box.
Said rule is
an oral rule, and is not entered in the records of the court, but
It is further
has been regularly enforced for many years.”
recited that the defendant and his attorney, at the time of the
challenge, did not know of the rule, but they did not inform
the court on being advised of such rule that either or both of
them were ignorant of it, and did not ask that it be suspended.
nor that an exception be made to its enforcement. on account
We think it quite clear that there can
of such ignorance.
properly be no such thing as an oral rule of a court. Rules
of court, when legally adopted and promulgated, have the
Sec. 1443, Burns 1908, sec. 1323 R.
effect of positive laws.
1;.
Billings
(1899), 152 Ind. 177; State 1'.
Magnuson
1881;
S.
Van Cleave (1902), 157 Ind. 608; Smith '0. State, ex rel.
(1894), 137 Ind. 198; 11 Cyc. 742.
They ought not only to be formally promulgated, but they
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should be deﬁnitely stated, which could not be true of a prac
tice reposing solely in the breast of a judge. They should be
published and made known in some permanent form, so that
they might be known to all. The so-called rule was clearly
not a rule at all, and binding upon no one—-clearly not upon
one who has no notice of it.
The statutory provision (sec.
2099 Burns 1908, Acts 1905, pp. 584, 634, sec. 228), is as fol
lows: “In prosecutions for capital offenses, the defendant
may challenge, peremptorily, twenty jurors; in prosecutions
for offenses punishable by imprisonment in the state prison,
ten jurors; in other prosecutions, three jurors.
When sev
eral defendants are tried together, they must join in their
challenges.
Irrespective of the so-called rule, was appellant denied a
statutory right? No provision is made by statute nor by rule
as to how or when the right shall be exercised, and it is
claimed by appellant that it may be done at any time until
In some jurisdictions the passing of a
the jury is sworn.
juror after he has been examined, tendered to and accepted
by the other party, is a waiver of the right to challenge. In
others, the right to challenge is in the sound discretion of the
court. In others, a party who accepts a juror with knowledge
of an objection waives the objection, but if a cause of objec
tion is afterward discovered it is not waived, unless he is
guilty of negligence in not discovering the objection. 24 Cyz.
There is no showing made that appellant did not
322, 323.
know from the beginning the grounds for the peremptory
challenge, and he stands here upon the bare proposition that
he was entitled to the challenge in any event, without offering
any excuse to the court, or making any request for exemption
Had any request for ex
or relief from the local practice.
emption upon the ground that the so-called rule was void, or
that the appellant or his counsel had no knowledge of it, been
made, or if any reason were shown why the juror twice
passed by appellant as satisfactory had been discovered to be
unacceptable,‘ a different question would be presented, for, in
dependently of the so-called rule, appellant shows no ground
for relief from his own act and acquiescence.
We think it cannot be said that the right of challenge is de
nied where it is restricted to a deﬁned number of opportu
nities for challenge, nor that there must be a deﬁnite rule ﬁx
ing the time when, or the manner in which, it must be exer
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cised, for we think it may be controlled either by a ﬁxed rule,
or by any reasonable limitation imposed in any speciﬁc case,
so long as the right of peremptory challenge is not taken
away; in other words, that, when reasonable opportunity is
given to challenge, the spirit of the statute is complied with,
and that it does not mean that the right is an open one at all
times until the jury is sworn, irrespective of all else; that
there is no good reason why there may be speculation as to
what the opposite party may do, and the jury passed back
ward and forward to await the action of the adversary; that
the statute means that when the jury is passed to a party he
must challenge peremptorily if he would challenge, in the
absence of an after-arising condition, and that, when the op
portunity was twice given, as here, and not exercised, a party
cannot complain, unless new conditions arise, calling for an
exception to, or relaxation of, the practice or the order in the
particular case, and that if a given practice, not rising to the
dignity of a rule, is invoked, as here, one to be exempt from
its operation, on account of his ignorance of it, must season
ably apply to be relieved from its operation. At common law
no challenge to the array or panel could be made until the full
jury was present. 1 Chitty, Crim. Law (4th Am. ed.), ‘544.
Our statute (sec. 2101 Burns 1908, Acts 1905, pp. 584, 634,
sec. 230), was evidently adopted with this practice in mind,
and the right to challenge contemplated the right to challenge
as the panel thus full stood, or as it might stand, and not that
the right should be one arising out of indeﬁnitely passing the
jury as acceptable.
In State v. Potter (1846), 18 Conn. 166, a talesman was
called and examined by the counsel for defendant as to his
bias, or for cause of challenge, and no objection appearing
the court informed defendant's counsel that they could chal
lenge him peremptorily. They declined to exercise the right
at that time, as the panel was not full, and after it was full
they challenged the juror peremptorily, and the court in
quired whether any cause then existed which did not exist
They answered in the
when they ﬁrst declined the right.
challenge
negative, and the court held that the
came too late,
“
and this ruling was upheld.
Where, upon impaneling a jury, the judge announced that
he would require the defendant to make his challenges as he
desired, to each juror as called, it was held not error to re

' '
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fuse a peremptory challenge after the juror was sworn and
accepted, and it was held that, when there was a fair oppor
tunity to interpose a peremptory challenge, the defendant
cannot complain of a refusal to be allowed the further exer
cise of the right. People v. Carpenter (1886), 102 N. Y. 238,

N. E. 584.
We are not unaware that in the earlier cases in this State
and in other states it is held that the right of challenge con
tinues up to the swearing of the jury, but we are unable to
perceive that any substantial right of a defendant is invaded
when an opportunity for challenge of the full numbers is af
forded and it is not availed of up to the time the jury is
The object to be attained is an impartial jury, and
sworn.
while the right of peremptory challenge is an absolute one, it
is not, we think, so far so that it may be exercised under all
If, by the introduction of new men upon the
conditions.
panel, a cause for challenge should arise—such as the coming
on of a person at such enmity to one already passed that they
could not work in harmony, or the introduction of anything
which might prejudice the right of a defendant—he would
have a clear right to exercise his preference, and challenge
the man already acceptable, rather than the new man, and the
right would thus be preserved until the full panel is complete
He has a right to a full panel to begin
and the jury sworn.
with, the right of canvass and comparison among jurors, and
if his full right of challenge is preserved, within the line here
indicated, it is practically a right of peremptory challenge un
til the jury is sworn, but it does not follow that the opportu
nity must be open under all circumstances or conditions, for
it is a right which may be waived. Neither do we understand
that the rule here declared is in conﬂict with the earlier hold
ings of the court, which upon examination are found to be
general declarations as to the right of peremptory challenge
extending until the jury is sworn, and did not involve any
question of practice as to the mode of conducting the impanel
ing of juries, and of exercising the right of challenge, or of
the right and power of courts to direct the manner of its ex
ercise. * * * No reversible error is shown, and the judg
ment is affirmed."
6

58 Order
"The right to challenge jurors is one given
of challenges.
Until the
and secured by law, and cannot be taken away by the court.
challenges to which a party is entitled under the statutes are exhausted,
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The juror is ﬁrst challenged
the right extends to every juror called.
for cause, either actual or implied bias; then peremptorily. In civil
challenges.
actions, each party is entitled to three péreniptory
G. S.
1894, § 5370.
The usual practice in the selection of a jury in such
actions is to require the peremptory challenges to be made by the parties
alternately, one at a time, beginning with defendant."
v.
Swanson
Mendenhall, (1900)

/1

80

5.

Supreme

Minn.

56, 82

N. W.

v.

1093.

CADY.

s'rA'rE

Judicial Court of Maine.
80

1888.

Maine, 418.

PETERS, C. J. Two respondents were arraigned together
under a joint liquor indictment, having the same counsel to
answer for them. The judge allowed each respondent two
peremptory challenges in impaneling the jury, and when one
respondent in person challenged a juror, the other disputed
the challenge, claiming that he had a right to have the chal
lenged juror on the panel. ‘One respondent accepted and the
other rejected the juror.
The judge accorded to them two challenges each, while they
were entitled to two jointly, and no more. In capital cases
each prisoner, under a joint trial, is entitled to his personal
challenges.
The statute in that case-prescribes that “each
In all other criminal cases it is
person” shall be so entitled.
“the party” that is entitled to the two challenges. If they do
not agree upon the persons to be objected to. they lose their
challenges.
The presumption is, where respondents in crim
inal cases, not lately capital, consent to be tried together, or
where the judge in his discretion orders a joint trial, that
their interests are alike, and differences between them are
uncalled for. By R. S., c. 134, sec. 20, it is provided that is
sues in fact in criminal cases not capital, shall be tried by a
jury drawn and returned in the same manner, and challenges
shall be allowed, as in civil cases. By R. S., ch. 82, sec. 74, it
is provided that in civil cases, and criminal cases not capital,
“each party” is entitled to two peremptory challenges when
a jury is impanelled by lot.
Al
lowing challenges without cause is a merely statute right, not
Where defendants are nu
to be extended by construction.

~on.
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merous, if each had personal challenges, it would require the
presence of an impracticable number of jurors.
This ques
tion is settled by several authorities. State v. Reed, 47 N. H.
466; Stone in Segur, 11 Allen, 568; State v. Sutton, 10 R. I.
159.
These cases show that several respondents are but one
party, and are entitled to no more challenges than one defend
ant. But if in his discretion, the judge extended a greater
privilege than the statute concedes, neither respondent is in
a position to complain of it. We have held in Snow 11. Weeks,
75 Maine, 105, that to a ruling of a judge, in excusing or re
jecting a juryman, exceptions will not lie. It is there said:
“He may put off a juror when there is no real and substantial
cause for it. That cannot legally injure an objecting party
as long as an unexceptionable jury is ﬁnally obtained.
He
may put a legal juror off. He cannot allow an illegal juror to
go on.” This question was exhaustively and learnedly exam
ined in a case of piracy, United States v. Marchant, 12 Wheat.
480, in which Judge Story maintains the same doctrine, and
he there says:
“The right of peremptory challenge is not of
right
to select but a right to reject jurors.”
He fur
itself a
ther remarks that the right “enables the prisoner to say who
shall not try him, but not to say who shall be the particular
persons who shall try him.”
#

~i
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Q
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Exceptions overruled.
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THEOBALD

v.

ST. LOUIS TRANSIT CO.

Supreme Court of Missouri.
191

J

1905.

Missouri, 395.

MARSHALL,
.—This is an action for $5,000 damages aris
ing from the death of the plaintiff's nineteen year old son,
about six o'clock in the afternoon on the 20th of January,
1903, caused by one of the defendant’s cars colliding with the
rear of a wagon driven by the deceased, at a point seventy to
one hundred ﬁfty feet west of Union avenue on De Givervillc
avenue, in the city of St. Louis. There was a verdict and
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judgment for the plaintiff for $5,000, and the defendant ap
pealed.
ll

I i

Q

II

$

I

C

Q

Q

I.
The ﬁrst error assigned is the ruling of the trial court in
overruling the challenge for cause of the jurors Hartman and
Bensberg.

i

Brieﬂy stated the facts developed upon the voir dire were,
that eight or nine years before the trial the juror Hartman
had been thrown off of a car. He stated that that fact would
inﬂuence him in the trial of this cause.
He also stated that
he would be governed by the testimony and instructions of the
court, and believed that he could render an impartial verdict;
that he had nothing against this defendant, but that he had
during all those years entertained a prejudice against street
car companies, and that that prejudice existed when he was
ﬁrst examined as to his qualiﬁcations for a juror, but that
during the examination, that prejudice had been removed,
and that he had reached the conclusion within the last ﬁve
minutes that he could try this case impartially.
The juror Bensberg testiﬁed that he had a sort of a preju
dice against the company, and that he did not think it would
inﬂuence his verdict as a juror, yet added, “But still a person
having a prejudice, that would probably unconsciously bias
his opinion.” “ “‘ "‘
Under our system of jurisprudence there is no feature of
a trial more important and more necessary to the pure and
just administration of the law than that every litigant shall
be accorded a fair trial before a jury of his countrymen, who
enter upon the trial totally disinterested and wholly unpreju
diced. Where a juror admits, as Hartman did, that he had a
prejudice against street car companies of eight or ten years
standing, and that that prejudice existed up to the time he
gave his ﬁrst answer upon his voir dire, yet after being ex
amined and cross-examined by counsel and the court. and be
ing put in the position of having to say he would allow that
prejudice to overcome the obligation of his oath as a juror, or
on the other hand to say that he could divest his mind of such
a prejudice and fairly try a case, and that the prejudice had
become dissipated within the last ﬁve minutes, it can scarcely
be reasonably said that such a juror ﬁlls_ the requirements of
our system of jurisprudence.
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The juror Bensberg more candidly and accurately stated
the conditions existing in such cases when he said: “Well, zi
person having a prejudice, that would probably unconsciously
bias his opinion.” The truth of this statement is self-evident.
The question of the qualiﬁcation of a juror is a question to be
decided by the court, and not one to be decided by a juror
*
“" * It is proper to examine a juror as to the
himself.
nature, character and cause of his prejudice or bias, but it is
not proper to permit the juror, who admits the existence in
his mind of such prejudice or bias, to determine whether or
not he can or cannot, under his oath, render an impartial ver
dict. Such a course permits the juror to be the judge of his
qualiﬁcations instead of requiring the court to pass upon them
as questions of fact.
Counsel for plaintiff further refer to Thompson on Trials,
section 115, where the doctrine is laid down as follows:
“The sound and prevailing view is that a party cannot, on er
ror or appeal complain of a ruling of a trial court in over
ruling his challenge for cause, if it appear that when the jury
completed, his peremptory challenges were not exhausted;
since he might have excluded the obnoxious Juror by a per
emptory challenge, and therefore the error is to be deemed
error without injury For the same reason, if a court errone
ously overrules a challenge for cause, and thereafter the chal
lenging party excludes the obnoxious juror by a peremptory
challenge, he cannot assign the ruling of the court for error,
appear that, before the jury was sworn, his quiver
unless
of peremptory challenges was exhausted; in which case there
room for the inference that the erroneous ruling of the
court may have resulted in leaving upon the panel other ob
noxious jurors whom the party might, but for the ruling,
have excluded by peremptory challenge. Some courts, there
enough, in such
juncture, to show that
fore, hold that
challenges
were
exhausted
before the jury
peremptory
his
was sworn. But others take what seems the better view, that
must also appear, not only that his peremptory challenges
were exhausted, but that some objectionable person took his
place on the jury, who otherwise would have been excluded by
peremptory challenge.”
Counsel for plaintiff cite cases which hold that even where
challenge for cause
the trial court erred, in overruling
affirmatively
by
the
record
that the party hail
appear
must
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exhausted his peremptory challenges in order to successfully
challenge the ruling of the court.
This doctrine is manifestly pregnant with diﬁiculty, and
would necessitate an extensive collateral inquiry precedent to
the regular proceedings in a case, in order that it might ap
pear that the aggrieved party had or had not exhausted his
peremptory challenges, or had not been driven to the neces
sity of using some of his peremptory challenges to get rid of
the alleged prejudiced juror, whom he had challenged for
cause, and thereby been deprived of the opportunity of get
ting rid of other objectionable jurors, though less objection
Such a ruling
able than the juror challenged for cause.
aggrieved,
which
party
upon
the
he ought no
a
burden
poses
to be compelled to bear, and reverses the theory of our system
of jurisprudence that error is prejudicial unless the party in
committed, shows that
was harm
whose favor the error
by
Thompson
rule
stated
on
Trials reverses
less error. The
this practice and imposes upon the party who points out and
assigns the error, the further burden of showing affirma
tively that he was prejudiced by the error. Under our statute
absolutely entitled to three peremptory chal
each party
gives parties litigant the__ri_g_ht._t9
_The
lenges.
challenge a juror for cause. IflerrY>r"appea‘i‘s‘in'tlie ruling of
challenge for cause that question should be de
the court on
cided wholly independent of any consideration of whether the
party litigant had or had not exhausted his peremptory chal
lenges. In other words, the statute provides for two classes
of challenges, one for cause and the other peremptorily with
And in the determination of the
out assigning any cause.
the ruling upon
challenge for
of
propriety
the
of
question
cause,
consideration of the
improper to mix with
complaining
the
party had ex
or
not
to
whether
as
question
hausted his peremptory challenges.
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irresistible that the trial court should

have sustained the challenge
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For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the circuit court
reversed.

TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE

356

/

STATE

(T1)

~Supreme

v.

3

DAVIS.

Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
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Virginia,

1888_.

890.

JOHNSON, President:
On the 20th day of February, 1888, William Davis was, in
the Circuit Court of Ritchie county, indicted for maliciously,
etc., stabbing one Creed Wilson, with intent to maim, dis
ﬁgure, disable, and kill him.
The prisoner moved to quash
the indictment, which motion was overruled, and the prisoner
pleaded not guilty. The jury was sworn on the 24th day of
February to try the issue. It appears from an order entered
on the next day that “it appearing to the court that Peter G.
Six, a juror, is unable to perform his duty, George W. Ham
mer, a qualiﬁed juror, was selected, tried, and sworn in his
place,” etc. The prisoner objected to the swearing of a new
juror, which objection was overruled. "'
The prisoner moved the court to discharge him, because he
had not been tried before a proper jury. He also moved in
arrest of judgment, and also for a new trial; which several
motions were respectively overruled, and the court pro
nounced judgment on the verdict, and sentenced the prisoner
to conﬁnement in the penitentiary for the term of two years.

' '

1‘
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#

I

S

i i
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¥

i

Upshur, Judge, in delivering the opinion of the court in
Fell’s Case, 9 Leigh 617, said, after reviewing a number of
English and American cases: “One general rule is deducible
from all the cases, which is that the court may discharge the
jury whenever a necessity for so doing shall arise, but what
facts and circumstances shall be considered as constituting
such a necessity can not be reduced to any general rule. The
power to discharge is a discretionary power, which the court,
as in all other cases of judicial discretion,
must exercise
soundly according to the circumstances of the case. The ob
ject of the law is to obtain a fair and just verdict, and. when
ever it shall appear to the court that the jury impaneled can
not render such a verdict, it ought to be discharged and an
This is emphatically the case of neces
other jury impaneled.
sity contemplated in the authorities we have referred to; as
where the prisoner became too sick to attend to his defense or
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one of the jury was rendered physically unable to discharge
his duty. There are other cases of necessity equally strong,
one of which probably is where a j uror, from the peculiar con
dition of his mind and feelings, is manifestly disqualiﬁed
from bestowing upon the case that attention and impartial
"‘
*
*
consideration which is necessary to a just verdict.
The actual sickness of a juror, and his consequent inability to
discharge his duty, is admitted on all hands to present such a
necessity.
In the case before us, the juror was not actually

sick, but there was every reason to believe he would become
so through longer conﬁnement.
Was the court bound to wait
till the case actually occurred? We think not. "‘ “‘ " A
necessity not less strong was presented by the situation of the
wife of another juror. If the object of the trial be, as it un
doubtedly is, to obtain a fair, just and -impartial verdict, there
can be but little prospect of such a result from the constrained
and reluctant action of minds wholly absorbed in the deep
and peculiar interest of their domestic relations.” It was held
that it would be improper, under such circumstances, to dis
charge the prisoner.

i

#

#

*

Q

Ii

#

#

ll

$

Here it appears from the record that the juror, Six, was
informed that his son had just died. It would, indeed, be a
stout-hearted father who could, unmoved, receive news of the
death of a child. Some men could receive such news and pro
ceed with their work with steady nerve and mind clear and
strong; but observation teaches us, if, indeed, we have not
learned from sad experience, that the natural result of infor
mation, suddenly imparted to a father, of the death of a child,
is to unﬁt him, for the time, to attend to business. It would

1

Ii

$

Ii

i

¥

Q

Q

$

Ill

nave been cruel to have required the juror to remain on the
His grief would naturally
jury under such circumstances.
unﬁt him for the discharge of such an important duty. And
if, as the court said in Fell’s case, the object of the trial is to
obtain a fair, just and impartial verdict, there could be little
*
*
"‘
prospect of it under such circumstances.
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in perfect accord with the prin
The statute says—and
sworn,
juror, after he
ciples of the common law—-that
be unable from any cause to perform his duty, the court may,
in its discretion, cause another qualiﬁed juror to be sworn in
""
his place. Code, ch. 159, sec.
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Both on principle and authority, the court, in this case. did
not err in discharging the juror Six, for the reason shown by
the record, because a manifest necessity existed therefor.
Neither did the court err in ordering the trial to proceed with
the jury as constituted after the substitution of the juror
Hammer for Six, as he had his legal challenge to the original
jurors and to the substituted juror. Every right guaranteed
to him by the constitution was granted him. “ ‘
"
*
*
The prisoner was not prejudiced by the fact that
the juror Hammer had not heard everything that the other
jurors heard. VVhen the substituted juror was sworn, the
trial commenced de novo. Then the prosecuting attorney in
troduced the evidence just as if the jury was entirely differ
ent from what it was before, and the defense, of course, had
the right to bring forward all the evidence it could. We can
not perceive how the prisoner was prejudiced by this. Cer
tainly, nothing appears in the record to his prejudice in this
respect. The court did not, therefore, err in refusing to ex
clude the evidence of the State.

'

1!

it

ll

i l

#

i

Q

I

Q

i

There is no error in the judgment of the Circuit Court and
is affirmed.

A ﬂirmedﬂ"
on In some states alternate jurors may be sworn, who hear the case
with the 12 and are ready to take the places of any oi‘ the 12 who for
Thus, in California, Penal Code,
any reason drop out during the trial.
Sec. 1089, in cases of felony, the judge may impanel two additional jurors
as substitutes, if he believes the trial ls likely to be a protracted one.
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Judicial Court of Maine.

‘

75

1884.

Maine, 544.

#

I
I

$

U

i

Q

*

t

t

Trespass in which the plaintiff claimed damages in the sum
of two thousand dollars for an alleged assault and battery by
the defendant upon the person of the plaintiff.
The pleadings and the question presented to the law court
are stated in the opinion.
PETERS, C. J. Plaintiff sued for an assault and battery.
Defendant pleaded “sou assault demesne," and plaintiff re
plied “de injuria."
Under these_p1e_ad_ings_ the defendant,
gainst the plaintiff's protest, was allowed byllthe coLii't'"fo
was contrarftfwhat we regard as the‘
we se ed practice in this state. The rule of practice and of
that, when a plaintiff has to prove an@/law in this state,
full and perfect case, he
thing to make out
entitled to
open and close. The test is, whether he need put in any proof
of any part of his claim. In this case, the burden fell upon
him to prove the extent of the damages sustained. It
case
of unliquidated damages, and not a case of nominal damages.)
or of damages to be assessed by computation merely.
The plaintiff certainly had something to prove. The coun
sel for the defendant contends that the defendant’s plea con
fessed everything alleged against him. We think not. It did
general demurrer or
default would
not admit more than
admit, and that would be nominal damages only. Hanley 11.
Sutherland, 74 Maine, 212, and cases cited. The plea of “son
qualiﬁed admission of the injury al
but
assault demesne”
The point may be tested in this way: Suppose that,
leged.
after the pleadings were completed the defendant had rested
Judgment would go for the
without any proof whatever.
plaintiff, no doubt. But for how much? Would the court or
der judgment for the sum of one thousand dollars, the amount
of damages which the plaintiff alleges, or would the plaintiff
be, that
Can
plea of
be required to prove the damages?
son assault demesne admits any amount of damages which

I

a

a

a

it

a

is

a

a
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plaintiff inserts in the ad damnum of his writ? If so, a plain
tiff may prevent the plea in many cases by alleging exagger
ated damages.
"

' ‘

To take the lead, a defendant “must admit all the
facts necessary to be proved by the plaintiff," and not merely
Spaulding 12. Hood, 8 Cush. 602. “When
a prima facie case.
anything is left for the plaintiff to show, he has the right to
begin and close.” Thurston v. Kennett, 2 Foster, N. H. 151;
Bellcnap 12. Wendell, 1 Foster, N. H. 175. The latest authori
*
“
"
ties sustain the plaintiff’s view upon this question.
Exceptions sustained."
69 Rule the same as to Evidence and Argument.
"The general rule
is that the order of argument follows the burden oi proof; and whoever
opens the case with the evidence, if he has a right to so open, has the
same right in the argumentz" Abel v. Jarrett, (1897) 100 Ga. 732, 28
S. E. 453. To the same effect:—-D. M. Osborne & Co. v. Kline, (1885) 18
Nebr. 344, 25 N. W. 360; O'Connor v. Henderson Bridge Co., (1894) 95
Ky. 633, 27 S. W. 251; Lowe v. Lowe, (1875) 40 Ia. 220; Palmer v. Adams,
(1893) 137 Ind. 72, 36 N. E. 695.
Discretionary or of right. In some jurisdictions the opening and clos
ing is held to be a matter resting in the discretion of the court. Wood
ward v. Insurance Co., (1899) 104 Tenn. 49, 56 S. W. 1020; Smith v.
Frazier, (1866) 53 Pa. St. 226; Young v. Newark Fire Ins. Co., (1890)
But in the great majority of jurisdictions it is
59 Conn. 41, 22 Atl. 32.
deemed a matter of right.
In Michigan, where the defendant is obliged in all cases to ﬁle a general
issue, he may obtain the opening and closing under Circuit Court Rule
waiving the beneﬁt ot the general issue and admit
24 (c) by expressly
ting the facts alleged in the plaintiff's declaration, this being done by a

the general issue.
special notice accompanying
In Sorensen v. Sorensen, (1903) 68 Neb. 483, 493, it was held that in
proceedings in rem, where each party must rely on the strength of his
own case, and not on the weakness of the opposition, and where, there
fore, both parties may fail tor lack ot evidence, the ordinary rule does
not apply, and the court should, as in cases of interpleader, determine
the opening and closing in its sound discretion.

-—-‘iii

l

']'~

Q

J,

-

LAKE ONTARIO NATIONAL BANK
Court of Appeals of New York.
122

v.

JUDSON.

1890.

New York, 278.

[This action may be considered as brought on two counts,
(1) on a promissory note, (2) on an overdraft. The defend
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ant ﬁled an answer in three divisions, (1) failure of consid
eration for the note, with admission of the facts alleged in
the ﬁrst count, (2) denial of all facts in the complaint except
as admitted, (3) a counterclaim.]
BRADLEY, J. "' “‘ "' Upon the trial the question as to
which party was entitled to the closing argument was raised;
the court held that the plaintiff had the right to it, and the
defendant excepted. The rule that the party having the af
ﬁrmative of the issue in an action shall have the opportunity
to make the opening and closing presentation of his case is
deemed founded upon a substantial right, the denial of which
is error. (Conselyea v. Swift, 103 N. Y. 604.) In its appli
cation to trials by jury it has ordinarily more practical im
portance than in those before the court without a jury and
before referees.
If it appears_that a party could not
been prejudiced by the failure of the court to observe this
rule, the error would not be available, and in trials by the
court without jury or before referees that question would be
dependent upon the circumstances of each case. In the pres
ent case the view of the court evidently was that the affirma
tive of the entire issue was not with the defendant, and that
The denial by
is the question presented for consideration.
answer,
admitted, of
except
as
therein
in
his
the defendant
each and every allegation of the complaint, put in issue every
material allegation of the complaint not distinctly admitted
by the answer.
(Allis /zr. Leonard, 46 N. Y. 688; 22 Alb. L. J.
Hallen,
25 Hun, 155.)
The charge in the com
28; Calhoun 7}.
plaint, in due form, of the indebtedness of the defendant
the plaintiff for the amount advanced to him upon his chec
in excess of the balance of his accountwith the plaintiff. wa

havew

I

a

a

*
the‘

"‘

"

not admitted by the answer, but was controverted by sue
It appears that after the trial had been moved an
denial.
the plaintiff, by its counsel had, by statement of it, made
opening of the case to the court, the defendant orally admit
ted the count of the complaint alleging the overdraft.
The question arises whether the oral admission at the trial
of the plaintiff’s claim for the amount of the defendant’s over
draft, entitled him to the right of closing the argument on
the ﬁnal submission of the case to the court for determina
And that depends upon the question whether the af
tion.
right, must be
view to such
ﬁrmative of the issue, with
may
or
arise
from
admissions
pleadings,
from
the
ascertained
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The issues to be tried can be ascer
tained only by reference to the pleadings, and they must gov
ern so far as relates to the right of the parties to open the
case at the beginning and conclude the argument at the close
of the trial. When the parties go to trial they respectively
assume the burden of establishing that which they have af
ﬁrmatively alleged as a cause of action or counter-claim, if it
is controverted by allegation sufficient to put it in issue. The
admission of a fact upon the trial is evidence merely. It may
obviate the necessity of further trial of the issue to which it
relates, but does not change it as represented by the plead
ings. That can be done by amendment only. It is true that
the admission made at the trial may reduce the controversy to
matter as to which the affirmative is with the defendant.
Such would be the effect of evidence of any character, undis
puted and indisputable of the facts constituting the alleged
cause of action.
The right under consideration does not de
pend simply upon the admission of those facts, unless they
are admitted or uncontroverted by the answer; otherwise it
is evidence only. There is no occasion to extend the rule so
as to give effect for such purpose, to concessions at the trial.
This might lead to the adoption of such a course when fur
ther dispute of the facts upon which a plaintiff relies may
appear hopeless to a defendant, for the purpose of obtaining
the right of closing the trial. There is no apparent reason
for applying such rule to any one more than to any other
stage of the trial. The defendant who may wish to take the
right of opening and concluding the trial, must frame his
pleading with that view, and so as to present no issue upon
any allegation of the complaint essential to the plaintiff’s al
leged cause of action.
If the defendant fail to do that, no
matter how little proof the remaining issue may require, or
how easily, or in what manner it may be established by evi
dence, the right of the plaintiff to open and close the case is
not denied to him.
(Mercer 'v. Whall, 5 Ad. & El. [N. S.]
The test is, whether Without any proof, the plaintiff,
447.)
upon the pleadings, is entitled to recover upon all the causes
If he is, and the defend
of action alleged in his complaint.
counter-claim,
alleges
any
controverted by the plaintiff's
ant
pleading or any affirmative matter of defense in avoidance of
the plaintiff’s alleged cause of action, and which is the subject
of trial, the defendant has the right to open and close, other

\
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If

the defendant, by permission of the
court, had stricken out the denial in his answer, or amended
it by inserting the admission orally made, a different question
would have been presented at the trial upon the claim of the
defendant to the right to conclude it.
No other question requires the expression of consideration.
The judgment should be aﬁirmed.
All concur except FOLLETT, Ch. ., not sitting.

wise not.

“‘

J

Judgment aﬁirmed.“

80 It is the substance, not the form of the issue which determines
the
right,—Huntington v. Conkey, (1860) 33 Barb. (N. Y.) 218, 228. Thus
one cannot obtain the right to open and close by anticipating defenses,—
Bush v. Wathen, (1898) 104 Ky. 548; nor by undertaking to assume the
v. Sorensen,
burden of proving denials,—Sorensen
(1903) 68 Neb. 483,

488.

There is some authority for the rule that admissions made at the
determine the right to open and close.
See Abel v. Jarrett,
(1897) 100 Ga. 732, 28 S. E. 453.
Statutory Modiﬁcation of Rule. The practice is sometimes governed by
Thus, in Schoonover v. Osborne, (1902) 117 Iowa, 427, 90 N. W.
statute.
844, it was held that under code § 3701, the right to open and close the
argument is to be determined by the evidence, and not by the pleadings.

trial will

SECTION 4.

/

32

OPENING STATEMENT

SCRIPPS

v.

REILLY.

_/‘;;8£Zp3reme Court of Michigan.
35

J.

or COUNSEL.

1877.

Michigan, 871.

Defendant in error recovered judgment in the
superior court of Detroit in an action for libel, and plaintiﬂ’
in error complains of various proceedings at the trial.
Defendant in error was a lawyer in practice in Detroit.
He was a single man. In the spring of 1875 he was elected
circuit judge of Wayne county, and in the fall thereafter
was appointed to ﬁll a vacancy caused by the resignation of
Judge Patchin.
In 1873 plaintiff in error began publishing the newspaper
called the “Evening News,” and has continued the publication
since that time. In 1875 the paper had a large daily circula
GRAVES,
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tion and the news items of each issue averaged some two
hundred.
The parties were not personally acquainted, but
the paper opposed the election of defendant in error and sup
ported another gentleman, and during the canvass some in
temperate articles were published.
Some time in the fall af
ter the election one Robbins ﬁled a bill in the superior court
to obtain a divorce from his wife, and among other charges
in the bill against her, alleged that she had been guilty of
adultery with defendant in error.
Almost immediately after this bill was placed on ﬁle, a re
porter and gatherer of local news for the paper got access to
the bill, and with the help of the city editor prepared an ar
ticle covering this charge in Robbins’ bill, and caused it to
be published in the paper.
This occurred on the 7th of De
cember. This article is the libel complained of. The action
was commenced the next day. * * "‘
The ﬁrst in the order of proceeding at the trial seems natu
rally to call for attention ﬁrst.
It relates to the course the counsel for defendant in error
was permitted to pursue, against repeated objections, in
opening the case to the court and jury.
He declared it to be his purpose, as part of his opening, to
read at length before the jury a series of articles published
in the newspaper during the course of several months and
commencing in the spring of 1875 and running until some
time after the appearance of the publication in suit.
And the ﬁrst group suggested consisted of articles from
the 19th of March to the 6th of December, and none of which
referred to defendant in error. The reading of them was ob
jected to on the ground that neither of them would be rele
vant or competent if regularly offered as evidence under the
issue.
Counsel for defendant in error then stated that he
proposed to read such articles as in good faith he should
offer in evidence, and he would read them because he could
not remember their contents. The court thereupon ruled that
he might read in his opening such articles as he claimed to be
libelous, and which had been afterwards retracted.
About twenty articles, not relating to defendant in error,
and running through the period before indicated, were then
read to the jury as part of the opening.
An exception was
They
were calculated from their character to
taken to each.
inﬂuence the minds of the jurors against plaintiff in error.
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The counsel for defendant in error then offered to read at
length, as part of his opening, a series of articles published
the spring before the publication charged as libelous, con
cerning the defendant in error when running for the office of
circuit judge.
This was objected to on the ground that the articles did not
tend to show actual malice, and would not be competent if of
fered as evidence. Counsel for defendant in error then ex
plained that he did not propose to then read them as evidence
to show malice, but to read such as he expected to offer and
prove afterwards, and such as when put in evidence would
tend to show malice towards defendant in error. The court
overruled the objection and allowed counsel to read as he pro
posed. He then read, as part of his opening to the jury, ﬁve
articles he claimed tended to show actual malice by plaintiff
in error against defendant in error. They bore date March
12th, March 22nd, March 29th, March 31st, and April 3rd,
1875.

.

The-counsel for defendant in error then proposed to read
at length, as part of his opening and not as evidence, another
series of articles published after the libel.
This was objected to on the ground that the articles would
not be competent or admissible if offered as evidence. They
all referred to the alleged libelous article and the legal pro
ceedings growing out of it.
* ‘ "' The opening state
The objection was overruled.
ment having been allowed to embrace the reading in full of
all these publications, and having been brought to a close, the
counsel for defendant in error proceeded to offer evidence.
None had yet been received, and although the plaintiff in er
ror had not been able to prevent the reading of the publica
tions to the jury he was still not able to meet them as evi
dence, for any purpose or in any way.
They were lodged in the jurors’ minds as matters in the
cause they were entitled to receive, but not through the
channel the law has made for the conveyance of evidence, or
at the stage of proceeding proper for submitting evidence.
They were matters which could not fail, when so presented,
to prepossess the jury unfavorably against the plaintiff in
error. Conﬁning attention now to this branch of the case, it
appears from the record, that of the series of publications
not relating to defendant in error, and permitted to be read
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at length in the opening statement, on the pledge that they
would be afterwards offered in good faith as evidence, ﬁve
were not even offered as evidence at all at any stage of the
trial, and as to one other the record is contradictory; some
ten or a dozen or more, the record being ambiguous as to a
few, were not offered except upon the rebutting case, and
were then rejected by the court; and the residue of this list,
being ﬁve or six, were reserved until the plaintiff in error
had rested his defense, and were then offered and admitted as
rebutting evidence.
Of the series published in the spring of 1875, concerning
the candidacy of defendant in error as circuit judge, and
which were read at length in the opening, on the avowal of
counsel’s belief that they intended to show actual malice by
plaintiff in error against defendant in error, and would be
offered in evidence for that purpose, not one was offered
during the making out the case in chief. They were held
back until the plaintiff in error had rested, and were then ten
dered as rebutting evidence. All were excluded. There were
ﬁve in this group.
Of the set published after the appearance of the alleged
libel, ﬁve were given in evidence by the defendant in error
to show actual malice, and they were so given, but against
objection, as part of his case in chief. * "‘ *
When the judge came to charge the jury, he referred to
the course which he had permitted in respect to the opening
statement, and observed, “Mr. Griffin in his opening read sev
eral articles which at the trial were ﬁnally excluded. These
should also be withdrawn from your consideration and laid
out of view in your deliberations upon the case.”
No further reference was made to the subject of the open
ing statement, and no caution whatever was given concerning
the articles which had been‘ read at length by permission of
the court against objection, but which had not even been of
fered in evidence at all.
The question is, whether the practice which was here al
lowed in the opening address was correct, and if not, whether
the advice quoted from the charge cured the error, and in
case it did not, then whether it is competent for this court to
revise the proceedings.
The trial judge must always have a very large discretion
in controlling and managing the routine proceedings at the
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trial, and it is not necessary to specify the matter to which

such discretion extends. .It applies beyond doubt to the ad
But it must
dresses of counsel as well as to other incidents.
be a reasonable, a legal discretion, and whether it be so or not
must depend upon the nature of the proceeding on which it
is exercised, the way it is exercised and the special circum
stances under which it is exercised. * " ‘
The text books in this country which deal with the subject
are distinctly agreed concerning the end and scope of this
opening address. They all represent it as a proceeding pre-l
fatory to putting in evidence, and as one practically neces
sary to make an advance exhibit of the legal nature of the
controversy and its salient peculiarities, and enable the judge,
jury and opposing counsel to apprehend the necessities of the
plaintif'f’s case and correctly understand the drift and bear
ing of each step and each offer of proof as it shall occur sub
sequently.
And considering that its oﬁice is to aﬂ"'ord pre
liminary explanation, that it is to precede proofs and precede
controversy before the jury, and is not to embody or convey
proof or prepossess the j ury, they unite in substantially deny \‘
ing the right to make use of it to get before the jury a detail
of the testimony expected to be offered, and especially any
not positively entitled to be introduced, and deny the right to
A brief
use it as a cover for any topics not fairly pertinent.
summary or outline of the substance of the evidence intended
to be offered, with requisite clear and concise explanations,
But a relation of expected oral testi
are considered proper.
/
.
mony at length, or a reading of expected documentary proofs
ii
at large, or any other course ﬁtted to mislead the triers, \
Of course there may be cases and
should not be tolerated.
instances where a statement of the evidence itself, or a read- ,
ing of a paper, may be convenient and harmless. Such, how
ever, must be exceptional, and not within the spirit of the
‘
*
"
"
general requirement.
The practice pursued was wrong, and the error was not
*
‘ " It is
cured or materially alleviated by the charge.
quite impossible to conclude that the jurors had not been in
ﬂuenced too far by the erroneous rulings and proceedings, to
be brought into the same impartial attitude by the court’s
admonition, which they would have held if the counsel for de
fendant in error had been properly conﬁned in his opening
The course of fair and settled practice was vio
statement.
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lated to the prejudice of plaintiff in error, and it is not a
satisfactory answer to say that the court went as far as prac
ticable afterwards to cure the mischief so long as an infer
ence remains that the remedy applied by the court was not
adequate. ‘ " "‘
The judgment must be reversed with costs and a new trial
ordered.

~i

I O
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FOSDICK

qvvcr/“;,/Supreme

.»/Jr

v.

VAN ARSDALE.

Court of Michigan.
74

1889.

Michigan, 802.

MoRsE, J. * * *
The record shows that, after the primary case of the plain
tiff was closed,—
“V. H. Lockwood proceeded to state the defendants’ case
to the jury, and during the opening proceeded to state the
law governing the defendants’ case, and upon which the de
fense was based; whereupon the counsel for the plaintiff in
terposed an objection, and the said court sustained the objec
tion, stating that the law would come from the court in due
time.”
This is made the ﬁrst assignment of error in defendants’

brief.
We are not able, from this meager statement in the record,
to know whether error was committed or not by this action
of the circuit judge. But counsel have the right in stating
their case to the jury at the opening to brieﬂy set forth what
points of the law they rely upon, and the nature of the testi
mony they propose to introduce 'to support such points.
It is
true the law is to be given by the court; but, as it is not given
in most cases until the testimony is ended, and the counsel
have summed the same up in support of their case before the
jury, the counsel have the right, both in opening the case to
the jury, before the testimony to support their case is offered,
and when closing the argument, after the testimony is in, to
state to the jury that they claim the law to be thus and so,
and that they shall request the court to so instruct them, and
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that they will adduce such and such testimony to support
their claim under the law in the ﬁrst instance, or at the close
to state that the evidence in the case, under the law as they
shall claim it to be, establishes their right to a verdict at the
hands of the jury. The counsel have no right to read law to
the jury, or to usurp the province of the court in any way in
this respect, but they have the undoubted right to state so
much of the law, as they claim it to be, as may enable them
to lay before the jury an intelligent idea of the force, effect,
and bearing of the testimony upon their case, either before or
after said testimony is in the case.
1

61

Contra:
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San Miguel Con. Gold Min. Co. v. Bonner,

(1905)

33 Colo.

207.

E
$7
b.

SCANYAN

v.

ARMS COMPANY.

upreme Court of the United States.
103

J

1880.

United States, 261.

FIELD, . This is an action to recover the sum of $136,000,
alleged to be due to the plaintiff upon a contract with the.
defendant, as commissions on the sales of ﬁre-arms to the
Turkish government, effected through his inﬂuence.
The
defendant pleads the general issue. At the time the transac
tions occurred, out of which this action has arisen, the plain
tiff was consul-general of the Ottoman government at the
port of New York. The defendant is a corporation, created
The action was originally
under the laws of Connecticut.
commenced in the Supreme Court of New York, and on
motion of the defendant, was removed to the Circuit Court
of the United States. When it was called for trial, and the
jury was impanelled, one of the plaintiff’s counsel, as pre
liminary to the introduction of testimony, stated to the court
and jury the issues in the case, and the facts which they pro
From such statement it appeared that the
posed to prove.
sales for which commissions were claimed by the plaintiff
were made whilst he was an officer of the Turkish govern
ment, and through the inﬂuence which he exerted upon its
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agent sent to this country to examine and report in regard
"'
"
to the purchase of arms.
It is sufficient now to
say that the defendant, considering that the facts which the
plaintiff proposed to prove showed that the contract was void
as being corrupt in itself and prohibited by morality and
public policy, upon which no recovery could be had, moved
the court to direct the jury to render a verdict in its favor.
The court thereupon inquired of the plaintiff's counsel if
they claimed or admitted that the statements which had
been made were true, to which they replied in the affirmative.
Argument was then had upon the motion, after which the
court directed the jury to ﬁnd a verdict for the defendant,
which was accordingly done. Judgment being entered upon
it, the case was brought to this court for review.
The re
versal of the judgment is sought for alleged errors of the
court below in three particulars:

'

l i i

#

ll

1

#

U

Q

O

Several reasons are presented against the power of
the court to direct a verdict upon the statement of the facts
which the plaintiff proposed to prove, that might be more
properly urged against its exercise in particular cases. The
power of the court to act in the disposition of a trial upon
facts conceded by counsel is as plain as its power to act upon
The question in either case must be
the evidence produced.
whether the facts upon which it is called to instruct the jury
If a doubt exists as to the statement
be clearly established.
of counsel, the court will withhold its directions, as where
the evidence is conﬂicting, and leave the matter to the de
termination of the jury.
In the trial of a cause the admissions of counsel, as to
matters to be proved, are constantly received and acted upon.
They may dispense with proof of facts for which witnesses
They may limit the demand
would otherwise be called.
Indeed, any fact, bearing upon
made or the set-off claimed.
the issues involved, admitted by counsel, may be the ground
of the court’s procedure equally as if established by the
And if in the progress of a trial, either by
clearest proof.
such admission or proof, a fact is developed which must
necessarily put an end to the action, the court may, upon its
own motion, or that of counsel, act upon it and close the case.
If, on a trial for a homicide, to take an illustration sug
gested by counsel, it should appear from the opening state
1.
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Our conclusion, therefore,
not well taken.
plaintiff
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ment that the accused had been pardoned for the offense
charged, it would be a waste of time to listen to the evi
dence of his original criminality; for if established he would
still be entitled to his discharge by force of the pardon. So,
in a civil action, if it should appear from the opening state
ment that it is brought to obtain compensation for acts
which the law denounces as corrupt and immoral, or declares
to be criminal, such as attempts to bribe a publicofficer, or
to evade the revenue laws, or to embezzle the public funds,
the court would not hesitate to close the case without delay.
Of course, in all such proceedings nothing should be taken,
without full consideration, against the party making the
statement or admission.
He should be allowed to explain
and qualify it, so far as the truth will permit; but if, with
such explanation and qualiﬁcation, it should clearly appear
that there could be no recovery, the court should not hesitate
to so declare and give such direction as will dispose of the
action.
Here there were no unguarded expressions used, nor any
ambiguous statements made. The opening counsel was fully
apprised of all the facts out of which his client’s claim orig
inated, and seldom was a case opened with greater fullness
He dwelt upon and reiterated the statement of
of detail.
fact
which
constituted the ground of the court's action
the
in directing a verdict for the defendant, namely, that it was
Oscanyan’s inﬂuence alone which controlled the agent of the
Turkish government; and for the use of that influence the
defendant had agreed to give the compensation demanded,—
that is to say, that whilst an officer of the Turkish govern
ment the plaintiff had stipulated for a commission on con
tracts obtained from it through his personal inﬂuence over
its agent. Had the case been pending in a court of some of
the States, or in an English court, a nonsuit would have
been ordered, if the facts stated had been deemed fatal to
Involuntary nonsuits not being allowed in the
the action.
Federal courts, the course adopted was the proper proceed
ing. The difference in the two modes is rather a matter of
form than of substance, except in the case of a nonsuit a
new action may be brought, whereas in the case of a verdict
the action is ended, unless a new trial be granted either upon
motion or upon appeal.

is that the ﬁrst position of the

I
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PUGET sounn IRON & STEEL WORKS.

Supreme

Court of Washington.

1905.

as Washington, 642.

RUDKIN, J.—This was an action brought by the widow
and minor children to recover damages for the death of the
husband and father, caused by the wrongful act of the de
fendant.
After the jury was impaneled to try the cause in
the court below, the attorney representing the plaintiff
made the opening statement of his case to the jury. Upon
this statement the defendant moved the court to withdraw
the case from the consideration of the jury, and to direct
a judgment for the defendant.
At the suggestion of the
court, the motion was so amended as to include the plead
ings, and, as thus amended, the motion was granted, the
jury discharged, and a ﬁnal judgment entered in favor of
the defendant.
The plaintiff appealed.
No reason is assigned in support of a judgment on the
pleadings except that the complaint is defective and does
not state facts sufﬁcient to constitute a cause of action.
The
judgment rendered was a ﬁnal judgment on the merits, and
if warranted at all, must ﬁnd its support in the opening
statement of counsel, and not in some defect in the com
plaint. The complaint alone, however deﬁcient, would not
justify or sustain a judgment on the merits such as was
For this reason we will not
rendered by the court below.
consider or.pass upon the sufficiency of the complaint, as
the same may be amended after the case is remanded.
It
is unnecessary to set forth the opening statement of counsel
in full. We deem it sufficient to say that the statement
was most general in its character, and fell far short of stat
I
ing facts sufficient to warrant a recovery against the re
Nothing was stated afiirmatively, however, that
spondent.
constitute
a defense to the action or bar a recovery.
would
When, then, is a court justiﬁed in taking a case from the
jury and directing a judgment on the opening statement
of counsel? That a party to an action is bound by admis
sions made by his attorney in the opening statment of his
case, or at any stage of the trial, and that the court may
act upon such admissions and direct a judgment in accord
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ance therewith in a proper case is not disputed or denied.
This is all that was decided in Limlley v. Atchison, etc. R.
Co., 47 Kan. 432, 28 Pac. 201, and Johnson v. Spokane, 29
Wash. 730, 70 Pac. 122.
In neither case was the opening
statement upon which the trial court acted brought before
Oscanig/an 12. Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261,
the appellate court.
was an action on contract.
It appeared from the opening
statement of counsel that the contract in suit was against
public policy and void, and the supreme court of the United
States held that upon such a statement the circuit court
So, in any
properly directed a verdict for the defendant.
case, if it affirmatively appears from the opening statement
of counsel that the contract in suit is void, or if facts are
admitted which constitute a full and complete defense to the
action, it would be idle for the court to proceed further with
the trial.
But such is not the case here. Counsel stated too little,
not too much. The court directed a judgment, not because
the appellant was admitted out of court, but because the
opening statement did not state facts sufficient to consti
tute a cause of action.
Counsel may state their case as
brieﬂy o'r as generally as they see ﬁt, and it is only when
such statement shows affirmatively that there is no cause
of action, or that there is a full and complete defense thereto,
or when it is expressly admitted that the facts stated are
the only facts which the party expects or intends to prove,
that the court is warranted in acting upon it. The opening
statement now before the court contained no admissions
which would constitute a defense or defeat the action, and
the omission of counsel to state the case more fully is no
justiﬁcation for the action of the court below in withdrawing
the case from the jury.
The judgment is therefore reversed, and the cause re
manded for new trial."

“In

Jordan v. Reed, (1908) 77 N. J. L. 584, 71 Atl. 280, it was held
to authorize a non-suit “the statement of counsel, by its omissions
or admissions, must render it clearly evident either that no case can
be made out or that a recovery is precluded."
In Kelly v. Bergen County Gas Co., (1906) 74 N. J. L. 604. 67 Atl. 21,
the court stated that "it objection be made to a statement too meagre
to sustain the plaintiffs case, counsel will, doubtless, be permitted
to
enlarge his statement."
In Hoffman House v. Foote, (1902) 172 N. Y. 348, 65 N. E. 169, the
that

_
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“The practice of disposing of cases upon the mere opening
court said:
of counsel is generally a very unsafe method of deciding controversies.
It cannot be resorted
where there is or ever was anything to decide.
to in many cases with justice to the parties, unless counsel stating the
and intentionally states or admits some
case to the jury deliberately
fact that, in any view of the case, is fatal to the action."
In Farnbam v. Le_nox Motor Car Co., (1918) 229 Mass. 478, 482, the

court said:—
"Doubtless it would be within the province of the court under the
rule to require the parties to state the substance of the evidence which
each expected to offer at the trial, and to ascertain whether there was
upon such statement any disputed question of fact or any fact to be
found either directly or by inference;
and also in appropriate instances
to frame questions, answers to which would settle such disputed fact or
facts.
Of course great care must be exercised in the use of this power
and the fullest opportunity given to parties to make a complete state
ment with the knowledge that it is to be made the basis of a ruling of
But there is no fundamental ob
law upon the rights of the parties.
jection to a ruling of law made upon a fair statement of what the evi
In reason there is no distinction between a
dence is expected to be.
practice of this court in
rule of this nature and the well-recognized
appropriate cases of permitting a ruling to be made on the footing that
on the opening statement of counsel to the jury no case is shown in
law. Hey v. Prime, 197 Mass. 474, 84 N. E. 141, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 570;
This rule prevails
Lee v. Blodget, 214 Mass. 374, 377, 102 N. E. 67.
Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261, 263, 264, 26 L. Ed.
generally.
539; Butler v. National Home for Soldiers, 144 U. S. 64, 12 Sup. Ct.
Lackawanna. & Western Railroad.
581. 36 L. Ed. 346; Carr v. Delaware,
78 N. J. Law, 692, 75 Atl. 928; Jordan v. Reed. 77 N. J. La'w, 584. 71
Atl. 280; Barto v. Detroit Iron & Steel Co., 155 Mich. 94, 118 N. W. 738;
Hoffman House v. Foote, 172 N. Y. 348, 65 N. E. 169; Hutton v. Stewart,
Cornell v. Morrison, 87 Ohio St. 215. 100
90 Kan. 602, 135 Pac. 681;
N. E. 817; St. Paul Motor Vehicle Co. v. Johnston, 127 Minn. 443, 149
N. W. 667. See also Lane v. Portland Railway, Light & Power Co., 58
Or. 364, 114 Pac. 940; James v. Pearson, 64 Wash. 263, 116 Pac. 852.
But it is not the rule in England and some of the states. Fletcher v.
London & North Western Railway Co., [1892] 1 Q. B. 122; Pietsch v.
Pietsch, 245 Ill. 454, 458. 92 N. E. 325, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 218; Haley
v. Western Transit Co., 76 Wis. 344, 45 N. W. 16; Sullivan v. Williamson,
21 Okl. 844, 98 Pac. 1001."
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This is an action on the case in the circuit court of Bureau all’/I
county to recover damages for personal injury sustained in
the appellant’s

DUNN,

J .—*i

coal mine.
"‘

i

“

*

t

t
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#

t
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1

Complaint is made of the conduct of counsel for the ap
pellee in the course of the trial.
The counsel who made
“In this case
the opening statement to the jury began:
Patrick McCarthy, thirty-three years of age, with a wife
and ﬁve children,” when he was interrupted with an objec
' “ "‘
tion, which the court sustained.
The statement to the jury that the appellee had a wife
and ﬁve children was manifestly improper. Its only object
could have been to enhance the damages by getting before
the jury, in this improper and unprofessional manner, facts
calculated to arouse their sympathy, which counsel knew
could not in any legitimate way be brought to their atten
tion.
To admit evidence of such facts is error.
(Jones &
Adams Co. 'v. George, 227 Ill. 64.) The fact once lodged in
the minds of the jury could not be erased by an instruction,
and appellee by his statement secured the beneﬁt of the
fact to the same extent as if he had introduced evidence
to prove it.
Q

I

U

#

1

Q

i i

Q

1

The Appellate Court required a rcmittitur of $2000 from
the judgment as the alternative of a reversal on account of
the effect on the minds of the jury of the improper state
ment in regard to appellee's wife and children.
Such re
mittitur does not, however, cure the error.
(Jones &
It is impossible to tell the
Adams C0. v. George, supra.)
effect, on the verdict, of the impressions wrongfully con
veyed to the jury’s mind by the improper conduct of coun
sel.

.
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The judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded.
for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.

/O 5’

‘V
LA

WAGONER

v.

HAZLE TOWNSHIP.
'

S'l1»2?1‘6m6 C ourt of P ennsy z vania.
215

'

P ennsy lvama Stat e,

1906‘

-

219 .

MESTREZAT, J.—The proximate cause of Mrs. Wagoner’s
Injuries was the hole or opening in the bridge, and if the
jury found, as they did, that the hole was caused by the
negligence of the defendant township, its liability necessarily

followed.

I i i I

Q

l l

1

I l

The question of Mrs. Wagoner’s contributory negligence
was for the jury.
The facts were not undisputed.
The
plaintiffs claim that after the wheel of the wagon had gone
into the opening in the bridge she attempted to alight from
the wagon, and was in the act of doing so at the time it
was struck by the car of the Lehigh Traction Company, and
that her conduct in no way contributed to her injuries.
What she did on that occasion, and Whether she acted with
the prudence required of her, were for the jury.
Prior to the present action the plaintiffs brought suit
against the Lehigh Traction Company to recover damages
for the same injuries, and obtained a verdict of $6,000. The
case, on appeal, was heard by this court last year, and the
judgment was reversed and a new trial was awarded.
On
plaintiff
present
action the counsel for the
the trial of the
in the presence of the jury and where they could distinctly
“We now offer in evi
hear it, made the following offer:
dence the record in that case, for the purpose of showing
that the jury gave the plaintiff a verdict of six thousand
dollars, and that the case was appealed to the Supreme
Court and that the Supreme Court reversed the judgment
of the court below, practically saying that it was not re
sponsible, but that the township was bound to keep its own
Thereupon the defendant’s counsel said:
road in repair.”
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“We object and move that a juror be withdrawn,.because
of the statement made by the attorney for the plaintiff, in
full voice before the jury, as to the amount of the other
verdict.”, The court declined to withdraw a juror and the
defendant excepted to the ruling. We think the court
mitted error for which the judgment must be reversed.
The offer was clearly incompetent, and the only purpose
could serve, or effect
could have, would be to place
before the jury the amount of the large verdict in the Le
high Traction Company case. The counsel should not have
made the offer, and after he had made it,
was the duty
of the court to protect the defendant against its effect. The
purposes of the offer was obvious, and its effect would be
equally apparent.
Such conduct on the part of counsel
from
an
unintentional or inadvertent remark to
different
a jury which does the opposite party no injury.
VVhen
they
may
may
such remarks are made
or
not have an in
ﬂuence upon the jury, but there can be no question about
the effect upon the tribunal of an offer to show what
former jury, dealing with the same facts, had determined
as to the amount of damages due the plaintiffs for the in
criterion for the jury
juries which they sustained. It was
considering
they
evidently
the case which
would accept,
in
and which no language of the trial judge could drive from
their minds. The offer got before the jury what was clearly
incompetent and what- manifestly would, to some extent at
least, control their verdict.
The only way to remedy the
wrong was to withdraw a juror and compel the plaintiffs
to submit the cause to another jury, uninﬁuenced by such
wholly irrelevant and incompetent matter.

a

it

When an attorney in the trial of a cause willfully and in
tentionally makes an offer of wholly irrelevant and incom
petent evidence, or makes improper statements as to the
facts in his address to the jury, clearly unsupported by
any evidence, which are prejudicial and harmful to the
opposite party,
is the plain duty of the trial judge, of
his own motion, to act promptly and effectively by repri
juror and continuing
manding counsel and withdrawing
In no other way can
the cause at the cost of the client.
justice be administered and the rights of the injured party
be protected.
The imposition of the costs will remind the

TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRAcT1cE

378

[Chap.

3

client that he has an attorney unfaithful to him as well
as to the court.
The obligation of ﬁdelity to the court
attorney
which an
assumes on his admission to the bar is
ever thereafter with him, and when he attempts to defeat
the justice of a cause by interjecting into the trial wholly
foreign and irrelevant matter for the manifest purpose of
misleading the jury, he fails to observe the duty required
of him as an attorney and his conduct should receive the con
demnation of the court.
This condemnation can _and should
be made effective.

~_

The ninth assignment of error is sustained and the judg
ment of the court below is reversed with a venire facias de
novo.

'06]

TOLEDO, ST. LOUIS & WEsTERN
BURR.
~_,_..\

O/V

l

Supreme

Court of Ohio.

RAILROAD co.

v.

1910.

82 Ohio State, 129.

This action was originally commenced in the court of
common pleas of Henry County, Ohio, by Burr & Jeakle
and The Ohio German Fire Insurance Company as plain
tiffs, against The Toledo, St. Louis & Western Railroad Com
pany as defendant, to recover damages from said railroad
company for the destruction by ﬁre—alleged to have been
communicated by sparks emitted from one of defendant’s
locomotive engines—of a sawmill owned by said Burr &
Jeakle and insured by them in The Ohio German Fire Insur
"'
*
*
ance Company.
CREW, J.—The only error assigned in this case which
need be specially considered in this opinion, is that of the
alleged misconduct of counsel in the argument of the case
to the jury. Upon the argument of this cause in the court
of common pleas one of the counsel for plaintiffs stated to
the jury among other things, “that within thirty days after
the occurrence of this ﬁre, Mr. Schmettau, as counsel for
the defendant, made an offer of settlement, and that offer
was repeated as late as the day of the commencement of
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this trial.”

To this statement the defendant by its counsel
And thereupon, to quote from
then and there excepted.
the record, ”counsel who had made the statement, stated
to the jury that he withdrew the statement objected to,”
and the court then instructed the jury as follows:
“Gentle
men of the jury, it becomes my duty to say to you on this
question that here is absolutely no evidence in this case that
either party ever wanted to settle or that any attempt was
ever made to settle; and I will say to you further, as a
matter of law, that if the parties had gotten together in an
effort to settle this case, the law wouldn't permit such effort
to settle to be given to the jury in evidence; it is your duty
to disregard absolutely the whole of any statement by any
counsel to the effect that any effort was made to settle this
case or any other case.” And thereupon the argument pro
That the statements thus made by counsel tran
ceeded.
scended the bounds of legitimate argument and were grossly
improper, is both obvious and conceded, but it is claimed
that any prejudicial effect which such statements may have
had was removed or cured by the subsequent action of court
This conclusion, we think, by no means fol
and counsel.
lows, nor does it affirmatively appear in this case that such
While it is true that
conclusion is justiﬁed by the facts.
courts of last resort have frequently, though not uniformly,
held the rule to be, that the prejudice, if any, resulting from
the misconduct of counsel in argument to the jury may be
eliminated or cured by the prompt withdrawal of the ob
jectionable statements made by counsel, accompanied by an
instruction from the court to the jury to disregard such
statements, yet this rule, so far as our examination of the
authorities has disclosed, is recognized and applied by the
courts in those cases only, where it is made to appear by the
record from a consideration of the character of the state
ments made, that their prejudicial effect has probably been
"
*
and instruction.
by such withdrawal
averted
When we consider, in the present case, that there was no
direct evidence establishing the origin of this ﬁre, and that
upon the whole of the evidence adduced on the trial the
question of defendant’s negligence and consequent liability
was at best a very close question of fact involved in much
uncertainty and doubt, the harmful and extremely preju
dicial effect of a statement by counsel to the jury, that soon

'
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after the ﬁre the railroad company had offered to settle the
loss, and that such offer had been renewed on the very day
the trial commenced, becomes at once perfectly apparent.
And the attempted withdrawal of these statements from the
jury was, we think, wholly impotent to rid them of the
mischievous inference that they were nevertheless true; and
was utterly ineffectual to dislodge or remove from the minds
of the jurors the harmful impression, which such statements
were calculated, and obviously intended, to produce.
S
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Judgments of the circuit court and of the court of common
pleas reversed, and cause remanded to the latter court for
a re-trial according to law.

13
Gov“

MURPHY’S EXECUTOR

v.

HOAGLAND.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
82

1908.

Kentucky Law Reporter, 889.

LASSING, J. This is a contest over the will of John, com
*
*
*
monly known as “Pat” Murphy.

i
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Appellant also complains of the misconduct of counsel
for the contestants during the progress of the trial. Dur
ing the course of the cross-examination
of the witnesses,
Margaret Devereaux, counsel for contestants asked this
question:
“Do you know how many of the jurors wanted
to break it,” (referring to the will of John Murphy at the
last trial thereof), and continued, “Don't you know, as a
matter of fact, that eight stood for breaking the will?”
This question was at once objected to by counsel for the
The learned
propounder and the objection was sustained.
counsel must have known that any question which referred
to the result or the partial result of a former trial of the
Propounder’s
case was very improper, in fact inexcusable.
counsel could not permit the question to go unnoticed, and
the very fact that he objected, but served to emphasize its
importance in the minds of the jurors. They may have, and
doubtless did, attach much importance to the question which
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was asked and objected to by counsel for the propounder,
and even though it was excluded by the court, the jurors,
being sensible and intelligent men, could not rid their minds
of the information which this question gave them, to-wit:
That eight jurors had, on a previous trial, stood for breaking
They no doubt reasoned among themselves that
the will.
this
not
been true, the propounder would not have ob
had
jected to its being asked, and, being taken as true, it was in
fact stating to the jury that, while you are to try this case
according to the evidence, we want you to know that, at
least, eight jurors on a former trial believed that the will
should not be permitted
*

ll

$

to stand.
1

Ii

i I

Q

¥

#

For the reasons given the judgment is reversed and cause
remanded, for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.“

_'

98 See Cosselmon
v. Dunfee, (1902) 172 N. Y. 507 and Simpson v.
Foundation Co., (1911) 201 N. Y. 479, in condemnation of the too preva
lent practice in negligence cases of bringing out the fact through im
proper questions or answers, that the defendant is insured against lla
bllity for accidental injuries.

LOUISVILLE

,

1

‘X
" .._

ll“
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&

NASHVILLE RAILROAD co.
REAUME.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
32

Kentucky Law Reporter,

v.

1908.
9./,6.

CARROLL, J. Appellee, who was a passenger on one of
appellant’s trains, was injured by the derailment of the train
at a point near Zion station, on the line of its railroad be
In an action brought by
tween Cincinnati and Louisville.
her to recover damages for injuries received, the jury re
turned a verdict in her favor for ten thousand dollars.
"
"‘
‘ Much is also said about the misconduct of appel
lee's counsel in continuing to ask questions that the trial
It is improper for counsel
court had ruled incompetent.
persist
asking
questions
in
that
the court has ruled to
to
be incompetent, the purpose being to impress the jury with
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the importance of the facts that have been excluded from
their consideration.
When the court has sustained an ob
question,
to
is the privilege of counsel to make
n avowal as to what the witness would say if permitted to
nswer, and this avowal he has the right to have put in
ecord for the purpose of an appeal.
But the question ex
cluded should not be again asked the same witness in like
or a different form, unless
be that the objection was made
question
the
to
because of the form in which
was put. If
this is the ground upon which the objection is based, coun
sel should, of course, be permitted to ask the question in
proper form, so that the objection may go to the competency
or relevancy of it. As an illustration of the manner in
which counsel for appellee sought to get before the jury
incompetent evidence, he repeatedly asked in different forms
and ways—if the railroad company had not settled or at»
tempted to settle with other persons injured in the same
wreck; and also concerning the condition of the health of
appellee’s father and other members of her family. A party
will not be permitted, by indirect means, to acquaint the
jury with facts which he is not allowed to bring to their
If this practice was permitted
notice by direct evidence.
to go without criticism, or could be indulged in, without suf
fering the penalty of reversal, the trial judge, after exhaust
ing all other means, could not, unless he felt -inclined to
resort to contempt proceedings, prevent the mind of the
jury from being prejudiced by the efforts of counsel to put
before them, in an indirect way, evidence that was incom
petent.
Skilled counsel in resorting to practices of this
character, have in view the effect that
will produce on
the jury and their expectations- are too frequently well
jury to escape from being
founded, as
difficult for
impressed in some manner by the insistence with which
damaging, but incompetent, evidence
offered and the ob
If practice of
jections of adverse counsel to
sustained.
indulged
counsel,
persistently
by
although the
in
this kind is
would as surely
trial judge repeatedly tried to prevent it,
grounds
any
for reversal as
other substantial error that
be
case.
party might commit in the trial of
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of the Supreme
I911.
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or Issues

Court of New York.

Appelwte Division, 1.

INGRAHAM, P. J. The New York County Lawyers’ Asso
ciation presented a petition to this court asking for the dis
barment of the respondent.
The charges in the petition are as follows: The respond
ent brought an action for one Rosenblatt in the United States
Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York to
recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been
A Dr.
caused by a ﬁrm consisting of Gould & Eberhardt.
professionally
respondent’s
had
attended
the
client
Dawbarn
for the injuries alleged to have been received. " "‘ " The
hospital records disclosed facts which would seriously affect
the plaintiff’s right to recover, and the respondent alleges
that the testimony of the doctor as to the facts disclosed
upon the operation that the doctor had performed upon the
plaintiff, in that action, was essential to a recovery.
That
being the situation, he ﬁrst drew up, executed, and deliv
ered to the doctor an agreement to pay him one-thi-rd of the
recovery and subsequently drew up and delivered to the doc
tor another agreement to pay him the same fee that he
should pay to the counsel who had tried the case.
Thus a
person who was to be examined as a witness received from
the attorney who expected to call him an agreement by
which the attorney agreed to pay him if he would testify
a substantial portion of the recovery which would result
from the testimony this witness was to give upon the trial,
and the bald question that we have presented is whether the
making of such an agreement between an attorney who rep
resented a party to an action and a person who was to be
called as a witness to prove the cause of action is profes
sional misconduct.
The law recognizes a contract between an attorney and
his client by which the attorney is to receive for the services
that he renders in an action a sum of money contingent upon
success, and the law also allows a party to an action who is
vitally interested in the result of the trial the right to give
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testimony to be considered by the court or jury in deter
mining the questions at issue. The interest of a party to
an action giving such testimony is, however, apparent from
the nature of the case, and the weight to be given to such
testimony is to be considered in view of the interest of the
But, when other witnesses are called to
party testifying.
substantiate a claim or defense, they occupy an entirely
They appear as witnesses, and, in the
different position.
absence of proof of facts showing interest in the case, their
testimony stands on a very different plane from that of
interested witnesses, whose testimony is allowed, but whose
interest in the result of the controversy leaves their credi
bility a question to be determined by the court or jury.
Article 76 of the penal law prescribes penalties for using
forged or fraudulently altered evidence or inducing another
"
‘ *
to give false testimony on the trial.
It is the object of these provisions to surround the giving
of testimony with all the safeguards possible to prevent the
giving of false testimony upon a trial or other judicial pro
ceeding, and yet every one who is familiar with the adminis
tration of justice has constantly called to his attention the
prevalence of perjury by parties and witnesses in judicial
proceedings.
If agreements between attorneys and witnesses upon
whose testimony the clients’ cases depend to share in the
attorneys’ fees for conducting the prosecution are to be
approved, it will be almost impossible to prevent perjury
and the violation of these provisions of the penal law to
which attention has been called. The only safeguard lies in
the fact that the attorney is an officer of the court upon
whom rests the responsibility of preventing false or perjured
testimony and calling only those witnesses whom he believes
to be truthful witnesses testifying to facts as they under
stand them to be, and there can be no greater professional
misconduct than for an attorney and counselor at law to
make agreement by which a witness is to share in the result
of the action, and then calling the witness and offering his
evidence to the court and jury as testimony to influence them
A witness
in the determination of the questions submitted.
who demands and receives compensation or a promise of
compensation for giving his testimony is necessarily a dis
credited witness, and an attorney and counselor at law who
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knowingly makes an agreement with a witness, by which he
agrees to pay a witness a sum of money or an interest in
the recovery as compensation for the giving of particular
testimony rather than other testimony, or in consequence
of an express or implied threat to testify against a party
proposing to call him as a witness, unless he receives com
pensation from the party proposing to call him, is making
an agreement which is plainly contrary to public policy,
and one which is subversive of the orderly and efficient ad
ministration of justice. We are aware that witnesses who are
to be called to give expert testimony which involves the spe
cial knowledge and skill of the witness and often require
examination and study upon a particular branch of science
are from the necessity of the case justified in demanding and
receiving compensation for the time and labor devoted to
the investigation of the particular science about which they
are to testify, but this practice has been allowed from the
necessity of the case and the inability of courts and juries to
determine questions without the beneﬁt of such expert
knowledge.
And there has grown up a habit in cases where
witnesses who are in impoverished circumstances can be
paid by the party calling them for the time actually lost in
attending at court or before the tribunal where they are to
But in all these cases the witness receives
give testimony.
compensation, not for swearing to a particular state of facts,
but for the time and labor expended in the investigation
of an abstruse subject about which testimony is to be given
or the time lost in attending at the tribunal where the tes
Such an agreement, however, can
timony is to be given.
never be valid where the amount to be paid is to depend
upon the testimony that he is to give, and where his right
to compensation depends upon the result of the litigation in
which he testiﬁes. It is apparent, therefore, that the mere
making of such an agreement as the respondent admits he
made in this case by which a witness that he intended to
call and did call to prove his case should have a substantial
portion of the recovery, if one was obtained, is a most seri
ous professional misconduct demanding the strongest con
demnation.

aa=¢:u‘t_n==u##

The question, then, is what the punishment should be. The
serious aspect of this case is the way that the respondent has
25
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treated this charge.
Both in the Municipal Court action
and in this proceeding, he seems to have considered as a
defense to this charge that this proposed witness exacted this
agreement as a condition to his testifying to the facts re
quired by the respondent and his client, and the fact that a
witness made a demand for compensation for giving testi
mony in a particular way which would be favorable to the
respondent and his client with a threat that he would testify
to a different state of facts if the agreement for compensa
tion was not given seem to be looked upon as a complete
defense to a charge of professional misconduct for making
such an agreement.
It is the attitude of the respondent in
making the agreements and in his answer to these charges
that forces us to the conclusion that he is not ﬁt to remain a
member of a profession the proper performance of whose
duties requires honesty and integrity.
The testimony given by Dr. Dawbarn was in an action
tried in the United States Circuit Court, and, in view of that
testimony, the facts as they now appear by his own affidavit
should be considered by the United States attorney; and the
petitioner should, we think, call his attention to the facts
appearing upon this application.
It follows, therefore, that upon the respondent’s own state
ment of his connection with this transaction he must be dis
All con
barred, and the application is therefore granted.

cur.“
64"As otﬁcers ot the court, the duties of counsel are not in conﬂict
of a party.
with those which devolve upon him as the representative
*
"'
"
It is not the duty of counsel to suggest points of law which
are against his client; but it is his duty to insist upon no point. which
he knows to be contrary to law."—Moody v. Davis, (1851) 10 Ga. 403, 410.

-Pl

IN RE CAHILL.

/ I

@/";_n.*-‘Sup
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66

Court of New Jersey.

1901.

New Jersey Law, 527.

FORT, J. Upon a proceeding in the court of chancery in
the case of Rilcer v. Riker, on a petition for divorce, it ap
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peared, during the taking of the depositions therein, that
the suit was instituted and carried on by collusion between
the parties to the record, and that the defendant in the peti
"‘
*
*
tion was paying the costs of the suit:
Mr. Cahill
allegation,
and
claims
that he was without
denied each
knowledge of the collusive character of the divorce suit.
‘ “ * But it does appear from the evidence, and it is
proven, that Mr. Cahill knew that this divorce was being
sought by collusive action of the parties.
That conclusion is
irresistible. " “ *

It seems hard to believe that the least inquiry or examina
tion would not have shown to Mr. Cahill that the adultery
which he was informed was the ground for the divorce was
“done with an intent to procure a divorce,” and we have
already found, under the evidence herein, that the complaint
was made by collusion between the parties, “for the purpose
of dissolving their marriage,” and that too, with Cahill’s
knowledge.
A solicitor cannot shut his eyes to facts and say,

“I did not see them,” when he would have seen them if he
had kept his eyes open.
_The court must feel that it can rely implicitly upon the
and recitals of fact by its attorneys and
representations
solicitors. If a solicitor allows a petition for divorce to be
presented to the court, with an aﬁidavit of noncollusion
which he knows to be false, he participates in an attempt
to deceive the court. Such conduct in an ofﬁcer of the court
The court has the right to rely
is highly reprehensible.
upon the integrity of its officers. The legal profession is a
conﬁdential one, with a double duty upon its members, viz.
A lawyer
utmost good faith towards both client and court.
who seeks by trick or by deception to impose upon either his
client or the court is unﬁtted to advise the one or to appear
before the other. He desecrates the temple of Justice.
It is quite gratifying to be unable to recall any previous
The
case of this nature having been presented to this court.
high
a
maintained
standard
has
of
this
state
ethics
in
bar of
its relation with the court. It is greatly to be regretted that
this single instance of apparent lapse in this regard should
‘ ‘ “‘
have occurred.
An order will be entered that John Francis Cahill be sus
pended as an attorney of this court until the ﬁrst day of the
November term of the supreme court for the year nineteen
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hundred and three, and that he be
ing as an attorney or a solicitor in
state until said date, upon pain of
roll absolutely, if he shall violate
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any of the courts of this
being stricken from the
the order of suspension.

STATE.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
100 Wisconsin,

1898.

301.

J.

The errors assigned on behalf of plaintiff
in error will be considered in their order and are as fol
lows: " ' ' (2) permitting the prosecuting attorney to
use improper language, detrimental to the accused, in clos
*
' '
ing his argument to the jury;
MARSHALL,
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attorney was permitted to say, in
closing the case to the jury, replying to remarks of the at
torney for the accused regarding the testimony of William
Spaulding: “What would counsel have him do? Come here
and shower bouquets on the assassin of his brother? Crown
him with a wreath of laurels?” And also permitting the
district attorney to say, in substance, that there was mur
der in the heart of the accused as he proceeded to and
effected the homicide,—that he had murder in his heart, in
his eye, and in his brain; that he stood where the tracks in
dicated to get a good aim; the object of his vengeance was
coming, sitting on the wood in full view; he (the accused)
was a crack shot and knew it; he cocked his gun, drew the
2.

The prosecuting

bead on the deceased, and the deed was done, and a son and
brother was sent to his Maker without a moment's warning,
by the act of an assassin,-as vile an act as ever happened
on earth; so foul that it would be worthy of the vicegerent
of the monarch of hell. That such language, with the ear
nestness with which we may well assume the words were ut
tered in the closing moments of an important trial, was
highly calculated to carry the jury along the line of thought
which it indicated, that is, that the accused was guilty, can
not be doubted; but whether it was outside the case, or
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tended unfairly to inﬂuence the jury, and to swerve them
from the duty of deciding the case on the evidence, and that
alone, in the light of the law governing the subject, is quite
another question.
So long as counsel did not depart from
the evidence produced, but conﬁned his argument to rea
soning from that up to the conclusion that it established
guilt, however eloquently and persuasively he may have
handled his subject, it was not only legitimate but commend
able. Within the record in this regard, the ﬁeld is broad,
and the license of the advocate, and duty as well, permits
him to say with the utmost freedom what the evidence tends
to prove, and that it convinces him, and should convince the
jurors as well, of the fact in issue. "' * " So long as the
advocate keeps within the record, the accused has no legiti
mate ground of complaint.
That appears to be what was
nothing to indicate that the
done in this case.
is
There
district attorney asserted that the accused was a murderer
or assassin, except with reference to the offense for which
he was being tried, and as he drew that conclusion from the
It was the inevitable conclusion of the line of
evidence.
argument pursued by the prosecutor, from the evidence, and
could not have been otherwise understood by the jury.
It
is quite unlike Scott v. State, 91 Wis. 552, where the district
attorney spoke of the accused as a thief, not with reference
to the offense for which he was on trial, but as a fact tending
to establish guilt of that offense.
#
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The judgment is aﬁirmed.

BROOKLYN ELEVATED RAILROAD
»

Court of Appeals of New York.
126

CO.

1891.

New York, 96.

This action was brought to recover damages to plaintiff's
premises in Brooklyn, caused by the erection and operation
of defendant’s elevated railroad upon the street in front of
them.
*
ANDREWS, J. ‘ *
It
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The counsel for the plaintiff, in his address to the jury,
after referring to “the utter disregard of the rights of the
private citizens by corporations,” proceeded to read from a
newspaper, “The New York Tribune,” an article headed
“Only a Boy Peddler,” purporting to be an account of the
death of a boy, “a little fellow ﬁfteen years old, a Rouman
ian, a stranger in its great city (New York), selling collar
buttons and pocket combs from a modest tray, to help sup
port his mother and eight brothers and sisters,” caused by
his touching an electric wire which, the article stated, had
been left swinging for months from a pole near which the

“
"
"
boy had taken his stand.
When the counsel for the plaintiff commenced reading
the article the defendant’s counsel interposed and objected
to the reading, and asked the court to prevent it. The court
overruled the objection, and the defendant’s counsel ex
cepted. "‘ " "‘
The reading by counsel in summing up to the jury of the
newspaper article “Only a Boy Peddler,” was wholly irrel
evant to the case.
It could have been read for no purpose
except to infiuence the jury against corporations and to lead
them, under the influence of a just anger excited by the in
cident narrated, to give liberal damages to the plaintiff in
the case on trial.
The refusal of the court to interfere,
under the circumstances of this case, was legal error. The
privilege of counsel and the largest liberality in construing
it did not authorize such a totally irrelevant and prejudicial
"'
*
*
proceeding.
We think the judgment in this case should be reversed
upon the exception taken to the reading of the newspaper

article.
Judgment reversed and new trial ordered.“
65 In Bjoraker v. Chicago,
M. & St. P. Ry. Co., (1908) 103 Minn. 400,
where plaintiffs attorney, in a personal injury case, had referred in
somewhat dramatic language to the poverty and helplessness of plain
tiff and his aged mother, contrasting it with the opulence of the officials
of the defendant railroad, stating (without evidence to support it) that
the earnings for two hours of the great Milwaukee system would pay
any verdict the jury might give, the court, in ordering a new trial,
“If attorneys will persist in indulging in such intemperate and
said:
unwarranted speeches to juries, they must expect that the verdicts which
are obtained will he set aside. " "‘ * It is simply an appeal to passion
and prejudice,
calculated
to carry the jury beyond the case and
induce a verdict for a large amount against the railway company, on

_

_

_

___
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the ground that the plaintiff is poor and unfortunate and the defendant
is able to pay."

§ '\

6

A-KQAMPBELL
é/(4/vlv

v.

MAHER.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
105

J

1885.

Indiana, 888.

ELLIOTT, . In the course of his argument to the jury the
“The record in this case
counsel for the appellee said:
shows that the plaintiff was not willing to try this case at
his home in Daviess county, among his neighbors, but has
brought the case to Pike county on a change of venue, among
strangers.” The appellant objected, and the court, as the
record recites, “remarked that it was not improper for coun
sel to refer to matters which were disclosed by the record,
since the whole record was before the jury, but that the argu
ment of counsel had gone too far, and should be limited to the
What followed is thus exhibited in the record:
record.”
“And thereupon counsel for the plaintiff resumed his seat,
and the counsel for the defendant again turned to the jury,
‘The court says I may
and. resuming his argument, said:
refer to the record. Gentlemen, the record of this case shows
that the cause was brought from Daviess county to this coun
ty on the motion of the plaintiff.’ To which statement the
plaintiff’s counsel again objected, and again assigned in sup
port of his objection the reasons assigned by him in support
of the objection to argument of defendant's counsel herein
above set out, but the court overruled said objection, to which
the plaintiff’s counsel excepted, whereupon the defendant's
counsel again turned to the jury and said: ‘Gentlemen of the
jury, I have only stated to you what the record in this cause
shows to be true, and the court has decided that I have a right
"
to do this.’
The trial court was unquestionably wrong in ruling that
everything that appears in the record is the subject of argu
ment to the jury, for there are many things which the record
Juries, as
discloses that the jury have no right to consider.
try
the case “according to the
every one knows, are sworn to
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law and the evidence,” and an argument must be conﬁned to
the evidence and the law. Where a party secures a legal right
according to law, the fact that he has secured it can not be
used to his prejudice.
A change of venue is a legal right, and
where it is awarded by the court in conformity to law, it can
not be used to the prejudice of the party by whom it was ob
tained, nor can it be commented on in argument.
It would be
a perversion of law to permit the exercise of a legal right, un
der the order of the court, to be made the subject of consid
eration by a jury. We need not, however, discuss this ques
tion further for it is settled against the appellee by authority.
Farman 'v. Lauman, 73 Ind. 568.

I I I I I I I I I I

Judgment reversed.

W

}/ 7

WILKIN,

It

WILKINSON

v.

PEOPLE.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

1907.

226 Illinois, 135.

J.
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is insisted that the judgment below should be reversed
because one of the attorneys who appears as counsel for the
People and argued the case orally in this court was a leading
and material witness on behalf of the prosecution in the court
below. In justiﬁcation of his conduct it is insisted that there
is no law in this State, statutory or otherwise, forbidding an
attorney to be a witness and at the same time an attorney in
a case. Doubtless that is true; but courts have generally con
demned the practice as one which should be discountenanced
We said, speaking
and of doubtful professional propriety.
by Justice Breese, in Morgan v. Roberts, 38 Ill. 65, on page
85: “We are not advised that it is contrary to any statute or
to any maxim of the common law to make the attorney in a
This is a mat
cause a witness in the cause he is managing.
ter which appeals to the professional pride of an attorney and
his sense of his true position and duty. In the English courts,
in several cases, it was held that an attorney cannot appear
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in the same cause in the double capacity of witness and ad
vocate, and it has been so ruled in Pennsylvania and in Iowa,
on the circuit. In Indiana it was held by Judge McDonald,
now United States district judge, that an attorney in a cause
could not be permitted to testify to the general merits of the
case.
In Frear u. Drinker, 8 Pa. St. Rep. 521, the court said
that it was a highly indecent practice for an attorney to cross
examine witnesses, address the jury and give evidence him
self to contradict the witness; that it was a practice to be
discountenanced by court and counsel; that it was sometimes
indispensable that an attorney, to prevent injustice, should
give evidence for his client. It, however, leads to abuse. But
at the same time there was no law to prevent it. All the court
can do is to discountenance the practice, and, when the evi
dence is indispensable, to recommend to the counsel to with
draw from the cause. This subject has engaged the attention
of other courts and of this court, and however indecent it may
be in practice for an attorney retained in a case and manag
ing it, to be a witness also, we cannot say he is incompetent,
and must leave him to his own convictions of what is right
and proper under such circumstances.”
The fact that he does appear in this record in the unenvi
able attitude of a willing witness and a zealous attorney
should not, perhaps, work a reversal of the judgment below
if the record were in all other respects free from error, but
we cannot overlook such professional impropriety when our
attention is called to it.
Other grounds of reversal urged have received considera
tion, but we think they are without substantial merit.
For the errors indicated the judgment below will be re
versed.
CARTER,

J

Judgment reversed.“
.,

dissenting.

66Neither the civil law nor the French law allowed an attorney to
testify for his client,—Granon v. I-Iartshorne, (1834) Fed Cas. No. 5689;
and new trials have been granted on the ground of such testimony in
England.—Stones v. Byron, (1846) 16 L. J. Q. B. 32, Dunn v. Packwood,
(1846)

11

Jur.

242.

In Jacobs v. Weissinger, (1920) 211 Mich. 47, the court said that the
consideration of such testimony by the court was “always a matter of
embarrassment,
because it is difficult to distinguish between the zeal
of the advocate and the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested
witness."
"it is unseemly tor a member oi the bar voluntarily to place himself
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in a position where his duty to his client requires him to address court
or jury on the question what degree of credibility should be given to
his own sworn testimony/'—New York Cent. & H. R. RR. Co. v. Henney,
'
(1913) 207 Fed. 78, 124 C. C. A. 635.
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Supreme Court of Illinois.

CARTWRIGHT,
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It is the province of the jury to determine the facts, but it
is the province and the duty of the courts to see that every
litigant has a fair trial in accordance with the law, and it is
complained that the verdict, which was very large, was in
creased and brought about by the conduct of the attorney for
the plaintiff on the trial.
The record of the trial from the
time the jury were sworn until the argument began contains
330 pages, and it is impracticable to give such a detailed
statement as would furnish a complete understanding of the
grounds for complaint.
There were continual side remarks
by plaintiff's attorney, interruptions in the examination of
witnesses conducted by the attorneys for the defendant, com
ments on the evidence, assertions of fact that would be
proved, epithets and remarks, and an attitude of disrespect
toward the court, such as statements that the attorney was
going to yield to the opinion of the court, but believed that he
was right. His conduct was correctly characterized by the
Appellate Court as consisting of a running fusilade of inter
cross-talk, and side remarks, in
ruptions, contradictions,
dulged in over repeated objections by counsel for the defend
ant, and persisted in over repeated warnings and admoni
tions of the court, and showing disrespect for all rules and
ethics in the practice of the law. The Appellate Court said
that the trial judge must certainly have been the personiﬁca
tion of “patience on a monument” to be able to refrain from
enforcing proper decorum, but said that it would be unwar
ranted to reverse the judgment, and thereby penalize plaintiff
for the conduct of his counsel, for which it did not appear he
was in any wise responsible.
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We do not concur with the Appellate Court that the judg
ment for the complainant could not be reversed for the con
duct of his counsel, or that he was not responsible for it.
That would be to reverse every rule of law approved by the
judgment of mankind as to the responsibility of a principal
for acts of his agent, or an employer for acts of his servant.
The law holds the principal responsible for the acts and dere
lictions of his agent within the authority conferred, and the
master for the conduct of his servant and injuries occasioned
A client is
by him within the scope of his employment.
bound, according to the ordinary rules of agency, by the acts
of his attorney within the scope of the att0rney’s authority,
and to say that he is not responsible for misconduct of his
attorney is to visit the evil consequences upon an unoffending
party. Not only is that true, but if such a rule is adopted the
services of an attorney able to get unjust verdicts by unfair
means, or prevent just verdicts by like means, would be in
very great demand, and his professional prospects greatly en
hanced, to the public injury. The Appellate Court did not
ﬁnd anything in the record to indicate that the defendant was
injured by the course pursued by the attorney for the plain
tiff, but we do not agree that such is a fact. Not only was it
impossible to have a fair trial in the state of disorder, con
fusion, and disturbance unusual in a court of record, but it
was impossible for the defendant to make any fair presenta
tion of the situation. The conduct of the attorney was such
as would naturally enhance the damages which the jury were
advised they could allow in the exercise of their discretion.
The learned judge exhibited rare patience and ability in his
rulings, and there was no error on his part in the trial or in
instructing the_ jury. He protested constantly against the
conduct of the attorney, and warned him how the record
would appear; but when he said that the record would show
matters that he was very much afraid of, and would not look
very good, the attorney said, “I don't care how it looks.” The
verdict obtained by the means employed in this case cannot be
permitted to stand.
The judgments of the Appellate Court and circuit court are
reversed, and the cause remanded to the circuit court.
Reversed and remanded.
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Attempts to Erert Personal Inﬂuence on the Court.
3.
Marked attention and unusual hospitality on the part of a
lawyer to
Judge, uncalled for by the personal relations of
the parties, subject both the Judge and the lawyer to miscon
structions of motive and should be avoided. A lawyer should
not communicate or argue privately with the Judge as to the
pending cause, and he deserves rebuke and de
merits of
Judge
nunciation for any device or attempt to gain from
A self-respecting
special personal consideration or favor.
independence in the discharge of professional duty, without
denial or diminution of the courtesy and respect due the
Judge’s station,
the only proper foundation for cordial
personal and official relations between Bench and Bar.
The Defense or Prosecution of Those Accused of
5.
Crime. It
the right of the lawyer to undertake the defense
of person accused of crime, regardless of his personal opin
ion as to the guilt of the accused; otherwise innocent persons,
victims only of suspicious circumstances, might be denied
proper defense. Having undertaken such defense, the lawyer
is bound by all fair and honorable means, to present every
defense that the law of the land permits, to the end that no
person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process
of law.
_
lawyer engaged in public prosecu
The primary duty of
convict,
not to
but to see that justice
done.
tion
The sup
pression of facts or the secreting of witnesses capable of es
tablishing the innocence of the accused is highly repre
hensible.

How Far a Lawyer May Go in Supporting a Client's
Nothing operates more certainly to create or to fos
class, and to de
ter popular prejudice against lawyers as
prive the profession of that full measure of public esteem and
conﬁdence which belongs to the proper discharge of its du
15.

a

Cause.

<

a

is

it

ties than does the false claim, often set up by the unscrupu
lous in defense of questionable transactions, that
the duty
of the lawyer to do whatever may enable him to succeed in
winning his client's cause.
It is improper for lawyer to assert in argument his per
sonal belief in his client’s innocence or in the justice of his
‘cause.
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The lawyer owes “entire devotion to the interest of the
client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights
and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the
end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by
the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor
or public unpopularity should restrain him from the full dis
charge of his duty. In the judicial forum the client is entitled
to the beneﬁt of any and every remedy and defense that is au
thorized by the law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer
to assert every such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly
to be -borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to
be performed within and not without the bounds of the law.
The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it de
mand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of
fraud of chicane. He must obey his own conscience and not
that of his client.
Restraining Clients from Improprieties.
A lawyer
16.
should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his cli
ents from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought
not to do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards
courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors.
If a
wrongdoing
lawyer
persists
client
in such
the
should termi
nate their relation.
Ill-feeling and Personalities Between Advocates.
17.
Cli
ents, not lawyers, are the litigants. Whatever may be the ill
feeling existing between clients, it should not be allowed to
inﬂuence counsel in their conduct and demeanor toward each
other or toward suitors in the case. All personalities between
counsel should be scrupulously avoided.
In the trial of a
cause it is indecent to allude to the personal history or the
personal peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of counsel on the
other side. Personal colloquies between counsel which cause
delay and promote unseemly wrangling should also be care

fully avoided.

Treatment of Witnesses and Litigants.
A lawyer
should always treat adverse witnesses and suitors with fair
ness and due consideration, and he should never minister to
the malevolence or prejudices of a client in the trial or con
duct of a cause. The client cannot be made the keeper of the
lawyer's conscience in professional matters. He has no right
to demand that his counsel shall abuse the opposite party or
indulge in offensive personalities.
Improper speech is not
18.

O
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excusable on the ground that it is what the client would say
if speaking in his own behalf.
Appearance of Lawyer as Witness for His Client.
19.
When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely
formal matters, such as the attestation or custody of an in
strument and the like, he should leave the trial of the case to
other counsel. Except when essential to the ends of justice,
a lawyer should avoid testifying in Court in behalf of his
client.

News
Newspaper Discussion of Pending Litigation.
paper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated
litigation may interfere with a fair trial in the Courts and
otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice. Gen
erally they are to be condemned. If the extreme circum
stances of a particular case justify a statement to the public,
unprofessional to make
anonymously.
An ea: parte
it
reference to the facts should not go beyond quotation from
the records and papers on ﬁle in the Court; but even in ex
‘is

it

20.

is

a a

a

a

a

is

it

treme cases
better to avoid any ea: parte statement.
22.
Ca-ndor and Fairness. The conduct of the lawyer be
fore the Court and with other lawyers should be character
ized by candor and fairness.
It
not candid or fair for the lawyer knowingly to mis
witness, the
quote the contents of
paper, the testimony of
language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the lan
guage of
decision or a text-book; or with knowledge of its
invalidity, to cite as authority a decision that has been over
ruled, or
statute that has been repealed; or in argument to
assert as
fact that which has not been proved, or in those
jurisdictions where a side has the opening and closing argu
ments to mislead his opponent by concealing or withholding
positions in his opening argument upon which his side then
intends to rely.
It is unprofessional and dishonorable to deal other than
candidly with the facts in taking the statements of witnesses,
in drawing affidavits and other documents, and in the pres
entation of causes.
A lawyer should not offer evidence, which he knows the
Court should reject, in order to get the same before the jury
by argument for its admissibility, nor should he address to
the Judge arguments upon any point not properly calling for
Neither should he introduce into an
determination by him.
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argument, addressed to the Court, remarks or statements in
tended to influence the jury or bystanders.
These and all kindred practices are unprofessional and un
worthy of an officer of the law charged, as is the lawyer, with
the duty of aiding in the administration of justice.
23.
Attitude Toward Jury. All attempts to curry favor
with juries by fawning, ﬂattery or pretended solicitude for
Suggestions of
their personal comfort are unprofessional.
counsel, looking to the comfort or convenience of jurors, and
propositions to dispense with argument, should be made to
A lawyer must never
the Court out of the jury’s hearing.
jurors
about the case; and both be
converse privately with
fore and during the trial he should avoid communicating with
them, even as to matters foreign to the cause.
Upholding the Honor of the Profession.
Lawyers
29.
proper
should expose without fear or favor before the
tribu
nals corrupt or dishonest conduct in the profession, and
should accept without hesitation employment against a mem
ber of the Bar who has wronged his client. The counsel upon
the trial of a cause in which perjury has been committed owe
it to the profession and to the public to bring the matter to
the knowledge of the prosecuting authorities. The lawyer
should aid in guarding the Bar against the admission to the
profession of candidates unﬁt or unqualiﬁed because deﬁcient
in either moral character or education. He should strive at
all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of
the profession and to improve not only the law but the ad

ministration of justice.
30.
Justiﬁable and Unjustiﬁable Litigations. The lawyer
must decline to conduct a civil cause or to make a defense
when convinced that it is intended merely to harass or to in
jure the opposite party or to work oppression or wrong. But
otherwise it is his right, and, having accepted retainer, it be
comes his duty to insist upon the judgment of the Court as to
His appearance in
the legal merits of his client's claim.
Court should be deemed equivalent to an assertion on his
honor that in his opinion his client's case is one proper for
judicial determination.
The Lawyer's Duty in its Last Analysis.
32.
No client,
corporate or individual, however powerful, nor any cause,
civil or political, however important, is entitled to receive, nor
should any lawyer render, any service or advice involving
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disloyalty to the law whose ministers we are. or disrespect of
the judicial office, which we are bound to uphold, or corrup
tion of any person or persons exercising a public office or
private trust, or deception or betrayal of the public. When
rendering any such improper service or advice, the lawyer
invites and merits stern and just condemnation.
Corre
spondingly, he advances the honor of his profession and the
best interests of his client when he renders service or gives
advice tending to impress upon the client and his undertaking
exact compliance with the strictest principles of moral law.
He must also observe and advise his client to observe the
statute law, though until a statute shall have been construed
and interpreted by competent adjudication, he is free and is
entitled to advise as to its validity and as to what he consci
entiously believes to be its just meaning and extent.
But
above all a lawyer will ﬁnd his highest honor in a deserved
reputation for ﬁdelity to private trust and to public duty, as
an honest man and as a patriotic and loyal citizen.“
67 These
are the canons of ethics ot the American .Bar Association
Only those are here given which apply to the subject
adopted in 1908.
See complete text in 33 Am. Bar Ass‘n Rep. (1908)
of court practice.
575, and in each volume of Am. Bar Ass'n Reports from 1917 to 1922 in
clusive (Vols. 42-47). Also in Costigan's Cases on Legal Ethics, 570-583.
On the general subject of legal ethics see An Essay on Professional
Ethics, by George Sharswood, of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
and Ethical Obligations of the Lawyer, by G. L. Archer,
pp. 1.-214;
pp. 1-367.
68 “The practice
of law is not a business open to all, but a personal
right, limited to a few persons of good moral character, with special
qualiﬁcations ascertained and certiﬁed after a long course of study,
and a thorough examination by a state
both general and professional,
The right to practice law is in the
board appointed for the purpose.
nature of a franchise from the state conferred only tor merit. It cannot
be assigned or inherited but must be earned by hard study and good
It is attested by a certiﬁcate of the Supreme Court and is
conduct.
protected by registration. No one can practice law unless he has taken
an oath of oﬂice and has become an oﬂicer of the court, subject to its
discipline, liable to punishment for contempt in violating his duties as
It is not a lawful business except
such, and to suspension or removal.
for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions
required by statute and the rules ot the courts.
As these conditions
it follows that the practice of
cannot be performed by a corporation,
law is not a lawful business for a corporation to engage in.
As it
cannot practice law directly, it cannot indirectly by employing cgmpetgnt
lawyers to practice for it, as that would be an evasion which the law
would not toierate."—Matter of Co-operative Law Co., (1910) 198 N, Y,

479.
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Dismissal.
v.

McLEOD.

~ERTSCHY
Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
82 Wisconsin,

1878.

205.

Appeal from the County Court of Milwaukee County.
This action was brought to recover an alleged unpaid bal
ance due from the defendant to the plaintiff for a steam en
gine and ﬁxtures furnished by the plaintiff to defendant, pur
suant to a written agreement between the parties, a copy of
which is inserted in the complaint.
The answer contains, in
addition to certain matters pleaded as defenses, two counter
claims, one of which alleges that the written agreement does
not contain the contract made by the parties and which they
intended to include therein, in that an important portion of
such contract is omitted therefrom, and prays that the writ
ten agreement be reformed so as to include the omitted por
tion; and the other counter-claim is for damages for the al
leged failure of the plaintiff to perform such contract on his
part, on account of which the defendant demands judgment
against the plaintiff for a sum exceeding the demand of the
plaintiff.
The plaintiff replied to such counter-claims, in effect deny
ing the material allegations thereof.
After issue was thus
joined in the action, the attorney for the plaintiff entered a
sidebar rule, or order of course, with the clerk of the court,
discontinuing the action on payment of the defendant’s tax
able costs therein. He also, on the same day, served upon the
attorneys for the defendant notice of such proceeding, and an
oﬂ’er to pay the defendant’s costs upon presentation of a taxed
bill thereof, and a further offer to appear without formal no
tice before any taxing oﬁicer for the purpose of having the
The attorneys for the defendant immediately
costs adjusted.
plaintiff's
attorney that they should disregard the
notiﬁed the
attempted discontinuance of the action, for the reason that
after a counter-claim had been interposed the action could
only be discontinued by leave of court; and they accordingly
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noticed the cause for trial, and caused it to be placed on the
calendar for trial at the next term of the court.
Thereupon a motion was made on behalf of the plaintiff, to
strike the cause from the calendar, on the ground that the
same had been discontinued.
The court denied the motion,
holding that the cause had not been legally discontinued, but
was still pending. This appeal is from the order denying such
motion.

l

Q

i l

1

i l

Q

I I

LYON, J. The following propositions must, we think, be
conceded: 1st. At the common law, a plaintiff had the abso
lute right to discontinue his action before or after issue
joined, and without leave of court. 2nd. In suits in equity,
under the former practice, the plaintiff might, in like man
ner, dismiss his bill, but such dismissal did not carry with it
a cross bill interposed by the defendant. 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 128
and cases cited. 3d. The right of discontinuance is not ef
fected by the code, but remains the same, both in legal and
equitable actions, as under the former practice.
By the common law, neither of the counterclaims here in
terposed could be pleaded in the action.
The one which de
mands a reformation of the written agreement could only be
made available by a suit in equity; and the other, which de
mands judgment for damages for the alleged violation of his
contract by the plaintiff, in excess of the plaintiff's demand,
Of course, the
could only be enforced by a separate action.
subject matter of the latter counter-claim might be pleaded
as a defense to the action, either in whole or in part; but the
defendant could not in that case recover judgment for any ex
cess of damages sustained by him, over and above the dam
ages sustained by the plaintiff.
In brief, at the common law
the defendant could only plead such matter in defense, and
could not obtain in the action equitable relief, or recover a
judgment for damages against the plaintiff, as he now may
Waterman on Set-Off,
under proper pleadings and proofs.
Recoupment, etc., 471; 1 Chitty’s Pl., 569; 2 Black. Com.
Hence, all there was of the
(Cooley’s ed.), 305, note 19.
action at the common law was the cause of action as stated
in the declaration, and the defense pleaded thereto by the
defendant; and that was all which the plaintiff had an abso
lute right to discontinue.
Such right of discontinuance still
remains under the present practice, and, to the extent above
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by the
The plaintiff’s cause of action, and all defenses
plaintiff.
pleaded thereto which could have been pleaded as such under
the former practice, have disappeared from the cause by
force of the order of discontinuance.
But we are unable to perceive how it can be held, upon any
logical principle, that such discontinuance necessarily carried
with it those proceedings of the defendant which the code
permits him to institute in the action, or rather to engraft
upon it, but which are, in substance and effect, actions
brought by the defendant against the plaintiff.
Had these
proceedings been under the common law practice, as already
observed, the counter-claims interposed in this action would
have been asserted in two separate and distinct actions, one
at law and the other in equity, in both of which the position
of the parties would be the reverse of their position in the
In such case, surely the discontinuance by
present action.
the plaintiff of the action brought by him would not work a
discontinuance of such other actions brought against him.
Why should the plaintiff’s discontinuance of his action lead
to that result under the present practice? The learned coun
sel for the plaintiff have failed to answer this question satis
factorily, and we freely confess our inability to do so.
The cases decided by the various courts of New York upon
the subject of the right of discontinuance under the code are
conﬂicting, and quite unsatisfactory; and we can get but little
aid from them in determining the question under considera
tion.
It may be stated, in support of the views above expressed,
that this right or practice of counter-claim is borrowed from
the civil law, where it is designated “demand in reconven
tion;” and the Louisiana cases referred to by the learned
counsel for the defendant clearly show that, by the rules of
the civil law, a discontinuance of the action by the plaintiff is
ineffectual to put a defendant out of the court who has inter
posed a “demand in reconvention.”
If the foregoing views are correct, it necessarily follows
that the discontinuance of his action by the plaintiff left the
issues made by the counter-claims and the reply thereto, pend
ing in court and for trial, and that the court ruled correctly
If applica
in refusing to strike the cause from the calendar.
purpose,
county
that
the
for
court
should,
tion be made
under
case
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of the case, permit the plaintiff to

vacate the order of discontinuance so entered by him, to the
that the whole controversy between the parties may be
adjudicated in this action.
end

#

8

I I

U

Q

I

i I

Q

By the Court.—The order appealed from is aﬁirmed.”
Many cases hold that the plaintiff has no absolute right to dismiss,
that the matter is always, in the absence of statute, within the
discretion of the court.—Beaver v. Slane, (1921) 271 Pa. St. 317, 114 Atl.
509; Carleton v. Darcy, (1878) 75 N. Y. 375.
In any case an order ot dismissal should be made.—-Barnes v. Barnes,
(1892) 95 Cal. 174; Carleton v. Darcy, supra.
69

but

GORHAM MANUFACTURING
Supreme

COMPANY

Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
184 Massachusetts,

v.

SAME.
1908.

98.

J

LORING, . It has always been a recognized principle of the
English law, on the equity as well as on the common law side
of the court, that a plaintiff is not bound to prosecute a suit
or action to a ﬁnish because he has begun it. But on the con
trary he is at liberty to abandon it without losing the right
of action on which it is founded, and he can enforce that right
subsequently on paying the costs of the former proceeding.
In this respect a plaintiff is more fortunate than a defendant
who has a day in court to interpose his defense if he would
not have ﬁnal judgment given against him.
What is not so clear is how far the plaintiff's proceeding
be a suit in equity or an action on the common
law side of the court) must have gone for it to have reached
the stage where this right of abandonment is lost.
In England the plaintiff originally had a right to abandon
an action at law and become nonsuit at any time before ver
ict, if not before judgment.
Derick 11. Taylor, 171 Mags,
was before verdict and not before judgment
444, 445. That
1;. Hudson,
Outhwaite
in
laid
down
is
Exch. 380, 381;

2

7

it

it
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CARPENTER AND SONS CO. v. NEW YORK, NEW
HAVEN AND HARTFORD RAILROAD CO

Xtwhether

,
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Tidd’s Practice, (3d Am. ed.) 867. This rule was adopted here
by an ordinance of the Colony in 1641; Anc. Chart. 46: and in
Locke '0. Wood, 16 Mass. 317, it was contended by Webster
and Shaw in 1820 that that was the rule of practice of the
Commonwealth and that the plaintiff had a right to become
But the court “were
nonsuit at any time before judgment.
of opinion that there was no such right; and that, after a
cause is opened to the jury, and begun to be proceeded in be
fore them, the parties are entitled to a verdict, unless the
court should, in its discretion, allow a nonsuit or discontinu
ance.” Since then it has been held or said to be the rule that
a plaintiff "can become nonsuit as of right at any time before
the trial has begun but not afterwards. Means v. Welles, 12
Met. 356, 361; Lowell v. Merrimack Manuf. Co., 11 Gray.
382; Shaw '0. Boland, 15 Gray, 571; Truro v. Atkins, 122
Mass. 418; Burbank 'v. Woodward, 124 Mass. 357; Kempton
v. Burgess, 136 Mass. 192; Derick 12. Taylor, 171 Mass. 444;
Worcester '12. Lakeside Manuf. Co., 174 Mass. 299.
See also
the previous case of Haskell '0. Whitney, 12 Mass. 47.
The reason for denying in this Commonwealth the rule of
the English common law was the injustice done to the defend
ant, who was subjected to being harassed a second time on
one and the same cause of action on receiving costs, which in
this Commonwealth are nominal. In that respect the burden
of being subject to a second action is much greater here than
in England, where costs are substantial.
But the common
By Order
law rule has now been abolished in England.
XXVI of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, adopted un
der the judicature act, it is provided that “the plaintiff may,
at any time before receipt of the defendant’s defense, or after
the receipt thereof before taking any other proceeding in the
action (save any interlocutory application), by notice in writ
ing” discontinue the action.
Wilson's Practice of the Su
preme Court of Judicature, (7th ed.) 234.
The Massachusetts rule as to when a plaintiff could become
nonsuit in a common law action was established when sub
stantially, if not absolutely, all such cases were tried to a
jury. No question could arise as to what the rule was when
applied to cases tried by the court, as so many cases are now
tried since Sts. 1874, c. 248, sec. 1; 1875, c. 212, sec. 1; 1894,
c. 357, now R. L. c. 173, sec. 56, directing all cases to be tried
by the court unless a trial by jury is claimed by one of the
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parties. Until the case is opened the right to become nonsuit
‘
exists.
A question did arise as to the application of the rule in case
of a preliminary trial before commissioners in case of a peti
tion to recover compensation for property taken under the
right of eminent domain. It was held that when the hearing
before the commissioners was begun the right to become non
suit was lost. Worcester v. Lakeside Manuf. Co., 174 Mass.
299.

The case at bar presents the question whether the right is
lost when a hearing before an auditor has been ﬁnished but
before the auditor’s report is ﬁled.

l i

Q

Q

i i I i I l

Were the question now before us a question of ﬁrst im
pression depending entirely on the advantages and disad
vantages to the plaintiff and the defendant respectively, it
is by no means clear that it ought not to be held to be too late
for a plaintiff to become nonsuit when an order had been
made sending the case to an auditor. A hearing before an
auditor is not now, as it was, a preliminary investigation of
"‘
"‘
complicated accounts and nothing more.
But in spite of the character which auditor’s hearings have
now assumed, it is still true that such hearings result in evi
dence merely and cannot result in an adjudication; and we
are of opinion that a hearing which results in evidence and
cannot per se result in an adjudication is not a trial within
the rule which has now been laid down for over eighty years,
namely, that a plaintiff can become nonsuit at any time before
the trial begins and not afterward.
Moreover this seems to
have been assumed by the Legislature in this very statute,
St. 1900, c. 418 (R. L. c. 165, sec. 59, and c. 173, sec. 81.) It is
there provided that if the plaintiff does not comply with the
provisions of the act and attend before the auditor, or if he
refuses in good faith to put in the testimony relied on by him,
the court is authorized to direct him to become nonsuit.
In
making that provision it is assumed that the court has no
power to enter judgment for the defendant at that stage of
the proceeding.
Under these circumstances, we do not feel at liberty to dis
If, under the practice
pose of the question on its merits.
which now obtains, the rule, which we feel we are bound by,

'
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does injustice to defendants, the remedy is with the Legisla
ture.

Entry of nonsuit

to

stand."

‘I0 In some states voluntary dismissal can be had until
the case is
ﬁnally submitted to the court or jury.—0ppenheimer v. Elmore, (1899)
109 Ia. 196; Lay v. Collins, (1905) 74 Ark. 536; Casey v. Jordan, (1885)
68 Cal. 246; New Hampshire Banking Co. v. Ball, (1897) 57 Kan. 812;
Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Barbour, (1893) 95 Ky. 7; Adams
v. Osgood, (1898) 55 Neb. 766; Woodward v. Woodward,
(1900) 84
Mo. App. 328.
It is too late to dismiss under the rule in these states after the case
has been submitted to the court on a motion to direct a verdict.—Fronk
Contra in
v. Evans City Steam Laundry Co., (1903) 70 Neb. 75.
Missouri, Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Metalstaﬂ, (1900) 101 Fed. 769,
41 C. C. A. 669.

/

~_
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2. ASHMEAD

v.

ASHMEAD.

1,4,. \-V‘:-it

Supreme Court of Kansas.
23 Kansas,

1880.

262.

BREWER, J. This was an action for divorce.
After the
testimony had been received, and the case taken under ad
visement, the plaintiff moved the court for leave to dismiss
Defendant objected, and in
her action without prejudice.
sisted that judgment be rendered upon the merits, but the
court sustained the motion, and permitted the plaintiff to dis
miss without prejudice.
Was this error? We have not be
fore us the testimony upon which the court acted in sustain
ing this motion. We must therefore presume it sufﬁcient, if
the court had the power to grant such a motion.
It will be
conceded that after the ﬁnal submission of the case, the plain
tiff had no right to a dismissal without prejudice. Up to that
time she had such right, and could exercise it of her own op
tion, without the consent of the defendant or the permission
of the court. At that time her rights in that respect ceased.
But has not the court the power in its discretion to permit a
plaintiff, even after the ﬁnal submission, to recall that sub
It would be both
mission and dismiss without prejudice?
strange and harsh, if such power did not exist. Oftentimes,
by some oversight or forgetfulness, the plaintiff omits some
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Is the court powerless to
essential portion of his testimony.
afford him relief? It is constant practice to open a case for
additional testimony.
Even after a jury has retired to con
sider of its verdict, the court may recall it, and open the case
for future evidence. All this, it is true, rests within the dis
cretion of the court, and is not a right of the party. Here the
court exercised its discretion, and we cannot say that there
was any abuse of such discretion.
The case of Schafer v.
Weaver, 20 Kas. 295, is in point.
The question there arose.
it is true, after a demurrer to the evidence had been sustained,
but the principle is the same. The judgment will be affirmed.

)

/7;

FERGUSON v. INGLE.

WSupreme

Court of Oregon.
88 Oregon,

1900.

48.

J. 1. It is contended by plaintiffs’ counsel that
court
erred
in refusing to grant a voluntary nonsuit re
the
quested by their clients; while defendant’s counsel insist that,
the motion therefor not having speciﬁed the ground upon
which it was predicated, no error was committed in this re
spect. Considering these questions in inverse order, the rule
is well settled that the motion of an adverse party for a non
suit must specify the grounds therefor, and, unless it does so,
an appellate court will not review the action of the trial court
in denying the motion: 14 Enc. Pl. & Prac. 117, 136; Silva
v. Holland, 74 Cal. 530 (16 Pac. 385); Flg/nn"v. Dougherty,
91 Cal. 669 (27 Pac. 1080, 14 L. R. A. 230); Wright v. Fire
Ins. Co., 12 Mont. 474 (31 Pac. 87, 19 L. R. A. 211.) The rea
son for this rule is found in the fact that an appellate court
will consider only such questions as have been presented to
the trial court at the proper time, and in an appropriate man
ner; and when it appears that the question sought to be re
viewed was not thus submitted to such court the presumption
that its decision thereon is correct ought to prevail. But,
whatever reason may be adduced for the existence of this
rule, the point insisted upon is without merit, for the motion
in this case was not made by the adverse party. The statute
MOORE,

Sec.

6]

BASED on TRIAL

PROCEEDINGS

or Issuss

409

provides, in effect, that the plaintiff, upon his own motion,
may secure a judgment of nonsuit at any time before trial,
unless a counter-claim has been pleaded as a defense. Hill’s
Ann. Laws, sec. 246. A voluntary nonsuit is, therefore. per
emptory, and, whatever motive may have prompted a plain
tiff to dismiss his suit or action, he is not required to state
it; for if the motion be made before trial, and in the absence
of a counter-claim pleaded as a defense, the trial court is
without discretion in the matter, and must give the judgment
requested.

i I

i

1

#

Q

$

#

i

1

The judgment is therefore reversed, and the cause re
manded, with instructions to grant the nonsuit.
Reversed.

/ jwy

(b)
i

Involuntary

Non,-suit.

CENTRAL TRANSPORTATION
PALACE CAR
Supreme

1890.

United States, 24.

J. ' ' '
1!

PULLMAN’S

Court of the United States.
189

GRAY,

CO. v.
CO.
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There is a preliminary question of practice, arising out of
the manner in which the case was disposed of below, which is
deserving of notice, although not mentioned by counsel in
argument.
The circuit court, in ordering a nonsuit because in
its opinion the evidence offered by the plaintiff was insuffi
cient in law to maintain the action, acted in accordance with
the statute of Pennsylvania, which provides that “it shall be
lawful for the judge presiding at the trial to order a judg
ment of nonsuit to be entered, if in his opinion the plaintiff
shall have given no such evidence as in law is sufficient to
maintain the action, with leave, nevertheless, to move the
court in banc to set aside such judgment of nonsuit; and, in
case the said court in banc shall refuse to set aside the non
suit, the plaintiff may remove the record by writ of error into
the supreme court for revision and review, in like manner
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and with like effect as he might remove a judgment rendered
against him upon a demurrer to evidence."
St. Pa. March
11, 1836, § 7; Id. March 11, 1875, § 1; 2 Purd. Dig. (11th
Ed.) pp. 1362, 1363. Under that statute, as expounded by
Chief Justice Gibson, the judge can order a nonsuit, only
when all the evidence introduced, with every inference of
fact that a jury might draw from it in favor of the plaintiff,
appears to be insufficient in matter of law to sustain a ver
dict; and the defendant’s motion for a nonsuit is equivalent
to a demurrer to evidence, differing only in the judgment
thereon not being a ﬁnal determination of the rights of the
parties, for if it is in favor of the plaintiff the case must be
submitted to the jury, and if in favor of the defendant it is
Smyth '0. Craig, 3 Watts & S. 14;
no bar to a new action.
Fleming v. Insurance C0., Brightly, N. P. 102', Bournonville
'v. Goodall, 10 Pa. St. 133.
It is true that a plaintiff, \vho ap
pears by the record to have voluntarily become nonsuit, can
not sue out a writ of error. U. S. v. Evans, 5 Cranch, 280;
Evans '0. Phillips, 4 Wheat. 73; Cossar 12. Reed, 17 Q. B. 540.
But in the case of a compulsory nonsuit it is otherwise; and
a plaintiff, against whom a judgment of nonsuit has been ren
dered without his consent and against his objection, is en
titled to relief by writ of error. Elmore 12. Grymes, 1 _Pet.
469; Strother 12. Hutchinson, 4 Bing. N. C. 83, 5 Scott, 346, 6
Dow. 238; Voorhees o. Coombs, 33 N. J. Law, 482.
There are many cases in the books in which this court has
held that a court of the United States had no power to order
Elmore v.
a nonsuit without the plaintiff’s acquiescence.
Gr-ymes, above cited; Crane v. Morris, 6 Pet. 598, 609; Silsby
'v. Foote, 14 How. 218; Castle v. Ballard, 23 How. 172, 183.
Yet, instead of overruling, upon that ground alone, excep
tions to a refusal to order a nonsuit, this court, more than
once, has considered and determined questions of law upon
the decision of which the nonsuit was refused in the court
below. Crane v. Morris and Castle v. Ballard, above cited.
The difference between a motion to order a nonsuit of the
plaintiff and a motion to direct a verdict for the defendant
is, as observed by Mr. Justice Field, delivering a recent opin
ion of this court, “rather a matter of form than of substance,
except [that] in the case of a nonsuit a new action may be
brought, whereas in the case of a verdict the action is ended,
unlessa new trial be granted, either upon motion or upon
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appeal.” Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261, 264. Whether
a defendant in an action at law may present in the one form
or in the other, or by demurrer to the evidence, the defense
that the plaintiff, upon his own case, shows no cause of action,
is a question of “practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of
proceeding,” as to which the courts of the United States are
now required by the act of congress of June 1, 1872, c. 255,
§ 5, (17 St. 197,) re-enacted in section 914 of the Revised
Statutes, to conform, as near as may be, to those existing in
the courts of the state within which the trial is had. Sawin v.
Kenny, 93 U. S. 289; Ea: parte Boyd, 105 U. S. 647; Chateau
gay Ore, etc., Co., Petitioner, 128 U. S. 544, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep.
150; Glenn '0. Sumner, 132 U. S. 152, 156, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep.
41.

It

is doubtless within the authority of the presiding judge,
is
often _more convenient, in order to prevent the case
and
from being brought up in such a form that the judgment of
the court of last resort will not ﬁnally determine the rights
of the parties, to adopt the course of directing a verdict for
the defendant and entering judgment thereon. But the judg
ment of nonsuit, being a ﬁnal judgment disposing of the par
ticular case, and rendered upon a ruling in matter of law
duly excepted to by the plaintiff, is subject to be reviewed in
this court by writ of error.

i i

$

it

i

3

Q

I

Q
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71 Non-suits may be based upon either the evidence or the record.
See
French v. Central Const. Co., (1907) 76 Oh. St. 509; Sanders v. Pierce,
(1896) 68 Vt. 468, and Conway v. Sexton, (1909) 243 Ill. 59, supra. for
cases of the latter kind. In Conway v. Equitable Accident Co., (1906)
where he sued in assumpsit
27 R. I. 467, the plaintiff was non-suited
upon a contract that the evidence showed to be under seal.
In Lehigh Valley RR. C0. v. Quereau, (C. C. A. 1923), 289 Fed. 767,
770, the court said:—“A dismissal at the end of the plaintiff's case has
always been regarded as caused by a failure of proof, and therefore it is
not on the merits, and is not a bar to a future action for the same cause
Ploxin v. B. H. R. Co. (C. C. A.) 261 Fed. 854. But
or subject-matter.
where judgment is directed after the defendant has rested his case, and
there is a more varying of reasons assigned for recovery in the future
action, the cause of action remains the same, and the prior disposition
United States v. Cal. & Ore.
of the case is a bar to the future action.
Lands Co., 192 U. S. 355. ' ' * In an action at law in the state
court, a dismissal of the complaint is but a non-suit, and dues not
Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Campbell
determine the merits of the action.
"
' ' To constitute a disposition on the
Stores, 101 App. Div. 400.
merits, it is necessary that the defendant either offer proof and rest, or
rest without offering proof, and then move for the direction of a verdict,
Peterson v. Ocean
otherwise it is error to dismiss upon the merits.
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But the rule in New York has been
Elec. Ry. Co., 214 N. Y. 43."
changed by the Civil Practice Act, Sec. 482, providing that a ﬁnal
judgment dismissing a complaint before the close of plaintiff's evidence
is not on the merits unless therein expressly declared to be so, but a
dismissal after the close of the plaintiff's evidence is on the merits
and bars another action unless the court dismisses without prejudice."
"The second question is, whether the judgment rendered
Rctraarit.
It is claimed to be equivalent only to a
in the ﬁrst action was ﬂnal.
non-suit, and therefore
A judgment of non-suit.
not rcs adjudicate.
whether rendered because of the failure oi’ the plaintiff to appear and
prosecute his action, or because upon the trial he fails to prove the
particulars necessary to make good his action, or when rendered by
consent upon an agreed statement of facts, is not conclusive
as an
estoppel, because it does not determine the rights of the parties.
Homer
v. Brown, 16 How. 354; Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Broughton, 109 U. S.
121; Haldeman
v. United States, 91 U. S. 584. But a non-suit is to be
distinguished from a rctrazrit.
Minor v. Mechanics’ Bank, 1 Pet. 46.
“A ret'ra:m't differs from a
Blackstone deﬁnes the difference as follows:
non-suit in this: one is negative and the other positive.
The non-suit
is a mere default or neglect of the plaintiff, and therefore he is allowed
to begin his suit again upon payment of costs; but a retrazit is an
open, voluntary renunciation of his claim in court, and'by this he for
3 Blackstone Com. 296.
ever loses his action."
And it has been held
that a judgment of dismissal, when based upon and entered in pursu
ance of the agreement of the parties, must be understood, in the absence
of anything to the contrary expressed in the agreement and contained
in the judgment itself, to amount to such an adjustment of the merits
of the controversy, by the parties themselves through the judgment of
a defense to another
the court, as will constitute
action afterwards
brought upon the same cause of action.
Bank of Commonwealth
v.
Hopkins, 2 Dana, 395; Merritt v. Campbell, 47 Cal. 542. It is clearly so,
when, as here, the judgment recites that the subject-matter of the suit
had been adjusted and settled by the partles."—United
States v. Parker,
'
(1887) 120 U. S. 89, 95.

'3'
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BOPP v. NEW YORK ELECTRIC VEHICLE

TRANSPORTATION co.
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Court of Appeals of New York.
17 7'

VANN,

J

At

1908.

New York, 88.

the close of the plaintiff’s evidence in chief,
each defendant made a separate motion for a nonsuit and
each excepted to the action of the court in denying the mo
Each defendant had the right to then withdraw from
tion.
the case and rest upon its exception.
Neither did so. The
Vehicle Company picked up the burden ﬁrst, put in its evi
Assuming that an ex
dence and again moved for a nonsuit.
.
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ception was taken to the denial of its motion, for the second
time it was in a situation to rely on its exception and refuse
to take any further part in the trial. It did not do so. On
the contrary, it continued to take an active and aggressive
part in the trial by cross-examining the witnesses of its co
defendant, thoroughly and at length. It aided in developing
the facts and attempted to defend itself against the allega
tions of the plaintiff and the effort of the other defendant to
fasten the responsibility upon it alone. It did not succeed,
and it now claims that all its action, after its motions to non
suit were denied, should go for naught and be ignored upon
the ground that the question is the same as if it had with
drawn from the case at that time. We do not think so. It
did not remain in the case for amusement, but for self
defense, and it could not make further efforts to defend itself
without running the usual risks. The plaintiff had the right
to rely upon any evidence in her favor, whether it was put in
by herself or by either defendant, and the Vehicle Company
by failing to withdraw when it had the right to and continu
ing to take part in the trial, ran the risk that evidence tend
ing to make it liable would be received. The situation does
not differ in principle from the ordinary case where a sole
defendant, instead of withdrawing when_he fails to secure a
nonsuit, continues to take part in the investigation to the end.
In so doing, even if his motion should have been granted
when made, the exception is undermined and becomes of no
avail, provided at the close of the whole case the evidence
presents a question for the jury.
Thus in Jones v. Union Railway Company (18 App. Div.
267, 268) Judge Cullen said:
“When the defendant enters
into its proof, the question never is, whether the plaintiff's
evidence is suﬁicient to justify the submission of the case to
the jury, but whether, on the whole case, there is a question
of fact as to the defendant’s liability. If, at the close of a
plaintiff's case, the defendant is conﬁdent that no cause of
action has been made out, the only method of securing a re
view of an erroneous ruling on the point is to let the case
stand without further evidence. If the defendant enters upon
its evidence, it takes the chances of supplying the deﬁciencies
of the plaintiff's case.”
So in Hopkins v. Clark (158 N. Y. 299, 304) we said
“The rule laid down by the Su
ﬂirough Judge Bartlett:

1
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preme Court of the United States seems the proper one, to
the effect that when a defendant, after the close of the plain
tiff’s evidence, moves to ‘dismiss, and, the motion being de
nied, excepts thereto, and then proceeds with his case, an .1
puts in evidence on his part, he thereby waives the exception,
and the overruling of the motion to dismiss cannot be as
signed as error.”

i i I I I

_

l I I i

U

in this case, the Vehicle Company, by continuing to try
its
for that is what it did, ran the risk that the evidence
of its codefendant would supply the defects in the plaintiff’s
case against itself. It could not keep on trying its case with
out abiding by the condition of the evidence when all the testi
So,

case,

mony was in. At that time there was a question for the jury
as to its liability, and hence its previous exceptions, taken
when the evidence did not present that question, became of
no avail.
#
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The judgment should be aﬂirmed, with costs.
GRAY, . (dissenting).

J
.

J

J

J.;

HAIGHT, MARTIN and WERNER, JJ., concur with VANN,
PARKER, Ch. ., and O'BRIEN,
., concur with GRAY,

/
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Judgment aﬁir-med.

wk
'2/xiv

ﬁn Supreme

KIRBY

v.

PEASE.

Court of Washington.
83 Washington,

1908.‘

*

511.

J

therein,

a.

is

.

a

This was an action to set aside
sale of real
alleged in the complaint that in 1896 an action
estate. It
was commenced in the superior court of Pierce county,
wherein Henry Holgate was plaintiff and Samuel Parker and
J. P. Kirby were defendants; that in February, 1898, be1"'ore
the issues were made up, the plaintiff therein, Henry Holgate,
died, and no administration was had upon his estate; that in
the month of December, 1898, after the attention of the trial
court had been called to the fact of the death of the plaintiff
MOUNT,

judgment

was entered against the said defendant
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on November\26,

was issued upon the said judgment. and
the property described in the complaint was sold thereunder,
and respondent Pease became the purchaser; that the judg
ment and all proceedings had thereunder were void because
the plaintiff in the action was dead at the time the judgment
was obtained.
When the respondents were served with the summons they
appeared, and moved the court to dismiss the action upon the
ground that the action was “impertinent, vexatious, and con
This motion was supported by an affidavit
temptuous.”
showing that the question involved was res adjudicata in
Holgate v. Parker et al., wherein the question of the death of
Holgate had been litigated, and that the lower court had been
prohibited by this court in State ex rel. Holgate v. Superior
Court, 21 Wash. 33, 56 Pac. 932, from again trying the ques
tion whether Holgate was dead at the time the judgment was
This motion was sustained, and the action dis
rendered.
missed. Plaintiff appeals.
The only question discussed upon this appeal is that the
grounds stated‘in the motion for dismissal are not grounds
It is true that the grounds stated in
recognized by statute.
the motion, viz., that the action is “impertinent, vexatious,
are not designated by the Code as
and contemptuous,”
In fact, we ﬁnd no
grounds for the dismissal of an action.
provision of the Code designating the grounds upon which an
Any sufficient ground may there
action may be dismissed.
fore be stated. The affidavit accompanying the motion called
the attention of the trial court to the facts that the parties to
this action are the same and the question of the death of Hol
gate the same as in the case of State ex rel. Holgate '0. Supe
rior Court, wherein the trial court wa's prohibited from again
trying that question. When these facts appeared, the trial
court was certainly justiﬁed in dismissing the action.
It
by
a
party
required
to
an
action
be
to
violate an or
could not
der of this court.
The judgment is therefore affirmed."
1902, an execution

18 In O'Connell v. Mason,
(1904) 132 Fed. 245. the court said:—“We
have no doubt of the inherent and necessary power of courts of general
jurisdiction to protect members of the public from vexatious suits through
an exercise of the right to dismiss frivolous proceedings which upon
the face of the pleadings present no cause of action recognized by law.
Unquestionably, the power to dismiss exists quite independent of express
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statutory authority, and may be exercised in a proper case by the court
upon its own motion."
suits, wherein parties seek to obtain the judgment of tho
(-‘ollusi-ve
court on ﬁctitious controversies or on abstract questions of law having
proceeding.
are also subject to
no relation to any actual adversary
dismissal at the instance ot the defendant or ot an amicua curiae or
of the court itselt.—Haley v. Eureka County Bank, (1891) 21 Nev. 127.
Unauthorized suits, brought by attorneys without authority from the
clients they purport to represent, may also be dismissed on motlon.—
Bell v. Farwell, (1901) 189 Ill. 414.
The same is true when it appears that the attorneys for the plalntiﬂ
are prosecuting
the action under an unlawful champertous
agreement
with their cllent.—Allard_v. Lamirande, (1872) 29 Wis. 502.

as

(c)
/1

MEYER

7
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Directed Verdict.

V

v.

HOUCK.

Supreme Court of Iowa.
85

1892.

Iowa, 819.

The defendants are husband and wife. On the twenty
seventh day of November, 1889, the defendant C. F. Houck
executed and delivered to Calla Houck his promissory note

for about twelve hundred

dollars, and a chattel mortgage
upon a stock of goods and merchandise, to secure the pay
ment of the note. The mortgage was ﬁled for record on the
fourth day of December, 1889, and duly recorded.
On the
seventh day of December. 1889, the plaintiffs commenced
an action against C. F. Houck upon an account for goods sold
and delivered to him, and sued out an attachment, and caused
the same to be levied upon the mortgaged goods.
Calla
Houck intervened in the action, and claimed the goods as
mortgagee. The plaintiifs answered her petition of interven
tion by claiming that the mortgage was invalid and void as
to creditors of C. F. Houck, because it was made with intent
There was a trial by jury, and
to defraud said creditors.
when the plaintiffs completed the introduction of their evi
dence the intervenor moved the court to direct the jury to
return a verdict against the plaintiffs. The motion was sus
tained, and the jury returned the verdict as directed, upon
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But it is further claimed that there was some evidence
tending to show that the transaction in question was fraudu
lent, and that it was the duty of the court to submit the case
to the jury if there was any evidence, however slight. It
may be conceded that there was some evidence. There are
one or two facts which might be regarded as badges of fraud;
but, when weighed in the balance with the other evidence,
they do not constitute such a conflict as would authorize a
verdict for the plaintiffs. The rule of practice in relation to
directing verdicts which has prevailed in.this state is Well
A motion to direct a verdict for the defendant
understood.
has been regarded as a demurrer to the evidence, and it has
always been held that such a motion not only admits the truth
of the fact found, but every fact and conclusion which the
evidence conduces to prove, or which the jury might have in
ferred therefrom in his favor. The rule was stated in very
nearly the foregoing language in Jones v. Ireland, 4 Iowa, 63.
And that practice has obtained in this state up to the present
time. There are a multitude of cases adhering to the rule.
It is unnecessary to cite them. They \vill be found collected
in McClain’s Digest (volume 2, pp. 335-338).
The practice
a,“scintilla
has been that where there is what is called
of evi
dence” to be considerredby thejary, it is ermTto_direct a
The rule has been stated in various forms of ex
verdict.
as
will be seen by an examination of the cases. In
pression,
Way v. Illinois Central R'y Co., 35 Iowa, 585, the following
“Hence, under the statute. and our
language is employed:
previous rulings, it follows that it is the duty of a nisi prius
court in this state to submit the case to the jury upon the
evidence where it only tends even to prove it, although the
court should feel in duty bound to set aside a verdict for
It is further said
the plaintiff if the jury should so ﬁnd.”
in that case that “in other states a different, and perhaps bet
ter and more consistent rule obtains whereby the court may
direct the jury how to ﬁnd, where it would set aside a verdict
otherwise.” Citing Brown r. R’_1/ Co., 58 Me. 389; Wilds 'v.
Hudson River R’y Co., 24 N. Y. 430. In other cases the state
ment of the rule has been modiﬁed, as in Starry '0. Dubuque

27
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S. W. R’y Co., 51 Iowa, 419, in which the district court di
“Such
rected a verdict for the defendant, this court said:
being the case, it would have been the duty of the court to
Why, then. occu
set aside a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
py the valuable time of the court at the public expense for
the purpose of going through a useless form and ceremony?"
Language to the same effect will be found in the case of Both
well v. C. M. & St. P. R'y Co., 59 Iowa, 192. After a thorough
examination of adjudged cases, we have reached the conclu
sion that the practice should be changed so as to harmonize
with that “better and more consistent rule" referred to in
Way 11. R’y Co., supra, which now obtains in England and in
the United States courts, and in nearly all the states of the
Union.
&'

The doctrine in England on this question is well stated in
the following language:
“But there is in every case a prelim
inary question, which is one of law, namely, whether there is
any evidence on which the jury could properly ﬁnd the ver
dict for the party on whom the onus of proof lies. If there
is not, the judge ought to withdraw the question from the
jury, and direct a nonsuit if the onus is on the plaintiff, or
direct a verdict for the plaintiff if the onus is on the defend
It was formerly considered necessary in all cases to
ant.
leave the question to the

jury if there was any evidence,

even

a scintilla, in support of the case, but it is now settled that
the question for the judge (subject, of course, to review) is,
as is stated by Maule, J., in Jewell v. Parr, 13 C. B. 916, ‘not
whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is
none that ought reasonably to satisfy the jury that the fact
" Ryder v. Wombwell,
sought to be proved is established.’
L. R. 4 Exch. 32; The Di-rectors, etc., of the Metropolitan R’y
C0. '0. Jackson, L. R. 3 App. Cas. 193; The Directors, etc., of
the Dublin, W. & W. R’;/. C0. v. Slatterly, Id. 1155.
* In Pleasarlts '0. Fant, 22 Wall. 120, the following
*
*
language is used: “It is the duty of the court, in its relation
to the jury, to protect parties from unjust verdicts arising
from ignorance of the rules of law and of evidence, from im
pulse of passion or prejudice, or from any other violation of
his lawful rights in the conduct of a trial. This is done by
making plain to them the issues they are to try; by admitting
only such evidence as is proper in these issues, and rejecting
all else; by instructing them in the rules of law by which that
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evidence is to be examined and applied; and ﬁnally, when
necessary, by setting aside a verdict which is unsupported by
evidence, or contrary to law. In the discharge of his duty it
is the province of the court, either before or after verdict, to
decide whether the plaintiff has given evidence sufficient to
support or justify a verdict in his favor; not whether on all
the evidence the preponderating weight is in his favor; that
is the business of the jury. But conceding to all the evidence
offered the greatest probative force which, according to the
law of evidence, it is fairly entitled to, is it sufficient to jus
tify a verdict? If it does not, then it is the duty of the court,
after a verdict, to set it aside, and grant a new trial. Must
the court go through the idle ceremony, in such a case, of
submitting to the jury the testimony on which the plaintiff
relies when it is clear to the judicial mind that, if the jury
should ﬁnd a verdict in favor of plaintiff, that verdict would
Such a proposition is ab
be set aside, and a new trial had?
surd, and accordingly we hold the true principle to be that,
if the court is satisﬁed that, conceding all the inferences
which the jury could justiﬁably draw from the testimony, the
evidence is insufﬁcient to warrant a verdict for the plaintiff,
the court should say so to the jury.” The same doctrine may
Raby v. Cell, 85 Pa. St. 80,
be found in the following cases:
in which it is said that “at one time, indeed, it was the ad
mitted doctrine that, if there was any, the least evidence,
a mere scintilla,—the question must be submitted to the jury.
But that doctrine has been very justly exploded both in Eng
land and in this state;” Wittkowsky 11. Wasson, 71 N. C. 451;
Zettler v. City of Atlanta, 66 Ga. 195; Weis v. City of Madi
son, 75 Ind. 241; Dryden v. Britten, 19 Wis. 31; Baldwin '0.
Shannon, 43 N. J. Law, 596; Brown v. R’y Co., 58 Me. 384, in
which it is said: “It would be absurd to send a cause to a
jury when the verdict, if rendered in favor of the plaintiff,
would not be permitted to stand; Wilds c. Hudson River R'j/
Co., 24 N. Y. 430, in which it is said: “No legal principle
compels him (the judge) to allow a jury to render a merely
idle verdict;” Brown v. Massachusetts M. & L. Insurance Co.,
59 N. H. 298; Brooks 12. Somercille, 106 Mass. 271; Ens
minger 1:. Mclntire, 23 Cal. 593; Morgan v. Durfee, 69 Mo.
469; Simmons ’L‘. Chicago & T. R’y Co., 110 Ill. 340.
We
might cite other adjudged cases to the same effect, but it is
It will be seen from what we have cited that
unnecessary.

420
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the whole turn of legal thought in this country and in Eng
land is contrary to the rule of practice which requires a court
to go on for several days with the trial of a case to a jury
when the verdict must in the end be either for the defendant,
or be set aside if for the plaintiff. It is true there are de
cisions to be found in a few states in which a scintilla of evi
dence is allowed to go to the jury. But an examination of the
later cases in some of these states will show that the rule has
not been adhered to. We have cited enough cases to show
that the great weight of modern authority is contrary to the
rule which this court has adhered to, though it has more than
once intimated that the other rule adopted by the large ma
jority of courts of last resort is better and more consistent.
Our conclusion is that when a motion is made to direct a
verdict, the trial judge should sustain the motion when, con
sidering all of the evidence, it clearly appears to him that it
would be his duty to set aside a verdict if found in favor of
the party upon whom the burden of proof rests. The adop
tion of this rule is no abridgment of the right of trial by jury.
A party against whom a verdict has been directed by the
court can have the ruling of the court reviewed by exception
and appeal just as well as he can if the rule were otherwise,
and he takes an appeal to this court from an order granting
He has no right to insist that the
a new trial after verdict.
as a mere idle form, or a mere
continued
be
his
cause
trial of
experiment, that he may have the gratiﬁcation of securing a
verdict which must be set aside. As we have seen, courts
very generally now designate such a proceeding as absurd.
Probably this court has too long followed the rule to be in a
position to denounce it in that way; but we think that, as the
question involves no more than the change of a mere rule of
practice, which will be of material advantage in the trial of
cases in the saving of the time of the trial courts,—time
which ought to be devoted to the transaction of legitimate
business,—and the saving of court expenses to the counties,
with no detriment to the rights of any one, it is high time
that this state should adopt the more consistent and logical
practice which now generally prevails elsewhere.
The judgment of the district court is aﬁirmed.
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METROPOLITAN STREET RAILWAY

Court of Appeals of New York.
167

421

CO.

1901.

New York, 66.

MARTIN, J. This action was for personal injuries result
ing in death of the plaintiff's intestate, and was based upon
An appeal was al
the alleged negligence of the defendant.
lowed to this court upon the ground of an existing conﬂict
in the decisions of different departments of the Appellate
Division as to when a verdict may be directed where there
is an issue of fact, and because in this case an erroneous
principle was asserted which, if allowed to pass uncorrected,
would be likely “to introduce confusion into the body of the
law.” (Scioli-na. v. Erie Preserving Co., 151 N. Y. 50.) The
court having directed a verdict, the appellant is entitled to
the most favorable inferences deducible from the evidence,
and all disputed facts are to be treated as established in her
favor. (Ladd v. /Etna Ins. Co., 147 N. Y. 478, 482; Higgins
v. Ea-gleton, 155 N. Y. 466; Ten Eyck v. Whitbeck, 156 N.
Y. 341, 349; Bank of Monongahela Valley "v. Weston, 159

N. Y. 201, 208.)

If

believed, the testimony of the plaintiff’s witnesses was
sufficient to justify the jury in ﬁnding the defendant negli
gent and the plaintiff’s intestate free from contributory
negligence.
The evidence of the defendant was in many
respects in direct conﬂict, and if credited would have sus
tained a verdict in its favor. Whether the defendant was
negligent, the plaintif'I"s intestate free from contributory
negligence, and the amount of damages, were submitted to
the jury. It, however, having agreed upon a general ver
dict and failed to answer the questions submitted, the trial
judge withdrew them and directed a verdict for the defend
ant. Upon the verdict so directed a judgment was entered.
Subsequently an appeal was taken to the Appellate Division,
where it was affirmed, and the plaintiff has now appealed to
this court.
Although there was a direct and somewhat severe con
flict in the evidence, the questions of negligence and con
tributory negligence were clearly of fact, and were for the
jury and not for the court unless the right of trial by jury
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is to be partially if not wholly abolished.
It was assumed
below that the plaintiff's evidence established a case which,
undisputed, was sufficient to warrant a verdict in her favor.
But the court said at the close of the defendant’s evidence
the plaintiff's case had been so far overcome that a verdict
in her favor would have been set aside as against the weight
of evidence. Upon that alleged condition of the proof, it
held that the trial court might have properly submitted the
case to the jury if it saw ﬁt, but that it was not required
to as the verdict might have been thus set aside. The prac
tical result of that decision, if sustained, is in every case
to vest in the trial court authority to determine questions
of fact, although the parties have a right to a jury trial, if it
thinks that the Weight of evidence is in favor of one and it
directs a verdict in his favor.
There have been statements by courts which seem to lend
some justiﬁcation to that theory, but we think no such broad
principle has been intended and that no such rule can be
maintained either upon principle or authority. The rule that
a verdict may be directed whenever the proof is such that a
decision to the contrary might be set aside as against the
weight of evidence would be both uncertain and delusive.
There is no standard by which to determine when a verdict
may be thus set aside. It depends upon the discretion of the
The result of setting aside a verdict and the result
court.
of directing one are widely different and should not be con
In one case
trolled by the same conditions or circumstances.
In the other the judgment is ﬁnal.’ One
there is a retrial.
discretion;
other upon legal right. One involves
in
the
rests
The other deter
a mere matter of remedy or procedure.
rights.
and
substantial
Such
a rule would
mines substantive
have no just principle upon which to rest.
While in many cases, even where the evidence is suﬁicient
to sustain it, a verdict may be properly set aside and a new
trial ordered, yet, that in every such case the trial court
may, whenever it sees ﬁt, direct a verdict and thus forever
conclude the parties, has no basis in the law, which con
ﬁdes to juries and not to courts the determination of the
facts in this class of cases.
We think it cannot be correctly said in any case where the
right of trial by jury exists and the evidence presents an
actual issue of fact, that the court may properly direct a

Sec.

PROCEEDINGS

6]

BAsEn ON TRIAL

or Issuns

423

So long as a question of fact exists, it is for the
the court.
If the evidence is insufficient,
has been introduced is conclusively an
that,
swered, so
as a matter of law, no question of credi
bility or issue of fact remains, then the question being one
of law, it is the duty of the court to determine it. But when
ever a plaintiff has established facts or circumstances which
would justify a ﬁnding in his favor, the right to have the
issue of fact determined by a jury continues, and the case
must ultimately be submitted to it.
The credibility of witnesses, the effect and weight of con
ﬂicting and contradictory testimony, are all questions of fact
If a court of review having
and not questions of law.
power to examine the facts is dissatisﬁed with a verdict be
cause against the weight or preponderance of evidence, it
may be set aside, but a new trial must be granted before
another jury so that the issue of fact may be ultimately
determined by the tribunal to which those questions are con
ﬁded. If there is no evidence to sustain an opposite verdict,
a trial court is justiﬁed in directing one, not because it would
have authority to set aside an opposite one, but because there
was an actual defect of proof, and, hence, as a matter of
law, the party was not entitled to recover.
(Colt v. Sixth
Ave. R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 671; Bagley v. Bowe, 105 N. Y. 171,

verdict.

jury and not for
or if that which

179.)

ii

i i i i

1

i

1

I

1

We are of the opinion that a plain issue of fact was pre
sented for the jury; that the court erred in directing a ver
dict; that the judgment and order should be reversed and a
new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.
Ch. J., BARTLETT, VANN, CULLEN and WERNER,
concur; GRAY, J., dissents. Judgment reversed, etc."

PARKER,

JJ.,

"Commenting

on this case the court said in Welgand v. United
“If, in the discretion of the
(1917) 221 N. Y. 34, 39:
court. a verdict may be set aside, the parties are not thereby deprived
of a jury trial. It is only when a verdict for the plaintiff must be set
aside as unsupported by sufficient evidence that a verdict tor the defend
ant should be dir--cted or the complaint dismissed."
See Begert v. Payne, (1921) 274 Fed. 784, holding that a verdict can
not be directed when a contrary verdict would be set aside as a matter
of discretion but only when it would have to be set aside as a matter

Traction

of law.

Co.,

/ 3+3
{ff
)
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1910.

383.

KNOWLTON, C. .—This was a trial in the Superior Court
upon three issues, framed upon an appeal from a decree
of the Probate Court allowing the will of Charles E. Giles.
The ﬁrst issue presented the question whether the will was
duly executed. The second raised the question whether it
was procured by the undue inﬂuence of the petitioner.
The
third issue was as follows:
“Was said instrument revoked
by the said Charles E. Giles subsequently to the date, exe
cution and publication thereof by the making, execution and
publication of another will which has been lost or destroyed,
and its contents cannot be proved so that it can be pro
pounded for probate?”
Upon the ﬁrst issue, after testimony by the subscribing
witnesses tending to show that the will was properly exe
cuted, it was admitted in evidence, subject to the appellant’s
exception, and at the close of the testimony the jury were
directed to return a verdict in favor of the petitioner. To
this direction the appellants excepted.
The will was rightly admitted in evidence, and the testi
mony well warranted a ﬁnding that it was duly executed.
If, indeed, full credence was given to the testimony of these
witnesses, this conclusion followed almost necessarily.
It
is true that two of the witnesses had little deﬁnite recollec
apart from their knowledge that
tion of the transaction,
their signatures to the clause of attestation were genuine,
and that they knew from their signing that they saw the
execution of the will by the testator in the presence of the
While the jury, upon the facts, could not
three witnesses.
have been expected to reach any other conclusion than that
which was recorded under the direction of the court, the
issue was one to be passed upon‘ by a jury, which is the or
dinary tribunal for the determination of questions of fact.
Where a proposition is only to be established by testimony
of‘ witnesses, the judge cannot properly direct a jury to de
cide that the fact is proved affirmatively by testimony.
It
is for the jury to say whether the witnesses are entitled to
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credit.
Merchants’ National Bank v. Haverhill Iron Works,
159 Mass. 158; Commonwealth 'v. McNeese, 156 Mass. 231;
Way 11. Butterworth, 106 Mass. 75; Whitten 12. Haverhill,
ante, 95.
We know of no case in this Commonwealth in
which it has been determined that a jury can be directed
to return a verdict, upon the oral testimony of witnesses,
in favor of a party who has the burden of proving the facts
to which they have testiﬁed.
This direction was erroneous
and the exception must be sustained.
Q
ii

1

i i i

$

#

$

Verdict on the ﬁrst issue set aside;
issue to stand.“

#

i

verdict on the third

Haughton v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., (1905) 165 Ind. 32, 73
74Ar-cord:
N. E. 592; Wolff v. Campbell, (1892) 110 Mo. 114, 19 S. W. 622; Anniston
National Bank v. School Committee, (1897) 121 N. C. 107, 28 S. E. 134;
Perkiomen R. R. Co. v. Kremer, (1907) 218 Pa. St. 641, 67 Atl. 913.
In Goidstein v. D'Arcy, (1909) 201 Mass. 312, the court sustained a
verdict directed for a party who maintained the burden of proof with
written evidence.
Many cases announce that the jury has the absolute right to disbelieve
of nnimpeached
witnesses.—Woodin v.
the uncontradicted
evidence
Durfee (1881) 46 Mich. 424; Charleston Ins. & Trust Co. v. Corner,
(1844) 2 Gill (Md.) 410; Anniston Nat. Bank v. School Committee,
121 N. C. 107.
In
But other courts refuse to give the jury such autocratic power.
Seibert v. Erie Ry. Co., (1867) 49 Barb. (N. Y.) 586, the court said:
“The positive testimony of an unimpeached, uncontradicted witness can
not be discredited, or disregarded arbitrarily and capriciously by court
Lorner v. Meel-ter, 25 N. Y. 361. If juries are permitted to
or jury.
discredit or disregard such testimony, there is no safety in the adminis
tration of justice, and parties might just as well let the result of a
litigation abide the cast of a die, or a game ot chance." See also Craw
ford v. The State, (1870) 44 Ala. 332.
See Directing a Verdict for the Party Having the Burden of Proof,
by E. R. Sunderland, 11 Mich. L. Rev. 198, where a. large number of cases
are cited holding that a verdict may be directed in favor of the party
having the burden of proof, irrespective of the character of the evidence.
See Woodstock v. Canton, (1897) 91 Me. 62; Chanute v. Higgins, (1902)
65 Kan. 680; May v. Crawford, (1899) 150 Mo. 504. 527;
Webber v.
Axtell, (1910) 110 Minn. 52; Seibert v. Erie Ry. Co., (1859) 49 Barb.
586; Crawford v. The State, (1870) 44 Ala. 382; Green v. Stewart, (1904)
23 App. Cas. D. C. 570; Clancy v. Reis, (1892l 5 Wash. 371;
Israel v.
Day, (1907) 41 Colo. 52; Shumate v. Ryan, (1906) 127 Ga. 118.

(1897)
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EMPIRE STATE CATTLE CO. v. ATCHISON, TOPEKA
& SANTA FE RAILWAY CO.
Q

3%

MINNESOTA AND DAKOTA CATTLE
Supreme

CO. v.

Court of the United States.
210

SAME.

1907.

United States, 1.

WHITE, J..—With the object of saving them from destruc
tion by the ﬂood which engulfed portions of Kansas City on
May 31 and the ﬁrst week of June, 1903, more than three
thousand head of cattle belonging to the petitioners, which
were in the Kansas City stock yards, were driven and
crowded upon certain overhead viaducts in those yards.
For about seven days, until the subsidence of the ﬂood, they
were there detained and could not be properly fed and
watered. Many of them died and the remainder were greatly
lessened in value.
These actions were brought by the peti
tioners to recover for the loss so sustained upon the ground
that the cattle were in the control of the defendant railway
company as a common carrier, and that the loss sustained
was occasioned by its negligence.
The railway company defended in each case upon the
ground that before the loss happened it had delivered the
cattle to a connecting carrier, but that if the cattle were
in its custody it was without fault, and the damage was
solely the result of an act of God, that is, the ﬂood above re

ferred to.
As the cases depended upon substantially similar facts
and involved identical questions of law, they were tried to
gether, and at the close of the evidence the trial court denied
a peremptory instruction asked on behalf of the plaintiffs,
135
and gave one asked on behalf of the railway company.
Fed. Rep. 135.
While there was some contention in the argument as to
what took place concerning the requests f_or peremptory in
structions, we think the bill of exceptions establishes that at
the close of the evidence the plaintiffs requested a peremp
tory instruction in their favor, and on its being refused
duly excepted and asked a number of special instructions,
which were each in turn refused, and exceptions were sepa
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rately reserved, and the court then granted a request for a
peremptory instruction in favor of the railway company, to
which the plaintiffs excepted.
On the writs of error which were prosecuted from the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that court
affirmed the judgment on the ground that as both parties
had asked a peremptory instruction the facts were thereby
submitted to the trial judge, and hence the only inquiry
open was whether any evidence had been introduced which
tended to support the inferences of fact drawn by the trial
judge from the evidence. One of the members of the Cir
cuit Court of Appeals (Circuit Judge Sanborn) did not con
cur in the opinion of the court, because he deemed that as
the request for peremptory instruction made on behalf of
plaintiffs was followed by special requests seeking to have
the jury determine the facts, the asking for a peremptory
instruction did not amount to a submission of the facts to
the court so as to exclude the right to have the case go to the
jury in accordance with the subsequent special requests. He,
nevertheless, concurred in the judgment of afﬁrmance, be
cause, after examining the entire case, he was of opinion
that prejudicial error had not been committed, as the evi
dence was insufficient to have justiﬁed the submission of

the issues to the jury. 147 Fed. Rep. 457.
The cases are here because of the allowance of writs of
certiorari. They present similar questions of fact and law,
were argued together and are, therefore, embraced in one
opinion.
The scope of the inquiry before us needs, at the
outset, to be accurately ﬁxed. To do so requires us to con
sider the question which gave rise to a division of opinion
If it be that the request by
in the Circuit Court of Appeals.
both parties for a peremptory instruction is to be treated
as a submission of the cause to the court, despite the fact
that the plaintiffs asked special instructions upon the effect
of the evidence then, as said in Beuttell v. Magone, 157 U. S.
154, “the facts having been thus submitted to the court, we
are limited in reviewing its action, to a consideration of the
correctness of the ﬁnding on the law and must affirm if
If, on the other
there be any evidence in support thereof.”
hand, it be that, although the plaintiffs had requested a
peremptory instruction, the right to go to the jury was not
waived in view of the other requested instructions, then
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our inquiry has a wider scope, that is, extends to deter
mining whether the special instructions asked were rightly
refused, either because of their inherent unsoundness or
because, in any event, the evidence was not such as would
have justiﬁed the court in submitting the case to the jury.
It was settled in Beuttell 1'. Magtme, supra, that where both
parties request a peremptory instruction and do nothing
more, they thereby assume the facts to be undisputed and
in effect submit to the trial judge the determination of the
inferences proper to be drawn from them. But nothing in
that ruling sustains the view that a party may not request
a peremptory instruction, and yet, upon the refusal of the
court to give it, insist, by appropriate requests, upon the sub
mission of the case to the jury, where the evidence is con
ﬂicting or the inferences to be drawn from the testimony are
divergent.
To hold the contrary would unduly extend the
doctrine of Beuttell o. Magoue, by causing it to embrace a
case not within the ruling in that case made.
The distinc
tion between a case like the one before us and that which was
under consideration in Beuttcll in Magoue has been pointed
out in several recent decisions of Circuit Courts of Appeals.
It was accurately noted in an opinion delivered by Circuit
Judge Severens, speaking for the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit in Minahan 1?. Grand Trunk Ry. Co.,
138 Fed. Rep. 37, 41, and was also lucidly stated in the con
curring opinion of Shelby, Circuit Judge, in McC0rmack v.
National City Bank of Waco, 142 Fed. Rep. 132, Where, re
ferring to Beuttcll v. Magone, he said (p. 133) :
“A party may believe that a certain fact which is proved
without conﬂict or dispute entitles him to a verdict.
But
other,
evidence
of
but
may
facts,
be
there
controverted
which, if proved to the satisfaction of the jury, entitles him
to a verdict, regardless of the evidence on which he relies in
It cannot be that the practice would not
the ﬁrst place.
ask
for peremptory instructions, and, if the
permit him to
court refuses to then ask for'instruction submitting the
other questions to the jury. And if he has the right to do
this, no request for instructions that his opponent may ask
can deprive him of the right. There is nothing in Beuttell
supra-, that conﬂicts with this view when the
12. Magone,
announcement of the court is applied to the facts of the
case as stated in the opinion.
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“In New York there are many cases showing conformity
to the practice announced in Beuttell v. Magone, but they
clearly recognize the right of a party who has asked for per
emptory instructions to go to the jury on controverted ques
tions of fact if he asks the court to submit such questions to
the jury. Kirtz 11. Peck, 113 N. Y. 226; S. C., 21 N. E. 130;
Sutter v. Vanderveer, 122 N. Y. 652; S. C., 25 N. E. 907.
“The fact that each party asks for a peremptory instruc
tion to ﬁnd in his favor does not submit the issues of fact
to the court so as to deprive the party of the right to ask
other instructions, and to except to the refusal to give them,
nor does it deprive him of the right to have questions of
fact submitted to the jury if issues are joined on which con
ﬂicting evidence has been offered. Minahan v. G. T. W. Ry.
Co., (C. C. A.), 138 Fed, Rep. 37.”
From this it follows that the action of the trial court in
giving the peremptory instruction to return a verdict for
the railway company cannot be sustained merely because of
the request made by both parties for a peremptory instruc
tion in view of the special requests asked on behalf of the
plaintiffs. The correctness, therefore, of the action of the
court in giving the peremptory instruction depends, not
upon the mere requests which were made on that subject,
but upon whether the state of the proof was such as to have
authorized the court, in the exercise of a sound discretion,
to decline to submit the cause to the jury. That is to say,
the validity of the peremptory instruction must depend upon
whether the evidence was so undisputed or was of such a
conclusive character as would have made it the duty of the
court to set aside the verdicts if the cases had been given
to the jury and verdicts returned in favor of the plaintiff.
McGuire 12. Blount, 199 U. S. 142, 148, and cases cited; Mar
ande v. Texas & P. R. Co., 184 U. S. 191, and cases cited;
Southern Paciﬁc Co. '0. Pool, 160 U. S. 440, and cases cited.
To dispose of this question requires us to consider some
what in detail the origin of the controversy, the contracts of
shipment from which the controversy arose and the proof
which is embodied in the bill of exceptions relied on to jus
tify the inference of liability on the part of the railway com
pany.

‘

"

As we think the undisputed proof to which we
have referred not only established the existence of the neces
*
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a

if

sity for the change of route, but also, beyond dispute, demon
strated that there was an entire absence of all negligence
in selecting that route, we are clearly of opinion that no
liability was entailed simply by reason of the change, even
concurring and
that change could in law be treated as
proximate cause of the damages which subsequently resulted.
Aﬁirmedﬂ‘
Accord,
3

Joseph Milling Co‘. v. Bank of Joseph, (1923)"—q Ore. —-'—.
»two-L...e‘ .
Mich. Law Rev. 557; 12 Mich. Law Rev. 619; 19 Mich. Law
g~
~

75

216 Pac. 560.
And see
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Court of Vermont.
86 Vermont,

&

v.

CO.

1918.

229.

$

i

i

Q

i

I
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O

U

#

It

J.

general assumpsit.
This
Trial was by
jury. Verdict and judgment were for the defendants. The
plaintiff excepted.
HASELTON,

a

a

a

a

a

At the close of the evidence, each party claimed that
motion
verdict should be directed in his favor, and ﬁled
pro forma order directing
to that end. The court made
verdict for the defendants, and, such verdict being returned,
pro forma, judgment thereon.
To the direction
rendered
of the verdict and to the judgment thereon the plaintiff ex
cepted. The exception raises the question of whether there
&

was evidence fairly and reasonably tending to sustain the
plaintiff's claim. Comeau 'v. Manuel
Sons Co., 84 Vt. 501,
509, 80 Atl. 51; Bass v. Rublee, 76 Vt. 395, 57 Atl. 965.
The defendants claim that, because of the two motions,
verdict one way or
was the duty of the court to direct
affirmatively
the other. But this claim is unsound. Where
jury,
party
go
neither
wishes
to
to
the
for
appears that
the court to direct such a verdict as in its judgment the evi
Davis '0. St. Albans, 42 Vt. 585; Robinson o.
dence requires.
Atl. 512; Taylor 'v. Coolidge, 64 Vt.
Larabee, 58 Vt. 652,
506, 24 Atl. 656; Mascott 12. First National Fire Ins. Co., 69
5

is

it

it

a

it

fﬁ

,9

FITZSIMONS
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_..
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Rev. 453.
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Vt. 116, 37 Atl. 255.
There is nothing novel about this
practice, for the parties in civil cases can always by agree
ment substitute the court for the jury. But the mere fact
that each party to a cause moves for a verdict in his favor
does not amount to a consent that the case shall be taken
from the jury. One who claims that the evidence is all his
way does not waive the right to claim that, at least, some
of it is his way, and that right is not affected by the fact
that the other party moves that a verdict be directed in his
favor. Woodsville, etc., Bank v. Rogers, 82 Vt. 468, 74 Atl.
85.

i

1

"Accord:

Wolf

¥

v. Chicago
86 N.

Hayes v. Kluge, (1914)

/.3

RAINGER

#

ii

i

8

$

#

Sign Printing Co.,

J. L.

#18

(1908)

233

Ill.

501;

657.

‘

a,~wL.I
v.

Supreme

BOSTON MUTUAL LIFE ASSOCIATION.

Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
167 Massachusetts,

1897.

109.

Contract, upon a policy of insurance for $1,000, issued by
the defendant on the life of Fred S. Rainger, and payable
The answer set up,
to the plaintiff, who was his wife.
among other defenses, false and fraudulent representations
by Rainger in his application for insurance.
Trial in the
Superior Court, before Dewey, J., who directed the jury to
return a verdict for the defendant; and the plaintiff alleged
exceptions.
The facts material to the points decided appear
"'
"‘
"‘
in the opinion.

Monron, J. * * '
The plaintiff further contends that it was not within the
power of the judge to order the jury to return a verdict for

the defendant at the time when and under the circumstances
which he did. All that the exceptions state on this point
is: “At the close of the evidence arguments were made by
counsel, and the presiding justice charged the jury. After
the jury had deliberated upon the case for nearly six hours,
The foreman stated that
they were called back into court.
they were unable to agree, and the presiding justice directed
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v.

CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE,

WAY

&

\o\\>:

it

&

a

a

a

if

the jury to return a verdict for the defendant, to which
the plaintiff duly excepted.”
So far as appears from the
exceptions this took place in open court, and,
so,
is
right to call back the
clear that the presiding justice had
jury and direct them to return
verdict as he did. He did
not lose his control over the jury because they had retired
to
side room, under his direction, to deliberate on their
verdict, and in the further conduct of the trial he could re
call them and give them such additional directions or in
structions as the case seemed to him to require. Kullberg v.
O'Donnell, 158 Mass. 405; Merritt v. New York, New Haven
Hartford Railroad, 164 Mass. 440.
Exceptions overruled.

ST. PAUL

RAIL

Seventh

Circuit.

CO.

Circuit Court of Appeals,

United States

1896'.

74

Federal Reporter, 285; 20 Circuit Court of Appeals, 184.

Before WOODS and JENKINS, Circuit Judges, and GROSS
District Judge.
This
an action on the case for
WO0Ds, Circuit Judge.
by
injury
suffered
Maria
Cahill. the plaintiff in
personal
switching
error, who, when attempting, afoot, to cross
Yards,
in
error
at
the
Union
Stock
track of the defendant
backing engine,
in Chicago, was struck and run over by
a

a

is

CUP,

whereby she lost both feet, and suffered other serious bodily
a

"‘

verdict for the defendant.
#

i

#

i

ill

*

*

1!

*

it

l

Ii

#

*

*
injuries.
The Court below directed

a

a

it

if

While we have treated the judgment in this case as
verdict of the jury delivered in
had been rendered upon
accordance with the court’s peremptory direction, the fact
The record shows that the jurors, at
is not literally so.
verdict
the conclusion of the charge, refused to render
stating
that they could not
for the defendant, severally
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“Very
conscientiously
do so, whereupon
the court said:
well. You may retire to your room, and return with such a
The jury accordingly retired,
verdict as you may ﬁnd.”
but were recalled into court at a later hour, and directed
again to return a verdict for the defendant; but, one juror
still holding out, counsel for the plaintiff was permitted to
stipulate of record that a judgment of dismissal might be
entered, to have the same force and effect, and none, other,
than a verdict for the defendant under~the direction of the
court, but that plaintiff should be considered as excepting
to such direction, and also to such order of dismissal, and
thereupon the court ordered such dismissal, and the plain
The stipulation
tiff thereupon excepted to such ruling.
authority
accepted.
The
and duty of
should not have been
a Judge to diFé'c‘t’a verdict for one party or the other, when,
in his opinion, the state of the evidence requires it, is be
yond dispute; and it is not for jurors to disobey, nor for
attorneys to object, except in the orderly way necessary to
save the right to prosecute a writ of error. The conduct of
the juror in this instance was in the highest degree repre
hensible, and might well have subjected him, and any who
encouraged him to persist in his course, to punishment for
contempt.
His conduct was in violation of law, subversive
of authority, and obstructive of the orderly administration
of justice. In fact, by his course he put in jeopardy the in
terests which he assumed to protect, because it is only by I
treating the case as if the verdict directed had been re
turned that we have been able to review the judgment and
We deem it proper to observe here
to order a new trial.
1
that it is not essential that there be a written verdict signed
by jurors or by a foreman, and we have no doubt that, in
cases where the court thinks it right to do so, it may an
nounce its conclusion in the presence of the jury and of the
parties or their representatives, and direct the entry of a
verdict without asking the formal assent of the jury. Until
a case has been submitted to the -jury for its decision upon
disputed facts, the authority of the court, for all the pur
poses of the trial, is, at every step, necessarily absolute;
and its ruling upon every proposition, including the ques
tion whether, upon the evidence, the case is one for the jury,
must be conclusive, until, upon writ of error, it shall be set
That remedy is provided by law, and presumably
aside.
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and adequate, if there be just ground for
invoking it. Certainly the obstinacy of a conceited juror is
The judgment
not likely to prove a wholesome substitute.
is reversed and the case remanded, with instructions to grant
a new trial.
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MITCHELL, . This was an action to recover upon
“hail
policy,” one provision of which was that,
“In case of loss by hail to the crops insured, the assured
written notice to the company at its office in
shall mail
the city of St. Paul, Minn., within forty-eight hours after
the time of such loss, stating the day and hour of the storm,
also the probable damage to each part of the crops insured.”
So far as material for the purposes of this appeal, the
was that the insured had not given notice of loss
in accordance with this provision of the policy.
Jdefense
The policy contained a warranty that the insured was
the owner of all the land upon which the crops covered by
breach of this warranty,
the policy were growing, but
matter of defense, and no such defense was
any, was

if

a

a

a

insurance

pleaded.
When the evidence closed the defendant moved the court
to direct a verdict in its favor, but the court denied the
motion and submitted the ca_se to the jury, which found a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Thereupon the defendant
motion, not in the alternative for judgment not
withstanding the verdict, or, in case that should be denied,
new trial, but merely for judgment notwithstanding
for
The court denied the motion, and from the
the verdict.
judgment entered upon the verdict the defendant appealed.
Originally at common law, judgment notwithstanding the
a
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[JENKINS, J., dissented on other grounds.]
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verdict could only be granted in favor of the plaintiff, the
remedy in favor of the defendant being to have the judg
ment arrested; but either by statute or by judicial relax
ation of this rule, judgment notwithstanding the verdict
became quite generally allowable in favor of either party.
But in either case the motion was based on the record alone,
and the granting or denying it depended upon the pleadings.
The rendition of judgment notwithstanding the verdict was
discretionary with the court. It would only be granted when
it was clear that the cause of action, or the defense, put
upon the record did not, in point of substance, constitute a
legal cause of action or defense. It was never granted on
account of any technical defect in the pleadings, but in such
case the court would order a repleader.
By enacting laws 1895, c. 320," the legislature was not
creating a new remedy, but merely extended, as has been
done in many other states, the common law remedy to cases
where, upon the evidence, either party was clearly entitled
In thus extending the remedy it must be pre
to judgment.
sumed that the legislature intended it to be governed by the
same rules which applied when it was granted upon the
record alone; that is, that it should not be granted unless
it clearly appeared from the whole evidence that the cause
of action, or defense, sought to be established could not, in
point of substance, constitute a legal cause of action or a
legal defense.
L
this
The court has acted on
construction of the statute
and refused to order judgment even where there was a total
absence of evidence on some material point, but where it
appeared probable that the party had a good cause of action
or defense, and that the defect in the evidence could be sup
plied on another trial. This is just such a case.
From the record it appears probable that the plaintiff
has a good cause of action and that the defects, if any, in
the evidence, are largely technical and could be supplied on
another trial. The alleged defects in the evidence suggested
are of the following character: that the letter from plain
tif’f’s father to Kenaston was not formally introduced in evi
dence, that there was no evidence that the letter from Kenas
ton to the defendant was never mailed, and that there was
no evidence that the person who came to adjust the loss was
McClure, or that McClure was at that time defendant’s ad
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The statute permits a party to make his motion in

Defendant has elected not to do so, but to
the alternative.
stand exclusively on its right to judgment in its favor not
withstanding the verdict against it. Not being entitled to
this relief, it is not entitled, at least as a matter of right, to
a new trial, on the ground of the insuﬁiciency of the evi
Indeed, counsel for the defendant conceded this upon
dence.
the argument.

Judgment aﬂirmed."
“In all cases where at the close of the
'7‘1The statute is as follows:
testimony in the case tried a motion is made by either party to the suit
requesting the trial court to direct a verdict in favor of the party making
such motion, which motion was denied, the trial court on motion made
that judgment be entered notwithstanding the verdict, or on motion for
a new trial, shall order judgment to be entered in favor of the party
who was entitled to have a verdict directed in his or its favor; and
the supreme court of the state on appeal from an order granting or
denying a. motion for a new trial in the action in which such motion
was made may order and direct judgment to be entered in favor of the
party who was entitled to have such verdict directed in his or its favor
whenever it shall appear from the testimony that the party was entitled
to have such motion granted."
The history of this statute in Minnesota is interesting. In 1913 it
was amended so as to require the court to overrule the motion for a
directed verdict whenever the adverse party objected to it, and to take
the verdict of the jury; and thereafter the error, if any, could be corrected
G. L. 1913, ch. 245.
on motion by the entry of a proper judgment.
In
removed the requirement
amendment
that the motion
1915 another
to direct should be overruled._ G. L. 1915, ch. 31. In 1917 it was again
amended so as to allow a judgment to be entered after an erroneous
refusal to direct a verdict in cases where the jury disagreed and were
discharged.
G. L. 1917, ch. 24.
‘I8 Such a statute
was held unconstitutional in Slocum v. New York
Life Ins. C0.. (1912) 228 U. S. 364, by a. ﬁve to four division, on the
ground that the entry of a judgment contrary to the verdict of a jury
was the denial of the right of trial by jury. See the following discussions
Trial by Jury in the United States, 26 Harv.
of this case. Thorndyke:
L. Rev. 732; Ezra Ripley Tliayer; Judicial Administration, 63 Univ. of
Penn. L. Rev. & Am. L. Reg. 585-608 (containing a very illuminating
discussion of the entire problem involved).
See Bothwell v. Boston
Other courts have held such statutes valid.
Elevated Ry. Co., (1913) 215 Mass. 467, citing many cases.
~
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HARLAN,
.—The plaintiffs in error and Thomas St. Clair
were indicted jointly for the murder of Maurice Fitzgerald
upon the high seas, on board of an American vessel, the bark
Hesper, as set forth in the indictment mentioned in St. Clair
v. U. S., 154 U. S. 134, 14 Sup. Ct. 1002.
On motion of the
accused, it was ordered that they be ‘tried separately.
St.
Clair was tried, found guilty of murder, and sentenced to
suffer the punishment of death. Subsequently the order for
separate trials was set aside, and the present defendants
were tried together, and both were convicted of murder.
A
motion for a new trial having been overruled, a like sentence
was imposed upon them.
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One of the speciﬁcations of error relates to the refusal
of the court to give certain instructions asked by the de
fendants, and to parts of the charge to the jury.

is

a

it

a

it

The refusal to grant the defendants’ requests for instruc
tions, taken in connection with so much of the charges as
referred to the crime of manslaughter, and the observations
of the court when the jury, through their foreman, applied
for further instructions, present the question whether the
court transcended its authority when saying, as in effect
did, that, in view of the evidence, the only verdict the jury
could under the law properly render would be either one of
guilty of the offense charged, or one of not guilty of the
offense charged; that if
felonious homicide had been com
mitted by either of the defendants, of which the jury were
the judges from the proof, there was nothing in this case to
-reduce
below the grade of murder; and that, “as one of
jury
expected to be gov
the tribunals of the country,
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it should receive from the court.

i I

C

i i

8

The general question as to the duty of the jury to receive
the law from the court is not concluded by any direct decision
of this court.
#

i

U

U

O

C

I

1

1

l

The question before us received full consideration by Mr.
Justice Story in U. S. '0. Battiste, 2 Sumn. 240, 243, 244, Fed.
Cas. No. 14,545.
That was an indictment for a capital of
fense, and the question was directly presented whether in
criminal cases, especially in capital cases, the jury were the
judges of the law as well as of the facts.
He said: “My
opinion is that the jury are no more judges of the law in a
capital or other criminal case, upon the plea of not guilty,
than they are in every civil case tried upon the general issue.
In each of these cases, their verdict, when general, is neces
sarly compounded of law and of fact, and includes both.
In each they must necessarily determine the law as well as
the fact. In each they have the physical power to disre
gard the law, as laid down to them by the court. But I deny
that, in any case, civil or criminal, they have the moral right
to decide the law according to their own notions or pleasure.
On the contrary, I hold it the most sacred constitutional right
of every party accused of a crime that the jury should re
spond as to the facts, and the court as to the law. It is the
duty of the court to instruct the jury as to the law, and it
is the duty of the jury to follow the law as it is laid down
by the court. This is the right of every citizen, and it is his
only protection.
If the jury were at liberty to settle the law
for themselves, the effect would be, not only that the law
itself would be most uncertain, from the different views
which different juries might take of it, but in case of error
there would be no remedy or redress by the injured party;
for the court would not have any right to review the law as
it had been settled by the jury.” “Every person accused as
a criminal has a right to be tried according to the law of the
land,—the ﬁxed law of the land, and not by the law as a
jury may understand it, or choose, from wantonness or
ignorance or accidental mistake, to interpret it. If I thought
that the jury were the proper judges of the law in criminal
cases, I should hold it my duty to abstain from the responsi
bility of stating the law to them upon any such trial. But
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believing, as I do, that every citizen has a right to be tried
by the law, and according to the law; that it is his privilege
and truest shield against oppression and wrong,—I feel it my
duty to state my views fully and openly on the present occa
s1on.”

In U. S.

Morris,

Curt. 23, 51, 52, 58, Fed. Cas. No.
15,815, the question, in all of its aspects, was examined by
Mr. Justice Curtis with his accustomed care. In that case
the contention was that every jury, impaneled in a court of
the United States, was the rightful judge of the existence,
construction, and effect of every law that was material in a
criminal case, and could, of right, and if it did its duty.
must, decide ﬁnally on the constitutional validity of any act
of congress which the trial brought in question. Touching
the rightful powers and duties of the court and the jury
under the constitution in criminal cases, Mr. Justice Curtis,
among other things, said: “The sixth article, after declar
ing that the constitution, laws and treaties of the United
States shall be the supreme law of the land, proceeds, ‘And
the judges, in every state, shall be bound thereby.’
But was
it not intended that the constitution, laws, and treaties of
the United States should be the supreme law in criminal as
well as in civil cases? If a state law should make it penal
for an officer of the United States to do what an act of con
gress commands him to do, was not the latter to be supreme
over the former? And if so, and in such cases juries ﬁnally
and rightfully determine the law, and the constitution so
means when it speaks of a trial by jury, why was this com
mand laid on the judges alone, who are thus mere advisers
of the jury, and may be bound to give sound advice, but have
no real power in the matter? It was evidently the inten
tion of the constitution that all persons engaged in making,
expounding, and executing the laws, not only under the
authority of the United States, but of the several states,
should be bound by oath or affirmation to support the con
stitution of the United States. But no such oath or affirma
tion is required of jurors, to whom it is alleged the constitu
tion conﬁdes the power of expounding that instrument, and
not only construing, but holding invald, any law which may
“In my opinion,” the
come in question on a criminal trial.”
learned justice proceeded, “it is the duty of the court to
decide every question of law which arises in a criminal trial.
'v.

1
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the question touches any matter affecting the course of
the trial, such as the competency of a witness, the admissi
bility of evidence, and the like, the jury receive no direction
concerning it.
It affects the materials out of which they
are to form their verdict, but they have no more concern
with it than they would have had if the question had arisen
in some other trial. If the question of law enters into the
issue, and forms part of it, the jury are to be told what the
law is, and they are bound to consider that they are told
truly; that law they apply to the facts, as they ﬁnd them, and
thus, passing both on the law and the fact, they from both,
frame their general verdict of guilty or not guilty. Such is
my view of the respective duties of the different parts of this
tribunal in the trial of criminal cases, and I have not found
a single decision of any court in England, prior to the for
mation of the constitution, which conﬂicts with it.”
1!

1

$
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#

#

ll

ll

¥
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But Mr. Justice Curtis considered the question from an
other point of view, and gave reasons which appear to us
entirely conclusive against the proposition that it is for
the jury, in every criminal case, to say authoritatvely what
is the law by which they are to be governed in ﬁnding their
verdict. He said: “There is, however, another act of con
gress which bears directly on this question.
The act of
the 29th of April, 1802, in section 6, after enacting that, in
case of a division of opinion between the judges of the cir
cuit court on any question, such question may be certiﬁed to
‘And shall by the said court
the supreme court, proceeds:
be ﬁnally decided; and the decision of the supreme court and
their order in the premises shall be,remitted to the circuit
court, and be there entered of record and have effect ac
cording to the nature of such judgment and order.’
The
proves
section
this
that
criminal as well as civil
residue of
cases are embraced in it, and under it many questions aris
ing in criminal cases have been certiﬁed to and decided by
the supreme court, and persons have been executed by rea
Now, can it be, after a question aris
son of such decisions.
ing in a criminal trial has been certiﬁed to the supreme court,
and there, in the language of this act, ﬁnally decided, and
their order remitted here and entered of record, that when
the trial comes on the jury may rightfully revise and reverse
Suppose, in the course of this trial, the
this ﬁnal decision?
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judges had divided in opinon upon the question of the con
stitutionality of the act of 1850, and that, after a ﬁnal de
cision thereon by the supreme court and the receipt of its
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Perhaps the fullest examination of the question upon prin
ciple, as well as upon authority, to be found in the decisions
Gray, 185,
of any state court, was made in Com. v. Anthes,
193, 206, 208, 218, where Chief Justice Shaw, speaking for
majority of the court, said that the true theory and funda
mental principle of the common law, both in its civil and
criminal department, was that the judges should adjudicate
ﬁnally upon the whole question of law, and the jury upon the
whole question of fact.
Considering, in the light of the authorities, the grounds
verdict of guilty or not guilty, in
criminal
upon which
a

case, was held, at common law, to be conclusive,

he observed

that though the jury had the power they had not the right to
decide, that is, to adjudicate, on both law and evidence.
He said. “The result of these several rules and principles
jury, both upon the law
is that, in‘ practice, the verdict of
and the fact, is conclusive: because, from the nature of the
proceeding, there is no judicial power by which the conclu
sions of law thus brought upon the record by that verdict
a

0

mandate here, the trial should come on before a jury, does
the constitution of the United States, which established that
supreme court, intend that a jury may, as matter of right,
And, if not, what becomes
revise and reverse that decision?
of this supposed right? Are the decisions of the supreme
court binding on juries, and not the decisions of inferior
courts? This will hardly be pretended; and if it were, how
is it to be determined whether the supreme court has or has
not, in some former case, in effect settled a particular ques
tion of law? In my judgment, this act of congress is in
accordance with the constitution, and designed to effect one
of its important and even necessary objects,—a uniform ex
position and interpretation of the law of the United States,
—-by providing means for a ﬁnal decision of any question of
law,—ﬁnal as respects every tribunal and every part of any
tribunal in the country; and, if so, it is not only wholly
inconsistent with the alleged power of juries, to the extent
of all questions so decided, but it tends strongly to prove
that no such right as is claimed does or can exist.”
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inquired into. A general ver
dict, either of conviction or acquittal, does embody and declare
the result of both the law and the fact, and there is no mode
of separating them on the record so as to ascertain whether
the jury passed their judgment on the law, or only on the
evidence. The law authorized them to adjudicate deﬁnitively
on the evidence; the law presumes that they acted upon cor
rect rules of law given them by the judge.
The verdict,
therefore, stands conclusive and unquestionable, in point
both of law and fact.
In a certain limited sense, therefore,
it may be said that the jury have a power and a legal right;
to pass upon both the law and the fact. And this is sufﬁcient
to account for many and most of the dicta in which the propo
sition is stated. But it would be more accurate to state that
it is the right of the jury to return a general verdict; this
draws after it, as a necessary consequence, that they inci
dentally pass upon the law. But here, again, is the question,
what is intended by ‘passing upon the law’? I think it is by
embracing it in their verdict, and thus bringing it upon the
record, with their ﬁnding of the facts.
But does it follow
that they may rightfully and by authority of the common
law, by which all are conscientiously bound to govern their
conduct, proceed upon the same grounds and principles in the
one case as the other?
What the jury have a right to do,
and what are the grounds and principles upon which they
are in duty and conscience bound to act and govern them
selves in the exercise of that right, are two very distinct
questions. The latter is the one we have to deal with. Sup
pose they have a right to ﬁnd a general verdict, and by that
verdict to conclude the prosecutor in the matter of law, still
it is an open and very different question whether, in making
up that verdict and thereby embracing the law, they have
the same right to exercise their own reason and judgment,
against the statement of the law by the judge, to adjudicate
The
on the law, as unquestionably they have on the fact.
affirmative of this proposition is maintained by the defend
ant in this case, and by others in many of the cases before
us.
If I am right in the assumption that the judge is to
adjudge the law, and the jury the fact, only, it furnishes the
answer to this question to what extent the jury adjudicate
the law; and it is that they receive authoritative direction
from the court, and act in conformity with them, though by
can be reversed, set aside, or
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their verdict they thus embrace the law with the fact, which
they may rightfully adjudicate.”
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To the same purport are the text writers.
“In theory,
therefore,” says Judge Cooley, “the rule of law would seem
to be that
is the duty of the jury to receive and follow the
law as delivered to them by the court; and such
the clear
weight of authority.”
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We are of opinion that the law in England
at the date of our separation from that country was as de
clared in the authorities we have cited. The contrary view
rests, as ‘we think, in large part, upon expressions
cer
tain judges and writers, enforcing the principle that when
compounded of law and fa-ct a general ver
the question
dict, ea: necessitate, disposes of the case in hand, both as to
what Lord Somers meant when he said
law and fact. That
Security
essay
on
“The
his
of Englishmen’s Lives, or the
in
Trust, Power, and Duty of the Grand Juries of England,”
that jurors only “are the judges from whose sentence the
indicted are to expect life or death,” and that, “by ﬁnding
guilty or not guilty, they do complicately resolve both law
and fact.” In the speeches of many statesmen and in the
utterances of many jurists will be found the general obser
vation that when law and fact are “blended” their combined
verdict of guilty or not
for the jury, and
consideration
guilty will determine both for the particular case in hand.
But this falls far short of the contention that the jury, in
applying the law to the facts, may rightfully refuse to act
upon the principles of law announced by the court.

Any other rule than that indicated in the above observa

it

it

if

tions would bring confusion and uncertainty in the adminis
a jury may right
tration of the criminal law. Indeed,
fully disregard the direction of the court in matter of law,
and determine for themselves what the law is in the par
is difficult to perceive any legal
ticular case before them,
ground upon which a verdict of conviction can be set aside
be the function of
by the court as being against law. If
facts,—if
well
the
the function
law
as
the
jury
to
decide
the
of the court be only advisory as to the law,—why should the
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court interfere for the protection of the accused against what
it deems an error of the jury in matter of law?
Public and private safety alike would be in peril if the
principle be established that juries in criminal cases may, of
right, disregard the law as expounded to them by the court,
and become a law unto themselves.
Under such a system.
the principal function of the judge would be to preside and
keep order while jurymen, untrained in the law, would de
termine questions affecting life, liberty, or property accord
ing to such legal principles as, in their judgment, were
applicable to the particular case being tried.
If because,
generally speaking, it is the function of the jury to determine
the guilt or innocence of the accused according to the evi
dence, of the truth or weight of which they are to judge, the
court should be held bound to instruct them upon a point
in respect to which there was no evidence whatever, or to
forbear stating what the law is upon a given state of facts,
the result would be that the enforcement of the law against
criminals, and the protection of citizens against unjust and
groundless prosecutions, would depend entirely upon juries
uncontrolled by any settled, ﬁxed, legal principles. And if it
be true that a jury in a criminal case are under no legal ob
ligation to take the law from the court, and may determine
for themselves what the law is, it necessarily results that
counsel for the accused may, of right, in the presence of both
court and jury, contend that what the court declares to be
the law applicable to the case in hand is not the law, and, in
support of his contention, read to the jury the reports of ad
judged cases, and the views of elementary writers.
Un
jurisdictions,
juries
where
in
doubtedly, in some
criminal
cases have the right, in virtue of constitutional or statutory
provisions, to decide both law and facts upon their own judg
ment as to what the law is and as to what the facts are, it
may be the privilege of counsel to read and discuss adjudged
cases before the jury. And in a few jurisdictions, in which
it is held that the court alone responds as to the law, that
But upon
practice is allowed in deference to long usage.
principle, where the matter is not controlled by express con
stitutional or statutory provisions, it cannot be regarded as
the right of counsel to dispute before the jury the law as
Under the contrary view—if it be
declared by the court.
held that the court may not authoritatively decide all ques
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tions of law arising in criminal cases—the result will be
that when a new trial in a criminal case is ordered, even by
this court, the jury, upon such trial, may of right return a
verdict based upon the assumption that what this court has
adjudged to be law is not law. We cannot give our sanction
to any rule that will lead to such a result.
We must hold
affirmatively to the doctrine that in the courts of the United
States it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the
law from the court, and apply that law to the facts as they
ﬁnd them to be from the evidence. Upon the court rests the
responsibility of declaring the law; upon the jury, the re
sponsibility of applying the law so declared to the facts as
they, upon their conscience, believe them to be. Under any
other system, the courts, although established in order to
declare the law, would for every practical purpose be elim
inated from our system of government as instrumentalities
devised for the protection equally of society and of individu
als in their essential rights. When that occurs our govern
ment will cease to be a government of laws, and become a
Liberty regulated by law is the under
government of men.
lying principle of our institutions.
#
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We have said that, with few exceptions, the rules which
obtain in civil cases in relation to the authority of the court
to instruct the jury upon all matters of law arising upon the
issues to be tried, are applicable in the trial of criminal cases.
The most important of those exceptions is that it is not com
petent for the court, in a criminal case, to instruct the jury
peremptorily to ﬁnd the accused guilty of the offense charged,
The
or of any criminal offense less than that charged.
grounds upon which this exception rests were well stated by
Judge McCrary, Mr. Justice Miller concurring, in U. S. v.
Taylor, 3 McCrary, 50, 505, 11 Fed. 470. It was there said:
“In a civil case, the court may set aside the verdict, whether
it be for the plaintiff or defendant, upon the ground that it
is contrary to the law as given by the court; but in a crim
inal case, if the verdict is one of acquittal, the court has no
power to set it aside. It would be a useless form for a court
to submit a civil case, involving only questions of la\v, to the
consideration of a jury, where the verdict, when found, if
not in accordance with the court's view of the law, would be
The same result is accomplished by an instruc
set aside.
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tion given in advance to ﬁnd a verdict in accordance with
the court's opinion of the law. But not so in criminal cases.
A verdict of acquittal cannot be set aside; and therefore, if
the court can direct a verdict of guilty, it can do indirectly
that which it has no power to do directly.”
We are of opinion that the court below did not err in say
ing to the jury that they could not, consistently with the law
arising from the evidence, ﬁnd the defendants guilty of man
slaughter, or of any offense less than the one charged; that
if the defendants were not guilty of the offense charged, the
duty of the jury was to return a verdict of not guilty.
Q

i I

The main reason ordinarily assigned for a recognition of
the right of the jury, in a criminal case, to take the law into
their own hands, and to disregard the directions of the court
in matters of law, is that the safety and liberty of the citi
zen will be thereby more certainly secured.
That view was
urged upon Mr. Justice Curtis.
After stating that, if he
assigned
to be well founded, he would
conceived the reason
pause long before denying the‘ existence of the power
claimed, he said that a good deal of reﬂection had convinced
him that the argument was the other way. He wisely ob
“As long as the judges of the United States
served that:
are obliged to express their opinions publicly, to give their
reasons for them when called upon in the usual mode, and
to stand responsible for them, not only to public opinion, but
to a court of impeachment, I can apprehend very little dan
ger of the laws being wrested to purposes of injustice. But,
on the other hand, I do consider that this power and cor
responding duty of the court authoritatively to declare the
law is one of the highest safeguards of the citizen. The sole
end of courts of justice is to enforce the laws uniformly and
impartially, without respect of persons or times or the opin
ions of men. To enforce popular laws is easy. But when an
unpopular cause is a just cause; when a law, unpopular in
some locality, is to be enforced,—there then comes the strain
upon the administration of justice; and few unprejudiced
men would hesitate as to where that strain would be most
ﬁrmly borne.” U. S. '0. Morris, 1 Curt. 62, 63, Fed. Cas. No.
15,815.

The questions above referred to are the only ones that
need be considered on this writ of error.
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MR. JUSTICE JACKSON participated in the decision of this
in the vi-ews herein expressed.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed as to Hansen,
trial
but is reversed as to Sparf, with directions for a
new
as to him.
BREWER, J., dissenting.
I concur in the views expressed in the opinion of the
court as to the separate functions of court and jury, and
"
*
*
in the judgment of afﬁrmance against Hansen.
case, and concurs

$

I

am authorized
these views.
GRAY,

J., with
$

It is our

Q

1

i

II

Q

$

$1

i

1!

to say that MR. JUSTICE BROWN concurs in

‘

J.,

whom concurred SHIRAS,
#

i

¥

ll

$

II

*

#

dissenting.
¥

and settled conviction, conﬁrmed by a re
examination of the authorities under the responsibility of tak
ing part in the consideration and decision of the capital case
now before the court, that the jury, upon the general issue of
guilty or not guilty in a criminal case, have the right, as well
as the power, to decide, according to their own judgment and
consciences, all questions, whether of law or of fact, involved
in that issue.
The question of the right of the jury to decide the law in
criminal cases has been the subject of earnest and repeated
controversy in England and America, and eminent jurists
have differed in their conclusions upon the question.
In this
country, the opposing views have been fully and strongly set
forth by Chancellor Kent in favor of the right of the jury,
and by Chief Justice Lewis against it, in People 1*. Croswell,
3 Johns. Cas. 337; by Judge Hall in favor of the right, and by
Judge Bennett against it, in State v. Croteau, 23 Vt. 14; and
by Chief Justice Shaw against the right, and by Mr. Justice
Thomas in its favor, in Com. v. Anthes, 5 Gray, 185.
deep

IF

#

8

i

U

#

i

#

i i

Littleton, speaking of civil actions in which the jury, upon
the general issue pleaded, might return a special verdict, says
that, “if they will take upon them the knowledge of the law
upon the matter, they may give their verdict generally, as is
Co. Litt. § 368. And accordingly Lord
put in their charge.”
“Although
the jury, if they will take upon them
says:
Coke
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(as Littleton here saith) the knowledge of the law, may give
yet it is dangerous for them so to do; for,
if they do mistake the law, they run into the danger of an at
taint; therefore to ﬁnd the special verdict is the safest, where
the case is doubtful.” Co. Litt. 227b.
_
a general verdict,

1

*

$

i

1

i i l

C

Q

In the reign of Charles II. some judges undertook to in
struct juries that they must take the law from the court, and
to punish them if they returned a verdict in favor of the ac
cused against the judge’s instructions. But, as often as ap
plication was made to higher judicial authority, the punish
ments were set aside, and the rights of juries vindicated.
1

l

U

i i i I i

Q

Q

The reasons are more fully brought out in BusheZl’s Case,
in 1670, not mentioned in the text of Lord Hale's treatise, and
doubtless decided after that was written. William Penn and
William Mead having been indicted and tried for a similar
offense, and acquitted against the instructions of the court,
Bushell and the other jurors who tried them were ﬁned by
Sir John Howell, recorder of London, and Bushell was com
mitted to prison, in like terms, for not paying his ﬁne. and
Penn and Meads’s Case, 6
sued out a writ of habeas corpus.
951;
Case,
Vaughan, 135, 6 How.
Bu.shell's
How. State Tr.
State Tr. 999; 1 Freem. 1; T. Jones, 13.
¥

1

l i

1

¥

i

II

#

¥

It

Q

*

*

*

#

Q

ll

*

II
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But Bushell was discharged from imprisonment, for rea
sons stated in the judgment delivered by Sir John Vaughan,
chief justice of the common pleas, after a conference of all
the judges of England, including Lord Hale, and with the
Vaughan,
concurrence of all except Chief Justice Kelyng.
144, 145; 1 Freem. 5; Lord Holt in Groen-welt 12. Burwell, 1
Ld. Raym. 454, 470.

it

difficult to exhibit the strength of Chief Justice
Vaughan’s reasoning by detached extracts from his opinion.
But a few other passages are directly in point:
“A man cannot see by another’s eye, nor hear by another’s
ear; no more can a man conclude or infer the thing to be re
solved by another’s understanding or reasoning; and though
the verdict be right the jury give, yet they, being not assured
is so from their own understanding, are forsworn, at least
in foro conscicntiaz.” Page 148.
is
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“That clecantatum in our books, ‘ad quazstionem facti non
respondent judices, ad quzestionem legis non respondent jum
tores,’ literally taken, is true; for if it be demanded, what is
the fact? the judge cannot answer it; if it be asked, what is
the law in the case? the jury cannotanswer it.” He then
explains this by showing that upon demurrers, special ver
dicts, or motions in arrest of judgment “the jury inform the
naked fact, and the court deliver the law.” “But upon all
general issues, as upon not culpable pleaded in trespass, nil
debet in debt, nul tort, nul disseisin in assize, ne disturba pas
in quare impedit, and- the like, though it be matter of law
whether the defendant be a trespasser, a debtor, disseisor, or
disturber, in the particular cases in issue, yet the jury ﬁnd
not (as in a special verdict) the fact of every case by itself,
leaving the law to the court, but ﬁnd for the plaintiff or de
fendant upon the issue to be tried, wherein they resolve both
law and fact complicately, and not the fact by itself; so as
though they answer not singly to the question what is the law,
yet they determine the law in all matters, where issue is
joined and tried in the principal case, but [i. e. except] where
97
Pages 149, 150.
the verdict is special.

i

In

ii

i

1

1791, the declaratory

i

1

$

$

i I

“An act to remove

statute, entitled

doubts respecting the functions of juries in cases of libel,”
and known as “Fox’s Libel Act,” was introduced in parlia
ment, and was passed in 1792. St. 32 Geo. III, c. 60.
#

#

i

$

l

#

1

#

i i

Mr. Fox, upon moving the introduction of the bill in the
house of commons in 1791, after observing that he was not ig
norant that “power” and “right” were notconvertible terms,
said that, “if a power was vested in any person, it was surely
meant to be exercised”; that “there was a power vested in
the jury to judge the law and fact, as often as they were

united, and, if the jury were not to be understood to have a
right to exercise that power, the constitution would never
have intrusted them with it”; “but they knew it was the
province of the jury to judge of law and fact, and this was the
case, not of murder only, but of felony, high treason, and of
every other criminal indictment”; and that “it must be left in
all cases to a jury to infer the guilt of men, and an English
subject could not lose his life but by a judgment of his peers.”

29

29

‘

Parl. Hist. 564, 565, 597.

i
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$
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“

#

*
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Pending the debate, the house of lords put questions to the
judges, who returned an opinion, in which, after saying that
“the general criminal law of England is the law of libel," they
laid down, as a fundamental proposition, applicable to treason
as well as to other crimes, “that the criminality or innocence
of any act done (which includes any paper written) is the
result of the judgment which the law pronounces upon that
act, and must therefore be in all cases, and under all circum
stances, matter of law, and not matter of fact.” With such a
basis, it is hardly to be wondered at that they “conceived the
law to be that the judge is to declare. to the jury what the
law is,” and “that it is the duty of the jury, if they will ﬁnd a
general verdict upon the whole matter in issue, to compound
that verdict of the fact as it appears in evidence before them,
and of the law as it is declared to them by the judge.” The
judges, however, “took this occasion to observe” that they
had “offered no opinion which will have the effect of taking
matter of law out of a general issue, or out of a general ver
dict,” and “disclaimed the folly of undertaking to prove that
a

jury, who can ﬁnd a general verdict,

themselves to deal with matter of
issue, and to hazard a verdict made
matter of law, according to their
against all direction by the judge."
#

¥

ll

i=

John Adams, writing in

t

It

cannot

take upon

law arising in a general
up of the fact, and of the
conception of that law,
29 Parl. Hist. 1361-1369.

#

said:

1

U

“

"‘

F

“Whenever a
general verdict is found, it assuredly determines both the
fact and the law. It was never yet disputed or doubted that a
general verdict, given under the direction of the court in
point of law, was a legal determination of the issue. There
fore, the jury have a power of deciding an'issue upon a gen
And, if they have, is it not an absurdity to sup
eral verdict.
pose that the law would oblige them to ﬁnd a verdict accord
ing to the direction of the court, against their own opinion,
“The general rules of law and
judgment, and conscience?”
regulations
society,
of
under which ordinary trans
common
actions arrange themselves, are well enough known to or<‘i
The great principles of the constitution are
nary jurors.
They are sensibly felt by every Briton.
intimately known.
It is scarcely extravagant to say they are drawn in and im
bibed with the nurse’s milk and ﬁrst air. Now, should the
melancholy case arise that the judges should give their opin
1771,

"‘
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1

ii

ions to the jury against one of these fundamental principles,
is a juror obliged to give his verdict generally, according to
this direction, or even to ﬁnd the fact specially, and submit
the law to the court? Every man, of any feeling or con
science, will answer, ‘No.’
It is not only his right, but his
duty, in that case, to ﬁnd the verdict according to his own
best understanding, judgment, and conscience, though in di
rect opposition to the direction of the court.” “The English
law obliges no man to decide a cause upon oath against his
own judgment.” 2 John Adams’ Works, 253-255.

Chief Justice Parsons, in delivering judgment in
a civil action for slander, said: “Both parties have submit
jury. The issue involved both
ted the trial of" this issue to
law and fact, and the jury must decide the law and the fact.
To enable them to settle the ‘fact, they were to weigh the testi
mony. That they might truly decide the law, they were en
titled to the assistance of the judge. If the judge had de
matter of law, yet the jury must have
clined his aid in
formed their conclusion of law as correctly as they were
“In this opinion of the
able.” And, as the reporter states:
judges,
Sedgwick,
justice
Sewall, Thatcher,
the other
viz.
chief
and Parker, severally declared their full and entire concur
25, 37.
Mass.
rence." Cojﬁn v. Coﬁin,
Q

C

#

1,

i

i

i

Q

i

#

i
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1808,
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"

"‘

l

Q

l

I
I

l
i

the trial of Aaron Burr in the Circuit Court
United States for the district of Virginia, in 1808, for
for levying war in Blennerhassett’s Island, Chief
while aiﬁrming that a question
Marshall,

of the
treason
Justice
of the

I

At

Q

l
i

5

a

J

a

Some justices of this court, indeed, who, as already shown,
admitted the general right of jurors in criminal cases to de
cide both law and fact, denied their right to pass upon the
constitutionality of a statute, apparently upon the ground
that the question of the existence or the validity of
statute
was for the court alone. Paterson, ., in Lyon's Case (1798)
Whart. St. Tr. 333, 336, Fed. Cas. No. 8,646; Chase, J., in
Callender’s Case (1800) Whart. St. Tr. 688-, 710-718, Fed.
Cas. No. 14,709; Baldwin, J., in U. S. 12. Shive (1832) Baldw.
It may well be doubted whether
510, Fed. Cas. No. 16,278.
distinction can be maintained.
Com. v. Anthes,
such
Gray, 185, 188-192, 262; Cooley, Const. Lim. (6th Ed.).
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admissibility of evidence must be decided by the court, be
cause that question was whether the ‘jury should hear the
evidence or not, yet told the jury (in many forms, but of the
same meaning) that upon a question compounded of fact and
law, involved in the issue submitted to the jury, the court
might give general instructions, but the jury must decide it;
that such a question, compounded of law and fact, would be
decided by the jury, with the aid of the court, so far as re
spects the law; that of such a question the jury, aided by the
court, must judge; and that, having “heard the opinion of the
court on the law of the case, they will apply,” not “that opin
ion,” but “that law,” namely, the law as to which the court
had expressed its opinion, “to the facts, and will ﬁnd a ver
dict of guilty or not guilty as their own consciences may di
rect.” The manifest intent and effect of all this were that the
jury, after receiving the aid of the instructions of the court
on matter of law, must judge of and determine, as their own
consciences might direct, every question compounded of law
and fact involved in the general issue of guilty or not guilty.

i

It

ii

i

t

l

F

1

#

#

#

is universally conceded that a verdict of acquittal, al
though rendered against the instructions of the judge, is ﬁnal,
and cannot be set aside; and, consequently, that the jury have
the legal power to decide for themselves the law involved in
the general issue of guilty or not guilty.
It has sometimes, however, been asserted that, although
they have the power, they have no right to do this, and that it
is their legal, or at least their moral, duty, in every criminal
case, to obey and follow the judge's instructions in matter of
law. The suggestion is not that the jury ought not to exercise
the power wrongfully, but that they ought not to exercise it
at all; that, whether the instructions of the court be right or
wrong, just or arbitrary, according to the law as known of
all men, or directly contrary to it, the jury must be controlled
by and follow them.
But a legal duty which cannot in any way, directly or in
directly, be enforced, and a legal power of which there can
never, under any circumstances, be a rightful and lawful ex
ercise, are anomalies; “the test of every legal power [as said
by Alexander Hamilton, and affirmed by Chancellor Kent, in
People '0. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 362. 368, above cited] being
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its capacity to produce a deﬁnitive effect, liable neither to
punishment nor control,” “to censure nor review.”
It has been said that, if not thleir legal duty, it is their mor
al duty, to follow the instructions of the court in matter of
law.
But moral duties, as distinguished from legal duties,
are governed, not by human, but by divine, laws; and the
oath which the jurors in a capital case severally take to the
Almighty Judge is to well and truly try and true deliverance
make between the government and the prisoner at the bar,
according to their evidence, not according
the instructions
of the court, and to decide whether, in their own judgment
guilty or not guilty.
and conscience, the accused
The rules and principles of the criminal law are, for the
most part, elementary and simple, and easily understood by
jurors taken from the body of the people. As every citizen
conclusively presumed to know the law, and can
or subject
not set up his ignorance of
to excuse him from criminal
jury of his peers
responsibility for offending against it,

a

a

a

a

is

it

it

must be presumed to have equal knowledge, and, especially
after being aided by the explanation and exposition of the
law by counsel and court, to be capable of applying
to the
by
the evidence before them.
facts as proved
a matter of common observation
On the other hand,
that judges and lawyers, even the most upright, able, and
learned, are sometimes too much inﬂuenced" by technical
rules; and that those judges who are wholly or chieﬂy occu
pied in the administration of criminal justice are apt, not only
to grow severe in their sentences, but to decide questions of
law too unfavorably to the accused.
The jury having the undoubted and uncontrollable power
to determine for themselves the law as well as the fact by
denial by the court of their
general verdict of acquittal,
right to exercise this power will be apt to excite in them a
spirit of jealousy and contradiction, and to prevent them
from giving due consideration and weight to the instructions
of the court in matter of law.
In civil cases, doubtless, the court, being authorized to
grant to either party a new trial as often as the verdict ap
pears to be contrary to the law, or to the evidence, may, in
order to avoid unnecessary delay, whenever, in its opinion,
verdict for one party only, order
the evidence will warrant
Pleasa-nts v. Fant, 22 Wall. 116;
verdict accordingly.
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Hendrick v. Lindsay, 93 U. S. 143; Schoﬁeld 12. Railway Co.,
114 U. S. 615, 5 Sup. Ct. 1125.
But a person accused of crime has a two-fold protection
in the court and the j ury-against being unlawfully convicted.
If the evidence appears to the court to be insufficient in law
to warrant a conviction, the court may direct an acquittal.
Smith 'v. U. S., 151 U. S. 50, 14 Sup. Ct. 234. But the court
can never order the jury to convict, for no one can be found
guilty but by the judgment of his peers.
Decisions of courts, and especially of courts of last resort,
upon issues of law, such as are presented by a demurrer or
by a special verdict, become precedents to govern judicial de
cisions in like cases in the future. But the verdict of a jury,
upon the general issue of guilty or not guilty, settles nothing
but the guilt or innocence of the accused in the particular
case; and the issue decided is so complicated of law and fact,
blended together, that no distinct decision of any question of
law is recorded or made. The purpose of establishing trial
by jury was not to obtain general rules of law for future use,
but to secure impartial justice between the government and
the accused in each case as it arose.
As said by Alexander Hamilton in Croswell’s Case, above
cited, the power of deciding both law and fact upon the gen
eral issue in ‘a criminal case is intrusted to the jury. “for
reasons of a political and peculiar nature, for the security of
Works, 335; 3 Johns. Cas.
life and liberty." 7 Hamilton’s
'
362.

i

Q

i

Ii

Q
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Q
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There may be less danger of prejudice or oppression from
judges appointed by the president elected by the people than
But, as
from judges appointed by an hereditary monarch.
the experience of history shows, it cannot be assumed that
judges will always be just and impartial, and- free from the
inclination, to which even the most upright and learned mag
istrates have been known to yield,—from the most patriotic
motives, and with the ‘most honest intent to promote symmet
ry and accuracy in the law,-of amplifying their own juris
diction and powers at the expense of those intrusted by the
constitution to other bodies. And there is surely no reason
why the chief security of the liberty of the citizen—the judg
ment of his peers—should be held less sacred in a republic
than in a monarchy.
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Upon these considerations, we are of opinion that the
learned judge erred in instructing the jury that they were
bound to accept the law as stated in his instructions, and that
this error requires the verdict to be set aside as to both de
fendants.

i

1

1

1

¥

#

#

#

$

#79

79Compare Horning v. District of Columbia,
(1920) 254 U. S. 135,
and see comment on this case in 19 Mich. L. Rev. 325.
In some states constitutional or statutory provisions give juries a
right in criminal cases or in prosecutions for libel, to judge of the law.
Louisiana. State v. Ford, (1885) 37 La. Ann. 443; Illinois, Mullinix v.
People, (1875) 76 Ill. 211; Indiana, Powers V. State, (1882) 87 Ind. 144;
Connecticut, State v. Buckley, (1873) 40 Conn. 247; Iowa, State v. Hea
cock, (1898) 106 Ia. 191; New Jersey, Drake v. State, (1890) 53 N. J. L.
23; Michigan, Thibault v. Sessions, (1894) 101 Mich. 279; Kansas, State
v. Verry, (1887) 36 Kan. 416; Missouri. State v. Armstrong. (1891) 106
Mo. 395; California, People v. McDowell, (1886) 71 Cal. 194.
Under such a statute it is proper to instruct the jury that "it the jury
can say on their oaths that they know the law better than the court
does, they have the right to do so.
Before saying this on their
oaths, it is their duty to reﬂect whether, from their habits of thought,
their study and experience, they are better qualiﬁed to judge of the
It, under all these circumstances, they are prepared
law than the court.
to say that the court is wrong in its exposition of the law, the statute
has given them that right."—State v. Heacock, (1898) 106 Ia. 191. 200.
In jurisdictions where the jury are acknowledged to be judges of
the law, it is proper to read and argue law to the jury, subject to the
reasonable control of the court.—Commonwealth v. Porter, (1845) 10
Metc. (Mass.) 263; State v. Verray, (1887) 36 Kan. 416; Harvey v.
State, (1872) 40 Ind. 516.
Even where the jury are required to take the law from the court,
it is proper for counsel to so far argue the law to the jury as to explain
the legal theory upon which the case is being tried and to state to
the jury that he believes the court will instruct them in accordance
therewith.—-Terrill v. Michigan Traction Co., (1921) 214 Mich. 478, 484.
But reading to the jury from law books, particularly recitals of facts,
is improper and may be reversible error.—Ray v. Ches. & Ohio Ry. Co.,
(1905) 57 W. Va. 333, 339.

' ' '
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AARON

v.
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MISSOURI AND KANSAS TELEPHONE
Supreme

Court of Kansas.
84

CO.

1911.

Kansas, 117.

JOHNSTON, C. J.: The appellees, Michael Aaron and Jean
nette Aaron, recovered a judgment for $10,000 against the
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appellant, the Missouri and Kansas Telephone Company, for
the violation of its duty to their son, Walter, through which
he lost his life. The action was brought against the appellant
and the Delaware Mutual Telephone Company, of Lansing,
but before the case was submitted to the jury the Delaware
Mutual Telephone Company was dismissed from the case. In
the petition it was alleged that Walter Aaron was an em
ployee of the Delaware company, which, under contract with
appellant, had two wires upon the poles of appellant, and
that it was the duty of appellant to have proper poles and
maintain them in a safe condition for its own operatives as
well as those of the Delaware company who found it neces
sary to climb and work upon them; that appellant had
planted new poles along the line and had removed its own
wires from the old and attached them to the new poles; that
Walter Aaron came along afterward and was transferring
the two wires of the Delaware company from the old to the
new poles, and that when he had climbed an old pole for that
purpose and had stripped the wires from that pole, to which
he was strapped, it broke and fell, crushing and killing him.
*

i

#

#

#

i

II

I
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The testimony included two written contracts between ap
pellant and the Delaware company relating to an interchange
of business, the connections to be made, the use of telephones
and switchboards, the maintenance of lines, the placing of
the wires of one on the poles of the other and ﬁxing the com
pensation for such use, a provision releasing one from loss or
damage caused by wires or ﬁxtures, and containing other
stipulations as to the duties of each company and its obliga
tions to the other.

In submitting the case to the jury the court instructed
“that if you believe from the evidence in this case that it was
the duty of the Missouri and Kansas Telephone Company, un
der a contract with the Delaware Mutual Telephone Company,
to maintain the line of poles in question, including the par
ticular pole in question, in a reasonably safe condition for
the linemen of the Delaware Mutual Telephone Company to
climb and operate upon; that it failed so to do, and because
thereof the death of Walter Aaron was caused, Without fault
on his part, then I instruct you shall ﬁnd for the plaintiffs,”
etc.

"‘

*

*
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The duty of appellant to the Delaware company in respect
to the maintenance of the poles, including the one which fell,
depended mainly upon the terms of the contracts between
these companies.
The contracts were in writing, and their
meaning and effect were questions of law, exclusively within
the province of the court. To send the jury to a written con
tract to ﬁnd the respective duties and obligations of the con
tracting parties was to leave the jury to decide the law as well
as the facts.
It was the province of the jury to determine all
questions of fact involved in the case, after the court had
advised them as to the governing rules of law and instructed
them how to apply those rules to the facts brought out in the
testimony.
To impose on the jury the task of interpreting a
contract and of determining the duty and responsibility of
appellant under the contract is to require them to perform a
function which belongs to the court alone—a duty which it
can not surrender or evade.
In Belil v. Keepers, 37 Kan. 64.
it was ruled that “when a written instrument is admitted in
evidence, it then becomes the duty of the court to construe
and determine its legal effect, the relation of the parties there
to, and to include such determination in the instructions to
(Syl. Par. 2; see, also, Brown o. Trust Co., 71
the jury.”
Kan. 134.)
The duty of appellant to one employed by and working for
another company is not only a matter of law, but it is one
The instruction was
of vital consequence in the action.
little less objectionable than would have been one that if the

jury believed the appellant was responsible for the injury and

death the plaintiffs were entitled to recover. The instructions
required the jury to cover the entire ﬁeld, including the prov
ince of the court, and left them to determine both the law and
It has been held that the failure of the court to
the facts.
deﬁne the issues in a case and state them to the jury is error,
and likewise it has been decided that to send the jury to the
pleadings to learn the issues or contentions of the parties is
reversible error.
(Railroad C0. v. Eagan, 64 Kan. 421; Ste
veus v. Maxwell, 65 Kan. 835; Railroad Co. v. Dalton, 66 Kan.
799.) The duty of the court to deﬁne to the jury the issues
made by the pleadings is no more imperative than to deter
mine the questions of law arising in the case and to state
them to the jury. It is in fact a greater departure from good
practice to leave the jury to interpret written contracts and
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determine their effect on the relations and obligations of the
parties than to leave them to ascertain the effect of the plead
ings or the issues which they present.
Q

l

i

Q

Q

Q

Q

i

O

I

For the error of the court in submitting the case to the jury
the case is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.

,5
6/V‘),

MITCHELL

TOWN OF FOND DU LAC.

v.

Court of Illinois.

Supreme

61

J .—This

1871.

Illinois, 174.

was assumpsit, brought by appellant
as administrator of the estate of William Mitchell, deceased,
against appellee, to recover for the support and maintenance
by the intestate in his lifetime of one Eliza McFerren, from
the 23d of March, 1857, to the 23d of January, 1858, said
Eliza being an alleged pauper and resident of the said town
ship.
MCALLISTER,

$

#

Q

1

#

#

it

1
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The ﬁrst instruction on behalf of appellee is as follows:
“If the jury believe. from the evidence, that the person,
Eliza McFarren, was boarded and lodged and furnished with
clothing by William Mitchell (whose administrator brings
suit) from the 1st day of March, A. D. 1857, until his death
in 1858, yet, unless they further believe, from the evidence,
that during that time the said Eliza McFerren was a pauper
for whose support the defendant was legally liable, or for
whose support the defendant had, by its proper officer, con
tracted to pay the said William Mitchell for during said time,
they will ﬁnd for the defendant.”
This instruction submits to the determination of the jury
two questions of law, without any aid from the court, viz.:
First—What shall constitute the legal liability of a town
to support a pauper?
Second-Who is the proper officer to make a binding con
tract on the part of the town for such support by another?
The impropriety of leaving questions of law to the deter
mination of the jury has been so often decided by the courts
that the citation of authorities seems unnecessary.
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The court should have instructed the jury as to what facts
were indispensable to create the legal liability of the town for
the support of the person in question, and then told them that
if such facts were not established by the evidence, to ﬁnd for
the defendant; and should like\vise have informed the jury
who the proper officer to bind the town for such support was,
and what would be necessary to constitute a contract express
or implied, and then left it for them to say whether such offi
cer acted in the premises, and if he did nothing to create a
contract within the deﬁnition given, that then they should
ﬁnd for the defendant.
A majority of the court think the in
struction erroneous.
For this error, the judgment of the court below must be
reversed and the cause remanded.
Judgment reversed.

/farce»/WLI

STANDARD

COTTON MILLS

v.

CHEATHAM.

Supreme Court of Georgia.
125 Georgia,

1906.

649.

J

BECK,
The petition of Cheatham contained substantial
.
ly the following allegations; that he was employed by the
Standard Cotton Mills to work at" certain machines called
“carders," which were operated by a belt from a pulley, and
it was a part of his duty to clean the machines by opening
certain lids thereon, placing his hand inside of the same, and
taking therefrom accumulations of trash and lint called
“strippings.” In order to clean the carders it was necessary
to stop them, and this was done by switching the belt from
the tight pulley, upon which it worked, to a loose pulley.
Plaintiff alleges that he had stopped the machines in the man
ner described, and had opened the lid and placed his hand in
side of one of the carders, when the belt slipped from the
loose pulley on to the tight one, the machine started, caught
his hand, and mangled it severely * * *
*

i l

F

3

i
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$

Movant also complains that the court erred in charging
“Ifthe carder machine was stopped by
the jury as follows:
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slipping the belt from the tight to the loose pulley, and that
was the proper way to stop the machine and keep it stopped
until the operator himself slipped the belt from the loose to
the tight pulley, if the plaintiff did not know, or ought to have
known to the contrary, he would have the right to presume
that the belt once shifted from the tight to the loose pulley,
and the machine thereby stopped, would remain stoppe¢untiL
again started. That I charge you as correct law, gentlemen,
provided the defect was one that the plaintiff could not have
discovered by the exercise of ordinary diligence.
It is al
leged that this portion of the charge was error, “because it
was a question for the jury to determine whether the plaintiff
would have the right to presume that the belt would stay
shifted _l1B11.. once shifted, considering all the facts before
em.” And this point seems to be well taken. In charging
as here alleged, the trial court went directly in the teeth of
the statute which declares that it is error for a trial judge to
express or intimate his opinion as to what has or has not
We cannot imagine a
been proved (Civil Code, Sec. 4334).
more direct invasion of the province of the jury than for the
court to instruct them that as to one of the facts material to
be considered by the jury in passing upon the question as to
whether or not the plaintiff himself was guilty of negligence,
“he would have the right to presume that the belt, once
shifted from the tight to the loose pulley, and the machine
thereby stopped, would remain stopped until again started.”
This did not fall far short of instructing them that if the
plaintiff took certain precautions while inserting his hand in
to a dangerous machine, he had the right to presume that the
precautionary measure so taken would be equivalent to the
exercise of due care and caution in guarding against an in
jury that might be brought about by the machine being set in
In brief, the court attempted to and did in one
motion.
breath deal with and dispose of a vital question of fact.
If
any presumption at all arose as to what would be the effect
of shifting the belt in question from the tight to the loose
pulley, it was a presumption of fact, and should have been
left for the jury's consideration alone, unaided by the court.
ll

*

Judgment reversed.
C.

J

.,

absent.

#

*

All

#

ii

1‘
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1
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the Justices concur, except FISH,
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Court of Illinois.

-

Vﬁpreme

221

Illinois,

v.

461

JOHNSON.

1906.

./,2.

J

CARTWRIGHT, C. .—This is an action on the case brought
by appellee, as administratrix of the estate of her son, Carl
Robert George Johnson, in the circuit court of Cook county,
to recover damages from appellant for causing his death.
The declaration alleged that the deceased, who was a minor,
became a passenger on November 3, 1900, on one of defend
ant’s trains, in the front car next to the engine, at West Pull
man station, to be carried to Pullman station; that the train
arrived at Pullman station about 7:45 in the evining; that at
Pullman station was an elevated platform between the tracks
for north-bound and south-bound trains for the use of pas
sengers; that when the train stopped at Pullman the deceased
left the car at the forward end, as was customary and as di
rected by defendant; that the train and car had passed by and
beyond said elevated platform, and on leaving the car de
ceased found himself on the ground a few feet north of the
elevated platform between said tracks, with the engine and
cars on the east side and a vacant space on the west and :1
high picket fence across the platform on the south; that the
depot and exit were on the west, and as the deceased went
from the place where he alighted, in a westerly and southerly
direction, toward the gates, using due care, one of the locomo
tive engines of the defendant going in a southerly direction
The plea
on the ‘south-bound track struck and killed him.
was the general issue, and upon a trial the jury returned a
verdict ﬁnding the defendant guilty and assessing plaintiff's
Judgment was entered on the verdict,
damages at $5000.
judgment
was
affirmed by the Appellate Court for
and the
'
the First District.
II

#

t

i i

$

#

I

O
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The instruction given at the request of the plaintiff which
purported to state the relative duties of the parties, the the
ory of the plaintiff and ground for recovery alleged in the
declaration, and the amount of damages which might be
awarded, was as follows:
“The jury are instructed, as a matter of law, that if you
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ﬁnd, from the evidence, that the defendant corporation was
engaged in the business of transporting passengers and
freight, for hire, upon a railroad operated by said company,
then the law denominated the defendant a common carrier.
The court instructs the jury that common carriers of per
sons are required to do all that human care, vigilance and
foresight can reasonably do, in view of the character and
mode of conveyance adopted, to prevent accidents to passen
gers. So, too, persons who become passengers must at all
times exercise ordinary care and caution for their own safety.
And if the jury believe, from the evidence in this case, that
the defendant was at the time of the accident a common car
rier, and if you further believe, from the evidence, that the
deceased was a passenger on the defendant’s train and in the
exercise of due care on his part, if the jury so believe from
preponderance of the evidence, and that the defendant care
lessly or negligently operated its said train or car by run
ning the same past the station platform, so as to cause the
deceased to alight upon the ground and tracks of the defend
ant instead of upon the platform where the passengers are
usually unloaded, and that by reason of such negligent acts.
if any are proven by the preponderance of the evidence in
the case, of the defendant, their agents, and employees, the
deceased, Carl Robert George Johnson, while exercising due
care for his safety, if you so ﬁnd from the preponderance of
the evidence, was struck by an engine controlled and oper
ated by the defendant and was then and there killed, then you
may ﬁnd the defendant guilty, and assess the plaintiff dam
ages at such reasonable sum as she may be entitled to recover
under all the facts and circumstances proved in the case, not
exceeding $5000.”
The instruction was erroneous in three respects. It was
proved, and not disputed, that the train ran three or four
feet past the north end of the platform, and that deceased
alighted upon the ground instead of on the platform where
passengers were usually unloaded. The questions in dispute
were whether the act of defendant in running past the plat
form constituted negligence on its part, and whether such
act caused the deceased to alight upon the ground at an im
proper place, or whether he was negligent in going down the
steps where he did. They were questions of fact for the jury
to determine from the evidence, and it was the exclusive
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province of the jury to determine whether the act of the de
fendant was negligent and whether the deceased was guilty
of negligence. "‘ "' * On'that question the instruction as
sumed both that the act was a careless and negligent one, and
that it caused the deceased to alight upon the ground on the
tracks of the defendant instead of upon the platform, and it
afterwards refers to the acts as “such negligent acts.” The
plaintiff was entitled to recover if the jury should decide that
the act of the defendant was negligent, that it caused the in
jury, and that the deceased was in the exercise of ordinary
care; but it was the exclusive province of the jury to deter
mine those facts, and they should have been submitted to the
jury for determination without any intimation or assump
*
*
*
tion as to the proper conclusion.
Where the evi
dentiary facts will justify different conclusions the question
of negligence is one of fact, and instructions should always be
drawn so as to state the law upon a supposed or hypothetical
state of facts, leaving the jury to ﬁnd the fact.
Instructions
assuming the existence of any material fact have always been
condemned. “‘ "‘ “ Under this instruction, when the jury
found that the train was run past the platform, they would
understand that the court regarded such act to be a careless
and negligent operation of the train, and that it caused the
deceased to get off the train at the place where he did.
It
did not call upon the jury, as it should have done, to decide
whether the act constituted negligence on the part of the de
fendant.
1!
t
1
Q
#

is

Because of the material and prejudicial errors which have
been pointed out, the judgments of the Appellate Court and
circuit court are reversed and the cause
remanded to the
circuit court.
Reversed and remanded.
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WALDEN.

for the Trial of Imneachments and the Correction of
Errors in the State of New York. 1815.
12

Johnson, 518.

This cause came up from the Supreme Court on a writ of
error.

l

1

U

1

l I

U

i

Q

O

For the plaintiffs in error, it was contended.

1.
That
of
certain
letters and matters, rela
there was a concealment
tive to the conduct and character of the master, which were
material to the risk, and ought to have been disclosed to
the plaintiffs in error, at the time the policy was under
written. * "‘ * 2. That under the circumstances of the
case, the policy did not protect the ship against the barratry
of Cartwright, the master; and that there was not sufficient
evidence of barratry to entitle the plaintiffs below to re
"‘
*
*.
3. That the materiality of
cover on that ground
the concealment was a question of fact, and ought to have
"‘
*
"
been left to the jury.
THE CHANCELLOR. This case comes up upon a bill of ex
ceptions, and we are accordingly to be conﬁned to the ob
jections taken at the trial, and appearing on the face of the
bill. The question is, whether there was error in the charge
which the learned judge delivered to the jury. This charge
was, “that the several matters given in evidence on the
part of the plaintiffs, were, in his opinion, conclusive evi
dence of the barratry of the master of the vessel, on the
voyage; and that the plaintiffs were not bound to communi
cate, or disclose, to the defendants, any of the letters, mat
ters, or circumstances, which were, at the time of the insur
ance, in their possession, relative to the master; and that
the matters given in evidence, on the part of the defend
ants, were not sufficient to maintain the issue on their part,
or to bar the action of the plaintiffs; and that if the jury
agreed with him in opinion, they ought to ﬁnd a verdict for
the plaintiffs;” and with that charge, he left the matter to
the jury.
The counsel went at large into the discussion of the ques

tion, whether

the assured

were

bound to communicate

to
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the underwriters, at the time they applied for insurance,
the letters and other knowledge they possessed of the im
proper conduct of the master.
But it appears to me that
this question is not for the decision of this Court, because,
whether the circumstances relative to the master ought to
have been disclosed, depends upon the question, whether
those circumstances were material to the risk; and the ma
teriality is a question of fact for a jury and not a question
of law for the Court.
It is a well-settled principle in the
law of insurance, that what facts, in the knowledge of the
assured, are material, and necessary to be communicated
to the underwriter, when insifrance is asked for, is for a
jury to determine; and I will brieﬂy notice a few cases, in
illustration of this point. My whole opinion will rest upon
the admission and the solidity of this principle.
*

$

#

*

i

#

ii

#

i i

It

is thus settled, (as far as authority goes,) beyond all
doubt or contradiction, that, whether the matters not dis
closed in this case were material, was a question that ought
to have been submitted to the consideration and decision of
the jury; and here, I apprehend, lies the error committed
by the learned judge, that he has given a binding direction
to the jury, upon matter of fact, as if it had been matter of
It appears to me, that the true and necessary con
law.
struction of the charge, as stated in the bill, is, that it was
a positive direction, in point of law * as to the materialit
of
the non-disclosure, and that it must have been so received
and obeyed by the jury. If the charge had been intended
as a mere opinion to the jury, on a matter of fact, on which
they were to exercise their judgment, the jury would, un
doubtedly, have been told, that the defense in the case rested
upon the question of the materiality of the letters and
facts not disclosed, and that it was for them to judge, from
the evidence, whether the disclosure would have varied the
premium, or increased the risk, in respect of the barratry
of the master; and that if the jury should be of opinion
that the facts not disclosed were in that sense material, they
must ﬁnd for the defendants; and that, if they thought other
wise, they must ﬁnd for the plaintiffs.
This would have
language
charge
a
suited
of
to the submission of
been the
such a point; and we have an example of this species of
charge (if, indeed, an example can be wanting) in the bill
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of exceptions taken in the case of Smith v. Carrington, (4
If, then, the judge had deemed it proper to
Cranch, 64.)
add his own opinion on that fact, for the assistance or satis
faction of the jury, it might have been done with utility, and
with safety. But the charge, as stated in the case, is not of
this nature, but it is in the usual style and language of a
direction of the Court, on matter of law. The precedent of
a bill of exceptions, which was cited from Buller’s N. P. 317,
and which is given as for misdirection, is in the language
of the cha-rge in this case. “-And the said chief justice did
then and there (says the precedent) declare and deliver his
opinion to the jury, that the said several matters so produced
and proved, on the part of the defendants, were not, upon
the whole case, sufficient to bar the plaintiff of his action;
and, with that direction, left the same to the jury.” There is
a precedent of a bill of exceptions given in 3 Burr. 1742, and
which was taken to a charge on the subject of search-war
rants, made by Lord Camden, when Ch. J. of the C. B., and
the language of this very authentic precedent is almost in
the very words of the one before us: “And the said chief
justice did then and there declare and deliver his opinion to
the jury, that the said several matters so produced and
proved, on the part of the defendants, were not, upon the
whole case, sufficient to bar the action, and, with that opin
ion, left the same to the jury.”
In this case, from Burrow, it was never doubted but that
the opinion of the chief justice, so stated in that bill, was
taken and received as a direction in point of law; and if the
charge in the case before us is not to be deemed of that
character, it will be impossible, hereafter, to discriminate
between a charge containing a positive direction in point of
I shall not en
law, and mere advice on a matter of fact.
No one who con
ter into any minute criticism on words.
sults the precedents can well be at a loss for the meaning
The language of the learned judge was,
of this charge.
that the plaintiffs were not bound or required to make the
disclosure; that the matters offered in evidence were not
suﬂicient to bar the action, and nothing was said about the
weight of evidence for the consideration of the jury.
If
even it was doubtful, by the bill, whether the charge was in
tended as direction, or otherwise, the result of my opinion
would be the same; because, when the judge interposes his
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opinion to the jury, on a point of fact, it ought not to be
left in doubt in what light they are to receive his charge.
In order to preserve a just balance between the distinct
powers of the Court and the jury, and that the parties may
enjoy, in unimpaired vigor, their constitutional right of hav
ing the law decided by the Court, and of having the fact
decided by the jury, every charge should distinguish clearly
between the law and the fact, so that the jury cannot misun
derstand their right or their duty, nor mistake the opinion
of the judge upon matter of fact, for his direction in point
of law. The distinction is all important to the jury. The
direction of the judge, in the one case, is obligatory upon
their consciences, and so they will, and so they ought to,
regard it; but his opinion, in the other case, is mere ad
vice, and the jury are bound to decide for themselves, not
withstanding the opinion of the judge, and to follow that
opinion no farther than it corresponds with the conclusions
Unless this distinction be kept
of their own judgment.
view,
deﬁned
with all possible precision,
steadily in
and be
the trial by jury may, in time, be broken down, and rendered
nominal and useless.
I am far from wishing to restrain the judges of the
Courts of law from expressing freely their opinions to the
jury on matters of fact, and still less from interfering with
their power of controlling the mistaken verdicts of juries,
by a liberal exercise of the discretion of awarding new trials.
No man can be more deeply sensible of the value and salu
tary tendency of this judicial aid and discretion, and none,
certainly, can possess higher conﬁdence in the character and
wisdom of the Court whose judgment is now under review.
All that I feel it my duty to contend for is, that whenever
the judge delivers his opinion to the jury on a matter of
fact, it shall be delivered as mere opinion, and not as di
rection, and that the jury shall be left to understand, clearly
that they are to decide the fact, upon their own view of the
evidence, and that the judge interposes his opinion only to
aid them in cases of difficulty, or to inspire them with con
ﬁdence in cases of doubt. It is for this principle that I feel
solicitous, and not for anything that may have taken place
The case before us is, compara
in this particular cause.
tively, of triﬂing consequence; but the distinction I have
suggested goes to the very root and essence of trial by jury,

I
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and may, indeed, become of inestimable value, and, perhaps,
of perilous struggle, when the present generation shall have
ceased to exist.
I am disposed to hand to posterity the institution of
juries as perfect, in all respects, as we now enjoy it; for
believe it may, in times hereafter, be found to be no incon
siderable security against the systematic influence and tyr
anny of party spirit, in inferior tribunals.

I

i I

Q

i

#

i I i

#

l
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am, accordingly, of opinion, that the judgment of the
Supreme Court be reversed, and that the cause be remanded,
with directions that a renilre de novo be awarded.
A majority of the Court being of this opinion, it was
thereupon ordered and adjudged, that the judgment of the
Supreme Court be reversed, and that a venire de nova be
awarded, for the trial of the issue joined between the par
ties in the said Court; and that the costs in this Court abide
the ﬁnal decision of the cause.

Judgment of reversal."
80 This
rule obtains in the federal courts and is employed even in
the face of local state legislation prohibiting courts from changing juries
on questions of tact.—St. Louis Iron Mountain & So. Ry. v. Vickers.
(1887) 122 U. S. 360.
For a discussion of the great advantages in the administration of
justice resulting from the free expression of opinion by trial judges as
to the facts in the case. see Government by Jury, by Lucilius A. Emery,
24 Yale Law Jour. 265-273:
The Ineﬁiciency of the American Jury, by
Edson R. Sunderland, 13 Mich. Law Rev. 302-316; Report of the Mass.
1921, pp. 85-89
Judicature Commission,
(same in 2 Mich. State Bar
Journal 178).
Ihering gives a very interesting suggestion as to the causes for the
development of the jury as a legal institution, viz., to free the admin
istration of justice from two burdens,—(1) state domination or abso
lutism through its control of the judge, and (2) the mediaeval theory of
Both, he points out, were temporary
exigencies, and both
evidence.
having been fully outgrown in modern times, the real foundation and
necessity for the jury has disappeared.
Law as a Means to an End,
pp. 304-314.
Instead of the inefficient jury he would have an eﬂicient
bench-court of judges, p. 299.
Summing up evidence. The judge may sum up the evidence without
infringing the rule against commenting upon the weight of the evidence,
and in so doing he may properly “state, analyze, compare and explain the
evidence."
Hamlin v. Treat, (1895) 87 Me. 311, 32 Ati. 909. Some state
constitutions couple with the prohibition against charging on the facts an
express permission for the judge to state the evidence.
Thus, the con
stitution of Tennessee. Art. 6, Sec. 9, provides: “Judges shall not charge
juries with respect to matters of fact, but may state the testimony and
declare the law."
The California constitution has identically the same
provision. Art. VI, Sec. 19.
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9

1864.

Allen, 276.

Indictment for keeping and maintaining a tenement in
School Street in Boston, used for the illegal sale and illegal
keeping for sale of intoxicating liquors.
At the trial in the superior court, before Vose, J., all the
witnesses were policemen, two of them being officers whose
daily beat included School street. The defendant’s counsel,
in his argument to the jury, commented with some severity
upon their testimony, as the testimony of policemen.
The
judge in his charge told the jury that the same rules were
applicable to policemen as to all other witnesses, in deter
mining the credit to be given to their testimony; that in
very many of the cases which had been tried at the present
term of the court policemen had been the principal wit
nesses, and he thought the jury would agree with him in the
opinion that in all these cases they had manifested great in
telligence, and testiﬁed with apparent candor and impar
tiality. _
The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the defendant
alleged exceptions.
BIGELOW, C. . Upon mature consideration we have come
to the conclusion that we cannot give our sanction to the
instructions under which this case was submitted to the
jury. Viewed in either of the two aspects of which they
are susceptible, it appears to us that they cannot be sup
ported, consistently with the rules of law.
If they are to be regarded only as an expression of opin
ion by the court concerning the credibility of certain wit
nesses who had testiﬁed in other cases than the one on trial,
they were clearly of a nature to mislead the jury.
The
implication from the language of the court is direct and
positive, that the jury might properly infer that the wit
nesses in support of this prosecution were entitled to credit
for the reason that other persons engaged in the same occu
pation had testiﬁed with candor and impartiality in the
The objection to this instruction is
trial of other cases.
twofold. In the ﬁrst place, it authorized the jury to draw

J
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an inference which was not a legitimate deduction from the
premises.
It by no means follows naturally or logically
that witnesses employed in the same or similar occupations
will testify on all occasions with equal fairness and im
partiality. In the next place, the instructions gave the jury
to understand that they might travel beyond the case as
proved before them, to seek for corroboration and support
of the testimony adduced in behalf of the prosecution the
facts which not only were not proved, but which could not
have been properly offered in evidence by the government.
The facts
Nor is this the whole extent of the objection.
thus introduced into the case were submitted to the jury
with a distinct expression of opinion by the court as to the
effect to be given to them, at a stage of the trial when the
defendant could not controvert them, and without any oppor
tunity being given to his counsel to address the jury on the
weight which was due to them. Such a course of proceed
ing is certainly unusual, and, as we think, does not accord
with the due and orderly conduct of a criminal trial.
But in another aspect it seems to us that the instruc
The credibility of the witnesses
tions were objectionable.
who had testiﬁed in support of the charge in the indictment
was a fact which it was the exclusive province of the jury
As essentially affecting their bias, and the
to determine.
credit to be given to their testimony, their occupation and
connection with the origin of the prosecution, against the
defendant might be important elements, and, within proper
limits, proper subjects of comment by counsel, and of con
If the instructions are to be con
sideration by the jury.
strued, as we think they fairly may be as the expression of
the opinion of the court on the degree of credit to which
these witnesses were entitled, the court exceeded its author
ity in stating such opinion to the jury. By Gen. Sts. c.
172, Sec. 15, the duty of charging the jury in criminal cases
By Gen. Sts. c. 115,
is specially enjoined upon the court.
Sec. 5, which is applicable alike to civil and criminal trials,
the rule is prescribed by which courts are to be guided in
It must be admitted that
the performance of this duty.
this provision of the statute is not expressed in terms which
But although there is a seeming
are free from ambiguity.
repugnancy in the two branches of the section, we think
that they are susceptible of a reasonable interpretation,
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which will give full force and effect to both of them, and
at the same time carry out what seems to have been the
It is clear beyond con
manifest purpose of the legislature.
troversy, that the ﬁrst clause contains a distinct and abso
lute prohibition, that the “courts shall not charge juries with
respect to matters of fact.” To reconcile this with the clause
that follows, which provides that the courts “may state the
testimony and the law,” the prohibition must be regarded
as a restraint only on the expression of an opinion by the
court on the question whether a particular fact or series of
facts involved in the issue of a case is or is not established
by the evidence. In other words, it is to be construed so as
to prevent courts from interfering with the province of
juries by any statement of their own judgment or conclusion
This construction effectually accom
upon matters of fact.
plishes the great object of guarding against any bias or
undue inﬂuence which might be created in the minds of
jurors if the weight of the opinion of the court should be
permitted to be thrown into the scale in deciding upon issues
of fact. But further than this the legislature did not intend
to go. The statute was not designed to deprive the court of
On the con
all the power to deal with the facts proved.
clearly
very
contemplates
section
trary, the last clause of the
that the duty of the court may not be fully discharged by a
mere statement of the law. By providing that the court may
also state the testimony, the manifest purpose of the legis
lature was to recognize and aﬁirm the power and authority
of the court, to be exercised according to its discretion, to
sum up the evidence, to state its legal effect and bearing on
the issues, and to indicate its proper application under the
rules of law.
In the case at bar, the court exceeded the limit prescribed
If the language used by the court was in
by the statute.
to the witnesses who had testiﬁed
applicable
tended to be
in behalf of the prosecution, it was an expression of opinion
As this was a matter of fact, within
as to their credibility.
the exclusive province of the jury to determine, such ex
pression of opinion went beyond a “statement of the testi
mony,” and trenched on prohibited ground, being a charge
to the j_ury “with respect to matters of fact.”
We have already said that the occupation of a witness, in
connection with other facts, may have a material bearing on
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the credibility of his testimony in a particular case.
But
we feel bound to add that we do not intend to express an
opinion on the question whether in the case at bar there
was any valid ground for calling in question the veracity or
candor of the witnesses whom the defendant’s
counsel
impeach.
point
sought to
No such
seems to have been
raised at the trial, nor are the facts bearing upon it stated
in the exceptions.
The inference from the course of the
trial, especially from the line of argument which the coun
sel for the defendant was permitted to take, and from the
instructions to the jury, is that the ground on which the
impeachment of the witnesses was placed was deemed to
have been proper matter for the consideration of the jury.

Exceptions sustained."
81 In Benner v. Benner,
“When
(1921) 120 Me. 468, the court said:
the legislature, in deﬁning the respective functions of the court and the
jury in the trial of a case. laid down the inhibition that the judge must
not express opinion on arising issues of fact. it went no further in its
meaning than that he should refrain from speaking of the facts in a
manner implying his utterance entitled to obedience."
Where the court is not permitted to comment on the weight of the
evidence, the error arising from such comment cannot be corrected by
a statement from the court that the jury are not to feel bound by any
opinion expressed by him.-—State v. Dick, (1864) 60 N. C. 440.

-~
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(b)

Substance and

Form of Instructions.

TRUSTEES OF SCHOOLS

v.

YOCH.

Appellate Court of Illinois.
133

Illinois Appellate,

1908.
82.

*

*

*

#

*

#

¥

*

*

Ill

CREIGHTON, P. J. This was an action in case, in the Cir
cuit Court of St. Clair county, by appellants against appel
lees, to recover damages alleged to have resulted to appel
lants’ school house and premises by reason of the failure of
appellees to leave proper and sufficient support for the
soil” upon which the school house stood.
“superincumbent
jury.
Verdict in favor of appellees. Judgment in
Trial by
favor of appellees in bar of action and for costs, and order
ing execution to issue therefor.
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The court gave to the jury the following erroneous in
structions on behalf of appellee:
“The court instructs the jury that if you believe, from
the evidence, that the pillars in said mine and the roof in
said mine are intact and in good condition under the plain
tiffs’ premises and for a distance of three hundred feet be
yond and adjacent to plaintiffs’ premises, then you have a
right to take this fact into consideration in determining the
question whether the defendants have caused any subsidence
of the surface of plaintiffs’ land, as alleged in plaintiffs’
declaration, or one count thereof,-if you believe from the
evidence there has been any subsidence in such surface.

I

#

i

#

*

*

*

i

*
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The instruction ﬁrst above quoted contains all the vices
of that class of instructions so often condemned by the
It singles out particular facts from
courts of this State.
the other facts in evidence and specially directs the atten
tion of the jury to them. This instruction bore upon a close
and controverted issue of fact in the case and it was equally
as important in an honest effort to arrive at a just verdict
that the jury should take each and every other pertinent
fact in evidence “into consideration in determining the ques
tion whether the defendants have caused any subsidence of
the surface of plaintiffs’ land,” as it was to take the facts
particularly singled out in this instruction. All the evidence
bearing upon that issue, was admitted for the consideration
of the jury, and it was error to make any detached portion
of it or to make any fact which any detached portion of it
might tend to prove, more prominent than any other part
This instruction
of the evidence, or other pertinent fact.
speciﬁed,
and magniﬁed
gave undue prominence to the facts
their importance, and tended to divert the minds of the jury
from the main issue.
Q
i 1 F t # Q $ i C

For and on account of the errors in this opinion noted,
the judgment of the Circuit
remanded.

Court is reversed

and cause

Reversed and remanded.“

erroneous to single out particular witnesses for special
emphasis.—Taubert v. Taubert, (1908) 103 Minn. 247.
And the same error occurs where items of evidence are mentioned
for the purpose of minimizing their effect, as where, in an action on a.
88

It is

equally
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life insurance policy involving the question of suicide, the court told
the jury that the presence of strychnine in the stomach was not alone
sufficient to prove suicide.—-Life
Ins. Co. of Virginia v. Hairston, (1903)
108 Va. 832.

.

“The practice of repeating instructions should be condemned.
It is
wrong to do this, and thereby prominently impress a single feature of
a case upon a juror."—State v. Legg, (1906) 59 W. Va. 315. But if the
repetition of instructions does not tend to mislead the jury it is not
reversible error.—Gran Y. Houston. (1895) 45 Neb. 813.

~i___

¥

MCBRIDE

éi/‘VA

v.

DES MOINES CITY RAILWAY CO.

Supreme

Court of Iowa.
13!,

J

1907.

Iowa, 398.

MCCLAIN, C. .—The facts appearing in the record which
are essential to the determination of the questions of law
raised on this appeal are as follows:
Plaintiff's intestate
was a member of the paid ﬁre department of the city of
Des Moines, and in response to a ﬁre alarm, about half
past ten in the morning, with eight other members of the
department, he started on a hose wagon from the ﬁre sta
tion on Eighth street going north.
One Nagle was the driver
of the wagon. Plaintiff's intestate rode in his proper place
on a running board or step on the west side of the wagon,
facing east and near the rear end. As the wagon approached
the crossing of Grand avenue running east and west, on
which there was a double track of defendant’s railway, the
driver saw a car coming from the west, and without check
ing the speed of the wagon drove on across the track on
which the car was approaching.
The car struck the rear
wheel on the west side of the wagon, and deceased was vio
lently thrown to the pavement and his skull was fractured.
From this injury he died within a few hours.
After stating very elaborately and in great detail the
1.
claims of the parties as to the facts bearing upon the ques
tion of the negligence of the defendant’s motorman, in
charge of the car which collided with the hose wagon on
which plaintiif’s intestate was riding, and deﬁning negli
gence, the court instructed the jury to consider “whether
or not the motorman having charge of the running and
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operating of the car in question was negligent or not in
not stopping or checking the speed of the car before the
collision with the ﬁre hose wagon occurred”; and he then
proceeded to detail a variety of circumstances which the
evidence for plaintiff tended to establish, such as the clear
ness and calmness of the day, the ringing of the bell on
the hose wagon, and the distance at which such bell might
be heard, the rate of speed of the wagon, etc., none of which
were controlling on the question of the motorman’s negli
And he concluded the instruction with this sentence:
gence.
“After carefully considering these facts, if they be
'
her
ces proved on the trial
'a1fd' all
if you believe from a preponderance of the evidence that
the motorman by the use of the means at his command could
have stopped the car, or checked the speed thereof, in time
to have avoided the accident, and that he failed to do so,
that would be negligence on his part; and his negligence,
he was so negligent, would be the negligence of the defend
ant, and your verdict should be for the plaintiff, unless you
ﬁnd the deceased, B. McBride, was negligent, and that his
own negligence contributed to his injury in any degree, in
which case you would ﬁnd for the defendant.”
whole
The ﬁrst objection urged to this instruction as
that therein the court called to the attention of the jury
the facts which the evidence tended to establish favorable
to plaintiff’s recovery, and omitted special reference to those
relating to defendant’s theory of the accident. This objec
An instruction was asked
tion we think was well taken.
calling
defendant,
attention
to other circum
on behalf of
stances which the evidence tended to establish, which should
have been considered as bearing on the motorman’s negli
gence, and which were favorable to defendant’s contentions
was clearly improper for the court to thus
in the case.
emphasize the circumstances from which negligence might
be inferred, and omit any reference to circumstances tend
Perhaps the court
ing to support the opposite inference.
catalogue
the circumstances
might properly have omitted to
which the testimony tended to establish bearing on the ques
general
tion of negligence, and simply have referred in
way to the facts and circumstances proved on the trial. But
in suggesting to the jury that they should take into consid
eration some of the circumstances which were favorable to
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the plaintiﬂ’, and omitting reference to others favorable to
defendant, he put the case unfairly to the jury.
Another serious objection to the instruction is that the
portion thereof above set out withdraws from the jury the
question whether the motorman was negligent in not stop
ping the car or checking the speed thereof in time to have
avoided the accident.
There could be no question under the
evidence as to the ability of the motorman by the use of
the means at his command to stop the car or check the
speed thereof in time to have avoided the accident, if he
had endeavored to do so a sufﬁcient length of time before
the accident occurred, nor was there any doubt that he
failed to stop the car or check its speed so as to prevent
the result of a collision; and the court speciﬁcally instructs
the jury that this ability on the part of the motorman and
his failure to act constituted negligence. The real question
in the case was, not whether the motorman could have
stopped the car, but whether he was negligent in not doing
so; and this was a question for the jury, and not for the
Had the evidence shown without controversy that
court.
the motorman, in the exercise of care, could and should
have anticipated the collision long enough beforehand to
enable him to stop the car or check its speed so as to avoid
the accident, then the instruction might have been correct.
There were circumstances
But the facts were in dispute.
supporting either conclusion, and the question of negligence
should have been left to the jury.
It is no answer to this position to say that in the ﬁrst
part of the instruction the jury were told that they must
consider whether or not the motorman was negligent in not
stopping or checking the speed of the car. After this gen
eral statement, the court proceeded to enumerate a large
number of circumstances indicating that the motorman was
negligent, and then told the jury that if these circumstances
were found to be established, and they believed from these
and other circumstances proved on the trial that the motor
It was
man could have stopped the car, he was negligent.
not the physical ability of the motorman to stop or check
the speed of the car that was in question, but his failure
The instructions as a whole are lengthy
to use due care.
statements, and the one now specially
in
their
and intricate
is particularly obscure, and the bald
under consideration
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statement at its conclusion that the motorman was negligent
if he could have stopped or checked the speed of the car in
time to avoid the accident and failed to do so, may very well
have been seized upon by the jury as the solution of the
whole diﬂiculty. We reach the conclusion that in the two
respects pointed out the instruction was erroneous and mis
leading.
Q

ii

#

$

1

Q

1

#

i

#

For the errors pointed out in the ﬁrst division of this
opinion,

the judgment is reversed.

/

9‘?, TAMPA
JACKSONVILL
v.

3d’[a_K
28

County,
certain
escape

NE FF.

1891.

Florida, 373.

The appellee, Neff, in April, 1887, sued the ap
railway company in the Circuit Court for Clay
Florida, for $5,000 damages for the destruction of
property of appellee by ﬁre, caused by the alleged
of sparks from a locomotive engine under the con

MABRY,

pellant

KEY wesr RAILWAY co.

Court of Florida.

Supreme

J

&

.

trol of appellant.
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The third point calls in question the correctness of the
This charge is as
second charge given for plaintiff below.
follows:
“That if the jury believe from the evidence that
fault
or neglect of the plaintiff, defendant’s em
without
ployes negligently permitted a lot of loose dry hay to remain
for some time prior to the 18th of March, A. D. 1887, ex
posed in a box car near plaintif'f’s property which was set
on ﬁre on said day, and that the employes of said defendant
railroad company negligently permitted said ﬁre to be com
municated from said car so left exposed by said employes to
plaintiff’s said property, and to burn and destroy the same,
This charge was
the verdict should be for the plaintiff.”
The objection urged by
excepted to by defendant below.
appellant to this charge is, that “it has no relation what
ever to the issues raised by the pleadings, and the jury

I
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were thereby instructed that if a loss resulted to the plain
tiff by reason of a cause of action of which no mention was
made in the pleadings, they should ﬁnd for the plaintiff."

i i i

contains but one count, and the gist of
the action as therein stated is, that the defendant company
so neglected and unskillfully managed its engine and the
ﬁre and the burning matter therein contained, and said en
gine was so insufficiently and improperly constructed, that
sparks from said ﬁre and portions of said burning matter
escaped and ﬂew from said engine to and upon a building
in which plaintiff’s property was situated, whereby said
building and property were burned and totally destroyed.
The ob
Issue was joined upon all the pleas of defendant.
ject of pleading is to ascertain with certainty and precision,
the matters of fact which are affirmed on the one hand and
denied on the other, and which are mutually proposed and
It is clear that plain
accepted by the parties for decision.
tiff’s cause of action is based upon the negligent construc
tion or negligent use of defendant’s locomotive engine,
whereby sparks and burning matter escaped from it and
The question submitted by the pleadings
caused the ﬁre.
is whether or not defendant caused the ﬁre by reason of a
defective engine or the unskillful management of the en
The negligence of defendant submitted to the jury
gine.
investigation
by the charge under consideration consists
for
not in causing the ﬁre, but in allowing loose dry hay to re
main in a box car near plaintiff's property, and in negligently
permitting ﬁre to be communicated from said car to plain
The origin of the ﬁre is lost sight of in
tiff’s property.
this charge, and under it the jury were authorized to ﬁnd
for the plaintiff although the defendant did not in any way
cause the ﬁre, provided they believed that it negligently
permitted loose dry hay to remain in the car near plaintiff’s
property, and negligently permitted the ﬁre to be communi
cated from said car to plaintiff’s property and destroy it.
If it be conceded that this charge embodies a good cause
of action against the defendant, it is evident that it is not
Appel
contained within the issues made by the pleadings.
lee contends, however, that his right to recover is co-ex
tensive with the case made by the evidence introduced on
the trial, and the trial judge was authorized to go outside

The declaration

Sec. 7]

Pnoonsnmcs BASED ON TRIAL or Issuns

479

of the issues joined between the parties and instruct the
jury to ﬁnd for the plaintiff to the extent justiﬁed by the
Respectable authorities hold that the pleadings
evidence.
are merely to notify the opposite party of the ground of
action or defense, and where a party fails to object to evi
dence

because

it is not relevant to the issues, the court is

#

*

1

i

Q

#

1

*

*

Ill

justiﬁed in instructing the jury upon the whole evidence,
and is not conﬁned in his instructions to the issues made in
the pleadings.
The correct view, we think, is that the instruc
tions must be conﬁned to the issues made by the pleadings;
*
*
*
and this rule has been recognized in our state.
The judge who presided at the trial of this case presented
by instructions to the jury defendant's liability under the
issues raised by the pleadings, but the second instruction
presented a view of the case not embraced in the issues and
was calculated to mislead the jury in their verdict.
We can
not say that the jury did not base their ﬁndings against
defendant under this instruction. The view of this charge,
that defendant is liable if its employes negligently permitted
ﬁre to escape from the car to plaintiff's property, would call
for further consideration, even if the charge were not ob
noxious to the rule above pointed out. Our decision is based,
however, upon the view that the instruction under considera
tion was without the limit of the issues joined between the
parties and was likely to mislead the jury in making up their
verdict, and was for this reason erroneous.

is

For the error in giving the second charge in behalf of the
reversed, and a new trial
plaintiff below, the judgment
awarded.”
To the same eﬂect see Kunst v. City of Grafton. (1910) 67 W. Va.
Co. v. Rowland, (1907) 100 Tex. 363,
S. E. 74; W. L. Moodey
Latourette v. Meldrum, (1907) 49 Ore. 397, 90 Pac. 503;
99 S. W. 1112;
H. R. R. Co., (1910) 83 Conn. 59, 75
Goldman v. New York, N. H.
Atl. 148.
&

67

&

98
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I
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HANSON

v.

PRAcTIcE

3

KLINE.

Supreme Court of Iowa.
186

[Chap.

1907.

Iowa, 101.

Action at law to recover damages arising out of false repre
sentations in connection with an exchange of properties.
The defendants, additional to Kline, are W. E. Gray and
J. E. Gray, and at the time in question all the parties lived
in Rockwell City, Calhoun county. The petition alleges that
in July, 1904, plaintiff was the owner of a stock of merchan
dise in Rockwell City, valued by him at $2,000, which he was
induced by the defendants Gray to trade to the defendant
Kline for a farm of one hundred and sixty acres situated in
Hayes county, Nebraska.
The speciﬁc averment is that de
fendants entered into a conspiracy to bring about such trade
by false representations respecting the Nebraska farm, and
that, pursuant thereto, the farm was falsely represented. and
the trade thereby accomplished, greatly to his damage. The
defendants answered separately, and each denied the charge
On the trial plaintiff
of fraud as contained in the petition.
jointly, on which
against
the
defendants
all
had a verdict as
judgment was entered, and the defendants appeal.—Rei*ersed
and remanded.
BISHOP, J. "‘ “ * The theory of the petition was that the
representations claimed to have been made by defendants
were made as from personal knowledge—such is the distinct
"'
"'
"
The jury was instructed strictly on the
allegation.
theory of the petition; that is, they were told that if defend
ants in representing the condition of the farm did so as of
their own personal knowledge, and so stated to plaintiff, and
the representation was false, and plaintiff relied on such rep
resentation to his damage, the defendant would be liable.
And, contra, if the representations were not so made as al
The jury was not
leged, then plaintiff could not recover.
subject.
We think here was er
otherwise instructed on the
ror. Should it be conceded that the instruction given correct
ly stated the law applicable to the case, the defendants were
This is so because there was no evi
entitled to a verdict.
dence on which to base a ﬁnding to the contrary, but, as we
have seen, plaintiff himself declares that in making the repre
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sentations alleged defendants expressly disavowed any and
all personal knowledge.
Hence the proof did not meet the
issue. Accordingly, we must go back to the query: Did the
instruction correctly state the law applicable to the case? If
we are to judge alone from the issues made in pleading, the
If we are to judge from
answer must be in the affirmative.
the issues as developed on the trial, then the call for a nega
tive answer is imperative.
We say issues developed on the
trial, because it is plain that plaintiff did not go into the trial
relying upon representations made as of the personal knowl
edge of the defendants.
At the very outset, he testiﬁed that
And it is
defendants denied having any personal knowledge.
evident that from beginning to end the defendants did not
consider that they were called upon to face the strict issue
Plaintiff did rely on representa
as made by the pleadings.
professedly
tions
made on information and belief, and de
This being true,
fendants trained their forces accordingly.
there arises the further question whether or not it was com
petent for the court, and its duty, to disregard the strict issue
as made in the pleadings, and instruct according as the par
ties had made the issue on the trial. That it was competent
for the court to do so we have no doubt. Beach v. Wakeﬁeld,
So, also, we
107 Iowa, 567; Fenner v. Crips, 109 Iowa, 455.
and,
view,
in
of the case pre
think it was its duty to do so.
sented by the record, that failure amounted to error. Under
our system, it is left for the parties to frame the issues, and,
if they proceed without objection—and such is the case -here
the trial of an issue not presented by the pleadings, it
amounts to a consent to try such issue. The issue is then
rightfully in the case. Mitchell 11. Joyce, 76 Iowa, 449; Bank
v. Boesch, 90 Iowa, 47 ; Beach v. Wakeﬁeld, supra; Erickson»
And, the issue being
v. Fisher, 51 Minn. 300 (53 N. W. 638).
rightfully in the case, the court must instruct upon it. Potter
v. Railway, 46 Iowa, 399; Hill o. Aultmann, 68 Iowa, 630. We
must presume that the court was fully advised of the shift in
the issue. Attention to the course of the trial as it proceeded
was its duty. Moreover, there was before it the request for
instruction presented by defendants, and, while not ade
quately stating the law it was sufficient to arrest attention
Kinyon v.
and call for a proper instruction on the subject.
Iowa,
may
349.
We
add
that
as
the
issue made
Railway, 118
by the pleadings respecting the subject-matter under discus

-to
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sion was, in effect, withdrawn by the parties, such issue
should not in any event have been presented to the jury.
Lumber Co. v. Raymond, 76 Iowa, 225; Erickson v. Barber, 83

Iowa, 367.

For the reasons pointed out in this opinion, the judgment
appealed from must be, and it is, reversed, and the cause is
ordered remanded for a new trial."
I4 To the same eﬂ’ect see Mitchell v. Samford, (1910) 149 Mo. App. 72,
W. 99; Johnson v. Caughren, (1909) 55 Wash. 125, 104 Pac. 170;
Central R. R. & Banking Co. v. Attaway, (1892) 90 Ga. 656, 16 S. E. 956;
Brusie v. Peck Bros. & Co., (1892) 135 N. Y. 622, 32 N. E. 76; Flanders
v. Cottrell. (1875) 36 Wis. 564.
In Schwaninger v. McNeeley & Co., (1906) 44 Wash. 447, 87 Pac. 514,
the court said:
"When evidence is received without objection upon any
particular ground not covered by the complaint, the court may assume
that the complaint, is as broad as the evidence when charging the jury,
and the complaint will be deemed amended to conform with the evidence
and charge, since the amendment could have been made as of course at
the trial."
But in Budd v. I-Ioffheimer, (1873) 52 Mo. 297, it was held that if a
party wishes an instruction upon the matter duly proved but not alleged
in his pleading, he must ﬁrst ask leave to amend his pleading to conform
with the proof, and unless he does so such an instruction is properly
refused.
130 S.

M
/
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BUYKEN

v.

LEWIS CONSTRUCTION

Supreme Court of Washington.
51

J

CO.

1909.

Washington, 627.

RUDKIN, C. .—This was an action in trespass to recover
damages for sluicing down and removing earth from a cer
tain lot in the city of Seattle owned by the plaintiffs. The
defendant admitted the commission of the acts complained of,
though not in manner and form as alleged, and pleaded by
way of justiﬁcation that the sluicing was done pursuant to a
verbal contract between the plaintiffs and the defendant
which was afterward reduced to writing and signed by the
defendant, though not by the plaintiffs. The reply denied the
plea of justiﬁcation as set forth in the answer.
The cause
was submitted to a jury under instructions from the court,
and a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs in the sum of $1,500
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was returned.
From a judgment on this verdict, the defend
ant has appealed.
The principal assignment of error arises out of the follow
ing charge of the court, which was duly excepted to:
“If you ﬁnd from the evidence that there was no such con
tract as alleged by the defendant in its aﬁirmative defense.
which is exhibit No. 2 in the case, but do ﬁnd from the evi
dence that the acts performed by the defendant upon the said
premises of the plaintiffs were performed with the knowledge
and consent of the plaintiffs, then
instruct you that the
plaintiffs cannot recover for such acts even though in your
opinion the plaintiffs have been damaged thereby, unless you
ﬁnd from the evidence that defendant negligently or careless
ly performed the acts and by reason of such negligence and
careless performance the plaintz'_ﬁ’s had been damaged.”
The latter part of this instruction is clearly without the
issues presented by the pleadings.
The action was prose
cuted by the respondents solely on the theory that the acts
complained of were committed without their knowledge or
consent and against their will, and all their testimony was
directed toward establishing the allegations of the complaint
and proving the amount of the resultant damages. The testi
mony on the part of the appellant, on the other hand, was in
support of its afﬁrmative defense, and in reduction of the
claim for damages. The question of negligence in the prose
cution of the work was not an issue in the case under the
pleadings, nor was it made an issue at any stage of the trial.
There was no claim that any particular act committed by the
appellant was negligently or carelessly committed, nor was
there any attempt to segregate damages resulting from negli
gence from damages resulting from other and independent
The instruction was therefore erroneous, and calls
causes.
for a reversal of the judgment unless we are able to say that
the error was not prejudicial, and this we cannot do. There
was a direct conﬂict in the testimony, and the right of recov
ery was questionable at least. The jury may have found that
the acts committed by the appellant were so committed with
the knowledge and consent of the respondents, but that dam
ages resulted from the performance of the work in a manner
Under such circumstances, it is
the jury deemed negligent.
incumbent on this court to order a new trial.
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For error in the instructions of the court, the judgment is
reversed and a new trial ordered.

KARRER

I%
is

/"‘

CITY OF DETROIT.

v.

‘/Supreme Court of Michigan.
142

1905.

Michigan, 881.

[The plaintiff was injured by running his automobile into
an excavation in the street at the intersection of Mack avenue
and Grand Boulevard, while he was driving north up the
boulevard at night. He saw a red light, but thinking it was
in the west curb of the Boulevard he tried to pass to the east
of it, putting on power for the purpose and proceeding at the
rate of 8 or 10 miles an hour.
In fact the light was at the
west end of a trench which extended from the east almost
across the boulevard.
When the plaintiff discovered the
trench he was going too fast to stop his car, which went into
the excavation.]
HOOKER, J. * * "
The court also said to the jury:
“The plaintiff in this case desires me to say that the boule
vard is used especially for fast riding and for the use of auto
mobiles, and I think, gentlemen of the jury, you may take
that in consideration, if your own experience satisﬁes you
don't remember what the ordinance is relative to
of that.
part of the street, but doubtless some of you
particular
that
do, and you may have your own experience with reference to
the using of the boulevard for that purpose; but I think the
whole question, gentlemen, as to the degree of care, becomes
a question for you rather than for the court.”
This was in effect allowing the personal knowledge of the
jurors to have the weight of evidence in the case. It contem
plated not only their determination as to the use of the boule
vard from their personal observation, but also the character
of the ordinances relating thereto. This was erroneous.
new
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reversed, and
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The judgment
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trial ordered.
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BECK, J. The dispute between the parties in this case
over a strip of land 20 feet in width and about 1,381 feet in
length extending from Glenn street on the north to Shelton
street on the south, in the City of Atlanta, the issue being as
to whether the same constitutes the eastern edge of a 100-foot
right of way of the defendant railroad company or the west
The
ern third of
60-foot public road for said distance.
plaintiff, in 1881, acquired title to the lands lying east of and
abutting on the strip of land in dispute. He alleged, that at
that time this 20-foot strip was a road traveled by the public,
and had been so used for more than twenty years; that in
1884, upon petition of citizens, the commissioners of roads
and revenues of Fulton county passed an order formally open
ing and accepting the same as
public road; that upon the
passing of this order the petitioner and other abutting land
owners on the east, desiring that the road in front of their
property should be 60 feet in width, dedicated an additional
40-foot strip for that purpose, adjoining said 20-foot road;
that the county authorities took charge of and worked the
entire 60-foot_ road; and that the same has ever since been
public road. A short time prior to the bringing of this suit
the defendant railroad company began changing the grade of
the 20-foot strip in question and laying its tracks thereon,
and the plaintiff ﬁled suit to enjoin any further interference
with the alleged 60-foot road in front of his lands and the use
of any portion of same by the defendant as its right of way.

I

is

is

a

a

a

is

complained that the court erred in refusing a written
“Any un
request to give in charge to the jury the following:
interrupted use by the public generally of lands as
roadway
for period of time extending through 20 years, accompanied
prescriptive right
by acceptance by public authorities, gives
to the public to such road or highway.” We do not think that
the failure of the court to instruct the jury in the language of
the request was error. It is manifest that the charge which
ambiguous.
It
susceptible of
the court refused to give
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First, it might be construed to mean that
two constructions.
an uninterrupted use by the public generally of lands as a
roadway for a period of time extending through twenty years,
accompanied by acceptance by the public authorities extend
ing through that period of time, from the beginning to the
end thereof, would give a prescriptive right to the public to
such road. Second, it might be construed to mean that an
uninterrupted use by the public generally of the strip of land
in question as a roadway for a period of time extending
through 20 years and acceptance by the public authorities at
any time within that 20 years, even at or near the close of
that period, would give a prescriptive right to the public to
such road.
These two constructions embody very different
statements of the law upon the question involved.
If the ﬁrst
construction which might have been placed upon the written
request was the statement of the law desired by counsel offer
ing the request to charge, then the principle embodied in the
request was suﬁiciently covered by the charge as given; and
as the court might fairly have placed this construction upon
the written request, he should not be held to have committed
error in refusing to give another charge upon a subject which
was already sufﬁciently covered by his charge as given.
If
counsel had desired a charge laying down the doctrine as
stated in the second construction of the written request, he
should have framed it in terms more aptly embodying the
principle which he sought to have incorporated in the court’s
instructions.

i
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U

i i
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Judgment aﬂirmed.

the

Q

Justices concur.
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Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

1901;.

Virginia, 134.
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and references in the bill of excep
tions seem to proceed upon the theory of two instructions.
Whether given as one or as two is unimportant. The matter
“The court in
is set out in the bill of exceptions as follows:
jury
agent
employed
is
to sell real
structs the
that where an
estate for his principal if the agent was the procuring cause
of the sale of said real estate the agent is entitled to his com
missions, without regard to the extent of his exertions, and
although the contract commenced by said agent was consum
fnated by the principal himself or through the intervention of
another; and the court further instructs the jury that where
a broker or agent employed to negotiate a sale procures a cus
tomer for the sale of the said property on the terms proposed
by the owner and the principal takes the further proceedings
out of the hands of the broker, and completes the sale him
self, the agent is nevertheless entitled to his commissions, and
the principal cannot deprive him of his rights to compensa
tion by a discharge before the sale is consummated, and this
is true where the principal completes the contract with the
customer presented by the broker on different terms from
those stipulated to the broker."
The legal propositions stated by these instructions are no
They make no
doubt correct, but they are purely abstract.
evidence,
they
nor
do
submit to the
reference whatever to the
jury the ﬁnding from the evidence of the facts giving rise to
“Where a
the law enunciated in them. One of them says:
broker or agent employed to negotiate a sale procures a cus
tomer for the sale of said property on the terms proposed by
the owner, and the principal takes the further proceedings out
of the hands of the broker,” etc., the broker is entitled to his
Had the court given this instruction in the con
commission.
“If
crete instead of the abstract form it would have said:
from
the
evidence
that
the
believe
jury
defendant
em
the
ployed thelplaintiff to sell the property mentioned in the evi
dence at a certain price, and agreed to pay him, in case he
made such sale, a commission, and, in pursuance thereof, the
plaintiff procured a customer for the sale of the property on
the terms ﬁxed by the defendant, and the defendant prevented
him from making the sale by interfering and consummating
the sale himself with the customer, they should ﬁnd for the
plaintiff.” This would have directed the minds of the jury to
the facts necessary to be ascertained by them in order to
record.

The argument
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reach a proper conclusion.
An instruction for the defendant
embodying the same proposition of law might have been
given, and in it the jury would have been told, in substance,
that if the plaintiff, acting under such contract of employ
ment; failed to procure such a purchaser, they should ﬁnd for
the defendant.
Instructions should apply the law to the facts
in the case. “It is not the proper course for the judge to lay
down the general principles of law applicable to a case, and
leave the jury to apply them; but it is his duty to inform them
what the law is as applicable to the facts of the case. An
instruction, however pertinent and applicable it may be, is
abstract unless it be made to apply, in express terms, either
to the attitude of the parties or to the very facts in issue."
Blashﬁeld on Instr. s. 92. “It is not the province of the judge
to impress any particular view of the facts upon the jury, but
it is his province to make his charge so directly applicable to
the facts as to enable the jury to render a correct verdict.
To
leave as little room as possible for them to make mistakes in
applying the law to the facts, which they may be very liable to
do when they have only general abstract propositions given to
theni in charge, there ought, if possible, to be no room for
misunderstanding the charge or its application, and to this
end it ought to be speciﬁc and direct.” East Tennessee V. &~
“Courts shoulrl
G. R. Co. v. Toppins, 10 Lea. (Tenn.) 64.
apply the principles to the facts in evidence, stating the facts
#

#

i

8

#

#

Blashﬁeld on Instr. s. 92.
ii

*

Ill

hypothetically.”

Q

a

On account of the misleading character of the instructions
given and the want of sufficient evidence to support the ver
dict, the judgment must be reversed, the verdict set aside,
new trial granted, and the case remanded.
Reversed.
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WM. ROGERS CLAY, Commissioner.
Appellee, J. B. Davis,
instituted this action against appellant, West Kentucky Coal
Company, to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to
have been caused by appellant’s negligence. The trial in the
lower court resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of
appellee for the sum of $1,600.
To reverse that judgment
this appeal is prosecuted.
The appellant is a corporation operating a coal mine near
the town of Sturgis, Union county, Ky. It also owns and
operates a mine at Wheatcroft, and at one or two other places.
In connection with these mines it owns and operates a rail
road.
Under appellant’s tipple, there are three railroad
tracks upon which cars are transported and placed for the
purpose of loading. These tracks are known as tracks Nos. 1,
The engine which appellant operates was taken
2, and 3.
daily down track No. 1 to the scale-house; thence it was run
up track No. 2 to the tipple for the purpose of coaling before
beginning its regular operations for the day. On the occasion
in question, those in charge of the engine backed it down to
the scale-house on track No. 1; thence up track No. 2, where
appellee was at work atthe tipple. It was appellee’s duty to
check the cars, and see that they were properly loaded.
When the engine arrived at the tipple, it pushed the car
which appellee was loading out of the way, placed its tender
upon the tipple, and received its coal. It then went back,
placed a partially loaded car in position, and proceeded to
the scale-house.
It was standing there when appellee re
sumed his labors of loading the car on track No. 2. Accord
ing to its usual custom, the engine then started up track No.
While it was proceeding in the di
1, pushing an empty car.
rection of appellee, the car which the latter was loading on
When this took place,
track No. 2 became unmanageable.
appellee’s assistant jumped upon the car for the purpose of
stopping it. Appellee stepped back and moved up the track
for the purpose of notifying the tipple men to stop the ma
chinery. There was a distance of four or ﬁve feet between
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tracks No. 1 and No.12. When appellee rose up and stepped
backward to give the tipple man the required notice, he came
in contact with the car which was being pushed by the en
gine up track No. 1, and was injured. The evidence shows
that there was a ﬁagman on the front end of the car that
was being pushed by the engine. His testimony is to the ef
fect that appellee backed into the car so suddenly that it was
impossible to stop the train after his peril was discovered.
There was evidence to the effect that the whistle was not
blown nor the bell rung as the engine approached the place
of accident.

I

Q

i

Q

U

U

i

1

i i

The instructions complained of are as follows:
“(1) Gentlemen of the jury, the court instructs you that
it was the duty of the defendant’s employee in charge of the
engine and cars attached thereto at the time and place in
question to exercise ordinary care, as hereinafter deﬁned, in
running and operating the same so as to prevent injury to
its employes; so, if you shall believe from the evidence that
defendant’s said employes in charge of said engine and cars
failed to exercise such care as above required, but negligently
ran said cars against the plaintiff, thereby injuring him,
while plaintiff was exercising ordinary care, as hereinafter
deﬁned, for his own safety, if he was then doing so, then in
that event you should ﬁnd for the plaintiff and award to him
such an amount in damages as will fairly and reasonably
compensate him on account of any mental and physical suf
fering endured by him as a direct result of such injury, if any,
and also for the reasonable value of the time necessarily lost
from his business on account thereof, if any, and also for any
permanent reduction in his power to earn money, if any, as
was the direct result of such injury, not exceeding the sum
of $2,000, the amount claimed in the petition. But unless you
shall so ﬁnd and believe from the evidence as above required.
you must ﬁnd

for the defendant.”

“(4) The court further instructs you that it was likewise
the duty of the plaintiff performing his duties and doing the
work in question to exercise ordinary care for his own safety,
and, although you may believe from the evidence that the de
fendant’s said employee was at said time negligent and care
less, yet if you shall also believe from the evidence that plain
tiff at said time when he was injured was also careless or
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negligent, and that but for his own carelessness or negligence
the accident and injury would not have occurred, then in that
event you should ﬁnd for the defendant.”
It will be observed that the instructions complained of do
not present to the jury the reciprocal duties of appellant and
They are so general and abstract in form as to
appellee.
make the jury the judges of both the law and the facts.
Smith v. Cornett, 38 S. W. 689, 18 Ky. Law Rep. 818; C. N. O.
& T. P. Ry. Co. 12. Hill's Adm’r, 89 S. W. 523, 28 Ky. Law
Rep. 530.
The jury may have concluded that certain acts
constitute negligence, when, as a matter of fact, such was
not the case. That this conclusion is sound may be gathered
from the fact that one witness was permitted to testify that
the car which struck appellee was not equipped with a fender
or pilot; indeed, much stress is laid upon this fact in ap
pellee’s brief. Doubtless it was commented upon by counsel
in their argument to the jury. We can not, then, say that
the Jury were not inﬂuenced by this fact in returning a ver
dict in favor of appellee. Certainly the failure of appellant
to equip the car in question with a fender or pilot was not
negligence.
To so hold would be to impose upon appellant a
greater liability than has ever been imposed upon ordinary
railroads, and would almost defeat the practical operation of
its engines and cars.
Nor do we think the failure of appellant to offer more spe
ciﬁc instructions than those given deprived it of its right to
complain.
The rule is that in civil cases the court is only
required to give such instructions as are offered by the par
ties. If, however, an instruction offered is defective in form
or substance, the court should prepare, or direct the prepara
tion of a proper instruction on the point attempted to be cov
ered by the instruction offered. L. & N. R. R. C0. '0. Harrod,
115 Ky. 877, 75 S. W. 233, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 250; Nicola Bros.
'0. Hurst, 88 S. W. 1081, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 87.
But when no instructions are requested by either party,
and the court on its own motion undertakes to instruct the
jury, the instructions so far as they go should present cor
South Covington & Cincinnati
rectly the law of the case.
562, 29 Ky. Law Rep. 836;
Core,
96
S.
W.
v.
Street Ry. C0.
Swope 22. Schafer, 4 S. W. 300, 9 Ky. Law Rep. 160; Turner,
Jr. v. Terrill, 97 S. W. 396, 30 Ky. Law Rep. 89.
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Upon the next trial of the case the court will instruct the
jury as follows:
“It was the duty of the defendant’s agents in charge of its
engine and cars on the occasion in question to give reasonable
warning of the approach of the train by blowing the whistle
or ringing the bell, and to keep a reasonable lookout in front
of the train as it moved. It was the duty of the plaintiff to
exercise reasonable care to watch for the approaching train
If you believe from the evidence
and keep out of its way.
that a reasonable warning of the approach of the train was
not given or a reasonable lookout was not kept, and that by
reason of this plaintiff was struck and injured by one of de
fendant’s cars, while exercising ordinary care for his own
safety. you will ﬁnd for the plaintiff. Unless you so believe,

will ﬁnd for the defendant.
“(2) Although you may believe from the evidence that

you

defendant’s agents in charge of said train failed to give rea
sonable warning of its approach and failed to keep a reason
able lookout, yet if you believe from the evidence that the
plaintiff himself failed to exercise ordinary care to discover
the approach of the train and to keep out of its way, and that
such failure on his part, if any, so contributed to his injury
that but for said failure his injury, if any, would not have
been received, you will ﬁnd for defendant.
“(3) If you believe from the evidence that a reasonable
lookout was kept, and that reasonable warning of the ap
proach of the train was given, and that plaintiff went upon
the track so close to the approaching train that the injury to
him could not be avoided by the exercise of ordinary care
upon the part of those in charge of the train after they per
ceived his danger, or could have perceived it by the exercise
of ordinary care, you will ﬁnd for the defendant.
“(4) Reasonable or ordinary care is such care as an ordi
narily prudent person will usually exercise under circum
stances the same or similar to those proven in this case.
“
If you ﬁnd for the plaintiff, you will award him such
(5)
sum in damages as you may believe from the evidence will
fairly compensate him for his mental or physical suffering,
if any; for his loss of time, if any; and for the permanent im
pairment, if any, of his power to earn money, which you may
believe from the evidence was the proximate result of his

4
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injury, if any; not exceeding in all, however, the sum of
$2,000.”
No other instructions will be given.
The judgment is reversed, and cause remanded
trial consistent with this opinion.
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The appellant complains further that the instructions of
the court were contradictory, and that, although the court
held the deceased to have been guilty of contributory negli
gence, it nevertheless laid upon the plaintiff the burden of
proving freedom from contributory negligence before she
could recover even upon the theory of the “last clear chance.”
After a statement of the issues, the court presented its in
structions in paragraphs numbered from 1 to 19, inclusive.
The ﬁrst six are as follows:
(1) The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish
by preponderance of the evidence each of the following propo
First, that the deceased, Edith McDivitt Lawson,
sitions:
was struck and injured by the defendant’s car about the time.
at the place, and substantially in the manner alleged in plain
tiff’s petition; second, that said decedent was not guilty of
negligence causing or contributing to her said injury; third,
that the defendant was guilty of negligence substantially as
alleged by plaintiff and hereafter in these instructions more
fully speciﬁed; fourth, thatsaid injuries so received by de
cedent were the direct and approximate result of the negli
gence of the defendant; ﬁfth, that the estate of decedent has
If you ﬁnd affirma
been damaged in some amount thereby.
tively as to each and all of the above propositions, then your
verdict will be for the plaintiff. If you fail to ﬁnd affirma
tively as to any one of the above propositions, your verdict

will

be

for the defendant.
U

¥

¥
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The undisputed evidence in this case shows that the
deceased approached the railway track of defendant, and, af
ter having so approached the railway track of defendant,
waited for the west-bound car to pass her, and that, after
such car had passed, decedent immediately proceeded across
the north track, and the intervening space of almost ﬁve feet
between the north and south tracks, and stopped in front of
an east-bound car on the south track, there passing, and was
struck by said car without taking any precautions to avoid
the accident. You are instructed as a matter of law that this
action of decedent would constitute negligence, and plaintiff
cannot recover unless you ﬁnd as hereinafter instructed.
The only question therefore which you have submitted to you
for consideration is whether or not the defendant’s employees
in charge of the east-bound car, which came in contact with
the deceased, were guilty of the negligence charged in failing
to avoid the injury which resulted in the death of decedent
after the deceased stepped from behind the west-bound car
and onto the south track of defendant, and she was seen by
' ' "
the motorman in a position of danger
(6) You have been heretofore instructed, gentlemen, that
the decedent was negligent in going upon the track in front
of the east-bound car, which struck her; but you are further
instructed that, while the law holds that plaintiff cannot re
cover on account of the contributory negligence of the de
cedent in stepping in front of the east-bound car in the man
ner in which she did, yet if, after the motorman saw her in a
place of danger or about to step upon the track in front of
the approaching car, he negligently failed to stop said car
within a reasonable time or distance under the circumstances
shown by the testimony, and such failure was the direct and
proximate cause of the injury which resulted in the death of
decedent, then your verdict will be for the plaintiff.
From an examination of instruction 1, it will be observed
that the jury was instructed, expressly, that, if it failed to
ﬁnd that the decedent was not guilty of contributory negli
gence, the verdict must be for the defendant.
Instructions 4
jury
expressly
stated
the
that
to
the decedent was
and 6
guilty of contributory negligence. This presents the alleged
It is contended
contradiction of which appellant complains.
by appellee that instructions 4 and 6 expressly state to the
jury that the plaintiff may recover notwithstanding contribu
(4)
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tory negligence, and this contention is correct; but this does
not eliminate the contradiction in the instructions. Appellee
contends that the instructions must be considered as a whole,
and this is true. It is argued also, that the error in the ﬁrst
instruction is cured by the statement in the fourth and sixth;
butwit is cured only in the form of a contradiction. Our pre
It has been
vious cases cited by appellee are not in point.
held that where an instruction is ambiguous, or where stand
ing alone, it is erroneous because of some omission, it may be
cured by other instructions that are clear upon the omitted
or ambiguous point; but where an instruction is free from
ambiguity, and is affirmatively erroneous, the error is not
cured by a contradiction contained in another instruction.
There is no way in such case to determine which instruction
the jury may follow. The question presented in this case is
almost parallel with Christy '0. City Railway Company, 126
Iowa, 428, and the cases therein cited. The error in this
case was somewhat emphasized by the sixteenth instruction,
“Contributory negligence is
which contains the following:
such negligence as contributes to an injury”—a deﬁnition
which was quite unnecessary in view of the withdrawal of the
question from the consideration of the jury. The natural ef
fect of it would be to impress the jury that the question was
still in the case, and to emphasize the error contained in in

struction

1.

i

8

U

I!

II

i

1

Q

Q

O

The judgment below is reversed, and cause remanded for
a new trial.—Reversed."
as When an instruction
does not conclude with a direction to iind
for one party or the other, mere incompleteness will not make it erro
neous if other instructions supply the missing information.
But it it
concludes with such a. direction it must be complete in itself (except
for mere matter oi deﬁnition) and it incomplete will be erroneous.
Klofski v. Railroad Supply Co., (1908) 235 Ill. 146.
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Lucinda Harris brought suit against the Central Railroad
to recover damages for the killing of her husband. The testi
mony for the plaintiff tended to show that the husband was
in the depot in the city of Atlanta; that he walked alongside
the train to go beyond the engine, which projected from the
depot into a street-crossing at its end; that he undertook to
cross the track at the street-crossing, when the train started
rapidly without giving any signal and ran over him.
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verdict for the plaintiff for one thou
The defendant moved for a new trial upon the
sand dollars.
following grounds:
Because the court failed entirely to put before the
jury the main defense relied upon by the defendant, and to
sustain which abundant evidence had been introduced, to-wit,
that defendant had boarded the passenger train in the depot
ticket, and without having any
without having purchased
intention of leaving the city thereon, but simply to say good
bye to
crowd of colored servants on their way to Florida,
and that he had attempted to jump from said train when in
platform having no steps attached there
motion, and from
railing
to by which to descend to the ground, and having
extending around the entire platform to prevent persons from
was attached, at that
getting on and off the car to which
The charge of the court failed to call the attention of
end.
the jury in any way to these facts, but singled out the one
such failure
element of negligence arising from the failure,
existed, to toll the bell on crossing Pryor street.
It

1

#

*

i
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(2)

it

.

J

The very able and distinguished coun
JACKSON, C.
sel for defendant in error saw the force of this exception
by the reply that the
to the charge, and endeavored to meet
counsel for the plaintiff in error could not use the exception,
because he did not call the attention of the court to the omis
sion of which he now complains, and cited decisions of this
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court bearing upon the necessity of his doing so before he
could take advantage of the omission.
We think, however, that the cases cited, and the principles
on which they rest, do not apply to the clear omission to no
tice in the charge a plain defense of the company arising out
of his evidence so as not to escape the observation of the

_

\

judge, but to omissions to expand the charge, so as to make
more clearthe point on which he has charged substantially,
but not as fully as would have been done had attention been
called to it. The courts will not allow a party to lie in wait
for the judge when he charges substantially the law cover
ing the case, and then object to the insufficiency of a portion
of it; but in every case, the law of it must be given in sub
stance to the jury, because if it is not given, the general ver
dict they give is not upon the law, the law of the case, but on
facts without instructions on the law of the case. The ship is
at sea without chart or pilot, and can never reach the port to
which it is bound without their guidance. The verdict can
never be a legal verdict unless instructions on the law of the I
case be given by him who presides for that purpose. _Tl_1egs
'
'
the case substanti_e1lly _mu_st>_al_ways__setA__it _\
0
aside.

._.__-

.

In all these

1

Q

cases,

1

I

Q

i

Q

¥

#

i

it is believed, from an examination

of

the principle is clearly deducible that without any re
quest of counsel or reminder of the court by counsel, the in
structions of the court must substantially embrace the rule of
law on the issues between the parties which the evidence
makes. If that be done substantially, then there is a line of
decisions cited by counsel for the defendant in error, to the
effect that if the charge be not full enough or clear enough or
omits something that would put one side or the other more
fairly before the jury than the charge given does, then the
notice of the court must be called thereto, or the party com
plaining will not be heard here. If there be any exception to
this general rule in this court from 11th Ga. down to 69th, it
is very scarce, and will be found approximating closely to the
rule laid down, if not clearly within it.
each,

l

¥

‘F

*

Q

t

#

Q

#

1

The judgment is reversed solely because the court in the
charge ignored the defense set up by the defendant below,
that plaintiff's husband’s own negligence-—his own rash act
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in jumping from the cars killed him, without any negligence
at all of the defendant which contributed to that act of his,-—

the only negligence proved being the neglect to ring the bell,
which did not affect in the least the disastrous result of the
rashness of the deceased.

iii
j

Judgment reversed."

l

08 Accord:
Owen v. Owen, (1867) 22 Iowa, 270; Capital City Brick
Pipe Co. v. Des Moines. (1907) 136 Iowa. 243, 113 N. W. 835; York Park
Bldg. Ass‘n v. Barnes, (1894) 39 Neb. 834, 58 N. W. 440.

MORGAN

v.

MULHALL.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

1908.

214 Missouri, 451.

J

LAMM,
.--Suing Mulhall, Ernest Morgan by his next
friend asked $20,000 damages, grounding his right of action
on a negligent shooting and wounding. At a trial with the
From a judgment
aid of a jury, he got a verdict of $5,000.
entered, defendant appeals.
The petition follows:
“The plaintiff for his cause of action showeth to the court
that on the 24th day of May, 1905, upon the petition of said
Ernest Morgan the said circuit court did appoint Joseph
Morgan as his next friend to commence and prosecute this
suit, and said Joseph Morgan has consented in writing to act
as such next best friend for said purpose.
“And the plaintiff further showeth to the court that on the
18th day of June, 1904, in said city of St. Louis and on the
grounds of the Louisiana Purchase Exposition Company, the
defendant by shooting into a crowd of people negligently shot
the plaintiff, Ernest Morgan, with a pistol " “ "
1

#

i i

¥

1

4!

IR

#

i

Defendant stood mute and neither prayed nor got any in
Plaintiff asked none on the trial issue
structions whatever.
of negligence nor on issues relating to the defense. He asked
and got two—one on the measure of damages, the other a rule
of law relating to the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight of their testimony.
In this state of the record, de
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fendant does not contend the instructions given were bad law
in and of themselves, but his counsel insist it was error to not
give instructions bearing upon the issues and announcing
rules of law by which the jury could be guided to a just ver
dict on them.

l

(b)

1

C

l

1

#

C

#

1

1

An excellent law writer states the general doctrine in

cases to be:
“It is then, a general rule of procedure,
subject, in-this country, to a few statutory innovations, that
mere non-direction, partial or total, is not ground of new
trial, unless speciﬁc instructions, good in point of law and
appropriate to the evidence, were requested and refused. A
party cannot, by merely excepting to a charge, make it the
foundation for an assignment of error, that it is indeﬁnite or
Judge
incomplete.”
(2 Thompson on Trials, sec. 2341).
Thompson supports his text by a wealth of authorities in a
note, adding: “The English rule seems to be that non-direc
tion, where speciﬁc direction is not requested, is no ground of
a new trial, unless it produce a verdict against the evidence."
(Citing Ford v. Lacey, 30 L. J. (Exch.) 351; Railroad '0.
Braid, 1 Moore, P. C. Cas. [N. S.] 101.)
To question that general rule in Missouri at this late day
would be to spin cobwebs before the eyes of justice and mis
chievously unsettle the law.
This is so because our statute
on procedure in civil cases does not contemplate instructions
whether or not. Parties litigant have their operation to ask
or not ask for them. That statute ordains (R. S. 1899, sec.
748) : “When the evidence is concluded, and before the case
is argued or submitted to the jury or to the court sitting as a
jury, either party may move the court to give instructions on
any point of law arising in the cause, which shall be in writ
ing and shall be given or refused. The court may of its own
motion give like instructions, and such instructions as shall
be given by the court on its own motion or the motion of
counsel shall be carried by the jury to their room for their
guidance to a correct verdict according to the law and evi
dence; which instructions shall be returned by the jury into
court at the conclusion of the deliberations of such jury. and
ﬁled by the clerk and kept as a part of the record in such
case.”
In construing that section, the better view is that it is per
missive, not mandatory.
Doubtless it conduces to the science\

civil
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of jurisprudence and the orderly administration of the law
to have instructions deﬁning the issues, putting it to the jury
to ﬁnd the fact and declaring the law on the fact when found,
but it is within the knowledge of the profession (and our
decisions show) that cases. are not infrequently tried, nisi,
without them. That mere non-directi0I1_iS_11ot misdirection
is a familiar-,»settled rule of appellate procedure.
Under that
rule, before appellant can predicate reversible error on what
a trial court does not say to the jury, he must ﬁrst put the
court in the wrong by asking it to say something, or else the
court in trying to cover the case by instructions holds a false
voice, or omits in general instructions essential elements of
the case.
(Tetherow '0. Railroad, 98 Mo. 74; Coleman 1:.
Drane, 116 Mo. l. c. 394; Browning v. Railroad, 124 Mo. 55;
Nolan v. Johns, 126 Mo. 159; Wilson v. Railroad, 122 Mo.
App. l. c. 672, et seq., and cases cited; Nugent r. Armour
Packing Co., 208 Mo. l. c. 500; Flaherty v. Railroad, 207 Mo.
l. c. 339.)
Here, manifestly, appellant was as much to blame as the
court or respondent for the omission to instruct on vital is
sues; for he is by his silence joined in the general silence and
made it more profound. At most it was common error, if
any, and error common to all is not reversible error. He who
does not speak when he should, will not be heard to speak
when he would.
The premises considered, we have nothing to do but look
to the record and see if it supports the verdict.
We ﬁnd
ample testimony to support it.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. It is so ordered."
Stuckey v. Fritsche, (1890) 77 Wis. 329, 46 N. W. 59;
B7Accord.'
Osgood v. Skinner, (1904) 211 lll. 229, 71 N. E. S69; Palatine Ins. C0.
v. Santa Fe Mercantile Co., (1905) 13 N. Mex. 241, 82 Pac. 363; Womack
v. Circle, (1877) 29 Gratt (Va.) 192; Texas & Paciﬁc Ry. C0. v. Volk,
(1894) 151 U. S. 73.
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MOORE.

Court of Illinois.
139

or Issuss

1891.

Illinois, 201.

J

SHOPE, .—This was a suit for personal injury, alleged to
have been received by defendant because of a defective side
walk over and upon which she was passing with due care and
caution, and which appellant was required to keep in safe
repair and condition.
The trial resulted in a verdict for
plaintiff, which on appeal to the Appellate Court, was
affirmed.
#

1

$

#

i

$

#

i I

#

The ﬁrst point made which we will consider is that, the
court erred in refusing all instructions asked, and giving one
It is insisted with
prepared by the court in lieu thereof.
great earnestness, that under the practice in this State, and
under the statute, the respective parties have the right to
have instructions given or refused by the court as asked by
them. and that it is error for the court to refuse an instruc
tion containing a correct proposition of law applicable to the
facts, although an instruction embodying every material
phase thereof be given in an instruction or instructions pre
pared by the court.
It is said “that there is no place under
our law for instructions by the court sua sponite, except when
counsel have failed to present proper instructions, and the
justice of the case demands that the judge supply the omis
sion.” The contrary to this contention has been so repeatedly
held, and the practice of giving a charge prepared by the
court, and containing all of the material points covered by
the instructions asked, has been so often commended by this
court, that the question ought to be regarded as settled in this
/
state. Hill et al v. Parsons et al, 110 Ill. 111; Hanchett 12.
Kimbark et ail, 118 id. 132; Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. ‘v.
Pulver, 126 id. 329.
.
In the latter case, in speaking of this practice, we said:
“The propriety of the practice thus adopted is challenged,
the proposition contended for seeming to be, that in this State
the functions of the court in the matter of instructing a jury
are practically limited to giving or refusing the written in
structions asked by counsel. Such, clearly, is not the case.
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True, he may, if he sees ﬁt, limit himself to giving the in
structions submitted by the counsel which properly state the
law, and then, even though the law be inadequately given to
the jury, no error can ordinarily be predicated upon such
action, because if counsel had deemed other instructions nec
essary, they might and should have asked them. But where
the judge sees proper to do so, it is competent for him to
prepare his own charge to the jury, but if he does so, he
should embody in it, either literally or in substance, all proper
instructions asked by counsel.” See, also, Chicago and Iowa
Railroad Co. v. Lane, 30 Ill. App. 443.
And it has been so repeatedly ‘held that it is not error to
refuse instructions, however applicable and pertinent, when
the material parts are given in other instructions, that the
citation of authority seems unnecessary.
Here appellant
asked seventeen instructions.
A careful consideration of
them will show, as it is conceded, that the instruction pre
pared and given by the court contained every important or
material proposition embodied therein, except the fourth in
struction asked and refused, in respect of which, as we shall
see hereafter, appellant has no cause of complaint.
If the
jury were accurately instructed in respect of each proposi
tion contained in the instructions asked, proper to be given,
the party can not be heard to complain.
It is, however, said, that the instructions prepared by the
counsel presented the questions sharply and incisively, while
those of the court are more moderate in expression and less
forceful. This may be conceded without affecting the result.
As said by the Appellate Court:
“The instructions handed
up come to the judge from partisan hands, and have been
drawn as carefully as the skill of a lawyer can accomplish it
to present a partisan view, or to convey a hint, suggestion or
intimation of advantage to his client. The same legal rule
may be stated in a differently arranged combination of words
by the judge, and be, as it is very likely to be, coldly impar
tial, and entirely colorless in its statements of facts on which
it is based.” The utmost care should be taken by the judge
to include within the charge every proposition of law ap
plicable to the facts of the case embraced within the instruc
tions asked, and such others as he may deem necessary to the
attainment of justice. His language should be clear and im
partial, and convey to the jury the law of the case in terms
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they will comprehend. When this is done the practice is to be
commended, rather than the other, which too frequently
leaves the mind of the juror in uncertainty as to what is
meant by the disjointed, and to his mind, disconnected and
conﬂicting, propositions of law, and which embarrass and
mislead him perhaps quite as often as they lead him to correct
conclusions.
Q

t

i

$

I I

1

1!

#

i

Finding no error in this record for which the judgment
should be reversed, it is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed."
BIA number of courts have declared that the practice of charging the
jury in the language of the court instead of in the language of counsel.
is decidedly preferable, even where the requested charges are unexcep
tionable in law when separately examined, for the reason that thereby
the charge can be made more orderly and harmonious and is freed from
the partisan spirit and want of proper perspective which instructions
usually show when prepared by counsel.
Rosenstein
v. Fair Haven v.
Westville R. R. Co., (1905) 78 Conn. 29, 60 Atl. 1061; Kinney v. Ferguson,
(1894) 101 Mich. 178, 59 N. W. 401.
On the other hand, some courts hold that the court is bound to give
Thus, in Morrison
a correct instruction in the language of the request.
v. Fairmont & Clarksburg Traction Co., (1906) 60 W. Va. 441, 55 S. E.
"A party is entitled to an instruction in his own
669, the court said:
language, if it correctly propounds the law applicable to the case, and
is not misleading and there are facts in evidence to support it. State
v. Evans, 30 W. Va. 417; Jordan v. Benwood, 42 W. Va. 312.
Where
such instructions are asked a court should, without hesitation, give
It is a right a party has to couch his instructions in his own
them.
language, and when he has done so, if they fulfill the legal requirements,
But while this is true, yet what should be the
they should be given.
effect after verdict, where such instruction is refused, but modified and
given?
Can we say that it is reversible error for the court to make a.
slight or immaterial change in an instruction?
Must instructions be
given literally as offered, and if this is not done, must we overthrow
While such an instruction should be
the verdict? We cannot so hold.
given, yet a verdict will not be set aside where this is not done, when
it is modiﬁed and given, it we can clearly see that the instruction as
modified is the same in legal effect as the one offered."
And in some states it is provided by statute that the court shall in
struct in the language of the request when such request is correct in law.
Alabama. Code, 1903, § 5364; North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1905, 5 7021;
South Dakota, Code Civ. Pro., 1903, § 256.
If an instruction as requested is not correct, the court is under no
obligation to modify it and give it as modified, but may properly refuse
& Ohio Ry. Co. v. Stock, (1905) 104 Va. 97,
it altogether.—Chesapeake
A rigid rule limiting the number of in
Number of Instructions.
structions which can be given for each party is unreasonable.
Number
Several short and concise instruc.
alone is not always of importance.
tions are frequently better than one long, diffuse and complicated
instructi0n.—Chicago City Railway Co. v. Sandusky,
(1902) 193 1||_
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But the mass of instructions given may be so great as in itself to
constitute reversible error. Sidway v. Missouri Land & Live Stock Co.,
400.

(1901) 163 Mo. 342, 376.

_

jo

3%.

General lrwtructions.

(c)

SCURLOCK
Supreme

v.

CITY OF BOON E.

Court of Iowa.

1909.

142 Iowa, 580.
EVANS, C. J.—The plaintiff was a resident of the defend
ant city. On February 26, 1907, she claims to have fallen
upon one of the sidewalks by reason of a loose board there
on. The claim is that her grandson, who was walking at
her side, stepped upon one end of the board, whereby the
other end was thrown up against the plaintiff in such a
way as to cause her to fall. It is claimed that she suffered
internal injuries either by the fall or by the blow from the
board. It was claimed at the time of trial that she was then
in a poor state of health, and one of the issues of fact in
dispute was whether her then condition was caused by the
accident complained of.
1

II.

It

i i i

1

Q

l i

from the testimony

Q

i

on behalf of the
plaintiff that prior to the accident she had always main
On behalf of the defendant, Mrs. Miller
tained good health.
and Mrs. Ball, her daughter, both testiﬁed that on one oc
casion, about two years previous, the plaintiff called at their
home at Ames, and that she stated to them at that time
that she was in very poor health. T. L. Jones, one of the
city council, testiﬁed also that prior to the accident the
plaintiff had frequently told him that she was not well.
None of this testimony was denied by the plaintiff, either
directly or indirectly; nor did she refer to it in any way in
The court gave to the jury the fol
her rebuttal testimony.
lowing instruction. “(121/2) There is some evidence in this
case with respect to an admission by the plaintiff in re
gard to the condition of her health at a time prior to the
Verbal admissions, consisting of mere representa
accident.
appeared
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tions of oral statements, made a long time before, are sub
ject to much imperfectionand mistakes, for the reason that
the person making them may not have expressed her own

&

a

/

1

it

_is

meaning, or the witness may not have understood her, or,
by not giving her exact language, may have changed the
meaning of what was actually said, and this is especially
true where a long time has elapsed since the alleged ad
mission was made. Such evidence should therefore be re
earnestly
ceived by you with caution.”
This instruction
challenged by the appellant.
We are constrained to" hold
cannot be sustained.
This court has heretofore ap
that
proved the rule on this point as laid down by Greenleaf.
Greenleaf, section 200; Martin v. Town of Algona, 40 Iowa,
392; Allen v. Kirk, 81 Iowa, 670.
It will be observed that the instruction under considera
tion, through probable oversight, falls short of stating the
Greenleaf rule. As set forth in the Martin case, supra, the
following should have been added: “But when such admissions are deliberately made or often repeated, and are cor
rectly given, they are often the most satisfactory evidence,
and the jury should consider all the circumstances under
which they were made and give them such weight as they;
This latter proviso gives‘
are justly entitled to receive."
proper balance to the rule. An instruction substantially
in the form of the one under consideration was condemned
N. Ry. Co., 64 Iowa,
by this court in Hawes v. B., C. R.
The
See, also, Castner v. Railway Co., 126 Iowa, 586.
315.
natural effect of the court’s instruction as given was to
minimize unduly the testimony of the defendant on the sub
ject referred to, and this is especially so in view of the fact
that the plaintiff neither denied the statements attributed to
her, nor denied recollection of them, nor offered any ex
planation.
The tendency of this instruction to minimize the evidence
referred to was further emphasized by the use of the word
“some” in the ﬁrst sentence. This court has heretofore con
demned the use of this word in this connection, in that its
State v.
tendency is to belittle the evidence referred to.
Iowa,
174;
Dorland,
103
Donovan, 61 Iowa, 369; State v.
State v. Rutledge, 135 Iowa, 581. We feel constrained there
fore to hold that defendant’s exception to this instruction
must be sustained.

TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRAcTIcE

506

C

Q

1

8

O

U

I

U

8

U

For the error pointed out in instruction
ment below must be reversed."
Accord:

[Chap. 3

121/2

the judg

~_

Allen v. Kirk, (1891)

81 Iowa, 658, 47 N. W. 906;
Stewart
(1890) 86 Ga. 729, 12 S. E. 1067; Tozer v. Hershey. (1870)
15 Minn. 257; Haven v. Markstrum, (1886) 67 Wis. 493, 30 N. W. 720.
89

v. De Loach,

W

,_j’(o

KAUFFMAN

v.

MAIER.

Supreme Court of California.
94

1892.

California, 269.

HARRISON, J.—The plaintiff brought this action against
the defendants to recover damages for personal injuries
alleged to have resulted from their negligence.
He was in
their employ at the time of the injury, and the negligence
charged upon them was their permitting the shaft of a
wheel to protrude into the room where he was at work, by
reason of which his sleeve was caught upon the jagged end
of the shaft, causing him to be carried around it, whereby
his arm was so injured as to require amputation.
The plain
tiff recovered judgment in the court below, and a new trial
was granted upon the motion of the defendants, and from
In their statement
this order the plaintiff has appealed.
upon the motion for a new trial, the defendants have as
signed various errors of law on the part of the court, as
well as many particulars in which the evidence is claimed to
be insufficient.
It

t

l

1

#

Q

Q

Q

It

#

Evidence was given at the trial tending to show that
shortly after the injury the plaintiff had made statements
to the effect that it was the result of his own fault, and that
the accident had been brought about by a different cause
In its instructions
from that shown at the present trial.
to the jury, the court said:
“The court instructs the jury
that although parol proof of the verbal admissions of a
party to a suit, when it appears that the admissions were
understandingly and deliberately made, often afford satis
factory evidence, yet, as a general rule, the statements of
5.
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the witnesses as to the verbal admissions of a party should
be reviewed by the jury with great caution, as that kind of
evidence is subject to much imperfection and mistake.
The
party himself may have been misinformed, or may not have
clearly expressed his meaning or the witness may have mis
understood him; and it frequently happens that the witness,
by unintentionally altering a few expressions really used,
gives an effect to the statement completely at variance with
what the party did actually say. But it is the province of
the jury to weigh such evidence, and give it the considera
tion to which it is entitled in view of all the other evidence
in the case.”
In thus instructing the jury, the court disregarded the
provision of the constitution that “judges shall not charge
juries with respect to matters of fact, but may state the
testimony and declare the law.”
While it is a matter of common knowledge that the state
ments of a witness as to the verbal admissions of another
are liable to be erroneous, and for that reason should be
received with caution, yet such conclusion is only_ an infer
ence of fact which must be made by the jury, and is not
a presumption or a conclusion of law to be declared by the
The reasons which are to be urged in favor of re
court.
ceiving such statements with caution are based upon human
experience, and vary in strength and conclusiveness with the
facts and circumstances of each case, and their sufficiency
in any particular case is an inference which the reason of
the jury makes from those facts and circumstances;
but
jury
law
directs
is
no
rule
of
the
invariably
there
to
which
make such an inference from the mere fact that the proof of
That deduction called
the admission is by oral testimony.
a presumption which the law expressly directs to be made
from particular facts is uniform, and not dependent upon the
varying conditions and circumstances of individual cases.
To weigh the evidence and ﬁnd the facts in any case is the
province of the jury, and that province is invaded by the
court whenever it instructs them that any particular evi
dence which has been laid before them is or is not entitled to
receive weight or consideration from them: (People v. Wal
den, 51 Cal. 588; People v. Fzmg Ching, 78 Cal. 173; Mauro
v. Platt, 62 Ill. 450; Commonwealth 'v. Galligon, 113 Mass.
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Barney, 51 Cal. 603; People v. Dick, 34 Cal.

666.)

The instruction above quoted is, in substance, an argu
ment to the jury with “respect to matters of fact" that had
been presented at the trial, and a comment by the court
upon the weight which they should give to that testimony.
Whether the facts and circumstances proved in the case
were sufficient to cause the reason of the jury to make this
inference was fair matter of argument for the counsel of
the respective parties; but the court forsook its judicial
position when it assumed the oﬁice of commenting upon the
weight and credibility of this evidence. The closing para
graph in the instruction, to the effect that it was for the
jury to give to the evidence the consideration to which it
was entitled, did not obviate the error, as by its remarks
the court had, in substance, said to them that as matter of
law the evidence was not entitled to any great considera
tion.
The order is a._ﬂi1~med.°°
90

Accord;

son v. Stone,

Knowles v. Nixon, (1896) 17 Mont.
(1892) 69 Miss. 826, 13 So. 850.

CRABTREE
Supreme

v.

473, 43 Pac.

628;

John

REED.

Court of Illinois.

1869.

..»

50

Illinois, 206.

BREESE, C. J.—The only question between the parties to
this record was, as to the value of a mule the appellee ac
knowledged he had struck with a heavy stick, and which
belonged to the appellant, causing its death.
The action was case, for killing the mule, and the court,
on behalf of defendant, instructed the jury that the burden
of proof rested upon the plaintiff, and that he was bound
to maintain, by a clear preponderance of evidence, the alle
gations in the declaration, and that unless they ﬁnd such
Though
a preponderance, they will ﬁnd for the defendant.
the defendant had admitted he struck the mule in disciplin
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ing him, he not having been broke to work, and that from
the blow the mule died, he contested the fact of killing be
fore the jury, and under the above instruction, the jury
found for him.
This instruction must certainly have misled the jury.
The law is not, in such a case, that there shall be'a clear
preponderance of evidence in favor of the plaintiff to en
title him to recover. It is sufficient, if the evidence creates
probabilities in his favor--that the weight of the evidence
inclines to his side.
For this error the judgment must be reversed and the
cause remanded.

Judgment reversed."
91 In Altschuler v. Coburn,
(1894) 38 Neb. 881. it was held proper to tell
the jury that the plaintiff must establish his case by a “falr" preponder
ance of the testimony.

/I“
~DDEN

v.

SAYLOR COAL

CO.

Supreme Court of Iowa, 1907'.
133

Snsnwm,

J.

I

' '

"
Q

$

#

Iowa, 699.
t

$

i i i

1

The second instruction given by the court was in the fol
“By the term ‘preponderance of evidence’
lowing language:
as used in these instructions, is meant the greater weight of
testimony.
The preponderance of evidence is not alone de
by
termined
the number of witnesses testifying to a particu
It is determined by fully and
lar fact or state of facts.
fairly considering and weighing all of the testimony of each
witness, and the aggregate testimony of all the witnesses,
giving to their testimony, and to the testimony of each, such
weight as you may deem it entitled to when taken in con
nection with the other facts and circumstances, pryven upon
the trial of the case. But, in weighing the testimony, after
having applied all the tests as to its credibility and weight
found in these instructions for your guidance, while the
weight of the testimony is not necessarily determined by the
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number of witnesses on either side of a controverted propo
sition of fact, yet when the witnesses are of equal credibility,
and the circumstances equally consistent with the evidence of
each, then the number of witnesses would fairly determine
the preponderance."
The appellant complains of this in
struction, because it invaded the right of the jury to deter
mine the weight to be given to the testimony of witnesses,
and the right to determine all fact questions in the case with
out any direction or attempt on the part of the court to con
trol its action in that respect. While we regret the necessity
of reversing the case because of error in this instruction,
we are constrained to do so, for the reason that it was clearly
prejudicial to the defendant.
The court alone determines
the competency of witnesses, and of the testimony which
shall be admitted upon the trial of a case; but the credibility
of witnesses, and the weight which shall be given to their
testimony, when considered in the light of all of the sur
rounding facts and circumstances appearing in the case, is
the exclusive province of the jury, and with this the court
The
has no right to interfere by instruction or otherwise.
ﬁrst part of the instruction is not complained of, and we set
it out only for the purpose of presenting the instruction as
an entirety. It is the second clause of the instruction that
is claimed to be erroneous. The court therein in eifect told
the jury that if the witnesses were of equal credibility, and
the circumstances proved equally consistent with the testi
mony of each witness, then “the number of witnesses would
fairly determine the preponderance” of the evidence, as de
ﬁned in the fore part of the instruction. The statement thus
When we
made to the jury was manifestly prejudicial.
witness,
only
speak of the credibility of a
it refers
to his
integrity, and to the fact that he is worthy of belief.
The
term does not imply that he has intelligence, or knowledge,
or opportunity for knowledge of the particular facts in the
case.
Bierbach v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 54 Wis. 208, 11 N.
W. 514, 41 Am. Rep. 19; Peck 12. Chambers, 44 W. Va. 270,
And see,
28 S. E. 706; Noland '0. McCracken, 18 N. C. 594.
on the subject generally, 2 Words & Phrases, 1710, 1711.
Witnesses may be equally entitled to credit in so far as their
being truthful is concerned, and still the testimony given by
such witnesses may not be of equal value as proof of certain
facts although the circumstances may be equally consistent
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with the testimony of each, for the reason that the intelli
gence of such witnesses and their means of observation may
Their memories may not be of equal
be entirely different.

strength, and many other elements may appear to the jury
which would have weight in determining the value of the
testimony of each witness; in other words, while witnesses
may be equally worthy of belief, the value which is ulti
mately to be placed upon the testimony of each witness can
alone be determined by the jury, and, when a trial court says
to a jury that where the witnesses are of equal credibility
the number thereof should determine the preponderance of
It
the evidence, it clearly invades the province of the jury.
is never the province of the court to say to the jury what
The testimony
evidence shall or shall not be given weight.
of an entirely credible witness may be as thoroughly contra
dicted by circumstances as by the testimony of other credible
witnesses, and it is always dangerous for a trial court to in
dicate to the jury, by instruction or otherwise, its own con
clusion as to where the weight of the testimony
lies.
preponderance
of
particu
evidence in a
Whether or not the
lar case depends alone upon the number of witnesses is a
question of fact to be determined by the jury, and the court
has no right to instruct them as a matter of law where the
preponderance may be. Pennsylvania Co. v. Hunsley, 54 N.
E. 1071, 23 Ind. App. 37. On the error in the instruction,
Delvee v. Boardman, 20 Iowa, 446;
see the following cases:
Franks v. State, 1 G. Greene, 541; Robinson v. Illinois Cr.
Co., 30 Iowa, 401; Miller v. Mutual B. & L. Ins. Co., 31 Iowa,
216, 7 Am. Rep. 122; Saar v. Fuller, 71 Iowa, 425, 32 N. W.
405; Johnson v. Whidden, 32 Me. 230; Johnson v. People, 29
N. E. 895, 140 Ill. 350; Bierbach 'v.'Goodyea<r Rubber Co.,
supra.
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ERIE RAILROAD co.

v.

Court of New Jersey.

1903.

New Jersey Law, 57.

J

FORT, .—This was an action for damages alleged to have
resulted from an injury caused by the train of the defend
ant company running into a wagon of the plaintiff, in which
the plaintiff was, at the crossing of the said company, at or
near Soho, in Essex county.
Q
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Another alleged error
trial judge to charge
ﬁrmative evidence of the
the whistle is generally

was on account of the refusal of
the following request:
“That af
ringing of the bell and blowing of
entitled to more weight than evi
dence that it was not noticed or heard."
We are unable
to see upon what principle a judge is justiﬁed in stating to
a jury that one piece of evidence, which is legitimate, is
not to be treated by the jury the same as other evidence in
the cause.
It is for the jury to say whether the testimony
of a witness having an equal opportunity to hear and whose
hearing is equally good, and who testiﬁes that he did not
hear the blowing of a whistle or the ringing of a bell, not
withstanding he listened, shall or shall not be given equal
credit with the testimony of a witness, similarly situated,
who testiﬁes that he did hear.
There was no error in the refusal of the trial judge to
charge the request excepted to.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.”
the

99.~ive0rd:
Atlantic Coast Line
685. 56 S. E. 986: St. Louis & San
69 Kan. 448, 77 Pac. 86.

R. R. Co. v. O'Neill, (1906) 127 Ga.
Francisco R. R. Co. v. Brock, (1904)

Psocsanmos
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IN RE ESTATE OF WHARTON.
Supreme

Court of Iowa.

1907.

182 Iowa, 714.

_

This is a proceeding for the probate of the will of Stephen
Wharton, deceased, offered for probate by A. M. Harrah,
devisee, who is also named as executor, to act without bond,
and contested by George Wharton, his son, and Esther Whar
ton, his widow, who, having been adjudged insane, is repre
sented by a guardian.
The grounds of contest were want
of mental capacity, and undue inﬂuence. There was a spe
cial ﬁnding of want of mental capacity by the jury, a general
verdict in favor of contestants, and a judgment entered on
such verdict, denying and refusing admission of the will to
Proponent appeals.
probate.
MCCLAIN, C. .—Many errors are assigned as to the action
of the trial court, and it will only be possible to discuss those
which seem to this court to be of controlling importance.

J
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VI. Another instruction is complained of which directed
the jury that, other things being equal, afiirmative testi
mony is in general entitled to more weight than negative
testimony, and that, if a witness testiﬁes that he did see
certain things, and another witness of equal credibility tes
tiﬁes that he did not see such things, then if everything else
is equal and such witnesses on either side are of equal cred
ibility, the witness testifying negatively is entitled to less
credit than the one testifying affirmatively.
It is said that
this rule, which certainly has some support in our decisions,
has been discredited in Stanley v. Cedar Rapids & Marion
City R. Co., 119 Iowa, 526, 533, and Selensky v. Chicago G.
W. R. Co., 120 Iowa, 113, 116.
But in each of these cases
the instruction asked to this general effect was held properly
refused, because witnesses who gave the so-called negative
evidence, or some of them, were in as good a position to
hear the sounds and signals referred to in the testimony of
the witnesses giving the affirmative evidence as the latter
But the instruction given in this case is not open
were.
to any such objection, and, under the evidence to which the
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instruction could have been understood by the jury as hav
ing reference, there was no error in giving it.
'
it
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The judgment of the trial court is aﬂirmed."
as
108

Accord:

Ill.

617;

Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry. Co. v.‘ Shires, (1884)
Jones v. Casler, (1894) 1?-9 Ind. 382, 38 N. E. 812.

____''
tr’
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CLINE
Supreme

ary, 1884.

LINDSEY.

Court of hutiana.
110

1886.

Indiana, 887.

J.—Lewis
Cline died on the 26th day of Janu
By his last will, executed on the 22d day of that

J.

ZOLLARS,

v.

“Q55 /51

a

a

a

a

it

a

month, he bequeathed all of his property to appellants, chil
dren of
brother.
Appellees brought this action to set aside that will on the
ground that at the time
was executed, the testator was
mind,
person
unsound
and
a
of
hence incapable of making
valid will. With the will out of the way, appellees and the
father of appellants are entitled to the property left by Lewis
J. Cline, as his heirs at law, being his brothers, sister, and
the descendants of deceased sisters.
Upon
verdict of the jury in favor of appellees, the court
below, over appellants’ motion for
new trial, set aside the
will. Appellants ask for
reversal of the judgment upon
the alleged error of the court in charging the jury.
Our attention is ﬁrst called to the twentieth instruction
given by the court. It is as follows:
“20th.
In weighing the testimony of witnesses, the jury
should consider their capacity to understand the facts about
which they testify, their opportunity of knowing the mental
condition of the testator._1' The testimony of the testator’s
l
neighbors, who have long been acquainted with him, and
have had frequent intercourse with him, and whose atten
tion has been particularly called to the testator, who have
had frequent opportunities of observing his mind, is en
titled to greater weight than that of a witness of equal
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sagacity, whose opportunities were more limited. The facts
upon which the witnesses’ opinions are based have been
given you, and of these you are the judges, weighing the
facts as they have been given, in order to determine the
You are to weigh each
condition of the testator’s mind.
particular incident and fact stated to you by the witnesses,
and to determine from the whole whether or not the tes
tator, at the time of the execution of the will, was or was
You are to take into consideration the
not of sound mind.
will itself and its provisions, its unjustness or hardships, if
any exist, to determine the soundness or unsoundness of the
testator’s mind.”
The objection urged to the instruction by appellants’ coun
sel is, that the court thereby invaded the province of the
jury by charging, as a matter of law, that the testimony
of the testator’s neighbors, who had long been acquainted
with him, etc., was entitled to more weight than the testi
mony of other witnesses of equal sagacity, whose opportu
nities had been more limited.
Considered without reference to any other charge that may
have been given, the above instruction, in our judgment, is
open to the objection urged against it.
It may be true, as a matter of fact, that the testimony of
the neighbors of the testator, who had the advantages and
opportunities named, was entitled to more weight than the
testimony of other witnesses of equal sagacity, who had had
less opportunities because of less acquaintance with the tes
tator. But that was a fact to be determined by the jury as
a fact, and not by the court as a question of law.
The instruction, it will be observed, leaves out of view
The neighbors of the
the essential element of credibility.
testator may have had greater opportunities and may have
been of equal sagacity with other witnesses having had less
opportunities, and yet be less worthy of credence.
Nor does it follow necessarily, and as a matter of law,
that the testimony of one of two witnesses, of equal sagacity,
is entitled to greater weight simply because he may have
had more acquaintance with, and more frequent opportu
nities to observe, the person whose sanity is in question,
The witness who has had less acquaintance, and less oppor
tunities, may yet be the most reliable witness, because of
some special training, experience, or habit of closely observ
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In all such cases it is for the
ing persons whom he meets.
jury to determine for themselves to what witness they will
give the most credence. They have a right to consider the
fact that some of the witnesses may have had greater op
portunities than others. The court may instruct them that
they have such right, but it ought not to invade their prov
ince, and undertake to determine for them what witness is
the most reliable.

I I I I I I I I I I

It

appears here that an erroneous instruction was given,
but it is not shown by the record that the giving of it was
prejudicial to appellants. The evidence is not in the record,
nor is there anything in the record showing, or tending to
show, that the witnesses spoken of in the charge as the
neighbors of the testator, were witnesses below in behalf
of appellees. For aught that is shown by the record, they
may have been called by appellants, and may have testi
ﬁed in their behalf, that the testator was a person of sound
mind, and hence capable of making the will.
_

I

I I

I I

I I I I I

Upon the whole case, we think that the judgment ought
to be affirmed.

\§;

HIGGINS

v.

WREN.

.-’

upreme

.

Court of Minnesota.
79

1900.

Minnesota, 462.

Action in the district court for Wright county to recover
$200, and interest, damages for the conversion of a note
Lizzie Stowell intervened.
and mortgage.
The case was
tried before Giddings, J., and a jury, which rendered a ver
dict in favor of plaintiff and against defendant and the
intervenor for $263. From an order denying a motion for
a new trial, the intervenor appealed.
Reversed.
COLLINS, . On the trial of this cause there was testimony
received tending to impeach one of the defendants who had
testiﬁed as a witness, as unworthy of credit, on the ground
of general bad reputation for truth and veracity in the neigh

J
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borhood wherein he resided. The court subsequently charged
the jury as follows:
“If the jury believe from the evidence in this case that
the reputation of any witness in this case for truth and
veracity in the neighborhood where they reside is bad, then
the jury have a right to disregard his whole testimony,
and treat it as untrue.” At this point defendant’s counsel
called special attention to the words “treat it as untrue,”
and thereupon the court resumed thus: “That is, you have
a right to treat his testimony as untrue; that is, you have
the right—the law does not require that you must, but that
you have the right—to treat it as untrue, except where it
is corroborated by other credible evidence, or by facts and
circumstances proved on the trial.”
To this part of the charge counsel reserved an exception.
We are of the opinion that this statement of the law was
altogether to broad.
This instruction authorized the jury
disregard
and reject all of the testimony given by
to wholly
the witness if satisﬁed that his general reputation for truth
and veracity was bad in the neighborhood in which he re
sided, no matter how truthful all or a part of such testimony
might in itself, and standing alone, appear to be.
It is
true that_this language was taken bodily from a well-known
work on instructions to juries, but the author cites no au
thority in support of it. Nor do we ﬁnd any. We are of
opinion that the instruction upon this point approved in
State "0. Miller, 53 Iowa, 209, 4 N. W. 1083, is one which will
be better understood and much better serve the purpose, as

follows:
“Where it is

shovsm
that the reputation for truth of a
witness is bad, his evidence is not necessarily destroyed,
but it is to be considered under all the circumstances de
scribed in the evidence, and given such weight as the jury
if they believe
believe it entitled to, and to be disregarded
'
weight.”
it entitled to no
The successful impeachment of a witness merely affects
his credibility. Order reversed.
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2

)

v.

RITTER.

SfijJ'reme Court of Indiana.
159 Indiana.

'

‘

'

HADLEY,

J.

-

1902.

8

MT

FIFER

Z

is

Complaint
made of certain instructions given to the
jury. Number two informed the jury that they were the
exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and of
the weight of their testimony, and that in determining these
things they must take into consideration the interest, the
upon the witness stand, the intelligence, the op
portunities for learning the truth concerning the things
testiﬁed about, the apparent candor and correctness of the
statements as compared with the usual and ordinary nature
of things. The particular assault upon the instruction is
directed against the word must, as being an encroachment
upon the absolute and exclusive right of the jury. We can
here employed in the sense of
not adopt this view. Must
equivalent to telling the jury that
duty, and the term
was their duty to consider the matters enumerated in esti
And
mating the credibility and weight of the testimony.
clearly was their duty.

_\_\

appearance

I

i

Judgment aﬂirmed.

ﬁél-HCAGO AND ALTON RAILROAD CO.
Supreme

Q,,_;_,\(=Q/

Court of Illinois.
210

v.

KELLY.

1904.

Illinois, 449.

a

J

HAND,
.—This was an action on the case brought by the
appellee to recover damages for the death of his intestate,
Joseph G. Kelly, occasioned, as is alleged, by the negligence
of the appellant in failing to stop its train, upon which Kelly
passenger, at Braidwood station
was
sufficient length
alight
Kelly
to
therefrom with safety, by
of time to enable
means whereof said Kelly, while in the exercise of due care
a

/17

We ﬁnd no error in the record.
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for his own safety and while attempting to leave said train
at said station, was thrown beneath the 'wheels of said train
"
and run over and killed. * *
There was upon the question of the length of time the
train stopped at the Braidwood station,—which was a ma
terial question,—a sharp conﬂict in the evidence, and in that
state of the record it was important that the jury should
have been correctly instructed as to the law of the case,
especially as to the rule which should govern them in weigh
ing the evidence of the respective witnesses.
On behalf of
jury
following
gave
appellee
court
to
the
the
instruc
the
the
tion, the giving of which has been assigned as error:
“If the jury believe, from the evidence in this case, that
any witnesses who testiﬁed in the case has willfully sworn
falsely as to any matter or thing material to the issues in
this case, then the jury are at liberty to disregard the en
tire testimony of such witness, except in so far as it may have
been corroborated by other credible evidence which they do
believe, or by facts and circumstances proved on the trial.”
It has been repeatedly announced as the law of this State,
that the jury are at liberty to disregard the evidence of a
witness who upon the trial has willfully sworn falsely to
a material fact, except in so far as such witness has been
by other credible evidence or by facts and
corroborated
circumstances proven upon the trial.
(Crabtree v. Hagen
baugh, 25 Ill. 233; Swan v. People, 98 id. 610; Hoge v. Peo
ple, 117 id. 35; Bevelot v. Lestrade, 153 id. 625.)
The in
struction is much broader than the rule announced in the
foregoing cases, as it informed the jury they were at lib
erty to disregard the testimony of any witness who had
willfully sworn falsely to any matter or thing material to
the issues, except in so far as such witness had been cor
roborated by other credible evidence which they do believe,
the effect of which was to eliminate from the consideration
of the jury the evidence of any witness, if any such there
were, who had willfully sworn falsely upon a material mat
ter, even though he were corroborated by other credible
evidence, unless the jury believe such other credible evi
If the jury may disregard the testimony
dence to be true.
unless
he is corroborated by other credible
of such a witness
evidence which they believe, then the jury may disregard
the evidence of such a witness even though he be corrobo
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rated by other credible evidence, which would be in viola
tion of the rule established by this court. It is not the duty
of the jury to accept as true the testimony of a witness who
has testiﬁed willfully falsely as to a material fact simply
because he is corroborated by other credible evidence, but
when such witness has been corroborated by other credible
evidence it is the duty of the jury to consider his testimony
in connection with such corroborating evidence and the
other evidence in the case, and to give to it such weight
as they may be of opinion it is entitled to receive at their
The error in the instruction under consideration
hands.
is found in this: that it permits the jury to refuse to con
sider the testimony of a witness who has willfully sworn
falsely with reference to a material fact, although he is
corroborated by other credible evidence, unless the jury be
Credible evi
lieve the other credible evidence to be true.
dence is not evidence which is necessarily true, but is evi
dence worthy of belief,—that is, worthy to be considered
by the jury. If it were held the jury were not to consider
the evidence of a witness who had willfully sworn falsely
to a material fact unless he was corroborated by other cred
ible evidence, and then only when they believe such credible
evidence to be true, it would, in effect, be to hold that the
testimony of such a witness is only to be considered by the
jury after they have become satisﬁed of the truth of the
facts testiﬁed to by the corroborating witnesses.
If this
jury
rule,
the
would
have reached a conclusion as
were the
to the truth of the matter about which the witness testiﬁed
before they would be required to consider the evidence of
the witness, which would make the consideration of the tes
timony of such witness unnecessary, even though his testi
mony were corroborated by other credible evidence.
We are of the opinion the instruction is in conﬂict with
a long established rule of evidence in force in this State
and that the giving thereof constituted reversible error.
The judgment of the Appellate and circuit courts will be
reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court for a
new trial.
Reversed and remanded.“
94 It is error to instruct a jury that where it is probable that a
witness
has deliberately sworn falsely as to some material matter and is not
by other evidence, the jury is warranted in disregarding
corroborated
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his entire testimony, and changing
it.—Cameron v. Wentworth, (1899)

/é¢*

Mont.

to palpable

not

cure

How Arrived at.

HEFFRON

GALLUPE.

v.

Judicial Court of Maine.

Supreme

will

70.

Tnn VERDICT.

SECTION 8.

(a)

probable

23

521

55

1868.

Maine, 563.

KENT, J.—The motion for a new trial, now before us, is
based on the following facts, which are undisputed.
In the
evening after all the evidence, in the trial of the cause be
tween these parties, had been given, and before the argu
ments commenced, a juryman called at the defendant’s house
and asked him if he had one of the pamphlets containing
the evidence given at a former trial.
The defendant said
he had one, and gave it to the juryman. The defendant did
not at ﬁrst recognize the applicant as a juror in the case,
but did so before he gave him the pamphlet.
Defendant
hesitated, but the juror remarked that there was nothing
wrong, and thereupon the copy was delivered by defendant
to the juryman. This document had been used by the coun
sel, during the trial, for reference, and the testimony given
at the former trial by several witnesses was read by consent
therefrom, as testimony in the case on trial. The juryman
read and examined it in part, before the verdict was ren
dered, and formed the conclusion that the testimony of some
of the witnesses varied from that given at a former trial as
He named Dr. Brown and Dr. Coe as two
there recorded.
of such witnesses.
#

i

#

1

1

1

i i

F

O

The theory of our jury trials is, that all parties and wit
nesses are to be heard in open Court, in the presence and
under the direction of the presiding Judge. The law is ex
tremely tenacious of this cardinal doctrine, and looks with
distrust and aversion upon any departure in practice from
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its strictness.
The oath of the juror is to decide according
to the law and the evidence given to him—given to him ac
cording to the rules of evidence in open Court and with the
parties face to face. It surely cannot mean evidence given
to a juryman by a party outside of the court room, to be
read and pondered upon in secret, before joining his fellows
in deliberation on the verdict.
This pamphlet had been legitimately used on the trial.
The testimony of witnesses at former trial had been read
by consent, but not the testimony of either of the two sur
geons named by the juror.
His purpose in seeking the
possession of this printed document was to compare the testi
mony given at this trial with the testimony of the same wit
nesses contained in the volume given to him.
The legitimate way to show this is by the testimony of
a witness who heard him testify.
But it is often proved, by
consent, by reading the minutes of testimony taken at the
time by the Court or counsel.
It is a species of evidence which particularly requires ex
planation and elucidation by the Court,-—aided by the argu
ments of counsel.
It is not in itself evidence of the facts
testiﬁed to in a former trial, but simply evidence to be con
sidered only as it affects the credibility of the witness, in
his, then, present testimony.
But often facts are stated as
true in the former testimony, which are ignored or not re
membered in the subsequent examination.
But the jury, in
the second trial, cannot legitimately consider such facts as
It often requires great
established by the ﬁrst testimony.
care and effort on the part of the Judge to make the jury un
derstand this distinction.
It may be assumed that the report of evidence in the
pamphlet was substantially correct.
But the essential wrong
injury
is,
illegal
testimony,
that
calculated to affect the
or
juror’s mind, has been read and considered by him, as facts
They might be true and legitimate tes
proved in the case.
timony, if offered in the regular course.
But the juryman
right
them,
to know
when obtained or communicated
had no
in this manner.
The other party had a right to object to
The
the admission of the testimony, if regularly offered.
printed document in itself was not evidence. If admitted,
the counsel had a right to comment, and to show. if he could,
in his argument, that there was no material discrepancy
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between the evidence before given and that then given by
But here the juryman was left to form his
the witness.
conclusions from a source unknown to one party, and of
course without any explanation or argument from that side.
'
It was a violation of the juryman’s obligations to seek
for the document. It was as clearly an unjustiﬁable act for
the defendant to furnish it to him, knowing him to be a

juror.

l i i I

Q

Ii

t

ii

i

1

The evidence in this case does not disclose any seeking
The juror applied to
out of the jurors by the defendant.
gave
him,
request,
He,
his
him, and he
at
the pamphlet.
through his counsel, now admits that it was an improper
act, and one which, if he had taken a moment's time to re
ﬂect, he would not have then done.
But he did it, and he
must abide the consequences of his hasty act.
Motion sustained.—New trial granted.

/6é

DORR

v.

FENNO.

"110-ft‘
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
12

J.

*

*

‘

1882.

Pickering, 521.

The defendant also moves to set
aside the verdict on account of the misconduct of the jury.
The conduct complained of related to the assessment of dam
Immediately after the aﬁirmance of the verdict the
ages.
chief justice, who presided at the trial, “at the request of
the defendant and with the consent of the plaintiff,” made
inquiries as to the manner in which they had computed in
“The foreman, in the presence and hearing of the
terest.
jury, answered that upon the subject of damages there was
great diversity of opinion among the jury, that they acted
upon no uniform rule but each juror ﬁxed the sum he thought
right, and these were all added together and the aggregate
divided by twelve, and that the average thus ascertained
was the sum inserted in the verdict as damages.”
Two inquiries naturally suggest themselves in the con
Were the facts properly ascer
sideration of this motion.
MORTON,
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tained? And if so, do they amount to such misconduct
will vitiate the verdict?

i I

But even

if

O

U

U

U

C

U

3
as

I I

we receive and examine the statement of the
jury, we do not perceive in it evidence of misbehaviour.
Al
though the average of the individual opinions of all the
jurors was ﬁnally adopted, yet it does not appear that there
was any previous agreement to be bound by such results.
To suppose this would be to put upon the language used by
the foreman a construction most unfavorable to the jury,
whereas we ought to adopt the most favorable one,—-to im
pute misconduct, where we are bound to presume good con
duct. We think, therefore, that all that can fairly be under
stood from the statement of the foreman, was, that the jury
agreed that each should express his individual opinion,
that the average of the whole should be ascertained, which
should be a proposition for the consideration of the jury,
and which they might accept, modify, or reject, as they
The
should think best, upon discussion and deliberation.
ﬁnal adoption of the average does not imply impropriety of
conduct, as it must be presumed that ultimately each juror
freely assented to it. It this view of the answer of the
jury, even if it were regularly before us, we can see no cause
for setting aside the verdict.
No authority need be cited to show, that a verdict deter
mined in any form or degree by chance or lot, cannot be sus
In Warner v. Robinson, 1 Root, 194, and Harvey v.
tained.
Rickett, 15 John. R. 87, where the jurors agreed that they
should each mark on a paper the sum which he thought the
plaintiff ought to recover, then add the whole together and di
vide by the number of jurors, and that the quotient should,
without alteration, be the amount of the damages, the court
There can be no
could do no less than set aside the verdicts.
doubt that such a practice might lead to great injustice. For
it would enable any one juror, by marking a very large sum,
to produce an average which would be unreasonably high
and contrary to the opinion of the other eleven jurors.
The impropriety consists in the agreement to be bound
It may be assumed as a truth established by
by the result.
experience, that the judgments of twelve men never will
It can never be
exactly agree upon any doubtful subject.
expected that any set of jurors, in their ﬁrst opinion, ever
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will exactly agree as to the amount of damages, which any
plaintiff ought to recover.
They can only hope to bring
their judgments together by making known their respective
opinions and views, by comparing them together, and by dis
cussing the whole matter with feelings of conciliation and
of deference and respect for each others’ judgments.
And
perhaps a better mode of ascertaining the unbiassed opinion
of each individual juror cannot be found, than was resorted
to in this case.
No one was bound by the result.
And if
the average was ﬁnally adopted as the amount of the ver
dict, it was after a comparison of the different views of all,
after due deliberation and full discussion of the Whole sub
ject, and by means of reciprocal concessions among the dif
ferent jurors. It appears to have been freely assented to by
all.
And we can perceive no impropriety in the mode of
reaching the result or in the ﬁnal adoption of the amount as
the sum of the damages. Goodwin 12. Philips, Lofft, 71; Law
rence 12. Boswell, Sayer, 100; Dana '0. Tucker, 4 John. R. 487;
Grinnell '0. Phillips, 1 Mass. R. 541.
The motion for a new trial is overruled.

SHEA

v.

UNITED STATES.

United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

1919.

260 Federal Reporter, 807; 171 Circuit Court of Appeals, 588.

Before GILBERT, Ross and HUNT, Circuit Judges.
GILBERT, Circuit Judge. The plaintiff in error was charged
with the murder of Rance W. Book on November 14, 1917,
*
*
at Cordova, Alaska. “
Error is assigned to the following instructions given to
the jury after they had deliberated for a time upon their ver
dict and were brought into court upon the court’s order:
“You have now been out about 30 hours on this case, and
while I have no doubt that any differences between you are
honest and sincere, I want to call your attention to the fact that
in no case can absolute certainty be expected. * ' "' If a
large number or majority are of a certain opinion, the juror
dissenting should carefully consider whether his doubt or
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difference from such opinion is a reasonable one, which
makes no impression upon the minds of so many men equally
honest and equally intelligent as himself. Upon the question
of the expense in the trial of this case, I deem it proper to
call your attention to the fact that this case has involved a
very great expense upon the government.
A large number
of witnesses have been called from their homes and business
important to themselves already for a considerable time;
that they reside at Cordova, and a steamer is expected to
pass through Valdez en route to Cordova within the next
12 hours, and there will probably not be another steamer for
a week or more; also, in connection with the matter of ex
pense, I call your attention to the difficulty of getting quali
ﬁed jurors in a case of this kind, in so small a community,
after so many have been disqualiﬁed, having already been
called and excused on this case. We all desire to see justice
administered, honestly and fairly. At the same time, justice
to both the government and defendant requires that it be
not attended with too great outlay or expense. The defend
ant has already been in custody over six months, and is en
titled to have the case speedily determined. I call these facts
to your attention as matters for your careful and honest
consideration; but I wish to impress upon you that nothing
that I have said should be understood as seeking to-inﬂuence
the conscientious and honest opinion which you or any one
of you, as reasonable men, may entertain.
If you have a
reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt, as the same is
deﬁned to you in the instructions already given, you should
acquit the defendant; if you have not, you should convict him,
and the degree of the crime is a matter which should not
cause you to entirely disagree and fail to reach a proper ver

dict.”
We are not convinced that the court in so instructing the
jury committed reversible error. In 16 C. J. 1091, it is

said:
ll

It

is proper for the court, after the jury have deliberated
for some time, to recall them to ascertain why they cannot
agree, and to inquire as to whether there is any likelihood
Providing nothing is said to coerce an
of an agreement.
agreement, or to indicate what verdict should be rendered,
or that may be considered as an appeal to the jury to decide
the case in some way even at the expense of honest convic
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tions, the court may give the jury further instructions or
advice calculated to assist them in coming to an agreement,
may call their attention to the time taken in the trial and the
great expense incurred therein, or which would be incurred
by a retrial, may impress upon them the importance of the
case, and urge them strongly to come to some agreement.”
We do not think that the instruction here in question was
more coercive or more invasive of the province of the jury
than the instruction to the jury in United States 'v. Allis (C.
C.) 73 Fed. 182, which was approved in Allis 'v. United
States, 155 U. S. 117, 15 Sup. Ct. 36, 39 L. Ed. 91, where the

court said:

“It

is a familiar practice to recall a jury after they have
been in deliberation for any length of time for the purpose
of ascertaining what difficulties they have in the considera
tion of the case, and of making proper efforts to assist them
It would be startling to
in the solution of those difiiculties.
have such action held to be error, and error sufficient to re
verse a judgment.”
Again in Allen v. United States, 164 U. S. 492, 17 Sup. Ct.
154, 41 L. Ed. 528, the court approved an instruction of the
court in which the jury were told it was their duty to decide
the case if they could conscientiously do so, and. that they
should listen, with a disposition to be convinced, to each
other’s arguments; that in case the larger number were for
conviction, a dissenting juror should consider why, if his
doubt was a reasonable one, it made no impression upon the
minds of so many other men equally honest and equally in
telligent with himself. The court said:
“It certainly cannot be the law that each juror should not
listen with deference to the arguments, and with a distrust
of his own judgment, if he ﬁnds a large majority of the
jury taking a different view of the case from what he does
himself. It cannot be that each juror should go to the jury
room with a blind determination that the verdict shall repre
sent his opinion of the case at that moment, or that he should
close his ears to the arguments of men who are equally hon
est and intelligent as himself.”
In Suslak v. United States, 213 Fed. 913, 130 C. C. A. 391,
this court, reviewed and held proper instructions to the jury
not dissimilar from those which_ are here under review.
The plaintiff in error relies upon Peterson v. United States,
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Fed. 920, 130 C. C. A. 398, in which we held certain
instructions to the jury reversible error. In that case the
court had inquired of the jurors as to how they were divided,
and was informed that they stood ﬁve to seven; thereupon
the court said to the jury, among other things, “The gov
"
"
"
to a verdict without further
ernment has a right
expenditure of time and money," and in conclusion the court
expressed the belief that the jurors could honestly come to
We adverted to the fact that nowhere did
an agreement.
the court make it clear that, however desirable it might be
to avoid another trial and ﬁnally to terminate the prosecu
tion, an agreement should not be reached in violation of the
honest conviction of any one of the jurors.
213

l i i

We ﬁnd no error.
96 In People v.
the threat of the
term unless they
a new trial. See

I

1,

U

I

O

1

O

U

The judgment is aﬁlrrned."

211 Mich. 266, it was held that
to discharge the jury for the remainder of the
arrived at a verdict was such coercion as to call for
note on this case in 19 Mich. Law Rev. 228.

Strzempkowski, (1920)
court

9

MR

1

(b)

BISHOP

Supreme

Delivery.
v.

MUGLER.

Court of Kansas.
83

1885.

Kansas, 145.

JOHNSTON, J. The district court of Saline county, Kan
writ of mandamus against the
sas, granted a peremptory
plaintiff in error, who is a justice of the peace of Saline
county, Kansas, commanding him to receive and ﬁle a ver
dict alleged to have been agreed upon by a jury in a certain
cause tried before him as a justice of the peace, where the
defendant in error was plaintiff and one William Huebner
From the pleadings and the evidence in the
was defendant.
record, it fairly appears that the cause was submitted to the
jury late in the evening, and the justice of the peace, with
the consent of the counsel, instructed the jurors that, if they
agreed upon a verdict during the night, they might seal the
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same and separate, returning the verdict into court on the
next morning, at 9 o'clock, to which time the court adjourned.
The jury reached an agreement during the night, when the
verdict was signed and given to the bailiff, and the jurors
dispersed.
The bailiff carried the verdict in his pocket for a
short time, and then returned and deposited it upon a desk
in the oﬁice of the justice of the peace. The attention of the
justice of the peace was called,to it in the morning, and he
was informed that it was the verdict agreed upon the pre
vious night. Upon the convening of the court on the next
morning, the jury failed to appear, and the justice directed
the bailiff to bring the jury into court. After some effort to
ﬁnd the jurors, the bailiff returned, and reported that only
four of the jurors could be found. It was then suggested
that the verdict which had been returned by the bailiff to
the justice be received and ﬁled, but the counsel for defend
ant objected to its reception because it had been out of the
hands of the jury, and insisted that it could not be received
unless presented by the jury, with all of the jurors present.
The court was then adjourned until 3 o'clock of the after
noon of the same day, and the bailiff was instructed in the
meantime to make search for the absent jurors, and bring
The court reconvened at 3
them into court at that time.
p. m., when ﬁve of the jurors appeared, the bailiff reporting
that he was unable to ﬁnd one of the jurors, or learn any
The justice then refused to re
thing of his whereabouts.
ceive the verdict, declared a mistrial, discharged the jury,
Whereupon,
and continued the case for future disposition.
the defendant in error instituted this proceeding in manda
mus, and obtained a peremptory writ, as above stated. The
plaintiff alleges error.
The question presented for our determination is, was it
the duty of the justice of the peace to receive and ﬁle the
verdict brought into court in the manner hereinbefore stated;
and can its reception and ﬁling be compelled by mandamus?
It will be observed that the agreement of counsel and the
direction of the court did not go further than to permit the
jury, when they had agreed upon a verdict, to seal it and
separate for the night. This did not operate as a discharge
of the jury, but it remained in existence as an organized
body, and it was the duty of the jurors to have appeared at
the convening of the court the following morning, and there,
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through their foreman, to present and publicly announce the
verdict previously agreed upon. The permission to seal the
verdict and separate for the night, did not dispense with
the necessity of their attendance upon the court at the time
to which it had adjourned. The determination
of a jury,
formally
although
stated in a verdict, and signed and sealed,
is not ﬁnal with them, but it remains within their control,
and subject to any alteration or amendment they desire to
make, until it is actually rendered in court and recorded.
It
is well settled that any member of the jury is at liberty to
withdraw his consent from a verdict already agreed upon,
at any time before it is received and recorded, (Root v. Sher
wood, 6 Johns. 68; Proff. Jury, § 449;) and until a sealed
verdict is properly received and recorded in court, it is with
out force or validity. Id. § 460. Except by consent the ver
dict can only be rendered by a full jury. Every member
should be present when it is received, so that the parties may
avail themselves of the right to examine each juror, and learn
if he concurs in the verdict announced.
The main purpose in requiring the jury to bring in their
verdict and personally present it in open court is that the
parties may have an opportunity to poll them, or to correct
any informality found in the verdict presented.
The polling
jury
is
a
mere
of
discretion
not
matter
with the court,
of the
As was
but is an absolute right of the parties to the suit.
Thomas,
6
party
Kan. 159: “A
said in Ma.du.ska v.
has in
all cases a right to know whether a supposed verdict is the
verdict of each juror, or of only one or more of the jury;
and if sections 283 and 284 of the Civil Code do not apply
where the jury decide without retiring from the jury-box,
still the common law would give each party the right to
know the verdict of each juror.” Thornburgh v. Cole, 27
Kan. 499. Of course, some of these requirements and rights
might have been waived and dispensed with by the agree
Here there was no such
ment or conduct of the parties.
agreement or waiver; the defendant in the action stood upon
his rights, and strenuously objected to the reception of a
verdict unless it was regularly presented by the jury, as an
organized body, with every member present.
With the aid
of the bailiff, ﬁve of the jurors were found and brought into
court, but the sixth could not be found.
The determinations
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of the ﬁve jurors was not a valid verdict, and the court could
not receive it as such. Maduska '0. Thomas, supra.
*
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The judgment of the district court will be reversed."

“As
see

to how tar these rules may be waived or changed by stipulation,
Dubuc v. Lazell, Dalley & Co., (1906) 182 N. Y. 482.
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is next urged as a ground for reversal that the
circuit court erred in refusing to accept the verdict of the
jury, which was ﬁrst returned into court ﬁnding the defend
ant guilty of manslaughter in the second degree and assess
ing his punishment at a term of 30 years, and directing the
jury to retire for further consideration, after which they
returned a verdict of murder in the second degree assessing
the punishment of the defendant at 30 years in the peni
tentiary. From the testimony taken on the motion for new
trial, it appeared that when the jury returned into court,
they handed their verdict to the clerk, and it was in this form:
“We the jury ﬁnd the defendant guilty of manslaughter in the
second degree, and do assess his punishment by imprisonment
in the penitentiary for a term of 30 years.” At this point
the judge said to the clerk:
“Hand me those instructions."
Thereupon the judge informed the jury that their verdict
did not conform to the instructions of the court; that, under
the law given them by the court, they could not assess the
punishment for manslaughter for 30 years. The foreman of
the jury testiﬁed that at the close of the argument by coun
sel, the court handed the jury blank forms for their verdict
with the instructions in the case. He states that when the
verdict for manslaughter was read over by the clerk, by
the direction of the judge, several of the jury at least told
8.

\
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the court that that was not their verdict; that there was a
mistake. The court thereupon stated to the jury that it could
not receive the verdict, and directed them to retire and con
Afterwards, on the same day, the
sider of their verdict.
jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the second de
gree, and assessed the defendant’s punishment at 30 years
in the penitentiary. It is clear from all the testimony on
the motion, as well as from the statement of the judge in
the bill of exceptions, that the court did not receive the ver
It seems perfectly plain that the verdict of man
dict.
slaughter was not intended by the jury, but was the result
of having a form of a verdict of manslaughter, as well as
one for murder in the second degree furnished them by the
court when they retired, and that they had ﬁlled out the
blanks in the manslaughter verdict instead of the one for
murder in the second degree by oversight of the foreman,
and that when their attention was called to it by the read
ing of the verdict by the clerk, the jury never declared it
was their verdict in court. And the court advised them that
they could not affix a punishment of 30 years for man
slaughter, and directed the sheriff to return the jury to
And after
their room, to consider further of their verdict.
wards they returned into court the verdict of murder in the
second degree, which was read over to them and they all de
clared in the presence of the court, that this was their ver
dict, and they were then discharged.

Mr. Bishop, in his New Criminal Procedure (volume 1,
“Until the announcement that the verdict
§ 1003), says:

" or some such period, as to which the
*
"‘
is recorded,
cases are not distinct or uniform, the jury may change it at
their pleasure, or one may defeat it by dissent; but after
they have dispersed, they cannot be recalled to alter or
amend it, nor can the juror object that he did not consent
thereto." And, in section 1004, he says: “A verdict inade
quate in form or substance should not be received, but the
jury should be required to perfect it, either in the presence
of the court, or by returning for the purpose to their room,
due consultation having been had with the judge, and if
The authorities fully
necessary further evidence delivered.”
learned
author.
the
of
sustain the text
In State ex rel. ’l/‘. Clementson, 69 Wis. 635, 35 N. W. 59,
the court says: “All the authorities hold that a jury may,
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they see ﬁt, before they are
discharged, change the same, and render a different ver
And in many cases where the jury have manifestly
dict.
made an omission or mistake in their verdict it is the duty
of the presiding judge to call their attention to that fact,
and return it to the jury for correction.” Many cases are
cited by the court in support of this statement and the court
concludes:
“These cases show the power of the court as well
as the jury over their verdict, and that the verdict which
binds all parties, is that at which the jury ﬁnally arrive
and deliver to the court.”

a

is

if

is

it

it

it

The following from Bishop's Criminal Procedure directly
applies: “When the jury comes in with a verdict,
not
as of course to be immediately received in the form in
probably the correct doctrine
is rendered. And
which
that the judge may require the jury to pass on the verdict
upon the whole indictment in such form or words as shall
they
sufficient ﬁnding in point of law; or,
constitute

is

I

I

Q

Q

¥

#

ii

ll

#

$

it
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§

1,

a

refuse, decline altogether to accept the verdict.
It seems
rendered,
plain
quite
that in every case of
verdict
the
judge or prosecuting officer, or both, should look after its
form and its substance, so as to prevent a doubtful or insuf
ﬁcient ﬁnding from passing into the record of the court."
Volume
1004.
“It settled by repeated decisions where
the jury returns an incomplete verdict, or one not responsive
to any charge in the indictment, the court may direct them
proper verdict.
It follows that the
to retire and bring in
court may inform the jury without necessarily suggesting
that the verdict is in
what shall be the verdict, why
complete or not responsive to the charge.”

it

is

it

it

it

“

'
'

That the ﬁnding of the jury in the ﬁrst verdict,
that the defendant should be imprisoned in the penitentiary
for 30 years for manslaughter, was contrary to the law, and
the instructions of the court, there can be no doubt, and
was his duty to
was clearly in the power of the “court, and
decline to receive the verdict in that form, independent of
the fact that the jury had made a mistake in ﬁlling out the
blank verdict for manslaughter instead of the one for mur
der in the second degree, and when the jury discovered their
was in the power of the
mistake,
also obvious that
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jury

it when they retired to further consider their

to correct
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rule is the same in civil cases.—Hatch

N. Y. 383.
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(c)

.

GD’!

v.

Attrili,

(1890)

118

General Verdict.

COMMONWEALTH

v.

CAREY.

Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
103 Massachusetts,

1869.

214.

a

a

if

a

a

is

a

c.'

141, with three counts,
Indictment on the St. of 1868,
the ﬁrst charging the defendant with unlawfully exposing
intoxicating liquors for sale, and the second and third re
spectively with making different unlawful sales of intoxicat
ing liquors. Trial in the superior court, before Brigham,
bill of exceptions of which the follow
C. J., who allowed
ing
the material part:
general verdict of guilty.
“The jury returned
Before
the verdict was affirmed, the defendant’s counsel suggested
doubt whether the jury intended to convict on all the
counts.
The judge then said to the jury, ‘You mean guilty
The foreman said that the jury did not
on each count?’
pass upon them separately.
The defendant’s counsel then
requested the judge to ask the jury to consider the several
counts,
they had not already done so; or to inquire of
them what they really intended by their verdict. The judge
replied that the jury had already been sufficiently instructed
as to their duties in relation to the several counts, and had
general verdict; and that he should say no more,
rendered
and ask no more questions, unless the jury had some sugges
No member of the jury said anything further; and
tions.
judge
ordered the verdict to be affirmed and recorded,
the
to which the defendant excepted.
The judge gave instruc
jury
upon
counts, which were not
to
the
several
tions
the
excepted to.
The defendant ﬁled
motion to set aside the
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verdict upon the above grounds which motion was overruled.
To all these rulings and refusals the defendant excepts.”
MORTON, J.
It is well settled that several offenses may
if
be charged in separate counts of the same indictment,
they are of the same general character and subject to the
same kind of punishment; and whether they shall be tried
separately or together is a matter within the discretion of
But if they are tried together, the
the presiding judge.
cardinal principles of the criminalilaw apply in the same
manner as if each offense was charged in a separate indict
Each offense charged must be
ment and tried separately.
proved beyond reasonable doubt, by evidence legally appli
It necessarily follows that the jury must
cable thereto.
pass upon each count separately, and apply to it the evi
dence bearing upon the defendant’s guilt of the offense
therein charged.
And if they fail to do so, their verdict
cannot be sustained.
In the case at bar, the jury returned a general verdict of
guilty, but, before it was aﬂirmed and recorded, their fore
man stated, in answer to a question by the court, that they
It was thus made
did not pass upon the counts separately.
manner,
proper
jury, probably
appear
in
a
that
the
to
through misapprehension
of the instructions given, had
duty
required of them, and that their
perform
the
failed to
It was undoubtedly a
verdict was unauthorized by law.
matter within the discretion of the presiding judge whether
inquiry should be made of the jury as to the grounds or counts
upon which they found their verdict; and if no inquiry had
been made, the general verdict of guilty would apply to each
count, upon the presumption that the jury had correctly un
derstood and applied the instructions given them. But, the
inquiry having been made, and having elicited the fact that
the verdict had not been found in a manner authorized by
law, it was erroneous in the court to order the verdict thus
found to be afiirmed and recorded.

Exceptions sustained.
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GLINES

174/
Supreme

v.

3

SMITH.

Judicial Court of New Hampshire.
48

[Chap.

1869.

New Hampshire, 259.

The writ was dated Sept. 8th, 1866.
Case for slander.
The declaration, excepting the fourth and seventh counts,
which were stricken out by amendment, is made a part of
the case.
The defendant pleaded the general issue, with a
justiﬁcation alleging the truth of the words. The jury ren
dered a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant now moves
in arrest of judgment on the ground that the declaration
does not contain any allegation or allegations, showing that
the defendant charged the plaintiff with a crime, nor any
showing special damages.
SARGENT, J. "‘ "‘ *
Where there are several distinct counts, as in this case,
each one stating a distinct and separate cause of action, and
there be a general issue pleaded to all, and a general ver
dict upon all the counts, and an assessment of damages gen
erally, and one of the counts be bad, judgment will be ar
rested, unless the judge who tried the cause, can and does
certify, that all the evidence introduced applied to the good
counts only, in which case the verdict may be amended so
as to apply to the good counts only. Atkinson v. Scammon,
22 N. H. 40, where it is said by Perley, J., that “by a well
settled and familiar rule of pleading, the verdict for the
plaintiﬂ’ being general, and one count bad, the judgment
must be arrested." Peabody 'v. Kingsley, 40 N. H. 416, and
'
numerous authorities cited by counsel and court.
So Richardson v. Mellish, 3 Bing. 334, (11 E. C. L. 167)
is a leading case on that subject, where it is held that, in
order so to amend a general verdict as to have it apply to a
good count only, when there are both good and bad counts in
the declaration, it must appear that the good count was fully
sustained in all its material allegations by the evidence at the
trial, and also that all the evidence given at the trial was
admissible under that count. Sullivan 12. Holker, 15 Mass.
374; Pattee v. Guernsey, 17 Mass. 182. In this case no such
certiﬁcate of the presiding judge is given, and we infer that
none could properly be given, because so far as the evidence
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in the case is reported, it seems to bear more directly upon
the bad counts, or one of them (the 5th), than any other.
In the absence of such certiﬁcate by the judge who tried the
cause, judgment must be arrested.
Small '0, Rogers, 46 N.
H. 176.
I am aware that in some jurisdictions they have relaxed
In New ‘York, Sayre '0. Jewett, 12
this rule somewhat.
Wend. 135, it is held that where the certiﬁcate of the judge
who tried the cause is, that all the evidence on the trial
would properly apply to the good count as well as to the bad
one, there the verdict may be amended so as to apply to the
good count only, upon payment of the costs of the motion
in arrest.
And in Vermont, in McDuﬂ’ie v. Magoon, 26 Vt. 523, after
deciding that in that case no presumption could be allowed
that the verdict was taken upon the bad counts, inasmuch
-as from the whole case it appeared that the evidence was
entirely and solely applicable to the good one, which is all,
perhaps, that would be required here, Judge Redﬁeld adds
“In cases where noth‘ing appears to
the following dictum:
show on which count a verdict is taken, and some of the
counts are good and some bad, we now allow the same pre
sumption in favor of the proceedings, which we do in favor
of all other proceedings of this character, and which was
always allowed in criminal proceedings, that it is more likely
that the verdict was taken on the good counts than upon the
That doctrine has never been adopted in this
bad ones.”
State.

Here we have followed the rule as stated by Chitty in
his work on Pleading, vol. 1, page 411, (9th Am. Ed.). The
reasons assigned for this practice, where there is a general
verdict upon several counts, some of which are good and
others bad, is that the court do not and cannot know upon
which count the damages were assessed; the court cannot

tell but all the damages were assessed by the jury upon evi
dence introduced solely to establish the charge made in the
But when the court can be made
counts which are bad.
reasonably certain as to that fact, as by the jury’s ﬁnding
for one party on one count, and for the other party upon
the other, or by assessing damages on the sufficient counts,
saying nothing of the others, or by the certiﬁcate of the
judge who tried the case, that the evidence on trial was all
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applicable to the good counts, then the verdict may be
amended when necessary; but the judgment will not be ar
rested. Blanchard v. Fisk, 2 N. H. 398.
The reason for the distinction in this respect between
declarations with several counts, some good and some bad,
with a general verdict, and indictments, where it is held
that if there be one good count and others bad and a gen
eral verdict of guilty, judgment will not be arrested, as
stated by Chitty in his Crim. Law, vol. 1, p. 249, is that in
the civil case the jury ﬁnd entire damages and the court
cannot apportion them, whereas, in the criminal case, the
court themselves regulate the severity of the sentence, and
can do so according to their discretion upon these points of
the indictment which are supported; and he refers to 1 Salk.
384, Regina v. Ingram, which was a case of assault and bat
tery, where it was said: “In a civil action where one part
of the declaration is ill, and the jury ﬁnd entire damages,
the judgment must be arrested, because the court cannot
apportion them; but in indictments the court assess the ﬁne,
and they will set it only according to those facts which are
well laid. If an offense sufﬁcient to maintain the indictment
be well laid ’tis enough.”
In People v. Curling, 1 Johns 322, the court of New York
held that the reason for this rule in criminal cases was that
the prisoner has been convicted of the whole matter included
in the good as well as the bad counts, and that if judgment
were only entered on the good counts, no injustice could be
In this view, perhaps, some reason may appear for
done.
the different rule applied in the two cases.
As we understand the rule, it does not appear particularly
In an indictment, only one offense is charged.
objectionable.
The different counts are only different forms of describing
or setting forth the same charge. If one of these counts is
good, and the others bad, and the evidence sustains the good
But if there is a general ver
one, that would be enough.
dict, ﬁnding the respondent guilty of all the charges, that
But he is only
covers the good count and all the bad ones.
charged with one offense, and in one count that offense is
properly described and set forth, and he is only to be sen
tenced for one offense, no matter in how many different
forms it is charged.
The established rule is clearly right so far that in indict
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ments, containing several counts, with a general verdict of
guilty, the verdict will stand if there is one good count in
the indictment.
But take a civil cause like the present, where there are
several counts, and each count charges, as seems to be the
in which
case here, a separate and distinct conversation
slandering
plaintiff,
charged
with
the
and upon
is
defendant
any one of which alone an action might be maintained,
and upon each and all of which separate and distinct dam
ages were claimed, there a general verdict on all the counts
would be a ﬁnding that the jury found all the charges proved
and had assessed damages upon all, and that the sum of all
these damages added together, was the amount of their gen
eral verdict.
In such case, unlike the indictment, plaintiff may join
these several distinct causes of action in one suit, and may
properly recover all his damages in a single verdict. But if
there are several counts, upon each and all of which dam
ages are assessed in a general verdict, and some of these
counts prove to be bad, then the amount of damages assessed
on that count should be deducted; but as that cannot be
done, the court having no knowledge of the different amounts
found by the jury on the several counts, and no means of
properly apportioning the damages, the whole verdict must
We can certainly see no ground to complain
be set aside.
of the rule in such a case. So in a civil suit for damages for
several assaults and batteries, where each of several counts
set forth a separate and distinct battery, for which separate
damages were claimed, the rule would hold good.
But in case there are several counts in slander or tres
pass, and all the counts set forth the same charge, only in
different form, and that fact is understood, then there being
but one cause of action, there could be an assessment of
damages only for one cause, on all the counts, and if either
one of the counts were good, then, as in the case of the in
dictment, the verdict ought to stand. In such case, it would
be in fact immaterial whether all the counts were good or
only one of them, the same damages would be assessed in

either case.
But in such a case, the court would give the jury such
instructions as would make the case and the verdict intel
ligible, ordinarily; or if not, and the jury found a general
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verdict on all the counts, and it afterwards proved that some
of the counts were bad, and there was no other way in
which the court, at the law term, could tell from the case
whether damages were claimed on all the counts, or only on
one, then a certiﬁcate of the judge who tried the case would
generally set the matter right, so that the verdict might be
amended so as apply to the good counts only.
#
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98 In many
states statutes declare that a general verdict is good if
there is one good count in the declaration.—Ray v. Ches. & Ohio Ry. Co.,
Bridge Co. v. Williams, (1840) 9
(1905) 57 W. Va. 333; Frankfort
Dana (Ky.) 403; Varn v. Pelot, (1908) 55 Fla. 357; Hayes v. Solomon,
(1889) 90 Ala. 520.
Some courts hold such a general verdict good even in the absence of a
statute.—i-loag
v. Hatch, (1855) 23 Conn. 585; Bradshaw v. Hubbard,
(1844) 6 Ill. 390; Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Fox, (1884) 101 Ind.

416.

I
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Chancellor Kent severely criticized the common law rule in Bayard
v. Malcolm, (1807) 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 559.
Referring to the rule that a general verdict upon several counts, one
of which is bad, will be held good in criminal cases but bad in civil
cases, the Supreme Court of Vermont said. in Camp v. Barker, (1849)
fact in English jurisprudence, and in
21 Vt. 469:—“It is a remarkable
that of a majority of the American states, that while in an indictment
for crime, affecting a man's liberty, and even life, if it contains one
defective count, among others which are sufficient, upon a general verdict
the court consider it rendered upon the good counts, upon the very
natural inference, that a general verdict ﬁnds all the facts alleged in the
declaration. yet in an action upon contract judgment is arrested for one
defective count, upon the ground that the verdict may have passed upon
It is the pertinacious adoption and perpetuation of such
that count.
gross absurdities and inconsistencies,
which tend so obviously to bring
all special pleading into disrepute."
If any count is bad, judgment may be arrested on that count.—State
C0ntra,—Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co.
v. Tibbetts, (1893) 86 Me. 189.
v. Fox, (1884) 101 Ind. 416, on the ground that a motion in arrest
addresses itself only to the entire complaint.
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in this case no question affecting the
There
nolle prosequi; such
power of the district attorney to enter
LORD,
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an entry affects only the proceedings subsequent to it, but
the record of what is antecedent to it remains.
By that record it appears that there had been the larceny
of a cow, and but one larceny of that cow. The defendants
were charged in one count of the indictment with such lar
ceny, and in the second count with having received her
knowing her to have been thus stolen. It is certain that the
defendants could not be guilty upon both counts, because in
law the guilty receiver of stolen goods cannot himself be the
thief; nor can the thief be guilty of a crime of receiving
stolen goods which he himself had stolen.
The presiding judge, as the record shows, instructed the
jury that there was no evidence upon which they could con
vict upon the second count. Still, however, without direct
ing a verdict of acquittal upon the second count, he sub
mitted to the determination of.the jury the question of the
The fact that the ver
defendants’ guilt upon that count.
dict which they rendered was inconsistent with the views
of the presiding judge does not invalidate it as a verdict
after it had been recorded and affirmed. The record, there
fore notwithstanding the entry of the nolle prosequi shows
that the defendants had been convicted by the jury upon
both counts; and although, as a legal effect of a conviction
upon each count it cannot be said strictly that it is an ac
quittal upon the other, yet the finding of guilty upon both
is inconsistent in law, and is conclusive of a mistrial.
It
would have been quite proper, before the record and affirma
tion of the verdict, for the presiding judge to have called
the attention of the jury to their misunderstanding of his
previous instructions, and to have explained to them the
mode by which it became their duty, if they convicted upon
either of the counts, to acquit upon the other, and to have
required of them to retire for further deliberation; if, after
such instructions, the jury persisted in returning a general
verdict of guilty upon both counts, it would have been proper
in the presiding judge, if not his duty, to set aside the ver
dict as the only means of securing to the defendants their
rights. After the afiirmation of the verdict, when there was
no means of knowing of record upon which count the jury
intended to convict, as there was no right in them to convict
upon both, to assume that the error is corrected by a nolle
prosequi of either count by the district attorney, is to permit
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the district attorney to determine, instead of the jury, upon
which count the defendants were guilty. But the nolle prose
qui corrects no error, and has no effect upon the record as
it stood prior to its entry. The record showed a verdict so
inconsistent with itself, and so uncertain in law, that no
judgment could be entered upon it. The nolle prosequi does
not change that record, nor make the verdict which the jury
rendered any less inconsistent with itself, nor any more cer
tain in law than it was before such entry.
1
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WASHINGTON, J.—This was an action of debt, instituted
in the district court of Maryland, by the United States,
against Robert Patterson, the plaintiff in error, upon a bond,
dated the 2d of August, 1809, in the penalty of $35,000,
with condition that certain merchandise, which had been
imported into the United States, and which the said Patter
son had then reshipped, in order to export the same to Ton
nington, should not be relanded in any port or place within
the United States, and that the certiﬁcate and other proofs
required by law of the delivery of the same, at some place
without the limits of the United States, should be produced
at the collector’s oﬂice of the port of Baltimore, within one
year from the date of the bond.

is

is

was afterwards impanelled to try the issue, who
following verdict, viz: “that the within-mentioned
the
found
writing obligatory
the deed of the within-named Robert
Patterson, &c., and they ﬁnd there
really and justly due
upon the said writing obligatory the sum of $23,989.58.”
Upon this verdict, the court gave judgment in favor of-the
United States, for $35,000, to be released on the payment of
the above sum assessed by the jury, from which judgment,
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writ of error was obtained to remove the cause to this

court.

The court considers it to be unnecessary to decide the
questions which were argued at the bar, as the verdict is so
defective that no judgment can be rendered upon it. The
issue, which the jury were sworn to try, was, whether the
certiﬁcate, and other proofs required by law, of the deliv
ery of the cargo, at some place without the limits of the
United States, were produced at the collector's office at Bal
timore, Within one year from the date of the bond.
The
verdict does not ﬁnd the matter in issue, one way or the
other, but ﬁnds that the bond in the declaration mentioned
is the deed of the defendant, and that there is justly due
to the United States upon the said bond, a certain sum of
money. But whether the bond was the deed of the defend
ant, or not, was not a matter in issue between the parties,
and consequently, it was a false conclusion to say, that, be
cause it was his deed, therefore, he was indebted to the
United States.
The rule of law is precise upon this point. A verdict is
bad, if it varies from the issue in a substantial matter, or
if it ﬁnd only a part of that which is in issue. The reason
of the rule is obvious; it results from the nature and the
Whether the jury ﬁnd a general or a
end of the pleading.
special verdict, it is their duty to decide the very point in
issue; and although the court in which the cause is tried may
give form to a general ﬁnding, so as to make it harmonize
with the issue, yet, if it appears to that court, or to the
appellate court, that the ﬁnding is different from the issue,
or is conﬁned to a part only of the matter in issue, no judg
It is true, that if
ment can be rendered upon the verdict.
issue,
something
and
more, the latter part
the jury ﬁnd the
of the ﬁnding will be rejected as surplusage; but this rule
does not apply to a case where the facts found in the ver
dict are substantially variant from those which are in issue.
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MACK.

Court of Ohio.

1877.

38 Ohio State, 52.
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to consider whether the court erred in
entering judgment upon the verdict of the jury.
It is claimed by counsel for plaintiff in error, that the
verdict does not respond to the issue made by the pleadings.
The main, if not the sole, issue joined between th_e parties,
was upon the plaintiff’s ownership of the judgment upon
The language of the verdict is
which suit was brought.
“we the jury do ﬁnd for the plaintiff”—-and then it proceeds
We
to state the amount to which they ﬁnd him entitled.
think this must be understood as a ﬁnding for the plaintiff
upon the issues joined between the parties.
Even if there
had been several distinct issues made by the pleadings, such
a verdict would be regarded as a substantial ﬁnding upon all
the issues. Calvin et al. v. The State, 12 Ohio St. 60.
But it is further objected to the verdict that it is too in
deﬁnite and uncertain to justify the rendition of the judg
And this objection we
ment which was entered upon it.
ﬁnd it difﬁcult to answer to our own satisfaction.
If the meaning of the jury in their verdict is certain
from its terms, or becomes so when read in the light af
forded by the pleadings, of which it is the duty of the court
to take judicial notice, and if the judgment is in conformity
with their ﬁnding, it ought not to be set aside. The Su
preme Court of Kentucky has laid down the rule that:
“In
considering the verdict itself, with a view to its sufficiency,
the ﬁrst object is to ascertain’ what the jury intended to
ﬁnd, and this is to be done by construing the verdict liber
ally, with the sole view of ascertaining the meaning of the
jury, and not under the technical rules of construction which
Miller 'U. Shackleford, 4 Dana.
are applicable to pleadings.”
271. And it has been said that every reasonable construction
There can also be
is to be adopted in support of a verdict.
“Id certum est, quod certum
no doubt that the maxim:
to
applicable
a verdict.
is
For example, in
reddi ~potest,”
a suit upon a promissory note, a verdict in favor of the
2d.

remains
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plaintiff for the amount of the note in suit, with interest
from its maturity, would be certain, because it could be
Bur
made certain in amount, by any competent accountant.
ton v. Anderson, 1 Texas, 98; Stevens v. Campbell, 6 Iowa,
538.

There is no uncertainty in the verdict of the jury in this
case, except in the assessment of the amount to be recov
ered. The code requires that, “when, by the verdict, either
party is entitled to recover money of the adverse party, the
jury in their verdict must assess the amount of the recov
ery.”
The question, then, is: Do the terms
(Sec. 278.)
in
of the verdict
this case render the amount assessed by the
jury ascertainable with certainty? The verdict is quite cer
tain and deﬁnite as to the principal sum found due to the
plaintiff. That is $7,000, on which the verdict gives interest
up to March 2, 1874. The only uncertainty is as to the date
or dates at which the computation of interest is to commence.
The verdict awards “interest from the date of the maturity
of the seven notes of $1,000 each, given February 2, 1860.”
Seven promissory notes are here referred to and described
by a statement of their respective amounts and date. The
jury ﬁnd, substantially, that there is due to the plaintiff
$7,000, the aggregate principal of these notes, and interest
on them from the time when they respectively mature.
But the action was not brought upon promissory notes,
nor were any such notes referred to in the pleadings, and
the verdict neither gives copies of them nor states the times
at which they are respectively payable.
Was it then within
the province of the court to identify the notes referred to

by the jury, and ascertain the times when they severally
matured, by reference to the evidence offered on the trial?
We are constrained to answer this question in the nega
The facts found by the court formed no part of the
tive.
record, and were found only from the memory or minutes
of the judge who tried the case. Without a knowledge of
these facts, no one could tell from the verdict, considered
per se, or in connection with the record, from what time
the jury intended the computation of interest to be made.
The court found, from facts outside of the record, that
the jury intended by their verdict to refer to certain notes,
which had been offered in evidence upon the trial. Perhaps
they did so intend, though the verdict does not say so. The
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facts found in regard to it are, neither expressed nor neces
sarily implied in its language. But, even if it had been ex
pressly stated in the verdict that the notes therein referred
to were the same which had been offered in evidence, would
it have been competent for the court to look to the evidence,
or to any matter dehors the record, for the purpose of ﬁxing
that which it was the sole province of the jury to deter
mine?
We think not.
The judgment should follow as a logical sequence, from
the issues of fact disclosed by the pleadings and the ﬁnd
ings of the jury thereon.
If the judgment is warranted by
the pleadings and verdict, it should be sustained; but if it
In several cases
has no such basis it can not be supported.
cited by counsel for plaintiff in error, the very question now
under consideration has been determined, in accordance with
this principle.
In Smith v. Tucker, 25 Texas, 594, a part of the syllabus
is as follows: “Where, in an action of trespass to try title,
the verdict of the jury found for the plaintiff, ‘the land de
scribed in the petition, less seven hundred and sixty-seven
and a half acres,Aas described in the deed read in evidence
from B. F. Hooper to C. M. Adams,’ and the pleadings con
tained no description of the land conveyed by that deed; Held,
that the court could render no judgment upon such ﬁnding
of the jury, because it could only do so by looking out of
#

trial.”
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In Fromme v. Jones, 13 Iowa, 474,
was held that, “A
verdict, defective in form, may be reformed by the court
when the intention of the jury can be ascertained from data
given in the verdict, or referred to in the pleadings; but the
court cannot supply an omission to name the amount of the
ﬁnding by reference to the evidence outside the record.”
See, also, McArthur '0. Porter’s Lessee,
Peters, 626, and
Porter,
Heirs,
Lee v. Campbell’s
198.
These authorities, and the principle on which they rest,
constrain us to say, that the verdict of the jury was too un
certain, as to the amount assessed in favor of the plaintiff
below, to form
legitimate basis for the judgment entered
upon it. And that
was not within the province of
court
certain by reference to the evidence offered in
to make
the case.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.
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WEISSMAN.

Court of California.
77

J
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1888.

California, 423.

THORNTON, . This action was brought to recover $948.60
for work and labor and materials furnished to defendant in
the construction of the foundation of the Garﬁeld monu
ment in Golden Gate park.
The ﬁrst point regards the
verdict of the jury herein, which is in these words: “We,
the jury in the above-entitled action, ﬁnd for the plaintiff.”
It is urged that the amount of the recovery of plaintiff is
not found by the verdict; that issue was joined on the
amount due; and in failing to ﬁnd it the verdict does not
respond to all the issues in the case, is therefore insufficient,
and judgment should not be‘ entered on it.
On examining the complaint and answer, we are not pre
pared to say in view of the decisions of this court in Wells
'v. McPike, 21 Cal. 219, and Lightner v. Menzel, 35 Cal. 460,
that the position above stated in regard to the pleadings is
correct.
But be that as it may, it appears that at the commence
ment of the trial a discussion took place between the coun
sel of the respective parties as to the issues to be tried in
the cause, and that they concurred in the opinion that the
only issue to be tried was whether plaintiff contracted with
defendant or some one else. No reference was made in this
discussion to any "issue as to the amount claimed or due.
_'1‘he only issue spoken of as awaiting trial, referred to in the
discussion, was the one above stated. To this issue the tes
timony was directed, and, when the court came to instruct
the jury, its directions were in accordance with this view
of the issue they were to pass on. We quote here that por
tion of the charge of the court which relates to this sub
“The only question for you to pass
ject. It is as follows:
plaintiff
and the defendant in this
Did the
upon is this:
case make an agreement for the building of the second foun
dation? That is the question for you to pass upon,—whether
the plaintiff and the defendant madethat agreement, as
testiﬁed to by the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff entered
upon this contract under the agreement between the plain
Theonly question of fact for you to
tiff and defendant.
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pass upon is, did the plaintiff and defendant enter into a
certain contract for the completion of the second founda
If you ﬁnd from the evidence that the defendant
tion?
agreed with the plaintiff, for the plaintiff to build the second
foundation, and that the plaintiff did build the same, then
your verdict must be for the Plaintiff for the amount claimed
in the complaint; for the defendant does not deny that the
work done was of the value claimed. If, on the other hand,
you believe the evidence of the defendant, that he did not
make any contract with the plaintiff, then your verdict must
Now, gentlemen, you cannot con
be for the defendant.
sider the difference between the price of the ﬁrst foundation
and the second; you must not consider that at all.
If the
plaintiff is entitled to anything, he is entitled to the whole
amount claimed.
There is no _question about the value of
the work at all."
There was no exception by counsel for defendant reserved
to the charge, but it was accepted by him as correctly pre
senting the law of the case to the jury. Under the state of
the case here presented, the counsel for defendant having
agreed that the only issue to be tried was that which was
tried, that the court charged the jury that the only issue to
be determined by them was that which they did determine,
and that the counsel for defendant did not in any manner
object to or except to the charge, we are of opinion that the
cause should be regarded as one where the amount of money
claimed was not in issue, that the only matter counsel in
tended to contest was the responsibility of his client, the
defendant, and that, being found against him, the verdict
There being no contro
should be for the amount claimed.
by
plaintiff, the verdict did
versy as to the amount claimed
embrace all there was in dispute in the cause, did cover all
the issues, and was sufficient.
Considering the peculiar features of this case, we see no
good reason for sending it back for a new trial, because the
jury under the charge of the court did not follow the direc
tion of the statute, (Code Civil Proc. § 626), and by their
We have consid
verdict “ﬁnd the amount of the recovery.”
ered the other points made on behalf of appellant, and find
nothing which would authorize a reversal.
Judgrmernt and order aﬁrm.ed.99
99A verdict should

be construed

and may be corrected

by the court
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in

accordance with undisputed evidence.--W. H. Shenners Co. v. Delzer,
(1919) 169 Wis. 507; Jones v. Norfolk So. R. R. Co., (1918) 176 N. C.
260; Williams v. Thrall, (1918) 167 Wis. 410; Harvey v. Head, (1881)
68 Ga. 247; Vanvalkenberg v. Vanvalkenberg, (1883) 90 Ind. 433; Consol.
G. & S. Min. Co. v. Struthers, (1910) 41 Mont. 565.
Compare Cohues V. Finholt, (1907) 101 Minn. 180.

//2!-»

PLYMOUT
Supreme

OUNTY TRUST

CO. v.

SCANLAN.

Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
227 Massachusetts,

1917.

71.

Contract, the ﬁrst and only material count of the dec
laration being upon a promissory note for $550 signed by
the defendant’s husband and indorsed in blank by the de
Writ dated April 15,
fendant as described in the opinion.
1913.

J

~

In the Superior Court the case was tried before Dubuque,

The material evidence is described in the opinion.
At the close of the evidence the defendant asked the judge
to rule as follows:
“1. That upon all the evidence the plaintiff is not entitled
to recover upon the ﬁrst count in its declaration.
“2. That the note declared upon by the plaintiff in its
ﬁrst count, being a note payable on demand, and dated No
vember 29, 1910, and endorsed by the defendant, upon which
no demand was made on the maker until January 29, 1912,
was one which required a demand to be made upon the maker
within sixty days of the date in order to charge the indorser.
No such demand was made, and there is no evidence intro
duced by the plaintiff, which excuses the plaintiff from mak
ing such demand.”
Appropriate instructions
The judge refused so to rule.
jury.
given
to
the
not excepted to were
The jury found for the plaintiff on the ﬁrst count in the
sum of $580.48.
After the return of the verdict and before the recording
.

thereof, the trial judge under St. 1915, c. 185, “reserved
leave, with the assent of the jury, to enter a verdict for
the defendant, if, upon the exceptions taken or the questions
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of law reserved,” the Superior Court “or the Supreme Ju
dicial Court should decide that such verdict for the defendant
should have been entered,” and reported the case to this
court, “to dispose of the same as it deems proper.”
#
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DE COURCY, J. The main question raised by the excep
tions is whether the demand note in suit was presented for
payment “within a reasonable time after its issue," as re
\quired by the negotiable instruments law. R. L. c. 73, § 88.
"‘
*
"
We are of opinion, however, that on the undis
puted facts in the present case a demand made fourteen
months after the issue of the note was not made “within a
reasonable time ;” and that the judge should have ruled as re
‘ " "
quested by the defendant.
In accordance with the report, a verdict for the defendant
shall be entered in accordance with R. L. c. 173, § 120, as
amended by St. 1915, c. 185, 1.
Ordered accordingly.‘
1 In commenting
on the practice employed in this case, Ezra R. Thayer,
in Judicial Administration.
63 Pennsylvania
L. Rev. 585, said:—
“The importance of obtaining from the jury the necessary material
tor a ﬁnal decision has always been understood by English courts. They
have never tolerated the wasteful and unintelligent practice to which we
tamely submit of taking a general verdict and letting the case go up on
exceptions;
on the contrary it has been their regular practice, as a
reference to the English reports for a hundred years bcfore the Judi
cature Act will show, to take :1 verdict from the jury with leave to enter
a different verdict thereafter if the law required it.
This simple and
ﬂexible method, which can be made to ﬁt all sorts oi! situations, gave
the judge time to consider the law after the verdict without delaying the
trial, and left the matter in such shape that any error could be corrected
by the appellate court.
It did this, too, without trenching in the least
Even those whose sensitlveness concerning judicial
on the jury’s powers.
makes them object to the judge's charging on the facts
encroachment
cannot reasonably criticize this feature of the English practice.
It exalts,
not limits, the jury's function, for it provides that their labors shall
not be in vain, but shall settle the case according to the law."'
In a note to the above article the method of employing this remedy
is outlined by Mr. John L. Tliorndike, of the Boston bar, as i'0llows:—
“The jury ﬁnd for the plaintiff and assess damages in the sum of eight
hundred and eighteen dollars, seventy-two cents.

“W. B. Foreman.
case the jury ﬁnd for the plaintiif, what additional
“Quest1'on—In
damages should be given tor the dualin manufactured
before the aban
donment oi the contract, it the plaintiff is entitled to recover for such

dualin?
“Ans1ccr—Three hundred
118 Mass.

319, 323

“When the jury

(1875).
announce

and ﬁfty dollars."

See Dittmar

their verdict in court,

v. Norman.

the judge

will

say
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to them that a question of law has been reserved for consideration by
the court, and that leave will be reserved with the assent of the jury
to enter the verdict for three hundred and ﬁfty dollars in addition to the
damages found by them, if upon the question of law reserved the court
shall decide that the verdict ought to have been so entered. The jury
will assent, and a note of the leave so reserved will then be made at the
foot or on the back of the verdict or on the docket, and the verdict
entered subject thereto, as follows:
“Leave being reserved with the assent of the jury to enter the verdict
for three hundred and ﬁfty dollars in addition to the eight hundred and
eighteen dollars and seventy-two cents damages found by them, if upon
the question of law reserved the court shall decide that the verdict ought
~
to have been so entered.”
“Leave to reduce the damages would be similarly reserved, as in
Hobbs v._ London & Southwestern Ry. Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 111, 113 (1875)."
“In a case like Negus v. Simpson, 99 Mass. 388, 391-392 (1868), the
damages would be ascertained
according
to the contentions
of both
parties, and leave reserved to enter the verdict according to the proper
rule, which would have saved the second trial."
“So a verdict being directed for the defendant, leave could be reserved
to enter the verdict for the plaintiff for the amount of a draft, upon the
decision of a question of law, as in Treacher. v. Hinton, 4 B. & Ald. 4'13
So, if the jury ﬁnd for the plaintiff in a case like Slocum’s Case,
(1821).
228 U. S. 364 (1913), the verdict would be entered for the plaintiff with
leave reserved to enter the verdict for the defendant if the court should
decide that the judge ought to have directed such a verdict."

/ 7 7

Special Verdict.

(d)

FIRST NATIONAL BANK

@w;<_/
-r

'

Supreme

Court of Kansas.
8

BREWER,

In this

J.: '

'

"

v.

PECK.
1871.

Kansas, 660.
‘

case a special verdict was returned at the instance
Objection was made to the verdict on the
plaintiff.
the
of
ground that it did not state all the facts established by the
Special verdicts and ﬁndings upon particular
evidence.
questions of fact are by the laws of 1870 matters of right.
Laws 1870, p. 173, sec. 7. It is no longer discretionary with
Under these circum
the court to require them or not.
important
to determine the scope of a
stances it becomes
special verdict as ﬁxed by our statute.
Considerable dif
ference of opinion has existed in reference to it and a ju
dicial construction in this court with doubtless be of service
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in many cases.
What is a special verdict? Under our stat
ute the jury can be called upon to respond in three ways
—by a general verdict, by a special verdict, and by return
True, this
ing answers to particular questions of fact.
latter mode of interrogating the jury can be resorted to
only in conjunction with the ﬁrst, but it is nevertheless a
A general verdict embraces both the law
distinct mode.
and the facts.
It states the result of the whole contro
versy.
It determines the ultimate rights of the parties. It
combines the decisions of the court with the opinions of
True, the jury receive the law in the instruc
the‘ jury.
tions of the court, but they apply the law to the facts, and,
having combined the two, declare the result.
So that un
der such a verdict they really perform two functions, that
of ﬁnding the facts, and then that of applying the law to
Any one at all familiar with the experiences
those facts.
of a court-room is aware that the errors of the jury result
oftener from their misapplication of the law as stated, to
A
the facts, than from their misapprehension of the facts.
special verdict, on the other hand, ﬁnds only the facts, and
leaves to the court the duty both of determining the law and
of applying it to the facts. It is thus deﬁned in sec. 285 of
the code of civil procedure, Gen. Stat., 684: “A special ver
dict is that by which the jury ﬁnds facts only. It must pre
sent the facts as established by the evidence, and not the
It was decided in 1 Miles, 26,
evidence to prove them.”
that “if instead of ﬁnding facts the special verdict set out
the evidence, a.new trial will be granted.” Whether that
be the necessary result or not, it is clear that a special ver
dict should not be a recital of testimony, but a ﬁnding of
But what
certain facts as established by such testimony.
facts? How minutely may they, must they, be subdivided?
The facts stated in the pleadings; as minutely, and no more
so in the special verdict, than in the petition, answer, and
The special verdict must conform to the pleadings.
reply.
The word “facts” is used in this section in the same sense,
and refers to the same things as when used in sec. 87 of the
code, which declares that a “petition must contain a state
ment of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordi
nary and concise language without repetition.” There are
in every cause of action certain essential substantive facts,
Every pleader knows this
certain elements, so to speak.
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when he prepares a petition.
The omission of any one of
these elements renders the petition defective.
The failure
to prove one defeats the cause of action.
Now these essen
tial elemental facts are the ones the special verdict must
ﬁnd, no more, no less.
A history of the case in the nature
of a recital of the testimony, or a detail of the various
steps in the transaction is not the function of a special ver
dict.
It responds to the various facts of the petition like
a special denial, touching each separately.
The statute
clearly points to this construction.
It says, (Laws 1870,
p. 173, ch. 87, sec. 7, amending sec. 286 of the code,) “the
court shall direct the jury to ﬁnd a special verdict in writ
ing upon all or any of the issues in the case. H The issues
are to be passed upon in the special verdict.
In Bacon's
Abridgment, vol. 10, p. 313, it is said, citing as authority
United States v. Bright, Bright's Trial, 199, “If in a special
verdict the jury ﬁnd the issue, all they ﬁnd beyond is sur
plusage.”
The special verdict is simply the response of the
jury separately to the several issues presented by the plead
"
‘ * The judgment will be affirmed.
ings.
All the Justices concurring.’
8A discussion of the purpose and superior effectiveness of the special
verdict in civil causes, with suggestions for making it safer and more
convenient
for practical use, may be found in Verdicts, General and
Special. by Edson R. Sunderland. 29 Yale L. Jour. 253-267.
See also, A
Brief History of Special Verdicts and Special Interrogatories, by Edmund
M. Morgan. 32 Yale L. Jour. 575-592.
A few states have abolished special verdicts by statute; others have
made them discretionary with the jury, as at common law; others make
them discretionary with the jury in actions for the recovery of money
only or of speciﬁc real property; others leave them to the discretion
of the court; and others require the court to order them on the request of
either party. See Clementson on Special Verdicts, pp. 172-177.
The same tests applicable to'special verdicts are to be employed in
connection with ﬁndings oi’ facts made by the court in cases tried without
National Bank v. Nelson, (1910) 38 Utah, 169; Darling
a jury.-—Utah
V. Miles, (1911) 57 Ore. 593; Graham v. State ex rel., (1879) ﬁﬁ_1nd. .386.
It is commonly required that ﬁndings of fact and ﬁndings of law
may or shall be made separately by the court when trying cases without
a jury.—Slayton v. Felt, (1905) 40 Wash. 1; City of Buffalo v. Delaware,
L. & W. RR. Co., (1907) 190 N. Y. 84.
ot such ﬁndings is not reversible error in equity cases.—
~But' omission
Gaines 8: Co. v. Whyte Grocery Co., (1904) 107 Mo. App. 507.
And no ﬁndings are required where there is an agreed statement of
tacts.—City of Owonsboro v. Weir. (1893) 95 Ky. 158.
In Ontario the special verdict has practically supplanted the general
verdict except in cases of slander.—The Courts of Ontario, by W. R
Riddell, 62 Univ. of Penn. L. Rev. 27.
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ROYAL INSUR

8“

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
201

1902.

,

Pennsylvania State, 645.

MESTREZAT, J.—This was an action of assumpsit on a ﬁre
insurance policy issued by the defendant.
On the trial the
court below instructed the jury to return a special verdict
and to answer the following questions:
1.
Did Bedient take possession of the property in the
interest of the machine company, and let Markle and Merry
man hold it for the company after the assignment for the
beneﬁt of creditors and prior to the ﬁre in question?
Did the machine company thus acting through Bedient
2.
subject the property to hazard not contemplated by the pol
icy and stipulated against by the provisions thereof?
What was the loss? This is to be estimated by the
3.
cost of repairing or replacing the property with material of
like kind and quality so as not to exceed the limit thus indi
catedﬁ
The ﬁrst question was, by agreement of counsel, answered
in the aﬁirmative; the jury returned a negative reply to the
second question; and to the third question, the answer was
Subsequently the court entered judgment on the
$1,747.
verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $1,747.
This appeal is by the defendant and error is alleged in the
ruling of the court on the measure of damages, in the con
struction put upon the policy of insurance by the court, and
in entering judgment on the special verdict, the defendant
claiming that the facts found were not sufficient to sustain
the judgment.
The last reason assigned for reversing the judgment of
the court below may be considered ﬁrst.
It is the province of a special verdict to ﬁnd and place on
This includes the
record all the essential facts in the case.
disputed as well as the undisputed facts. What is not found
by the verdict is presumed not to exist, and no inferences
as to matters of fact are permitted to supply the facts them
selves which the verdict should have found.
In entering
judgment, the court is conﬁned to the facts found by the
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verdict, and unless they are sufficiently found no
judgment can be entered.
The jury must ﬁnd the facts
Such
and the court declare the law on the facts so found.
are the requisites of a special verdict as held in all our
In Wallingford v. Dunlap, 14 Pa. 33, it is said: “It
cases.
is of the very essence of a special verdict that the jury
should ﬁnd the facts, on which the court is to pronounce
judgment according to law. And the court will not intend
anything, especially any fact not found by the jury. “ * *
The undisputed facts ought to have been incorporated in
*
*
*
The court is conﬁned to the
the special verdict.
facts found by the special verdict. And when a special ver
dict is given, the court ought to conﬁne its judgment to
that verdict. * * "‘ But this special verdict is so defective
and erroneous, and the judgment so anomalous in being en
tered partly on the verdict and partly on what was called
undisputed facts, that we must do what has often been
done before, reverse the judgment and send the case back
Mr. Justice Mercur, delivering the
for a new trial.”
Vansyckel v. Ste-wart, 77 Pa. 126,
in
opinion of the court
says:
“It (special verdict) must include both disputed and
The court will not infer a fact not found
undisputed facts.
by the jury. It must declare the law on these facts alone.
As all the essential facts must be found in the verdict, it
follows that it cannot be aided by intendment or by ex
In Tuigg v.
trinsic facts appearing upon the record.”
Treacy, 104 Pa. 498, Clark, J., speaking for the court, says:
“We cannot resort to the testimony, or to such extrinsic
matters as were undisputed at the trial, oravail ourselves
of such even as appear upon the record. It is of the very
essence of a special verdict, that the facts found are those
upon which the court is to pronounce judgment, according to
What is not thus found is presumed not to exist, the
law.
verdict being conclusively the complete result of the jury’s
deliberation upon the whole case presented.”
In delivering the opinion of the court in the compara
tively recent case of McCormick 1». Royal Insurance Com
special

Pa. 194, Chief Justice Sterrett says:
is better settled, on principle as well as authority,
all the facts upon which the court is to pronounce
It
should be incorporated in the special verdict.
jury,
in
the
ﬁrst place, to
clusive province of the
pang/,

163

“Nothing
than that

judgment
is the ex
determine
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all disputed

questions of fact, from the evidence before
them; and then their special verdict is made up of those
ﬁndings of fact, together with such undisputed facts as may
‘ ‘ “ The
be necessary to a just decision of the cause.
court, in considering a special verdict and entering judg
ment thereon, is necessarily conﬁned to the facts found and
embodied in the verdict; the latter cannot be aided by in
tendment or extrinsic facts that may appear in the evidence.”
Applying these principles to the case in hand, it is appar
ent that the verdict here is fatally defective.
As said by
Chief Justice Black in Tha-yer v. Society of United Breth
ren, 20 Pa. 63, “the jury found a special verdict, but it
omits almost every important fact.” Here the verdict found
but three of the many facts necessary to support a judg
ment. It is silent as to whether a policy of insurance, the
basis of this action, was issued to the plaintiff, and the
terms of the policy; as to what property was insured and
where situated; as to the loss of or damage to the insured
property and whether it occurred within the life of the pol
icy; and as to the cause of the loss, whether by ﬁre or other
wise. Other omissions of fact might be suggested, but those
named are sufﬁcient to show that the verdict is wholly in
adequate to sustain the judgment entered by the court below.
A special verdict more barren of facts is not to be found in
the reported cases.
*

*

"

"

It

1

It

#

I

1

i I

Q

the judgment is reversed and a venire facias de

novo is awarded.‘

-

This method oi preparing a special verdict,
8F0rm of special verdict.
-—in the form of questions to be put to the jury upon all the material
facts in the case, is a common and convenient one. It is sometimes pre
scribed by statute.
In any event. the jury cannot be expected to draw up their own form
As said in Pittsburgh.
ot special verdict, and it must be done by counsel.
Ft. W. and C. Ry. C0. v. Ruby, (1871) 38 Ind. 294, “Jurors are very
competent to understand the evidence, ﬁnd facts, and draw conclusions
from the facts found; but as a general rule, and especially in compli
cated cases, they are not equal to the task of preparing a special verdict.
They do not know what facts should be found to cover the issues, nor
the manner of stating th,em."
Another familiar method is for counsel on each side to prepare a
special verdict in the form of a statement oi’ the facts which they believe
have been established by the evidence, and submit the same to the
trial judge, who thereupon hands both forms. with or without amend.
ment, as he deems proper, to the jury under proper instructions, and
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the jury may then adopt either one, in the form presented to them or
with such changes as they wish to make, as their verdict. Pittsburgh,
Ft. W. & C. Ry. Co. v. Ruby, supra: 22 Encyc. Pl. & Pr. 993.
4'i‘here is some authority to the contrary, as in Wisconsin, but see
Hodges v. Easton,
(1882) 106 U. S. 408, where it was held that the
practice of rendering judgment on a special verdict which found only
the disputed facts but not those undisputed, was a denial of the right of
trial by jury.
Where, however, the party who does not have the burden of proof
asks for a judgment upon a special verdict, the want of a ﬁnding upon
any material tact will entitle him to such judgment.—Wabash RR. Co. v.
Ray, (1899) 152 Ind. 392.

W

BAXTER

V.

CHZIAGO & NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY
CO.

Supreme

Court of Wisconsin.
104 Wisconsin,

1899.

807.

Action by an employe of defendant to recover compensa
tion for personal injuries received by him by the explosion
of a locomotive engine, claimed to have been caused by de
fendant’s keeping it in use with knowledge, or reasonable
means of knowledge, that it was defective to a degree which
rendered such an accident among the natural and reasonable
probabilities, and one which, in the exercise of ordinary care,

it should have apprehended.

I

J

Q

l i

U

3

l i

Q

i

MARSHALL,
.
The chief controversy on the trial was as to
whether the defective condition of the boiler, which caused
the explosion, ought to have been discovered by the defendant
before that event, and guarded against.
To cover that ﬁeld
by the special verdict, defendant’s attorneys requested the
court to submit for answers these four questions:
“Could the
defects have been discovered without removing the ﬂues from
such boiler?”
“Was it the ordinary custom and practice
among persons generally, using locomotive boilers of a like
kind, under similar circumstances, to remove the ﬂues for the
purpose, only, of inspecting the shell of such boiler?” “Was
the boiler of engine No. 249, up to the time it exploded, used,
operated, treated, and inspected by the defendant in the man
ner usually and ordinarily followed by persons generally, who
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use, operate, treat, and inspect locomotive engine boilers

like kind under

“If

of

3
a

you answer
‘Yes’ to question No. 10, did such use, operation, treatment,
and inspection cause or reveal any defects which caused the
injury to plaintiff?”
Such questions were rejected and in
lieu thereof, following the question of whether the boiler was
defective in fact and the nature of the defects, this question
was submitted: “If you ﬁnd in answer to question No. 5 that
the boiler was defective at the time of said explosion, then
could the defendant company through its agents and servants,
by reasonable and proper care, tests, or inspection, have dis
covered such defects before the explosion?”
In connection
with such question the jury were instructed as follows:
“Reasonable care as used in this question means such care as
ordinarily careful persons exercise under like circumstances,
and reasonable tests and inspections mean such tests and in
spections as are made and employed by ordinarily prudent
persons engaged in the same business and under like circum
stances.” That ruling is assigned as error and it appears to
be one of the chief grounds of complaint.
Appellant's coun
sel do not contend but that the real fact in issue was, by the
court’s question as explained, placed before the jury for de
termination, but they contend that the right of defendant to a
special ﬁnding as to every material fact in issue, stripped of
all conclusions of law, was violated because the question re
quired the application of legal deﬁnitions and explanations in
order to enable the jury to properly answer it, the result be
ing that the ﬁnal conclusion embodied in the answer was
rather a conclusion of law than one of fact; and in support
of that a lengthy argument upon the character of a special
verdict under the statute was presented.

similar circumstances?"

I I I I I

I I I I I

The idea advanced by counsel for the defendant that the
statutory right to a special verdict is only satisﬁed by ques
tions that do not need to be considered in the light of legal
principles given to the jury by the court, is contrary to the
universal practice and the settled law upon the subject. Of
ten, Whether certain conduct complained of is negligence,
where the evidentiary facts are all established, is a question
of fact, in respect to which different minds may reasonably
come to different conclusions.
In that situation it is neces
sary to carefully instruct the jury regarding the standard of
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care necessary to the performance of the duty alleged to have
been violated, leaving it to them to determine whether the
alleged wrongdoer came up to the legal standard in the par
ticular instance complained of. The question of contributory
negligence, of proximate cause, and what is reasonable, are
only, ordinarily, determinable by viewing evidentiary facts in
the light of legal principles. The ultimate fact being only
properly determinable by viewing evidentiary facts in the
light of legal standards, instructions by the court in regard to
such standards are necessary. When such ultimate facts are
established, the legal liability follows as a conclusion of law.
They are
At that point the jury should not be instructed.
to ﬁnd the facts, guided by the law regarding such facts, but
regardless of the legal effect of their conclusions.
The issues
of fact raised by the pleadings are to be passed upon by the
jury. The legal conclusion to be drawn from such ﬁndings is
to be referred to the court with an additional conclusion by
the j ury, express or implied, that if the court should be of the
opinion, upon the whole case, as found, that plaintiff has a
good cause of action, they ﬁnd for the plaintiff, otherwise for
the defendant. Suydam v. Williamson, 20 How. 427.

it

is

#

1

3

Q

I
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It

Q
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it
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Further,
proper, and on request
is error
refuse,
give
requested
to
instructions
as to each question
to
submitted, that may be reasonably necessary to enable the
intelligently and according to the law gov
jury to answer
erning the subject. But no instructions as to the effect of
an answer upon the ultimate rights of the parties
proper.
Ryan v. Rockford Ins. Co., 77 Wis. 611; Ward v. C., M.
St.
215.‘
Co.,
102
Wis.
P. R.
"‘

a

5Gcneral instructions, on the law of the case are never proper where
special verdict.
Stayner v. Joyce,
the Jury are required to return
(1889) 120 Ind. 99, 22 N. E. 89.
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Special lnterrogatories.

AND NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY CO. v.

DUNLEAVY.

Supreme

Court of Illinoz'.9.
129

1889.

Illinois, 182.

BAILEY, J.—This was an action on the case, brought by
Annie Dunleavy, administratrix of the estate of John Dun
leavy, deceased, against the Chicago and Northwestern Rail
way Company, to recover damages under the statute for the
The declaration consisted
death of the plaintiff’s intestate.
of nine counts, to the ﬁfth, sixth and seventh of which a de
murrer was sustained. To the remaining counts the defend
ant pleaded not guilty, and on trial before the court and a
jury, the issues were found for the plaintiff and her damages
assessed at $1800, and for that sum and costs, the court, after
denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial, gave judg
Said judgment was afﬁrmed by the
ment for the plaintiff.
Appellate Court on appeal, and by a further appeal the record
is now brought to this court.
The ﬁrst count of the declaration alleges that the defend
ant, on the 26th day of July, 1886, by its servants, ran one of
its locomotive engines with a train of freight cars thereto
attached, from east to west over one of its tracks under a via
duct at Blue Island avenue, in the city of Chicago; that the
plaintiff’s intestate was then and there in the employ of said
city, cleaning and painting the iron columns, etc., of said
viaduct, and that “the said train was, by and through the
negligence, carelessness and improper conduct of the said de
fendant, through its servants in the premises, run at a high
and dangerous rate of speed,” and that while being so run, it
was driven against and upon said Dunleavy, whereby he was
instantly killed. The second count alleges that the defend
ant, through its servants, “so carelessly, improperly and un
skillfully managed and conducted said engine and train, that
the said John Dunleavy was forcibly knocked down by said
engine and train” and thrown under the wheels of the train
and instantly killed. The third count sets up an ordinance of
said city requiring the bell of each locomotive engine to be
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rung continually while running within the city, and alleging
that the defendant’s servants in charge of said train failed to
comply with said ordinance, and that in consequence of such
failure said Dunleavy was killed. The fourth count is sub
stantially like the second. The eighth count alleges that the
engineer and ﬁreman could, by looking, have seen Dunleavy
standing at his work, and by sounding a whistle have given
him notice of the approach of a train, but that they failed to
sound the whistle, and that in consequence of such failure
said Dunleavy was killed. The ninth count alleges substan
tially the same act of negligence as the eighth, though in dif
ferent language.
Each count alleges in proper form that
Dunleavy at the time he was killed, was in the exercise of due
care.

i

#

$

#

i

#

i i

#

t

The next questions to be considered are those which relate
to the special ﬁndings of the jury. Upon this branch 01' the
case it is urged, ﬁrst, that the court improperly refused to
submit certain questions of fact to the jury; second, that cer
tain of the questions of fact submitted were not properly an
swered; and third, that the special ﬁndings of fact are in
The statute under which
consistent with the general verdict.
special ﬁndings may be required is but recent, and the rules
of practice thereby established have never before been pre
We must therefore
sented to this court for its consideration.
guide
mainly
to
statute
for
our
in determining
look
the
itself
the propositions now raised. The statute is as follows:
Section 1. “That in all trials by jury in civil proceedings
in this State in courts of record, the jury may render, in their
discretion, either a general or a special verdict; and in any
case in which‘ they render a general verdict, they may be re
quired by the court, and must be so required on request of
any party to the action, to ﬁnd specially upon any material
question or questions of fact which shall be stated to them in
writing, which questions of fact shall be submitted by the
party requesting the same to the adverse party before the
commencement of the argument to the jury.
“Submitting or refusing to submit a question of
Sec. 2.
fact to the jury when requested by a party as provided by
the ﬁrst section hereof may be excepted to and be reviewed
on appeal or writ of error as a ruling on a question of law.
“When the special ﬁnding of fact is inconsistent
Sec. 3.
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with the general verdict, the former shall control the latter
and the court may render judgment accordingly.”
This statute, so far as it relates to special verdicts, is mere
ly declaratory of the common law. It has been competent for
juries at common law, since the statute of 13 Edward 1, to
ﬁnd a general verdict, or when they have any doubt as to the
law, to ﬁnd a special verdict, and refer the law arising thereon
to the decision of the court.
By a special verdict, the jury,
ﬁnding
instead of
for either party, ﬁnd and state all the facts
at issue. and conclude conditionally, that if upon the whole
matter thus found, the court should be of the opinion that
the plaintiff has a good cause of action, they then ﬁnd for the
plaintiff, and assess his damages; if otherwise, then for the
2 Tidd’s Practice, (Am. ed.) 897, and‘ note.
defendant.
It is manifest of course that a special ﬁnding by a jury
upon material questions of fact submitted to them under the
provisions of the statute is not a special verdict, but an es
sentially different proceeding.
A special verdict cannot be
found where there is a general verdict, but the special ﬁndings
of fact provided for by the statute can be required only in
But while this is so, much
case a general verdict is rendered.
light in relation to special ﬁndings upon questions of fact, and
their office and objects may be derived from the rules ap
Both forms of verdict are pro
plicable to special verdicts.

is

a

a

it

:14

vided for by the same statute, and they must the!"~e"t'o1'e be
construed as being in pari materia.
In giving construction to the statute, the ﬁrst, and per
haps the most important question, relates to the scope and
meaning of the phrase, “material question or questions of
fact.” l_V‘I_ay_V_su_c_lI__qpe_stions relate to mere evidentiary fa_cts,
to those ultimate facts upon
or should they__be_r_es@ted
which the rights of the pa?fi‘és‘d1“r'ectIy depend? Evidently
Notnorily ‘d<3é§." this conclusion follow from an
the latter
alogy to the rules relating to special verdicts, but
arises
very
nature of the case. It would clearly be of no
from the
avail to require the jury to ﬁnd mere matters of evidence, be
cause, after being found, they would in no way aid the court
pro
in determining what judgment to render. Doubtless
bative fact from which the ultimate fact necessarily results
would be material, for there the court could infer such ulti
matter of law. But where the probative fact
mate fact as
prima
merely
facie evidence of the fact to be proved, the
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proper deductions to be drawn from the probative fact pre
sents a question of fact and not of law, requiring further ac
tion by the jury, and it cannot therefore be made the basis of
Requiring the jury to ﬁnd such
any action by the court.
requiring
them to ﬁnd the evidence
probative fact is merely
and not the facts, and results in nothing which can be of the
slightest assistance to the parties or the court in arriving at
the proper determination of the suit.
The view we take is strongly fortiﬁed by the provision of
the third section of the statute, that, when a special ﬁnding of
fact is inconsistent with the general verdict, the former shall
This necessarily implies that the fact to be submit
control.
ted shall be one which, if found, may in its nature be control
ling. That can never be the case with a mere evidentiary
A fact which merely tends to prove a fact in issue
fact.
without actually proving it, can not be said to be, in any legal
sense, inconsistent with a general verdict, whatever that ver
dict may be. Such inconsistency can arise only where the
fact found is an ultimate fact, or one from which the exist
ence or non-existence of such ultimate fact necessarily fol
lows, and that is never the case with that which is only prima
facie evidence of the fact sought to be proved.
The common law requires that verdicts shall be the decla
ration of the unanimous judgment of the twelve jurors.
Upon all matters which they are required to ﬁnd they must be
agreed. But it has never been held that they must all reach
their conclusions in the same way and by the same method of
reasoning.
To require unanimity not only in their conclu
sions but in the mode by which those conclusions are arrived
at would in most cases involve an impossibility. To require
unanimity therefore, not only in the result but also in each
of the successive steps leading to such result, would be prac
tically destructive of the entire system of jury trials. To
illustrate, suppose a plaintiff trying his suit before twelve
jurors, should seek to prove a fact alleged in his declaration
by giving evidence of twelve other facts, each having an in
dependent tendency to prove the fact alleged. The evidence
of each probative fact, or the conclusions to be drawn from
it, might appeal with peculiar force to the belief or judgment
of some one of the jurors, but less so to his fellows.
The
might
the
evidence
effect
of
all
be
such
as
cumulative
to leave
no doubt in the mind of any member of the panel as to the
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truth of the fact alleged, still, if the jury were required to
ﬁnd specially as to each probative fact, no one of the twelve
facts would be at all likely to meet with the unanimous con
currence of the entire jury. As to each they would be com
pelled to confess their inability to agree, or what would be its
equivalent, say they did not know or could not tell, which, if
we apply the rules governing special verdicts, would be tanta
mount to a ﬁnding that the fact was not proved or did not
exist. If such ﬁnding should be required, and should be given
the effect of controlling the general verdict, the result would
be, that under such system of trial, general verdicts could but
seldom stand.

However natural the curiosity parties may have to know
the precise course of reasoning by which jurors may arrive
at verdicts either for or against them, they have no right, un
der guise of submitting questions of fact to be found specially
by the jury, to require them to give their views upon each
item of evidence, and thus practically subject them to a cross
examination as to the entire case. Such practice would sub
serve no useful purpose, and would only tend to embarrass
and obstruct the administration of justice; and we may fur
ther say that such practice ﬁnds no warrant in our statute.
In the present case the defendant’s counsel prepared and
submitted ﬁfteen questions of fact upon which the court was
asked to require the jury to make special ﬁndings.
Of these
The ﬁrst was modi
the eleventh and twelfth were refused.
ﬁed and submitted to the jury in its modiﬁed form. The resi
due of the questions were submitted as asked. We do not
understand that the defendant is now complaining of the ac
tion of the court in relation to its eleventh and twelfth ques
tions of fact. The ﬁrst, as prepared by the defendant's coun
sel, was as follows:
“What precaution did the deceased take to inform him
1.
self of the approach of the train which caused the injury?"
This was modiﬁed by the court so as to read as follows:
“Was the deceased exercising reasonable care for his
1.
safety
at the time he was killed?”
own
The ultimate fact which it was incumbent upon the plain
tiff to prove, and which the defendant sought to disprove,
was that the deceased, at the time he was killed, was in the
exercise of due care. That was one of the issues made by the
pleadings, and it was one of the ultimate facts upon which
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the plaintiff's right to recover necessarily depended. What
the deceased did to inform himself of the approach of the
train was material only as tending to show reasonable care
on his part or the want of it. His acts in that behalf, then,
whatever they may have been, were facts which were merely
evidential in their nature, and while they doubtless would
have had a tendency to prove reasonable care or the contrary,
there were none of them, so far as the evidence shows, which
would have been conclusive of that question.“ The question
then, as submitted by the defendant’s counsel, sought to ob
tain a ﬁnding as to mere probative facts, and the court there
fore properly refused to require the jury to answer it. The
question substituted by the court submitted to the jury a
material and controlling fact, and one which could be prop
erly made the subject of a special ﬁnding.
Complaint is made to the answers given by the jury to the
fourth and ﬁfth questions. Those questions were as follows:
4.
“Did the deceased look to ascertain if the train in ques
approaching?
was
tion
5.
“Did the deceased listen to ascertain if said train was

approaching?"
“Don’t
To both of those questions the jury answered:
defendant,
questionable
whether the
in
know.” It is perhaps
order to avail itself of the objection that no proper answer
was made to these questions, should not have made it at the
time the verdict was returned and before the jury were dis
charged, for then the jury might have been required to com
plete their verdict by making proper answers. M oss v. Priest,
But however that may be, it is manifest
19 Abb. Prac. 314.
that the error, if it be one, cannot have been prejudicial to
the defendant unless it can be seen that answers to said ques
tions most favorable to the defendant, which of course would
have been answers in the negative, would have constituted a
ﬁnding inconsistent with the general verdict.
If then we treat said questions as having been answered in
the negative, would such answers, either alone or in connec
tion with the answers to the other questions, have constituted
a ﬁnding necessarily inconsistent with the general verdict?
To the second question, viz., “If .the deceased had looked be
fore the accident, could he have discovered the approach of
the train in time to have avoided the accident?” the jury an
swered, “Yes,” and to the third question, viz., “If the deceased
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had listened before the approach of said train, could he have
discovered the approach of the train in time to have avoided
the accident?” they answered, “If he had concentrated his
attention in that particular direction, yes.” The ﬁrst ques
tion, viz., “Was the deceased exercising reasonable care for
his safety at the time he was killed?” was also answered,

“Yes.”
The question then presents itself, whether, if it be admit
ted that the deceased neither looked or listened for the train,
and also that if he had looked he could have seen it, and if he
had listened with his attention concentrated in that direction,
he could have heard it in time to avoid the accident, such facts
would constitute such conclusive proof of contributory negli
gence on the part of the deceased as would have barred a re
Undoubtedly a failure to look or listen, especially
covery.
where it affirmatively appears that looking or listening might
have enabled the party exposed to injury to see the train and
thus avoid being injured, is evidence tending to show negli
gence.
But they are not conclusive evidence, so that a charge
negligence
of
can be predicated upon them as a matter of law.
There may be various modifying circumstances excusing the
party from looking or listening, and that being the case, a
mere failure to look or listen cannot, as a legal conclusion, be

U

C
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I

I
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pronounced negligence per se.
In determining whether the special ﬁndings are inconsist
ent with the general verdict so that the latter must be held to
be controlled by the former, this court cannot look at the
All reasonable presumptions will be entertained
evidence.
in favor of the verdict, while nothing will be presumed in aid
of the special ﬁndings of fact. The inconsistency must be ir
reconcilable, so as to be incapable of being removed by any
Pennsylvania Co. 'v.
evidence admissible under the issues.
Smith, 98 Ind. 42; McComas 12. Haas, 107 id. 512; Redels
heimer v. Miller, id. 485.
Under these principles it must be
held that there is no necessary or irreconcilable inconsistency
between the special ﬁndings and the general verdict,'especial
ly in view of the fact that the jury, notwithstanding their ﬁnd
ing that the deceased did not look or listen, also found that he
was in the exercise of reasonable care.
We are of the opinion that the record contains no material
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error. and the judgment of the Appellate Court will therefore

be affirmed.‘

6Clementson,
in his work on Special Verdicts and Findings, ingeni
ously observes:—‘"I‘he
of interrogatories under the statute
submission
is a sort oi ‘exploratory opening’ into the abdominal cavity of the general
verdict (it I may be pardoned a surgical metaphor) by which the court
determines whether the organs are sound and in place and the proper
treatment

to be pursued."

165 U. S.

593.

Page 45.

The constitutionalityot the practice of employing special interroga
tories was sustained in Walker v. New Mexico & S. P. R. R. Co., (1897)

oi questions which are merely evi
Some courts do not disapprove
dentiary.——Atchison,
T. & S. F. RR. Co. v. Ayers, (1895) 56 Kan. 176.
Such questions could not serve as the basis for a judgment contrary to
the verdict, but would be available only as the basis tor granting a new
trial.
Putting a question in the leading form is improper.—Atchison, T. &
'
S. F. RR. Co. v. Ayers, (1895) 56 Kan. 176.
State statutes differ as to whether the submission
of special inter
rogatories is discretionary with the court.
A considerable number make
it discretionary in every case; others make it discretionary unless either
party requests such submission, in which case the court is required to
on Special Verdicts, pp. 49-56, citing many
See Clementson
accede.
statutes and cases.
It is entirely competent without any authorizing statute, tor the
court to put questions to the jury to be answered in connection with
their general verdict, and new trials may be granted on the basis of
such questions and answers.-—Freedom
v. New York, N. H. & H. RR. Co.,
i1909) 81 Conn. 601; Walker v. New Mexico & So. Pac. RR. Co., (1897)
165 U. S. 593.
Where special ﬁndings by the jury are inconsistent with each other,
some cases hold that they destroy themselves and leave the general
verdict unimpaired.——Drake v. Gold Min. Co., (1904) 32 Colo. 259; while
other courts hold that such special ﬁndings not only destroy themselves
but also destroy the general verdict.—St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co.
v. Bricker, (1899) 61 Kan. 224.

LOUISVILLE,

/f/37.4-FL

NEW ALBANY & CHICAGO RAILWAY
CO. v. WORLEY.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
107

'

Indiana,

1886.

8.20.

.

*
ELLIOTT, J. ‘
The appellant submitted to the court interrogatories, and
asked that they should be submitted to the jur_v, but the
court, instead of submitting those asked by the appellant,
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The
and submitted interrogatories of its own.
prayer for the submission of the interrogatories to the jury
was not a proper one, for the court was not asked to instruct
the jury to answer the interrogatories in the event that they
returned a general verdict. Taylor ‘L’. Bruk, 91 Ind. 252.
We have, however, examined the interrogatories, and ﬁnd
that those propounded by the court substantially covered
those asked by the appellant. so far as they were competent
and material. Our decisions are that it is proper for the trial
court to revise interrogatories submitted by the parties, and
to prepare and propound for itself proper interrogatories to
the jury. Killian '0. Eigenmann, 57 Ind. 480.
The court submitted this interrogatory:
“Could the de
fendant have lawfully fenced its track at the point where said
mules entered upon the track?” It is contended that this in
terrogatory is not a proper one, as it calls upon the jury to
decide a question of law, and not of fact, and thus casts upon
them a duty that the court should perform. We can perceive
no answer to this contention, and appellee’s counsel have not
4
suggested any. * " "
That principle governs here. The jury should be required
to state facts, and not conclusions of law, and the answer to
the question propounded in this instance could be, as it was,
nothing more than the statement of the jury’s conclusion as
to whether the railroad company could lawfully fence its
track at the place where the mules entered upon it. Whether
it could lawfully fence at that place depended upon the charac
ter and surroundings, and when these are ﬁxed the question
whether it could be lawfully fenced becomes one of law for
the decision of the court. There are many facts which make
it improper for a railroad company to fence, as, for instance.
the fact that to fence would interfere with the discharge of
the company's duty to the public, or would make the place
dangerous to its servants, and it is for the jury to state the
facts, leaving the law to be applied by the court to the facts
.
found by the jury.
* "‘ * It would defeat the manifest purpose of
the statute
to allow conclusions of law, rather than statements of facts,
to be made by the jury, for the purpose of the statute is to
get upon record the speciﬁc and material facts in the form
of answers to interrogatories.
prepared

Judgment reversed.

Sec.
Z

(~
8]

P

cssomos BASED on TRIAL or issues

RUNYAN

v.

KANAWHA WATER

&

LIGHT

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
68 West

Virginia,

569

CO.
1911.

609.

Action by C. D. Runyan, administrator of Walter Runyan,
A verdict
against the Kanawha Water & Light Company.
for plaintiff having been set aside, he brings error.
BRANNON, J. The Kanawha Water & Light Company,
a corporation furnishing electricity for public consumption
in the city of Charleston, had its Wires on a bridge over the
Kanawha river for conveyance of electricity. Walter Runyan
was an employe of the bridge company engaged in painting
the bridge, and while so employed came in contact with an
electric wire, and was so badly burned by the electricity that
he died.
His administrator sued the Kanawha Water &
Light Company, and recovered a verdict for $5000, and the
court having set the verdict aside, the plaintiff comes to this
Court.
*

1

Q

*

#

#

¥

Q

Q

i

The main defense in the case is contributory negligence.
The general verdict ﬁnds against that defense; but defendant
insists that that verdict is overruled by a ﬁnding in answer to
an interrogatory. This has given us some perplexity, and is
the question of gravity in the case. The interrogatory is this:
“If Walter Runyan had been careful, considering the knowl
edge he had of the wires, would he have been injured?”
The
is,
answer
“We think not.”
Is this inconsistent with the
general verdict so as to overrule it? It must be so inconsistent
that both cannot stand together. * * "
*
* ‘ This ﬁnding says that if Runyan had been careful
he would not have been injured.
Does this come up to the
standard of full contributory negligence?
No. It does not
tell in what he was careless, or to what degree. Runyan
having a right to be where he was in work, he could go near
or over the wires, unless he knew that there was positive ac
tual danger staring him in the face. If he by accident fell
upon or caught his foot in the wires, this would not bar re
covery.
He might not have used the highest degree of care
and yet not be found guilty of contributory negligence de
feating the action. We cannot see what was the extent of
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his knowledge of danger, whether or not he knew of defects
in insulation. He was called on to use only ordinary care re
quired of a prudent man under the circumstances; but this
ﬁnding does not indicate what care or carelessness he used.
We cannot from the ﬁnding say, or guess, whether he exer
cised the only care required by law, ordinary, or was charge
able with gross negligence.
In the one case he would not
be guilty of contributory negligence defeating the action; in
the other he would. We cannot say which from the question
and answer.
The main verdict ﬁnds no negligence, and we
are asked to say from the special ﬁnding that there was; and
thus make the special ﬁnding inconsistent with the main ver
dict, when the special one does not give facts which, in law,
impute contributory negligence.
There is another defective feature of this ﬁnding to show
It is in the
its inadequacy to overcome the general verdict.
“Answers express
inconclusive language, “We think not.”
ing only the inclination of the minds of the jury, as to say,
‘We think not’ are insufﬁcient and too uncertain to base a
judgment on.” Hopkins ’U. Stacey, 43 Ind. 554.
Eminent
authority there cited says, “An opinion is not a legal verdict,
and verdicts must be positive, certain and free from all am
biguity.” This position may be assailed as technical; but re
member that special ﬁnding, to overcome general verdicts
must be certain and clearly and plainly inconsistent with it.
I grant that there are authorities holding otherwise. 20
Ency. Pl. & Prac. 344. I cannot say that I would for this
defect alone reject the answer; still it must be said that the
answer is indeﬁnite and leaves the mind in doubt whether
the jury intended to ﬁnd a deﬁnite fact. Why did it not say
“No,” if so intended?
The law says that answers to inter
rogatories should be “direct, deﬁnite, certain and complete.”
20 Ency. Pl. & Prac. 342.
Again this question 10 called upon the jury to say whether
if Runyan had been careful he would have been hurt. “Only
such questions as can be fairly and intelligently answered
Interrogatories requiring the jury to
should be submitted.
speculate as to what might have happened in a certain con
tingency should not be submitted." Atchison &-c. '0. Lanni
Therefore, we must regard the answer
gan, 42 Pac. 343.
mere speculation, and not on speciﬁc facts, not a ﬁat ﬁnding.
Findings must be free of obscurity.
“They must destroy the
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general verdict, if at all, only by their own inherent clearness
Special
Verdicts. 135.
on
and strength.”
Clementson
says:
Trials,
Thompson on
“The court will not strain
§ 2693
the language of the special ﬁndings to override the general
If possible they will be interpreted to support the
verdict.
verdict rather than overturn it. No presumption will be
made in their favor; nor will they control the general verdict,
unless they are invincibly antagonistic to it.”
Another objection to this ﬁnding, depriving its answer of
force, is, that it assumes a very material fact, that is, that
Runyan knew the condition of the wires, their danger, etc.
This had a tendency to lead the mind of jurors to conclude
that Runyan had such knowledge, that even the judge thought
so, else he would not have allowed such an interrogatory.
An interrogatory must not assume material facts. 20 Ency.
Pl. & Prac. 322; Elliott v. Reynolds, 16 Pac. 698; Toledo R.
Goddard, 25 Ind. 185.
Co.
*

II

it

#

Q

$

Q
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¥
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Therefore, we reverse the order setting aside the verdict,
and render judgment upon that verdict for the plaintiff.
Reversed

and rendered."

'lWhere the jury evade the issues by answering any question “Wo
know," the court should, on motion, order them to retire and
C. C. & I.
return proper answers or report a disagreement.—Cleveland,
Ry. Co. v. Asbury, (1889) 120 Ind. 289.
don’t
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SOUTHERN TRACTION
SPIEGEL.

Appellate Court of Indiana.
49

J

CO. V.

1911.

Indiana Appellate, 412.

.
This is an action brought by the appellee, George
against
the appellant for damages occasioned by
Spiegel,
P.
the death of Carl Spiegel, the minor son of appellee, which
death is alleged to have been caused by the negligence of ap
pellant in the operation of one of its cars on Main street in
the city of Evansville, Indiana. The direction of Main street
is a little east of north, and the appellant company has a
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street car track near the center of said street.
Williams street enters Main street from the east, at a point
almost opposite to the place where Sycamore street enters it
from the west, so that the south line of Williams street, at
the point of its connection with Main street, is almost oppo
site to the point where the north line of Sycamore street con
nects with it on the west. The accident in which Carl Spiegel
lost his life occurred about noon on the 4th day of October.
He came out of Williams street riding a bicycle, and
1907.
started diagonally across Main street toward Sycamore
street, and was struck and killed by a street car going south
on the west track.
double

I I

I I I I I I I I

(3) On behalf of appellant, it is urged that its motion
for judgment on the interrogatories notwithstanding the
general verdict should have been sustained, for the reason
that these answers show that the decedent was guilty of
negligence contributing to his death. The general verdict in
favor of the plaintiff is a ﬁnding of every material fact neces
sary to a recovery. The special ﬁndings of the jury will over
throw the general verdict only when both cannot stand, and
this antagonism must be apparent on the face of the record
beyond the possibility of being removed by any evidence ad
missible under the issues made by the pleadings.
The evi
dence actually introduced cannot be considered in passing
upon this question. Cox v. Ratcliffe, 105 Ind. 374, 5 N. E. 5;
Indiana National, etc., Co. in Long, 27 Ind. App. 219, 59 N.

E.

410.

Under the issues formed by the pleadings in this
case, evidence might have been introduced which would bring
the case within the operation of the doctrine known as the
This doctrine is clearly stated by a
“last clear chance.”
writer in the Quarterly Law Review (vol. 2, p. 507), as fol
lows: “The party who last has a clear opportunity of avoid
ing the accident, notwithstanding the negligence of his oppo
nent, is considered solely responsible for it.” This has been
frequently recognized and applied by our courts.
(4)

I

I

I I I I I I I I

Even though it be conceded that the answers to the
interrogatories show that the plaintiff’s decedent negligently
approached and entered upon the track of the appellant in
front of an approaching car, and thus negligently exposed
(5)
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himself to the danger of a collision, this would not necessarily
preclude a recovery from injury resulting from appellant’s
negligence.
Answers to interrogatories showing such facts
would not overthrow a general verdict in favor of the plain
tiff, for the reason that evidence may have been introduced
proving or tending to prove that, after said decedent was in
the position of danger in which he had so negligently placed
himself, the defendant knew of his perilous position, or
might have known it by the exercise of ordinary care, in time
to have prevented the injury, and that it negligently failed
to take advantage of the last clear chance to prevent the in
jury. It is the duty of this court to reconcile the interroga
tories with the general verdict if they can be so reconciled by
any evidence which might have been introduced within the
issues; and, to this end, the court, in ruling upon this motion,
will treat the case as though this evidence had been intro
duced and acted upon by the jury. In view of what we have
said, we are of the opinion that the answers to the interroga
tories are not in irreconcilable conﬂict with the general ver
dict, and the motion of appellant for judgment in its favor
on such interrogatories notwithstanding the general verdict
was properly overruled.

i
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[Reversed on other grounds.]
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ROCKFORD INSURANCE CO.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
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J

1890.

611.

CASSODAY,
.
The learned counsel for the defendant stren
uously contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the
general verdict or any of the special ﬁndings in favor of the
plaintiff. The view we have taken of the case renders it un
necessary for us to determine that question.
The statute requires the court to direct the jury to ﬁnd a
special verdict when requested as prescribed.
Sec. 2858, R.
prepared
verdict
by
must “be
S. Such
the court in the form
of questions in writing, relating only to material issues of
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fact and admitting a direct answer, to which the jury shall
make answer in writing.
The court may also direct the
verdict, to ﬁnd in writing upon
general
jury, if they render a
any particular question of fact to be stated as aforesaid.”
Ibid. This last provision is applicable to the case at bar.
The purpose of thus submitting particular controverted ques
tions of fact is to secure a direct answer free from any bias
or prejudice in favor of or against either party. It is a wise
provision in certain cases when properly administered.
It
has often been demonstrated in the trial of causes that the
non-expert juryman is more liable than the experienced law
yer or judge to be led away from the material issues of fact
involved by some collateral circumstance of little or no sig
niﬁcance, or by sympathy, bias, or prejudice; and hence it is
common practice for courts, in the submission of such par
ticular questions and special verdicts, to charge the jury, in
effect, that they have nothing to do with, and must not con
sider the effect which their answers may have upon, the con
troversy, or the parties.
The learned trial judge, when in
health, has frequently so charged.
It is certainly a very
proper thing to do when the business or reputation of either
party is such as to naturally stimulate a bias in favor
the
It
true that juries, under such
one party or the other.
charge, sometimes return inconsistent answers; but
is usu
the honest result of their unbiased judg
ally because such
upon
different
branches of the evidence.
ment
In the case at bar the learned trial judge seems to have
been particularly anxious to prevent such inconsistent an
swers; and hence he explained to the jury what different an
swers to each particular question so submitted would be con
sistent, and what inconsistent, with
general verdict in favor
of one or the other party. This was peculiarly calculated to
gen
secure special answers which would be consistent with
eral verdict rather than in accordance with the weight of evi
The effect of
dence upon each of such particular questions.
such instructions was very much the same as though the
court had charged the jury that after they had determined
general verdict then they should answer the particu
upon
lar questions submitted in the way they had thus been in
formed would be consistent with such general verdict.
This
was misleading, and well calculated to defeat the very object
of the statute in authorizing such submission.
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By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court
versed, and the cause
remanded for
new trial.
_
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was improper practice to permit
counsel for appellee to read the special interrogatories to the
jury, and in connection therewith discuss the evidence, for
the purpose of convincing the jury that under the evidence
the interrogatories should be answered in the affirmative or
in the negative, as the case might be. The objection
not
that the argument of counsel appealed to the prejudice of the
jurors or to their sympathies, or that
transcended legiti
mate grounds of debate, but simply that
was error to allow
counsel to read the interrogatories to the jury and discuss the
evidence which bore upon the answers which counsel con
ceived should be made by the jury thereto. The statute which
authorizes the submission of special questions of fact to be
jury requires that such questions shall be
answered by
stated to the jury in writing, and “shall be submitted by the
party requesting the same, to the adverse party before the
commencement of the argument to the jury.” The end de
signed to be attained by the argument of counsel
to lead the
jury to the proper decision of or answer to the issues made
by the pleadings.
It was entirely legitimate for counsel to
review the evidence and suggest to the jury what, under the
proof, their general verdict should be, and none the less to
suggest the answers which, in the view of counsel, the evi
dence demanded should be returned to the special interroga
tories.
In Timins ’U. Chicago, etc., Railroad Co., 72 Iowa, 94,
competent for an attorney to read special
was said: “It
interrogatories to the jury, and to discuss the evidence ap
plicable thereto, and to suggest the answers which in his
judgment ought to be rendered.”
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The judgment of the Appellate Court must
affirmed.

--Q;

L? (f
MYNCH

be

and

is

-

Verdicts Contrary to Law or Evidence.

K

v.

SNEAD ARCHITECTURAL IRON WORKS.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
132

1909.

Kentucky, 241.

Opinion of the court by JUDGE LAssING—Reversing.
1

Q

Q

I I

t

*

i

II

i

‘

Appellant complains that the jury in arriving at their ver
dict wholly disregarded instruction No. 1, and returned their
verdict in favor of plaintiff in spite of it. It is urged by
counsel for appellant that, without entering into a considera
tion as to Whether or not this instruction properly presented
the law as warranted by the facts proven, nevertheless it was
the law of this case, and in disregarding it and returning a
verdict in favor of plaintiff as they did the jury found con
trary to the law, and that, for this reason, the judgment pred
icated upon their verdict should be reversed and a new trial
On the other hand, it is claimed by plaintiff’s
awarded.
counsel that this instruction did not fairly present the law
of the case, as warranted by the facts, but that as the jury,
reached a reasonably
even though not properly instructed,
fair and just conclusion, their verdict and ﬁnding should not
The greater part of the briefs of opposing
be disturbed.
counsel is devoted to a consideration of this question.
The
defendant did not except or object to this instruction, nor is
his counsel now objecting to same, but his complaint is that
*
*
*
the jury disregarded this instruction.
Section 340, subsec. 6, Civ. Code Prac. makes one of the
grounds upon which a new trial may be granted “that the ver
dict or decision is not sustained by sufficient evidence, or is
contrary to law.” An examination of the authorities discloses
the fact that courts of last resort of the various states are not
by any means harmonious in the construction which they
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have placed upon similar code provisions, and there is, at
least, an apparent lack of uniformity upon this point in the
decisions in our own state. The superior court in the cases
of Gausman 'v. Paﬁ’, 10 Ky. Law Rep. 240; Palmer v. Johnson,
13 Ky. Law Rep. 590; Burns 12. McGibben, 9 Ky. Law Rep.
441; and Bertman v. Ebert's Adm’r., 9 Ky. Law Rep. 198, held
that, where a verdict is sought to be avoided on the ground
that it is contrary to law, the complaint relates to the law as
given by the court in its instructions to the jury, and not as
it should have been given, or, in other words these decisions
hold that where a new trial is sought on the ground that the
verdict is contrary to law, the “law” here referred to means
the “law” as declared or given by the court, and not as it
should have been given; that, even though the court was in
error and failed to give the law correctly, nevertheless the
jury was bound by the “law” as given, and, if their verdict
was contrary to the “law”, this fact would authorize a ire
versal of the case, and the granting of a new trial.
*
* * In the case of Smith v. Morrison, 3 A. K. Marsh,
81, in passing upon the ruling of the trial court in stopping
Smith’s counsel from arguing a proposition of law seemingly
contrary to that given by the court, this court said: “In thus
restraining counsel we are-of opinion the court acted per
fectly correct. After having obtained from the court an opin
ion on the legal import of the settlement, a decent regard for
that opinion would seem to forbid the same matter from be
ing again canvassed before the jury.” “ * “ The decisions
of other courts of last resort upon this point are not harmoni
ous, but the decided weight of the authorities is to the effect
that, where a statute authorizes a reversal upon the ground
that the verdict is contrary to the “law," the “law” referred
to means the “law” of that case as given by the court, whether
right or wrong.
In the case of Murray 7}. Heinze, 17 Mont. 353, 42 Pac.
1057, 43 Pac. 714, the court had under consideration the cor
rectness of the ruling and judgment of the trial court because
it was contrary to the “law” as given by the court. Upon ap
peal it was urged that this was error because the instruction
or “law” as given by the trial court was itself erroneous. In
disposing of this question the court said: “But counsel for
the appellant contend that, the instruction being erroneous,
the court erred in setting aside the verdict, because of the
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fact that the jury wholly disregarded it. The question pre
sented is:
Had the jury the right to disregard the instruc
tions of the court if erroneous?
This is a most important
uestion in the administration of the law.
It must be con
authority
eded that there is a conﬂict of
on this question.
Counsel for the appellant cite a number of authorities in sup
port of their claim that the jury may disregard the instruc
tions of the court, if erroneous, if the verdict is otherwise in
accord with the law, and that it would be error in the court

‘
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it
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under such circumstances to set aside the verdict.
It seems
from the authorities cited by appellant that Kentucky,
Georgia, Texas, and some other states have so held. A num
ber of the cases cited by counsel for appellant are not exactly
in point; that is, they are cases in which the jury did not
seemingly disregard the erroneous instructions upon vitally
material issues in the case, and where the verdict was in con
i
lformity with the charge of the court, taken as a whole. But
must be confessed that some of the authorities cited hold
right to disregard erroneous instructions
the jury have
ithat
the court, and that the verdict should not be set aside in
in accord with the correct law.
such cases
But
let
be conceded that there
conﬂict of authorities upon
the question under discussion, or let us suppose that
a
new question,'without any adjudications or authority, in
either event; what course should this court pursue? It has
always been held in this jurisdiction that
was the sole
province of the jury to determine questions of fact. It has
was error for the court to invade
been uniformly held that
this special province of the jury by even commenting on the
Mont. 174, 22 Pac. 1088, and
evidence. State '0. Sullivan,
certainly based
authorities cited. Our system of practice
upon the theory that
the province of the jury to deter
facts,
and
that
of
the
court to determine and declare the
mine
law in all cases, except in prosecutions for libel. ‘The jury,
under the direction of the court, shall determine the law and
section 10. From this consti
the facts.’ State Const. art.
tutional clause
seems plain that the jury have no right to
‘Ezpressio unius est
determine the law in any other case.
erclusio alterius.' This
the ﬁrst time
has been seriously
contended in this court that the jury have the right to deter
mine the law in an ordinary suit at law and to absolutely dis
regard the instructions of the court on the ground that, in
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the opinion of the jury, the instructions of the court are
If the contention of the appellant is to be upheld,
erroneous.
what may we not anticipate as the result in the administra
tion of the law in this state? If the jury may rightfully in
vade the province of the court, why may‘ not the court retali
ate by invading the province of the jury in determining
questions of fact? As counsel for the respondent suggest, if
the contention of appellant is correct, then logically there is an
appeal in all cases upon questions of law'from_the trial court
to the jury. And as counsel for respondent further suggest
in their argument, if the fury may determine the law, an at
torney arguing the case may say to the jury: ‘The court will
charge you that the law is so and so, but I say to you the
court is wrong. You, the jury, are the judges of the law, and
Would any court permit
may determine it for yourselves.’
jury?
Certainly
argument
not. But, if the jury
to a
such an
are the judges of the law, why should a court prohibit such
an argument to them? If a juror should state upon his voir
dire that he would not be governed by the law as declared by
the court, if he thought the instructions erroneous, nobody
would doubt that he would not be permitted to sit in the case.
Yet, if he has the right as a juror to determine the law, we
do not see why he should be challenged for asserting that
right. If the contention of appellant is correct, the time of
this court in hearing future appeals will be devoted to deter
mining -whether the court or the jury were right in their
views of the law in the trial of the cause in the lower court.
Authority, or no authority, we cannot give our sanction to a
practice that would lead to such results. Such a course would
ultimately result in overturning our system of keeping sep
arate and distinct the powers and duties of the courts and
juries, conﬁning each to its own proper province, in the deg
radation of the courts, and confusion and chaos in the ad
ministration of the law.” "‘ "‘ “ Emerson 'v. County of
Santa Clara, 40 Cal. 543; " * " Barton v. Shull, 62 Neb.
"‘
"'
*
Way v. Chicago & Rock Island
570, 87 N. W. 322;
*
"‘
"
Iowa,
Co.,
463, 35 N. W. 525.
Railway
73
To the
same effect are Bunten 'v. Mutual Ins. Co., 4 Bosw. (N. Y.)
254; Flemming v. Marine Ins. Co., 4 Whart. (Pa.) 59, 33
Am. Dec. 33; Dent v. Bryce, 16 S. C. 1; Fleming 71. L. & N. R.
R. Co., 148 Ala. 527, 41 South. 683; Wood v. Cox, 84 English
Common Law, 280.
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full consideration,

we adhere to the rule inferen
' "' ‘ and subse
Morrison,
tially declared in Smith v.
quently followed by the superior court in the several opinions
to which we have referred, and by this court in the later case
of Curran v. Stein, that it is the duty of the trial jury to “con
form to the instructions of the court upon matters of law.”
In other words, that it is the exclusive province of the court
determine questions of law, and that of the jury only to
apply the facts proven to the law as given by the court; and,
contrary to “law,” refer
when
stated that the verdict
had to the law as given by the court, and not as
ence
might or should have been given.
is

is
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Schoepbach v. La Clede Gas Light Co., (1910) 232 Mo. 603, the
said:—"As an appeal is a mere creature of the statute, the dis
position of an appeal in an upper court is subject to statutory regula
tion. What the statute grants it may regulate, modify or take away. By
express mandate of the lawgiver we are forbidden to reverse any judg
materially affecting the
ment. unless we believe error was committed
'
Accordingly, it 3
merits of the action.
[Sec. 2082, R. S. 1909]
court below, giving a wrong reason, reaches the right conclusion, its
will not be disturbed above. So, if a jury could ﬁnd but
conclusion
one verdict on the facts and ﬁnds that verdict, a misdirection by the
court does not touch the ‘merits’ of that case.
Under the statute in
hand,
the court told the jury to go south and they went north and
north was the only way the law would allow them to go, we cannot
reverse and remand in order that the court might tell them on a new
the court give too little, too much, or bad law
trial to go north. So
party litigant, and yet the jury stumble into a verdict consonant
for
with justice, and the only one the facts allow, under the statute in
hand we must let that judgment alone."
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court

SERLES

Supreme

v.

SERLES.

Court of Oregon.

1899.

35 Oregon, 28.9.

a

is

an action by W. L. Serles against Clara Serles, S. C.
Zuber, and John Hough, to recover damages for trespass in
detaching and removing
dwelling house from the realty of
the plaintiff. The verdict of the jury was for plaintiff in the
sum of $400, and against the defendants Series and Zuber,

This

and

judgment having been

entered

thereon,

they

appeal
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After the rendition of the verdict, the defendants
interposed a motion to set it aside, and for a new trial, based
upon several grounds: First, that of newly discovered evi
dence; Second, excessive damages; and, Third. that the evi
dence was insuﬁicient to warrant the verdict,-that the ver
dict is against the evidence, is not justiﬁed thereby, and is
contrary to law. This motion was overruled, the court say
ing: “The question of whether the verdict is a proper one
upon the evidence is not now involved, only to the extent as
to whether there was any evidence to support it, and there is
no doubt that there was, and the court cannot review their
decision upon the preponderance of the evidence."
WOLVERTON, C. J., after stating the facts.

l

It

#

*

IF

#

¥

l i

¥

1

is strenuously urged, however, that the court below
decided the motion for a new trial upon an erroneous prin
ciple of law, in this: That it was governed, as is shown by its
written opinion, by the idea that, if there was any evidence in
the record to support the verdict, it was without power to
disturb the same or set it aside; whereas, it is insisted that
it is the duty of the court, in the consideration of the motion
for a new trial, based upon the insufficiency of the evidence,
to weigh all the evidence submitted to the jury, and if, upon
the whole case, the verdict appears to be against the weight
of evidence and is manifestly unjust, to allow the motion.
The trial judge seems to have assimilated the ground for
granting a new trial to that which is proper in support of a
motion for a nonsuit, and hence, his conclusion that, if there
was any evidence to support the verdict, it was his duty to
uphold it. It is a rule of law, well established in this juris
diction, that a motion for a nonsuit is in the nature of a de
murrer to the evidence, and it not only admits all that the
evidence proves, b'ut all inferences that might be legitimately
drawn therefrom tending to prove a fact under the issues;
and, if there is any evidence offered from which such an in
ference could be drawn, it is the duty of the court to permit
it to go to the jury, as the motion is a test of the competency
of the evidence to prove the fact to which it is directed. And
the question is, upon such motion, whether there is any evi
dence tending to prove the material allegation upon which the
cause of action is based, and this is one of law. But whether
a given amount of evidence is suiiicient to sustain an allega
2.
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tion is a question of fact for the jury; so that, if there is any
evidence tending to prove a given fact, it is the duty of the
court, upon the motion for nonsuit to permit it to go to the
jury, and to take their verdict touching it: Vanbebber v.
Plunkett, 26 Or. 562 (27 L. R. A. 811, 38 Pac. 707), and cases
therein cited.
Under the statute (Hill's Ann. Laws, § 235, subd. 6), the
court is authorized to set aside a verdict and grant a new trial
for “insufﬁciency of the evidence to justify the verdict or
other decision, or that it is against law.” This statute does
not appear to have received any direct construction by this
court; but there are authorities elsewhere pertinent to the
inquiry, and they leave no doubt but that, in passing upon the
suﬁiciency of the evidence to support the verdict, the trial
court is authorized to weigh and consider all the evidence
which has been submitted to the jury, and if it is ascertained
that the verdict is against the clear weight thereof, or is one
that is manifestly unjust, or that reasonable men would not
adopt or return, to set it aside and grant a new trial. A sim
ilar statute has received express construction by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of Metropolitan R. R.
It was there
C0. '0. Moore, 121 U. S. 558 (7 Sup. Ct. 1334).
held that the language used in the statute, which gave a right
to set aside the verdict for insuﬁicient evidence, was not to
be limited to its insufficiency in point of law, but that it ex
tended also to its insufficiency in point of fact. Such evidence
is said to be insufficient in law only where there is a total ab
sence of proof, either as to the quantity or kind, or from
which no inference could be drawn in support of the fact
sought to be established.
But insuﬁiciency in point of fact
may exist where there is no insufficiency in point of law;
that is, there may be some evidence to sus_tain every element
of the case._competent both in quantity and quality under the
law, and yet it may be met by countervailing proof so potent
and convincing as to leave no reasonable doubt of the opposite
conclusion. So it is that, upon a review of the whole evidence,
the testimony in support of the cause of action or defense
may be so slight, although competent in law, or the pre
ponderance against it may be so convincing, that a verdict
may seem to be plainly unreasonable and unjust; and in many
cases it might be the duty of the court to withdraw the case
from the jury, or to direct a verdict in a particular way, yet
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in others, where it would be proper to submit the case to the
jury, it might become its duty to set aside the verdict and
grant a new trial.

i I i

It

*

i i i i
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must be understood, of course, that a mere dissatisfac
tion of the judge with the verdict is not sufficient ground for
disturbing it, but the court must exercise its judgment in
each particular case, and if, from all the testimony given the
jury, it is satisﬁed that the verdict is against the clear weight
or preponderance of evidence, or that the jury has acted un
reasonably in returning the verdict, or has been misled or
misdirected, or has acted through improper motives, it is the
duty of the court to set it aside and grant a new trial. Wright
v. Southern Express Co., 80 Fed. 85, 93; Mt. Adams, etc., Ry.
Co. v. Lowery, 20 C. C. A. 596, 74 Fed. 463, 477. There may
be sufficient evidence to go to the jury to make a prima facie
case, yet there may be opposing evidence so strong, palpable,
and overwhelming as to dissipate any reasonable idea that
the prima facie case should prevail; or the case as ﬁrst made
may be so strong, and the countervailing testimony so weak
and unsatisfactory, as to preclude an honest and rational
judgment against the case ﬁrst made. In either case, if the
jury should disregard the better showing, it would plainly
be the duty of the court to interpose, upon motion for a new
trial, and set the verdict aside; and this is the rationale of
the statute, in providing that the verdict may be set aside for
insufficiency of evidence.
Mr. Justice Brewer has laid down what seems to us to be
the proper rule for the guidance of the trial judge, in Kansas
Pac. Ry. Co. 12. Kunkel, 17 Kan. 172. He says: “The one (the
trial judge) has the same opportunity as the jury for form
ing a just estimate of the credence to be placed in the various
witnesses, and, if it appears to him that the jury have found
against the weight of evidence, it is his imperative duty to
set the verdict aside. We do not mean that he is to substitute
his own judgment in all cases for the judgment of the jury,
for it is their province to settle questions of fact; and when
the evidence is nearly balanced, or is such that different
minds would naturally and fairly come to different conclu
sions thereon, he has no right to disturb the ﬁndings of the
jury, although his own judgment might incline him the other
way. In other words, the ﬁnding of the jury is to be upheld
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by him as against any mere doubts of its correctness.
But
when his judgment tells him that it is wrong; that, whether
from mistake, or prejudice, or other cause, the jury have
erred, and found against the fair preponderance of the evi
dence—then no duty is more imperative than that of setting
aside the verdict, and remanding the question to another

Jury}:
We think the court in the case at bar proceeded upon an
erroneous principle of law in limiting its inquiry to ascertain
ing whether there was any evidence from which the jury
might infer the facts which were attempted to be proven. It
should have gone further, and weighed the evidence in ac
with the principles hereinbefore
cordance
enunciated:
Larson 'v. Oregon Ry. & N111). Co., 19 Or. 240, 247 (23 Pac.
974) ; State '0. Billings, 81 Iowa, 99 (46 N. W. 862) ; City of
Tacoma 'v. Tacoma Light & Water Co., 16 Wash. 288 (47 Pac.
738) ; Hawkins o. Reichert, 28 Cal. 534; Dickey '0. Davis, 39
Cal. 565; Bennett 'v. Hobro, 72 Cal. 178 (13 Pac. 473) ; Rcitl.
v. Young, 7 App. Div. 400 (39 N. Y. Supp. 899) ; First Nat.
Bank 12. Wood, 124 Mo. 72 (27 S. W. 554). The defendants
were entitled to have their motion for a new trial passed
upon in pursuance of correct principles of law, and, the trial
court having failed in this, the cause will be remanded, with
directions to determine the motion under the rules herein
The cumulative character of the newly-discov
announced.
ered evidence renders defendants’ position upon the ﬁrst
ground untenable; and, as it pertains to the second, viz., that
the damages assessed are excessive, that was a matter within
By anything we have said
the discretion of the trial court.
in this opinion it is not intended to indicate in any manner
our impressions touching the weight of the evidence submit
ted to the jury, and the court below, having seen the witnesses
and observed their manner, must act entirely upon its own
judgment in passing upon the motion.
Reversed?
9Verdlcts for amounts which are clearly excessive or clearly too
For cases
small may be set aside as against the weight of the evidence.
oi the ﬁrst description see Harrison v. Sutter Street Ry. Co., (1897) 116
Traction Co., (1900) 65 N. J. L. 539;
Cal. 685; Graham v. Consolidated
and tor a case oi.’ the second kind see Tathwell v. City of Cedar Rapids,
(1903) 122 Ia. 50.
After two verdicts ot a jury for substantially the same amount the
court will usually acquiesce.—Bryant v. Ins. Co., (1833) 13 Pick. (Mass)
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32 Rhode

1910.

Island, 16.

JoHNsoN, J.—This is an action of the case, brought by
Samuel Phillips against The Rhode Island Company, to re
cover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sus
tained through the negligence of the defendant company in
the operation of one of its street cars.
*
*
The case was tried in the Superior Court with a
jury on the 21st, 24th, and 25th days of January, 1910, and a
verdict was rendered for the plaintiff in the sum of twenty
ﬁve hundred dollars.
Thereupon the defendant moved for
a new trial, alleging as grounds therefor:

'
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That certain members of the jury before whom
said cause was tried were guilty of misconduct in this, that
during the progress of said trial, and without the consent of
the court, without the knowledge and consent of the attorneys
for the defendant, did take an unauthorized view of the
premises where the accident occurred, concerning which said
action was brought and prosecuted.
*
*
"‘
The defendant's motion for a new trial was denied
justice
by the
who presided at the trial, and the case is now
before .this court on the defendant’s bill of exceptions.
1
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juryman was introduced as to an unau
thorized view he himself took of the place of the accident;
also, an affidavit of
person not a juryman who stated there
in what another juror had told him about an unauthorized
view taken by that juror, together with an affidavit of the
latter juror denying the statements in the affidavit concern
ing what he had said.]

[An affidavit of
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is well settled in this State that the affidavits of j urymen
as to what takes place in the juryroom are inadmissible to
impeach their verdict.
In Tucker v. Town Council of South
Kingstown, 5 R. I. 558, 560, the court, speaking by Ames, C.
J., said: “The afﬁdavits of the jury-men as to what took
place in the jury-room, or as to the grounds upon which they
found their verdict, and which were read de benc at the hear
ing, must be rejected; a rule of policy, well settled both in
England and in this country, excluding, for the security of
verdicts, this mode of impeaching them.”
The general rule that the affidavits of jurors as to their
own misconduct during the trial are inadmissible to impeach
their verdict is, we think, supported by the great weight of
authority both in this country and in England. In Owen Tr.
Warburton, 4 Bos. & Pull. 326, where the affidavit of a jury
man, that the verdict was decided by lot, was offered, Mans
ﬁeld, Ch. J. (pp. 329-330), said: “We have conversed with
the other judges upon this subject, and we are all of the
opinion that the affidavit of a juryman cannot be received.
It is singular that almost the only evidence of which the case
admits should be shut out; but, considering the arts which
might be used if a contrary rule were to prevail, we think it
necessary to exclude such evidence.
If it were understood
to be the law that a juryman might set aside a verdict by
such evidence, it might sometimes happen that a juryman.
being a friend of one of the parties, and not being able to
bring over his companions to his opinion, might propose a
decision by lot, with a view afterwards to set aside the ver
dict by his own affidavit, if the decision should be against
him.” In State "v. Freeman, 5 Conn. 348, the court, by
Hosmer, C. J. (p. 351), said: “In this state, it has been the
practice to admit such testimony; but, said Ch. J. Swift (1
Dig. 775), ‘In England, and in the courts of the United States,
jurors are not permitted to be witnesses respecting the mis
conduct of the jury; for it is a great misdemeanor; and this
is most unquestionably the correct principle; for otherwise, a
juror, who should be disposed to set aside a verdict, would
give information to the party for that purpose; if not so dis
posed, he could suppress the information; and, in that way,
any of the jury could command the verdict.’

It
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the reception of the testimony in question; and, in my opin
ion, on invincible foundations.”
In the cases cited supra, the affidavits of the jurors were
Where the
offered as to their misconduct in the juryroom.
affidavits of jurors have been offered as to their misconduct
outside of the juryroom to impeach their verdict, the same
rule of public policy has generally been applied by the courts.
Thus in Chadbourn v. Franklin, 5 Gray 312, where defendant
moved for a new trial, and in support of the motion offered
one of the jurors as a witness to show that on the Sunday
intervening, while the trial was in progress, said juror went
to the place where the collision occurred, and examined it for
the purpose of informing himself upon the subject-matter of
the trial, and the judge below ruled that the juror could not
be permitted to testify, in support of this motion, to these
acts tending to show his own misconduct, and the defendant
excepted, the.court, Shaw, C. . said: “The modern practice
has been uniform, not to entertain a motion to set aside a
verdict on the ground of error, mistake, irregularity or mis
conduct of the jury, or of any of them, on the testimony of
one or more jurors; and it rests, we think, on sound consid
erations of public policy.” In Rowe p. Canney, 139 Mass. 41,
42, the court, by Morton, C. J. said:
“The same considera
tions of public policy protect the communications of jurors
with each other, whether in or out of the jury-room, during
the pendency of the case on hearing before them.” See also
Commonwealth o. White, 147 Mass. 76, 80.
In Sanitary District v. Cullerton, 147 Ill. 385, the affidavits
of three of the jurors were offered touching the conduct of
others of the jury, and the bailiff in charge, tending to im
It was complained that after they had
peach the verdict.
ﬁnished viewing the premises some of the jurors drank in
toxicating liquor. The court, p. 390, said: “This court, in
an unbroken line of decisions from the case of Forrester r.
Guard, Breese, 44, is committed to the doctrine that the affi
davits of jurors can not be received for the purpose of show
ing cause for setting aside the verdict. * * *”
¥
*
II
i # t *
#
*
#

J

1'. Shrere, 22 N. J. L. 176, the court said, at
principle is now well settled, that generally
“The
182:
page
the affidavits of jurors shall not be received as to what took
place in the jury-room, or elsewhere, to show misbehaviour,
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In some States affidavits of jurors

i
i

*

I i i i

ii

1

Ill

or on the delivery of the verdict to show mistake, for the pur
pose of correcting or destroying the verdict, though it seems
their affidavits are admissible for the purpose of exculpation.
The rule stands on the ground of public policy, courts being
unwilling to permit a dissatisﬁed juror by such means to de
stroy a verdict to which he had given a public assent.”
In Downer v. Baxter, 30 Vt. 467, after the case had been
given to the jury, the officer in charge allowed the jury to
separate, and they went to their respective boarding-houses
for dinner, returning thence to the jury-room and resuming
the consideration of the case. The aﬁidavits of all the jurors
were read, stating that after they were impanelled to try the
cause they had no conversation with any one touching it, ex
cept among themselves. The court, p. 475, said: “An objec
tion was taken to the competency of the affidavits of the
jurors and their admissibility raises a legal question which
we are called upon to decide. We think the true rule is, that
the aﬁidavits of jurors may be read to exculpate themselves
and'sustain their verdict, but not to impeach it. In this case
they were offered to show that the jurors had no conversation
with others, nor heard any in relation to the cause.”
as to

their own mis

a

is

a

&

I.

a

5

it

conduct outside the jury-room during the trial are admitted
to impeach their verdict.
Pierce v. Brennan, 83 Minn. 422;
Peppercorn v. Black River Falls, 89 Wis. 38; Roller v. Bach
Lea. 153. In Iowa
has been held that affidavits of
man,
jurors may be received, for the purpose of avoiding verdict,
to show any matter occurring during the trial, or in the jury
room, which does not essentially inhere in the verdict itself.
Wright 11.
M. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa, 195. This was
case of
This rule has been followed
misconduct in the jury-room.
in Kansas,—Perry 1;. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539. We are not, how
ever, convinced by the reasoning of these cases.
We are of
the opinion that the affidavits of jurors as to their own mis
conduct in or out of the jury-room during the trial are in
The objection on the
admissible to impeach their verdict.
just as strong in the one case as
ground of public policy
in the other. The affidavit of the juror in this case was in
admissible as to his own misconduct in taking an unauthor
ized view, to impeach the verdict, and therefore can not be
An affidavit to the declaration of
juror im_
considered.
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peaching the verdict, besides contravening the same rule of
policy, is condemned by the ordinary rule of evidence, ex
cluding hearsay testimony.
The defendant's exceptions‘ are overruled, and the case is
remitted to the Superior Court with direction to enter judg
ment upon the verdict.

I

/Y7—___t

Q-&

\MATTOX
j A-k

Supreme

v.

UNITED STATES.

Court of the United States.
146

1892.

United States, 140.

This was an indictment charging Clyde Mattox with the
murder of one John Mullen, about December 12, 1889, in
that part of the Indian Territory made part of the United
States judicial district of Kansas by section two of the act
of Congress of January 6, 1883, (22 Stat. 400, c. 13,) en
titled “An act to provide for holding a term of the District
Court of the United States at Wichita, Kansas, and for other
purposes.”
.
Defendant pleaded not guilty, was put upon his trial,
October 5, 1891, and on the eighth of that month was found
guilty as charged, the jury having retired on the seventh
Motions for a new trial and in
to consider their verdict.
arrest of judgment were severally made and overruled, and
Mattox sentenced to death. This writ of error was there
upon sued out.
3

I I

1

I

8

1

l I

Q

In support of his motion for new trial the defendant of
fered the affidavits of two of the jurors that the bailiff
who had charge of the jury in the case after the cause had
“and while they were deliberat
ing of their verdict,” “in the presence and hearing of the
jurors or a part of them, speaking of the case, said ‘After
you fellows get through with this case it will be tried again
Thompson has poison in a bottle that them
down there.
And at another time, in the
fellows tried to give him.’
presence and hearing of said jury or a part of them, refer
ring to the defendant, Clyde Mattox said:
‘This is the
been heard and submitted,
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third fellow he has killed.’ ” The affidavit of another juror
to the same effect in respect of the remark of the bailiff
as to Thompson was also offered, and in addition the aﬁi
davits of eight of the jurors, i'ncluding the three just men
tioned, “that after said cause had been submitted to the
jury, and while the jury were deliberating of their verdict,
and before they had agreed upon a verdict in the case, a
certain newspaper printed and published in the city of
Wichita, Kansas, known as The Wichita Daily Eagle, of the
date of Thursday morning, October 8, 1891, was introduced
into the jury room; that said paper contained a comment
upon the case under consideration by said jury, and that
said comment upon said case so under consideration by said
jury, was read to the jury in their presence and hearing;
that the comment so read to said jury is found upon the
ﬁfth page of said paper, and in the third column of said
‘ *”
"
page, and is as follows:
FULLER, C. J., afterstating the case.
The allowance or
refusal of a new trial rests in the sound discretion of the
court to which the application is addressed, and the result
cannot be made the subject of review by writ of error, Hen
derson v. Moore, 5 Cranch, 11; Newcomb v. Wood, 97 U. S.
581; but in the case at bar the District Court excluded the
afﬁdavits, and, in passing upon the motion, did not exercise
any discretion in respect of the matters stated therein. Due
exception was taken and the question of admissibility thereby
preserved.
It will be perceived that the jurors did not state what
inﬂuence, if any, the communication of the bailiff and the
reading of the newspaper had upon them but conﬁned their
statements to what was said by the one and read from the
other.

I

$

l

ll

I I I l I

Q

There is, however, a recognized distinction between what
may and what may not be established by the testimony of

jurors to

set aside a verdict.

This distinction is thus put by Mr. Justice Brewer, speak
ing for the Supreme Court of Kansas in Perry v. Bailey, 12
Kans. 539, 545: “Public policy forbids that a matter rest
ing in the personal consciousness of one juror should be
received to overthrow the verdict, because being personal
it is not accessible to other testimony; it gives to the se
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cret thought of one the power to disturb the expressed
conclusions of twelve; its tendency is to produce bad faith
on the part of a minority, to induce an apparent acqui
escence with the purpose of subsequent dissent; to induce
tampering with individual jurors subsequent to the verdict.
But as to overt acts, they are accessible to the knowledge
of all the jurors; if one affirms misconduct, the remaining
eleven can deny; one cannot disturb the action of the twelve;
it is useless to tamper with one, for the eleven may be heard.
Under this view of the law the affidavits were properly re
ceived. They tended to prove something which did not essen
tially inhere in the verdict, an overt act, open to the knowl
edge of all the jury, and not alone within the personal
consciousness of one.”
The subject was much considered by Mr. Justice Gray,
then a member of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa
chusetts, in Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453, where
numerous authorities were referred to and applied, and the
conclusions announced, “that on a motion for a new trial
on the ground of bias on the part of one of the jurors, the
evidence of jurors as to the motives and inﬂuences which
affected their deliberations, is inadmissible either to impeach
or to support the verdict. ‘But a juryman may testify to
any facts bearing upon the question of the existence of any
extraneous inﬂuence, although not as to how far that in
fiuence operated upon his mind. So a juryman may testify
in denial or explanation of acts or declarations outside of
the jury room, where evidence of such acts has been given
See, also, Ritchie v. Holbrook,
as ground for a new trial.”
7 S. & R. 458; Chews v. Driver, 1 Cox (N. J.), 166; Nelms
v. Mississippi, 13 Sm. & Marsh. 500; Hawkins v. New Or
leans Printing Co., 29 Ala. Ann. 134, 140; Whitney v. Whit
man, 5 Mass. 405; Hia: v. Drury, 5 Pick. 296.
We regard the rule thus laid down as comformable to
right reason and sustained by the weight of authority.
These aﬁidavits were within the rule, and being material
their exclusion constitutes reversible error. A brief exam
ination will demonstrate their materiality.
*

1

Q

i

1

I

U

i
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is reversed, and the cause remanded to the
I)istrict Court of the United States for the District of Kan
The judgment
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trial."

10 In McDonald v. Pless,
(1914) 238 U. S. 264, it was held that it
could not be shown by jurors‘ afhdavlts that the amount of the verdict
was ﬁxed by lot, although the court remarks that in some states by
statute and In others by decision of the court, such aﬂidavlts are ad~
missible.
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WOLFGRAM

v.

TOWN OF SCHOEPKE.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
128 Wisconsin,

1904.

19.

Action for personal injuries from a hole in a country
highway, left by the town authorities in original construc
tion by merely covering the same with poles. Special ver
dict of twenty questions returned by jury, ﬁnding all ma
terial facts in favor of the plaintiff except that question
No. 16, “Was plaintiff guilty of any want of ordinary care
which contributed to injury he received?” was answered
Plaintiff produced affidavits of all twelve jurors
“Yes.”
to the effect that all the jurors agreed that plaintiff was
not guilty of any want of ordinary care, and that the in
sertion of the answer “Yes” instead of the word “No” was
The foreman, agreeing with these facts, states
a mistake.
that he intended to write answer to the sixteenth question
so as to ﬁnd that said plaintiff was not guilty of any want
Upon
of ordinary care which contributed to his injury.
these affidavits the plaintiff moved, ﬁrst, that the answer
“Yes” to the sixteenth question be stricken out, and the
answer “No” be inserted in lieu thereof, and for judgment
upon the verdict as so amended, basing the request also on
the contention that there was no evidence to sustain the
That motion was de
affirmative answer to that question.
nied, from which denial the plaintiff appeals.
Thereupon plaintiff moved on minutes and said affidavits
for a new trial. Defendant moved to strike out jurors’ affi
The court entered its order reciting that the mo
davits.
tion was based on a mistake in the verdict and on the lack
of support from evidence, whereby it denied defendant’s
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motion to strike out said aﬁidavits, “excepting that said
aﬁidavits be received and considered only as tending to show
that there was
mistrial by reason of
mistake by the
jury in writing the answer to question No. 16,” but reject
ing said affidavits in as far as they “tend, generally, to‘ im
peach or contradict said special verdict.” The court entered
further order granting plaintiff's motion to set aside the
new trial, no costs being imposed on
verdict and awarding
either party. From that order the defendant appeals.

it

is

is

it

I

\

it

a

is, however, probably true that the new trial was
granted because the court was convinced by the jurors’ af
ﬁdavits that the written verdict did not express the con
clusion of the jury, and that the peril of injustice from
entry of judgment for defendant was so great that, in exer
eise of the discretion vested in him,
new trial ought '00 be
had. This view presents the question whether the affidavits
of jurors could be received as evidence of the facts they
The general rule is very ancient, and often reiter
state.
ated, that the statements of the jurors will not be received
to establish their own misconduct or to impeach their ver
dict. Edmister 'v. Garrison, 18 Wis. 594, 603. An excellent
collection and analysis of decided cases will be found in
appears
Woodward 'v. Lea-vitt, 107 Mass. 453. From this
that the early idea was that of secrecy in their delibera
tions, and, further, the impropriety of receiving jurors’
statements as to their mental processes, whether to impeach
This rule, in its application, has
or support their verdict.
been subjected to much of reﬁnement and qualification by
different courts, involving conﬂict of dicta and of actual
would not be proﬁtable to review in detail
decision which
The necessity of some limita
nor possible to harmonize.
tion to the general rule against receiving statements of the
jurors
declared in McBean v. State, 83 Wis. 206, 209, 53
limited to things which
N. W. 497. In some cases the rule
transpire in the jury room or in court, but
will be found
in most of those cases also limited to matters involved in
This limitation was recognized and
reaching the verdict.
applied in Hempton v. State, 111 Wis. 127, 145, 86 N. W.
596; Roman v. State, 41 Wis. 312; Schissler v. State, 122
Wis. 365, 99 N. W. 593; Peppercorn v. Black River Falls, 89
Wis. 38, 41, 61 N. W. 79; Mattoa: v. U. S., 146 U. S. 140, 13
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Sup. Ct. 50. In line with the same idea are a number of
decisions drawing a distinction between the proceedings in
in reaching and agreeing upon the verdict and the
The
mere act of expressing it, either orally or in writing.
ollowing cases recognize such distinction, and hold that the
easons excluding jurors’ testimony as to their conduct in
he former stage do not exclude their evidence as to what
eally was the verdict agreed on in order to prove that it
as not been correctly expressed, through mistake or other
Burrows, 383; Roberts v. Hughes,
ise: Cogan v. Ebden,
Mees.
W. 399; Little v. Larrabee,
Greenl. 37; Weston
Law,
1). Gilmore,
63 Me. 493; Peters v. Fogarty, 55 N.
386, 26 Atl. 855; Jackson v. Dickenson,
15 Johns. 309;
Dalrymple v. Williams, 63 N. Y. 361; Hodgkins v. Mead, 119
N. Y. 166, 23 N. E. 559; Capen v. Stoughtcm, 16 Gray, 364;
Pelzer Mfg. Co. v. Hamburg-B. F. Ins. Co., 71 Fed. 830.
Several of these cases were cited with approval of this very
Against their doc
distinction in McBea.n v. State, supra.
trine we ﬁnd Polhemus v. He-iman, 50 Cal. 438; Murphy 'v.
Murphy,
S. Dak. 316, 47 N. W. 142, and McKinley v. First
Bank,
Nat.
118 Ind. 375, 21 N. E. 36. ~Of these, the ﬁrst two
seem to be controlled by local statutes, and are therefore
not persuasive.
The Indiana case, however, squarely de
nies the admissibility of jurors’ testimony to prove that the
special question was the reverse of the
written answer to
agreement in fact reached. This view is based on the rule
that jurors cannot “impeach their own verdict.”
But is
an attempt to impeach their own verdict? That depends
used.
Is the written
on the sense in which that word
jury
ﬁled,
agreement
reach,
or the
which the
paper
the ver
dict? We think the latter is what is intended when we say
the jurors cannot impeach it. The former, like most rec
ords or writings, is but the expression or evidence of some
Hence it may well be said that a show
mental conception.
ing that such writing
not correct
not impeachment of
the verdict itself.
The repudiation of written expressions,
when, by mistake, they fail to express the intention or men
tal concept,
familiar in the law. A writing
not
con
tract when
fails to express that on which the minds of
the parties met, and courts freely exercise power to correct
mistakes when the proof leaves no doubt that the real con
tract was something else. That which decides the rights of
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parties litigant is the unanimous agreement of the jurors.
Each party is entitled to such judgment as results from that
agreement. Any other is presumptively unjust, and any rule
that necessitates it is unreasonable unless supported by con
siderations of public policy, or of such danger from opening
the door to investigation that wrong is likely to be done
oftener than the right promoted.
We are persuaded that
juror
from showing that
the reasons which should exclude a
he made a mistake in reaching his conclusion
(see Mur
dock v. Sumner, 22 Pick. 156) do not extend to a showing
that the words used in conveying it to the court, or enroll
ing it on the records, by mistake of the person uttering or

writing them, fail to express the conclusions reached by all

the jurymen. Of course, the showing of the latter fact must
be clear beyond peradventure; at least to warrant a change
in the written verdict and ﬁnal judgment thereon.
If the
slightest doubt lurks in the mind of the court, he should
conﬁne relief to the granting of a new trial, which, of course,
he may always order when there is reasonable cause to be
lieve that the judgment will do injustice.
Some courts in
cline to the view that a new trial is the only relief after the
jury have separated. Little u. Larrabee, supra; Weston v.
Gilmore, 63 Me. 493. But the clear weight of authority is
that, upon sufficiently clear showing of the mistake, and of
what was the verdict agreed on and intended to be expressed,
the court may substitute a true expression for the incorrect
one, and enter judgment accordingly.
See Cogan v. Ebden,

supra; Peters v. Fogarty, supra; Dalrymple '0. Williams, su
pra; Hodgkins v. Mead, supra; Pelzer Mfg. Co. v. Hamburg
'
B. F. Ins. Co., supra.
We conclude, therefore, that the trial court properly re
ceived'and considered the affidavits of the» jurors in this
case; that they at least sufficed to satisfy the court of great
danger of injustice being done by entry of judgment in ac
cordance with the written verdict, and therefore justiﬁed
him in exercising his discretion to relieve plaintiff from the
predicament in which he stood by awarding him another
trial. Whether such affidavits made so plain. a case as to
entitle plaintiff to correction of the verdict and judgment
in his favor is a question not open to plaintiff on this appeal.
Plaintiff might probably have raised it had he refrained
from motion for new trial and appealed from a judgment in
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When, however, he made the latter
defendant’s favor.
motion, he appealed to the court's discretion to relieve him
from the adverse situation which, while not due to his fault
or mistake, was due neither to any misconduct of the jury
nor error of the court.
He had no absolute right to such
relief, but merely to have the court exercise a judicial dis
cretion whether it ought to be accorded him. The situation
does not fall within any of those where it is held proper
to grant the relief without terms, under the authorities on
the subject above cited. We are brought to the conclusion,
therefore, that the court committed no error in awarding
new trial; but, whether it was granted because the verdict,
as ﬁled, was against the weight of evidence or was impugned
by the affidavits of the jurors, error was committed in fail
ing to impose reasonable terms as a condition.
What those
terms should be is a subject for consideration primarily by
the trial court.
By the Court.—Plaintiﬁ"s appeal is dismissed. Upon de
fendant’s appeal the order is reversed, and cause remanded
with directions to embody in the order granting new trial
the payment of reasonable terms by plaintiff as a condition.

/

/ ‘I /
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SECTION 9.

NEW

TRIALs.

GUNN v. UNION RAILROAD CO.

Appellate Division of the Supreme

Court of Rhode Island.

1901.
23 Rhode
ROGERS,

Island, 289.

J.—This suit is trespass

on the case

for negli

brought in the Common Pleas Division, wherein, upon
a jury trial, the plaintiff obtained a ‘verdict against the
defendant for $10,000; and thereupon the defendant brought
it to this Division on a petition for a new trial on the ground,
among others, that the verdict was against the law and the
On December 28, 1900,
evidence and the weight thereof.
this Division ﬁled its opinion granting the petition on the
ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evi
gence
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I. 321. On the same day, to wit, Decem
ber 28, 1900, the plaintiff moved that this Division dismiss
the defendant's petition for a new trial and direct the Com
mon Plea Division to enter judgment on the verdict of the
jury in said action,
“First. Because the record in said case shows that to
grant a new trial on the grounds therein set forth would
be in violation of the constitution of Rhode Island, and also
of the constitution of the United States, to wit, of the four
teenth amendment to said constitution of the United States,
wherein it is provided that no state shall ‘deprive any per
son of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.’
“Second.
Because the court in its opinion has ‘granted
the defendant's petition for a new trial’ on grounds which
the record shows deprive the plaintiff of his right to a trial
by jury, and of his property, ‘without due process of law.’ ”
At the time our State constitution went into operation
section 5 of “An act to establish a Supreme Judicial Court"
was in full force, which gave that court the power to grant
new trials in cases decided therein or in any Court of Com
mon Pleas for various reasons speciﬁed; and said section
contained this clause, viz.: “and the said court shall also have
power to grant new trials in cases where there has been a
trial by jury, for reasons for which new trials have been
usually granted at common law.” Digest of 1822, p. 109.
It is clear that our ancestors prior to our present State
constitution found trial by jury so fallible that it was nec
essary to provide for more than one trial.
In England as
well as in the older States of America, two hundred years
ago, trial by jury was in a state of evolution.
The old law
of attaints against a jury as a means of reversing a verdict
against the evidence was apparently obsolete both in Eng
land and in this country before the American Revolution.
dence.

Note to

See 22 R.

Erving
Gray.

11.

Cradoek,

Quincey,

560,

by Horace

(Mr.

Justice)
Sir William Blackstone, writing in or about 1765 (3 Com.
“Formerly the principal rem
Chitty’s ed., 388-392), says:
edy, for reversal of a verdict unduly given, was by writ of
attaint. " * "' But such a remedy as this laid the in
jured party under an insuperable hardship by making a
conviction of the jurors for perjury the condition of his
The judges saw this; and therefore very early,
redress.
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upon writs of assise, they devised a great variety of
distinctions, by which an attaint might be avoided, and the
verdict set to rights in a more temperate and dispassionate
*
*
"
method.
When afterwards attaints, by several
statutes, were more universally extended the judges fre
quently, even for the misbehavior of jurymen, instead of
prosecuting the writ of attaint, awarded a second trial: and
even

subsequent resolutions, for more than a century past, have
so ampliﬁed the beneﬁt of this remedy, that the attaint is
now as obsolete as the trial by battle which it succeeded;
and we shall probably see the revival of the one as soon as
"
"
If every verdict was ﬁnal
the revival of the other.
in the ﬁrst instance, it would tend to destroy this valuable
method of trial, and would drive away all causes of conse
quence to be decided according to the forms of imperial
law, upon depositions in writing, which might be reviewed
in a course of appeal. " " ‘ The jury are to give their
opinion instanter; that is, before they separate, eat, or drink.
And under these circumstances the most intelligent and best
inentioned men may bring in a verdict, which they them
selves upon cool deliberation would wish to reverse.
“Next to doing right, the great object in the administra
tion of public justice, should be to give public satisfaction.
If the verdict be liable to many objections and doubts in
the opinion of his counsel, or even in the opinion of by
standers, no party would go away satisﬁed unless he had a
prospect of reviewing it.
Such doubts would with him be
decisive: he would arraign the determination as manifestly
unjust, and abhor a tribunal which he imagined had done
him an injury without a possibility of redress.
“Granting a new trial, under proper regulations, cures
all these inconveniences, and at the same time preserves
entire and renders perfect that most excellent method of
decision, which is the glory of the English law. A new trial
is a rehearing of the cause before another jury, but with as
little prejudice to either party, as if it had never been
"
“
heard before.
“Nor is it granted where the scales of evidence hang
nearly equal; that which leans against the former verdict
ought always very strongly to preponderate.”
Bright v. Eynon, 1 Burr. 390, decided in the King's bench
in 1757. was a motion for a new trial upon which the judges

'

'

I
I

Sec.

9]

PROCEEDINGS

BASED

on TRIAL or Issues

599

gave their opinion, granting the new trial, seriatim.
Lord
Mansﬁeld, inter alia, said, page 393,—“Trials by jury, in
civil cases, could not subsist now without a power some
where, to grant new trials.
If an erroneous judgment be
given in point of law, there are many ways to review and
set it right. Where a court judges of fact upon depositions
in writing, their sentence or decree may, many ways, be re
viewed and set right.
But a general verdict can only be
set right by a new trial; which is no more than having the
causes more deliberately considered by another jury, where
there is a reasonable doubt, or perhaps a certainty, that jus
tice has not been done.
“The writ of attaint is now a mere sound in every case:
in many it does not pretend to be a remedy. There are
numerous causes of false verdicts, without corruption or
bad intention of the jurors. They may have heard too much
of the matter before the trial, and imbibed prejudices with
out knowing it. The cause may be intricate; the examina
tion may be so long as to distract and confound their at
"
*
"
tention.
“If unjust verdicts obtained under these and a thousand
like circumstances, were to be conclusive forever, the deter
mination of civil property, in this method of trial, would
It is absolutely nec
be very precarious and unsatisfactory.
essary to justice, that there should upon many occasions, be
opportunities of reconsidering the cause by a new trial.

i

#

“It

i

is not true ‘that no new trials were granted before
1655,’ as has been said from Style, 466.”
After referring to Slade's case, which was in 1648, re
ported in Style, 138, and to Wood v. Gunston, in 1655, Style
466, Lord Mansﬁeld proceeds:
“The reason why this matter
cannot be traced further back is, ‘that the old report-books
do not give any accounts of determinations
made by the
court upon motions.’
“Indeed, for a good while after this time, the granting of
new trials was holden to a degree of strictness, so intoler
able, that it drove parties into a court of equity, to have, in
effect, a new trial at law, of a mere legal question, because
the verdict, in justice, under all the circumstances, ought
not to conclude; and many bills have been retained upon
this ground, and the question tried over again at law, un
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der the direction of a court of equity. And therefore of late
years the courts of law have gone more liberally into the
granting of new trials, according to the circumstances of
And the rule laid down by Lord
the respective cases.
Parker, in the case of the Queen against the corporation of
Helston, H. 12 Ann. B. R. (Lucas, 202) seems to be the best
general rule that can be laid down upon this subject; viz.
‘Doing justice to the party,’ or in other words ‘attaining the
justice of the case.’
“The reasons for granting a new trial must be collected
from the whole evidence, and from the nature of the case
considered under all its circumstances.”
Mr. Justice Denison concurring, added “that it would be
difficult perhaps to ﬁx an absolutely general rule about grant
ing new trials, without making so many exceptions to it as
might rather tend to darken the matter than to explain it;
but the granting a new trial, or refusing it, must depend
upon the legal discretion of the court, guided by the nature
and circumstances of the particular case, and directed with
a view to the attainment of justice.”

I I I I I I I I I I

Other cases in which new trials were granted in England
prior to the American Revolution, are Berks v. Mason, Sayer,
264, decided in 1756; Goodtitle '0. Clayton, in 1768, 4 Burr.
2224; and Norris v. Freeman, in 1769, 3 Wil. 38. In Marsh
'v. Bower, 2 Black. W. 851, heard in 1773, the action was for
words spoken, and the words were fully proven on the trial,
The court refused
but the jury found for the defendant.
a new trial solely on the ground of triviality, declaring “that
they would not grant a new trial for the sake of sixpence
damages, in mercy to the plaintiff as well as the defendant.”

I I I I I I I I I I

The plaintiff in the case at bar contends that it was an
essential provision of the common law that motions for new
trials should be addressed to the trial court.
One judge,
however, as we understand it, went upon circuit, and the
judges in bane sat upon motions for a new trial, and though
the opinion of the judge that sat on the jury trial was lis
tened to with much respect, yet it was not ﬁnal; otherwise
there would have been no reason for the others sitting and
going through the idle form of expressing their opinions as
they were wont to do.

Reference to the old cases hereinbe
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fore cited seems to show that. In Marsh v. Bower, supra.
the report of the case says:
“Lord Mansﬁeld, who tried
the cause on the Home Circuit, reported,” &c., but “The
court unanimously declared,” etc.
18

In

#

i

'1

U

#

#

#

C

8

A. & E. Enc. of Law (1st ed.), 618, is the following
statement, viz.:
“In the absence of statute regulations, the
general rule is that an application for a new trial must be
16

addressed to the court in which the cause was tried, and
under circumstances rendering it necessary, it may be made
This
to the judge who presided at the trial, during vacation.
rule is particularly applicable, and of nearly universal ap
plication in case of motions for new trial for errors of fact.
Where a judge dies or goes out of office, however, his suc
cessor may entertain the motion, and where a cause has
been transferred from one district to another by a change
of lines or otherwise, such a motion may be heard by the
proper tribunal in the new district, while power to entertain
such motions has been conferred by statute in many and
perhaps all of the states upon courts other than those in
which the trial took place, in cases and under circumstances
and conditions differing greatly in the different states.”
In 3 Waterman on New Trials, 1214, is this statement,
viz.: “Notwithstanding, however, the evident want of qual
iﬁcation of the Appellate Court to form a correct opinion as
to the conformity of the evidence with the verdict, in this
country it is generally permitted to exercise a discretion in
the premises.”
Our statute provides that a new trial by jury may be
granted “for reasons for which a new trial is usually granted
at common law.” We have already expressed the opinion
that the verdict’s being against the weight of the evidence
was a common-law reason at the time of the adoption of
our State constitution; but while reasons are prescribed,
methods of procedure are not, and it seems to us utterly
unreasonable to try to stretch the application of the word
reasons, to methods of procedure, so that in the lapse of
years, reaching it may be to centuries, no change, or develop
ment, or improvement, no adaptation to altered conditions
or circumstances, -can be made or permitted without making
unconstitutional the very same reasons that are still being
i
adhered to.
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Granting a new trial is exercising a discretion, and, with
us, as in many other States, is a power not conﬁded to a
single justice.
The exercise of that discretion, when de
pending upon the weight of the evidence, necessitates some
knowledge of the evidence, and in this State that knowledge
is furnished by a stenographic report of the evidence—ques
tions, answers, and rulings—typewritten out at length, made
by a sworn ofﬁcer of the court and veriﬁed by the allow
ance of the justice presiding at the jury trial, or, if that
be not possible, then veriﬁed by affidavit.
In this way all
opportunities
judging
judges
the
of
of the evi
have equal
dence, and are not dependent upon the prejudices or pecu
liarities of any one man; and, as they will not grant a new
trial because of the verdict being against the weight of the
evidence, unless it is against a clear and decided preponder
ance thereof, if they have any question in the matter they
will invariably sustain the verdict. Though the justice pre
siding at a jury trial has some opportunity, perhaps, of
weighing the evidence, that other justices have not, yet he
is also subjected to greater probability of having prejudices
awakened, so that in some states the disadvantages are
deemed to outweigh the advantages of his sitting on a peti
tion for a new trial, and, in this State, it is provided by
statute, that “no justice shall sit in the trial of any cause
"‘
*
*
in which he has presided in any inferior court,
or in any case in which the ruling or act of such justice
sitting alone or with a jury is the subject of review, except
by consent of all the parties.” Gen. Laws R. I. cap. 221, s. 4.

i

U

1

#

i i

#

l i

#

In our opinion it is not necessary in order not to contra
the constitution either of this State or of the United
States that the justice presiding at the jury trial should
ﬁrst pass upon the question whether the verdict is against
the weight of the evidence, or that he should sit with the
court required to pass upon that question in granting a new
trial for that reason.
We are of the opinion that this court has the constitu
tional right to grant a new trial in a civil case when in its
opinion the verdict is against the weight of the evidence,
and that granting such new trial in the case at bar, would
not be a violation of the constitution either of this State or
of the United States. The plaintiff’s motion, therefore, that
vene

Sec. 9]

PROCEEDINGS

BASED

on TRIAL or Issues

603

this Division dismiss the defendant's petition for a new trial
and direct the Common Pleas Division to enter judgment
on the verdict of the jury in this action, is denied.“
things,
11 “A venire facias de novo and a new trial, are very different
They differ in this: that the venire facias
though alike in some points.
is the ancient proceeding of the common law; the new trial is a modern
invention to mitigate the severity oi’ the proceeding by attaint. New
trials are usually granted where a general verdict is found, a vcnire
de nova upon a special verdict.
The most material difference between
them is, that a venire de novo must be granted upon matters appearing
upon the record; but a new trial may be granted upon things out of it:
as it the verdict be contrary to evidence, or the judge has given wrong
instructions."—Chief Justice Willis, in Witham v. Lewis, 1 Wils. 48, 55.
"Under a writ of attaint the inquiry was made by a jury, double the

number of those who rendered the alleged false verdict, and if they found
the verdict a false one, the judgment of the common law was, that the
jurors should become infamous; should forfeit their goods and the
be imprisoned,
proﬁts of their lands;
should themselves
and their
wives and children thrown out of doors; should have their houses razed,
their trees extirpated, and their meadows plowed; and that the plaintiff
should be restored to all that he lost by reason of the unjust verdict."—
Com. 404.
3 Blackstone
The best account of the attaint is found in two articles by John M.
Zane, The Attaint, I, II, 15 Mich. Law Rev. 1, 127.
“The new trial is here, as everywhere, a new trial of the facts, and
is in no sense a. new trial of the law. The error of law has been tried
upon the motion and has been decided by the court in deciding to_grant
the new trial. The new trial, when granted, is no longer a trial of the
law, but solely of the fact."—Zaleski v. Clark, 45 Conn. 397.
English Practice. Order 39, rule 1 provides that every motion for a
new trial shall be_by way of appeal to the Court oi’ Appeal, and rule 2
provides:
“No judge shall sit on the hearing of any motion for a new
trial in any cause or matter tried with a jury before himself."

4

Z

1-~

1.

Q-(1/re-L

CALDWELL

Supreme

V.

Court of Idaho.
16 Idaho,

J

WELLS.
1909.

459.

*
STEWART, . “ *
A notice of intention to move for a
as
follows:
new trial was served
“Take notice, that plaintiff, J. W. Caldwell, intends to
move the above-named court to vacate and set aside the
judgment rendered in the above-entitled cause, and to grant
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trial of said cause, upon the following grounds, to

wit:
It

II

I I I I I I I I

Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the judg

“3.

ment.
“4.
“5.

That the judgment is against the evidence.
That the judgment is against the law.
*
*
*
The motion for a new trial was overruled and
the plaintiff appeals from the judgment and from the order
overruling the motion for a new trial.

I I I I I I I I I I

An application for a new trial is directed to the
verdict of the jury or the decision of the court. The ver
dict and the decision are supposed to be based upon the
facts.
The judgment is based upon the verdict, or the de
If the verdict or ﬁndings of
cision or ﬁndings of the court.
the court do not support the judgment, the remedy is not
by moving for a new trial. If, however, the verdict or de
cision of the court are not supported by the evidence, then
the remedy is to move for a new trial and this requires a
of the issue of fact. When a new trial is
re-examination
granted, the ﬁnding or verdict is set aside, in which case the
judgment must also fall. “ * *
*

"‘

*

In other words, the motion should have been directed to
the decision of the court, rather than the judgment.
Whether
the judgment is correct cannot be determined upon a motion
for a new trial; whether the decision of the court as contra
distinguished from the judgment, was correct, could have
been determined upon motion for a new trial, had such mat
ter been speciﬁed as a reason for granting such new trial.
1

I I

For

these reasons the
awarded to respondent.

judgment

is

aflirmed.

Costs
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FISH.

Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
210 Massachusetts,

1912.

568.,

The single question presented by these ex
RUGG, C. J.
ceptions is whether the superior court had the power (before
the passage of St. 1911, c. 501, expressly conferring it) in
setting aside a verdict, returned by a jury for the plaintiff
in an action to recover compensation for a personal injury
on the ground of inadequacy of damages, to direct that at
the new trial damages shall be the only issue, and that the
other questions shall be treated as settled in favor of the
'

plaintiff.
There can be no doubt as to the power of the court at
common law to set aside a verdict as a whole for insufficient
Sampson v. Smith, 15
as well as for excessive damages.
Mass. 365-367; Taunton Manufacturing Co. v. Smith, 9 Pick.
11; Clark v. Jen-kins, 162 Mass. 397, 38 N. E. 974; Shanahan
v. Boston & Northern St. Ry. Co., 193 Mass. 412, 79 N. E.
751; Phillips v. London & South Western Ry. Co., 4 Q. B. D.
406, 5 Q. B. D. 78; Johnston v. Great Western Ry. Co.,
It is a constitutional incident of
[1904] 2 K. B. 250-255.
jury,
by
which
cannot
be taken away by legislative
trial
action, that the assistance and protection of the presiding
judge shall be available to the litigants in setting aside ver
dicts not so supported by law and evidence that they ought
to stand. Opinion of Justices, 207 Mass. 606, 94 N. E. 846;
Capital Traction C0. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1-13, 19 Sup. Ct. 580,
43 L. Ed. 873.
The ancient common law doctrine that a
verdict of a jury was single and indivisible and must stand
or fall as a whole was early modiﬁed by the custom of this
commonwealth, as is pointed out in Bicknell v. Dorion, 16
Pick. 478, 483, where a verdict was set aside as to one of
The practice has prevailed for many
several defendants.
years in this court of awarding a new trial upon a single
point where the error committed in the trial court was of a
kind which could be readily separated from the general issues,
and applied without injustice to one matter.
In Winn v. Columbian Insurance Co., 12 Pick. 279, a plain
tiff, in an action upon a policy of insurance, dissatisﬁed with
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the amount of the verdict, was restricted upon a new trial,
to which he was held to be entitled, to damages alone.
In Boyd v. Brown, 17 Pick. 453, 461, which was an action
for trespass for carrying away a schooner, the verdict was
held to be for an excessive amount, and the new trial was
conﬁned to damages alone.
Robbins '0. Townsend, 20 Pick. 345, was an action to re
cover for the support of a pauper by the keeper of a house
During the trial an error was committed in
of correction.
admitting evidence of the official character of the plaintiff.
The court, in sustaining the exceptions, said: “There hav
ingbeen a full and legal trial on the merits as to the other
parts of the case, and the question of the appointment of the
plaintiff as master of the house of correction being entirely
disconnected with the other questions raised, and one which
in no way could have had any inﬂuence upon the ﬁnding of
the jury upon those questions, the new trial is limited to this
particular point. In cases like the present, substantial jus
tice may be done without disturbing the verdict generally,
by submitting to a new jury the question, in reference to
which, evidence was erroneously admitted.”
The money ele
ment established by the ﬁrst trial and that as to the settle
ment of the pauper were left undisturbed.
'v.
Sjrrargue
Bailey, 19 Pick. 436, was an action against a collector of
taxes for taking personal property in levying a tax. Error
was committed by the trial court touching proof whether
the defendant had been duly sworn as collector, and the new
trial was conﬁned to that single issue and those necessarily
dependent upon it, while other matters were left as settled
by the ﬁrst verdict. . In Amherst Bank v. Root, 2 Metc. 522,
the only exception which was sustained related to the exe
cution of a bond, and the court conﬁned the new trial to the
ascertainment of that fact alone. The only error committed
by the trial court in Hnbbell v. Bissell, 2 Allen, 196, 201,
concerned one of several defendants, and bore upon the single
ground of defense of mental incompetency, and the court
granted a new trial only upon condition that it should be
conﬁned to that single issue, the facts found by the ﬁrst
verdict to stand in other respects. In Scccomb 'L’. Provz'nczTa.l
Insurance Co., 4 Allen, 152, there were actions upon policies
In the trial court, after verdict for
of marine insurance.
the plaintiffs, a new trial was granted solely for the pur
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pose of submitting to another jury the question whether,
according to the usage of commerce, Smyrna was a port in
Europe, in all other respects the plaintiffs being held en
titled to retain the beneﬁts of the ﬁndings of the verdict in
their favor. By reason of the conduct of parties, it was
held that a new trial upon all issues, was open, but by infer
ence the restriction of the new trial to the single point was
Wayland o. Ware, 109 Mass, 248, was an action
approved.
to recover for the support of a pauper. The only error com
mitted by the trial court related to evidence, whether one
Davis was credited to the defendant town as a part of its
quota of enlistments in the Civil War.
In sustaining the
exceptions, the court restricted the new trial to that part of
the case which had been affected by this error, and outlined
alternative forms of judgment to be thereafter entered de
pendent upon the ﬁnding of that fact at the new trial.
Warshauer v. Jones, 117 Mass. 345, was a writ of entry to
recover one tract of land consisting of a passageway and
a strip of land. Error was committed during the trial, and
the court directed a verdict to stand as to the passageway,
which was not affected by the error of the trial court, and
that the new trial, be restricted to the rest of the demanded
"‘
*
"
premises.
Dulligan v. Barber Asphalt Co., 201 Mass. 227, 233, 87
N. E. 567, was-an action in two counts, the ﬁrst to recover
for the death, and the second for the conscious suffering, of
an employé of the defendant under R. L. c. 106. A mistake
of the trial court touching the ﬁrst count was not permitted
to disturb the verdict in favor of the plaintiff upon the sec
"'
"'
“'
ond count.
This review of our cases demonstrates that this court con
tinuously from early times has exercised the power of nar
rowing a new trial to speciﬁc points in cases where the
error committed at the trial was so limited in character as
with justice to both parties to be separable from the other
It has done this as a
issues determined by the ﬁrst verdict.
part of its inherent judicial authority, and not under any
It has exercised the power in a great variety of
statute.
cases touching divers kinds of issues involved in general
The guiding principle is that, although a verdict
verdicts.
ought not to stand which is tainted with illegality, there
ought to be but one fair trial upon any issue, and that parties
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ought not to be compelled to try anew a question once dis
posed of by a decision against which no illegality can be
shown.
Thus the parties and the commonwealth have been
saved the expense, annoyance and delay of a retrial of is
sues once settled by a trial as to which no reversible error
*
"'
"
appears.
It is a power which ought to be exercised with great cau
tion, with a careful regard to the rights of both parties, and
only in those infrequent cases where it is certain and plain
that the error which has crept into one element of the ver
dict by no means can have affected its other elements. But
when a proper occasion clearly exists, it is in the interests
of justice to exercise the power.
There is nothing incon
sistent with this view in the decision of Timpany v. Ha'ruira,
him, 198 Mass. 575, 85 N. E. 183.
The language of the
opinion that there can be “no division of a verdict by a judge
in such a way that it shall stand in that part which is satis
factory to him and shall be canceled in that part with which
he is dissatisﬁed" was used in deciding the narrow point of
practice then under discussion.
A verdict cannot be divided,
but it can be set aside as a whole and an order entered that
at the new trial where a ﬁnal verdict shall be rendered the
range of inquiry as to facts shall be limited to issues less
than those open upon a general trial. No sound distinction
in this regard can be made between a verdict in which ex
cessive damages have been returned and one in which in
adequate damages have been awarded.
Indeed, it is said in
the Opinion of the Justices, 207 Mass. 606, 609, 94 N. E.
846, 848, referring to a proposed statute in terms limiting
a new trial to the question of damages alone, when that is
the sole ground for granting a new trial: “In substance the
section is in accordance with the general practice to grant a
new trial upon the question of damages only, if the verdict
is satisfactory in all particulars as a determination of the

liability.”

It is undoubtedly true that in England there can be no
limitation of a new trial to speciﬁc issues without consent of
There a new trial means a new trial as to all
both parties.
issues, unless by agreement of parties.
Watt 11. Watt, [1905]
A. C. 115, overruling Belt 22. Lawes, 12 Q. B. D. 356, a con
trary decision in the court of appeal. The great weight of
authority in this country supports the conclusion we have
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Lisbon v. Lyman, 49 N. H. 553, 582 to 605; Lake
reached.
'0. Bender, 18 Nev. 361, 369-381, 4 Pac. 711, 7 Pac. 74; Duﬁ
v. Duff, 101 Cal. 1, 5, 35 Pac. 437; San Diego Land & Town
Co. v. Neale, 78 Cal. 63, 20 Pac. 372, 3 L. R. A. 83; Wood
ward 'v. Horst, 10 Iowa, 120; Ramsdell v. Clark, 20 Mont.
103, 49 Pac. 591; Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Ester, 86 Hun. 22,
33 N. Y. Supp. 143; Lauelle v. Corrignio, 86 Hun, 135, 33
N. Y. Supp. 376; Laney 12. Bradford, 4 Rich. (S. C.) 1;
Walker v. Blassingame, 17 Ala. 810 (see Edwards u. Lewis,
18 Ala. 494) ; Zaleski v. Clark, 45 Conn, 397, 404; McKay 'v.
New England Dredging Co., 93 Me. 201, 44 Atl. 614; Treat
'v. Hiles, 75 Wis. 265, 276, 44 N. W. 1088 (see Hutchinson v.
Piper, 4 Taunt. 555) ; Burnett v. Mills Co., 152 N. C. 35, 41,
67 S. E. 30; Goss v. Goss, 102 Minn. 346, 113 N. W. 690;
Fry '0. Stewart, 98 Va. 417, 36 S. E. 482; More-Jonas Glass
Co. v. West Jersey & Sea Shore R. R., 76 N. J. Law, 9, 69
Atl. 491; Clark '0. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. (R. I.) 80 Atl.
406; Cramer v. Barmon, 193 Mo. 327, 91 S. W. 1038.
Contra: State v. Tem-plin, 122 Ind. 235, 23 N. E. 697;
Johnson 'v. McCulloch, 89 Ind. 270; Edwards v. Lewis, 18
Ala. 494; Sea-board Air Line Ry. 12. Randolph, 129 Ga. 796,
59 S. E. 1110; Central of Georgia Ry. v. Perkerson, 112 Ga.
923, 38 S. E. 365, 53 L. R. A. 210.
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Supreme Court of Minnesota.
57 Minnesota,
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1894.

448.

COLLINS, J. At the trial of this cause, at the request of
defendants’ counsel, the court plainly charged the jury that,
if they found a certain fact from the evidence, the defendants
could not be held liable upon the note in suit. To this, counsel
for plaintiff took no exception, nor was there even a sugges
tion that it was erroneous. The verdict being for defendants,
a motion to set it aside, and for a new trial, was made by
plaintiff’s attorneys. on two grounds,—those speciﬁed in 1878,
G. S. ch. 66, § 253, subd. 5th and 7th. Subsequently, and, as
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The majority are of the opinion that, in civil actions, the
power of the court to grant new trials
limited to the
grounds prescribed in section 253, and that new trials for er
rors of law can only be granted when an exception has been
taken.
The statutory grounds for new trials are exclusive.
Practically, this has oftentimes been held in this court, es
is

'

$

III

stated by-the court in its order, solely because there was no
evidence which warranted that part of the charge referred to
above, p1aintiff’s motion was granted.

is

it

is

is

a

is is

it

I

1,

J

§

j

a

a

pecially when considering motions made upon the ground that
errors of law had occurred upon the trial, as witness the Min
nesota cases before referred to. To permit
defeated party
to have the beneﬁt of an error of law not excepted to would
be giving him a great advantage; and here we are asked to
party who made no objection to the
go further, and allow to
giving of the erroneous instruction, and thereby actually ac
quiesced in its pertinency and correctness, the beneﬁt of the
error. Manifest injustice would be the result, for, had even
a suggestion been made that the court was not ustiﬁed in this
part of the charge, we have no doubt prompt correction would
Our construction of the statute has been
have followed.
lplaced upon others substantially the same.
See Hayne, New
7; Id. ch. 16.
Trials, ch.
Order reversed.
BUCK, J., absent, sick, took no part.
CANTY,
.
dissent. Where the trial court has misstated
the law in his charge, or charged propositions of law not ap
of the opinion that in fact the
plicable to the case, and he
in his discretion to grant a new
jury was misled thereby,
trial though no exception was taken, if, in his opinion, the
taking of an exception would not have caused him to change
case the
his mind in time to obviate the mistake. In such
all,
losing party has no standing at
as a matter of right. It
merely an application for equitable relief, addressed pe
culiarly to the discretion of the trial court.
In New York this
carried so far as to hold that, on re
view at the general term of the rulings of the judge at the
trial, the want of an exception is not necessarily fatal, but the
general term may, in its discretion, reverse for error not
not, strictly
saved by exception, on the ground that
speaking, exercising appellate jurisdiction, but has all the
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discretionary powers of the trial court. Baylies, New Trials
& App. 125; Standard Oil Co. 12. Amazon Ins. Co., 79 N. Y.
506; Mandeville v. Marvin, 30 Hun, 282; Maier v. Homen, 4
Daly, 168; Lattimer 12. Hill, 8 Hun, 171; Ackart v. Lansing,
6 Hun, 476.
It is also in the discretion of the trial court to allow an
exception after the jury has retired. St. John v. Kidd, 26
If he has power to allow an exception after the
Cal. 267.
proper time to take it, he has power to consider it taken for
the purpose of a new trial.
This ground for new trial does not come under 1878, G. S.
ch. 66, § 253, subd. 7, “Error in law occurring at the trial and
excepted to by the party making the application,” but under
the ﬁrst subdivision of that section, “Irregularity in the
proceedings of the court, jury, referee or prevailing party or
any order of the court or referee or abuse of discretion by
which the moving party was prevented from having a fair
trial.”
The discretionary power exercised by the court below in
this case is one which a trial court, having due_ regard for
the rights of the prevailing party will seldom exercise. It is
only when he is satisﬁed that in fact the particular mistake
produced a wrong result and that the failure to except did
not prejudice the prevailing party and where he is satisfied
that his rulings would have been the same, and that
nothing would have been done by him or the prevail
ing party in time to obviate the mistake even if an exception
had been taken. Even viewed by this strict rule I cannot see
that the order granting a new trial was an abuse of discre
tion, and hold that the order appealed from should be
affirmed.
Since the above was written the majority opinion has been
re-written. It is now admitted that at common law it was in
the discretion of the trial court to grant a new trial for er
rors to which no exception was taken, but it is insisted that
by the adoption of the Code this discretionary power has been
cut off. It has seldom before been held that the discretionary
power of a trial court of general jurisdiction has been cut off
by the Code. The Code is a mere skeleton, and much of it
Especially is this
merely declaratory of the common law.
true as to its provisions regulating practice. We do not look
to ‘it for the discretionary powers of the District Court, as we
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justice of the peace practice act for the discretionary
power of that court.
On the contrary, it is not unusual to
look to the great sources of authority on common law and
equity practice to ascertain what the discretionary powers
of our District Court are.
The point is also now made for the ﬁrst time that the mo
tion for a new trial was not made on the grounds stated in
the ﬁrst sub-division of section 253, but on those stated in
the ﬁfth and seventh subdivisions.
As to this I will say many
able judges, in times past, have often set aside verdicts on
their own motion, even before the ink was dry on them, and
without any motion or grounds of motion being made or
stated by the party at all; and the right to do so has hardly
been questioned.
At common law the trial court had the
power to grant a new trial, no matter how informal the ap
plication for it might be, or how much the moving party had
waived his technical rights by failing to take the proper ex
ception, or to put the proper grounds, or any grounds at all.
in his motion. When, as in the present case, a formal motion
for a new trial is made, stating the grounds, it will not be
presumed that it was granted on any grounds except those
stated. It must aﬂirmatively appear that it was granted on
some other grounds which it does in this case. It is a new
doctrine that a trial court of general jurisdiction has no discretion to brush aside technical informalities, and prevent in
~
justice, by granting a new trial.
do to the

$

8

$

¥

#

$

#

8

Q
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But the judge's powers and the applicant’s rights are, in
this respect, very different questions. The moving party not
only fails to save his rights for review in the appellate court,
by failing to make them appear of record, and to cover them
in his grounds of motion, but he also runs the risk of having
his motion denied on technical grounds, merely, by the trial
court, which it usually will and ought to do. But notwith
standing this, in furtherance of justice, the trial court may
relieve him from his laches, by giving him something which
he asked for, but was not in a position to demand as of right.
And when it affirmatively appears that the court, in granting
him a new trial, has, in furtherance of justice. intentionally
relieved him from his technical laches and omissions, it is
merely a question whether or not, on common-law principles,
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Holding that statutory grounds are not exclusive:—Corley v. N. Y.
H. RR. Co., (1896) 12 App. Div. (N. Y.) 409; Bottineau Land C0. v.
Hintze, (1911) 150 Ia. 646; Contra, St. Louis & S. F. RR. Co. v. Werner,
(1904) 70 Kan. 190.
'l‘he usual grounds for new trial, as presented in Waterman on New
Trials, are:—Want of Notice of Trial; Error in Summing and Drawing
Jurors; Disqualiﬁcation of Jurors; Tampering with the Jury; Bias or
Hostility of Jurors; Misconduct of Jury; Misruling of Judge; Misdirec
tion of Judge; Surprise; Newly Discovered Evidence; Error as to Dam
ages; Verdict against Law; Verdict against Evidence; Improper Rendi
tion of Verdict.
18

&

LOFTUS

I

METROPOLITAN STREET RAILWAY

v.

Supreme Court of Missouri.
220

GRAves,
*

CO.

1909.

Missouri, 470.

J ' ' '
.

After verdict was returned the defendant ﬁled its
motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment, which mo
*

"'

tions were by the court sustained by an order of record in
this language:
“Now on this day it is ordered by the court
that the motion for a new trial and motion in arrest of judg
ment be and the same are hereby sustained because the court
erred in giving instruction ‘No. One P.’ to which the plaintiff
excepts.”

‘

8

II.

I

$

Q

8

Q

l

#

l I

The further contention is made that this court should
not disturb the discretion exercised by the trial court in
granting the new trial. In other words, that the granting
of a new trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial
In the broad sense, the granting of a new trial does
court.
rest within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and this
discretion, like all judicial discretions, should not be dis
We are cited to the recent
turbed when properly exercised.
cases of Rodan 12. Railroad, 207 Mo. l. c. 407, and Seeger v.
Silver Co., 193 Mo. l. c. 407, as stating correct rules upon the
question.
In the latter case, Judge Marshall said: “The rule is now
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well settled in this State that this court will not reverse the
action of a trial court in granting one new trial, unless the
case is such that no verdict in favor of the party to whom the
new trial is thus granted, could, under any circumstances, be
permitted to stand.”
And in the former, Judge Lamm said: “In the ﬁrst place,
in limine, it must be assumed as a commonplace of the law,
arising to the level of an axiom, that the granting of a new
trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court; and
its action in that behalf will not be disturbed on appeal unless
it appears that its discretionary power was abused, i. e., exer
cised in an arbitrary or improvident manner.
(R. S. 1899,
sec. 800; and see ﬁrst note under that section, Ann. Stat. 1906,
761, where the authorities are gathered.)”
-These announcements must be taken in the light of the
facts of the cases. "‘ * * Both of those cases announce the
proper rule in cases where judicfal discretion has been exer
cised as to the facts and the weighing of the evidence as to the
In such cases we will not disturb such discretion in a
facts.
case wherein there is sufficient evidence to sustain a verdict
in favor of the party for whom such discretion has been exer
cised. But these cases are not this case.
Upon the facts of
the case at bar a verdict for either party could be sustained,
but the discretion of the trial judge was not directed to the
facts, so far as the question now before us is concerned. He
was passing judgment upon a clear question of law, and we
have concluded that his judgment on that question was erro
neous. When the judicial act is directed solely to a question
of law and the act is erroneous, it does not fall within the
rule of the exercise of sound judicial discretion.
There is no
discretion as to the law of a case. Nor can there be an exer
cise of a sound discretion as to the law of a case.
So that
when we speak of the granting of a new trial being within
the sound discretion of the trial judge, we have no reference
to a case where the new trial is granted solely upon the
ground that the law has been erroneously given, when in
fact it has been properly given.

I I

I

I

I

I I I I

I13

18 The court's discretion will not be exercised
in favor of granting a
new trial where only nominal or triﬂing damages are involved.—York v.
Stiles. (1899) 21 R. I. 225.
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READING.

v.

Court of Pennsylvania.

Supreme

615

1903.

206 Pennsylvania State, 479.

J

Appeal from jury of view. Before Endlich, .
From the record it appeared that the city of Reading ap
propriated one and one-half acres of plaintiff's land for the
The boulevard was so located as to
purpose of a boulevard.
cut oﬁ’ three acres of plaintiff’s land to the north, leaving
about seven acres to the south of the boulevard.
Verdict for plaintiff for $3,295.83.
On a rule for a new trial the court made the following
order:
November 10, 1902. The rule to show cause is discharged,
on condition that the plaintiff withir. thirty days from the
date of entry of this order convey to the defendant, for park
purposes, the tract lying north of the boulevard; otherwise,
upon the expiration of said period, the rule to become absolute.

Plaintiff appealed.
It

1

J .-—The

i i

#

Q

Q

l

U

$

granting or refusing of a new trial ex
cept for causes like errors of law by the judge or misconduct
of the jury, where it may be matter of right, is an exercise of
judicial discretion by the court in furtherance of right and
justice according to the circumstances of the case. Hence it
is well settled that the court may impose terms upon either
or both of the parties as conditions of the grant or refusal,
and the latitude allowed to the discretion of the court to this
As each case must be determined on its
end is very great.
own circumstances the causes cannot all be speciﬁed or enu
merated beforehand, but in general as is said by the most
prominent writer on the subject, “it may be safely asserted
that no case can occur presenting circumstances timely ad
dressed to the discretion of the court, in which the rights of
the parties may not be fully protected by the imposition of
Graham on New Trials.
conditions meeting the exigencyz”
MITCHELL,

610.

Large as the discretion is, however, it is a judicial discre
tion and must be used with reference to the rights involved
The conditions imposed therefore must
in the controversy.
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have some direct relation to the issue between the parties in
the case.
The condition complained of in the present proceeding
transgresses this limit.
The conveyance of the three acres
was not asked for by the city nor offered by the appellant.
Whatever its merits as a just or wise settlement between the
parties. it was not apparently desired by either, and was cer
tainly no part of the issue which they brought into court to
have decided. In imposing it as a condition of the refusal
of a new trial therefore, the court exceeded its discretionary

authority.
Judgment reversed, and record remitted with directions to
reinstate the rule for new trial and proceed to dispose of it
according to law."
Conditions of various kinds may be imposed for granting or refusing
trial, the most common being payment of costs or expenses.—
North Center Creek M. & S. Co. v. Eakius, (1880) 23 Kan. 317; Brooks
v. San Francisco & N. P. Ry. Co., (1895) 110 Cal. 173; Cohen v. Krulewitch,
(1902) 77 App. Div. (N. Y.) 126.
14

new

;/

ll

GILA VALLZY," GIIOBE

Supreme Court of the
18

NORTHERN RAILWAY
HALL.

&

6

\

c.“

!

')
.

a

Territory of Arizona.

CO. V.

1911.

Arizona, 270.

a

a

a

a

a

a

.

J

CAMPBELL,
Appellee was in the employ of appellant as
chainman.
On April 23, 1907, he was engaged with another
employee, named Ryan, in measuring distances, locating mile
posts on appellant’s line of railway.
For that purpose they
three-wheeled velocipede furnished by appellant.
used
This
velocipede was of the kind ordinarily used in work of this
character, with
gasoline engine for motive power.
It had
two wheels on the right-hand side, over which was the engine,
seat for the use of the operator, and
seat in front for
and
The third wheel was
small wheel on the
another person.
side,
nearly
opposite
the
front wheel on the right
left-hand
bar extending
hand side, and fastened to the machine by
mentioned,
day
Hall and Ryan were
across the track. On the
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upon this velocipede on plaintiff’s line of railway, Ryan oper
ating the machine and Hall sitting in front. While the veloci
pede was going at a speed of from eight to twelve miles an
hour, it suddenly left the track, going to the left, the side on
which was situated the one small wheel. Hall was thrown in
front of it and run over, sustaining severe injuries. This ac
tion was brought against the railroad company to recover
damages for the injuries so received, it being alleged that the
ﬂange on the third or small wheel was worn and cracked, and
that by reason of such condition the machine left the track,
and that the company was negligent in furnishing such veloci
Appellant answered, denying the negligence alleged.
pede.
pleading contributory negligence, and that Hall knew or
might have known the condition of the velocipede and as
sumed the risk of the injuries resulting from the alleged de
fect. The jury returned a verdict for $10,000.
A motion for
a new trial was made, and prior to its determination Hall
voluntarily remitted $5,000 from the amount of the verdict.
Thereafter, the court denied the motion for a new trial and
entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $5,000 and
costs. From this judgment and from the order denying the
motion for new trial, the railway company appeals.

a

is

4

*

"‘

*

a

it

a

is

is

whether
The remaining important question in the case
the court erred in rendering judgment for the amount of the
verdict less the sum remitted by the appellee. It
insisted
new trial
by appellant that the court should have granted
beyond the power of
court to permit
for the reason that
remittitur where the damages are unliquidated and the ver
dict excessive. The question has heretofore been before this
Southern Paciﬁc C0. v. Tomlinson,
Ariz.
court

for death
statute permitting the jury “to give

126, 33 Pac. 710, was an action to recover damages

a

a

is

it

A

a

by wrongful act, under
such damages as they may think proportioned to the injuries
resulting from said death.”
verdict for $50,000 was re
turned, from the which the plaintiff remitted $31,998, and
The power of the
judgment was entered for the remainder.
trial court to permit the renzittitur was questioned, but
“A trial court has the power, where excessive
was held:
damages have been allowed by the jury, and where the mo
tion to set aside the verdict
based upon this ground, to make
remission
condition precedent to overruling the motion.
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The exercise of this power rests in the sound discretion of
the court. This doctrine is affirmed in the case of Cattle Co.
1*. Mann, 130 U. S. 74, 9 Sup. Ct. 458, 32 L. Ed. 854; also in
Railroad C0. 'v. Herbert, 116 U. S. 642, 6 Sup. Ct. 590, 29 L.
Ed. 755. Of course, if it is apparent to the trial court that
the verdict was_the result of passion or prejudice, a remittitur
should not be allowed, but the verdict should be set aside.

In passing upon this question, the court should not look alone
to the amount of damages awarded, but to the whole case, to
determine the existence of passion or prejudice, and to deter
mine how far such passion or prejudice may have operated
in inﬂuencing the ﬁnding of any verdict against the defend
ant.
When the circumstances, as they may appear to the
trial court, indicate that the jury deliberately disregarded the
instructions of the court, or the facts of the case, a remittitur
If
should not be allowed, but a new trial should be granted.
indicate,
voluntarily
they do not so
and the plaintiff
remits so
much of the damages as may appear to be excessive, the court,
in its discretion, may allow the remission and enter judgment

accordingly.”

It is argued that to permit a 're~mittitur, or to require it as a
condition of refusing a new trial, is to substitute the court’s
judgment for that of a jury, to the latter of which the de
fendant is entitled. But it is to the jury’s judgment that de
fendants object when they appeal to the court for new trials
The trial court has un
on the ground of excessive verdicts.
doubted power to determine whether the verdict is or is not
excessive, and in considering the question usually determines
in its own mind the maximum amount for which a verdict
could with propriety be permitted to stand. Where there has
been no error of law committed which would require a re
trial, and it appears that the excessive verdict has resulted
from too liberal views as to the damages sustained, rather
than from prejudice or passion, to permit a remission of the
excess, instead of putting the parties to the expense of a new
trial, promotes justice and puts an end to the litigation. Of
course, if it appears that the verdict is tainted by prejudice
or passion, and does not represent the dispassionate judgment
of the jury upon the question of the right of the plaintiff to
recover, a new trial should be granted.
But we think that
the trial court is in a better position to determine Whetlfer the
verdict is so tainted than is this court, and that unless it
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clearly appears from the record that the excessive verdict re
sulted from prejudice or passion, rather than from that liber
ality which jurors sometimes exercise in cases which appeal
to men's sympathies, we should accept the trial court’s deter
mination. The trial court in this case has determined that
the jury was not inﬂuenced by passion or prejudice, and we
see no reason for not accepting its conclusion.
Other rulings of the court are assigned as error and have
received our consideration, but they are not of sufficient im
portance to warrant discussion here. We ﬁnd no reversible
error in the record, and afﬁrm the judgment of the district

court."

_

16 This
decision was sustained and the views here stated were ap
proved, on appeal to the United States Supreme Court, (1913) 232
U. S. 94.

FORT W YNE

&

BELLE ISLE RAILWAY C0.
CIRCUIT JUDGE.

Supreme Court of Michigan.
110

Michigan,

V.

WAYNE

1896.

1'73.

MONTGOMERY, J. One Emma L. Long brought an action
against the relator for personal injury, and, on a trial before
a jury, recovered a verdict of $800.
The respondent. deem
ing this award insufficient, set aside the verdict, and ordered
a new trial. The relator asks for a writ of mandamus direct
ing that this order be set aside.
The counsel for relator concede that the court might, for
an error of its own commission on the trial, order a new trial
on its own motion, but contend that the court has no such
control over verdicts of juries, and can only vacate such ver
dicts on application of one of the parties. We think the pl‘ac_
tice in this State has been otherwise. from its earliest history,
and although the exercise of this power has been very rare,
there have been instances of it. That these instances must, of
necessity, be infrequent, naturally results from the recog
nized impropriety of a trial judge interposing his own judg
ment, as against that of a jury, except in a clear case. But
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in such case the court possesses the power, at common law, to
grant a new trial on its own motion; and in our opinion the
power is not limited to cases where the error is that of the
court, or where there is misconduct of the jury, as contended
by relator’s counsel, and as appears to have been held by the
supreme court of Texas in Lloyd v. Brinck, 35 Tex. 1. As
sustaining the broader power, as a common-law power, see 2
Thomp. Trials, § 2711, and cases cited,—particularly, State
v. Adams,

84 Mo. 313.

Having determined that Judge Donovan had the power to
this verdict, it follows that his discretion must con
trol his action, except in a case of clear abuse of such discre
tion, which we do not ﬁnd in this case.
The writ will be denied.
set aside

HOOKER and MOORE, JJ., concurred.
sit. GRANT, ., took no part."

J

LONG, C.

J.,

did not

.

16 Hensley v. Davidson Bros. Co., (1907) 135 Ia. 106, demonstrates
same doctrine with citation ot many cases.

I Q

Q

MEHNERT

6,

v.

THIEME.

Supreme C0urt~of Kansas.
15

the

1875.

Kansas, 368.

J.:

The plaintiffs in error were sued upon a
promissory note. Mehnert ﬁled an answer in person, alleg
ing part payment to the amount of $166.10, and that after
the maturity of the note he and his co-defendant had given
a mortgage due in twelve months as security, and that this
time had not passed. They made no appearance at the trial,
and judgment was rendered for the face of the note and in
BREWER,

terest. On the same day they, by an attorney, ﬁled a motion
to vacate the judgment, and grant them a new trial, on the
ground that they were prevented from making their defense
by “accident, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against, and unavoidable misfortune.”
This motion
overruled,
the
complained
and
this
is
error
was
of. Mehnert’s
affidavit was the only testimony offered upon said motion.
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He testiﬁed that he ﬁled the answer, and that it was true;
that he lived twelve miles from Fort Scott, where the court
was in session; that he had a large amount of stock, and no
male help on his place, and was consequently obliged to be
home every night; that in order to be present in court in time
on that morning he rose between three and four o'clock, at
tended to his home duties, and started with his team for Fort
Scott between ﬁve and six o'clock, drove with all possible dis
patch, and made no stoppages on the road; that he reached
the court-house about ten o'clock and found that the case had
been called and disposed of a few minutes prior thereto; that
the delay in driving in was caused by the bad almost impass
able condition of the roads. Was this accident which ordi
nary prudence could not have guarded against, or unavoidable
misfortune? It does not appear that the roads were for that
season of the year, December, exceptionally bad, or that by
an unexpected change in the weather they had become sud
denly bad, or that Mehnert did not by frequent travel have
full knowledge of their actual condition. At that time, it is
no uncommon thing for country roads to be very rough, and
in very bad condition. Common prudence would dictate that
one who was acting as an attorney, and attending to business
in court then in session, should not run the risk of getting into
court in the morning over such roads from a remote part of
The real difficulty was, that Mehnert was at
the county.
tempting to perform the double part of suitor and attorney.
While’ this is perfectly proper, yet whoever attempts it sub
jects himself to the obligations and liabilities of both. It is
the duty of an attorney having business in court to be present
during its sessions. There is his business; there is his work.
Oftentimes that which will excuse the absence of a suitor, will
come far short of excusing the absence of his attorney.
N ow.
Mehnert, was acting as an attorney, intrusted with business
in the court then in session. Instead of employing some one
to take care of his stock on his farm, and being himself in
readiness to attend to his case, he is with full knowledge of
his great distance from the court-house, and the almost im
passable condition of the roads, attempting to take care of
He succeeded in the former, but
both stock and lawsuit.
failed in the latter, and failed simply from omitting the ordi
nary precautions which men take under similar circum
stances. Hill v. Williams, 6 Kas. 17.
The judgment will be afﬁrmed.
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V.

CHRISTENSEN.

Court of the Territory of Utah.
7

3

1890.

Utah, 26.

a

a

ANDERSON, J. The defendant was indicted for unlawful
cohabitation, and was tried and convicted.
He moved for a
new trial upon the ground, among others, of misconduct of
fair and due consideration of
the jury tending to prevent
showing
case,
upon
that one John Harris,
the
based
aﬁidavits
who was one of the petit jury which convicted him, was on
the grand jury which found the indictment, and that the fact
was not known to him or his counsel until after the verdict,
and that the juror stated falsely on his voir dire that he had
not formed or expressed an unqualiﬁed opinion as to the
guilt or innocence of the accused of the offense charged. The
new trial granted, and the
motion was sustained, and
United States excepted to the ruling of the court, and now
prosecutes this appeal from the order of the court granting
new trial. When the juror Harris was called, he was sworn
on his voir dire, and interrogated by defendant’s counsel as
follows: “Do you know the defendant? Do you know any of
the witnesses named on the back of the indictment? Have
you talked with any person regarding this case? Have you
ever formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or inno
To each of these questions he an
cence of the defendant?”
negative,
juror in the
and
was accepted as
in
the
swered
a

a

case.

a

a

a

a

3

2

it

a

is

whether the court
The only question to be determined
new trial
In the case of
erred in sustaining the motion for
Utah,
Reece,
72,
61,
Rep.
Pac.
People 1v.
was held that
juror falsely stated, upon examination under oath as
where
juror, that he was
citizen of the
to his qualiﬁcations as
United States, and neither of the defendants knew or had
citizen,
reason to believe until after verdict that he was not
the defendants could not be deemed to have waived their right
jury of twelve men possessing the qualiﬁcation of citi
to
zenship, and, being guilty of no negligence or want of Watch
fulness, were entitled to have the verdict set aside, and
new
Utah, 42,
trial granted. In People '0. Lewis,
Pac. Rep.
543, the defendant was convicted of grand larceny.
One of
5

4

a

a

4.
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the trial jury which convicted him was a member of the grand
jury which found the indictment against him. Neither the
defendant nor his counsel knew this until after the verdict.
The defendant moved for a new trial, which was overruled,
and the ruling was affirmed in this court upon the ground of
the defendant’s negligence in not making sufficient inquiries
as to the qualiﬁcations of the jurors. The jurors were sworn
as to their statutory
on their voir dire, and interrogated
qualiﬁcations, to which no answer was given.
Counsel for
defendant then examined the jurors as follows:
“Are you acquainted with the defendant, Walter Lewis
here? Have any of you heard so much about his case as to
form or express an opinion, an unqualiﬁed opinion, concern
ing his guilt or innocence?
If any of you have, make it
I will not put questions directly to each of you.”
known.
The jurors were then asked if any of them were related to
the prosecuting witness, and if they had formed or expressed
an opinion from anything they had heard him say, and he
“You don't seem to answer, and I will not put the
added:
No statement of the
question to any of you particularly.”
constituting
alleged
offense
was
made to the jurors,
the
facts
and hence, the court say, the jurors could not well have
known whether they had an opinion as to the guilt or inno
cence of the defendant or not, and that, taking into considera
tion the timidity and apparent unwillingness of many jurors
to answer questions unless they are individually interrogated.
it is not surprising that there was no response to the ques
tions of defendant’s counsel. The court was of the opinion
that interrogating the jurors in such a general way was such
negligence that the defendant could not, after an unfavorable
verdict, successfully move for a new trial, when, with the
proper diligence, good ground for a challenge of the juror
The court said, however, that
would have been discovered.
“an express unqualiﬁed answer that the juror is a citizen, or
that he has not formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt
or innocence of the accused, is sufficient to relieve the defense
from further investigation unless there is something to put
the party upon further inquiry.”
In the present case the
defendant’s counsel asked the juror whether he had formed or
expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the de
fendant, and he answered that he had not, and under the
ruling in People v. Lewis, supra, the defendant was not bound
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to pursue the investigation further. It is not shown that the
juror Harris had formed or expressed an unqualiﬁed opinion
as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant further than the
fact that he was one of the grand jury that found the indict
ment against him, and as to this fact he was not interrogated.
The case of Rice v. State, 16 Ind. 298, was precisely like the
one at bar in its facts.
One of the trial jurors had been one
The juror
of the grand jury which found the indictment.
was not asked as to whether he had been on the grand jury
that found the indictment, but was asked whether he had
formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence
of the accused, and answered that he had not. The fact that
he had been on the grand jury was not discovered until after
verdict, and, on a motion for a new trial, the affidavit of the
juror was ﬁled in support of the verdict to the effect that at
the time of being examined he had no opinion as to the de
fendant’s guilt, and had forgotten the circumstance of his
having been on the grand jury. The court held that the
defendant was entitled to a new trial, and was guilty of no
negligence in not sooner discovering the fact of the juror’s
incompetency, but that, if the fact had been known to the
accused at the time the jury was accepted and sworn, he could
not afterwards have been heard to make the objection.
An objection to a juror such as is raised in this case is not
like merely technical disqualiﬁcations, such as alienage, non
residence, and the like, which do not tend to impeach the
fairness and impartiality of the j ury. It is possibly true that
the juror in this case had no opinion at the time of his ex
amination as to the guilt or innocence of the accused. He
may have forgotten that he was on the grand jury that found
He may have voted against ﬁnding the in
the indictment.
dictment, or may have been absent when it was found, as
twelve of the ﬁfteen jurors constitute a quorum, and may
transact business; but the presumptions of the law are all
to the contrary, and, in the absence of any showing to that
effect, he must be presumed to have participated in the ﬁnd
ing of the indictment, and to have formed an opinion as to
"‘
"
"‘
If he [de_
the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
of
the
records
the
court
had
searched
he
would
have
fendant]
fact,
and
it
would
have
been commendable
ascertained that
prudence and diligence to have done so; but we do not think
his failure to do so is such negligence as should deprive him
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of the right to be tried by an impartial jury, especially in
view of the false answer given by the juror. The motion for
a new trial ,was properly granted.
In support of the views
above expressed, see Com. v. Hussey, 13 Mass. 221; Dilworth
'v.\ Com., 65 Amer. Dec. 264; Bennett
v. State, 24 Wis. 57;
Hayne, New Trials, § 45, and cases cited. See, also, section
64. Our attention has been called to a number of cases where,
upon the same state of facts as are presented here, a different
conclusion has been reached, but we think the weight of au
thority as well as of reason is in accordance with this opinion.
The ruling of the district court is affirmed.

Q
'-

0

/

HOSKINS

v.

HIGHT.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
95 Alabama,

1891.

284.

S'roNe, C. J. " * "‘
The power to set aside verdicts and grant new trials is in
herent in our courts of common-law jurisdiction; and in the
exercise of this power the court is called upon to use its
equitable discretion to prevent a palpable and material wrong.
As said by Clopton, J., in Cobb 'v. Malone, 92 Ala. 630, “The
power is essential to prevent irreparable injustice, in cases
where a verdict wholly wrong is the result of inadvertence,
forgetfulness, or intentional or capricious disregard of the
testimony, or of bias or prejudice, on the part of juries, which
sometimes occurs.”
When, in the exercise of this inherent power, the trial court
grants a new trial, the presumption is that it has rightfully
used its discretion; but, if the contrary appears, and it is
plainly shown that the trial court has abused its power, this
discretion, being judicial in its character, should be revised
on appeal.-Edsall v. Ayres, 15 Ind. 286; Lloyd v. McClure, 2
Greene (Iowa), 139; Frieley 'v. David, 7 Iowa, 3.
The grounds upon which a new trial may be granted are as
varied as the circumstances of each individual case.
In the
exercise of a sound discretion, the court must consider the
particular surroundings, and have special regard to the
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equitable demands of each separate case.
But text-writers
and different courts recognize many different grounds for the
granting of new trials. Surprise and mistake are placed in
this category; and there are many instances where new trials
have been granted, because one party to a suit has been
taken by surprise, or has been prejudiced, on account of a
mistake or inadvertence for which he was not responsible.
and which was not occasioned in any way by his negligence.
No doubt it was intended that the ground upon which the new
trial in this case was asked and granted should receive its
force and eﬂicacy from this division of the causes that justify
such equitable interposition by the court.
We shall so con
sider it; for the ground as stated in the motion is, that the
defendant “was prevented from making his defense thereto
by accident or mistake, and without fault on his part.”
In order to obtain a new trial on the ground of mistake and
surprise, there are certain requirements which must be ful
ﬁlled as conditions precedent to the exercise by the trial court
of this discretion.
It must be shown that the surprise or mis
take occurred in reference to some matter material to the is
sue involved; that injury resulted therefrom and that the
party asking for a new trial has not been guilty of negligence
or fault in the premises.-Beadle v. Graham, 66 Ala. 1-02;
Brooks v. Douglass, 32 Cal. 208; Jackson v. Worford, 7 Wend.
62; Huber 11. Lane, 45 Miss. 608; Walker 12. Kretsinger, 48 Ill.
502; Fretwell 11. Lajfoon, 77 Mo. 26; 16 Amer. & Eng. Encyc.

Law, p. 532.
The ﬁrst duty of a party surprised at the trial, or upon the
i
l discovery
of a mistake that will prejudice his interest, is to
l
take proper legal steps to continue or delay the cause; for
I “he can not neglect this in the hope of securing
a verdict in
surprise
mistake),
spite of the
and then obtain a new
(or
trial.” In the case of Shipp v. Suggctt, 9 B. Monroe (Ky.) 5,
the court observed; “The correct practice in such case is for
the party at once, upon the discovery of the cause, during the
progress of the trial, which operates as a surprise on him, to
move a continuance or postponement of the trial, and not
attempt to avail himself of the chance of obtaining a verdict
and if he should
fail, then to apply for a new trial on the ground of surprise.
To tolerate such a practice would have the effect of giving to
the party surprised an unreasonable and unfair advantage,
on the evidence he has been able to introduce,

Sec.

9]

PROCEEDINGS

BASED on TRIAL oe Issues

627

and tend to an unnecessary and improper consumption of the
time of the court.” We approve this language, and announce
the rule, that before a party can be granted a new trial on the
ground of surprise and mistake, which was known or dis
covered before or during the trial, he must ﬁrst move for a
continuance, or take such legal steps to postpone the trial of
the cause as the circumstances of the particular case may re
quire. Washer v. White, 16 Ind. 136; Young v. Com., 4 Gratt.
550; Gee v. Moss, 69 Iowa, 709; Wells v. Sanger, 21 Mo. 354;
Rogers v. Hine, 1 Cal. 429; Bell v. Gardner, 71 Ill. 319; Doyle
v. Sterga, 38 Cal. 459; Dewey '0. Frank, 62 Cal. 343; 16 Am.
& Eng. Encyc. of Law, p. 533. This motion for a continuance,
or effort to postpone the trial, is affirmative matter, and
should therefore, appear of record. In its absence, this court
can not presume such motion or effort was made; and the
cause must be considered in the light of such facts and mat
ters of record as appear in the transcript. This conclusion is
decisive of the only question presented by this appeal, for no
motion for a continuance, nor any effort to postpone the trial,
was made when the absence of the important witnesses was
The trial court should not have granted the mo
discovered.
tion for a new trial, under the circumstances shown in the
record.
We could rest our opinion here; but, considering that this
phase of the question has never before been presented to us
for review, we deem it best to decide the correctness of the
lower court's ruling in granting a new trial upon the ground
stated in the opinion, and the evidence produced to substan
tiate such ground.
The accident or mistake that prevented the defendant from
making his defense, was the absence of certain witnesses,
whose names he had given to his counsel to have summoned.
These witnesses were never subpoenaed, and this is, no doubt,
at least one of the reasons they were absent. These witnesses
were not subpdznaed by reason of the mistake or negligence of
the defendant or his counsel, whose recollection was that
counsel directed his clerk to have the clerk of the court sub
The clerk had no recollection of any
pcena the witnesses.
such direction, and never instructed the clerk of the court to
subpoena the said witnesses.
While it is true that a new trial may be granted to a party
who was deprived of the beneﬁt of the evidence of a witness
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who was excusably absent, and whose testimony would have
probably affected the result, yet, in order to claim the beneﬁt
of a new trial on this ground, it must, as a general rule, be
shown that the witnesses had been regularly summoned and
that their absence was not caused through the negligence of
the party asking for a new trial. As said in 16 Amer. & Eng.
Encyc. of Law, 541, “It is a general rule, that a new trial
should not be granted on account of the absence of witnesses,
when a continuance has not been asked for, or the absence of
the witnesses is caused by any form of neglect by the party
applying for a new trial.”—Huhland v. Sedgwiclc, 17 Cal.
123; Tilden v. Gardiner, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 663; Love v.
Breedlove, 75 Tex. 649; Gee v. Moss, 68 Iowa, 318; Young v.
Com., 4 Gratt. (Va.) 550; Wells v. Sanger, 21 Mo. 354;
Rogers v. Hine, 1 Cal. 429.
The result is the same, whether the absence of the wit
nesses was caused by the mistake or negligence of the party
or of his attorney. “The mistake or negligence of the attor
ney appearing for the party to a suit is the mistake or negli
gence of the party; and no new trial will be allowed where
such mistake arises from negligence or lack of skill.”—Handy
v. Davis, 38 N. H. 411; Heath v. Marshall, 46 N. H. 40. The
failure to make defense to a suit, by reason of a mistake of
the defendant or his counsel, caused by negligence, can not
justify the granting of a new trial, it matters not how effec
tive or just the defense may be.—16 Amer. & Eng. Encyc. of
Law, 549, n. 4.
Under the principle above announced, the judgment of the
City Court granting a new trial is reversed, and a judgment
is here rendered overruling the defendant’s motion for a new

trial.
Reversed and rendered."
1'1 One cannot
claim surprise over the introduction of relevant testi
defense properly admissible
mony, such as evidence of an affirmative
under the general issue.—Nellums v. Nashville. (1901) 106 Tenn. 222.
So, in general, mistake of law will not authorize a new trial,—14 Encyc.
Pl. & Pr. 743; but exceptions are often made in order to prevent serious
injustice,-—Chinn v. Taylor, (1885) 64 Tex. 385; Douglass v. Todd,
(1892) 96 Cal. 655; Whereatt v. Ellis, (1887) 70 Wis. 207; Baxter v,
Chute, (1892) 50 Minn. 164.
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MR. COMMISSIONER CLAYBERG prepared the following opin
ion for the court:
This is an appeal by Metcalf from an order granting a new
trial. The only ground of the motion for a new trial was
newly discovered evidence. The only affidavit ﬁled showing
that evidence was newly discovered is that of plaintiffs. This
affidavit, in so far as the discovery of the evidence and the
showing of diligence in that regard is concerned, is as fol
lows: “That subsequent to the trial of said cause, to-wit, on
the 12th day of December, A. D. 1902, I have discovered evi
dence which will establish the fact that myself and my co
plaintiff in said action,” etc. Then follows a statement of the
evidence which has been discovered.
The affidavit then con
tinues: “I did not know of the existence of said evidence at
the time of the trial, and could not, by the use of reasonable
diligence, have discovered or produced the same upon the
former trial. The name of the witness by which I can estab
lish the facts herein set forth is E. A. Briggs, now residing at
Centerville, in Silver Bow county, Montana; that I did not
for eighteen years prior to the 12th day of December, A. D.
1902, know the whereabouts of said Briggs.”
The affidavit
of Briggs also appears in the record, supporting the affidavit
of plaintiffs as to the facts to which he would testify, and
stating that he was present and heard the conversation upon
which plaintiffs’ cause of action was based.
,
The statute concerning new trials provides as follows:
“The former verdict or other decision may be vacated and a
new trial granted on the application of the party aggrieved
for any of the following causes materially affecting the sub
stantial rights of such party ‘ " “ (4) Newly discovered
evidence material for the party making the application which
he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and
produced at the trial.”
(Section 1171, Code of Civil Pro
cedure.)
We are of the opinion that the affidavit does not contain a
sufficient showing of diligence, as contemplated by the statute,
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the order appealed from.
(Rand '0. Kipp, 27
Mont. 138, 69 Pac. 714; Gregg v. Kommers, 22 Mont. 511, 57
Pac. 92; Caruthers v. Pemberton, 1 Mont. 111; Butler 'v. Vas
sault, 40 Cal. 74; Hendy v. Desmond, 62 Cal. 260; Bagnall '0.
Roach, 76 Cal. 106, 18 Pac. 137; Barton v. Laws, 4 Colo. App.
212, 35 Pac. 284; State 'v. Power, 24 Wash. 34, 63 Pac. 1112,
63 L. R. A. 902; Bradley v. Norris, 67 Minn. 48, 69 N. W.
624; 1 Spelling on New Trial and Appeal, Secs. 209-218.)
Under these authorities it was incumbent upon plaintiffs to
show that they had been guilty of no laches, and that failure
to produce the evidence on the trial could not be imputable to
lack of diligence on their part. They must make strict proof
of diligence, and a general averment of its existence is insuffi
cient. Whether reasonable diligence has been used is a ques
tion to be determined by the court upan the affidavits pre
sented, and therefore these aﬁidavits should state with par
ticularity what acts were performed. They should show what
diligence was used, how the new evidence was discovered,
why it was not discovered before the trial, and such other
facts as make it clear that the failure to produce the evidence
was not their own fault, or because of want of diligence on
their part. So far as the evidence presented in this case is
concerned, the ﬁrst search for evidence may have been made
after the cause had been tried. If Briggs was present at the
conversation, plaintiffs must have known it. Perhaps this
fact escaped their memory at the time of the trial, but mere
forgetfulness is no excuse. (H endy v. Desmond, 62 Cal. 260.)
The mere allegation that for eighteen years plaintiffs did
If plain
not know the whereabouts of Briggs is insufficient.
tiffs knew that Briggs could testify in their behalf, they
should have shown that they had exhausted the methods pro
vided by law for obtaining the attendance of witnesses.
If
Briggs
they did not know that
could so testify, it is immate
rial that they did not know his whereabouts.
While it is true that the granting or refusing of a motion
for a new trial is largely in the discretion of the trial court,
and its action will not be interfered with on appeal unless
there is abuse of such discretion, the affidavits being defec
tive in the showing of diligence, we are satisﬁed that the court
below had no authority to grant the order, and therefore
abused its discretion.
to warrant
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We therefore advise that the order appealed from be re
versed, and the cause remanded.
PER CURIAM.—For the reasons stated in the foregoing
opinion, the order is reversed and the cause remanded."

ll Where a non-resident attorney arranges with a local agent to notify
him when his case is called for trial, the failure of the agent constitutes
negligence of the attorney, and precludes a. new trial.—Griﬁin v. O'Neil,
(1891) 47 Kan. 116. This is true even when the attorney arranges with
the clerk of the court to notify him, in the absence of a statute placing
this duty upon the clerk.—Colley v. Sapp, (1923) — Okla. -—, 216 Pac.
454; First Nat. Bank v. Wentworth, (1882) 28 Kan. 183.
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BRUNSWICK AND BATH
STREET RAILWAY.

Judicial Court of Maine.
96

J

1902.

Maine, 508.

WISWELL, C. . While the plaintiff was driving a horse at
tached to a long covered vehicle on runners across the bridge
between the cities of Lewiston and Auburn, in the direction
of ‘Auburn, he met the defendant’s rotary snow-plow coming
towards him from Auburn; his horse became frightened at
the appearance of the snow-plow and the noise caused by it to
such an extent as to become unmanageable; ﬁnally, the horse
bolted towards one side of the bridge, and, after striking that
side, started diagonally across the bridge to the other side,
the plaintiff in the meantime was thrown out, dragged some
distance and sustained severe injuries.
The plaintiff, claiming that the accident was attributable
to the negligence of the defendant’s employees in the manage
ment of the snow-plow, brought this suit to recover the dam
ages sustained by him.
The trial resulted in a verdict for
plaintiff
brings the case here upon two
the defendant and the
motions for a new trial, one, because the verdict was against
the weight of the evidence, the other upon the ground of
newly-discovered evidence. The plaintiff's counsel admits in
argument that the jury was authorized in ﬁnding a verdict
for the defendant upon the evidence introduced at the trial,
so that it only becomes necessary to consider the second mo
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tion and the newly-discovered testimony presented under it,
in connection with the case as submitted to the jury.
The contention of the plaintiff at the trial was that his
horse showed signs of fright when about one hundred feet
distant from the snow-plow as the two were slowly approach
ing each other; that the fact that his horse was greatly fright
ened and was becoming unmanageable was so apparent that
it should have been seen, and in fact was seen, by the motor
man a suﬁicient length of time before the horse bolted, for
him to have stopped his plow, and allow the plaintiff to drive
past; that by doing so the accident would have been avoided,
but that he failed to stop the snow-plow and that this failure
was the proximate cause of the accident resulting in the in
jury to the plaintiff. The defendant’s answer to this proposi
tion is, and was at the trial, that the motorman did stop his
plow as soon as the horse showed any signs of fright. De
fendant’s counsel in their brief say, “coincident in point of
time with the ﬁrst appearance of real fright on the part of
the horse, the motorman shut off the current, applied the
brake, and stopped the plow.”
Upon this issue, the plaintiff testiﬁed that the snow-plow
did not stop until after the accident, and one witness called
by him, whose means of observation on account of his dis
tance from the scene of the accident were not particularly
good, to some extent substantiated the plaintiff, stating it as
his impression that the snow-plow did not stop. Upon the
other hand, four witnesses called by the defense, all of whom
were on the snow-plow at the time, and in the employ of the
defendant corporation, and three of whom were still in its
employ at the time of the trial, all testiﬁed in substance that
the motorman stopped his plow as soon as the horse appeared
to be frightened. A jury certainly would be authorized to
ﬁnd that it was negligence upon the part of those managing
the rotary snow-plow, such as this one was described and
shown by the photographs to be, “to continue its movement
along the track, in such a situation as this, when an approach
ing horse displayed signs of great fright and of becoming
But, upon the other hand, the jury was au
unmanageable.
ﬁnd
from
the testimony in the case that the motor
thorized to
man seasonably stopped his plow, and did all that he could do
So that the important issue of fact
to prevent the accident.
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at the trial was, as to whether or not the plow was seasonably
stopped, in view of the situation.
Since the trial the plaintiff has discovered three additional
witnesses who saw the accident and who will testify, with
varying degrees of positiveness, that the snow-plow did not
stop until after the accident.
These witnesses are entirely
disinterested, they had no acquaintance with the plaintiff‘,
their opportunities for seeing what happened were good
The testimony of these three witnesses is newly-discovere
within the well-established rule in this state, its discove
subsequent to the trial was accidental; and the failure of th
plaintiff or his counsel to be earlier aware of its existence
cannot be attributed to any negligence upon their part, be
cause diligence upon their part would not have been likely to
have put them in possession of it.
The question then is, whether the court, in the exercise of
its sound discretion, but within the rules which have been
adopted relative to granting new trials upon this ground,
should grant a new trial in this case. But ﬁrst, inasmuch as
there may be some confusion as to what the true doctrine is
governing the court in the exercise of its discretion in cases
of this kind, growing out of the language used in two de
cisions of this court, it may be well to carefully state it.
The true doctrine is, that before the court will grant a new
trial upon this ground, the newly-discovered testimony must
be of such character, weight and value, considered in connec
tion with the evidence already in the case, that it seems to
the court probable that on a new trial, with the additional evi
dence, the result would be changed; or it must be made to
appear to the court that injustice is likely to be done if the
It is not sufficient that there may be a
new trial is refused.
possibility or chance of a different result, or that a jury might
be induced to give a different verdict; there must be a proba
bility that the verdict would be different upon a new trial.
But it is not necessary that the additional testimony should
be such as to require a different verdict.
Q

I I i
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In this case we can not say that the new evidence, in con
nection with the former evidence, would require a different
verdict.
After this evidence is submitted it then becomes a
question for the jury to pass upon. But it does seem probable
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to the court that the verdict will be different when the case
is submitted anew with the additional evidence.
It is true that this evidence is cumulative, but it is not an
absolute and unqualiﬁed rule that a new trial will not be
granted under any circumstances
upon newly-discovered
cumulative testimony.
Snowman 1'. Wardwell, 32 Maine, 275.
When the newly-discovered evidence is additional to some
already in the case in support of the same proposition, the
probability that such new evidence would change the result
is generally very much lessened, so that much more evidence,
or evidence of much more value, will generally be required
when such evidence is cumulative; but if the newly-discovered
testimony, although merely cumulative, is of such a character
as to make it seem probable to the court that, notwithstand
ing the same question has already been passed upon by the
jury, a different result would be reached upon another trial
with the new evidence, then such new trial should be granted.
And after all, while it is important to have general rules in
regard to the granting of new trials upon this ground, which
may be known to the profession, and by which the court will
be governed so far as practicable, each case differs so materi
ally from every other, that the decision of the question as to
whether or not a new trial should be granted in any particular
case must necessarily depend, to a very large extent, but of
course within the limits‘ of such general rules, upon the sound
discretion of the court, which will always be actuated by a
desire, upon the one hand, to put an end to litigation when the
parties have fairly had their day in court, and, upon the
other, to prevent the likelihood of any injustice being done.
In the exercise of this discretion, and within the rules as
above laid down, the court is of the opinion that this plaintiff
should have the opportunity to again submit his case, with the
additional testimony, to the determination of a jury.

New trial granted."
In

Oberlander v. Fixen & Co., (1900) 129 Cal. 690, the court said:——
so often reiterated by the courts, that a new trial should not
must be regardeu‘
be granted where the evidence is merely cumulative,
(in this state) not as an independent rule, * " " but as ‘a corollary
that the newly discovered evidence must be such
of the requirement
"
as to render a different result probable on a retrial of the case.’
19

“The rule,
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alleged to be due on account of
business transacted with defendant in the years 1872 and
The defendant denies that any balance
1873.
due plain
tiff. Trial to the court.
Plaintiff testiﬁed in substance that on or about Nov. 25th,
1872, he gave defendant two drafts, each for $1,000, on
Vaughn Bros., Chicago.
That one of these drafts was forwarded to Chicago and
That the other, under his direction, was retained;
paid.
that he gave checks against this draft to the amount of
$980.93, which was charged to his account; and that after
ward he settled the account by turning out notes which the
bank discounted, and this draft was delivered up to him
and destroyed.
The defendant’s cashier and vice-president both testiﬁed
that the draft sent to Chicago was drawn on the 23d of No
vember, and that the bank paid over the counter therefor
$1,000 less exchange.
was possible the
The plaintiff, in rebuttal, testiﬁed that
draft paid by Vaughn Bros. was drawn on the 23d, but
that he did not, on that day or any other day, receive from
any officer of the bank $1,000 in cash over the counter of
the defendant on that draft, or upon any draft in contro
versy in this suit; and that no officer of the bank ever
claimed to him before the day of trial that they had paid
cash over the counter of the bank on any draft in contro
versy.
Upon the testimony introduced, the court rendered judg
ment for the defendant.
new trial on the ground
Plaintiff thereupon moved for
of surprise and of newly discovered evidence.
The court overruled the motion on the ground that the
newly discovered evidence was cumulative.
Plaintiff ap
peals.
The further material facts are stated in the opinion.
new trial will not be granted because of
DAY, J.--That
a

a

it

-

‘
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$1,000,
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merely cumulative,
the discovery of evidence, which
general doctrine of the courts, and has been frequently recog
nized in this state. See
Graham and Waterman on New
Trials, 486-495, and cases cited; Alger '0. Merritt, 16 Iowa,
121; Sturgeon v. Ferron, 14 Iowa, 160; Mania: v. Malony,

Iowa, 81.
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It is exceedingly difficult,
not impossible, to furnish
general deﬁnition of cumulative evidence, which in
given
case will materially aid in determining whether particular
testimony offered falls within or without that class.
In
Greenleaf on Evidence,
said: “Cumulative
evidence
evidence of the same kind, to the same point.
Thus, if
fact is attempted to be proved by the verbal ad
mission of the party, evidence of another admission of the
cumulative.”
same fact
And in Alger '0. Merritt, 16 Iowa,
(127),
121,
said: “If the new evidence be speciﬁcally
may be inti
distinct and bear upon the issue, though
mately connected with some parts of the testimony at the
trial,
Citing
not cumulative.”
G.
W. on New Trials.
Many of the cases seem to hold that evidence
cumulative
goes to establish the issue which was principally con
troverted upon the former trial. These cases, we think, lay
rule. The evidence may tend to establish
down too broad
the same issue, and yet be so unlike and distinct from any
testimony before produced, as to furnish no protext for de
claring
cumulative.
The case of Gardner v. Mitchell,
Pick. 114, furnishes an apt illustration.
In that case the plaintiff recovered
verdict for $5,337
warranty
as to the quality of 51,000 gallons
on a breach of
The defendant moved for
of oil sold him by defendant.
new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence by
which he could prove declarations of the plaintiff that the
oil was as good as expected. It was held that this was a
new trial was granted.
new fact not before in the case, and
The same principle was recognized in Guyot 12. Butts,
Wen
dell, 579.
In this case plaintiff states in his motion for new trial,
“that he can fully prove by the testimony of William Phil
lips of Clayton county, Iowa, that on the 23d day of No
vember, A. D. 1872, this plaintiff drew
draft on Vaughn
Bros. of Chicago, for $1,000, at the bank of defendant; that
said witness was with plaintiff at the time, and that he,
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plaintiff did not receive cash for the same, but did check
against said draft to the amount of $500, and plaintiff says
he can show he drew no other draft that day.
Plaintiff also states he can prove substantially the same
by Abram Gish.
Now, whilst this testimony tends to the establishment of
the same fact as that testiﬁed to on the former trial by plain
tiff, to-wit: that $1,000 was not paid when the draft was
drawn, it tends to establish it in part, as an inference from a
new fact, not introduced upon the former trial, viz: that a
check was drawn against the draft to the amount of $500.
It seems to us, therefore, that the case falls within the
principal of Gardner 12. Mitchell, 6 Pick. 114, and Guy/ot v.
Butts, 4 Wendell, 579, and that the evidence newly discov
ered was something more than merely cumulative.
See 1
G. & W. on New Trials, 490-493, and cases cited; 3 Id. 1048,
and cases cited.

l

i l i I

Q

#

Q

Q

I

We think the motion for a new trial should have been
sustained.
.

Reversed."

80A written admission is cumulative evidence of the same fact already
by an oral admission.—Brown v. Wheeler, (1901) 62 Kan. 676.

shown

_Z'—"—i—_ii"
CHICAGO AND EASTERN ILLINOIS RAILROAD CO. v.

STEWART.

Supreme

Court of Illinois.
208

Illinois,

1908.

228.

WILKIN, J.—This is an action of trespass

the case,
brought by Robert Stewart against appellant, to recover
damages on account of a personal injury sustained by him
on the 30th day of December, 1899, occasioned by a collision
between appellant’s locomotive engine and the street car
upon which appellee was a passenger, in the city of Chi
Appel
cago.
The jury returned a verdict for $1,358.40.
lant made a motion for a new trial, which was overruled,
The railroad
and judgment was rendered upon the verdict.
on
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company now prosecutes a further appeal from a judgment
of affirmance in the Appellate Court for the First District The only ground for reversal urged in this court is that
the court below erred in overruling the defendant's motion
for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
The claim for damages was for injuries to the plaintiff’s
During the progress of the trial
spine, shoulder and arm.
plaintiff testiﬁed that he had never received an injury be
fore this accident.
On cross-examination
he was asked if
he had not been injured some years ago in an accident on
the Santa Fe Railroad, to which he replied that he did not
get hurt in that accident.
He was then asked to hold up
hand,
his left
which showed three ﬁngers missing, and when
asked as to the time of losing those ﬁngers he replied that
he did not remember when it was.
After the verdict was
returned the claim agent of the appellant company made an
investigation on the Santa Fe accident, and ascertained
from the county hospital that on April 25, 1899, one “R.
Stuart” had been taken to -that hospital because of an in
jury to his hand. The agent then made an affidavit to the
facts ascertained by him in his investigation, and coun
sel for appellant presented it to the court in support of
Counsel insisted that new evi
the motion for a new trial.
dence had been discovered which would tend to impeach
the plaintiff and show that he had sworn falsely when he
stated that he did not know when he received the injury to
his hand. No claim is made in this cause for any injury
to the hand, therefore the loss of the ﬁngers was wholly
immaterial to the issue,of the case. It was, perhaps, proper,
in the discretion of the court, to permit the cross-exam
ination of the witness upon that subject for the purpose of
discrediting him, but for no other purpose. The newly dis
covered evidence, therefore, even if it would have been
competent upon the trial, tended only to impeach or dis
credit the plaintiff, and that upon a matter not material
It has been often decided by this court that
to the issue.
a new trial will never be granted on the ground of newly
discovered evidence merely for the purpose of impeaching a
(Friedberg '0. People,
witness who testiﬁed upon the trial.
102 Ill. 160; Grady '0. People, 125 id. 122; Monroe '0. Snow,
131 id. 126; Bemis '0. Horner, 165 id. 347; Chicago and
Northern Railway Co. '0. Calumet Stock Farm, 194 id. 9.)
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The motion for a new trial was therefore properly over
ruled.

The judgment of the Appellate Court will be ajﬁrmed."
81 See also, on the subject of impeaching
evidence, Moore v. Chicago,
St. L. & N. 0. RR. Co., (1881) 59 Miss. 243; Blake v. Rhode Island Co.,
'
(1911) 32 R. I. 213.

HEISKELL

v.

ROLLINS.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.
81

1895.

Maryland, 397.

ROBINSON, C. J. The motion to dismiss the appeal in this
case is made on the ground, that the appeal was not taken
within two months after ﬁnal judgment was entered, as re
quired by Code, art. 5, § 6. The docket entries show that
the judgment was entered 6th October, 1894, and that the
appeal was taken on 2d January, 1895. If the matter rested
here, we should be obliged to dismiss the appeal, for the
reason that it was not taken within two months after judg
But the docket entries also show that
ment was rendered.
the verdict was rendered on the 6th October, 1894, and that
judgment on verdict was entered on the same day, and that
on the same day a motion for new trial was made, and rea
sons in support of the motion were ﬁled; and they further
show that the motion for new trial was not disposed of until
2d January, 1895.
The court could not, of course, have en
tered ﬁnal judgment on the verdict until the motion for new
trial was overruled or otherwise disposed of.
At common law, it was incumbent on the plaintiff, after
verdict, to enter a rule for judgment nisi causa, and this
rule expired in four days. Within the four days the de
fendant had the right to move for new trial or arrest of
judgment, and, unless the motion was made within that time,
the right was gone. In Clerk 2:. Rowland, 1 Salk. 399, it is
said: “So, where there is a verdict, there must be four
Therefore, after
days between the verdict and the judgment.
verdict or writ of inquiry, the course is for the plaintiff to
give a rule to enable him to enter his judgment nisi causa.”
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In the court of king's bench, the day on which the verdict
was entered was not reckoned one of the four days,'and the
four days were computed exclusive of the day on which the
rule was made.
In the court of common pleas, however,
the practice was to include the day on which the rule was
made.
And in Standfast v. Chamberlaine, 3 Salk. 215, the
judgment was set aside because it had been entered before
Now,
the expiration of the four days, as required by law.
in this case, the judgment was entered on the day the verdict
was rendered, although the plaintiff had on that day ﬁled a
motion for a new trial, with reasons in support of such mo
tion; and it further appears by the docket entries that this
We
motion was not disposed of until 2d January, 1895.
assume,
was
some
must
therefore that there
mistake on the
part of the clerk in entering ﬁnal judgment on the day the
verdict was rendered, and while the motion for a new trial
was pending, and, if so, no ﬁnal judgment has been entered
on the verdict, because the record shows that the motion
for a new trial was overruled 2d January, 1895; but it does
not show that judgment was entered on that day, or on any
day subsequent thereto, and if this be so, the appeal must
be dismissed, on the ground that no ﬁnal judgment has
We shall therefore dismiss the appeal, with
been entered.
out prejudice, in order that the appellant may take such
steps as he may deem necessary to have the entry of judg
ment which was improvidently entered stricken out, and ﬁnal
judgment entered, and which could not be entered until the
Appeal dismissed,
motion for new trial was disposed of.
without prejudice."
89~In Hogan v. State, (1874) 36 Wis. 32, the court said:—“It is certain
that at common law, motions for a new trial must be made after verdict
It would be no greater absurdity to move for a
and before judgment.
new trial at common law before verdict than after judgment."
In Romine v. Haag, (Mo. 1915) 178 S. W. 147, the court said:
“Although in theory this motion suspends the entry of the judgment,
the practice has grown up of entering it upon the bringing in of the
The effect of the ﬁling of the motion for a new trial is then
verdict.
to suspend its effect as a; ﬁnal judgment until the court shall determine
It is upon this theory that, although
whether the verdict may stand.
that no appeal shall be
the statute (R. S. 1909, Sec. 2040) provides
unless it be made during the term at which the judgment
allowed
appealed from is rendered, the appeal may be taken at a subsequent
term to that upon which it is formally entered, upon the overruling
' ' ' Until the motion is determined
of a motion for a new trial.
provisional,
and
the sustaining of the motion vacateg
the judgment is

_~
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Brown, (1910)

316.

Sometimes the right to move for a new trial on grounds arising out
of the conduct of the trial, as well as for newly discovered evidence,
after the entry of judgment, is given by statute.—Tracey v. Altmyer,
(1871) 46 N. Y. 59_8.
Sometimes the statute makes the entry of a‘judgment a necessary
condition precedent to a motion for a. new trial.—McIntyre v. MacGinniss,
(1010) 41 Mont. 87.

¢Q-_

0
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CHAMBLISS
Supreme

v.

HASS.

Court of Iowa.
125

1904.

Iowa, 484.

WEAVER, J. Benjamin Chambliss died intestate in the
year 1899, and the appellee herein, J. H. Hass, was duly ap
pointed administrator of his estate.
Thereafter Jefferson
Chambliss, a son of.the intestate, brought suit, against the
administrator, claiming the ownership of certain promissory
notes held by said administrator, and listed as a part of the
Upon trial,
assets of the estate of Benjamin Chambliss.
judgment was rendered in favor of the claimant.
Within
less than one year from the date of said judgment the ad
ministrator ﬁled a petition for new trial under the provi
sions of Code, tit. 20, c. 1, alleging the discovery to show
that the testimony offered upon the trial by said Jefferson
Chambliss concerning his alleged possession of the notes dur
ing the lifetime of his father was untrue, and that the gift
or transfer to his son was never in fact consummated by
delivery.
The plaintiff’s demurrer to this petition having
been overruled. he ﬁled an answer in the nature of a denial.
In February, 1903, Jefferson Chambliss died, and his admin
istrator was substituted as plaintiff. In April, 1903, plaintiff
amended his answer to petition for new trial, alleging that,
before said petition was ﬁled, the defendant had appealed
from the judgment of the district court to this court, where
on May 21, 1902, said judgment was duly afﬁrmed, and that
thereafter execution had been issued upon said judgment,
and was returned by the sheriff on June 10, 1902, fully
satisﬁed, for which reasons the trial court was without juris
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diction to entertain the petition for a new trial. To this
amendment a demurrer was sustained, and trial was held
to the court upon the issues presented by the petition and
answer.
The court found for the petitioner, and ordered a
new trial, and plaintiff's appeal from this order now before
us.

l

II

l

$

Q

I

U

I I

O

The one serious question presented by this appeal is
upon the ruling of the trial court sustaining defendant’s
demurrer to the plea setting up the appeal from the judg
ment in the main case, the afﬁrmance of such judgment, and
its subsequent payment, as a bar to the demand for a new
trial. The contention of the appellant, that the appeal from
the judgment in the principal case had the effect to deprive
the trial court of jurisdiction to entertain the application for
new trial, cannot be sustained.
The right to petition for
new trial within one year upon the grounds named in the
statute is absolute and unqualiﬁed, and is wholly independent
of the right of appeal. The proceeding involves no attempt
to review the judgment which has been appealed from, nor
to pass upon or take advantage of any alleged error in the
It is in effect an independent proceeding, in which
record.
a new and different issue is joined and tried as an ordinary
Code, §§ 4094, 4095.
action.
Bank v. Mu-rdough, 40 Iowa,
26; Cook v. Smith, 58 Iowa, 607, 12 N. W. 617. In the last
cited case, after judgment rendered against them in the cir
cuit court, the defendants ﬁled a petition for a new trial,
and, without waiting for a disposition of the petition, they
also prosecuted an appeal to this court, where the judgment
Pending the appeal, the plaintiff ﬁled an an
was affirmed.
swer setting up the pendency of the case in this court as a
bar to the proceeding for a new trial, and a demurrer thereto
After the aﬂirmance of the judgment on
was sustained.
appeal the proceeding for a new trial was brought on for
hearing, and a new trial granted, and, this order being ap
pealed from, was by us affirmed, saying that “during the
time limited by statute the power of the court and the right
of the party are unconditional.” The case at bar is paral
lel with Cook v. Smith in every essential particular, except
as relates to the payment and satisfaction of the judgment,
The view
the effect of which we shall hereinafter consider.
we have indicated has the very general support of the au
2.
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thorities. Henry v. Allen (N. H.) 41 N. E. 894; Hellman
o. David Alder & Sons Clothing Co. (Neb.) 83 N. W. 846;
Brooks 'v. Syndicate (Nev.) 53 Pac. 59G; Naglee v. Spencer,
69 Cal. 10; Fuller '0. United States, 182 U. S. 563, 21 Sup.
Ct. 871, 45 L. Ed. 1230; State v. Cir. Court, 71 Wis. 595, 38
N. W. 192. In Fuller's Case a judgment in his favor was
aﬁirmed by the Circuit Cout of Appeals (72 Fed. 467, 18
C. C. A. 641) and by the Supreme Court of the United States
(18 Sup. Ct. 944, 168 U. S. 707, 42 L. Ed. 1215), and man
A petition for new trial
date returned to the trial court.
had been ﬁled while the appeal was pending, and, after ﬁnal
order of aﬁirmance had been entered, the trial court granted
Upon appeal from this order, the
a new trial as prayed.
court, by Harlan,
., goes into an elaborate discussion of the
for
new trials, and of the precedents, in
statute providing
cluding Cook 12. Smith, and decides that the trial court acted
within its jurisdiction. It says of the proceeding that it
“is in form a new and independent suit, although the statute
requires it to be heard summarily by the court," and quotes
approvingly from Ea: parte Russell, 13 Wall. 664, 20 L. Ed.
632, the following pertinent language:
“It has been ob
jected that the granting of a new trial after a decision by
this court is, in effect, an appeal from the decision of this

J

court.

This would

if it were granted upon
But it is not. A new case

the same
presented to us.
must be
made; a case involving fraud or other wrong upon the gov
ernment [the new trial in that case having been granted
upon the application of the United States]. It is analogous
to the case of a bill of review in chancery to set aside a
former decree or a bill impeaching a decree for fraud.” In
Henry v. Allen, supra, an appeal having been taken from
the judgment of the trial court, and a proceeding having
also been begun in that court for a new trial, the appellant
moved the Court of Appeals to suspend further proceedings
for the time being without prejudice to his rights in the
premises, and to remand the case to the trial court in order
that the application for a new trial might be disposed of.
This motion was denied on the ground that the pendency
of the appeal in no manner affected the right or jurisdic
tion of the lower court to proceed to hear and dispose of the
application. In Brooks '1). Syndicate, supra, a motion by ap
pellee in the Supreme Court to dismiss the appeal because
case

be so

644

TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE

[Chap. 3

the appellant had applied for and obtained an order for a
new trial in the court below was overruled, the court holding
there was no such interference of jurisdiction, and no such
inconsistency between the right to appeal and the right to
apply for a new trial. that both might not be prosecuted
to a termination. A like principle was applied by the West
Virginia court in Gillespie v. Allen, 37 W. Va. 675, 17 S. E.
It is there held that where, pending an appeal, a bill
184.
of review has been ﬁled in the lower court, based solely on
the ground of newly discovered evidence, the questions pre
sented to the two tribunals are entirely distinct, and no con
fusion can arise from their separate determination.
The
question presented by the appeal from the judgment is sim
ply whether the record of the proceedings before the trial
court is sufficient to sustain it. The appellate tribunal can
not hear or consider any attack upon such judgment for
fraud or undue advantage in its procurement, except as the
Of after-discovered fraud,
same is disclosed by the record.
perjury, or other wrong it can take no original cognizance.
That is left to the trial court alone. The aﬂirmance of the
judgment on appeal makes it immune against all attack
based upon or inhering in the record of the proceedings up
to and including its rendition by the trial court, but it can
not estop the party aggrieved who, within the time pre
scribed by statute, makes a sufficient showing that but for
the fraud or wrong, since discovered, of the prevailing party,
such judgment would probably not have been obtained.
To
so hold would be to nullify to a great extent the statute
providing for new trials.
We come, then, to inquire whether the collection of the
judgment upon execution after its affirmance by this court
It is a well
operates to defeat the right to a new trial.
settled proposition that one who obtains and enforces a judg
ment which is afterwards reversed on appeal, or is annulled
or set aside by the trial court for fraud or mistake, may be
required to make restitution to-the party so injured.
Pitts
115;
Halfhill,
Barnstead,
Heath
1).
o.
38
N.
H.
106
Iowa,
ﬁeld
Bank,
56 Iowa, 133, 8 N.
131, 76 N. W. 522; Zimmerman v.
W. 807; Ha-nschied 'v. Staﬁord, 27 Iowa, 301; Kidd 'v. Curry,
29 Hun, 215; Clark 'v. Pinney, 6 Cow. 299; Haebler 'v. Myers,
132 N. Y. 363, 30 N. E. 963, 15 L. R. A. 588, 28 Am. St. Rep.
589; Bank U. S. 'v. Bank, 31 U. S. 8, 8 L. Ed. 299; He;/den»
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Sup. Ct., 117 Cal. 348, 49 Pac. 210; Flemings '0. Rid
dick’s Ex’r, 5 Grat. 272, 50 Am. Dec. 119; Peyser 12. Mayor,
70 N. Y. 500, 26 Am. Rep. 624; Hiler '0. Hiler, 35 Ohio St.
647; Cleveland 12. Tuﬁts, 69 Tex. 584, 7 S. W. 72.
Inde
pendent of statutory provisions for restitution upon motion.
the right thereto has long been recognized as a rule of the
common law, and may be enforced in an independent action.
It is said that, where payment of money has thus been en
forced upon a judgment or order of the court which is after
ward reversed or set aside, the law implies a promise to
restore it to the party from whom it was exacted. Bank U.
S. 'v. Bank, 31 U. S. 17, 8 L. Ed. 299; Haebler '0. Myers,
supra. Had no appeal been taken, and plaintiff had enforced
collection of his judgment soon after its rendition, and there
after, and within the year allowed by the statute, the defend
ant had obtained a vacation of such judgment and an order
for new trial, no one, we think, would contend that such
payment would deprive the defendant of the right to be
heard, or of the right to restitution should the retrial result
in his favor. Nor do we see how the fact that an appeal
has been taken and judgment affirmed before the order for
new trial is entered can introduce any change in the relative
rights or positions of the parties. As already suggested, the
afiirmance simply decides that the judgment was regularly
and properly entered upon the case which the trial court
then had before it, but leaves it exposed to the liability of a
new trial, on proper showing therefor, precisely as if no
appeal had been taken.
Let us suppose, for instance, that
an appeal had been promptly perfected, an aiﬁrmance or
dered, and the judgment collected by execution, all within
six months from the date of its rendition in the trial court,
and thereafter and within one year the defendant had dis
covered indubitable proof that the recovery against him had
been secured by gross fraud and perjury; could it be said
that the affirmance and satisfaction of the judgment had
made the statutory provision for new trial of no avail to
him? If so, why? The law gave him the entire year in
which to act, and an application made upon evidence dis
covered during the eleventh month is as timely as if it had
been made during the ﬁrst month.
This issue which he now
seeks to try has never been adjudicated by any court, and
was in no manner considered or passed upon by the appel

feldt
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late tribunal, and the satisfaction of the judgment by execu
tion cannot be considered an acknowledgment of its ﬁnality
or a waiver of the right to attack it for fraud. It is sug
gested, also, that the payment was voluntary, and operates
Even if the pay
as a waiver of any right to restitution.
ment had been made without actual coercion, it does not fol
low that no right to demand repayment exists.
Whatever
may be the doctrine of some of the older cases, it is now the
recognized general rule that a party under such circum
stances is not required to submit to seizure or distress of
his property to preserve his right to compel restitution.
Scholey '0. Halsey, 72 N. Y. 578; Hiler v. Hiler, 35 Ohio St.
645; Brown '0. Richardson, 30 N. Y. Super. Ct. 57. See, also,

Manning v. Poling, 114 Iowa, 20, 83 N. W. 895, 86 N. W. 30,
and cases there cited. In the present case the only showing
as to the manner of payment is contained in the pleading
The allegation there
to which the demurrer was sustained.
aﬁirmed,
judgment
was
execution was
made is that after the
issued thereon, and “returned on the 10th day of June, A.
Accepting the correctness of this
D. 1902, fully satisﬁed.”
statement, it must be conceded that the payment was in
voluntary, within the rule applied by us in the Manm'n.g
A payment made upon execution is not voluntary.
Case.
Nichols 12. Knowles (C. C.) 5 McCrary, 478, 17 Fed. 494.

I i i i

1

#

i i l I

In our judgment, the conclusion reached by the trial court
is correct, and the order appealed from is aﬁirmed.”
When the statute allows a motion for a new trial to be ﬁled within
designated period after ﬁnal judgment,
this refers to the entry of
judgment in the trial court and not to the aﬂirmance on appeal.—Heil
man v. Adler & Sons Clothing Co., (1900) 60 Neb. 580.
88
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CEASE.
‘

Court of Illinois.
50

1869.

Illinois, 228.

J .--It

is very seldom that a court of chancery
will interfere to grant a new trial at law, though its juris
In this case, a bill was ﬁled
diction to do so is undoubted.
for that purpose, and the case having been heard on a motion
to dismiss the bill, the relief prayed was refused.
We are
of opinion, however, that the motion should have been over
ruled, and if, after the cause is at issue and proofs taken,
the case made by the bill is sustained, a new trial should
For the present, we must take the allegations
be awarded.
of the bill as true, and they show, not merely that the only
evidence upon which the judgment at law was obtained was
false, but that the witness who gave it has voluntarily made
an affidavit of its falsity before a magistrate, stating his
desire to retract the same, and this aﬁidavit is made an
exhibit with the bill. This, then, is not a case of conﬂict
ing evidence. An unrighteous judgment has been obtained
upon perjured testimony, and the perjury is shown, ‘not
by uncertain admissions of the perjurer, but by his own oath
voluntarily made for the purpose of repairing his wrong.
A stronger case could hardly arise. The motion to dismiss
should have been overruled, and the defendant required to
After the answer is ﬁled and the cause is at issue,
answer.
it will be incumbent on the complainant to take the testimony
of the Witness, when the defendant will have an opportunity
of cross-examining, and if the witness adheres to the state
ments of his affidavit, and there is no evidence he has been
subjected to corrupt inﬂuences, the court will award a new
LAWRENCE,

trial.
The decree is reversed and the cause remanded.“
:4 “Applications to courts of chancery, for the purpose of granting new
trials at law, and the interposition of the Chancellor, whenever a proper
case is made out, may be warranted as well upon the score of principle
as of precedent.

“An injunction to stay proceedings upon an unjust judgment, and tor
a new trial, is a remedy recognized and 9-Dproved by courts of equity.
These remedies are to be enforced under the operation of established
forms and rules of proceeding, instituted as they are for the development
of truth and justice.

\
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Anciently, courts of equity exercised a familiar jurisdiction over trials
at law, and compelled the successful party to submit to a new trial, or to
(Floyd v. Jayne.
be perpetually enjoined from proceeding on his verdict.
6 John. Ch. Rep. 479.)
"But this practice, except in cases the most extraordinary, has long
since gone out of use; because courts of law are now competent to grant
new trials, and are in the constant exercise of that right to a most liberal
Anclently, courts of law did not grant new trials; and in those
extent.
days, courts of equity exercised that jurisdiction over trials at law, and
compelled the successful party to submit to a new trial when justice
required it. But. even in that age, the Court of Chancery proceeded with
great caution.
A new trial was never granted, unless the application was
founded upon some clear case of fraud or injustice, or upon some newly
discovered evidence, which the party could not possibly, by any vigilance
or industry of his, have had the beneﬁt of, on the ﬁrst trial.
O

I I

O

I

O

0

O

O

O

In general, where it would have been proper for a court of law to have
granted a new trial, if the application had been made while that court
had power to do so, it is equally proper for a court of equity to grant a
new trial, if the application be made on grounds arising after the court
of law ceased to have power to act.
“The general rule is, that courts of chancery will not interfere after
verdict and judgment at law, except in cases of fraud, or in extraordinary
cases where manifest injustice would be done; nor where the party might
have defended himself fully at law and neglected it. Great abuse would
by drawing within the jurisdiction of
be made of a. contrary doctrine.
equity, as by a side wind, almost all causes decided at law.
The high
powers intrusted to Chancery, to promote the purposes of justice, should
not be abused to the vexation of citizens, and the unsettling solemn deci
sions of other courts, where it is always to be presumed that full justice
has been done."
3 Graham & Waterman on New Trials, 1455 ct seq.
For a further discussion of this subject see: Black on Judgments, § 357;
Equity Jurisprudence.
Freeman on Judgments, § 485: 3 Pomeroy’s
§ 1365;
(1324) 5 Littell (Ky.) 8, 15 Am. Dec. 35;
Yam‘-Y V- DOWIIBI‘.
Wynne v. Newman's Adm'r, (1881) 75 Va. 811; Kansas & Arkansas Valley
R. R. Co. v. Fitzhugh, (1895) 61 Ark. 341, 33 S. W. 960.

STREET RAILWAY

CO.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

V.

JOHNSON.

1905.

114 Tennessee, 632.

a

a

SHIELDS, J.-This action is brought by W. B. Johnson
against the Memphis Street Railway Company to recover
damages for personal injuries sustained by him, through the
negligence of the defendant, while plaintiff was
passenger
on one of its cars.
jury, and
The case was submitted to
verdict found
a
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for the plaintiff.

The motion of the defendant for a new
trial was overruled, and judgment entered. The defendant
tendered a bill of exceptions to this action of the court, which
was signed and ﬁled, and the case is now before us upon
appeal in the nature of a writ of error.
The errors assigned are predicated upon the refusal of
the trial judge to set aside the verdict of the jury and grant
the defendant a new trial because of the admission of cer
tain evidence offered by the plaintiff over the objection of
the defendant, and his refusal to give in charge to the jury
certain written instructions submitted by counsel for the
railway company at the conclusion of the charge in chief.
For the defendant in error it is insisted that these assign
ments of error cannot be considered by this court because
the errors complained of were not properly set out and
relied upon as grounds for a new trial in the motion made
by the plaintiff in error in the trial court for that purpose,
as required by a rule of that court, and passed upon by the
presiding judge.
The rule of the circuit court of Shelby county in relation
to motions for new trials, which is in the record, requires
all grounds upon which a new trial is asked to be stated
and set out separately in a written motion and entered upon
the minutes of the court; and all errors not so set out are
presumed to be waived,‘ and will not be considered on the
hearing of the motion.
The plaintiff in error attempted to comply with this rule,
and the grounds for a new trial upon which these assign
ments are based are stated in its motion in these words:
“(1) For error in the admission and exclusion of evi
dence.

‘

"J

'

~

“(2) The court erred in refusing the special instructions
F
asked by the defendant.”

i

IR

#

Q

#

it

i

ii

Q

1

We are now to determine whether or not the grounds upon
which these assignments of error are predicated are suffi
ciently set out in the motion for a new trial. It seems to be
well settled that the statement of the grounds in the motion
must be sufficient to direct the attention of the court and op
posing counsel to the error or irregularity relied upon to

vitiate the verdict.
In the work on Pleading & Practice last quoted from, it
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is further said: “The general rule is that the grounds (for
a new trial) must be stated so speciﬁcally as to direct the
attention of the court and opposing counsel to the precise
A mere statement of the grounds,
error complained of.
without further speciﬁcations, will therefore be insufficient.
The purpose of the rule is to direct the attention of the
trial judge to the alleged erroneous rulings, and present to
the appellate court the precise question involved.
The safest
course is to assign each error with the same particular
"'
ity of an assignment of error in appeal.
But this
is not the practice in most of the States; the courts holding
that it is sufficient merely to assign error in giving a cer
tain instruction or admitting certain evidence, without stat
ing why such ruling was erroneous.
If the grounds for
a new trial are not stated in the motion, it may be overruled
by the court, and disregarded on appeal. All errors known
at the time of ﬁling the motion must be included therein,
or the errors omitted will be deemed to have been waived.”
Ency. of Plead. & Prac., vol. 14, pp. 882, 883.
We are of the opinion that the grounds set out in the mo
tion should be as speciﬁc and certain as the nature of the
error complained of will permit. Thus, if the error con
sists in the admission or rejection of evidence, the evidence
If it be for affirm
admitted or rejected should be stated.
ative error in the charge, or for failure to give an in
struction properly and reasonably presented, it should set
out the portion of the charge complained of, or the instruc
tion refused, or otherwise deﬁnitely identify the instruction.
If it be for misconduct of the opposite party or that of the
jury, the facts constituting it should be stated. This was
not done in this case. The testimony admitted and that ex
cluded is not stated—not even the name of the witness given
—and the instructions requested are not set out or sufficiently
identiﬁed.
We do not think that it is necessary to state why the rul
ing complained of is erroneous as fully and with all the
strictness required in assignments of error in this court, but
a fair statement of the error complained of, sufficient to
direct the attention of the court and the prevailing party
to it, is all that is required.
Nor was it necessary for the successful party in the court
below to there object to the form of the motion, because

'

i~

'
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rules of this character are made in the interest of the pub
li_c, and for the purpose of enabling the courts to speedily
and correctly dispose of the cases pending in them, and
they cannot be waived by litigants.
We are of the opinion that no sufficient grounds for a new
trial because of the admission of incompetent or rejection
of competent testimony, or a failure to give in charge to
the jury instructions submitted by the defendant, were stated
in the motion made by it in the circuit court, and that there
is therefore nothing upon which these assignments of error
on the action of the trial judge in refusing to set aside the
verdict and grant a new trial can be predicated; and, un
der the practice of his court, in cases coming from those
courts having rules like that in this record, not to consider
the assignments of error upon any ground not appearing
in the motion for a new trial, these assignments of error are
insufﬁcient, and must be overruled.
The other assignments of error ﬁled by the plaintiff in
error were disposed of in an oral opinion.
_

aoa"w§7l
I
KING v.
Supreme

Court of Missouri.
206

Woonsou,

J.

M issouri,

' ' '
1

1

GILSON.

Q

U

I i

1907'.

264.

Q

i

O
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The motion for a new trial was ﬁled on March 27, 1906,
and one of the grounds assigned therefor is in words as
follows:
“11. Because, since the trial of this cause, the defend
ants have discovered new and important evidence material
to the issues submitted to the jury, which evidence is not
cumulative in character and which evidence was unknown
to defendants at the time of the trial.”
On the same day the court granteddefendants ten days
in which to ﬁle afﬁdavits in support of motion for new trial;
and within that time they ﬁled the affidavits of Dr. Water
house, Arthur Marshall, Edward Unwin and J. H. Orr, one
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of the attorneys for the defendants, the three latter stating
what diligence they had used in trying to discover all theH
witnesses and evidence in the case.
The plaintiffs contend that the action of the court in
granting a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evi
dence

was erroneous.

The motion for new trial does not disclose or set out the
newly-discovered
evidence or its nature, nor does it give
the names or addresses of the witnesses by whom the newly
discovered evidence was to be given, nor was there any affi
davit ﬁled with the motion.
The motion simply states that, “since the trial of this
cause, the defendants have discovered new and important
evidence material to the issues submitted to the jury, which
evidence is not cumulative in character, and which evidence
was unknown to the defendants at the time of the trial.”
This question has been before this court repeatedly, and
there is nothing new to be said upon it.
In the case of State v. David, 159 Mo. 1. c. 535, this court
“A new trial was also asked upon the ground of
said:
newly-discovered evidence, but the evidence was not set out
in the motion. The mere fact, asserted in the motion, that
the newly-discovered evidence was material, did not prove
it to be so. It should have been set out in order that the
court might pass upon its materiality. For these reasons,
besides others unnecessary to mention, this question cannot
be considered by this court.”
#

1

#

8

#

l

#

#

#

Q

.

In the case at bar, the affidavits were not ﬁled in sup
port of and in proof of the newly-discovered evidence stated
in the motion for a new trial, because, for the very ob
vious reason, there was no such evidence stated therein;
but the object and purpose in ﬁling them was to bring the
evidence itself and not the proof thereof to the attention of
The law requires such evidence to be set out in
the court.
the motion; and the mere fact that it is so stated does not
prove it to be true, and for that reason its truthfulness is
But here the de
required to be established by affidavits.
fendants are trying to make the affidavits serve a two-fold
purpose; ﬁrst, a ground for a new trial, and, second, proof
This cannot be
of the statements constituting that ground.
The motion for a new trial must be ﬁled within four
done.
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days after the trial, and the court has no power to extend
the time for ﬁling it. If the evidence is set out in the motion,
then this court has repeatedly held that the -trial court may
give the parties time in which to ﬁle affidavits in support
thereof.
The defendants state in their motion that they have dis
covered new evidence; that it was material to the issues;
that it was not cumulative, and that if admitted in evidence
probably a different result would be reached if a new trial
was granted.
If they knew such evidence existed at the
time the motion was written, why did they n'ot incorporate
it into the motion and later ﬁle the affidavits in support

thereof?

If

such a practice as is contended for in this case was
permissible, it would enable the parties to supplement and
add to their motion for a new trial after the expiration of
the four days allowed for ﬁling it, and thereby open the
door to temptation and fraudulent conduct in bolstering up
motions for new trials.

I

#

#

#

=8

*

#

#

*

#

[Aﬁirmed on other grounds.]

-LL;-It

1 (I 6 vosn

v.

MAYO.

United States Circuit Court for the District of Maine.
8

Cliﬁord,

1871.

481,.

CLIFFORD, Circuit Justice.
Power to set aside a verdict
before judgment and grant a new trial is vested in the cir
cuit courts “in cases where there has been a trial by jury,
for reasons for which new trials have usually been granted
in the courts of law,” and the correct mode of applying to
the court for the exercise of that power is by motion for
new trial, which, under the rules of the circuit court in this
circuit, must be made in writing, and must, unless the time
is enlarged by leave of the court, be ﬁled within two days
Such a motion must assign the reasons
after the verdict.
application,
and when the motion is grounded on
for the
facts not within the knowledge of the presiding justice, and
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not appearing in his minutes, it must be veriﬁed by affidavit,
unless the requirement is waived by the opposite party. No
affidavit of merits, however, is required when the motion is
properly addressed to the minutes of the presiding justice,
as where the motion is to set aside the verdict for error of
ruling in admitting or rejecting evidence, or for refusing to
instruct the jury as requested, or for misdirection, or be
cause the verdict is against the law, or against the evidence
or the weight of the evidence, as the theory of the motion
in all such cases is, that all the matters of fact alleged in
the motion are within the knowledge of the presiding jus
tice, or that they may be veriﬁed by reference to his minutes
taken at the trial.
Where the motion is for new trial on
account of newly discovered evidence, or where the motion
is grounded on the charge that the opposite party or the
jury were guilty of misconduct in respect to the trial, the
rule is different, as the motion in such cases presents a pre
liminary question whether the facts and circumstances dis
closed are such as to make it the duty of the court to order
notice to the opposite party, and to direct the mode in which
the proofs shall be taken, and in all such cases the motion
must be in writing, and must, unless the requirement is
waived, be supported by affidavit.
Johnson v. Root (Case
No. 7, 409;) Hill, New Trials, 393, sec. 35; Macy v. DeWolf
(Case No. 8, 933).

$‘tlti¢8II#85

Ill Various methods have been devised by which the data necessary for
the determination of a motion for a new trial may be presented to the
court.
1.
The minutes of the court may be used. These being deemed already
in existence and before the court. a party moving upon them is required
to prepare no abstract or statement of the proceedings in the case, upon
which to base his olaim for relief.
“The term ‘minutes of the court,’ as used in subdivision 4, 5 5090,
Comp. Laws, seems to have no well-defined legal meaning, but is evidently
used in that section as referring to such minutes as the judge may make
of the evidence, and to his recollection of the same, and is evidently
intended to relieve a party from the expense and labor of preparing a.
statement or bill of exceptions.
To require the party moving for a
new trial upon the minutes of the court to procure a transcript of the
stenographer's
notes, and cause the same to be filed, would, in effect,
impose upon him a greater burden than preparing a bill of exceptions
or statement."
Distad v. Shanklin, 11 S. D. 1.
2.
It may be made upon a bill of exceptions or statement of the case.
By this means a. statement of the evidence and other proceedings had
upon the trial, so far as material to the questions raised by the motion,
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is written out at large, and settled as correct by the attorneys or the
court, and thereupon such statement becomes the exclusive source ot
information as to what took place upon the trial, and the sole founda
tion for the motion so far as it relates to the trial itself.
It may be made upon aflidavits. This method is to be employed
3.
when matters outside the proceedings at the trial are to be brought to
the attention of the court as a basis for the reliet asked. It is commonly
used in connection with, and supplementary to, the other two methods.

1/4-5/<7'“€_i
TRIAL

BY COURT WITHOUT A JURY.

SECTION 10.

FOWLER
Supreme

v.

TOWLE.

Judicial Court of New Hampshire.
49

'

1870.

New Hampshire, 507.

This was a writ of error, brought by Cyrus Fowler and
The writ of error is dated
others against Elias Towle.
October

1,

1869.

The original action was replevin, for a meeting-house
bell, in favor of Towle, against Fowler and others.
The
plea was non cepit, with a brief statement, giving notice of
title to the bell in the defendants and others. By consent
of the parties, the action was tried by the court at Free
dom, after the adjournment of the May term, 1868. Neither
party requested the court to report the facts found, nor the
At the close of the trial,
conclusions of law upon them.
the cause was reserved for consideration upon written ar
guments, and the finding of the court was subsequently ﬁled
in the clerk’s ofﬁce. The ﬁnding, after giving a description
of the action, concludes as follows:
“The case was well tried, and the evidence and law were
well argued by the respective counsel engaged, in writing.
The court, after a mature examination and consideration
of the facts and evidence, and the law applicable thereto,
has come to the conclusion, that the said Elias Towle re
cover of said defendants one dollar, for his alleged dam
ages for the alleged caption and detention of said bell men
tioned in his declaration; and also that plaintiff be restricted
to the recovery of one dollar in full of all costs whatsoever
in this suit.
G. W. N., Jus. &c.
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“The ﬁnding of the court is also upon the further limi.
tation and condition, that if the defendants shall under
take either by transfer of the action to the full court or
otherwise, to delay immediate judgment according to the
aforesaid ﬁnding of the court, then the plaintiff by way of
penalty, shall be allowed to recover the whole_amount of
his legal costs from the beginning, and also if the plaintiff
shall attempt to transfer this action as aforesaid or other
wise disturb the aforesaid ﬁnding of the court, then, in
such case, the court orders that. by way of penalty, the
aforesaid ﬁnding shall be wholly reversed and annulled, and
that the said defendants recover as damages against said
plaintiff the value of the bell, being three hundred dollars,
with interest from the 5th'day of July, A. D. 1867, and full
costs of court.
G. W. N., Jus. &c.
“The action on the docket having been continued nisi
judgment is therefore ordered as of the last term for plain
tiff for one dollar debt, and one dollar costs, and the clerk

In the assignment of errors in this

‘Ki

.2 Jus. &c.”

I

‘re

I

ll

Q

i

t

Q

Q

will enter it up accordingly.

case the

plaintiffs in

i
I

#

Q

Q

I
i

#
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#

error pray that “the judgments aforesaid may be reversed
and held for nothing, and that they may be restored to all
things they have lost by reason thereof.”

U

Q

IF

*

Ill

Q

$

#
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The defendant in error moved to quash the writ of error
upon its return into court, and the parties agreed that
“pleas may be ﬁled and argued wihout prejudice to defend
ant’s motion to quash in the same brief in which said motion
No plea has been furnished, and the defendant
is argued.”
in error relies solely upon his motion to quash.

2

1

a

J.

The ﬁrst ground taken by defendant in er
ror, on his motion to quash is, that in this class of cases,
error does not lie. That the proceeding being entirely by
proceeding according to
force of special statute, is not
the course of the common law, and therefore that certiorari
should have been the form of proceeding instead of error.
What are the statute provisions applicable to this case?
and
of chap. 189,’ Genl. Stats., prescribe the juris
Secs.
SARGENT,
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of this court at the law terms, while sec. 3 does the
same at the trial terms, as follows:
“At the trial terms
they shall take cognizance of civil actions and pleas, real,
personal and mixed, according to the course of the com
mon law,” etc.
Sec. 4 then provides that “in civil actions
the court shall try the facts in controversy and assess the
damages, if the parties so elect, and judgment rendered on
such trial shall be conclusive as if rendered on the verdict
of a jury ;” and sec. 5 provides that “the decision of the
court in such case. shall be in writing. if either party so
requests, stating the facts found and the conclusions of law
upon them, which shall be ﬁled and recorded, and either
party may except to any ruling or decision of the court in
matters of law in the same manner and with like effect, as
upon a trial by jury.”
Now the question is, whether the substitution of the
court for the jury, to settle the questions of facts, by agree
ment of parties, so far changes the nature of the whole pro
cedingfthat it is no longer “a civil action or plea” prose
cuted “according to the course of the common law?”
The
writ is the same; the service the same; the entry in the
court the same; the defendant’s appearance the same; the
pleadings the same; the issue joined is the same; and, af
ter verdict, the judgment must be the same; and shall have
the same effect, as though rendered upon a verdict of the
jury; and provision is made, that either party requesting
it, shall have the decision in writing, and may except to any
ruling or decision of the court in matters of .law, in the
same manner, and with the same effect, as upon a trial by
diction

jury.

all these facts are considered, and also the fact
that it is only by agreement of the parties, that this change
can be made, and that all the proceedings, both before and
after trial, are to be the same in both cases, we are satis
ﬁed that this arrangement of the parties as to the trier of
the facts, does not change the nature of the proceeding any
more than it does the form, and was not designed to change
When

either.
It is suﬁicient answer to this suggestion, that if by this
agreement of the parties, and this trial of the facts by
the court instead of a jur_v, the proceeding is changed so
as to be no longer a “civil action or plea according to the
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course of the common law,” then the court at the trial term
would no longer have jurisdiction of the case, because it
clearly does not come under any of the other heads enumer
ated in sec. 3, and unless it continues to be what it was
when it was commenced, viz., a civil action or plea accord
ing to the course of the common law, the court would cease
to have jurisdiction of the same at the trial term, because
it is only as such an action or plea, that the court at that
term has any jurisdiction of the case.
This position of the
defendant in error is not well taken.
A writ of error would be the proper remedy in a case
tried by the court, under secs. 4 and 5 in all cases, where
it would be the remedy if the same case had been tried by
The court was substituted
the jury, instead of the court.
jury
try
facts, by express agree
case,
in
the
this
to
for the
ment of the parties; but while the court thus settles the
questions of fact, in the capacity of a jury, still the judge
retains all his powers as judge in questions of law, and may
exercise the same discretion in allowing or limiting costs,
that he might before, so that while acting as a jury, to try
the facts, he has no power over the costs, either to allow or
disallow, or limit, yet as judge, he may pass upon the ques
tion of costs.
And while the judge who thus acts in the double capacity
of judge and jury has, and may exercise all the powers both
of the judge and jury, still he has no powers in addition
to those which the court and jury have in any ordinary
Having premised thus much, in relation to the powers
case.
and duties of the judge, who acts as judge and jury both,
in the trial of a cause, let us look at the verdict in this case,
and see how much of it is a ﬁnding upon questions of fact,
and what part of it is simply a ruling upon questions of
law, or the exercise of the discretion vested in the court.
So far, as the limiting of the original plaintiff's costs
is concerned, that was a matter within the discretion of the
court, as a court, and had nothing to do with the ﬁnding
of the facts, and no exception would lie to the ruling of the
court, upon a matter like this, which is placed by law in the
discretion of the court, and it seems equally well settled, that
Rochester v. Rob
a writ of error will not lie in such a case.
erts, 29 N. H. 360, 368.
To this part of the verdict, then, there could be no ex
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and there was no error.
And if there had been
the plaintiffs in review being the original
defendants, would hardly insist upon having that corrected,
and being compelled to pay full costs, instead of the limited
amount ﬁxed by the judge who tried this cause. That is not
one of the errors assigned in this case.
The other part of the verdict (omitting now the condi
tional portions of it) is “that said Towle recover of said
Fowler & als. one dollar as damages for the caption and
detention of said bell mentioned in his declaration."
As
there was no request to state in writing either the facts
found, or the conclusions of law upon the facts in the case,
by either side, we think this ﬁnding is plain, intelligible
and explicit enough, to answer the requirements of the law.
In order to reach that conclusion, the facts found must
have been, that the bell in question belonged to Towle, and
as he had taken the bell into his possession upon the re
plevin writ, all he could recover would be the damages for
the wrongful taking and detention of it, and that is, what
he does recover by this verdict and judgment.
This is such
a ﬁnding that judgment may be properly rendered upon it.
ception,

error in this,

i

1

$

Q

It

I

¥

l

U

it

Let us next consider the remaining or conditional por
tion of the verdict in this case. It will be observed, that the
ﬁnding of the court is in three separate and distinct parts;
the ﬁrst and third relate to the same subject-matter; the
ﬁrst, the ﬁnding of one dollar damages and the limiting
the costs to one dollar; the third, ordering a judgment on
These, too, are con
that ﬁnding, according to its terms.
sistent with each other, and are perfect in themselves, and
each is signed separately, and neither of them contains any
thing, as matter of fact, which the presiding judge might
not properly ﬁnd, acting in place of a jury, or as matter
of law, which the same judge acting as court, might not
properly do and order.
But the second or conditional part of the verdict is all
inconsistent with the other ﬁndings, it is all conditional,
not upon the law or facts of the case, but upon the future
conduct of the parties, and was intended to be held over
both parties, as it would seem, in tcrrorem, in order to in
duce them to abide by the ﬁrst award, and submit to the
This portion of the
judgment, which was ordered thereon.
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verdict is entirely separate from all the rest, and is signed
separately.
Whence did the presiding judge, who tried this cause,
derive his power to make orders as to the future conduct
of these parties? The power to deprive them of rights
which the law had given them, the powerito punish them
for resorting to those remedies which the law has provided
for all good citizens? He could not derive this power from
the agreement of the parties, because this agreement was
simply, that the court should act in the place of the jury in
ﬁnding the facts in the case, and gave the court no addi
tional powers as a court.
After that agreement, the pre
siding judge, had just the powers he had before as presiding
judge, and in addition, the power and authority to ﬁnd the
facts in the case, upon legal testimony, and that was all.
A jury may mistake their province, and undertake to
ﬁnd something, that was not in issue, but such part or
parts of their verdict would be rejected as surplusage, and
only such part as was conﬁned to the issue raised by the
pleadings, could stand as a verdict.
Tuckcr v. Cochran, 47
N. H. 54. So far, then, as he acted as a jury, the pre
siding judge, had no authority or power to undertake to
regulate the future conduct of these parties, and so far the
verdict can have no force or effect. While acting as judge,
he had’ the power to limit costs, in his ‘discretion, and to
order judgment upon the verdict he had rendered, still he
had no more power than he would have had if the jury had
found the verdict upon the evidence. In such case, he would
have the power to set aside the verdict if a proper case
was made, or to order judgment upon it, or to continue the
cause, but he had no power or jurisdiction to put the parties
under bonds for good behavior, without the proper com
plaint on oath, nor had he the power to say that they should
not avail themselves of all their legal rights and remedies,
after the judgment which he might properly render, was
entered up.
As a part of the verdict, upon the facts, this portion
would be merely surplusage, and would all be rejected, and
as an order of the court, or a part of the judgment, it was
extra-judicial, was without authority, and without legal ef
fect, a mere nullity, not 'v0'idable merely but absolutely void.
There is no doubt, therefore, that the second judgment
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would be reversed, if the question were brought before the
court at the proper time and in the proper way. But the
question here is, whether a writ of error is the proper way
to bring the matter before the court at this time.
When
this case was brought forward, and the new judgment was
rendered, it was at a regular term of the court, when coun
sel were present, as it was their duty to be, and ’had every
opportunity to take exceptions.
All the objections existed
now,
proper
exceptions had been
and
if
then that exist
the
taken to the rulings and orders of the court at that time,
the judgment must inevitably have been reversed." No rea
son or excuse is given or offered, or pretended to exist, why
"‘
"
*
objection was not then made, and exception taken.
Under these circumstances, the plaintiffs in error, having
had ample opportunity to take any and all excepiions, season
ably, and have them considered just the same as upon a writ
of error, and having neglected to take any such exceptions at
the proper time, they cannot now * " "‘ be heard to raise
*
*
*
exception.
We ﬁnd no ground, therefore, upon which this writ of
error can _be sustained, and are of opinion that the motion
to quash the writ should be granted.
Writ quashed.

Q

CC3»c.c~UU

UTAH NATIONAL BANK
Supreme Court of Utah.

V.

NELSON.
1910.

as Utah, 169.

Action by the Utah National Bank of Salt Lake City, Utah,
Joseph Nelson.
From a judgment for plaintiff, de
fendant appeals. Aﬂirmed.
Plaintiff, a corporation organized and existing under the
laws of Congress, brought this action to recover from defend
ant upon a promissory note. The complainant alleges, in
That the defendant, on anuarv 22, 1908, at Salt
substance:
Utah,
City,
for value received, executed and delivered to
Lake
plaintiff his certain promissory note, and thereby promised,
on 30 days’ demand after date, to pay to the order of plain
against

J
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$13,250, with interest at 6 per cent. per annum from date
until paid, and to pay 10 per cent. additional as attorney's
fee if the note should be placed in the hands of an attorney for
collection; that payment of the note was demanded September
11, 1908, but the defendant refused to pay the same, or any
part thereof; that the note was placed in the hands of attor
neys for collection.
The answer admitted each allegation in
the complaint, with the exception that it denied that the note
was given “for value received."
The answer also contained
the following affirmative allegation, namely; “That the prom
issory note signed by the defendant and delivered by him to
the plaintiff, as alleged in said complaint, was without con
sideration, and that no consideration whatever passed or was
given for the’ said promissory note; " ' " that neither the
plaintiff nor any other person ever paid any sum of money or
any other thing, or ever suffered or received any detriment as
a consideration for the signing and delivery of the said prom
issory note; and that said note was wholly without considera
tion.” The case was tried to the court without a jury. * "' "
The court, among other things, found, so far as material
here: “That, for a valuable consideration received by defend
ant, he executed and delivered his promissory note (the note
in question) to plaintiff ; "‘ * " that all of the allegations
contained in plaintiff’s complaint ﬁled herein are true, and
all the denials and allegations of said defendant in his answer
are untrue, except as to the admissions therein contained.”
As a conclusion of law the court found that plaintiff was en
titled to judgment against defendant for the principal of the
note, $13,250, and interest thereon amounting to $1,104.16,
and for attorney’s fee amounting to $1,325, and rendered
judgment in favor of plaintiff for the sum of $15,679.16 and
costs of suit. To reverse the judgment defendant has brought
the case to this court on appeal.
MCCARTY, J. (after stating the facts as above).
Appel
lant, in his assignment of errors, alleges “that the court erred
that
failed to ﬁnd the facts,
any there were, consti
tuting, or which could constitute, any consideration for the
contract or promissory note,” and insists that the ﬁnding
made by the court, namely, “that for a valuable considera
tion received by said defendant he (the defendant) executed
the promissory note mentioned,” was a mere conclusion of
"
law and not ﬁnding of fact at all
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the author says;
“If an issue be tendered in general terms and met by a denial
in the same form, a ﬁnding in the same general form will be
sufficient; but, where the pleadings are so framed that the
controversy turns upon a particular fact, the ﬁnding should
conform to the issue thus presented and be speciﬁc. Accord
ingly, when only general facts are averred, and the contro
versy related to the settlement of a long standing account eon
sisting of numerous items, it was held that a general ﬁnding
of a balance in favor of plaintiff was sufi‘icient”—citing with
approval the case of Pratalongo 'v. Larco, 47 Cal. 378. The
action in that case was, as stated in the opinion, “for money
lent and advanced and paid, laid out, and expended by the
plaintiff to and for the use of the defendant and for money
had and received by the defendant for the use of the plaintiff.
The answer is a general denial and a counterclaim in which
the defendant avers that the plaintiff is indebted to him for
money had and received, lent and advanced, and paid, laid out,
and expended.” So in this case it is alleged in the answer, in
general terms, that the note in question “was without consid
eration, and that no consideration whatever passed or was
given for the promissory note." The general ﬁnding that the
note was executed “for a valuable consideration received by
said defendant” negatives the affirmative allegation of the
answer and is therefore sufficient. Moreover, the authorities
seem to hold that ﬁndings are sufﬁcient when the facts found
are stated in the same way as they are alleged in the plead
mgs.
In Hayne on New Trial, sec. 243, the rule is stated as fol
lows: “Facts may be stated in the ﬁndings in the same way
It is not necessary that the
they are stated in the pleadings.
ﬁndings should follow the precise language of the pleadings;
but the only purpose of ﬁndings is to answer the questions
put by the pleadings, and it seems to be the received idea that
it is sufficient if the answers are given in the same language
as the question, and that the two modes of statement are gov
erned by the same general rules.”
In 8 Ency. Pl. & Pr. 939, it is said: “It is not necessary
that the ﬁndings should be in the exact language of the plead
ings or in any particular form.” The ﬁnding complained of
in this case, while of course not in the exact language of that
part of the answer in which want of consideration is alleged,
§ 593,
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And, further
nevertheless is directly responsive thereto.
more, the doctrine is elementary that the ﬁndings should be a
statement of the ultimate facts in controversy and not of the
evidentiary matters from which the ultimate facts are to be
deduced or found. In 8 Ency. Pl. & Pr. 941, it is said: “The
ﬁndings of the court should be statements of the ultimate
“
The ﬁndings
facts only, and not probative facts "‘
should contain a concise statement of the several facts found
by the court from the evidence and not the evidence from
which they are found."
Murphy v. Bennett, 68 Cal. 528, 9 Pac. 738, was an action
to recover damages for the tearing down of a barn and con
verting the materials thereof. It was alleged in the complaint
that the plaintiff was the owner of the barn at the time of the
alleged conversion.
The answer denied the ownership of the
plaintiff and set up two affirmative defenses in justiﬁcation
of the taking. The court found that the plaintiff was not, and
that the defendant was, the owner of the building, but omit
ted to ﬁnd on the affirmative defenses. It was contended that
the ﬁnding was a conclusion of law. On appeal the Supreme
Court held that the ﬁnding on the issue of ownership was
sufficient, and that the failure to ﬁnd on the affirmative de
In the course of the
fenses did not prejudice the plaintiff.
opinion the court said: “Here the allegation in the com
plaint is that the plaintiff ‘was the owner of a certain frame
building, situate,’ etc. The answer denied that plaintiff was
the owner of the building. Whether plaintiff did own the
building or not was then the ultimate fact to be determined,
and upon the issue thus raised the court found against the
plaintiff. We think it clear that the ﬁndings referred to are
ﬁndings of fact, and not conclusions of law.”
In the case of Kuhn 11. Central Smelling Co., 2 Utah, 371,
it is said in the syllabus: “A ﬁnding ‘that there was no part
nership between the plaintiff and the defendant, is not a con
clusion of law, but is a ﬁnding of fact.” And in the course of
the opinion Mr. Justice Emerson, speaking for the court,
says: “The fact that there was a partnership is the ultimate
There are certain facts and
fact alleged in the complaint.
conditions and circumstances set out in the complaint from
which this ultimate fact is deduced; that is, there is in the
complaint much detail of mere evidentiary facts.
The mate
rial issue of fact is, however: Was there a partnership?

'
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And the ﬁnding responds to this issue. This was the ultimate
fact to be ascertained, and it is none the less a ﬁnding of fact
because drawn as a conclusion from other facts.”. This case
is cited with approval and the doctrine therein announced re»
affirmed by this court in the case of Snyder ‘U. Emerson. Au
ditor, 19 Utah, 319, 57 Pac. 300, wherein it is held that “the
ﬁnding that W. F. Critchlow was duly appointed as night
jailer is not a conclusion of law, but a ﬁnding of an ultimate
fact which was an issue.”
As a test for determining whether the ﬁnding in question
is a conclusion of law or a ﬁnding of an ultimate fact, let us
suppose, for example, that the court had, in the language of
the defendant’s answer, found “that the promissory note
signed by defendant and delivered by him to the plaintiff, as
alleged in said complaint, was without consideration, and that
no consideration whatever ever passed or was given for the
said promissory note.” Could such a ﬁnding be successfully
assailed on the ground that it is a conclusion of law and not
a statement of an ultimate fact? Certainly not, because it is
the only ﬁnding that the court could have made had it found
on this issue in favor of the defendant, and that, too, notwith
standing this issue was presented by the affirmative allega
tions of defendant’s answer and the burden was upon him to
prove that the note was executed without consideration.
Now, if a ﬁnding that the note was executed without consid
eration would be a sufficient ﬁnding to support a judgment in
favor of defendant, it necessarily follows that a ﬁnding that
the note was made and delivered “for a valuable considera
tion" is a sufficient ﬁnding to support a judgment for plain
tiff. We are clearly of the opinion that the ﬁnding made by
the court is a ﬁnding of an ultimate fact, and, as we have
stated, it is directly responsive to the affirmative allegations
contained in the defendant’s answer.
'

i i

#

#

#

#
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Judgment aﬂirmed, with costs to respondent.
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"
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*

“

"'

a

"

*

"‘

“‘

is

an action by Thomas Darling against S. A. Miles
to recover damages suffered by reason of the fraudulent rep
resentation made by defendant in the sale of certain lots.
The complaint alleges that on “the 20th day of July, 1906,
the defendant herein did, with intent to cheat and defraud
the plaintiff, falsely and fraudulently represent to the plain
tiff that he was the absolute owner in fee, free from incum
brance, of lots six (6) and seven (7) in block ﬁve (5), in
Pleasant View addition,
in the city of Portland, and
by
that lot six (6) was 46.9 feet
100 feet,
when in
truth and in fact the defendant at that time was not, and well
knew that he was not, the owner of the south ﬁfteen (15) feet
of said lot six (6) free from incumbrance, and plaintiff al
leges that the public then had a right to use the said 15 feet
highway, and the defendant then knew it; that plaintiff
as
herein relied upon the truth of the statement of the defendant
and believed the same, and on July 20, 1906, he did, by reason
of such reliance and belief, purchase
and received
from the defendant his warranty deed, wherein and whereby
the grantors certiﬁed that the said premises were free from
all encumbrances
"‘.”
All these allegations are denied by the answer, except that
defendant admits the execution and delivery of the deed, with
covenants and warranty, as alleged in the complaint.
The action was tried by the court without a jury. At the
close of the testimony the court made the following ﬁnding of

This

a is

6

a

5,

7

6

facts:
“The court ﬁnds that on or about the 20th day of July, 1906,
the plaintiff purchased from the defendant lots
and
in
block
Pleasant View addition, Multnomah County, Oregon,
for valuable consideration, and received from the defendant
a general warranty deed therefor. That the south 15 feet of
subject to a right of way of the public to use the
said lot
highway, and said sale was made without any
same for
fraud on the part of the defendant, and without any fraudu
lent representations in regard thereto.”
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Judgment was rendered thereon in defendant’s favor, from
which plaintiff appeals.
EAKIN, . 1. Plaintiff contends that the ﬁndings of fact
do not support the judgment, and to this we agree.
Section
158, B. & C. Comp., provides that when an action is tried by
the court, without the intervention of a jury, the decision
shall state the facts found, and such decision shall be entered
in the journal, and judgment entered thereon accordingly.
The ﬁnding that “the sale was made without " "‘ " any
fraudulent representations” only states a conclusion of law.
To justify a conclusion to that effect it was necessary for
the court to ﬁnd whether or not defendant represented that
he was the owner of the lot, free from incumbrance, and that
its dimensions were as stated, with knowledge on defendant’:-5
part that the representations were false or were made reck
lessly as of his own knowledge, without any knowledge of
their truth; and if the court ﬁnds that the representations
were so made it must also ﬁnd whether plaintiff relied there
Cawston 'v. Sturgis, 29 Or. 331 (43 Pac.
on to his injury:
Finding
to plaintiff on at least one of these
adverse
656).
matters is necessary to support the conclusion that there
were no fraudulent representation, or to support a judgment
to that effect.
This court has held in many cases that ﬁndings of fact
2.
must be made on all material issues necessary to support the
judgment. See Wright v. Ramp, 41 Or. 285 (68 Pac. 731) ;
Henderson v. Reynolds, 57 Or. 186 (110 Pac. 979), and cases
therein cited.
Counsel for defendant urges that the proof fails to es
3.
tablish the elements of fraudulent representations alleged,

J

but the case is not before us upon the evidence. The only
means we have of knowing what was proved is from the
ﬁndings of fact which are silent as to the elements urged here.
4.
It is said in Drainage Dist. No. 4 v. Crow, 20 Or. 536
(26 Pac. 846), after quoting from said Section 158, B. & C.

Comp.:
“The object of this statute was to enable the parties to have
placed upon the record the facts upon which the right liti
gated depends as well as the conclusions of law. " * "‘ The
facts found are conclusive upon the appellate court, but the
conclusions of law are reviewable here on appeal.”
The facts found must justify the conclusions of law.
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reversed and remanded
did not sit in this case.

U“ SLAYTON

pﬂ/V-3?Supreme

v.

for a new trial.

FELT.

Court of Washington.
40 Washington,

1905.

1

MOORE, C.

1

i
i
The judgment

Q

they are abstract statements and not conclusions.

Otherwise,

.-This

i

I

I

8

Q

II

#

I
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It

*

"

*

a

J

J

action was commenced by appellant,
Charles . Slayton, against respondent, D. W. Felt, to recover
a broker's commission on the sale of real estate in the city of
jury, ap
Seattle. Upon the trial before the court without
favor,
which the court
pellant presented ﬁndings of fact in his
declined to make. Judgment was entered dismissing the ac
tion.
CROW,

‘

Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in
failing to make ﬁndings of fact and conclusions of law, sep
(2)

is

if

is

._¢—

it

arately stated, or at all, and asks that the judgment be re
Appellant urges that under Bal.
versed by reason thereof.
Code, Sec. 5029,
was the duty of the trial court to make
ﬁndings of fact and conclusions of law, separately stated.
Respondent contends that, as the ﬁnal judgment was one of
dismissal, ﬁndings of fact were unnecessary, citing, Thornc
v. Joy, 15 Wash. 83, 45 Pac. 642, and Noyes v. King County,
Both of said cases were actions
18 Wash. 417, 51 Pac. 1052.
in equity. This court has heretofore announced the rule that
ﬁndings of fact and conclusions of law are not necessary in
equitable actions, but we are not aware of any such announce
ment being made as to actions at law. We see no reason why
ﬁndings of fact and conclusions of law are not just as essen
tial,
properly requested, in an action at law when the same
dismissed, as where an aﬁirmative judgment
entered.
law,
being
an
action
at
the
cases
by
cited
respondent do
This
The question then arises whether
not sustain his contention.
the action of the trial court in failing to make ﬁndings of fact
and conclusions of law amounted to such prejudicial error as
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would entitle appellant to a reversal. In Wilson v. Aberdeen,
25 Wash. 614, 66 Pac. 95, this court said:
“We come now to the consideration of the appellants’ con
tention that the judgment must be reversed because of the
failure of the trial court to make ﬁndings of fact and conclu
sions of law. Our statute provides that ‘upon the trial of an
issue of fact by the court, its decisions shall be given in writ
ing and ﬁled with the clerk. In giving the decision, the facts
found and the conclusions of law shall be separately stated.
Judgment upon the decision shall be entered accordingly.’
Bal. Code § 5029; 2 Hill's Code, § 379. This provision of the
code is in form mandatory, and this court has several times
held, in effect, that in actions at law tried by the court with
out a jury, ﬁndings of fact and conclusions of law are neces
See Bard v. Kleeb, 1 Wash.
sary to support the judgment.
Mitchell,
Kilroy
2 Wash. 407, 26 Pac.
370, 25 Pac. 467;
'0.
865; King County 'v. Hill, 1 Wash. 404, 25 Pac. 451; Sadler v.
Niesz, 5 Wash. 182, 31 Pac. 630, 1030; Potwin '0. Blasher, 9
Wash. 460, 37 Pac. 712. But in more recent cases it has been
decided that a judgment will not be reversed on appeal for
want of ﬁndings of fact and conclusions of law, where it is
not made to appear by the record that there was any request
for such ﬁndings and conclusions, or any objection raised
upon that account. Washington Rock Plaster Co. 7.‘. Johnson,
10 Wash. 445, 39 Pac. 115; Remington v. Price, 13 Wash. 76,
42 Pac. 527."

It

‘

-

is true that appellant did request the trial court to make
ﬁndings of fact in favor of himself, upon the issues raised by
the pleadings, the same being claimed by him to be warranted
The court, not thinking the evi
by the evidence admitted.
ﬁndings,
such
refused to sign the same.
It
dence warranted
does not appear, however. that appellant at any time re
quested the court to make such ﬁndings of fact and conclu
sions of law as it might determine to be proper or warranted
We think this request should have been
by the evidence.
made, before appellant would be entitled to base a successful
assignment of error upon the refusal of the court to make any
The ﬁndings requested by appellant are
ﬁndings whatever.
shown in the record, and afford him an opportunity, of which
he has availed himself, to assign error upon the refusal of the
trial court to make the same. He has been deprived of no
This court in Bard
legal or valuable right in that direction.
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v. Kleeb, 1 Wash. 370, 25 Pac. 467, 27 Pac. 273, construing
said Bal. Code, § 5029, there mentioned as § 246, said:
“As we regard it, § 246 is for the protection of court and
parties.
To the court it gives an opportunity to place upon
record its view of the facts and the law in deﬁnite written
form, suﬁiciently at large that there may be no mistake. To
parties it furnishes the means of having their causes re
viewed, in many instances, without great expense."
The only privilege of which the appellant has been de
prived, if any, has been to bring an appeal to this court with
out a statement of facts based upon such ﬁndings as the court
would have signed if requested, but which, necessarily, would
have been against appellant upon the issues joined.
Such an
appeal could not have beneﬁted appellant in any manner
whatever.
In view of this fact, and, also, the further fact
that appellant failed to require the court to make ﬁndings in
accordance with its view of the evidence, we think no error
In an action
prejudicial to appellant has been committed.
at law, either party has the right to request a trial court to
make such ﬁndings of fact as it may deem proper, upon all
the issues involved, or upon any particular issue, which such
party may deem material or important, and such ﬁndings
should then be made. A mere request, however, to make cer
tain ﬁndings in favor of such party only, is not in itself sulﬁ
cient. Of course, it is the proper and correct practice for a
party to request ﬁndings in his own favor, to which he may
think himself entitled, so that he may make proper exceptions
to their refusal. But such ﬁndings in his favor having been
refused and excepted to, he must, if he desires to assign error
on a failure to make any ﬁndings or conclusions whatever,
also request the court to make such ﬁndings as it thinks the
This was not done by appellant in this
evidence warrants.

action.

-~
We ﬁnd no prejudicial error in the record.

The judgment

is affirmed.

Mourrr, C.

J

JJ

., concur.
Roo'r and HADLEY,
DUNBAR,
.,
concur
in the result.
and
FULLERTON
.,

JJ

‘
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STATE, EX REL.’ BOARD OF COMMIS
SIONERS.

j")»°§ipreme

Court of Indiana.
66

1879.

Indiana, 886.

J

C. .—This was an action by the appellee, against
the appellant, which resulted in a trial by the court, and a
ﬁnding and judgment for the plaintiff, for the sum of two
thousand dollars.
The~action was brought against Graham, as a surety on the
official bond of Rufus Gale, as the auditor of Jefferson county.
The bond was in the usual form of such bonds, but was in the
Breaches of the bond were
penalty of ﬁve thousand dollars.
assigned, alleging, among other things, that Gale, during his
term of office, had, as such auditor, drawn numerous war
rants or orders upon the county treasury, payable to himself,
for large amounts, and had presented them to the treasurer
for redemption, who had paid the amount thereof to said Gale
in redemption thereof; that the orders were drawn without
any order of the board of commissioners of the county, or au
thority of law.
WORDEN,

U

I

1

II

1

#

Q

U

Q

3

The defendant ﬁled a motion for a venire de novo, because
And it is said in the
the facts were not sufficiently found.
brief of counsel for the appellant, that “The failure of the
court to ﬁnd one way or the other, upon the facts, as to two
of the breaches alleged in the complaint, leaves the issues as
to those breaches untried, just as the verdict of a jury on one
paragraph of a complaint consisting of several paragraphs
leaves the issues on the other paragraphs untried, and in such
a case a oenire de novo is awarded.”

_

This makes it necessary to consider to some extent the na
ture and office of a special verdict or ﬁnding.
The statute provides that “A special verdict is that by
which the jury ﬁnd the facts only, leaving the judgment
thereon to the court.” 2 R. S. 1876, p. 171, sec. 335. The next
following section provides that “the court shall, at the request
of either party, direct them” (the jury) “to give a special
verdict in writing upon all or any of the issues."
By section 341, 2 R. S. 1876, p. 174, it is provided that upon
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trials of questions of fact by the court, if one of the parties
request it, “the court shall ﬁrst state the facts in writing,
and then the conclusions of the law upon them.”
There is no difference between a special verdict and a spo
cial ﬁnding by the court, except that the special verdict ﬁnds
the facts only, and the court afterward pronounces, or rather
applies the law to the facts found, and renders judgment ac
cordingly; while, in a special ﬁnding, the court states the
conclusions of law upon the facts found, so that the parties
Neither a special verdict nor
can except to the conclusions.
a special ﬁnding can do more in relation to facts than to ﬁnd
or state them. But what facts are to be thus found or stated?
Clearly those that are proved upon the trial, and none other.
When the special verdict has found the facts proved on the
trial, it has performed its entire office; and when the special
ﬁnding has stated the facts proved on the trial, it has per
formed its entire office, so far as the facts are concerned.
Of course the facts may be proved by circumstances or other
wise, as in any other mode of trial.
But suppose there are issues in the cause concerning which
no evidence is given. There is nothing in such case in rela
tion to those issues for the court or jury, in ﬁnding specially,
to pass upon. No fact in relation to them has been proved,
and, hence, no fact in relation to them is to be found or stated,
because, as we have seen, the special verdict or ﬁnding is con
ﬁned to the facts proved.
In the case supposed, it would seem that, in rendering judg
ment, the issues concerning which no facts are found should
be regarded as not proved by the party on whom the burden
of the issue or issues lies.
#

#

*

#

ii

i

#

$

¥

The judgment below is affirmed, with costs.
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1898.

Kentucky, 158.

The question involved in this appeal is the
appellant, City of Owensboro, for the fee of

.

Qe

the appelleé's'—attorneys at law—for services rendered by
them at the employment of the mayor of the appellant acting
without the authority of the city council.
The circumstances of the employment are set forth in an
“agreed case” and in the record in which the services were
rendered.
Q

8

Q

Q

O

8

i

1

i

#

But, say the appellees with earnestness, there was no state
ment by the court of its conclusions of fact found, separately
from its conclusions of law.
Section 332 of the Civil Code provides that “upon trials of
questions of fact by the court, it shall not be necessary for
the court to state its ﬁndings, except generally for the plain
tiff or defendant, unless one of the parties request it, with a
view of excepting to the decision of the court upon the ques
tions of law involved in the trial; in which case, the court
shall state in writing the conclusions of fact found, separate
ly from the conclusions of law.”
Now upon an agreed state of fact, what could the court do
in the way of stating “in writing the conclusions of fact found
separately from the conclusions of law?” Simply copy or re
state the agreed state of fact! Clearly the court's judgment
on the law only was asked. There was no trial of questions
of fact. The case of Harris v. Ray, 15 B. M. 629, cited by
counsel, simply determined that the provisions of the Code
regulating applications for a new trial applied to judgments
by default.
It has no bearing on the section quoted.
'
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Kansas City Court of Appeals.
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CO.

1904.

Mzssoun Appeal, 507.
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SMITH, P. J.—The plaintiff and defendant are both busi
ness corporations, the former organized under th-statute of
this State and the latter under that of the State of Kentucky.
The plaintiff in its petition alleged, (1), that it was and is
the owner of a special trade-mark for “Old Crow” whiskey,
which defendant had infringed and was infringing; and (2),
that by the use of the words “Old Crow” upon bottles contain
ing whiskey other than the genuine “Old Crow" whiskey pro
duced by plaintiff which it offered to the trade, defendant
thereby carried on such unfair trade and competition as en
titled plaintiff to the injunctive process of the cou-rt.\ The de
fendant’s answer, in addition to a general denial. interposed
the defenses of laches and the statute of limitation.
There
was a trial and decree for plaintiff and defendant appealed.
The defendant’s ﬁnal contention is, that the trial court
erred in its refusal to make special ﬁnding of the facts and
conclusions
of law thereon.
The statute (section 695)

applies to both legal and equitable actions, but
so, we do not think the failure to make
while this
special
ﬁnding in an action of the latter kind constitutes
reversible
error, because the supervisory courts are authorized on ap
peal to try and determine such actions upon the pleadings and
evidence de nova. The ﬁndings of the trial court, if any, may
be entirely disregarded by the former tribunal and such ﬁnd
ings and decree entered therein as seems to
to be meet and
The Legislature did not, by the enactment of the
proper.
statute already referred to, intend to abrogate the well and
long-established practice of the appellate courts in supervis
ing the ﬁndings of trial courts in equity cases, or to deprive
the former of the jurisdiction to determine for themselves
the correctness of the ﬁndings of the latter. Blount v. Spmtt,
113 Mo. 48; McElr0y v. Mazrwell, 101 Mo. 294; Benne v.
Sclmecko, 100 Mo. 250.
If the supervisory courts are not
bound by the ﬁndings of the trial courts, or their conclusions
of law in equity cases, but may review the whole evidence and

it

a

a
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determine for themselves what the ﬁndings of fact and con
clusions of law should be, it is difficult to see how a party
could be prejudiced by the failure of the trial court to make
special ﬁndings of fact, in such cases.
The failure, therefore, of the court in the present case to
make special ﬁnding of facts was not such an error as re
quires a reversal of the decree; and especially so since it was,
as we think, clearly for the right party and the only one that
could have been given "in the cause.
Accordingly, our conclusion is that the decree should be
affirmed. All concur.

CITY OF BUFFALO

v.

DELAWARE, LACKAWANNA_&
RAILROAD CO.

~ERN

§oa1't"o

Appeals of New York.
190

1907.

New York, 84.

The object of this action was to secure a judicial determina
tion that a portion of the river front in the city of Buffalo is
a public street and to compel the defendant to remove certain
The main issue raised by the answer
obstructions therefrom.
was whether the locus in quo, called Front street, was a pub
lic street when the action was commenced. " * ‘
The trial justice found the following facts, among others:
Q

I

C

“Eighteenth. That said dock and wharf from the time of
its erection down to the commencement of this action, and
since, has been open to travel by vehicles and pedestrians, ex
cept when such travel was temporarily obstructed by freight
stored upon said dock or wharf, and the said dock or wharf
has been used during the said times by vehicles and pedestri
ans, more largely by the latter than the former; that the
greater number of persons using said dock or wharf for foot
or vehicle traffic did so for the purpose of reaching the stores
and warehouses abutting on said wharf, and for the purpose
of delivering supplies to the vessels lying thereat, or receiv
ing passengers from such vessels, or transacting other busi
ness with said vessels. But it is equally true that many of
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the people using said dock and wharf, both for foot and
vehicle traffic, used the same as a way of communication be
tween Main street and points east of Washington street, and
that many pedestrians constantly used said dock and wharf
who had no business with the abutting stores and warehouses,
or the vessels lying at said dock.”
After ﬁnding the facts as thus stated the trial court found
the following, which were designated as “conclusions of lawz"
Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

"Third: That for a period of six years and more prior to
the commencement of this action the said premises herein
designated as ‘Front street,’ ceased to be traveled or used as
a public highway, and ceased to be a highway for any purpose.
Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

VANN, J. The trial court rendered judgment against the
plaintiff on the theory that, although Front street became a
public highway as early as 1826 through tender of dedication
by the owners and acceptance by the municipal authorities,
still it had ceased to be a public highway because it had not
been traveled or used as such for a period of more than six
years prior to the commencement of the action. While facts
were found which sustain the conclusion of law that Front
street became a public highway through offer and acceptance,
no ﬁnding of fact, classiﬁed as such, was made that the street
had not been traveled or used as a public highway for the
statutory period required to effect an abandonment.
(City of
Cohoes 12. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., 134 N. Y. 397; Mat
ter of Hunter, 163 N. Y. 542, 548; L. 1861, ch. 311; L. 1890,
ch. 568, § 99.)

It

is claimed that the third conclusion of law contains the
ﬁnding of fact needed to support the judgment and that, al
though it is classiﬁed as a conclusion of law, since it is really
a ﬁnding of fact the same effect should be given to it as if it
had been so designated in the decision.
The ﬁnding in question is one of fact or law. If it is the
latter, the facts found do not support the judgment, because
a street once in existence is presumed to continue until it
ceases to be such owing to abandonment or some other lawful
We think, however, that the
cause.
(Cohoes Case, supra.)
thereof,
ﬁnding, except the last clause
is not one of law but
of fact. The cessation of user and travel upon a street for
the period prescribed involves a question of fact. Traveling
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upon a street is an act or a series of acts which can be seen
and described.
The use of a street for traveling purposes
requires that something should be done thereon which is ap
parent to ordinary observation.
One may travel on a street
walking,
riding
driving.
by
or
Each method involves action
and an act is a fact, as that word is known to jurisprudence.
An error in the classiﬁcation of ﬁndings by the trial court
does not prevent an appellate court from classifying them for
Giving a
itself in accordance with their actual character.
wrong name to a ﬁnding does not change its nature and if it
is placed under the head of “conclusions of law,” when it is a
ﬁnding of fact, it will be treated on appeal as what it really
(Berger
is, at least for the purpose of upholding a judgment.
'v. Varrelmann, 127 N. Y. 281, 288; Christopher & Tenth
Street R. R. C0. v. Twenty-third Street R. R. Co., 149 N. Y.
51, 57.)
As we have already seen, the judgment appealed
from cannot stand unless the ﬁnding under consideration is
a ﬁnding of fact, and it now remains to be seen whether it can
stand even on that theory, since it is claimed that such ﬁnding
of fact is inconsistent with other ﬁndings of fact, and hence
must yield thereto at the election of the appellant in aid of
his exceptions.
It was upon this ground that one of the
learned justices below based his dissent.
What is the situation according to the ﬁndings when prop
erly classiﬁed? About 1826 a public highway existed on the
river front between Washington and Main streets. It still
existed in 1838, when a dock was built by the abutting owners
over and upon the land owned by them constituting said high
way, covering it for its entire width and length. From that
time to this the abutting owners have used the dock for dock
purposes and the general public have used it for highway pur
poses, neither use excluding the other altogether, although
doubtless interfering with it to some extent.
Under these
circumstances what became of the street when the dock was
built? Can abutting owners destroy a street in this way?
Did the construction of the dock annihilate the highway?
There is no statute which gives it that effect, and according
to the common law the street leaped from the ground to the
dock and stayed there.
It is there now unless it has been
*
abandoned by nonuser as we read the authorities. " "

l i i

$

1

i

8

O

#

l

When a private dock is built over a public street upon the
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shore of navigable waters, the dock becomes part of the street
and the public has a right to travel over it. Ownership of the
dock is not inconsistent with the existence of the street any
more than ownership of the land over which the street ex
Assuming that the defendant or its predecessors
tended.
could lawfully build a dock over their own land in order to
reach the river, still, as their land was subject to the right of
the public to travel upon it, they could not unreasonably in
terfere with that right nor with the existence of the street
which was the foundation thereof.
Two rights co-existed.
The defendant, as owner of the river front, had the right to
reach the water. As there was a street along the river front
over the defendant’s land the public had the right to use the
street. The building of the dock changed neither right. Both
They
continued to exist, although under changed conditions.
met but did not merge, nor did either destroy the other. The
defendant had the right to use its dock, as a private dock,
subject to the right of the public to travel over it, as they
had previously traveled upon the land over which it was built.
The city had no right to use the dock for dock purposes, but
its citizens had the right to use it for street purposes. While
the street followed the dock, and covered the whole of it, that
did not authorize the city to collect wharfage; and although
the dock was private property the same as the land beneath it,
that did not authorize the defendant to prevent the public
from using it for the same purpose that they had previously
used the land.
The easement for travel still existed, but it
was over the dock which took the place of the land constitut
ing the street. The public had the right to travel in the same
place and in the same direction that they had before, but in
stead of traveling upon the surface of the land, they were
obliged to travel and had the right to travel upon the struc
ture that the defendant had placed on the land. That struc
ture became a street for the purpose of travel and a private
dock for use as such, with a superior right in the public in
case of conﬂict through reasonable use of the respective

rights.

I I I I I I I I I I

We have thus laid down the law applicable to the facts as
found independent of the fact appearing in the third conclu
sion of law. It is clear that the latter, treated as a ﬁnding of
fact that Front street had not been traveled or used as a pub
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lic highway for more than six years, is inconsistent with the
eighteenth ﬁnding of fact that the public used the dock con
tinuously from the time it was built, both for foot and vehicle
traffic, as a way of communication ,between Main street and
points east of Washington street. The learned trial justice
evidently regarded the street as no longer in existence after
the dock was built, and hence found that travel had ceased

upon the street, although he found that it continued upon the
dock which took the place of the street. He may thus have
been misled into making the inconsistent ﬁndings.
“While an appellate court should harmonize inconsistent
ﬁndings when it is possible to do so, if they prove irrecon
cilable it is the duty of the court to accept those most favor
able to the appellant, and he is entitled to rely upon them in
aid of his exceptions.”
(Israel 'v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 158 N.
Y. 624, 631; Nickell v. Tracy, 184 N. Y. 386, 390.) The ﬁnd
ing that the street has been abandoned cannot be reconciled,
according to our view of the law, with the ﬁnding that the
dock has been used and traveled upon continuously as a street.
We are, therefore, compelled to reject the former and to ac
cept the latter, with the same force and effect as if it was the
only ﬁnding upon 4 the subject appearing in the decision.
This leaves the conclusion of law that the defendant is en
titled to the exclusive use, possession and occupancy of Front
street, and that the plaintiff is not possessed of any right, title
or interest therein, without any ﬁnding to support it. The
of law , as well
exception to this __conclusion
d1re¢_
ito the#_'___
_ _
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(a)

THE JUDGMENT.
Nature.

l

MONTGOMERY
_

v.

VIERS.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
180

[Chap. 3

1908.

Kentucky, 694.

J

Eetition

O’REAR, C. . Plaintiff avers that in 1900 a judgment by
default was rendered in his behalf by the Hardin county
quarterly court against Euclid Walker and Mary F. Walker,
for $49.50, with interest and costs, but that the then judge
of said court, who was also its clerk, failed to sign the judg
Application was made re
ment upon the judgment book.
cently by plaintiff to the respondent, who is now judge of the
Hardin county quarterly court, to sign that judgment, or, in
lieu of doing so, to enter now for then a judgment identical
in terms. The respondent refused to entertain the motion
unless notice was given to the Walkers; the case having years
go gone off the docket. Thereupon the plaintiff exhibits his
in this court, praying that the writ of mandamus
ssue against the respondent compelling him to enter the

is

is

*

"‘

"‘

is

it

is

is

is

'udgment now for then.
Common-law courts have from earliest times exercised
the prerogative of correcting their own judgments by their
own records so as to make them conform to the original
fact. In this they have exercised the inherent power of sup
plying their lost or defaced records. It must be manifest that
only historical. Its
not the judicial act. It
the record
evidential.
The judge hears the
principal practical use
So may the jury. The judgment of the court
case.
the
pronouncement of the judge upon the issue submitted to him.
the court’s judgment.
When spoken,
Necessarily, the
giving of the judgment must precede its historical engross
ment. The clerk of the court executes the mechanical act of
recording in some manner so as to give permanence to the
evidence of the judgment that the court has delivered.
But some officer whose responsibility may be regarded as
higher ought to authenticate what the clerk has recorded as
None other
so well qualiﬁed, or so
the action of the court.
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much interested, as the judge of the court whose acts are in
volved. Hence for all time the presiding judge or justice has
usually signed the records of his court, perhaps not for the
purpose of making of them records, but to identify them as
such, and to authenticate them in the most irrefragable man
ner, for future use; but his signature is not always deemed
essential to the completeness of the record, or to its validity
as such.
* " "‘ In Raymond v. Smith, 1 Metc. 65, 71 Am. Dec. 458,
it was held that a loose paper among the ﬁles of a suit, pur
porting to be the judgment of the court in that case, but not
recorded, nor signed by the judge, nor indorsed in any man
ner to show that it had been ﬁled, nor in the handwriting of
*
*
the judge, was not a judgment of the court.
As regards the sufficiency of the entry of a judgment, Free
man (Freeman, Judgments, 550) says:
“I think however,
that from the cases this general statement may be safely
made:
That whatever appears upon its face to be intended
as the entry of a judgment will be regarded as sufficiently
formal, if it shows:
(1) The relief granted; and (2) that the
grant was made by the court in whose record the entry is
written. In specifying the relief granted, the parties of and
for whom it is given must, of_ course, be sufficiently identi
In inferior courts the same strictness in this, as in
ﬁed.”
other particulars, has not been exacted, though none the less
A few instances cited by Freeman may be re
desirable.
relevant.
In New York, justices of the peace
to
as
ferred
were required to enter their judgments in their dockets with
in four days after the rendition of the judgments; but, under
the general rule that the entry of a judgment is a ministerial
act, the failure of a justice to comply with that part of the
law as to time of recording the judgment was held to leave
the judgment in force. Hall '0. Tuttle, 6 Hill, 38, 40 Am. Dec.
382; Walrod '0. Shuler, 2 N. Y. 134; Fish v. Emerson, 44 N.
Y. 377. In the last-named case, while censuring such loose
practice on the part of the magistrate, the judge writing the
opinion for the Court of Appeals said: “I am unable to ﬁnd
any principle of law requiring us to hold that the omission to
docket must inﬂict a penalty upon the plaintiff more justly
due to the magistrate.” In Maine, a justice of the peace, af
ter having been out of office for over three years, completed
the record of a case which he had tried by writing up and
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entering a judgment upon his judgment book. Matthews v.
Houghton, 11 Me. 377. ‘ " "
Under the maxim that “An act of the court shall prejudice
no one” (Broom’s Legal Maxims, p. 115), made to also read
by its frequent application to this class of cases as “A delay
of the court shall prejudice no one,” the practice of entering
judgments nuns pro tune exists, and has from very early
times. Doune v. Lewis, 11 Ves. 601. Nor is there a limita
tion upon the time when it may be done, unless such be found
in the modern statutes of limitation; one instance being re
corded Where such an entry was made 23 years after the judg
ment was rendered.
Danl. Ch. Pr. 1219. The entry of such
judgments are always to protect some right that has arisen
since the judgment was delivered, as otherwise a judgment
now would be as efﬁcacious as if entered then. For that rea
son, and to that end, in pursuance of the maxims just quoted,
the courts will enter a judgment which was in fact rendered,
but which through the omission of the clerk, or other casu
alty, has not been recorded; but, before proceeding to order
such judgment entered as of the date of its rendition, strict
evidence is required that it was then so rendered.
Therefore
the rule is that such judgment can be entered only upon evi
dence of the fact of its rendition contained in the record it
self.
*

‘

*

“

"

*

The present oﬂicial can examine the record. He
can see whether it imports a regular entry, and whether it
is written by the clerk who recorded the other entries of the
time. He can see whether the summons had been served in
due season, or whether the record shows that the defendants
had appeared. He may examine the minute book and docket
of the court. And from all these sources of record evidence
can determine whether the judgment is correctly entered, and
thereupon sign it, or, though not entered, to enter it now for
then, thereby securing the plaintiff in such rights as legally
accrued to him by its virtue but for the omission complained
of by which the record was not formally completed.
Even if the former judge were living, he might have wholly
forgotten the circumstances of the transaction, or, after these
years, misremembered them. Hence the rule of resorting to
the record alone, and not to the judge’s memory, to see what
judgment ought to be entered now for then. In Tidd’s Prac
tice, 965-972, it was stated upon authorities cited that the
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practice of allowing such entries is attended with great cau
tion, lest the rights of innocent strangers may be affected.
Hence notice of the application should be given. In the case
at bar, not only the Walkers, whose rights are necessarily in
volved, but we think any other person who may have become
interested in the title to the property which had become af
fected by the proceedings under the regular entry, should
have notice of the motion.
The respondent was right in re

quiring it.

*

"‘

"'

for mandamus is denied.”

The motion

entry of record is not indispensable to a
86 “Save for some statute,
judgment; but it is just as clear that a judgment is essential to the
on Judgments, Sec. 38, and cases
validity of an entry.
See Freeman
' " “A judgment rendered and entered in vacation, without
"
cited."
consent of the parties or any order of court entered during term time,
is void. See Code Sec. 247, and authorities cited thereunder.
But judg
ments and decrees ordered and rendered during term time may be
entered in vacation.”—Burke v. Burke, (1909) 142 Ia. 206, 210.
There can be normally only one judgment or decree in an action.
Hence
where part only of the relief demanded is obtained, another judgment
Washington Motor Co. v.
for the balance cannot be had,—Overland
Alexander, (1915) 43 App. D. C. 282. So, too, a second judgment entered
in a cause will not affect the validity of a prior judgment, but the
second will be inoperative.—Wagner v. Noe Life Ins. Co., (1912) 70
Wash. 210.
The doctrine stated in the
Pa-rol evidence to ﬁa: terms of judgment.
principal case is criticized by Freeman in 1 Judgments, §§ 62, 63. In
“Whether the ‘old notion’ has yielded so
the latter section he says:
far as to authorize the entry of a judgment as of some prior date, when
there is no record evidence of its rendition at such date, is doubtful; but
being made evident by the
the fact of the rendition of a judgment
record, a decided preponderance
of authority authorizes the court to
proceed in its subsequent investigations with the aid of oral as well as
Were the rule otherwise, the power of courts to
of written evidence.
furnish relief, made necessary by the negligence or inadvertence of their
clerks, would be so restricted in its operation as to be of little or no
"
"‘
utility.
Should the record in any case be lost or destroyed,
whose
record it was possesses the undoubted power, at any
the court
‘ *
time afterward, to make a new record.
There is no reason why
when,
instead of being lost, the record
the same rule should not apply,
was never made up, or was so made up as to express a different judg
ment than the one pronounced by the court.
Hence the general rule
that a record may be amended, not only by the judge's notes, but also
“
by any other satisfactory evidence," even
‘the testimony of the wit
nesses who heard the decision announced in open court."'

'

'
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CRONAN.

.

Szpreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
76 Connecticut,

1908.

118.

TORRANCE, C. J. The complaint in this case alleged that
the defendant owed the plaintiff divers sums of money, one
of the items being in amount $300. The trial court allowed
this item and disallowed the others. Thecase was tried at
the November term of the court in 1902, and decided at the
January term, 1903; the precise date of judgment being the
26th day of February, 1903.
On that day the judge ﬁled in
court a paper called “Memorandum on Which Judgment is
Based,” which, after reciting the substance of the evidence in
the case, stated that the court allowed the $300 item and dis
allowed the others, and ended with the‘se words: “Judgment
for the plaintiff to recover $300 and costs.
. Bishop, Judge.”
#

$

O

J

It does not appear that any formal judgment in accordance
with said memoranda was ever entered up, but on the 11th of
March, 1903, the court ordered judgment for $400.50 in favor
of the plaintiff to be formally entered up; and this was done
under the following circumstances, as stated in the ﬁnding:
“On March 2, 1903, the plaintiff and defendant appeared in
court, and Judge Julius C. Cable, one of the judges of the
court, directed the clerk to call in Judge Bishop to hold said
court. Said court was duly opened by the sheriff, and there
upon the plaintiff orally moved that the judgment be cor
The defendant objected to such
rected by adding interest.
correction on the ground that the January term of said court
had ended, and the March term begun; and further that if the
court had jurisdiction the plaintiff was not, in law, entitled to
such interest; and further that the plaintiff, by his failure to
prosecute his suit with diligence, waived whatever right, if
any, he had to interest on the judgment.
On March 11, 1903,
the court granted said motion of the plaintiff, and corrected
said judgment, and added the interest, amounting
It will thus be seen that the judge, through
memoranda, announced, in effect, that he found
to be $300, and that he rendered judgment for

to $400.50."
said signed
the damages
the plaintiff
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case?
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#

¥
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Q

After this the
was not continued to the next term, nor was it held for fur
ther consideration or advisement, nor was any further action
of the court necessary to entitle the plaintiff to the entry of a
formal judgment in his favor for $300 damages and costs.
It

for that amount only, and costs of suit.

it

a

it

a

a

The plaintiff claims that on the 26th of February, 1903, the
court did in fact.render judgment for $400.50. but that by
clerical mistake
different and a smaller amount was entered
up. If the record sustains this claim,
may be conceded, for
the purposes of this case, that the court had the power to cor
rect the mistake at, the succeeding term, or at least that
new trial would not be granted on account of its action in so
doing.
Mistakes merely clerical, by which the judgment as
recorded fails to agree with the judgment in fact rendered,
may be corrected at a term subsequent to that in which the
judgment was rendered, upon proper notice to all concerned.
Over its recorded judgments the court may exercise two pow
ers: (1) The power to correct and amend the record so that
shall truly show what the judicial action in fact was; (2)

"‘

"

a

it

is

*

a

a

9,

a

is

is

the power to set aside, annul, and vacate such judgments.
It
well settled that these powers may be exercised during the
rendered, and, speaking gen
term in which the judgment
erally, that the ﬁrst can be exercised at any subsequent term,
while, as rule, the second cannot be so exercised, save under
Tyler v. Aspinwall, 73 Conn. 493,
exceptional circumstances.
47 Atl. 755, 54 L. R. A. 758; Wilkie 1). Hall, 15 Conn. 32, 37;
Weed '0. Weed, 25 Conn. 337; Hall 'v. Paine, 47 Conn. 429;
Sturdeoant 11. Stanton, 47 Conn. 579; Bronson v. Schulten,
104 U. S. 410, 26 L. Ed. 997; Foster '0. Redﬁeld, 50 Vt. 285;
Maryland Steel Co. '0. Marney (Md.) 46 Atl. 1077; Black on
Judgments, c.
§§ 153-158, and cases there cited. The case
thus turns upon the question whether the claimed mistake
judicial one, in failing to include interest in the judg
was
ment as rendered, or
clerical one, in failing to include inter
If the mistake was of the
est in the judgment as recorded.
former kind, the court, upon the facts found, had no power to
correct the mistake at the March term.
A judgment, speaking generally,
the determination or
sentence of the law, speaking through the court; and
does
legal entity, until pronounced, expressed, or
not exist, as
made known in some appropriate way. It may be expressed

686

TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRAcTIcE

[Chap.

3

orally or in writing, or in both of these ways, in accordance
with the customs and usages of the court in which the judg
ment is rendered.
In the case at bar the February judgment was pronounced
in writing only, in and by the signed memorandum of the
judge.
There is no ﬁnding that it was ever otherwise pro
nounced or made known.
Before that entry was made, the
judgment had no existence. When it was made, the judgment
ﬁrst came into being. The entry of it was thus the only ex
pression of it, the only declaration of it, ever made by the
iudge. It was both pronounced and entered up, so to speak,
in the same words and at the same moment.
Of necessity,
then, the judgment “entered up” was the same as the judg
It thus clearly appears from the
ment actually pronounced.
record, outside of the ﬁnding now under consideration, that
the entry of the judgment made by the judge is a true record
of the judgment actually rendered, and cannot, in the nature
of things, be other than a true record; and we think there is
nothing in that ﬁnding absolutely inconsistent with this con
clusion. When read in the light of the other facts found, all
that the ﬁnding can fairly be said to mean is that the court
by mistake accidentally failed to include interest in its signed
memoranda, and that is equivalent to saying that the court
failed to include interest in its judgment, and also in its rec
ord of it. We think any other view of the ﬁnding is untenable,
in view of the other facts set forth in the record. It follows
that the court in March had no power to correct, amend, or
change the February judgment.
V
There is error. The March judgment is set aside, and the
cause is remanded, with directions that judgment be entered
up as of February 26, 1903, for $300 and costs. The other
Judges concurred.

I
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As a Bar and an Estoppel.

AETNA LIFE INSURANCE CO. v. BOARD OF COM’RS
OF HAMILTON COUNTY.
United States

Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
1902.

117

Federal Reporter, 82; 54 Circuit Court of Appeals, 468.

In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the
District of Kansas.
On July 20, 1897, the Aetna Life Insurance Company, a
corporation, brought this action upon coupons, some of which
were cut from 20 bonds dated May 7, 1877, and others from
40 bonds dated May 16, 1888. The plaintiff alleged in its peti
tion that these bonds and coupons had been issued by the
defendant, the board of county commissioners of the county
of Hamilton, state of Kansas; that the plaintiff had purchased
them for value, before maturity; that the coupons in suit were
overdue; that demand of payment had been made, and that
they had not been paid. The answer of the defendant con
sisted of a denial that the bonds and coupons were ever issued
by it; a denial that the plaintiff ever bought them; an asser
tion that these bonds and coupons were executed and issued
by parties who were not officers of the county of Hamilton,
and who had no authority to issue them on its behalf; that
the county never received any consideration therefor; and
that the plaintiff was estopped from maintaining this action,
because in a prior suit between the same parties upon other
coupons cut from the same bonds the same defenses had been
interposed and the same issues had been presented which
were interposed and presented in this case, and those defenses
and issues had been tried, and a judgment had been rendered
therein for the defendant, and had been subsequently affirmed
by this court. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hamilton Co., 25 C. C.
A. 94, 79 Fed. 575. To this answer the plaintiff replied that
it was true that in an action between these parties on other
coupons cut from the same bonds from which those involved
in this action were taken the same defenses were interposed
and the same issues were made which were interposed and
made in this suit; that evidence was introduced in support of
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all the allegations of the petition; that a trial was had; that
the court found for the defendant, and rendered a judgment
in its favor, which was afﬁrmed in this court. But it denied
that all the issues and defenses in the former action were liti
gated and determined, and alleged that the court made no
speciﬁc ﬁnding of facts, but that the judgment in favor of the
defendant was rendered upon a general ﬁnding in its favor;
so that it is impossible to determine which of the various de
fenses pleaded by the county in that action were sustained.
The reply also contains an allegation that the county clerk of
Hamilton county made a written certiﬁcate to the effect that
the actual indebtedness of the county, including that evi
denced by the bonds in question, did not exceed $80,000; that
he did this for the purpose of persuading the plaintiff to buy
the bonds; that the plaintiff was thereby induced to purchase
them; and that these facts estop the county from denying
their validity.
In this state of the case the court below
granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings in favor of
the defendant upon the ground that the right of the insurance
company to recover upon the bonds or the coupons was ren
dered res adjudicata by the former judgment to the effect that
they were void. The writ of error challenges this decision.
Before SANBORN and THAYER, Circuit Judges, and Locu
REN, District Judge.
SANBORN, Circuit Judge, after stating the case as above,
delivered the opinion of the court.
The defenses interposed and the issues raised in this case
are identical with those presented in the former action, in
which judgment was rendered for the defendant upon coupons
cut from the same bonds as were those in this suit. The only
new allegation in this action is that the plaintiff was induced
to buy the bonds and coupons by the certiﬁcate of the county
clerk that the indebtedness of the county, including that evi
denced by the bonds in question, did not exceed $80,000; and
this averment is immaterial, because the county clerk had no
statutory or other authority to make such a certiﬁcate for
City of Huron v. Second Ward Sac. Bank, 86
the county.
Fed. 272, 282, 30 C. C. A. 38, 48, 49 L. R. A. 534. The fact
that the issues of demand and refusal'of payment in the two
actions differ because they must have been made at different
times, since the coupons in this action were not due until
after the former action was commenced, is of no consequence,
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because a demand and refusal were not essential to the main
tenance of either action, and the legal presumption is that
the former judgment was based on a sufficient defense, and
not upon an immaterial issue. Speer 12. Board, 88 Fed. 749,
753, 754, 32 C. C. A. 101, 105; Hughes Co. 'v. Livingston, 43
C. C. A. 541, 556, 104 Fed. 306, 321. The only real question
in the case, therefore, is this: Is a former judgment upon a
general ﬁnding in favor of the defendant which does not
disclose which one of several defenses was sustained, an es
toppel of the plaintiff therein from maintaining a second ac
tion upon different causes of action against the same defend
ant in which the same defenses are interposed and the same
issues are presented that were made in the earlier action?
Counsel for the plaintiff argue with great force and per
suasiveness that this question must be answered in the nega
tive. They plant themselves upon the declaration of the su
preme court in Russell u. Place, 94 U. S. 606, 608, 24 L. Ed.
214, that “it is undoubtedly settled law that a judgment of a
court of competent jurisdiction upon a question directly in
volved in one suit is conclusive as to that question in another
suit between the same parties. But to this operation of the
judgment it must appear, either upon the face of the record
or be shown by extrinsic evidence, that the precise question
If there be
was raised and determined in the former suit.
any uncertainty on this head in the record,—as, for example,
if it appear that several distinct matters may have been liti
gated, upon one or more of which the judgment may have
passed, without indicating which of them was thus litigated,
and upon which the judgment was rendered,—the
whole
subject-matter of the action will be at large, and open to a
new contention, unless this uncertainty be removed by extrin
sic evidence showing the precise point involved and deter
mined. To apply the judgment, and give effect to the adju
dication actually made, when the record leaves the matter in
doubt, such evidence is admissible.”
They cite in‘ support of
their contention Cromwell v. Sac Co., 94 U. S. 351, 24 L. Ed.
195; Board u. Sutliﬂ, 38 C. C. A. 167, 97 Fed. 270; Packet
Co. 1.‘. Sic!-tles, 5 Wall. 580, 18 L. Ed. 550; Nesbit v. Independ
ent Dist., 144 U. S. 610, 12 Sup. Ct. 746, 36 L. Ed. 562; Rail
way Co. u. Leathe, 84 Fed. 103, 28 C. C. A. 279; and Bank o.
Williams (Wash.) 63 Pac. 511,—and they insist that, because
the general ﬁnding and judgment in the ﬁrst action do not
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indicate which one of the several defenses pleaded in both
actions was litigated, nor upon which one the judgment was
based, that judgment cannot constitute an estoppel upon any
one of these defenses or issues, and that every defense there
presented may be again litigated in this action, unless the de
fendant proves by extrinsic evidence which one or more of
them were actually litigated and determined in the former
The propositions that there is nothing in the record
suit.
in the former action nor in the pleadings in this action that
discloses which one of the several defenses interposed in
both actions was sustained in the earlier one, and that, if it
is essential to the estoppel in this case to determine this fact,
But how is
this judgment cannot stand, must be conceded.
the determination of the question whether one or another of
these defenses was sustained in the earlier action essential
The pleadings upon
to the establishment of the estoppel?
which this judgment stands show that the same issues are
made and that the same defenses are interposed here that
The judg
were made and interposed in the former action.
is
conclusive
evidence
in
the
earlier
action
that
at least
ment
one of these defenses was sustained, and that at least one of
By
these issues was determined in favor of the defendant.
that judgment the plaintiff is estopped from again litigating
that defense or that issue, and an estoppel from litigating one
of many defenses or issues that are equally fatal to his case
would seem to be as conclusive and as fatal as an estoppel
The quotation from Russell 2:.
from litigating them all.
Place, and the general declarations of the courts in the other
cases cited, must be read in the light of the facts then under
consideration by those courts. In that class of cases in which
the second action presents a material issue or matter which
may not have been raised; litigated, and decided in the former
action it is undoubtedly essential to the estoppel to show what
issue was litigated and decided and what question was deter
mined in the earlier case, in order to determine whether or
not the issue there determined embraced the matter in litiga
tion in the second action. But where, as in the case at bar, the
pleadings conclusively show that all the defenses made and
all the issues joined are identical in the two actions, it is diffi
cult to perceive how it can make any difference to which one
of the defenses or issues the estoppel applies, because the
mere fact that it does apply to one defense and to one issue
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is as fatal to the maintenance of the second action as it would
be if it applied to all.
When the opinions which have been
cited by counsel for the plaintiff are carefully read, analyzed,
and considered, they will not be found to be inconsistent with
this distinction. The decisions which they cite all fall within
the ﬁrst class of cases to which we have adverted and fail to
rule the question which is presented in the case in hand.
In Russell '0. Place, 94 U. S. 606, 609, 24 L. Ed. 214, the
question was whether a judgment at law against a defendant
for damages for the infringement of a patent which contained
two claims estopped the defendant in a subsequent suit
against it for an injunction against the infringement from
litigating the issues of the novelty, the prior public use, and
the infringement of the invention, which had been pleaded in
the action at law.
The court answered this question in the
negative, because there were two claims to the patent, one of
which might be valid and the other void, and the judgment at
law did not disclose whether it rested on a ﬁnding that both
or only one of the claims was infringed, and, if but one, it
In other words, the judgment in
did not show which one.
might
have been founded upon the deter
the action at law
mination of an issue which would not have entitled the com
plainant to an injunction restraining the defendant from the
use of both of the inventions described in the two claims of
the patent.

Sickles, 5 Wall. 580, 18 L. Ed. 550, the ac
tion was brought upon a contract to pay three-fourths of the
fuel saved by the use of Sickles’ cut-off on a steamboat for a
certain length of time. The plaintiff, for the purpose of es
topping the defendant from questioning the validity of this
contract, offered in evidence the record of a former judgment
in an action of like character for the fuel saved during an
earlier term, together with the testimony of witnesses that
the contract involved in the earlier action was the same as
that upon which the second action was founded. The supreme
court decided that in this state of the case it was competent
for the defendant to introduce the testimony of witnesses to
prove that the contract involved in the former action was in
writing, while that in question in the latter suit was a parol
agreement, and therefore void under the statute of frauds.
In other words, the defendant was permitted to show that the
former judgment was not an estoppel, because it had a new

In Packet Co.
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defense in the second action, which was not pleaded, tried. or
ruled upon in the former case.
In Cromwell v. Sac Co., 94 U. S. 351, 359, 24 L. Ed. 195, the
ﬁndings in the former action upon which the judgment for
the defendant was based disclosed the fact that the bonds and
the coupons that had been cut from them upon which the ac
tion was based were fraudulently issued, and they contained
no ﬁnding that the holder of the bonds paid value for them.
The supreme court held that a judgment upon this ﬁnding did
not estop the holder of the bonds from maintaining a second
action on other coupons taken from bonds of the same issue
upon proof that he had purchased and paid value for them
in good faith in reliance upon the recitals which they con
tained, before their maturity.
In other words, it held that
the earlier judgment did not estop the plaintiff from main
taining a second action upon different causes of action, and
upon a state of facts which presented an issue of law and of
fact that was not raised or litigated in the earlier suit. To
the same effect is the decision in Board v. Sutliﬂ‘, 97 Fed. 270,
274, 38 C. C. A. 167, 171.
V
In Nesbit v. Independent Dist., 144 U. S. 610, 619, 12 Sup.
Ct. 746, 36 L. Ed. 562, the converse of this proposition is
It is there held that the litigation and defeat, in
maintained.
a prior action upon coupons by a purchaser for value without
notice, of the defense that the debt of the district exceeded
its constitutional limit when the bonds were issued did not
estop the district in a subsequent action upon the bonds them
selves from maintaining the defense that the debt was in ex
cess of the constitutional limit against the same plaintiff who
was there proved to have received notice of this fact before
he bought the bonds.
This brief analysis of the controlling facts of the cases
upon which the plaintiff places its chief reliance discloses the
fact that in every one of them the record was such that the
former judgment either was or might have been rendered
without a litigation and decision of the crucial and determina
tive issue presented in the second action. In every case cited
the second action presented some controlling issue, which
either was not or might not have been litigated and decided
in the former suit. It is not so in the case in hand. This
There
case is presented upon the petition, answer, and reply.
is no averment or statement in any of these pleadings that
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any issue or defense, any right, question, matter, or fact. that
is or can be determinative of this action, was not raised, pre
sented, litigated, and decided in the former suit.
On the
other hand, these pleadings admit that the same issues have
been raised, that the same defenses have been interposed in
both actions, that in the former action evidence was intro
duced in support of all the allegations of the petition, that the
earlier action was duly tried, and that a judgment was ren
dered for defendant upon due consideration.
It is true that
the defendant interposed several defenses to that action, and
that it is impossible to determine from the pleadings which
one was sustained.
Nor is that fact material.
One of the
defenses which the county has presented in both of the ac
tions was necessarily sustained in the earlier suit, and all the
bonds from which the coupons in both actions were taken
and the coupons themselves were held to be void in view of
that defense. The doctrine of res adjudicata is that the same
parties are conclusively estopped from again litigating any
issue, question, right, or matter which they have once law
fully raised and litigated, and which the court has once de:
cided. This second action upon coupons cut from the same
bonds as those involved in the ﬁrst action cannot be sustained
without a second litigation and an overruling of the very de
fense which the court sustained in the former action.
Con
cede that all the other issues and defenses may be tried and
decided in this suit without again litigating any issue pre
sented before, yet there remains that one defense which was
sustained in the former action which was fatal to the plain
tiff’s case then, and which is fatal to it now, unless the plain
tiff can again in this action raise the issue which that defense
presents, and can here obtain a decision and judgment upon
it which shall be the converse of those which were rendered
in the former action. This it may not do. The very purpose
of the establishment and maintenance of civil courts is to ﬁ
nally determine controversies between the parties who pre
sent them. If the decisions of these courts upon questions
lawfully submitted to and tried by them were not conclusive,
if the courts left the questions which they decided open to
repeated litigation and decision, their usefulness would im
mediately cease, and litigants would no longer invoke their
It is es
aid to protect their rights or redress their wrongs.
sential to the peace and repose—nay, it is essential to the very
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existence—of civilized society that the decisions and judg
ments of the courts invoked for the protection of the rights of
person and of property should be ﬁnal and conclusive between
the parties and their privies upon every question of fact and
of law which they properly put in issue and the courts actu
ally try and decide. The maintenance and application of
this salutary principle have evoked these established rules for
the administration of estoppel by judgment:
Where the second suit is upon the same cause of action, and
between the same parties as the ﬁrst, the judgment in the
former is conclusive in the latter as to every question which
was or might have been presented and determined in the

former!“
When the second suit is upon a different cause of action,
but between the same parties, as the ﬁrst, the judgment in
the former action operates as an~estoppel in the latter as to
every point and question which was actually litigated and de
termined in the ﬁrst action, but it is not conclusive as to
other matters which might have been, but were not, litigated
or decided. Linton v. Insurance Co., 104 Fed. 584. 587, 44 C.
C. A. 54, 57; Commissoners '0. Platt, 79 Fed. 567, 571, 25 C. C.
A. 87, 91, 49 U. S. App. 216, 223; Board 12. Sutlijf, 38 C. C. A.
167, 171, 97 Fed. 270, 274; Southern Pac. R. Co. 'v. U. S., 168
U. S. 1, 48, 18 Sup. Ct. 18, 42 L. Ed. 355; Southern Minnesota
Ry. Extension Co. v. St. Paul & S. C. R. Co., 55 Fed. 690, 5
C. C. A. 249.
Where the record is such that there is or may be a material
issue, question, or matter in the second suit upon a different
cause of action which may not have been raised, litigated, and
decided in the former action, the judgment therein does not
constitute an estoppel from litigating this issue, question, or
matter, unless by pleading or proof the party asserting the
estoppel establishes the fact that the issue, question or mat
ter in dispute was actually and necessarily litigated and de
termined in the former action. Russell v. Place, 94 U. S. 606,
608, 24 L. Ed. 214.
A former judgment, based upon a general ﬁnding for the
defendant, which does not disclose which one of several de
fenses therein was sustained, constitutes an estoppel of the
plaintiff therein from maintaining a second suit against the
same defendant upon different causes of action in which the
same

defenses are interposed

and the same issues are pre
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sented that were made in the earlier action, unless the party
denying the estoppel makes it appear by pleading or proof
that some new and material issue, question, or matter is in
volved in the second action, which was not or may not have
been litigated or decided in the ﬁrst action.
Bissell '0. Spring
Valley Tp., 124 U. S. 225, 236, 8 Sup. Ct. 495, 31 L. Ed. 411;
Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. 'v. Keokulc & H. Bridge Co.,
46 C. C. A. 639, 644, 107 Fed. 781, 786, 787.
Where the same issues are made and the same defenses are
interposed in both actions,\and there is no pleading or proof
that any new determining issue, question, or matter is or may
be involved in the second action, it is not material upon which
defense or issue the former judgment was based, because an
opposite judgment cannot be rendered without relitigating at
least one defense and issue determined in the former action,
and overruling the decision upon that defense which was
there rendered.
The pleadings in this case leave no avenue of escape from
the conclusion that at least one of the defenses pleaded in this
action was actually and necessarily litigated and sustained
in the former action between these parties, wherein there was
a judgment for the defendant.
That defense proved fatal to
validity
coupons
of
the
bonds
and
in that earlier action.
the
In the absence of pleading or proof that this action presents
some determining issue which might not have been litigated
and decided in the former action, the defense which was there
sustained is as conclusively established in this action by the
judgment in that action, and is as fatal here as it was in the
earlier suit.
The judgment below must be aﬂirmed, and it is so ordered.
expression, often found in the reports, that a judg
261 “The general
ment is conclusive of every matter which the parties might have litigated
What is really meant by this expression is,
in the action is misleading.
that a judgment is conclusive upon the issues tendered by the plaintiffs
complaint.
It may be that the plaintiff might have united other causes
of action with that set out in his complaint; or that the defendant might
counterclaims,
cross-bills,
and equitable
defenses, or
have interposed
either of the parties may have acquired new rights pending the litiga
tion, which might, by permission of the court, be pleaded by supplemental
complaint or answer, and therefore might have been litigated in the
But as long as these several matters are not tendered as issues
action.
in the action, they are not affected by it. Whatever material allegations
the plaintiff makes in his pleadings he must maintain, if they are con
troverted. and failing to do so, a judgment against him is conclusive of
The defendant, on his part, must oontrovert all these
their falsity.
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allegations which he wishes to gafnsay, and failing to do so. their truth
He cannot by failing to deny
established against him.
fs incontestably
any of them, or if he denies them, by failing to offer evidence to con~
trovert that offered by plaintiff in support of any of them, successfully
claim that it has not been litigated and determined against him. ' ' '
The plaintiff must support all the issues necessary to maintain his
cause of action.
The defendant must bring forward all the defenses
which he has to the cause of action asserted in the plaintiffs pleadings
1 Freeman on Judgments, 5 249.
at the time they were ﬁled."

9’
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EX
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Impeaching Judgments.

MORRILL
Supreme

V.

MORRILL.

Court of Oregon.
20 Oregon,

1890.

96.

[This was a suit to quiet title to lot 3, block 116, in the city
Plaintiff, Ida Morrill, alleged title by mesne

of Portland.

conveyances from the United States and also by adverse pos
session. The answer alleged that defendant, Eli Morrill, in
stituted a partition suit in 1883 against this plaintiff, and a
decree was therein made, adjudging that the plaintiff and de
fendant were tenants in common of the said lot, and award
ing to Eli Morrill in severalty the north 19 feet and to Ida
Morrill in severalty the south 31 feet thereof. To this an
swer Ida Morrill replied that she was in exclusive and ad
verse possession of the whole of said lot when_the partition
suit was instituted, that the evidence in that suit did not jus
tify the decree, and that her attorney by fraud and collusion,
and without her knowledge, entered into a stipulation in that
suit whereby Eli Morrill obtained the decree.
The issues
were referred to a referee who reported in favor of plaintiﬂ’,
and a ﬁnal decree was given quieting plaintiﬁ"s title to the
whole of lot 3. From this decree the defendant appealed.]
BEAN, . It is conceded by the parties that, if the decree in
the partition suit of Morrill 1:. Morrill is valid and binding on
*
* *
her, this case should be reversed.
It is ﬁrst important to determine whether this is a direct
or collateral attack on this decree.
The contention of re
attack,
spondent is that it is a direct
and therefore no pre
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sumptions are to be invoked in order to sustain it. The com
plaint contains no allegations concerning this decree, but the
ﬁrst mention thereof is in the answer, where defendant pleads
it as an estoppel. The plaintiff then seeks to avoid its effect
by averring in the reply matters which she claims are suffi
cient to indicate it. This is undoubtedly a collateral attack.
It is an attempt to impeach the decree in a proceeding not
instituted for the express purpose of annulling, correcting, or
modifying the decree or enjoining its execution. A collateral
attack on a judgment is any proceeding which is not insti
tuted for the express purpose of annulling, correcting, or
modifying such decree or enjoining its execution. 12 Amer.
& Eng. Enc. Law, 1479'.
The fact that the parties are the
plaintiff
and
seeks to attack the decree by the
that
the
same.
allegation of the reply, cannot change the rule, or make the
attack any the less a collateral one.
The ﬁrst objection to the validity of this decree is based
upon the stipulation of the attorney “that the defendant in
the partition suit has since February 4th been in the actual,
exclusive occupancy of all of said premises, and has lived
there as a home, and that neither the defendant, nor any per
son for him, has actually occupied said premises or any part
thereof since February 4, 1882, as a home or otherwise.”
The contention is that a plaintiff, in order to maintain a suit
for partition, must not only be a tenant in common, but in the
possession, of the land sought to be partitioned. If he has
been ousted or disseised, and his co-tenant is holding adverse
ly to him, the suit cannot be maintained, and many authorities
are cited to that effect. * * * But, however that may be,
it was a question for the court before whom the suit was
pending, and its decision, however erroneous it may have
been, is binding on the parties, until reversed or annulled in
Atkins v. Kinnan, 20 Wend. 246;
some proper proceeding.
Voorhees v. Bank, 10 Pet. 473; Dolph o. Barney, 5 Or. 192;
Woodward v. Baker, 10 Or. 491; Norton v. Harding, 3 Or.
361; Hill 'v. Cooper, 8 Or. 254.
After a court has acquired jurisdiction, it has a right to
decide any question arising in the case, and, however errone
ous its decision may be, it is binding on the parties until re
Here We have a competent court with
versed or annulled.
admitted jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties,
with full power and authority to decide all questions arising
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in the case, and it is sought to impeach the validity of its
forsooth, it was mistaken, either as to the
law applicable to the facts before it, or to the facts them
selves. Baldwin, J., in the case of Voorhees v. Bank, supra,
speaking on this subject, says:
“The errors of the court,
however apparent, can be examined only by an appellate pow
er; and by the laws of every country a time is ﬁxed for such
examination, whether in rendering judgment, issuing execu
tion, or enforcing it by process of sale or imprisonment.
No
rule can be made more reasonable than that the person who
complains of an injury done him should avail himself of his
legal remedy in a reasonable time, or that that time should
be limited by law.
This has wisely been done by acts of limi
tations on writs of error and appeals. If that time elapses,
common justice requires that what a defendant cannot di
rectly do, in the mode pointed out by law, he shall not be per
mitted to do collaterally, by evasion. A judgment irreversible
by a superior court cannot be declared a nullity by any au
thority of law. If, after its rendition, it is declared void for
any matter which can be assigned for error only on a writ
of error or appeal, then said court not only usurps the juris
diction of an appellate court, but collaterally nulliﬁes what
such court is prohibited by express statute law from even
reversing.
If the principle once prevails that any proceeding
of a court of competent jurisdiction can be declared to be a
nullity by any court after a writ of error or appeal is barred
by limitation, every county court or justice of the peace in
the Union may exercise the same right, from which our own
We need not
judgments or process would not be exempt.”
pursue the examination of this question any further, for
the principle is so well settled that it is said to be “an axiom
of the law” that, when a court has jurisdiction of the subjectmatter and the parties, its judgments cannot be impeached
collaterally for errors of law or irregularity in practice.
Cooper '0. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308; Sibley "0. Waﬁie, 16 N. Y.
decree,

because,

191.
Q

i i

1

Q

i
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Q

t
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The next question in this case is, can the decree in the par
tition suit be impeached for fraud? It is claimed by respond
ent that the evidence and ﬁndings of the referee show that
the decree was obtained by fraud and collusion between her
attorney in that suit and the defendant here. It is argued
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with much force and learning that, since defendants rely upon
the particular decree as one of the muniments of their title,
plaintiff should be permitted to show, if the facts are with
her, that such decree was obtained by fraud and collusion be
tween her attorney and adversary; that, since fraud vitiates
every transaction, even a judgment, she ought to be permitted
to treat this decree as invalid, when sought to be enforced or
This, we believe,
relied upon even in a collateral proceeding.
is the ﬁrst time this question has ever been before this court
for decision. In the case of Murray 'v. Murray, 6 Or. 19, the
court held that a judgment of a sister state could be attacked
collaterally for fraud by a party, when offered in evidence in
the courts of this state, for the reason that the party sought
to be affected thereby has no opportunity to attack it in our
own courts by a direct proceeding, and should not be required
to go into a foreign state to do so. As we have already said,
this cannot be considered a direct attack upon this judgment.
No
No reference is made to the judgment in the complaint.
facts are alleged upon which a court could have a decree an
nulling the decree or judgment.
The plaintiff in the com
plaint claims title by good and sufficient mesne conveyances
from the government of the United States, and by virtue of
the statute of limitations. This is not sufficient to entitle her
U. S. 12. Flint, 4 Sawy. 42; Mayor,
to attack this judgment.
etc., 'v. Brady, 115 N. Y. 599, 22 N. E. Rep. 237; U. S. v.
Th-rockmorton, 98 U. S. 61. It is a general rule, at common
law, that parties and privies to a judgment may not attack it
collaterally for fraud. And, after a party has been duly
served with process, it is his duty to see that such a judgment
is not obtained against him, and, if it is, he must take some
proper proceedings to have it annulled. As long as it remains
in full force and effect the parties cannot treat it as invalid,
unless such invalidity appears upon the face of the judgment.
It is true, fraud vitiates every transaction into which it en
ters, even a judgment, but such fraud must be made to ap
pear in some appropriate proceeding known to the law. 'I'he
statute points out ample methods by which a party may be
relieved from such a judgment, such as a new trial, review
for error of law, an application to be relieved therefrom ; and,
beyond the methods provided by statute, courts possess in
herent powers, as has been said, “to an almost unlimited ex
tent, to redress wrongs by modifying or setting aside judg
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ments obtained by fraud or mistake.”
These methods, how
ever, must be resorted to. They give no countenance to the
idea that a judgment wrongfully obtained may be completely
ignored, and the rights of the parties again inquired into in
udgm. § 334; Dar-‘is '0. Da
a collateral proceeding.
Freem.
395;
vis, 61 Me.
Massey 11. White, 58 Vt. 45, 3 Atl. Rep. 319;
Granger 1). Clark, 22 Me. 128; Railroad Corp. v. Sparhawk, 1
Allen 448; Demerit v. Lyford, 27 N. H. 541; Krekeler '0. Rit
ter, 62 N. Y. 372; Weiss v. Guerineaa, 109 Ind. 438, 9 N. E.
Rep. 399; Callahan 'v. Griswold, 9 Mo. 457; Mason v. Mes
senger, 17 Iowa, 273. From these, and many other authori
ties that could be cited, we take the law to be that a judgment
of a court of this state having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties cannot be questioned collaterally for
fraud aliunde the record by the parties or privies. The case
relied upon by the respondent as announcing a contrary doc
trine is Mandeville v. Reynolds, 68 N. Y. 528. This was an
action on a judgment, the defense to which was based upon a
satisfaction of the judgment of record, and upon an order of
The plaintiff offered to
court ratifying that satisfaction.
show that the entry upon the docket and the order were ob
tained by fraud and collusion.
The court held that such evi
dence was competent, and in the opinion there are statements
to the effect that a judgment obtained by fraud could be at
tacked collaterally. This decision was made under the re
formed Code of Procedure of the state of New York, which
permits equitable defenses to be pleaded in actions at law;
and the court say: “The court acts upon the matters involved
in the action now in a double capacity,—as a court of law and
As a court of equity it meets the question of
one of equity.
validity
of the judgment, not as one of law, but as of equi
the
ty, and takes hold of the facts offered to it, not as a collateral
attack upon the judgment, but as a direct assault, which, by
the changing nature of the suit and trial, has become the main
In this state
question and legitimately before it for trial.”
the distinction between proceedings at law and in equity is
Barrage v. Mining Co., 12 Or. 169, 6 Pac.
still maintained.
Authorities under the reformed Codes of Pro
Rep. 766.
*
"‘
*
cedure are therefore not applicable here.
It follows, therefore, that the decree of the court below
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must be reversed, and a decree entered here in favor of de

fendants.”
87 “It is only third persons who have the right to collaterally impeach
They are accorded this right because not being parties to
judgments.
"
the action, nothing determined by it is as to them, res judicota.
strangers
are
entitled
to
It must not, however, be understood that all
It is only those strangers who, it the judgment
impeach a judgment.
were given full credit and effect, would be prejudiced in regard to some
pre-existing right, that are permitted to impeach the judgment."—2
Freeman on Judgments, §§ 334, 335.
See extended note in L. R. A. 1918D, 470, on “What is a collateral,
and what a direct attack upon a judgment, within the rule that a judg
ment that is not void cannot be collaterally attacked."

'

9’:
?1>~

'

FERGUSON v. CRAWFORD.

"""'

:2

Court of Appeals of New York.
70

1877.

New York, 253.

Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme
Court in the second judicial department, aﬁirming a judg
ment in favor of defendants, entered upon a decision of the
court, on trial at Special Term.
(Reported below, 7 Hun,
25.)
RAPALLO, J. This action was brought to foreclose a mort
gage, held by the plaintiff, on certain real estate in the county
of Westchester.
One of the defenses was, that the right of
mortgagee,
as
plaintiff,
the
had been barred by a judgment of
foreclosure of a mortgage prior to his, in favor of one Mc
Farquahar, covering the same premises, under which judg
ment the premises had been sold to the defendant Horton.
It was alleged in the answer that the plaintiff was a defend
ant in the McFarquahar action, in which the judgment had
been rendered, and appeared therein, by John W. Mills, as his
attorney, but did not put in any answer.
On the trial of the present action, the defendants, in sup
port of this defense, put in evidence the judgment-roll in the
last-mentioned action, which roll contained a notice of ap
pearance for the present plaintiff, and a consent that judg
The
ment be entered, purporting to be signed by Mills.
judgment was entered by default for want of an answer, and
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on this consent, and recited that the summons had been
served on the defendants therein. and that none of them had
appeared, except the present plaintiff, by John W. Mills, his
attorney, and some others named in the judgment.
Thereupon the plaintiff called Mills as a witness, and of
fered to prove by him, 1st. That the signature to the notice
of appearance and consent was a forgery; 2nd. That Mills
was never authorized
to appear for the plaintiff;
and
3rd. That he never did appear for him.
No proof of service of the summons on the plaintiff is at
tached to or contained in that judgment-roll, and it appears
to be conceded on the present argument, as matter of fact,
that no such service was made. The defendants rely wholly
upon the effect of the recital in the judgment and the notice of
appearance contained in the judgment-roll, and claim that in
a collateral action these import absolute verity and cannot be
~
cdntradicted by extrinsic evidence.
*

*

*

#

*

#

¥

IF

‘

‘

It is an elementary principle recognized in all the cases
that, to give binding effect to the judgment of any court,
whether of general or limited jurisdiction, it is essential that
the court should have jurisdiction of the person as well as
the subject-matter, and that the want of jurisdiction over
either may always be set up against a judgment when sought
to be enforced, or any beneﬁt is claimed under it. There is
no difference of opinion as to the general rule, but the point
of difficulty is as to the manner in which this want of juris
’diction must be made to appear, in the case of a judgment of
a domestic court of general jurisdiction, acting in the exer
cise of its general powers, when it comes in question in a col
lateral action: Whether, when the record is silent as to the
steps taken to bring the parties into court, it may be proved
by evidence that they were not legally summoned and did not
appear; or whether, when the record recites that they were
summoned or appeared, such recitals may be contradicted by
extrinsic evidence; or whether the jurisdiction over the per
son and subject-matter is a presumption of law, which can
not be contradicted, unless it appears on the face of the record
itself that there was a want of such jurisdiction, as in cases
where the record shows that the service of process was by
publication or some other method than personal.
On these points there has been as much diversity of opin
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ion, especially between the courts of this State and those of
other States, as upon any general question which can be men
tioned, although ‘there has as yet been no authoritative ad
judication in this State on the subject. It is well settled by
our own decisions, that in the case of a judgment of a court
of general jurisdiction of a sister State, although it is en
titled to the beneﬁt of the presumption of jurisdiction which
exists in favor of a judgment of one of our own courts, yet the
want of jurisdiction may be shown by extrinsic evidence, and
that even a recital in the judgment record that the defendant
was served with process, or appeared by attorney, or of any
other jurisdictional fact, is not conclusive, but may be con
tradicted by extrinsic evidence.
(Borden 'v. Fitch, 15 Johns.
121; Starbuck y. Murray, 5 Wend. 148; Shumway v. Stillman,
6 Wend. 447; Kerr '0. Kerr, 41 N. Y. 272; Hoﬁman '0. Hoff
man, 46 N. Y. 30.)
And the same rule prevails in some of the other States in
regard to the judgments of courts of sister States. Although
some have held, even in regard to such a judgment, that if
the record contains recitals showing jurisdiction, they cannot
be contradicted (Field '0. Gibbs, 1 Peters C. C. R. 155; Rob
erts 12. Caldwell, 5 Dana, 512; Ewer 11. Coﬂin, 1 Cush. 23; 1 R.
I. 73; Shelton v. Tiﬂin, 6 How. [U. S.] 186.)
After considerable research, I have been unable to ﬁnd a
single authoritative adjudication, in this or any other State,
deciding that in the case of a domestic judgment of a court
of general jurisdiction, want of jurisdiction over the person
may be shown by extrinsic evidence, while there are a great
number of adjudications in neighboring States, holding that,
in the case of such judgments, parties and privies are es
topped in collateral actions to deny the jurisdiction of the
court over the person as well as the subject-matter, unless it
appear on the face of the record that the court had not ac
quired jurisdiction; and that in such cases there is a con
clusive presumption of law that jurisdiction was acquired by
service of process or the appearance of the party. * * *
is

quite remarkable, however, that notwithstanding the
It
formidable array of authority in its favor, the courts of this
State have never sustained this doctrine by any adjudication,
but on the contrary the great weight of judicial opinion, and
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jurists, are di

the views of some of our most distinguished
rectly opposed to it.
Q

[Chap.

Q

The distinction which is made in almost all the
other States of the Union between the effect of domestic judg
ments and judgments of sister States, in regard to the con
clusiveness of the presumption of jurisdiction over the per
son, is sought to be explained, by saying that in regard to
domestic judgments the party aggrieved can obtain relief
by application to the court in which the judgment was ren
dered, or by writ of error, whereas in the case of a judgment
rendered against him in another State he would be obliged to
go into a foreign jurisdiction for redress, which would be a
manifestly inadequate protection; and therefore the Consti
tution may be construed so as to apply only where the per
sons affected by the judgment were within the operation of
the proceeding.
This explanation, however, does not remove
the difficulty in making the distinction, for if there is a con
clusive presumption that there was jurisdiction, that pre
sumption must exist in one case as well as in the other. The
question whether or not the party is estopped, cannot be made
to depend upon the greater inconvenience of getting rid of
the estoppel in one case than in another.
But aside from this observation as to the effect of the
authorities, an examination of them shows that our courts
did in fact proceed upon a ground common to both classes of
" “‘ "‘
judgments.
"‘
* "‘ In Bolton v. Jacks, 6 Rob. 198, Jones, J., says
that
it is now conceded, at least in this State, that want of juris
diction will render void the judgment of any court, whether
it be of inferior or superior, of general, limited or local juris
diction, or of record or not, and that the bare recital of
jurisdictional facts in the record of a judgment of any court,
whether superior or inferior, of general or limited jurisdic
tion, is not conclusive, but only prima facie evidence of the
truth of the fact recited, and the party against whom a judg
ment is offered, is not by the bare fact of such recitals es
topped from showing, by affirmative proof, that they were
untrue and thus rendering the judgment void for want of
He cites in support of this opinion several of
jurisdiction.
the cases which I have referred to, and Dobson '0. Pearce, 12
N. Y. 164, and Hatcher v. Rocheleau, 18 N. Y. 92.
"‘
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It

thus appears that the current of judicial opinion in this
State is very strong and uniform in favor of the proposition
stated by Jones, ., in 6 Rob. 198, and if adopted here, is de
cisive of the present case. It has not as yet, however, been
directly adjudicated, and if sustained, it must rest upon the
local law of this State, as it ﬁnds no support in adjudications
elsewhere.
There are reasons, however, founded upon our
system of practice, which would warrant us in so holding.
The powers of a court of equity being vested in our courts of
law, and equitable defenses being allowable, there is no reason
why, to an action upon a judgment, the defendant should not
be permitted to set up, by way of defense, any matter which
would be ground of relief in equity against the judgment; and
it is conceded in those States where the record is held con
clusive. that when the judgment has been obtained by fraud,
or without bringing the defendant into court, and the want
of jurisdiction does not appear upon the face of the record,
relief may be obtained in equity.
Ill

Q

t

1

l

#

1

$

II

'0'

J

a

new trial ordered
The judgment should be reversed, and
with costs to abide the event. All concur; ANDREWS, J., in
result.

Judgment reversed.
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SECTION

WALLACE
Supreme

1.

v.

FINAL ORDERS.

MIDDLEBROOK.

Court of Errors of Connecticut.
28 Connecticut,

1859.

464.

C. J. The only error assigned in this case, and
which the plaintiff in error relies for the reversal of the
proceedings of the city court, is, that that court granted a
new trial in the original case on the ground that the verdict
rendered therein was against the evidence; and the only ques
tion argued before us respects the competency of that court
It appears, however,
to grant a new trial for that cause.
from the record presented on this writ of error, that that
case has not been retried in that court, and that no proceed
ings have taken place in the case since the new trial was
ordered. No ﬁnal judgment, therefore, has been rendered in
the case by the city court, and it remains before it undeter
mined; and we are of the opinion that, as the order of that
court granting a new trial was at most only in the nature
of an interlocutory judgment, and no ﬁnal judgment has been
rendered in the case, this writ of error is premature and
STORRS,

on

ought to be dismissed.
The principle is well settled that a writ of error does not
lie upon an interlocutory judgment in a cause until a ﬁnal
judgment has been rendered, or, as perhaps more precisely
(706)
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expressed by Lord Ellenborough, in Samuel '0. Judin, 6 East.,
336, “error can only be brought on ﬁnal »judgment;”
by
which, however, he does not mean that an error in an inter
locutory judgment is not a good cause of reversal on writ
of error, brought after ﬁnal judgment in a cause, but only
that such ﬁnal judgment must be rendered before a writ of
error can be brought; and then the writ of error is brought as
upon the ﬁnal judgment, on the ground that such judgment
is rendered erroneous by the errors in the interlocutory pro
ceedings. ‘ * * So, in an action of account, a writ of error
cannot be brought upon the judgment quod computet, until
after the entire matter of the account be determined and the
second or ﬁnal judgment be rendered. Ibid. If there are any
exceptions to this rule they have no application to the
This court has frequently adopted the same
present case.
principle.
In Dunham v. Braiman, 1 Root, 551, it was
held that a writ of error upon a judgment arresting
a verdict and ordering a repleader, brought’ before ﬁnal
judgment in the case, should be abated.
-In Gleason
Day,
verdict
27,
Chester,
1
after
for
plaintiff,
the
’U.
the
declaration on motion in arrest was adjudged insufficient
which judgment was reversed by this court and the case
remanded, and in the superior court, on motion for judgment
on the verdict, it was denied, and a repleader awarded, and
a writ of error brought to reverse the last judgment, before
ﬁnal judgment was rendered in the case, was abated. This
case is precisely applicable to and decisive of the present,
for the judgment of repleader, in regard to its interlocutory
character, was analogous to the granting of a new trial in the
case before us. See also Ray v. Fitch, 1 Root, 290, and Tread
way v. Coe, 21 Conn., 283. Whether, in the present case, if
the city court had no authority to grant a new trial, the plain
tiff in error has any other remedy before a ﬁnal judgment
is rendered it is unnecessary for us to determine.
This writ of error should therefore be dismissed.‘
1 It was held in Metcalfs Case (1615), 11 Coke 38, that a writ of error
did not lie until the ﬁnal judgment was given.
Statutes very commonly reaffirm the common law doctrine by allowing
an appeal or writ of error from any ﬁnal order, judgmcnt or decree.
Clv. Code 1907, 5 2837; Arkansas, Dig. 1921, § 2129,
See Alabama,
California, Code Clv. Pro. § 963; Colorado,
2233,
2258,
5 2287;
§
§

R.
§

S.
5820;

1908,

§§

District

1536,

of

1540,

Columbia,

1556,

Code,

1603;
§

Connecticut,

226;

Florida,

Rev.
G, S,

1913,
1920,
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Idaho, C. S. 1919, 5 7152; Illinois, St. ch. 110, § 91; Indiana,
Kansas, Code
Iowa, Code 1919, § 8481:
St. 1914, § 671;
1909, § 6160; Kentucky, Stat. 1909, § 950; Maine, R. S. 1916, ch. 82, §§ 22.
G. L. 1921.
97; Maryland, G. L. 1904, art. 5, §§ 26, 28; Massachusetts,
ch. 250, § 22; Michigan, C. L. 1915, § 13736, 13753; Minnesota, R. L. 1905,
Missouri, R. S. 1919, § 1469; Mississippi. Code 1906, § 33;
§ 4365;
Nebraska, C. S. 1911, § 7153, 7155; Montana, R. C. 1921, § 9731; Nevada,
R. L. 1912, § 5329; New Jersey, C. S. 1910, p. 1710, 2207; New Mexico,
C. L: 1897, § 2687, Subsec. 161; New York, Civ. Prue. Act 1920, § 608;
North Dakota, R. C. 1905, § 7225; Ohio, Gen. Code, Q 12224; Oklahoma, R.
L. 1910, § 5236; Oregon, L. 1920, § 548; Pennsylvania, Purd. Dig. Errors
& Appeals, I; Rhoda Island, G. L. 1909, ch. 289; § 25; South Carolina,
Code Cir. Pro. 1902, § 11; South Dakota, R. C. 1919, § 3168; Tennessee,
Shannon's Code 1917, § 4911; Texas, St. 1920, § 2078; Utah, C. L. 1917,
§ 6990; Vermont, G. L. 1917, § 1561; Virginia, Code 1919, § 6336; Wash
ington, R. & B.'s Codes, § 1716; Wisconsin St. 1919, § 3043; Wyoming,
C. S. 1920, § 6371.
.
“By our statutes an appeal is allowed from certain intermediate orders
made in the progress of the cause, but there is no provision of our statute
under which a failure to do so operates as a waiver oi the error it an
exception is taken to the ruling and an appeal be taken from the ﬁnal
judgment."—Jones v. Chicago & N. W. RR. Co., (1872) 36 Ia. 68, 73.
But some statutes contain a. provision denying the review after ﬁnal
judgment of interlocutory orders from which appeals might have been
taken,—Barry v. Barry, (1880) 56 Cal. 10; or allowing such review only
in so tar as the ﬁnal decree has been erroneously affected thereby,
Cawley Y. Jean, (1905) 189 Mass. 220.
§

2901;

Burns

BANKS
Supreme

V.

GUINYARD.

Court of Florida.
as Florida,

WHITFIELD, C.

J.

1912.

eel.

This is a proceeding for partition of real
estate. A decree was rendered May 26, 1911, adjudicating
the interests of the parties and appointing commissioners to
make partition of the lands, with directions that if they ﬁnd
that partition in kind cannot be made without manifest preju
dice to the parties, or to either of them, to report such ﬁnd
ings to the court for its action thereon. The commissioners
reported that, owing to the situation of the land and the
nature of the improvements thereon, partition in kind could
not be made without prejudice to the parties.
On this report
a decree ordering a sale of the property for partition was
rendered May 31, 1911. On November 25, 1911, the defend
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ants took an appeal speciﬁcally from and limited to the de
cree of May 26, 1911.
A decree in a partition suit, adjudicating the rights and
interests of the respective parties in the lands sought to be
partitioned, ordering partition thereof, and appointing com
missioners to make the same, is interlocutory merely, and
not ﬁnal; but a decree in such a suit, ordering a sale of the
property by the commissioners, based upon their report that
partition cannot be made without great prejudice to the own
ers of the lands, is ﬁnal. Camp Phosphate C0. 1:. Anderson,
'
48 Fla. 226, 37 South. 722.
In this case a sale of the property for the purposes of par
tition was required, and was actually made. Therefore the
decree of May 26, 1911, adjudicating the interest of the par
ties and appointing commissioners to make the partition, or
to report if a sale was necessary to an equitable partition,
was an interlocutory decree; the decree of May 31, 1911, or
dering a sale of the property for partition, being the ﬁnal
decree
the cause.
An appeal in an equity cause, taken subsequently to the
ﬁnal decree therein, solely and expressly from
rendition of
an interlocutory order therein, that does not bring up such
ﬁnal decree for review, cannot be considered by the appel
Stanley '0. Standard Cy
late court, and will be dismissed.
press C0., 54 Fla. 583, 45 South. 478.
As the appeal was entered after the ﬁnal decree of May
31, 1911, was rendered, and was taken from only the in
terlocutory decree of May 26, 1911, the appeal does not bring
the ﬁnal decree here; and in the absence of an appeal duly
taken from the ﬁnal decree, the appeal taken from the inter
locutory decree after the ﬁnal decree was rendered should
be dismissed.
The appeal will be dismissed.”
$“'l"he interlocutory judgment and the intermediate orders upon which
that ﬁnal judgment is based are all merged in the ﬁnal judgment, and
no right to review an interlocutory judgment or intermediate order upon
which the ﬁnal judgment was based survives the entry of the ﬁnal judg
ment, except so far as a review of the interlocutory judgment or inter
mediate order is allowed on the appeal from the ﬁnal judgment."—Bates
v. Holbrook, (1904) 89 N. Y. App. Div. 548.
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ST. LOUIS & SUBURBAN RAILWAY CO.

Supreme Court of Missouri.
154

1900.

Missouri, 428.'

MARSHALL, J.
(In Division one). Plaintiff, a passenger
on one of the trains of the St. Louis & Suburban Railway
Company, sues the defendants for ten thousand dollars dam
ages for injuries sustained by her on the 4th of October,
1894, in consequence of a collision between the street car
operated by the railway company with a steam car operated
by the railroad company.
The petition is in two counts,
the ﬁrst, in equity, asking to have a release of all claim
against both defendants, executed by her on the 11th of Au
gust, 1894, set aside and vacated on the ground that it was
procured from her by the fraud of the agents of the defend
ants, while sick at the hospital from the effects of her in
juries, and when she was not competent to contract, and
offering to return the $185 received by her as the consider
ation for the contract of release, and as compensation in full
for her claim to damages; and the second, an action at law
for ten thousand dollars damages for such injuries. The
defendants pleaded the release and a general denial. The re
ply was, substantially, a reiteration of the equity count of
the petition. The circuit court tried the equity count sepa
rately, and entered a decree canceling the release, and both
defendants appealed to this court. The record before us does
not show whether the count at law has ever been tried or not,
or, if so, what the result was.
It is patent, upon this statement of the condition of the
record, that this appeal was prematurely taken, and, hence
Section 2246, Rev. St. 1889, provides
must be dismissed.
that: “Any person aggrieved by any ﬁnal judgment or de
cision of any circuit court, in any civil cause,” etc., might
appeal, etc.
This section was amended by the act of 1891
so as to allow appeals to be taken from certain orders and
judgments entered in the progress of a cause before ﬁnal
By the act of April 11, 1895, (Acts 1895, p. 91),
judgment.
the act of 1891 amending section 2246 was itself amended so
as to provide that any party to a civil suit might appeal
from any of the following orders:
(1) An order granting
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trial or in arrest of judgment; (2) an order refusing

to revoke, modify, or change an interlocutory order appoint
ing a receiver: (3) an order dissolving an injunction; (4)
any interlocutory judgment in partition which determines
the rights of the parties; and (5) any ﬁnal judgment, or any
Except in the cases speci
special order after ﬁnal judgment.
ﬁed, an appeal will not lie until after a ﬁnal judgment in the
cause in the trial court.
Q

£1

IF

¥

#

8

U

#

U

#

.

The statute contemplates only one ﬁnal judgment in any
case. And while section 2040, Rev, St. 1889, permits a plain
tiff to unite in the same petition, by separate counts, as many
causes of action as he believes he has whether they “be such
as have been heretofore denominated legal or equitable or
both,” just as section 2049, Id., permits a defendant to unite
in the same answer as many defenses, stated separately, as
he believes he has, whether the same be legal or equitable,
still there can be but one ﬁnal judgment in any case; and if a
petition contains two counts, whether both at law or both in
equity, or one at law and one in equity, and one is adjudged
insufficient, there can be no ﬁnal judgment or appeal from
the order so adjudging it until after the whole issue is tried
and determined, and the order adjudging one count insuffi
cient is not a ﬁnal judgment until the whole case is deter
mined, and the whole judgment of the court is expressed in
So, in this case, where
the i'.nal judgment on both counts.
equity
is
in
to
cancel
a release, which, with
count
the ﬁrst

out being canceled, would, if pleaded by the defendant, be
a complete defense to the action at law, and the court prop
erly tried the equity count ﬁrst (Blair 12. Railroad Co., 89 Mo.
383, 1 S. W. 350; Mateer 12. Railway Co., 105 Mo., loc. cit.
350, 16 S. W. 847; Homuth v. Railway Co., 129 Mo. 629, 31
S. W. 993; Och v. Railway Co., 130 Mo. 27, 31 S. W. 962;
Courtney v. Blackwell, 150 Mo., loc. cit. 245, 51 S. W. 668),
there can be no ﬁnal judgment as to the equity count until
Or,
there is also a ﬁnal judgment as to the count at law.
in other words, no matter how many counts there may be in
a petition, there can be but one ﬁnal judgment in the case.
That judgment may be for one party on one count, and for
the other party on the other count, but it must all be ex
For example, the plaintiff may
pressed in one judgment.
in this case, and the defendant
equity
in
count
win on the

‘I12
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may win on the count at law, and the ﬁnal judgment in the
whole case would be entered accordingly, yet the defendant
would have no occasion to, and could not, appeal.
On the
hand,
if the defendant won on the equity count, the
other
plaintiff could not then appeal, because there would be no
ﬁnal determination of the right of the parties in the action,
but the case would have to proceed; and when the plaintiff
made out his prima facie case on the merits, and the de
fendant introduced the release in evidence, and the plaintiff
did not disprove its execution (he would not be allowed to
show that it was procured by fraud, because that issue would
already have been ruled against him), the release being a
complete defense to the cause of action, the court would be
compelled to instruct the jury to ﬁnd for the defendant.
On
hand,
the other
as in this case, the release being canceled
by the chancellor, it would be out of the case upon the trial
of the case on its merits, and, if the defendant offered it in
evidence, the court would be obliged to exclude it; and, if
the defendant lost the case, the ruling and ﬁnding of the
court and of the jury on the counts in equity and law, re
spectively, would be entered in the same ﬁnal judgment, and
be covered by the same motions for new trial and in arrest,
the same bill of ﬁnal exceptions (if the exceptions on the
trial of the equity count had been properly preserved by a
bill of exceptions, ﬁled during the term at which they were
saved, as in other cases of saving exceptions), and by the
same appeal.
As the record in this case does not bring the case within
this rule, it follows that the appeal was prematurely taken,
*
*
"
and must be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
MARSHALL, J. The foregoing opinion, heretofore deliv
ered in division No. 1, is hereby adopted as the opinion of
the court in bane.
GANTT, C. J., and SHERWOOD, Bunssss, and VALLIANT,
ROBINSON, J., dissents.
concur.

JJ.,

I
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SMITH.

Supreme Court of California.

1902.

187 California, 360.
MCFARLAND, J. The defendant Smith was a justice of
the peace, and defendants Packard and Brown were sureties
on his oﬁicial bond. The action was brought against all three
defendants to recover damages for an alleged unlawful im
prisonment of plaintiff by the defendant Smith.
Smith de
murred to the complaint, and his demurrer was overruled,
and from all that appears the action is still pending against
him.
Packard and Br_own also demurred to the complaint,
and their demurrer was sustained, and, plaintiff declining
to amend, what purports to be a judgment for costs was
entered in their favor. From this judgment, plaintiff ap
peals.
Respondents object to the hearing of the appeal, and con
tend that it should be dismissed because the purported
judgment from which plaintiff attempts to appeal does not
dispose of the whole case, and is not, therefore, a ﬁnal judg
ment, from which an appeal can be taken.
We think that
this contention must prevail. It is clear that the appeal does
not lie unless the action of the court below appealed from is
a “ﬁnal judgment,” within the meaning of section 939 of the
Code of Civil Procedure; and the conclusion that it is not
The ques
such a ﬁnal judgment seems to be unavoidable.
tion has not, to our knowledge, been before this court in the
exact form in which it is presented in the case at bar; that
is, where the objection was that the judgment appealed from
did not ﬁnally dispose of the rights of all the parties to the
But this court has given deﬁnitions of the phrase
action.
“ﬁnal judgment” which seem to exclude from that category
the so-called judgment in the case at bar. In Stockton Corri
bined Harvester & Agricultural Works 12. Glen's Falls Ins.
Co., 98 Cal. 577, 33 Pac. 633, the court say: “The judgment
or decree of December 19, 1890, denying to defendant the
relief demanded in what is termed his cross-complaint, was
not a ﬁnal judgment, and the attempted separate appeal
There can be but one ﬁnal
therefrom must be dismissed.
action,
judgment in an
and that is one which, in effect, ends
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the suit in the court in which it was entered, and ﬁnally
determines the rights of the parties in relation to the matter
in controversy. Elliott, App. Proc. §§ 90, 91; W. U. Tel. Co.
v. Locke, 107 Ind. 9, 7 N. E. 579.” See, also, Fox v. Mining
Co., 112 Cal. 571, 44 Pac. 1022; Peck v. Vandenberg, 30 Cal.
22, and cases there cited; Welch 'v. Allen, 54 Cal. 211.
Mr.
Freeman, in his work on Judgments, says that appellate
courts will not review cases by piecemeal, and that “the gen
eral rule recognized by the courts of the United States and
by the courts of most, if not all, the states is that no judg
ment or decree will be regarded as ﬁnal, within the meaning
of the statutes in reference to appeals, unless all issues of
law and fact necessary to be determined were determined,
and the case completely disposed of, so far as the court had
power to dispose of it.”
Freem. Judgm. § 34.
In other
jurisdictions the’ question seems to have been deﬁnitely
settled in favor of respondents’ contention.
The case of
Farish,
24 Mo. App. 110, is almost exactly like
Caulﬁeld v.
the case at bar. There Dockery, one of the defendants, had
demurred to the complaint, and the other defendants had
His demurrer had been sustained, and, plaintiffs
answered.
having declined to amend, judgment had been entered in fa
vor of Dockery for his costs, etc., and from that judgment
plaintiff had appealed. The supreme court of Missouri dis
missed the appeal, and said: “Although the case has been
submitted to us on the merits of the demurrer on both sides,
without any question as to whether an appeal will lie, we
must take the course of dismissing the appeal. The general
rule is that there can be but one ﬁnal judgment, and conse
quently but one appeal in a cause." And the court said fur
ther: “It was error on the part of the trial court to enter
what purports to be a ﬁnal judgment in favor of the de
fendant Dockery, without disposing of the other defendants.
In the state of the record, the court could not make a ﬁnal
disposition as to the other defendants, because as to them
The court should
the case stood upon petition and answer.
have made an interlocutory order as to Dockery, and pro
In V0or
ceeded to try the case as to the other defendants."
“An ap
his 12. Associa-tion, 59 Mo. App. 55, the court held:
peal from a judgment on demurrer in favor of one of several
defendants, which leaves the case pending as to the others,
is premature, and must be dismissed.” What seems to be the
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prevailing rule on the subject is clearly expressed by the
civil court of appeals of Texas in Railway & Real Estate C0.
v. Becker, 23 S. W. 1015, as follows:
“A ﬁnal judgment is
one which disposes of the matters in litigation between all
the parties before the court when the judgment is rendered.
A judgment for costs, only, for or against any one of the
parties, plaintiff or defendant, is not a ﬁnal judgment.
There
must be an express adjudication of the subject-matter
of
controversy as to all of the parties plaintiff and all of the
parties defendant; otherwise there is no ﬁnal disposition of
the matters litigated between the parties.” The same rule is
declared by the supreme court of Illinois in Hutchinson '0.
Ayres, 7 N. E. 476; Bucklenn 12. City of Chicago, 46 N. E.
1073; and Dreyer '0. Goldy, 49 N. E. 560; and also by the
supreme court of Tennessee in Lang v. Zinc Co., 42 S. W.
In Watkins '0. Mason (Or.) 4 Pac. 524, a demurrer of
198.
one of the defendants, Mary Mason, had been sustained, and
some time afterwards there had been a ﬁnal judgment in fa
vor of the other defendant, and on appeal by plaintiff there

was a motion to dismiss the appeal as to Mary Mason, on
the ground that the appeal had not been taken within the
statutory time after the sustaining of the demurrer; but the
supreme court of Oregon denied the motion to dismiss, and
said: “In this court a motion was ﬁled to dismiss the appeal
as to Mary Mason because not taken within six months from
the judgment on the demurrer, although within six months
of the determination of the case as to O. P. Mason.
The
hold,
however,
appeal
only
that
an
lies
when
cases
the con
troversy as to all the parties to the action has been ﬁnally de
The same rule has also been declared by the
termined.”
supreme court of the United States. See Bank v. Smith, 156
U. S. 330, 15 Sup. Ct. 358, 39 L. Ed. 441; Meaghcr v.
Thresher Co., 145 U. S. 608, 12 Sup. Ct. 876, 36 L. Ed. 834,
and cases there cited: U. S. 'v. Gifrault, 52 U. S. 22, 13 L. Ed.
587.
The appeal is dismissed.‘

8In Hutson v. Brookshire, (Ind. App. 1923) 140 N. E. 440, the court
said:—-“In the instant case the plaintiff is appealing from a judgment
based on a verdict that failed to ﬁnd on all the issues as to all the parties,
and where no objection was made in the trial court to the form of the
Had appellant ﬂied a motion for a vcnirc do novo and reserved
verdict.
an exception to the overruling of that motion, a different question would
be presented,"—citing, among other cases, Groot v. Oregon, etc., R. Co.,
34 Utah, 152; Carmichael v. City of Texarkana, 116 Fed. 845, 54 C. C.
A. 179.
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MCAUSLAN v. MCAUSLAN.
Supreme

Court of Rhode Island.
84 Rhode

1912.

\

Island, 462.

SWEETLAND, J.
The bill is
This is an equity appeal.
brought by certain cestuis que trust, beneﬁciaries under the
trusts contained in the will of John McAuslan, and the as
signee of certain interests in said trust estate, against the
trustees named in said will and the assignee under the mort
gage of the interest of certain other beneﬁciaries.
The bill
asks for the removal of George R. McAuslan, one of said trus
tees; that an account be taken of the trust property and the
application thereof by said trustees; and for a decree ordering
said trustees to pay to said trust estate what shall appear to
The bill alleges, among
be due from them on such account.
That said George R. McAuslan has assumed
other things:
the active management of said trusts and practically has been
the sole trustee; that said trusts have been mismanaged; that
said George R. McAuslan is incompetent to perform the du
ties of trustee; that by reason of certain investments of the
trust estate made by the trustees, as speciﬁed in the bill, the
trust estate has lost large sums of money; that the trustees
have failed to keep proper accounts, do not act in harmony,
have become personally indebted to the trust estate in large
amounts, and have been adjudged in contempt of court for
failure to make payments of money from the trust estate in
accordance with the decree of the superior court.
Of the respondents, other than the said trustees, one joins
in the prayer of the bill, another has permitted the bill to be
taken as confessed against him, and the others, as minors,
have submitte_d their interests to the care of the court. The
respondent trustee Amelia B. McAuslan in her answer admits
all the essential allegations of the bill and joins in therprayer
The other respondent trustee, George R.
for a receiver.
McAuslan, in his answer, among other things, admits that
the trustees have made losses in the management of the trust
estate, but sets out facts which he claims excuse him from
blame. After replication ﬁled, on motion of the complainants,
and after notice to the respondents and hearing, the superior
court, by decree entered April 2, 1910, referred the cause to a

\
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master, “to examine and state the accounts of the executors
and trustees with the estate of the said John McAuslan and
report to the court” a number of particulars regarding the
amount of the estate at the death of John McAuslan, the deal
ings of the trustees with the principal of the estate, the
amount of the income received from the estate, and the dis
position of said income by the trustees.
The master by this
decree was also directed to report to the court whether George
R. McAuslan should or should not be removed as trustee of
said estate.
After a number of hearings before the master, of which all
the parties received due notice, the master prepared a draft
of his report, and all the parties were notiﬁed by the master
that said draft report was on ﬁle in his office for the inspec
tion of the parties and their solicitors, and that at a certain
day and hour named he would hear objections to said report.
No objections were made by any of the parties, and the mas
ter ﬁled his report unsealed in the superior court. On motion,
of which the parties had due notice, the superior court, by
By
decree entered on March 4, 1911, conﬁrmed said report.
said report it appears that the master has taken testimony as
to all the questions referred to him, and has endeavored by
his consideration of such testimony and his conclusions there
on to give to the court the assistance which it had required.
Thereafter the superior court, by decree entered April 15,
1911, removed said George R. McAuslan from being trustee
as aforesaid, ﬁxed the amount due from said trustees to said
trust estate, ordered the said trustees to pay the sum so
found to be due to the receiver of said trust estate, made said
sum so found to be due a lien on the interests of said trustees
in the trust estate, and provided that, if said sum so found
to be due was not paid to said receiver within 30 days there
after, the interests of the said trustees in the trust estate
should be liable to be applied toward making good to the
trust estate said sum, or such part thereof as might then
From this decree the said George R. Mc
remain unpaid.
Auslan has appealed.
At the outset of the consideration of this appeal we are
met by the objection of one of the respondents, whose interest
in the present matter is similar to that of the complainants,
that the reasons of appeal stated by the respondent George R.
McAuslan cannot be considered, as they are objections to acts
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of the superior court preceding the decree conﬁrming the
master’s report; that the decree of April 15, 1911, from which
this appeal is taken, is merely auxiliary to the decree conﬁrm
ing the master’s report, which is the ﬁnal decree; that an ap
peal from the decree of April 15, 1911, can bring in question
before this court only the proceeding in the superior court
subsequent to the decree conﬁrming the master’s report, and
cannot interfere with that decree; that the respondent George
R. McAuslan could have raised the objections stated in his
reasons of appeal only upon an appeal from the decree con
ﬁrming the master’s report. This brings before us the ques
tion of what is the ﬁnal decree in equity causes intended by
our statute as the appealable decree in a cause. Previous to
the passage of the Court and Practice Act equity appeals were
unknown in our practice, since the period from 1867 to 1871,
when appeals to the full court were permitted from both the
ﬁnal and interlocutory decrees made by a single justice of the
Supreme Court. Under our present statute an appeal may
be taken from the ﬁnal decree of the superior court in an
equity cause, and from the ﬁnal decree alone, with these ex
ceptions:
An appeal may be taken from an interlocutory de
granting
cree
or continuing an injunction, appointing a re
ceiver, or ordering a sale of real or personal property. Hem
enway v. Hemenway, 28 R. I. 85, 65 Atl. 608.
What constitutes a ﬁnal decree is a question not easily de
termined in every case.
The decisions of the courts are far
from uniform upon the subject. As was said by the court in
McG0urkey v. Toledo & Ohio Ry., 146 U. S. 536, 13 Sup. Ct.
170, 36 L. Ed. 1079: “Probably no question of equity practice
has been the subject of more frequent decision in this court
The statutes of some of the
than the ﬁnality of decrees.”
states provide for an appeal from both ﬁnal and interlocutory
and the question before the courts in some reported
cases has been whether a certain decree was an appealable
By the terms
one, not whether it was interlocutory or ﬁnal.
of the statutes of some states an appeal will lie in chancery
from any decree or order “adjudicating the principles of the
cause." In some jurisdictions, where the statutes permit ap
peals from ﬁnal decrees alone, decrees which were strictly
and technically interlocutory have been held to be ﬁnal, when
irreparable injury might result to a party if he was compelled
to await the ﬁnal outcome of the cause in the lower court be
decrees,
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fore he could obtain a review in the appellate tribunal. For
these and other reasons there is much confusion in the re
ports as to what constitutes a ﬁnal decree for the purpose of
appeal.
Our statute regarding the appealability of decrees
in equity is similar to the United States statute. It is in the
federal courts that we ﬁnd the subject, now under considera
tion, most frequently treated and the practice most consistent
and reasonable.
We have frequently said, in regard to the removal of cases
at law to this court for review, that the intent of the statute
is that exceptions in such cases shall not be certiﬁed to this
court until after all matters arising in the cause in the su
perior court have been determined. We see in the statute the
same general intent with regard to appeals in equity, so far
as the distinctive character of equity procedure makes such
practice reasonable and expedient. From the nature of pro
ceedings in equity, it must be held that the ﬁnal decree is not
necessarily the last order in the case. On the other hand, a
decree should not be considered ﬁnal, although it purports to
declare the rights of the parties and to regulate all “actions
that may be expected to be taken in the future disposition of
the case.” Such decrees “have no efﬁcacy until put into the
form of a judgment that is capable of being carried into exe

Patterson v. Hopkins, 23 Mich. 541. "‘ "' *
With the modiﬁcation which we shall consider later, We
adopt, as a reasonable deﬁnition of a ﬁnal decree in equity u1i
der our statute, the one approved in Grant v. Phoenix Ins. Co.,
106 U. S. 429, 1 Sup. Ct. 414, 27 L. Ed. 237: “The rule is well
settled that a decree, to be ﬁnal within the meaning of that
term as used in the acts of Congress giving this court juris
diction on appeal, must terminate the litigation of the parties
on the merits of the case, so that, if there should be an afﬁrm
ance here, the court below would have nothing to do but to
cution.”

" " "
execute the decree it had already rendered.”
The strict observance of this general rule would in some
instances result in such possible hardship and injury that ap
pellate courts in such cases have taken cognizance of appeals
from decrees, which were technically interlocutory in their
character, before the merits of the cause had been determined
in the court below. These cases must- be considered as repre
senting a modiﬁcation of the ordinary rule. As was said by
the court in Dufour v. Lang, 54 Fed. 913, 4 C. C. A. 663:
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cause, orders and decrees may
made
which
so
parties
affect
the
or the property involved
be
in the suit as to require that such order or decree, to be re
viewed at all by an appellate court with effect, should be
appealed promptly, and not await the full disposition of the
whole suit; and whenever this is the case the decree is held
to possess such an element of ﬁnality as to bring it within the
terms of the statute limiting the right to appeal only from ﬁ
nal decrees.” In Forgay v. Con/rad, 6 How. 201, 12 I.. Ed. 404,
which is one of this class of cases, the court treats of the ne
cessity for this modiﬁcation of the ordinary rule as follows:
“In this respect the practice of the United States chancery
courts differs from the English practice.
For appeals to the
interlocutory
of
order of
House
Lords may be taken from an
the Chancellor, which decides a right of property in dispute,
and therefore there is no irreparable injury to the party by
ordering his deed to be canceled, or the property he
holds to be delivered up, because he may immediately
appeal, and the execution of the order is suspended un
til the decision of the appellate court. But the case is other
wise in the courts of the United States, where the right to
And if, by an inter
appeal is by law limited to ﬁnal decrees.
locutory order or decree, he is required to deliver up property
which he claims, or to pay money which he denies to be due,
and the order immediately carried into execution by the Cir
cuit Court, his right of appeal is of very little value to him,
and he may be ruined before he is permitted to avail himself
of the right.”
This case of Forgay '0. Conrad was an appeal from a decree
of the Circuit Court adjudging that certain deeds should be
set aside as fraudulent and void, ordering that certain lands
and slaves should be delivered up to the complainant, that one
of the defendants should pay a certain sum of money to the
complainant, and that the complainant should have execution
for these several matters, although the bill was retained in
The Supreme Court, in holding
court for other purposes.
that this decree authorized an appeal, said: “If these appel
lants, therefore, must wait until the accounts are reported by
the master and conﬁrmed by the court, they will be subjected
to irreparable injury; for the lands and slaves which they
claim will be taken out of their possession and sold, and the
proceeds distributed among the creditors of the bankrupt, be
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fore they can have an opportunity of being heard in this court
in defense of their rights.” This case and others of like char
acter are frequentlycited as authorities for the extension of
in equi
the ordinary rule in regard to appealable ﬁnal
decrees
ty. The case has been regarded by the United States Supreme
Court itself as an exception to that rule. -In Barnard v. Gib
son, 7 How. 650, 12 L. Ed. 857, it was held that Forgay 'v. Con
rad, 6 How. 201, 12 L. Ed. 404, is supposed to be a departure
from the uniform course of decision in the United States
'
Supreme Court. "‘ " "
In certain cases our statute has guarded against the possi
bility of injury arising from restricting appeals in all in
stances to ﬁnal decrees, in the technical sense, by providing
for appeals from interlocutory decrees granting or continu
ing injunctions, appointing receivers, or ordering a sale of
property.‘ Besides those provided for in the statute, other
instances may present themselves of decrees, in a strict sense
interlocutory, which by reason of their possible injurious con
sequences

require an immediate review, and must be held

for

this reason to have such elements of ﬁnality as to permit an
immediate appeal.
There is another class of decrees which is to a certain ex
tent ‘a modiﬁcation of the general rule. Of this class is a de
cree made as to one of several defendants, whose interests are
not at all connected with each other, with a direction for the
Such decree is ﬁnal
payment of costs as to that defendant.
as to him, although the cause may be still pending in the
court, as to the rest. Royall’s Adm’rs '0. Johnson, 22 Va. 421;
Dickinson 12. Codwise, 11 Paige (N. Y.) 189. Of this nature
was the decree considered in Doty '0. Oriental Print Works
Company, 28 R. I. 372, 67 Atl. 586. In that case the court
heard and determined an appeal from the decree denying and
dismissing the petition of one Tenney for leave to intervene
in the above-entitled equity cause as a preferred creditor of
the respondent.
It cannot be claimed in the case at bar that the decree con
ﬁrming the master’s report is within either of the exceptions
to the general rule which we have discussed, and that for
such reason it should be considered as a ﬁnal decree, from
which an appeal could and should have been claimed, if the
respondent George R. McAuslan wished to raise the objec
tions stated in his reasons of appeal. Under the general rule
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which we have adopted, the decree conﬁrming the master's
report is not the ﬁnal decree in the cause. More was required
to give the complainants the relief which they desired in the
cause, and which the superior court intended to grant, than
the entry of a mere auxiliary decree or a decretal order in
execution of the decree conﬁrming the master's report. The
ﬁnal decree in an equity cause is the decree which ﬁnally de
termines the rights of the parties, provides for the relief
which the court ﬁnds to be necessary that the parties may
have the full beneﬁt of the’court’s determination upon the
merits, and at most merely requires one or more orders or
The modiﬁcations
supplemental decrees for its enforcement.
which we have considered have been permitted to prevent the
consummation of injury beyond redress during the progress
of the cause, or because there has been a ﬁnal determination
of the cause as to one or more, but not as to all, the parties.
These modiﬁcations have been permitted for the protection of
the party aggrieved by the decree, and for that reason alone.
They should be considered as exceptions to the general rule,
and, if so considered, they will cause no confusion in practice.

'

is

it

a

is

is

it

a

a

a

"‘

a

*

ﬁnal decree in equity, as we
An appeal from
have deﬁned it, brings before this court for review all matters
contained in such decree, and all previous rulings, orders, or
decrees made or entered in the cause previous to the entry of
such decree, unless such decree or such previous rulings, or
ders, or decrees, from the circumstances or the manner in
which they have been made or entered, are not reviewable, as
decree conﬁrming
master's
decree entered by consent,
report, to which no exception has been taken, and others; and
said decree, or such previous rulings, orders, or decrees, are
speciﬁcally stated in the reasons of
not reviewable, unless
made to such decree, or previous rul
appeal that objection
ings, orders, or decrees.
A supplemental decree, or order for the execution of the
also so far
ﬁnal order
ﬁnal decree, as we have deﬁned it,
or decree as to support an appeal; but an appeal from such
order or supplemental decree will bring before the court for
review only such matters as are involved in the order or de
cree itself, or matters arising subsequent to the entry of the
cannot bring before the court any alleged
ﬁnal decree; but
error contained in the ﬁnal decree itself, or any matters aris
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ing in the cause previous to the entry of the ﬁnal decree, and,
only brings up for review
as
true of all appeals in equity,
the alleged errors which are stated in the reasons of appeal.
*5

&

it

a

5

4Statutes allowing appeals from orders granting injunctions and ap
pointing receivers are found in most states.
It is frequently said that an appeal may be taken from ﬁnal judg
ment or decree upon a collateral matter arising out of the action.
Ben
nett v. Thorne, (1904) 36 Wash. 253; Grant v. Los Angeles, etc., RR. Co.,
(1897) 116 Cal. 71; Trustees v. Greenough,
(1881) 105 U. S. 527; Wil
liams v. Morgan, (1883) 111 U. S. 684.
An order in a suit tor divorce that plaintiff pay to the defendant
money to enable her to make a defense to his action, has been held
appealable and not appealable.
Clay v. Clay, (1910) 56 Ore. 538, citing
cases both ways on petition for rehearing.
In Sharon v.~Sharon, (1885) 67 Cal. 185, 196, the court probably took
too broad a position when
said:-—“A ﬁnal judgment is not necessarily
the last one in an action.
A judgment that is conclusive of any question
in a case is ﬁnal as to that question.
The Code provides for an appeal
from a ﬁnal judgment, not from the ﬁnal judgment, in an action."
“Where accounts are to be settled between the parties and the decree
contains an order of reference by which the accounts are to be stated
according to certain principles ﬁxed by the decree, such order of refer
ence will not have the effect ot rendering the decree interlocutory; but
where the chancellor fails to ﬁx the principles by which the accounts
are to be stated and judicial action on his part is contemplated and
necessary, or where some equity other than that involved in the account
ing remains for further adjudication, then such decree is interlocutory,,
unless the status of the account or other matter to be thereafter deter
mined is apart from the equities involved."—Gray v. Ames, (1906) 220
Ill. 251, 254. See also McGourkey v. Toledo
Ohio Ry. Co., (1892) 146
U. S. 536.

In Wynn v. Tallapoosa County Bank, (1910) 168 Ala. 469, the court
said:-—“The test of ﬁnality of a decree to support an appeal is not
whether the cause remains in /ieri, in some respects, in the court of
chancery, awaiting further proceedings, necessary to entitle the parties
to the full measure of the rights it has been declared they have; but
whether the decree which has been rendered ascertains and declares
these rights—-it these are ascertained and adjudged, the decree is ﬁnal
will support an appeal."
In Forgay v. Conrad, (1848)

and

a

a

a

6

How. (U. S.) 201, the court suggested
the wisdom of circuit courts refraining “from changing unnecessarily
the possession of property, or compelling the payment of money by an
interlocutory decree," in order that parties might be relieved from the
burden and expense of successive appeals, since decrees of that character
had a sufﬁclent element of ﬁnality to be appealable.
As to appeals from part of a czwe. Elliott says:—“'I‘here is
class of
cases which apparently form an exception to the general rule that an
part of
appeal will not lie from
case, but the cases forming this class
will be found on investigation to be apparent rather than actual ex
ceptions.
The class to which we refer is composed of cases wherein an
issue, distinct, entire and complete, is formed between some ot the
parties and upon which issue a ﬁnal judgment is given affecting only
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The class
the interests and rights of the parties to that issue.
is composed of cases where the judgment is final as to the particular
issue and the parties to it, and the issue is one which neither affects the
main action nor the parties generally.
If the issue does affect the main
action and does involve the rights of others than the parties to the par
ticular issue, there can be no appeal until there has been a decree or
judgment upon all the issues as to all the parties." Elliott: App. Proc.,
§

99.

CHICAGO PORTRAIT CO.
Supreme

v.

CHICAGO CRAYON CO.

Court of Illinois.
217 Illinois, 200.

1905.
'

,

CARTWRIGHT, C. J. Appellant was plaintiff and appellee
was defendant in this suit in the circuit court of Cook county.
That court sustained the general demurrer of the defendant
to the declaration, and the plaintiff elected to stand by the
declaration.
The recital of said facts in the record is fol
lowed by this judgment: “Therefore it is considered by the
court that the defendant do have and recover of and from
the plaintiff its costs and charges in this behalf expended and
have execution therefor.” There was no disposition of the
rights of the parties or of the suit; but plaintiff prayed an
appeal from said judgment to the Appellate Court for the
First District, and assigned for error that the court sustained
Neither party raised
the demurrer and dismissed the suit.
any question as to the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court, but
The Appellate Court, in
submitted the cause on the merits.
the opinion ﬁled, called attention to the fact that the judg
ment was not ﬁnal, or such that an appeal could be taken from
it, but, treating it as ﬁnal, disposed of the case on the merits
Appellant prosecuted its further
and affirmed the judgment.
appeal to this court, and assigns for error that the Appellate
Court took jurisdiction of the appeal and decided the case on
its merits, instead of dismissing the appeal.
In the argument for appellant the only error relied upon is
that the Appellate Court had no jurisdiction of the appeal, for
The answer of
the reason that the judgment was not ﬁnal.
argument
appellant
is
that
that
is
appellee to
estopped, by
taking the appeal and submitting the cause upon the merits,
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from now saying that the Appellate Court ought to have dis
missed its appeal. The judgment was not ﬁnal, and the stat
ute only authorizes appeals from ﬁnal judgments.
The cir
cuit court merely sustained a demurrer to the declaration,
and neither adjudged that the plaintiff take nothing by the
writ, nor that the defendant go hence without day, and the
judgment contained no words of equivalent meaning. There
was no trial of any issue resulting in a ﬁnding for the de
fendant,

as there was

no issue to be tried,

and there was

nothing in the nature of a determination of the rights of the
parties.
Such a judgment is not ﬁnal.
Wenom v. Fossick;
213 Ill. 70, 72 N. E. 732; 11 Ency. of Pl. & Pr. 925. The only
question, therefore, is whether appellant is estopped, by tak
ing the appeal, from questioning the jurisdiction of the Ap
pellate Court. If a court on appeal has jurisdiction of the
subject-matter and of the parties, any objection to the manner
in which it reaches the court will be waived by the parties
Lynn v. Lynn,
appearing and pleading without objection.
160 Ill. 307, 43 N. E. 482. But, where the court has no juris
diction of the subject-matter, the jurisdiction cannot be con
ferred by agreement of parties an'd the want of jurisdiction
cannot be waived by failing to object. 2 Cyc. 536. The fact
that appellant took the appeal to the Appellate Court does not
affect the question. Peak v. People, 71 Ill. 278. It is not com
petent for parties to confer jurisdiction of the subject-matter
upon an appellate court by their stipulation. Westcott v. Kin
ney, 120 Ill. 564, 12 N. E. 81. In this case the Appellate Court
had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter, not being author
ized by law to hear or consider an appeal from a judgment
which is not ﬁnal, and appellant is not legally estopped to set
up a want of jurisdiction.
A court, ﬁnding it has no jurisdic
tion of a cause, should dismiss it of its own motion, and the
Appellate Court should have dismissed the appeal at appel
lant’s cost. Appellant, having taken an appeal where by law
no appeal would lie, will not be permitted to recover costs, but
will be required to pay all costs occasioned by such appeal.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed, and the
cause is remanded to that court, with directions to dismiss the
appeal at appellant’s cost.
Reversed and remanded.
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STATE

v.

SECURITY SAVINGS

Supreme

Court of Oregon.

&

TRUST
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CO.

1896.

28 Oregon, 410.

BEAN, C. J. On this appeal two questions have been pre
First, whether the order over
sented for consideration:
ruling defendant’s demurrer, and requiring it to answer the
information and interrogatories as prayed for in the bill, is
-an appealable order; " " ‘ The right of appeal is purely
statutory, and, unless the order from which defendant’s ap
peal is taken is a ﬁnal order, judgment, or decree within the
meaning of the statute, the appeal, of course, cannot be enter
tained. The law, as we understand it, is that an order or de
cree is ﬁnal for the purposes of an appeal when it determines
the rights of the parties; and no further questions can arise
before the court rendering it, except such as are necessary
to be determined in carrying it into effect. Freem. Judgm.
§ 36; Elliott, App. Proc. § 90; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. '0.
Southern Exp. Co., 108 U. S. 24, 2 Sup. Ct. 6. Within this
principle we think the present order or decree is ﬁnal. The
suit was brought for the sole and only purpose of obtaining
from the defendant an answer under oath to the several in
terrogatories, and for no other relief. The information is a
pure bill of discovery, in aid of a contemplated action at law,
asking no relief ; and the only litigated question in the case is
When,
the right of the informant to the discovery sought.
therefore, the demurrer was overruled, and the court held
that the plaintiff was entitled to the relief demanded, and or
dered and directed the defendant to answer the interroga
tories, it effectually determined all the issues in the case, and
ended the controversy between the parties so far as it could
do so, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce its determina
tion as made. No subsequent question could arise in the case
except as to the form or sufficiency of the defendant’s an
swers, and therefore, in our opinion, it was a ﬁnal order or de
cree within the meaning of the statute, and consequently ap
pealable; otherwise the defendant would be without remedy
by an appeal, though it should be admitted that the order com
plained of was in violation of its clear legal rights. If, as
contended by the plaintiff, before it can appeal it must com
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ply with the order of the court, and answer fully the informa
tion and interrogatories, an appeal would be a vain and use
less proceeding, for the sole object of the suit would have been
accomplished, and defendant’s appeal could avail it nothing.
Q

#

C

#

1

¥

i

8

$

Mimi?

CITY OF PARK RIDGE
Supreme

v.

MURPHY.

Court of Illinois.
258

i

1.918.

Illinois, 365.

J

VICKERS,
.
The city of Park Ridge instituted a proceed
ing in the county court of Cook county for a special assess
ment to pay

for a local improvement

costing

$64,050.50.

James A. Murphy was the owner of certain real estate, which
was assessed $6,327.50 for said improvement.
The proceed
ings on their face, up to and including the ﬁnal conﬁrmation
of the assessment, appear to be regular. Judgment of con
ﬁrmation by default was entered against the lands of appellee,
Murphy, May 18, 1911. On May 5, 1912, appellee gave notice
that he would ﬁle a motion to set aside the default and vacate
the judgment entered against his lands on May 18, 1911, and

for leave to ﬁle objections to said assessment.

After over

ruling a demurrer of the city, and striking certain pleas ﬁled
by the city to said motion, the court proceeded to hear the
motion to set aside the default against appellee on affidavits
and evidence, and made an order setting aside the default and
vacating the judgment of conﬁrmation as to appellee’s lands,
and gave leave to ﬁle objections instanter, which was done.
This appeal is prosecuted by the city from the order setting
aside the default and vacating the judgment of conﬁrmation.
$

1

If

*

Having reached the conclusion that the order set
ting aside the default and permitting appellee to ﬁle objec
tions is not a ﬁnal and appealable order, it will not be neces
sary to consider any other question.
Where a defendant makes a motion to set aside a default
and vacate a judgment in order to allow a defense, and such
motion is denied, the denial of the motion is a ﬁnal judgment,
"‘

"‘
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which may be reviewed by appeal or writ of error (Lake v.
Cook, 15 Ill. 353; Boyles v. Chytraus, 175 Ill. 370, 51 N. E.
563) ; but when the motion is allowed, and the judgment is set
aside merely for the purpose of allowing the party to inter
pose a defense, the order is interlocutory, and an appeal will
not lie therefrom. Walker v. Oliver, 63 Ill. 199. In such case
the court does not ﬁnally determine the rights of the parties.
Where a default is set aside and a money judgment is va
cated, the usual and proper practice is to allow the judgment
recovered to stand as a security for the payment of any
amount that may ultimately be recovered upon a retrial of the
case, and any liens that have been acquired under the judg
ment are retained until the ﬁnal determination of the merits of
Upon a retrial of the case the court may re
the controversy.
enter the same judgment, or modify it, or render an entirely
different judgment; but until such ﬁnal judgment is rendered
there is no ﬁnal disposition of the case, within the meaning of
the statute which allows appeals and writs of error to review
ﬁnal judgments. If the opposite party desires to question the
action of the court in setting aside the default and vacating
the judgment, it is his duty to preserve exceptions thereto and
assign error thereon as a part of the record after the contro
People v. Wells, 255 Ill.
versy has been ﬁnally determined.
450, 99 N. E. 606.
A ﬁnal judgment, within the meaning of the statute, is one
that ﬁnally disposes of the rights of the parties, either upon
the entire controversy or upon some deﬁnite and separate
branch thereof. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass’n v. Smith,
Cases like
169 Ill. 264, 48 N. E. 208, 61 Am. St. Rep. 172.
Owens v. Ranstead, 22 Ill. 161, Kochman v. O’Neill, 202 Ill.
110, 66 N. E. 1047, and Hilt v. Heimberger, 235 Ill. 235, 85
N. E. 304, all of which were original bills in equity for relief
against judgments at law, are not controlling under the facts
in the case at bar. In those and other like cases this court
has regarded a decree either setting aside the judgment com
plained of or refusing so to do as a ﬁnal decree, which might
be reviewed by an appeal or writ of error. The motion in the
case at bar to set aside the default and vacate the judgment of
conﬁrmation was not an independent original action, but was
simply a step taken in the original proceeding, which is au
thorized by section 89 of the Practice Act of 1907 (Laws 1907,
p. 444).

\
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There being no ﬁnal judgment here, the appeal will be dis
missed.“
6“Wl1at are known as ﬁnal orders are adjudications upon motions or
other applications, not involving a hearing upon pleadings and proofs.
but upon other issues interlocutory or collateral, whereby some sup
posed right of a party is deﬁnitely cut off, or some liability ﬁxed upon
Usually, if not always. an order made on such a side hearing is
him.
only ﬁnal if made in a certain way; whereas if the decision had been
otherwise it would have been interlocutory; while an absolute decree
If the decision of a motion opens
made in favor of either party is ﬁnal.
a case it is not generally ﬁnal, unless it cuts off some acquired right
under a decree. If it closes the matter and precludes any further hear

..~

ing or investigation it is ﬁnal."—Kingsbury

212, 215, per Campbell,

C.

J.

GREEN
Supreme

Klngsbury, (1870)

20

Mich.

-

FISK.

Court of the United States.
103

J

v.

v.

1880.

United States, 518.

WAITE, C. . This was a suit begun by Mrs. Fisk, the appel
in a State court of Louisiana, to obtain a partition of real
property. She alleged that she was the owner of one-half the
property; that she was not willing to continue her joint own
ership, and that a partition by sale was necessary, as a divi
sion could not be made in kind. The prayer of her petition
was in accordance with these allegations.
Green, the defendant below, being a citizen of California,
removed the case to the Circuit Court of the United States
for the District of Louisiana. In that court, on the 31st of
March, 1879, Mrs. Fisk was decreed to be the owner of
one-half the property, and the case was referred to “J . W.
Gurley, Esq., master, to proceed to a partition according to
law, under the direction of the court." From that decree an
appeal was taken by the defendant, which Mrs. Fisk now
moves to dismiss, because the decree appealed from is not the
ﬁnal decree in the cause.
We think the motion must be granted. In the Circuit Court
the suit was one in equity for partition. Although no formal
order was entered assigning it to the equity side of the court,
that was clearly its proper place, and it was so treated by the
parties and the court.
lee,
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In partition causes, courts of equity ﬁrst ascertain the
rights of the several persons interested, and then make a
division of the property. After the division has been made,
and conﬁrmed by the court, the partition, if in kind, is com
pleted by mutual conveyances of the allotments to the several
Mitford, Eq. Pl. (4th ed. by Jeremy), 120; 1 Story,
parties.
Eq., sect. 650; 2 Daniell, Ch. Pr. (4th Am. ed.) 1151.
A decree cannot be said to be ﬁnal until the court has com
pleted its adjudication of the cause.
Here the several inter
ests of the parties in the land have been ascertained and de
termined, but this is merely preparatory to the ﬁnal relief
which is sought; that is to say, a setting off to the complain
ant in severalty her share of the property in money or in
kind. This can only be done by a further decree of the court.
Ordinarily, in chancery, commissioners are appointed to make
the necessary examination and inquiries and report a parti
tion. Upon the coming in of the report the court acts again.
If the commissioners make a division the court must decide
Whether it shall be conﬁrmed before the partition, which is
the primary object of the suit, is complete. If they report
that a division cannot be made and recommended a sale, the
court must pass on this view of the case before the adjudica
tion between the parties can be said to be ended.
In this case a partition by sale was asked for, because the
property was not susceptible of division in kind. That the
court has not ordered, and the reference to the master was
undoubtedly to ascertain, among other things, whether such
a proceeding was in fact necessary in order to divide the
property. The master was in everything to proceed under
the direction of the court. He had no ﬁxed duty to perform.
He was the mere assistant of the court, not in executing its
process, but in completing its adjudication of the partition
which was asked. There are still questions, in which the par
ties have each a direct interest, and they must be determined
judicially before the relief has been granted which the suit
calls for.
In foreclosure suits it has been held that a decree which
settles all the rights of the parties and leaves nothing to be
done but to make a sale and pay over the proceeds is ﬁnal for
the purposes of an appeal. The reason is that in such a case
the sale is the execution of the decree of the court, and simply
enforces the rights of the parties as ﬁnally adjudicated.
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Here, however, such is not the case, because still the court
must act judicially in making the partition it has ordered.
What remains to be done is not ministerial but judicial. The
law has prescribed no ﬁx'ed rules by which the officers of the
court are to be governed in the performance of the duty as
signed to them. The court is still to exercise its judicial dis
cretion in directing the movements and approving the acts
of its assistants, until it has ﬁnally settled and determined on
the details of the partition, if made in kind, or directed a sale
by the ministerial ofiicers and prescribed the rules for a divi
sion of the proceeds.
Appeal dismissed.

EGGLESTON
Supreme

MORRISON.

Court of Illinois.
185

J

v.

Illinois,

1900.

577.

CARTWRIGI-IT, C. . Appellants appealed from a decree of
the superior court of Cook county for the foreclosure of a
mortgage, and directing the sale of the mortgaged premises,
and the branch appellate court for the First district affirmed
It is here complained that the decree is a joint
the decree.
one for the gross sum of $4,161.88 in favor of six different
persons as complainants, holding separate notes for different
amounts, and including a joint solicitor’s fee of $175.
The
complainant
separate
ﬁnds
the
amount
due
each
decree
on his
note, and orders payment to the complainants of the said
sums due them, respectively, and, so far as the debts are con
cerned, counsel are in error in their construction of the- de
cree. There was a solicitor’s fee allowed to the complainants
jointly; but whether that was right or wrong is immaterial,
The foregoing are
because it did no harm to the defendants.
presented as minor propositions, and the principal complaint
is that the court in the decree found that Eggleston, Mallette
& Brownell were personally liable for the indebtedness, and
ordered that, in case of sale of said premises after the coming
in and conﬁrmation of the master’s report of sale, in case any
deﬁciency should be shown in the amount due complainants,
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should be respectively entitled to execution therefor
against said defendants and one Dawson, who was also found
personally liable. Said defendants are grantees of the mort
gaged premises subsequent to the execution of the mortgage,
and the bill alleges that they assumed and agreed to pay the
mortgage indebtedness.
It is urged against this feature of
the decree that said defendants did not become personally lia
ble, and that the decree is premature.
The ﬁnding or conclu
sion of the court upon that subject in the decree is not pre
mature, but the appeal from such ﬁnding is premature, be
cause the decree is not ﬁnal in that respect, but provisional
merely. Section 16 of chapter 95 of the Revised Statutes pro
vides that in foreclosure suits a decree may be rendered for
any balance of money that may be found due to the complain
ant over and above the proceeds of the sale, and execution
may issue for the collection-of such balance. The decree may
be rendered conditionally at the time of decreeing the fore
closure, or it may be rendered after the sale and the ascer
Originally, a mortgagee was
tainment of the balance due.
relegated to his action at law to obtain a judgment for any
deﬁciency that might be due him after the sale of the mort
gaged premises, but this statute makes provision by which
he may, in the same proceeding, obtain a decree in rem for a
sale of the property, and a decree in personam if there should
While the statute authorizes the decree to be
be a deﬁciency.
entered conditionally at the time of decreeing the foreclosure,
its only effect is that of a ﬁnding that the complainant is en
titled to a personal decree for any balance that may be due
after the application of the proceeds of the sale. An appeal
will not lie from a ﬁnding or conclusion, either of law or fact,
not accompanied by any ﬁnal judgment or decree, and there
can be no personal decree until there is a judicial determina
tion of the amount due. That amount can only be ascertained
after the sale, and such a decree as this is not ﬁnal in that re
spect. Cotes v. Bennett, 183 Ill. 82, 55 N. E. 661. This de
cree lacks all the forms of a personal decree for the payment
of money, and no action could be brought upon it. Whether
anything, or how much, will ever be due from the defendants,
It has never been judicially determined that
is unknown.
there is, or will be, any balance of money due over and above
the proceeds of the sale. Unless a decree should be rendered
against the defendants in the future, they will be entirely un
they
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affected by the interlocutory ﬁnding or conclusion of the court
that they will be liable for a deﬁciency in case it shall exist.
The observations of the appellate court, and their opinion on
the subject of liability for a possible deﬁciency that may or
may not exist, relate to an interlocutory ﬁnding, and not a
ﬁnal decree. The question whether a personal decree will be
valid in case there should be a deﬁciency and such a decree
should be entered is a mere theoretical one.
If a personal
decree should ever be entered, it may not be for such an
amount as would authorize the review of it in this court. So
far as the decree was ﬁnal between the parties, we ﬁnd no
error in it, and the judgment of the appellate court afﬁrming
it in those respects is affirmed. Judgment afﬁrmedﬂ
7Some oourts hold that an order conditional upon the happening of
a subsequent event becomes ﬁnal as soon as the event occurs,-—People ex
rel. Hart v. York, (1902) 169 N. Y. 452; Abbott v. Sanders, (1909) 83
Vt. 165; Swanson v. Andrews, (1901) 84 Minn. 168; but others hold that
a new and ﬁnal decree should be entered after the event,—GrliTlths
v.
Monongahela RR. 00., (1911) 232 Pa. 639.
A condition in favor of appellant may be waived, thus making the
order ﬁnal,—Moore Printing Co. v. Nat. Sav. & Trust Co., (1908) 31
App. D. C. 452.

SECTION 2.

ORDERS

COMMONLY

REVIEWABLE

iii

BY STATUTE.’

8Many statutes specify with great detail particular orders, decrees
or judgments from which appeals may be taken.
These are usually
deﬁnite and certain and present no diﬁiculty.
But in practically all
states statutes are found authorizing appeals in classes of cases described
by general

terms,

and the meaning ot these terms has given occasion
Some of the more common of these general classes
be discussed in this section.

for much litigation.
of orders

will

PLANO MANUFACTURING

CO. v.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

KAUFERT.
1902.

¢

86 Minnesota,

13.

From an order denying a motion to set aside service of
summons, defendant appeals. Afﬁrmed.
START, C.

J.

*

*

*
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The plaintiff moves this court to dismiss the appeal
because the order is not appealable.
The motion was, in ef
fect, one which challenged the jurisdiction of the court, for
the summons is the notice whereby the defendant is brought
into court. If it was void, the court acquired no jurisdiction
1.

by the attempted service, and the defendant was entitled to
have the action dismissed.
The order, then, involved not
merely a question of practice or procedure, but the jurisdic
tion of the court to hear the case on the merits.
It is to be
distinguished in this respect from an order denying a motion
for judgment on the pleadings, or to set aside the complaint
because it does not comply with the summons, or to dismiss an
appeal, or to dismiss the action.
McMahon '0. Davidson, 12
Minn. 357° (Gil. 232) ; Board v. Young, 21 Minn. 335;

is

it

"

*

6140, subsec.

3.

§

*

;1°

Pillsbury '0. Foley, 61
Rabitte 12. Nathan, 22 Minn. 266
Minn. 434, 63 N. W. 1027.
It is not appealable unless
one “involving the
merits of the action or some part thereof.”
Gen. St. 1894,

& is

a

6

a

;

2

it

An order involves the merits of the action, or some part
thereof, within the meaning of this statute, when and only
when
determines the strict legal rights of the parties, as
contradistinguished from those mere questions of practice
which every court regulates for itself, and from all matters
which depend upon the discretion or favor of the court.
Minn. 118 (Gil. 95) Piper '0. Johnston,
Chouteau v. Parker,
stipula
12 Minn. 60 (Gil. 27). Thus, an order setting aside
tion settling the issues to be tried, also one setting aside a
stipulation to dismiss an action, have been held to be appeal
able because they deprived the parties of positive legal rights.
Bingham 12. Winona Co.,
Minn. 136 (Gil. 82); Rogers 'v.
Now, an order which
Greenwood, 14 Minn. 333 (Gil. 256).
defendant, appearing specially for that
denies the motion of
purpose, to set aside the service of the summons upon him, if
his contention be correct, determines his positive legal rights,
and compels him to take upon himself the burden of defend
ing the action on the merits when the court has no jurisdic
tion over him. This court has repeatedly assumed, and able
appealable. Columbia,
counsel conceded, that such an order
Dredge Co., 60 Minn.
Placer Co. 12. Bncyrus Steam Shovel
142, 62 N. W. 115; Hillary v. Railway Co., 64 Minn. 361. 67
N. W. 80, 32 L. R. A. 448; Bank o. Estenson, 68 Minn. 28, 70
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N. W. 775; Strom 'v. Railway Co., 81 Minn. 346, 84 N. W. 46.
We hold that the order is appealable."
9In McMahon v. Davidson, (1867) 12 Minn. 357, the rjipeal was from
an order denying a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the appellant
claiming that it was an order “involving the merits of the action or
some part thereof.”
The court said:—“An order from which an appeal
lies under this clause of the statute, must be decisive of the question
involved, or of some strictly legal right of the party appealing; an order
which leaves the point still pending before the court, and undetermined,
cannot be said to involve the merits, or affect a substantial right. The
motion in this case was made on the ground that the complaint did not
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and the refusal to
allow the motion did not determine the sufficiency oi‘. the pleading, or
prejudice the defendant's right to raise the question at a subsequent
*
‘ The order in which such question
"‘
stage of the proceedings.
shall be presented is ordinarily a matter of discretion with the court
below, and therefore not subject to review here."
1° In Rabitte v. Nathan, (1875) 22 Minn. 266, the appeal was from an
order denying a motion to dismiss an appeal from the probate court.
“The effect of the order appealed from was merely to
The court said:
retain the cause in the district court for trial and determination. ‘ * "
The order did not involve any part of the merits of the action."
ll Statutes are common which allow the review of an intermediate order
involving the nzcrils and necessarily aﬂecting the judgment.
See Arkan
California, Code Civ. Pro. § 956; Idaho, C. S.
sas. Dig. 1921, § 2129;
1919, § 7170; Iowa, Code 1919, § 8481; Kansas, Code 1909, 5 6160; Minne
sota, R. L. 1905, 5 4365; North Carolina, Con. St. 1919, § 640; North
Dakota, R. C. 1905, § 7226; Oklahoma, R. L. 1910, § 5236.
“The term ‘merits’ as used by the profession, when applied to actions,
usually denotes the subject or ground of an action as stated in the
complaint, or the grounds of defense as stated in the answer; and the
trial of the merits of an action generally means the elicitation of evi
dence in support of the averments of fact set out in the pleadings.
But
the courts, in construing statutes governing appeals from interlocutory
orders, have frequently enlarged this meaning and have held that the
phrase ‘involves the merits’ must be so interpreted as to embrace orders
which pass upon the substantial legal rights of the suitor, whether such
rights do or do not relate directly to the cause of action or subject
matter in controversy."—Bolton v. Donavan, (1900) 9 N. D. 575.
In St. John v. West, (1850) 4 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 329, the court held
that the term merits applies to strict legal rights as distinguished from
those mere questions of practice which every court regulates for itself.
In Peter Schoenhofen Brewing Co. v. Giffey, (1913) 162 Ia. 204, the
court laid down the following test of an intermediate order involving
the merits:—"If the question is or will be inherent in the ﬁnal judg
ment and may be presented on appeal from that judgment, it must be
treated as an interlocutory order review of which may only be had
upon the general appeal, excepting in such instances, as to pleading,
where appeal is expressly allowed; but if the ruling is of such a nature
and affects rights in such a manner that they cannot be protected or
affected by the final judgment, then appeal will lie." But a qualiﬁcation
was added in Northwestern Trading Co. v. Insurance Co., (1917) 180
Ia. 878, where the court said that waiver by proceeding to ﬁnal judg
ment was not enough to mark an order a.s appealable, adding, “There
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in addition to indicate that something substantial
of the waiver."
Statutes allowing appeals from interlocutory orders are to be strictly
construed.—Nisius v. Chapman, (1912) 178 Ind. 494.
In Lynch v. Spartan Mills, (1902) 66 S. C. 12. the appeal was from
an order requiring the plaintiff to make his complaint more deﬁnite and
The
certain by alleging what acts were negligent and what acts wilful.
court said:
“The word ‘merits’ naturally bears the sense of including
all that the party may claim of right in reference to his case. ' ' '
The order deprived the plaintiff of the [statutory] right to jumble in
one statement all acts of negligence or other wrongs; and its practical
effect was to compel the plaintiff to formulate his allegations so as to
set out two or more causes of action.
It was, therefore, appeaiabie."
The same court holds that the refusal to require two causes of action
to be separately stated and numbered involves the merits and is ap
pealable.——Matheson v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., (1923) -— S. C. —, 118 So.

must

will

be

something

be lost because

617.

PEOPLE

v.

NEW YORK CENTRAL RAILROAD C0.

Court of Appeals of New York.
29

New York,

1864.

1,18.

[Appeal from an order making an extra allowance of costs

against the plaintiff]
DENIO, Ch. J. " " " The question,
therefore,
is,
whether an order for an extra allowance made by a single
judge before judgment, is the subject of an appeal to the
general term. By the section of the code, providing for ap
peals from orders of a single judge to the general term (sec.
349), one of the cases in which an appeal lies is where the
order involves the merits of the action, or some parts thereof,
or aﬁects a substantial right. It may, perhaps, be doubted
whether a question respecting the costs can be said to in
volve the merits of the action; but I think this order affects
In
a substantial right, within the meaning of the section.
construing the section we see in the ﬁrst place that it con
cedes that there are some orders of a special term which are
not the subjects of an appeal to the general term, and that
such as affect a substantial right are not within that cate
In a general way it may be said that every order
gory.
which may be made in a cause affects the rights of the
What, then, is meant
parties in some appreciable manner.
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by the term substantial right?
In my opinion it is distin
guished from a formal right. Suitors have a certain right
to require the observance of all the terms of legal procedure;
but inasmuch as it would be productive of inﬁnite delay and
expense if every decision upon a matter of practice was sub
ject to be examined on appeal, the legislature wisely deter
mined that the litigation upon such points, which were gen
erally of minor importance, should be limited to the court or
judge who ﬁrst made the order. Parties frequently commit
laches in the proceedings in an action, and are obliged to
apply to the court for relief, or to be let in to answer or the
like, and proceedings are frequently set aside for irregular
ity, upon or without terms; and the cause proceeds; and it
may be eventually determined in favor of the party who was
These orders, or some of them, are
beaten on the motion.
only important in respect to the manner in which the case is
eventually to be tried on the merits.
Without now undertak
ing further to classify them, it is suﬁicient to say that an
order which peremptorily and ﬁnally charges a party with
the payment of a sum of money, great or small, which he
ought not to pay, or with a greater amount than he ought
to pay, affects his rights, not in a matter of form but in
substance; and such was the nature of the order in this case.
It was, therefore, examinable at the general term, and it
was error in the general term to refuse to take cognizance of
Y
and to examine it on the merits, on the plaintiff s appeal.

i
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18 Many statutes allow an appeal from any order aﬂecttng a substantial
right which determines the action and prevents judgment from which
an appeal might be taken:-—See Arizona, R. S. 1913, § 1227; Arkansas,
Dig. 1921, § 2129; Iowa, Code 1919, § 8481; Minnesota, R. L. 1905, 5 4365;
Nebraska, C. S. 1911, § 7154; New York, Civ. Prac. Act 1920, 5 609;
North Carolina, Con. St. 1919, 5 638; North Dakota, R. C. 1905, § 7225;
Ohio, Gen. Code, § 12258; Oregon, L. 1920, § 548; South Carolina, Code
C. Pro. 1902, § 11; South Dakota, R. C. 1919, § 3168; Washington, R. &
B.‘s Code, § 1716; Wyoming, C. S. 1920, § 6369; Wisconsin, St. 1919,
§ 3069.

And

of statutes provide for the review of an order aﬂecting
right made in a special proceeding:
See Arizona, R. S.
Arkansas, Dig. 1921, § 2129; Iowa, Code 1919, § 8481;
R. L. 1905, 5 4365; Oklahoma, R. L. 1910, 5 5237; Wisconsin,

a number

a substantial
1913, 5 1227;

Minnesota,
St. 1919, § 3069.
“It is claimed that a substantial right, within the meaning of the
Code, is an absolute right, and that a matter which is discretionary is
not a substantial right, and hence not appealable to the General Term.
There are judicial expressions made during the earlier period of the Code

I
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which favor this view, but it is an erroneous construction, and it has
been settled that the General Term may review orders that affect sub
stantial rights, although discretlonary."—Ma.rtln v. Windsor Hotel Co.,
(1877) 70 N. Y. 101.

ALLARD

~

Supreme

v.

SMITH.

Court of Wisconsin.
97 Wisconsin,

A judgment

1897.

534.

was rendered in a justice’s court against the
appellant.
He at once, on the 15th day of January, 1897,
presented to the justice a notice of appeal, with the proper
affidavit, and tendered him $7.50 as and for the sum required
to be paid to the justice upon taking an appeal. The justice
told him the sum was too small, and refused to receive it,
but claimed that $9.50 was the proper sum. The appellant
made no further tender, and the justice declared that he
would not make a return. The appellant at once applied
to the appellate court for an order to compel the justice to
The application was denied on February
make a return.
13, 1897, and the appellant appeals.
*
*
"‘
.
NEWMAN, J.
Whether the order is appealable depends upon whether it
is “an order affecting a substantial right, made in an action,
where such order, in effect, determines the action and pre
vents a judgment, from which an appeal might be taken.”
Laws 1895, c. 212, § 1, subd. 1. That the order affects a
substantial right is clear.
The right of appeal is an im
portant and valuable right. It is favored by the courts. The
purpose of the appeal is frustrated entirely by the want of a
return. The order was made in the action. The perfecting
of the appeal alone brought the action within the power of
the appellate court. For some purposes it was pending there.
It could not be tried there, in the absence of a return. But
the appellate court had power to compel a return (Rev. St.
Bruins 'v. Downey, 45
§ 3763) or to dismiss the appeal.
Wis. 496. The action was, potentially, in that court, where
all proceedings necessary to make the appeal effectual were
The order practically prevents a judgment from which
due.
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an appeal might be taken. The respondent might move the
dismissal of the appeal, and so afford room for the entry
of a judgment dismissing the appeal. But it is at his option
On the other hand, if the defendant
whether he does so.
moves to dismiss his own appeal, it is a judgment by consent.
From such a judgment no appeal lies. Hughes 1:. Feeter, 23
Iowa, 547; Imley 12. Beard, 6 Cal. 666; Sleeper '0. Kelly, 22
Cal. 456; Atkinson "v. Manks, 1 Cow. 691; Treat 'v. Hiles, 75
Wis. 265, 44 N. W. 1088. So the order practically prevents
a judgment from which an appeal might be taken, and is
appealable.
¥

l

8

O

YOUNG
Supreme

v.

i

8

1

Q

1

I

SHALLENBERGER.

Court of Ohio.

1895.

53 Ohio State, 291.

WILLIAMS, . * ' *
A ﬁnal order to which error will lie is deﬁned by the Code
to be “an order affecting a substantial right in an action,
when such order in effect determines the action and prevents
a judgment, and an order affecting a substantial right made
in a special proceeding, or upon a summary application in an
action after judgment.” Rev. St. § 6707. It is clear that the
overruling of the motion of plaintiff in error for a new trial
was not an order made in a special proceeding, or upon a
summary application after judgment.
It was made in a civil
action, as contradistinguished
from special proceedings, and
in the ordinary course of procedure in such actions. Nor is it
an order in an action which both affects a substantial right,
and, in effect, determines the action, and prevents judgment,
within the meaning of the section of the Code alluded to. The
action ends with the judgment; and the motion, which is an
application to the court to reconsider its judgment, and for a
retrial, is usually, though not always, essential to the proper
preservation and presentation of the errors preceding the
judgment, when relied on to obtain a reversal of it. Error

J
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lies to the judgment, but not to the decision of the motion
though that decision may be made a ground for the reversal
It has long been settled in this state that
of the judgment.
“an order of the court granting or overruling a motion to set
aside the verdict of a jury and grant a new trial is not a ﬁnal
judgment or order, for the reversal of which error can be
prosecuted before the ﬁnal disposition of the case.” Conord
v. Runnels, 23 Ohio St. 601.
Such a motion, it is held in that
case, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
granted, it does not determine the action, but merely compels
the parties to retry their case before the same tribunal; and,
if overruled, it simply permits the determination of the action
already reached to stand. It may be said that sustaining the
motion has the effect of preventing a judgment in favor of
the successful party at the trial, and affects a substantial
right of his by subjecting him to the costs and uncertainties
of another trial, and it undoubtedly does temporarily prevent
ﬁnal judgment, but not eventually; and the costs and uncer
tainties of another trial is the result of some error which the
court, in the exercise of its discretion, deems sufficient to war
rant it. And so, if the motion be overruled, the unsuccessful
party must incur the expense of a proceeding in error, if he is
dissatisﬁed with the result; but neither the overruling nor
sustaining of the motion is, within the meaning of the Code,
such ﬁnal order as may itself be the foundation of a proceed

If

ing in error.
1

QR

i i

C

¥

i

Q

ll
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18 Statutes
sometimes expressly allow appeals from orders granting
new trials,——Missouri, Ann. St., 1906, § 806; Montana, R. C. 1921, § 9731;
Oregon, L. 1920, § 548; Washington, R. & B.'s Codes, § 1716(6); West
Virginia, Code 1909, § 4038; Wisconsin, St. 1919, § 3069; or from orders
either granting or refusing new tria.ls,—Alabama, Civ. Code 1907, § 2846;
California, Code Civ. Pro. § 963; Iowa, Code 1919, § 8481; Kansas, Code
R. L. 1905, § 4365; New York, Civ. Prac. Act
1909, § 6160; Minnesota,
1920, § 609; North Carolina, Con. St. 1919, § 638; Oklahoma, R. L. 1910,
South Carolina, Code Civ. Pro. 1902, 5 11; South Dakota, R. C.
§ 5236;

1919, § 3168.

-
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WHITCOMB.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
Wisconsin,

111,

WINsLow,

J.
#

*
#

*
Q

*

i

Q

1

1902.

99.

I

1

$
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But it is objected by the respondent that the order strik
ing a case from the calendar is not an appealable order, be
cause it does not, in effect, determine the action, or prevent
judgment from which an appeal might be taken. Certainly,
an order striking a cause from the calendar because of in
sufficient notice or other irregularity not affecting the ques
tion of the pendency of the action is not appealable because

it affects procedure alone, and merely postpones the trial to
a futuretime; but when such an order is based upon the
ground that no such action is pending in the court it is mani
fest that a different question is presented. Such an order is,
in effect, a ruling that -the court has no jurisdiction, and
hence that it can never be brought to trial or judgment in
that court. Thus, in Cooper 21. Village of Waterloo, 88 Wis.
433, 60 N. W. 714, which was an action against a village for
personal injuries suffered by reason of a defective sidewalk,
an order was made striking the case from the calendar be
cause a third person, alleged to be primarily liable for the
defect, had not been joined as a defendant.
Upon appeal
this order was held to be appealable, because it affected a
substantial right, and in effect determined the action, and
prevented a judgment from which an appeal might have been
taken.
That case cannot be distinguished in principle from
In the present case it appears from the
the present case.
action
is still pending in the state court,
record that the
that removal to the United States court has been denied, and
there is nothing to show that the United States court has
Hence, so
assumed jurisdiction notwithstanding the denial.
concerned,
the state court con
far as the record before us is
clusively appears to be the proper court in which the case
is to be tried; but that court has refused to try it, and has
stricken it from the calendar, upon a ground which will
prevent its trial for all time in the future, and hence render
any judgment in the action impossible.
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Order reversed, and action remanded for further proceed
ings according to law.“
14 An order striking
an amend-ant which adds a new party and sets
out grounds of attachment against him, is an order preventing a judg
ment as to such party and therefore appealable.—Kay & Stevens v.
Pruden, (1897) 101 Ia. 60.

SUMNER IRON WORKS
Supreme

WOLTEN.

Court of Washington.
61

J

v.

Washington,

1911.

689.

MORRIS, . On February 10, 1909, the Sumner Iron Works
sold to the S. D. Lumber Company, under a conditional bill
The bill of sale contained
of sale, certain mill machinery.
remain in the Sumner
title
should
provision
that
the usual
Iron Works until the property was wholly paid for, and
that it should have the right to the possession of the property
upon default in the payments, retaining the amount paid as
"‘
"‘
the rental use and value of the property. *
On July 28, 1909, the lumber company upon petition of
and respondent appointed
. W. Stout was declared insolvent,
its receiver. He duly qualiﬁed as such, and took possession
of all the property of the lumber company, including the
machinery covered by the conditional bill of sale.
There
after the appellant ﬁled a claim in the receivership case, in
which it set forth the terms of the sale of the machinery to
the lumber company, and the default in the payments as
provided for in the contract, asserted its right to the pos
session of the machinery under the terms of the contract,
and asked that it be permitted to remove it, or that it be
The re
secured in the payment of the amount then due.
*
*
"‘
ceiver made a motion to strike this claim.
This
motion was granted, and appellant’s claim dismissed, and it
brings this appeal.
Respondent moves to dismiss the appeal upon the ground
that the order granting his motion and dismissing appel
In support of this
lant’s claim is not an appealable order.
Contention respondent argues that the court below treated
his motion as a demurrer, and that an order sustaining a de

J
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It is true we have so held and
murrer is not appealable.
is
plaintiff
such
still the rule. A
to whose complaint a de
murrer has been sustained may plead over, or he may elect
to stand on his plea, and appeal from the subsequent order
of dismissal, should such an order be entered. This is, in
effect, the situation here.
Appellant could not amend its
claim. It had stated the whole situation upon which it based
its claim to retake the machinery, and when the court held
as a matter of law that it had no right to retake the ma
chinery, but must submit its claim as an ordinary creditor
for the amount claimed to be due, and take its chances upon
a distribution, it was in effect a ﬁnal order, depriving it of
the right to recover the possession of the machinery, and
in effect determining the proceedings, so far as appellant
sought to enforce its rights under the conditional bill of sale.
It could hardly be said that such an order did not affect a
substantial right of appellant to have its interest in the ma
chinery determined in the receivership case upon its plea of
Rem. & Bal. Code, § 1716, provides for
title and ownership.
an appeal “(6) from any order affecting a substantial right
in a civil action or proceeding, which ( 1) in effect determines
the action or proceeding and prevents a ﬁnal judgment
therein; or (2) discontinues the action.”
We believe the
dismissing
appellant’s
claim
was
such
order
an order and
The motion to dismiss is therefore denied.
appealable.
O

i~

l I i i
TATUM

U

v.

U

Q

Q

8

GEIST.

Supreme Court of Washington.
40 Washington,

1905.

5’/"5.

Action by H. L. Tatum and another, doing business as
Tatum & Bowen, against W. A. Geist and others; the Niagara
Fire Insurance Company and another being garnishees. From
an order vacating a judgment against the garnishees, and
quashing the service of the writ of garnishment, plaintiffs
appeal.

On motion to dismiss the appeal.

RUDKIN,

J.

"

“

'

Denied.
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The statute provides that an appeal lies to this court from
any order affecting a substantial right in a civil action or
proceeding, which either in effect determines the action or
proceeding and prevents a ﬁnal judgment therein or discon
tinues the action, and from a ﬁnal order made after judg
Ballinger’s Ann.
ment which affects a substantial right.
Codes & St. § 6500.
The right to appeal from an order vacating a judgment
has been the subject of more or less controversy ever since
*
*
"
the organization of this court.
The rule deducible from these decisions is this: If an
order vacating a judgment or quashing a summons or the
service thereof is or may be followed by further proceedings
in the cause and the entry of a ﬁnal judgment therein, such
order may be reviewed on appeal from the ﬁnal judgment,
If, on the contrary, the order
and is not itself appealable.
vacating the judgment or quashing the summons or the serv
ice thereof in effect determimes the action or proceeding and
prevents a ﬁnal judgment therein, the order itself is a ﬁnal
Within this rule an order
one, and is therefore appealable.
vacating a judgment in a garnishment proceeding, which
does not determine the proceeding and prevent a ﬁnal judg
ment therein, is not appealable.
What is the effect of quashing the service of a writ of
garnishment? A decision of this question involves a brief
consideration of the purpose of the garnishment and the
Section 5393, Ballinger’s
effect of the service of the writ.
St.,
provides’ that the writ shall command the
Ann. Codes &
garnishee to appear and answer under oath “what, if any
thing, he is indebted to the defendant, or was when such writ
was served, and what property or effects, if any, of the de
fendant he has in his possession or under his control, or had
Section 5395 prescribes the
when such writ was served.”
Sec
form of the writ in substantially the same language.
shall
lawful
gar
that
it
not
be
for
provides
the
5398
tion
nishee to pay to the defendant any debt, or to deliver to him
any effects, after the service of the writ. Section 5401 pro
vides that, in case the garnishee makes default, it shall be
lawful for the court to render judgment against him for the
full amount claimed by the plaintiff against the defendant,
or, in case the plaintiff has a judgment against the defend
ant, for the full amount of such judgment, with all accruing
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interests and costs. Section 5402 provides that if it appears,
from the answer of the garnishee or otherwise, that the gar
nishee is indebted to the defendant, or was so indebted when
the writ was served, judgment shall be entered in favor of
the plaintiff and against the garnishee for the amount of
such indebtedness.
It will thus be seen that the garnishment only affects the
indebtedness due from the garnishee to the defendant at the
time of the service of the writ, or at any time thereafter
until ﬁnal judgment in the garnishment proceeding, or ef
fects in the hands of the garnishee belonging to the defend
ant between said dates. An order quashing the service of
the writ of garnishment, not only releases all such indebted
ness and effects, but in effect determines that particular pro
ceeding and prevents a ﬁnal judgment or any judgment what
If we concede that a second writ may issue on
ever therein.
the same affidavit, yet the second writ will only have the
same operation as the ﬁrst, viz., to bring within the juris
diction of the court indebtedness due from the garnishee to
the defendant or effects in the hands of the garnishee be
longing to the defendant at the time of the service of the
second writ, or thereafter until ﬁnal judgment on the second
writ. In other words, the proceedings under the second writ
are to all intents and purposes independent of the proceed
ings under the ﬁrst. There is a different subject matter and
different issues. True, the judgment on the ﬁrst writ would
be res adjudioata as to all issues there determined, but it
would have no other or further effect. We are therefore of
opinion that an order quashing the service of a writ of gar
nishment is in effect a ﬁnal determination of that proceed
ing, and prevents a ﬁnal judgment therein.
Such an order
is appealable, and, being a ﬁnal order, the appeal in this
case was taken within the time limited by law.
#15

§

3

a

15 An order vacating a judgment
is not appealable under such statutes
because "such order may be reviewed on appeal from the ﬁnal judgment,
and thus avoid the probable necessity of more than one appeal in the
same action.—State ex rel. v. Superior Court, (1903) 31 Wash. 53. This
is the general rule, and the same is true of an order refusing to vacate
judgment.
C. J.
355.
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BAILEY

v.

TAAFFE.

Supreme Court of California.
29

[ClIap. 4

1866.

California, 422.

SANDERSON, J.:
This is an appeal from an order setting
" "
"
aside a judgment by default.
It is true, as claimed by the learned counsel for the re
spondents, that orders like the present, in legal parlance,
rest very much in the discretion of the Court below, and
will not be disturbed by this Court unless we are satisﬁed
that the order is so plainly erroneous as to amount to an abuse
18
of discretion.
Cal. 455;
(Rowland v. Kreyenhagen,
Ha-ight 'v. Green, 19 Cal. 113; Mulholland '0. Heynema-n, 19
Cal. 605; Barrett 'v. Graham, 19 Cal. 682; Woodward v.
Backus, 20 Cal. 137; People '0. O'Connell, 23 Cal. 281; Howe
G. and S. M. Co., ante, 72.)
'0. Independence Consolidated
The discretion intended, however, is not a capricious or
arbitrary discretion, but an impartial discretion, guided and
controlled in its exercise by ﬁxed legal principles. It is not
a mental discretion, to be exercised ea: g~ratia., but a legal
discretion, to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of
the law, and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or
In a plain case, this
defeat the ends of substantial justice.
discretion has no oflice to perform, and its exercise is lim
ited to doubtful cases, where an impartial mind hesitates.
If it be doubted whether the excuse offered is sufficient or
not, or whether the defense set up is with or without merit
in foro legis, when examined under those rules of law by
which Judges are guided to a conclusion, the judgment of
If, on the contrary,
the Court below will not be disturbed.
we are satisﬁed beyond a reasonable doubt that the Court
below has come to an erroneous conclusion. the party com
plaining of the error is as much entitled to a reversal in a
case like the present as in any other.“
16 Discretionary orders are very numerous
and of great variety, such
as allowing or disallowing amendments to pleadings, granting. modify
ing or dissolving injunctions, appointing and removing receivers, grant
ing change of venue, allowing or refusing continuances, extending time
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for various proceedings, passing upon the qualiﬁcations of jurors. ad
mitting cumulative evidence, determining the order of proof, reopening
of wit
the case for further proof, extent and manner of examinations
nesses, granting a view by the jury, dismissal, non-suit and directing
a verdict, granting orrefusing a new trial based on questions ot fact
arising during or after the trial, vacating judgments, setting aside de
faults, etc. See a vast number of cases cited under these and similar
heads in 4 C. J. 796-843.

\

.~

SECTION 4.

EFFECT or Aoannmnnrs.

TOWNSEND v. THE MASTERSON, ETC., STONE DRESS
ING CO.
Court of Appeals of New York.
15

1857.

New York, 587.

Motion by the defendants to dismiss an appeal taken by
the plaintiff, on the ground that the parties had, interme
diate the judgment of the special term and the hearing of an
appeal at the general term, stipulated that no appeal should
The action was brought in the
be taken to this court.
Superior Court, among other things to compel the defendant,
Abernethy, who, as a trustee for the defendant, The Master
son Company, held a mortgage for a large amount which
the plaintiff had executed, to cancel'that mortgage, on the

The mortgage was given
ground that it had been satisﬁed.
part of the defendant,
performance,
on
the
secure
the
to
of certain engagements for furnishing dressed stone for the
plaintiff.
The defendant set up, by way of counterclaim,
that the plaintiff was indebted to it on account of the trans
action referred to, and that the mortgage was a security in
its hands for that indebtedness. The case was tried before
a referee, who reported, June 2, 1856, that there was due the
defendant, The Masterson Company, $3,647.20, and that on
payment of that amount, and not otherwise, the plaintiff was
Judgment was
entitled to a cancellation of the mortgage.
report
with
the
at the special term,
entered in accordance
both parties having excepted to certain decisions made
against them. On the 25th of June, 1856, the attorneys for
both parties signed a stipulation, allowing twenty days to
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the parties to prepare and serve a case and that The Master
son Company might use the plaintiff's case to insert their
exceptions.
On the 21st of July, 1856, the attorneys for the
respective parties signed the stipulation upon which the pres
ent motion is based, which, after giving the title of the action
in the Superior Court, is in the following words:
“It is
hereby mutually stipulated that the appeal in this cause from
the referee's report be brought to a hearing before the gen
eral term of this court as soon as practicable, and that no
appeal shall be taken from the decision of the general term
to the Court of Appeals.
It is further stipulated that this
case shall be settled according to the decision of the general
July 21, 1856.” The
term of this court, under its directions.
plaintiff, in his affidavit, read upon the motion, admitted that
the stipulation was signed on his behalf by his direction.
The plaintiff's notice of appeal to the general term was given
on the 6th and the defendant’s on the 8th of August, 1856.
On the hearing at the general term the stipulation was read
to the court by the defendant’s counsel, and after the de
cision of the general term, the court, on the motion of the
defendant’s counsel, made an order that said stipulation
should be incorporated into the judgment roll. By the judg
ment of the general term, upon the appeal, that part of the
judgment entered upon the referee's report, by which the
amount mentioned was found due to the defendant, was af
ﬁrmed; and it was ordered that the defendant recover that
sum against the plaintiff, with costs; but the general term
held that only the sum of $35.84 was secured by the mort
gage, and the judgment directed that it should be canceled
on the payment of that sum, with costs. It was shown upon
this motion that the mortgage had been cancelled pursuant to
the judgment.
DENIO, C. J. The suggestion made on the argument by
the plaintiff’s counsel, that the stipulation had relation only
to the appeal on his part, seems not to be well founded. When
the stipulation was signed, neither party had served any
notice of appeal to the general term. Both parties had, how
ever, taken exceptions to decisions of the referee, and it is
clear from the stipulation in regard to time for making a
case, and from the terms of the other stipulation upon which
the motion is founded, that both parties contemplated ap
That stipulation was mutual,
pealing to the general term.
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therefore, in its terms and effect. Both parties concurred
that they had reason for complaining of the report of the
referee, and they deliberately agreed that each should be
content with what the general term should decide, and that
they would not protract the litigation by an appeal to this
court.
It is insisted by the defendants’ counsel that the juris
diction of this court is limited to hearing appeals upon their
merits, and that it cannot enforce stipulations made by the
parties in the subordinate courts. But certainly, the duty of
hearing appeals involves the jurisdiction of determining
whether a particular case is properly before us on appeal.
It is perfectly competent for the parties to determine in the
preliminary steps of the litigation, whether they will place
the question in dispute in a condition to be reviewed here.
They may omit to except to the decision of the court before
whom the primary decision is made, or after excepting they
may waive or abandon the exception absolutely or to a modi
ﬁed extent.
There is no reason, therefore, why they may
not mutually agree that exceptions which have been taken
shall only be effectual to sustain an appeal to the general
term of the same court.
This is what has been done in
effect in this case. We should not regard any less authentic
evidence of such an arrangement than a plain stipulation in
writing; but when we are furnished with such evidence, and
especially where the court from which the appeal is taken
has sanctioned the agreement by making it a part of the
record, we ought to enforce it by refusing to pass upon the
questions which have thus formally been waived.
The appeal must be dismissed with costs, to be paid by
the appellant.

CHAPIN
Supreme

v.

PERRIN.

Court of Michigan.
46

1881.

Michigan, 130.

J

COOLEY,
.
This is an appeal in chancery.
ord it appears that the appeal is taken from

a,

From the rec
decree entered
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in pursuance of the following stipulation which is signed by

the ‘solicitors:
“It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and be
tween the solicitors in above entitled cause: 1st. That as the
jurisdiction of this court is in doubt, and for the purpose of
settling said jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, the demurrer
of defendant Andrew Perrin to the bill of complaint may be
sustained by the court, and the bill dismissed without preju
dice and without costs of any kind to either party; and said
complainant agrees to appeal said suit for the purpose above
set forth, and upon the conditions hereinafter stated. * " “'
Appeals bring up for review some action of the court below
which is complained of as erroneous. In this case there has
The chancery court has performed no
been no such action.
judicial act whatever, except what is implied in permitting a.
consent order to be entered. But neither party can complain
of a consent order, for the error in it, if there is any, is their
own, and not the error of the court.
It follows that there is
nothing to appeal from, and the case must be dismissed and
the record remanded.

Zia

POWELL
Supreme

v.

TURNER.

Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
139 Massachusetts,

J

1885.

97.

This being a scire faeias against a trustee,
the Superior Court had authority to enter, as it did, a judg
ment for costs in favor of the plaintiﬂ’, if the case was prop
erly pending in that court. Pub. Sts. c. 183, §§ 81-83.
The case was begun in the Municipal Court of the city of
Boston; in that court an agreement, signed by the parties,
that the case might be discontinued without costs to the plain
tiff, was ﬁled, and thereupon a judgment was entered that
the case was “discontinued, without costs to plaintiff, by writ
ten agreement.”
Within the time prescribed by statute, the
plaintiff claimed an appeal. She presented to the judge of
the Municipal Court a paper repudiating the agreement, on
the ground that it was obtained by fraud, and claimed an
appeal. The judge permitted this paper to be ﬁled as of a
MORTON,
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time prior to the entry of the judgment of discontinuance,
and allowed her appeal. A proper bond to prosecute the ap
peal was ﬁled, and the case was duly entered in the Superior
Court, and there fully heard upon the merits, without objec
tion by the defendant.
By our statutes, any party aggrieved by a judgment of the
Municipal Court of Boston has the right to appeal to the
Superior Court. If a judgment is rendered against a party
by his consent, he cannot be said to be aggrieved.
Volenti
injuria.
consent,
non ﬁt
But if rendered without his
he has
the right of appeal.
If the Municipal Court had entered a
judgment of discontinuance upon the faith of a forged agree
ment, there is no doubt that the plaintiff could appeal.
If the agreement upon which the court acted was obtained
by fraud practiced on the plaintiff, she had the right, upon
discovery of the fraud, to treat‘ the agreement as void ab
initio. If she had discovered the fraud before the adjourn
ment without day of that court, she could have repudiated the
agreement, and insisted upon a trial of its validity in that
court, with the right of appeal if the decision was adverse to
Having discovered it after the adjournment of the
her.
court, but before the time limiting her right of appeal had
expired, we see no objection to allowing her appeal.
Until
that time expires, the case is pending, and has not passed to
a ﬁnal judgment which excludes further consideration of it.
An appeal is her only adequate remedy, and there is no hard
ship on the defendant, for the whole case goes to the Superior
Court, and he can there try the question of the validity of
the agreement, if he desires to do so.
We are of opinion that, under the circumstances of this
case, the plaintiff had the right of appeal, and that the Su
perior Court had jurisdiction of the case.

Judgment afﬁrmed."
11

of errors has always been recognized
Fosdick, (1889) 134 U. S. 500.
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or RIGHT T0 REVIEW.

MARLEY.

Court of Oregon.

1909.

53 Oregon, 591.

This suit was brought by Carrie M. Elwert against P. H.
Marley, H. E. Noble, and J. Olsen to restrain them from in

terfering with, or making use of, certain alleged wharfage
rights on the Willamette river, alleged to be appurtenant to
and abutting upon lot 5, block 2, East Portland, Multnomah
county, and to belong to the plaintiff as owner of said lot, and
to adjudicate and determine any claim of title thereto asserted
by the defendants adversely to plaintiff's alleged rights.

I

$

i

SLATER, C.
1.
Plaintiff moves to dismiss the appeal on the ground
that, subsequent to the rendition of the decree, and before the
appeal, Olsen took from M. W. Parelius, who is plaintiff's
grantee, a lease of the premises in dispute, thereby recogniz
ing and acknowledging the validity of the decree, and estop
ping himself from further contesting the title and right to
the enjoyment of the premises by plaintiff and those in priv
ity with her. It appears from the aﬂidavits of Parelius in
support of the motion, and from Olsen’s in answer thereto
and the former’s reply, that on August 21, 1906, which was
after the cause had been submitted, Parelius received from
plaintiff a conveyance of lot 5 and the wharfage rights
claimed to be appurtenant thereto, in pursuance of a contract
of purchase entered into between them prior to the origin of
the suit; that the deed was recorded, of which Olsen had
knowledge; that on April 26, 1907, and after the entry of
decree, Olsen entered into a written contract of lease with
Parelius respecting the property rights in dispute. The con
tract is mutual in its covenants, and was executed by both
parties under seal. By its terms Parelius, for the considera
tion of $2 per month, to be paid by Olsen, leased to the latter
the right and privilege of mooring and keeping for two
months a certain scow or houseboat owned by him upon cer
tain premises, described as being “between ordinary high
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water mark in the Willamette river and the, established har
bor line of said river and abutting upon lot 5 in block 2 in
East Portland,” etc., being the identical property and rights
in litigation herein.
In consideration of the lease Olsen
therein agreed to pay the monthly rent in advance, beginning
on May 1, 1907, and that at “the expiration of said term he
will quit, vacate, and surrender up said premises to Parelius.”
It is stated in the latter’s aﬂidavit that one month’s rent was
paid. This is denied by Olsen; -but it appears to be uncontro
verted by him that he continued in the possession of the leased
premises, and has never at any time offered to surrender them
to Parelius.
A party to an action may, by his acts subsequent to a judg
ment or order against him, waive his right to have such right
or order reviewed by an appellate court, as by acquiescing
therein by payment or part payment, or by accepting the
beneﬁts thereof. Moore v. Floyd, 4 Or. 260; Portland Const.
C0. 1:. O'Neil, 24 Or. 54, 32 Pac. 764.
2.
In Ehrman v. Astoria Ry. Co., 26 Or. 377, 38 Pac. 306,
it was held that the right to appeal from a decree refusing to
foreclose a mechanic’s lien is waived by bringing an attach
ment action after the entry of the decree, when the right of
attachment is conditioned upon the fact that the claim is not
secured by any lien or mortgage. Kansas City, etc., Ry. Co. 'u.
Murray, 57 Kan. 697, 47 Pac. 835; Fidelity & Deposit C0. 1;.
Kepley, 66 Kan. 343, 71 Pac. 818. So any act, on the part of a
defendant, by which he impliedly recognizes the validity of a
judgment against him operates as a waiver of his right of ap
peal therefrom or to bring error to reverse it. 2 Cyc. 656. The
case of Sheldon v. Motter, 59 Kan. 776, 53 Pac. 127, was a
proceeding brought to review an order conﬁrming a sale of
real estate at which the defendant Motter was the purchaser.
Since the petition in error was ﬁled, plaintiff and her hus
band accepted a lease from Motter for the land sold, and at
torned and paid rent for the same. It was held that this was
a recognition of the defendant’s title which was inconsistent
with the prosecution of the writ of error, and the same was
dismissed. Staujffer et al. v. Salimonie Mining & Gas Co., 147
Ind. 71, 46 N. E. 342, " " * Ewing '0. Ewing, 161 Ind. 484,
69 N. E. 156.
C
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It follows that

allowed.

CLEVELAND,

the motion to dismiss

C., C. & ST.

should be

L. RY. CO. v. NOWLIN.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
163
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1904.

Indiana, 497.

MONKS, J.
Appellant commenced this proceeding under
section 5160, Burns’ Ann. St. 1901 (section 3907, Rev. St.
1881, and section 3907, Horner’s Ann. St. 1901), to condemn
real estate owned by appellees for a right of way. After the
appraisers returned their award, appellant ﬁled exceptions to
the award, and thereafter paid to the clerk of the court be.
low the amount of said award, and took possession of said
strip of land described in the instrument of appropriation,
and constructed its railroad thereon. Appellees received said
money from the clerk. and ﬁled no exceptions to the award.
To appellees’ answer averring said facts appellant replied
that it paid said money to said clerk and took possession of
said strip of land without any intention of waiving its right
of appeal or of conﬁrming the amount of said award, but
solely for the purpose of obtaining the right to enter upon
said strip of land and construct its railroad thereon while
awaiting the determination of the amount of damages on ap
peal. The court below held that by the payment of said award
to the clerk appellant was estopped from prosecuting its ex
ceptions to said award, and rendered ﬁnal judgment against
appellant.
The question to be determined in this case is whether, in
the exercise of the power of eminent domain under section
5160 (3907), supra, a railroad company, if it excepts to the
award, pays the amount assessed to the clerk, and takes pos
session for the purpose of constructing its railway, is thereby
estopped from prosecuting its appeal.
Appellees insist (1)
that appellant, having voluntarily paid the amount assessed,
and taken possession of the land and constructed its road
thereon, has accepted the beneﬁt of the award, and cannot
appeal therefrom; * * * (2) that no appeal can be taken
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from a judgment by a party who voluntarily pays the same.
It is provided by section 644, Burns’ Ann. St. 1901 (section
632, Rev. St. 1881, and section 632, Homer's Ann. St. 1901).
that “the party obtaining a judgment shall not take an appeal
This
after receiving any money paid or collected thereon.”
provision applies only to judgments which are made appeal
It is, however, a
able to the Supreme and Appellate Courts.
general rule that a party who accepts the beneﬁt of a judg
ment waives the right to prosecute an appeal from it. Holland
o. Spell, 144 Ind. 561, 564, 42 N. E. 1014, and authorities
cited; Elliott’s Appellate Procedure, §§ 150, 151; Ewbank's
Manual, § 112. This rule was enforced in Baltimore, etc., Co.
'0. Johnson, 84 Ind. 420, in which it was held that, when bene
ﬁts are awarded to a landowner in condemnation proceedings
under section 5160 (3907), supra, an acceptance of the sum
awarded will preclude him from prosecuting an appeal.
It
has been held by this court, however, that payment of a judg
ment by a defendant does not estop him from prosecuting an
"
"
"
appeal from such judgment.
Elliott's Appellate
Procedure, § 152, says:
“It is obvious that there is an es
sential difference between one who pays a judgment against
him and one who accepts payment of a sum awarded by a
judgment.‘ Payment by a party against whom a judgment is
rendered may often be necessary to protect his property from
sacriﬁce, and what a party does to prevent the sacriﬁce of his
property cannot, with any tinge of justice, be held to preclude
him from assailing the judgment.” "‘ " “
In Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v..Brower, 12 Ind. 374, " "' *
the award was paid by the company and was received by the
Thereupon the company appealed, and on motion
landowner.
of the landowner reciting the payment the circuit court dis
This court, in reversing
missed the appeal from the award.
said ruling, said: “It is insisted that, if an appeal is permit
ted in this case, it is at the expense of the twenty-ﬁrst section
of the Bill of Rights of our state Constitution, which pro
vides that no man’s property shall be taken by law, etc., with
out compensation ﬁrst assessed and tendered; that upon such
assessment and payment to the satisfaction of the owner of
the land the applicant is at liberty to enter immediately upon
the land thus condemned; and that the payment of the
amount assessed, followed by the entry upon the land, was
virtual acquiescence in the determination arrived at. We do
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not view it in that light. We think that under the provisions
of the Constitution referred to it was the duty of the appel
lants to tender the amount assessed before the right to enter
could arise. If it was important to the interest of the appel
lants that the entry should be made immediately, before the
appeal from the judgment upon the assessment could be ﬁnal
ly disposed of, we think the party seeking to make the entry
would not be precluded from further litigating the amount of
the damages by making such a tender as would, under the
constitutional provision, authorize him to enter on the lands.
The tender at that stage of the proceedings would have to be
the full amount of the assessment. We do not think the fact
that the defendant accepted the tender changes the rights of
the parties.” It was held in Fort St., etc., v. Peninsular, etc.,
103 Mich. 637, 61 N. W. 1007, that the right of appeal is not
lost to the condemner by paying the award and taking pos
The following au
session of the land pending the appeal.
adopted
by
thorities also sustain the view
this court in Balti
more, etc., R. Co. v. Brower, supra;~Fort St., etc., Co. v.
Backus, 92 Mich. 33, 52 N. W. 790; Oliver v. Union, etc., R.
Co., 83 Ga. 258, 9 S. E. 1086; Matter of N. Y. W. S. & B. R.
Co., 29 Hun, 646; Id., 94 N. Y. 287; St. Louis, etc., C0. v. Ev
ans, 85 Mo. 307; Commonwealth v. Hall, 8 Pick. 440; Peterson
v. Ferreby, 30 Iowa, 327; Chicago, etc., Co. v. Phelps, 125 Ill.
482, 17 N. E. 769; 7 Ency. Pleading and Practice, 632, 633;
2 Lewis on Eminent Domain (2d Ed.) § 556, p. 1226; Mills,

Eminent Domain (2d Ed.) § 139.
#
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evident under the authorities cited that when a rail
road company appeals from the award within the 10 days al
lowed, and pays the award to the clerk for the purpose of en
tering upon the property described in the instrument of ap
propriation, that such a payment is not a voluntary payment
in a legal sense, and the company is not thereby estopped from
prosecuting its appeal.
*1!

Patterson v. Keeney, (1913) 165 Cal. 465; Lott v. Davis.
Nashville, C.
St. L. Ry. Co. v. Bean's Ex'r, (1908)
Piano House v. Pick, (1911) 58 Ore. 54; Chapman
v. Sutton, (1887) as Wis. 657.
Contra, unless the payment is forced by execution,—-Comeaux
v. West,
(1908) 78 Kan. 404; Hintrager v. Mahoney, (1889) 78 Ia. 537; Cowell
Accord.

(1914) 262 Ill. 148;
128 Ky. 758; Eilers

&

18

Sec.

WHAT IS REVIEWABLE

5]

757

(1902) 130 N. C. 80; Rolette County v. Pierce County, (1899)
N. D. 613.
note in 45 Am. St. Rep. 271-274, citing many cases.
See comprehensive
and stating that the weight of authority is with the principal case.
"A party against whom a judgment has been rendered is not prevented
from appealing to this court by the fact that he has paid the judgment,
unless such payment was made by way of compromise, or with an agree
v. Nourse, (1887) 10,7
ment not to take or pursue an appeal."—l-Iayes
N. Y. 577.
v. Gregory,
8

STATE

v.

PRAY.

Supreme Court of Nevada.

1908.

80 Nevada, 206.

J

NORCROSS,
Appellants were convicted in the Second ju
.
dicial district court in and for Churchill county of the crime
of receiving stolen goods, and were each ﬁned $1,000, with the
proviso that in default of payment they be imprisoned at the
rate of one day for each $2 of said ﬁne. From the judgment,
and from an order denying their motion for a new trial, an

appeal is taken.
The state has moved to dismiss the appeal of C. A. Pray
upon the ground that he paid the ﬁne imposed upon him, and
having fully satisﬁed the judgment against him his right of
appeal is lost. This motion is resisted by counsel for appel
lant Pray upon the ground that by payment of the ﬁne im
posed the defendant does not lose his right of appeal, and fur
ther that, when defendant Pray paid his ﬁne, it was under
such circumstances that he reserved such right. We will con
cede, for the purposes of this opinion, that the facts relative
to the payment of this ﬁne are substantially as set forth in a
stipulation entered into between counsel for appellant and the
district attorney of Churchill county and ﬁled in the lower
court four months after the appeal was taken.
Said stipulation reads as follows: “That the record on ap
peal shall and may show "‘ "‘ * That the said defendant,
C. A. Pray, not only paid his said ﬁne, under protest, as above
set forth, but that the said sum so paid is still held by the
clerk of the court pending the outcome and ﬁnal decision of
his said appeal, and that the state of Nevada, so represented

P
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by said district attorney, is entirely willing for said defendant
to have his full rights of appeal in said cause, and for the
said money to be returned to him in case the appeal should be
decided in his favor.”
It is not contended that the arrangements entered into be
tween the clerk and defendant Pray were in pursuance of
any order of court or were authorized by law.
Counsel for
appellant admit that they were irregular.
Q

Q

U

Q

l

Q

#

I I

U

Under the provisions of sections 666, 667, of the Criminal
Practice Act (Comp. Laws, §§ 4631, 4632) it was the impera
tive duty of the clerk within 30 days after the receipt of the
amount of the ﬁne to pay the same over to the county treas
urer. A heavy penalty is imposed for failure so to do. The
full amount of all ﬁnes imposed and collected must be trans
mitted by the county treasurer to the State Treasurer (Comp.
Laws, §§ 1208, 4645), when the same becomes a part of the
state school fund, and may only be paid out upon the warrant
of the State Controller pursuant to law (Comp. Laws,
When a ﬁne is paid in pursuance of a judgment,
§ 1987).
the statute determines what disposition shall be made of it,
and neither the trial court nor this court has power to alter
such disposition, and certainly ministerial officials could not.
The judgment against appellant Pray must be treated as
satisﬁed.

There is a conﬂict among authorities as to whether a volun
tary satisfaction of a judgment waives the right of appeal.
Counsel for the state have cited a number of decisions holding
that it does. It is contended by appellant, however, that the
weight of authority is the other way, and this view is taken
in 2 Cyc. pp. 647-648, where numerous authorities are cited
in the notes. We think it unnecessary to determine between
these conﬂicting positions, for under the view we take this
case falls within that class of cases referred to in Cyc., supra:
“Where an order appealed from is of such a nature that its
execution has left nothing upon which a judgment of reversal
can operate, the appeal will be dismissed, unless such right
Conceding that in this casean at
was specially reserved.”
tempt was made to reserve such right, we have already shown
that such attempted reservation was by acts clearly void.
The Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Mills
'0. Green, 159 U. S. 651, 16 Sup. Ct. 132, 40 L. Ed. 293, said:
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“The duty of this court, as of every other judicial tribunal, is
to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be
carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot ques
tions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or
rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the
case before it. It necessarily follows that when, pending an
appeal from the judgment of a lower court and without any
fault of the defendant, an event occurs which renders it im
possible for this court, if it should decide the case in favor of
the plaintiff, to grant him any effectual relief whatever, the
court will not proceed to a formal judgment, but will dismiss
the appeal. And such a fact, when not appearing on the rec
ord, may be proved by extrinsic evidence." Boolc Co. '0. Kan
sas, 193 U. S. 49, 24 Sup. Ct. 394, 48 L. Ed. 613; School Dis
trict '0. San Diego County, 97 Cal. 438, 32 Pac. 517; Negley v.
Short (City Ct. N. Y.) 7 N. Y. Supp. 674.
Upon a reversal of this case, neither this court nor the
trial court has power to direct that the ﬁne paid by defendant
Pray be restored to him. Had the clerk of the trial court per
formed his plain duty under the statute. the amount paid for
the ﬁne would long since have reached the state treasury.
For this or the trial court to give defendant Pray relief from
the ﬁne and order it restored to him would be to give counte
nance to the illegal acts of the clerk and himself for which
there is no warrant.
The appeal of defendant Pray will be
dismissed.

ll
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WALNUT IRRIGATION DISTRICT
Supreme

Court of California.
158

I

v.

BURKE.

1910.

California, 165.

SHAW, J. This is a motion by the plaintiff to dismiss the
defendants’ appeal from the judgment.
The controversy involved in the case is the respective rights
of the plaintiff and defendants in the use of certain water
diverted from the San Gabriel river. The judgment of the
court below is that each party is entitled to a certain portion
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of the water, to be used in a certain manner at speciﬁed times,
and that each be enjoined from interfering with the use of
It is also adjudged
the water to which the other is entitled.
that the defendants recover of the plaintiff their costs laid
out in the action. After the decision was ﬁled, the defendants
ﬁled a memorandum of their costs. Before the judgment was
drawn or entered, the plaintiff paid and the defendants ac
cepted the amount of the costs as stated in said memorandum.
The defendants have appealed from the judgment “and from
each and every part, and the whole thereof.” The ground of
the ‘plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the appeal is that by the ac
ceptance of payment of the costs awarded to them by the
judgment the defendants are estopped and barred from prose
cuting an appeal from the whole, or any part of the judgment,
of which the judgment for costs is a part.
There is no doubt that the general rule is that if a party
to a judgment accepts payment or satisfaction of a part there
of which is favorable to him, and that part is of such a charac
ter that the part adverse to him cannot be reversed without
affecting the part which is in his favor and requiring the re
versal of that part also, the party so accepting the fruits of
a part of the judgment in his favor is estopped from prosecut
ing an appeal from those parts which are against him. Turn
er v. Markham, 152 Cal. 246, 92 Pac. 485, and cases there
cited.

The following statement of the rule, taken from Baylies on
New Trials, p. 18, sec. 7, has been approved by this court:
“If all the provisions of a judgment are connected and de
pendent, so that a part cannot be reversed without a reversal
of -the whole, a party cannot proceed to enforce such portions
of the judgment as are in his favor, and appeal from the part
which is against him. In such case the right to proceed on
the judgment and enjoy its fruits, and the right to appeal, are
not concurrent, but wholly inconsistent, and an election to as
sert one right is a waiver and renunciation of the other.”
Storke v. Storlce, 132 Cal. 353, 64 Pac. 578. This suggests
that there may be exceptions. As to these the court, in San
Bernardino C0. 12. Riverside Co., 135 Cal. 620, 67 Pac. 1048,
“A limitation to this rule exists where a reversal of
says:
the judgment or order cannot affect the right of the party to
the beneﬁt which he has secured thereby; as, for example,
where there is no controversy as to his right for the amount
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that he was

a case he is not pre

cluded from an appeal, even though he has received the
amount awarded to him." In 2 Cyc. 653, one of the excep
tions is thus stated: “So an appellant, by the collection of :1
judgment in his favor, will not be estopped from appealing
for the purpose of modifying the judgment so as to increase
the amount of his recovery—as where the judgment allows a
counterclaim, makes a deduction for usurious interest, for the
value of improvements, or disallows certain items of account,”
—citi'ng New Rochelle, etc., Co. 12. Van Benschoten, 47 App.
Div. 477, 62 N. Y. Supp. 398; Monnet 'u. Mertz (Super.) 17
N. Y. Supp. 380 ; Beats 12. Lewis, 43 Ohio St. 222, 1 N. E. 641;
Clay v. Miller, 7 Ky. 461, and Bryam v. Polk Co., 76 Iowa, 75.
40 N. W. 102. These cases support the text. See, also, Embry
v. Palmer, 107 U. S. 8, 2 Sup. Ct. 25, 27 L. Ed. 346; Knapp 2».

Brown, 45 N. Y. 210.
The appeal in this case is from the whole of the judgment.
If the judgment should be reversed for a new trial, the judg
ment for the costs which defendants have received would be
vacated, and their ultimate right thereto would depend upon
the result of the new trial. The appeal. in that event, would
directly affect their right to that which they have accepted,
they would be estopped from prosecuting it, and the court
would necessarily refuse such relief or dismiss the appeal.
But this would not be true, if the relief which the defendants
seek by their appeal can be given by a modiﬁcation of the
judgment, eliminating therefrom the part which was errone
ously adjudged against them, leaving the remainder in force.
A reversal for that purpose would not require a new trial nor
affect their right to the costs already received. No injustice
would thereby be done to the plaintiff. It will have paid that
which it should have paid, and no more. Under the rules
above stated there would be no estoppel, and the appeal may
be retained. unless upon an examination of the merits it ap
pears that a new trial must be ordered. The appeal has been
The matter will
submitted in department on the merits.
there be determined upon the principles here stated.
The motion to dismiss the appeal is referred to the court
in department, to be there further considered and decided.
We concur: BEATTY, C. .: SLOSS, J.; LORIGAN, .
ANGELLOTTI,
I concur in the judgment on the authority
.

J

J
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Riverside, etc., Co., 64 Cal. 57, 59, 28 Pac.

116.

Appeal from Superior Court, Los Angeles
County; Geo. H. Hutton, Judge.
Department

1.

J

SHAW, . " " "
It is not necessary to order a new trial of the action. There
was no substantial conﬂict in the evidence as to the facts real
ly in issue, and there is nothing indicating that different evi
dence could be produced, or throwing doubt upon the facts
above stated. Such of the ﬁndings as were properly made
under the issues were fully proven, and they sufficiently de
clare the facts upon which the rights of the parties depend.
The unnecessary ﬁndings may be disregarded and a new
judgment may be framed, omitting the objectionable parts, as
herein indicated.
The seventh and twelfth paragraphs of the
judgment should be omitted and the eighth and thirteenth
changed so as to leave out all the restrictions upon the defend
ants as to the times of using the water, the manner of such
concerning notice to plaintiff.
use, and the requirements
There are other particulars in the way of detail, which should
be changed so far as necessary to make them consistent with
what we have said herein.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded, with
directions to the court below to enter judgment in accordance
with this opinion. The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied
for the reasons given in the opinion thereon by the court in
bank.

SECTION 6.

JURISDICTIONAL

AMOUNT.

CAMERON v. UNITED STATES.
Supreme Court of the United States.
1./,6

1892.

United States, 533.

This was a proceeding by the United States to compel the
defendant to abate a wire fence, by which he was alleged to
have inclosed a large tract of public lands belonging to the
United States, and subject to entry as agricultural lands, in
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violation of the act of February 25, 1885, (23 St. p. 321), to
prevent the unlawful occupancy of public lands.
The ﬁrst
“All inclosures of any
section of the act reads as follows:
public lands in any state or territory of the United States,
heretofore or to be hereafter made, erected, or constructed by
*
*
"'
any person,
to any of which land included within
* making or controlling the
*
*
person
the inclosure the
inclosure had no claim or color of title made or acquired in
good faith, or an asserted right thereto by or under claim
made in good faith, with a view to entry thereof at the proper
land office under the general land laws of the United States at
the time any such inclosure was or shall be made, are hereby
declared to be unlawful, and the maintenance, erection, con
struction, or control of any such inclosure is hereby forbid
den and prohibited; and the assertion of a right to the exclu
sive use or occupancy of any part of the public lands of the
United States in any state or any of the territories of the
United States, without claim, color of title, or asserted right,
as above speciﬁed, as to inclosure, is likewise declared unlaw
'
ful, and hereby prohibited.”
The answer denied, in general terms, that the defendant
had inclosed any of the public lands without any title or claim
or color of title acquired in good faith thereto, or without
having made application to acquire the title thereto, etc. The
answer was subsequently amended by setting up a Mexican
grant of the lands in questioh, and an application then pend
ing before Congress for the conﬁrmation of such grant.
Upon the trial the court found the issue in favor of the United
States, and decreed that the inclosure was of public land, and
was therefore unlawful, and rendered a special judgment, in
the terms of the act, that the fence be removed by the defend
ant within ﬁve days from date, and, if defendant fail to re
move said fence, that the same be destroyed by the United
States marshal, etc.
Defendant thereupon appealed to the supreme court of the
territory, by which the judgment was atﬁrmed. Defendant
was then allowed an appeal to this court.
BROWN, J. By the act of March 3, 1885, (23 St. p. 443,)
“no appeal or writ of error shall hereafter be allowed from
any judgment or decree in any suit at law or in equity * * *
in the supreme court of any of the territories of the United
States, unless the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, shall
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of ﬁve thousand dollars.” The proceeding in
this case was a special one to compel the abatement and de
struction of a wire fence, with which the defendant was al
leged to inclose 800 acres of the public lands of the United
States, without title or claim or color of title thereto, acquired
in good faith. Defendant’s answer was a general denial of
the fact, and in an amended answer he set forth the title
claimed by him. The question at issue between the parties,
then, was whether the defendant had color of title to the
lands in question, acquired in good faith. Defendant justiﬁed
under a Mexican grant of “cuatro sitios de tierra para cria de
ganado mayor,” (literally, four places or parcels of land for
the raising of larger cattle;) and the case turned largely
exceed the sum

upon the question whether, under the laws, usages, and cus
toms of the country, and the local construction given to these
words, a grant of four square leagues or four leagues square
was intended.
The court found for the United States, and
held that the defendant had no colorable title to the four
leagues square which he had fenced.
We are of the opinion that this case must be dismissed for
want of jurisdiction by this court. The only evidence that it
involves the requisite jurisdictional amount consists of three
aﬁidavits of persons who swear they are acquainted with the
property in dispute, and that the value of said property is
more than $5,000, and the ﬁnding of the chief justice, in his
allowance of an appeal, that the property in controversy in
this action exceeds in value this sum. This evidently refers
to the value of the land inclosed by the fence in question. It
is not, however, the value of the property in dispute in this
case which is involved, but the value of the color of title to
this property, which is hardly capable of pecuniary estima
tion; and, if it were, there is no evidence of such value in this
Had the defendant succeeded in the action, he would
case.
not have established a title to the property, but a color of title
to it; and the adjudication would have been of no value to
him, except so far as to permit the fence to stand. He could
not have made it the basis of an action of ejectment or other
proceeding to test his actual title to the premises in question.
If the proceeding be considered as one involving the value of
the fence, only, it is also sufficient to say there is no evidence
of such value.
U

l

O
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The appeal is therefore dismissed."
I9 Pecuniary limitations are often restricted in terms to cases sounding
in damages.—Leopold v. The People, (1892) 140 Ill. 552; Gordon v. Cum
mings, (1914) 78 Wash. 515. And such limitations are sometimes held
to be impliedly restricted to cases involving rights measurable in money.
—State v. McK0ne, (1897) 95 Wis. 216; Conant v. Conant, (1858) 10
Cal. 249. On the other hand some statutes having a general pecuniary
limitation are held to apply to all cases and to exclude appeals in cases
not involving matters which can be estimated in money.—Simms v.
Simms, (1899) 175 U. S. 162; Renshaw v. Cook, (1908) 129 Ky. 347;
Perrine v. Slack, (1896) 164 U. S. 452; Smith v. Adams, (1888) 130 U.
S. 167.

Express exceptions to the pecuniary limitations are very common, such
as cases involving a constitutional question,—-Wood v. City ot Chicago,
Typewriter Co. v. Piggott, (1906) 60
(1903) 205 Ill. 70; Underwood
W. Va. 532; cases involving taxation,—Zabriskie v. Torrey, (1862) 20
Cal. 174; Ayers Asphalt Paving Co. v. Loewengardt.
(1903) 109 La. 439;
v.
cases involving the validity of a statute or ordinance,—-Boehrlnger
Yuma County, (1914) 15 Ariz. 546; Washington Twp. v. Ratts, (1913)
54 Ind. App. 229; cases involving tranchises,—Neal v. Commonwealth,
(1871) 21 Gratt. (Va.) 511; Spangler v. Green, (1895) 21 Colo. 505;
and cases involving title to land,—Jones v. Blumenstein, (1889) 77
Ia.
C
361; Getman v. Ingersoll, (1889) 117 N. Y. 75.

GIBSON v. SHUFELDT.
Supreme

Court of the United States.
122

United States,

1886.

2?’.

GRAY, J. The question presented by this motion can
hardly be considered an open one. But the subject has been
so often misunderstood that the court has thought it con
venient to review the former decisions, and the grounds on
which they rest. By the act of February 16, 1875, c. 77,
§ 3, which differs from earlier laws only in increasing the
amount required to give this court appellate jurisdiction
from a circuit court of the United States, it is necessary
that “the matter in dispute shall exceed the sum or value of
18 St. 316.
ﬁve thousand dollars, exclusive of costs.”
The
sum or value really in dispute between the parties in the case
before this court, as shown by the whole record, is the test
of its appellate jurisdiction, without regard to the collateral
effect of the judgment in another suit between the same or
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Elgin 11. Marshall, 106 U. S. 578, 1 Sup. Ct.
other parties.
Rep. 484; Hilton "0. Dickinson, 108 U. S. 165, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep.
424; The Jessie Williamson, Jr., 108 U. S. 305, 2 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 669; New Jersey Zinc Co. 12. Trotter, 108 U. S. 564, 2
Sup. Ct. Rep. 875; Opelika v. Daniel, 109 U. S. 108, 3 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 70; Wabash, etc., R. R. v. Knox, 110 U. S. 304, 3
Sup. Ct. Rep. 638; Bradstreet Co. v. Higgins, 112 U. S. 227, 5
Sup Ct. Rep. 117; Bruce v. Manchester‘ & K. R. R., 117 U. S.
514, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 849.
The value of property sued for is not always the matter
in dispute. In replevin, for instance, if the action is brought
as a means of trying the title to property, the value of the
property replevied is the matter in dispute; but, if the re
plevin is of property distrained for rent, the amount for
which avowry is made is the real matter in dispute, and the
limit of jurisdiction. Peyton v. Robertson, 9 Wheat. 527.
When the object of a suit is to apply property worth more to
the payment of a debt for less than the jurisdictional amount,
it is the amount of the debt, and not the value of the prop
erty, that determines the jurisdiction of this court.
This is
well illustrated by two cases, in one of which the ap-peal was
taken by the creditor, and in the other by a mortgagee of the
property. ,
In Farmers’ Bank of Alexandria 1). Hooff, 7 Pet. 168, this
court dismissed an appeal from a decree of the circut court
for the District of Columbia, dismissing a bill to have land,
worth more than $1,000, sold for the payment of a debt of
less than $1,000, which was the limit of jurisdiction, Chief
Justice Marshall saying: “The real matter in controversy is
the debt claimed in the bill; and, though the title of the lot
may be inquired into incidentally, it does not constitute the
object of the suit.”
In Ross '0. Prentiss, 3 How. 771, land worth more, and
mortgaged for more, than $2,000, was about to be sold on
execution of a debt for a less sum; and a bill by the mort
gagee to stay the sale was dismissed.
He appealed to this
court, and insisted that its jurisdiction depended on the value
of the property and the amount of his interest therein, and
that he might lose the whole beneﬁt of his mortgage by a
But the appeal was dismissed,
forced sale on execution.
Chief Justice Taney saying: “The only matter in contro
versy between the parties is the amount claimed on the exe
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cution.
The dispute is whether the property in question is
liable to be charged with it or not. The jurisdiction does
not depend on the amount of any contingent loss or damage
which one of the parties may sustain by a decision against
him, but upon the amount in dispute between them, and, as
that amount is in this case below $2,000, the appeal must be
dismissed.”
When a suit is brought by two or more plaintiffs, or
against two or more defendants, or to recover or charge
property owned or held by different persons, (which more
often happens under the ﬂexible and comprehensive forms of
proceeding in equity and admiralty than under the stricter
rules of the common law,) the question what is the matter
Generally speaking, how
in dispute becomes more difficult.
ever, it may be said that the joinder in one suit of several
plaintiffs or defendants, who might have sued or been sued
in separate actions, does not enlarge the appellate jurisdic
tion; that, when property or money is claimed by several
persons suing together, the test is whether they claim it
under one common right, the adverse party having no in
terest in its apportionment or distribution among them, or
claim it under separate and distinct rights, each of which is
contested by the adverse party; that when two persons are
sued, or two parcels of property are sought to be recovered
or charged, by one person in one suit, the test is whether
the defendants’ alleged liability to the plaintiff, or claim to
the property, is joint or several; and that, so far as affected
by any such joinder, the right of appeal is mutual, because
the matter in dispute between the parties is that which is
asserted on the one side and denied on the other.
In the leading case of Oliver o. Alexander, 6 Pet. 143, upon
a libel in admiralty against the owners of a vessel to recover
seamen’s wages, and an attachment of the proceeds of the
vessel in the hands of assignees, the libelants obtained a de
cree for the payment out of those proceeds to them respec
tively of sums less than $1,000, but amounting in all to more
This court, at
than $2,000, and the assignees appealed.
January term, 1832, in a judgment delivered by Mr. Justice
Story, dismissed the appeal, for the reasons that the shipping
articles constituted a several contract with each seaman to
all intents and purposes; that, although the libel was in form
joint, the contract with each libelant, as well as the decree

768

TRIAL AND APPELLATE

PRACTICE

[Chap. 4

in his favor, was in truth several, and none of the others
had any interest in that contract, or could be aggrieved by
that decree; that the matter in dispute between each seaman
and the owners, or other respondents, was the sum or value
of his own demand, without any reference to the demands of
others; that it was very clear, therefore, that no seaman
could appeal from the circuit court to this court, unless his
claim exceeded $2,000; “and the same rule applies to the
owners or other respondents, who are not at liberty to con
solidate the distinct demands of each seaman into an aggre
gate, thus making the claims of the whole matter in dispute;
but they can appeal only in regard to the demand of a sea
man which exceeds the sum required by law for that purpose
as a distinct matter in dispute.”
In equity, as in admiralty, when the sum sued for is one
in which the plaintiffs have a joint and common interest, and
the defendant has nothing to do with its distribution among
them, the whole sum sued for is the test of the jurisdiction.
The earliest case of that class is Shields 'v. Thomas, 17
How. 3, in which this court held that an appeal would lie
from a decree in equity, ordering a defendant, who had con
verted to his own use property of an intestate, to pay to the
plaintiffs, distributees of the estate, a sum of money exceed
ing $2,000, and apportioning it among them in shares less
"
"‘
*
than that sum. The case was distinguished from
Oliver v. Alexander “ "' ", above cited, upon the follow
ing grounds: “The matter in controversy,” said Chief Jus
tice Taney, “was the sum due to the representatives of the
deceased collectively; and not the particular sum to which
each was entitled, when the amount due was distributed
among them according to the laws of the state.
They all
They had a common
claimed under one and the same title.
claim,
in
interest
the
and
it was perfectly im
and undivided
material to the appellant how it was to be shared among
them. He had no controversy with either of them on that
point; and, if there was any difficulty as to the proportions
in which they were to share, the dispute was among them
It is like a contract with several
selves, and not with him.
to pay a sum of money. It may be that the money, when re
covered is to be divided between them in equal or unequal
proportions. Yet, if a controversy arises on the contract,
and the sum in dispute upon it exceeds two thousand dol
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lars, an appeal would clearly lie to this court, although the
interest of each individual was less than that sum.”
But in equity, as in admiralty, when several persons join
in one suit to assert several and distinct interests, and those
interests alone are in dispute, the amount of the interest of
each
the limit of the appellate jurisdiction.
Upon the same principle, neither party can appeal from
single plaintiff to enforce separate
decree upon
bill by
and distinct liabilities against several defendants, if the sum
alleged or found to be liable is less than
for which each
the jurisdictional amount.
For instance,
was decided in
Paving Co. 11. Mulford, 100 U. S. 147, that the plaintiff could
not appeal from the dismissal of
bill to assert a right
against two defendants in two distinct certiﬁcates of in
debtedness, held by them severally, for sums severally less,
though together more, than that amount; and in Ex parte
Sup. Ct. Rep. 772, that four
Phoenix Ins. Co., 117 U. S. 367,
insurance companies could not appeal from
decree that
each of them should pay $3,000 to the plaintiff.
The true line of distinction, as applied to cases like that
sharply brought out by the recent decisions
now before us,
Sup. Ct. Rep. 1163,
of Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U. S. 61,
Gunter,
183,
Sup.
Estes
121
and
'v.
U. S.
Ct. Rep. 854, in
preferred creditor for more than $5,000 was
each of which
side,
on one
and general creditors for less than $5,000 each
In Stewart "0. Dunham, the suit being
were on the other.
brought by the general creditors against the debtor and the
preferred creditor, to Whom the debtor had made the con
veyance alleged to be fraudulent, and the latter seeking no
afﬁrmative relief, the matter in dispute as between the de
fendants and each of the plaintiffs was the amount of the
claim of that plaintiff but in Estes v. Gunter, the suit being
brought by the preferred creditor against the trustee in the
deed of assignment by which he was preferred, and the gen
eral creditors being summoned in as defendants, and them
selves asking no afﬁrmative relief, the matter in dispute was
the value of the debt preferred, and of the property assigned
to secure the preference.
The case at bar is exactly like Stewart '0. Dunham.
The
creditors,
by
general
only
the
one of whose debts
suit
amounts to $5,000.
The trustee and the preferred creditor
appear as defendants only, ﬁle no cross bill, and ask no af
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Iii-mative relief; and the decree sets aside the fraudulent
conveyance so far only as it affects the plaintiffs’ rights. The
sole matter in dispute, therefore, is between the defendants
and each plaintiff as to the amount which the latter shall
recover; and the motion to dismiss the appeal of the defend
ants as to all the plaintiffs except the one whose debt ex
ceeds $5,000 must be granted.

l

COLVIN
Supreme

l i

t

v.

Q

I I

O

i I

CITY OF JACKSONVILLE.

Court of the United States.
158

1895.

United States, 456.

This was a bill ﬁled by John H. Colvin, a citizen of the
state of Illinois, on May 8, 1894, against the city of Jack
sonville, Fla., and its mayor, in the circuit court of the United
States for the Northern district of Florida, to enjoin and re
strain the issue, sale, delivery, pledge, or other disposition
of a certain issue of bonds, to the amount of $1,000,000.
*
‘
FULLER, C. J.
The certiﬁcate is as follows:

'

‘ii

1*

Q

“In the bill and amended bill ﬁled herein complainant al
leged that he was a citizen of the State of Illinois; that he
owned property within thelimits of the city of Jacksonville;
that the city was about to issue and sell bonds of the said
city to the amount of one million dollars; that the amount of
taxes that would be assessed upon the property owned by him
in the city of Jacksonville, on account of the issue of said
bonds, as interest and sinking fund, would exceed two thou
sand dollars; * * *
“"‘
*
*
The court found as a matter of fact that the
amount of taxes which the complainant would be obliged to
pay as interest and sinking fund on account of the said pro
posed issue of bonds would not exceed two thousand dollars,
and as a matter of law that the interest which the complain
ant had in the issue of bonds and not the amount of the entire
issue thereof was the amount in controversy, and found there
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fore that this court had no jurisdiction of such controversy,
and therefore dismissed said complainant's bill.”

315,
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We are conﬁned, in the disposition of the case, to the cer
appears that the case was heard upon
tiﬁcate, from which
a motion for an injunction and for the appointment of
receiver, on the bill and amended bill, answer, and aﬁidavits;
and that the court found, as matter of fact, that the entire
amount of taxes which complainant would be obliged to pay,
as interest and sinking fund, on account of the proposed
issue of bonds, would not exceed $2,000, and thereupon dis~
It was contended
missed the bill, for want of jurisdiction.
by complainant that the amount of taxes he would have to
pay was not the amount in controversy, but that the total
amount of the issue of bonds was. But this contention was
overruled, and
the court did not err in that particular, and
assuming, as we must, that complainant's liability did not
exceed $2,000, the decree of the court was right, since
was
appeared to its satisfaction that the suit
its duty, when
dispute or contro
did not really and substantially involve
versy properly within its jurisdiction, to proceed no fur
Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U. S.
ther, and to dismiss the case.
Sup. Ct. 289.

This leaves the only question to be considered whether the
amount of the interest of complainant, and not the entire
issue of bonds, was the amount in controversy; and, in re
spect of that, we have no doubt the ruling of the circuit court
was correct.

a

it

a

In El Paso Water Co. v. City of El Paso, 152 U. S. 157,
bill ﬁled by the water com
159, 14 Sup. Ct. 494, which was
pany against the city of El Paso for an injunction,
was
alleged, among other things, that if certain bonds were issued
the complainant would be compelled to pay taxes on its prop
erty for the interest on the bonds, and to provide
sinking
thereof,
but
the
principal
amount
the
of
for
the
fund
tax
that would be thereby cast upon complainant's property was

is

a

not disclosed; and we said, upon the question whether there
suﬂicient amount in controversy to give this court
was
ﬁled by the plaintiff to protect its
“The bill
jurisdiction:
individual interest, and to prevent damage to itself. It must
therefore affirmatively appear that the acts charged against
the city, and sought to be enjoined, would result in its dam
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in excess of $5,000. So far as respects the
which,
by the issue of bonds, would be cast
of
taxes
matter
upon the property of the plaintiff, it is enough to say that
the amount thereof is not stated, nor any facts given from
which it can be fairly inferred.” The case is in point, and
age to an amount

is decisive.

Brown

'0.

Trousdale,

U. S. 389, 394, 11 Sup. Ct. 308, is
There several hundred taxpayers of a
138

not to the contrary.
county in Kentucky, for themselves and others associated
with them, numbering about 1,200, and for and on behalf
of all other taxpayers in the county, “and for the beneﬁt
likewise of said county,” ﬁled their bill of complaint against
the county authorities and certain funding officers, and all
the holders of the bonds, seeking a decree adjudging the
invalidity of two series of bonds aggregating many hundred
thousand dollars, and perpetually enjoining their collection;
and an injunction was also asked, as incidental to the prin
cipal relief, against the collection of a particular tax levied
to meet the interest on the bonds. The leading question here
was whether the case had been properly removed from the
state court, and no consideration was given to the case upon
As to the jurisdiction of this court, we said:
the merits.
“The main question at issue was the validity of the bonds,
and that involved the levy and collection of taxes for a
series of years to pay interest thereon, and ﬁnally the prin
cipal thereof and not the mere restraining of the tax for
The grievance complained of was common
a single year.
plaintiffs,
and to all whom they professed to repre
to all the
sent. The relief sought could not be legally injurious to any
of the taxpayers of the county, as such, and the interest of
those who did not join in or authorize the suit was identical
with the interest of the plaintiffs. The rule applicable to
plaintiffs, each claiming under a separate and distinct right,
in respect to a separate and distinct liability, and that con
tested by the adverse party, is not applicable here; for al
though, as to the tax for the particular year, the injunction
sought might restrain only the amount levied against each,
that order was but preliminary, and was not the main pur
The amount in dispute,
pose of the bill, but only incidental.
in view of the main controversy, far exceeded the limit upon
our jurisdiction, and disposes of the objection of appellees in
that regard.”
Decree aﬁirmed.

\
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LOUIS TRANSIT

CO.

.1

Supreme

Court of Missouri.

1907.

205 Missouri, 176.

LAMM,

J.

Defendant

appeals

here

from

a

judgment

it for $5,789.30.
Plaintiff held a contract to reconstruct a certain power
station belonging to defendant for so much money; a day
being set for full performance, and $50 per diem named for
failure in time. Alleging performance, it sued for $7,043.97,
against

the balance due on that contract.
Defendant answered, denying owing plaintiff that sum, or
any other sum. Referring to the contract counted on, de
fendant pleaded full payment of the contract price. Further
referring to the contract, defendant pleaded a counterclaim
in two items: First, for $4,300 damages for 86 days’ delay
in performing the contract after the day set for full per
formance; and, second, for certain extra work, $142.74.
The reply put in issue the new matter.
With cross-claims and pleadings in this ﬁx (both parties
denying liability), the amount in dispute at the beginning
was the amount claimed in the petition, plus the two items
of the counterclaim, aggregating $11,486.71.
Presently the case came on for trial before Judge Hough,
sitting as a jury, and the parties litigant did not stand on
the amount in dispute outlined in the pleadings.
To the con
trary, defendant admitted it owed plaintiff on the building
contract the sum sued for, and plaintiff admitted it owed
defendant the smaller of the two items of the counterclaim.
This left the amount in dispute the ﬁrst item of defendant’s
counterclaim, to wit, $4,300. ‘That issue was threshed out at
the trial. To that issue the evidence was limited. To that
On that issue the court
issue the instructions were directed.
It found that defendant was entitled to
made its ﬁnding.
damages at $50 a day for 37 days’ delay, aggregating $1,850.
To this sum it added the admitted item of $142.74, with
interest aggregating $2,006. It deducted the ascertained and
from the
determined amount of defendant’s counterclaim
amount admitted to be due plaintiff, and rendered judg
From that judgment plaintiff took
ment for the difference.
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no appeal; defendant alone appealing, as said. So much for
the amount in dispute below.
In this court the case is presented by abstracts, state
ments, and briefs on both sides, on the theory that the bal
ance on the contract price is not in dispute; that the smaller
item in defendant’s counterclaim is not in dispute; and that
(as plaintiff took no appeal) the allowance of damages in the
sum of $1,850 for 37 days’ delay on the larger item of the
counterclaim is no longer in dispute. The single bone of con
tention is the issue whether defendant was entitled to dam
ages for 86 days’ delay in performing the contract, as
claimed in the answer, or the 37 days allowed by the court.
As there is no federal or constitutional question raised,
and the title to real estate is not involved, our jurisdiction
must hinge on the amount in dispute. Laws 1901, p. 107.
We are given jurisdiction in all cases where the amount
in dispute, exclusive of costs, shall exceed the sum of $4,500.
In determining the amount in dispute, we may look within
the mere shell of the pleadings and judgment—the mere col
orable amount in dispute-and seek out the real amount.
Vanderberg v. Gas Co., 199 Mo. 455, 97 S. W. 908. In that
“Frequently the amount in dispute is ma
case it was said:
terially affected by eliminating items and elements at the
trial, and the record shows this. Would it not be an act
sounding to folly for us to say that, for the purposes of
jurisdiction on appeal, we must continue to consider such
eliminated matters.”
Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q _

In re B'u.rlce’s Estate (Green, Executor, '0. Hussey), 169
Mo. 212, 69 S. W. 277, an executor makes ﬁnal settlement
After taking certain credits, he
in the probate court.
charges himself with a balance of $3,530.85.
A distributee,
Hussey, ﬁles exceptions.
These exceptions are disallowed,
That court in
and Hussey appeals to the circuit court.
by
creases the amount of the executor’s indebtedness
$2,979.97 and adjudges him to stand indebted to the estate
Thereupon the executor appeals
in the sum of $6,510.82.
beneath
the mere surface of the
This court looked
here.
judgment, and into the record, and there ascertains that the
only amount in dispute is the increase made by the circuit
court, to wit, $2,979.97. Accordingly, it refused to entertain
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jurisdiction. See, also, Douglas v. Kansas City, 147 Mo. 428,
48 S. W. 851.
In the case at bar, the amount in dispute on the surface
is the amount of the judgment against defendant.
That
amount would be sufficient to give this court jurisdiction.
But looking deeper into the record for the kernel of the
thing, it is not so; and, applying the settled rule of construc
tion as shown in the cases cited, it will be seen that if the
real amount in dispute is considered to be the ﬁrst item of
the counterclaim, $4,300, yet we have no jurisdiction; and,
a. fortiori
have we no jurisdiction if we come nearer to
the real amount in dispute, to wit, plaintiff's liability for
damages for the number of days’ delay after deducting the
37 days allowed by the court, to wit, 49 days, at $50 per
day, say $2,450.
Having no jurisdiction, the cause is transferred to the
All concur."
St. Louis Court of Appeals for determination.
20 Most of the cases involving counter-claims
and set-offs seem to be
decided in accordance with the rule that where the appellant loses in
whole or in part on both the original claim and the counter-claim,
the
amount in dispute is the sum of the amounts so lost, but where he
loses on one and wins on the other, the amount of the claim won cannot
the amount
be added to the claim lost, but the latter alone constitutes
in dispute. See Charlton v. Scoville, (1895) 144 N. Y. 691, 696; Gorham
Revere Rubber Co. v. Auto Co., (1913) 71 Wash. 578; Shriver v. Bowen,
(1877) 57 Ind. 266; Morgan r. Johnson, (1914) 158 Ky. 417; Moshier v.
Shear, (1881) 100 Ill. 469; Dickey v. Smith, (1896) 42 W. Va. 805. Other
may always be added
cases seem to hold that claim and counter-claim
together to get the amount in dispute,—Davis v. Laughlin, (1910) 147
Ia. 478; or that they can never be so added together,-—Crosby v. Crosby,
(1899) 92 Tex. 441; Norfolk & W. R. RR. Co. v. Potter, (1909) 110 Va.

427

(Semble).

-

~.

ZOELLER

v.

RILEY.

Court of Appeals of New York.
7

New York Civil Procedure

1885.

Reports,

303

Motion to dismiss appeal taken by the plaintiff from a
judgment of the city court of Brooklyn general term affirm
ing a judgment of trial term dismissing the complaint.
The action was brought for the conversion of a carriage,
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alleged its value to be $500 and demanded
judgment for that sum. The only evidence offered on the
trial as to the value of the carriage was that it was worth
about $300.
The respondent claimed that, for that reason,
the amount in controversy was less than $500 and the appeal
should therefore be dismissed.
PER CURIAM.--This action is not founded upon contract and
hence the sum for which the complaint demands judgment
is deemed to be the amount of the matter in controversy,
within the meaning of section 191 of the Code. Here the
complaint demands judgment for $500. It matters not that
proof given upon the trial shows that the plaintiff's damages
were less.
If he can succeed upon his appeal, upon a new
trial it will be open to him to show that his property was
worth $500, or more, if he can.
The motion must be denied, with $10 costs.
and the complaint

HILTON
Supreme

v.

DICKINSON.

Court of the United States.

1888.

108 United States, 165.

This was a bill of interpleader ﬁled by Charles D. Gilmore
against Benjamin S. Hilton, William H. Dickinson, John
Devlin, and others, to determine the ownership of $2,500,
The fund was paid into
which Gilmore held as trustee.
court, and when the decree below was rendered had increased
Hilton, Dickinson, and
by investment to more than $3,000.
court, at special term,
whole.
The
the
each
claimed
Devlin
decreed the whole to Hilton. From this decree both Dickin
There the de
son and Devlin appealed to the general term.
cree at special term was modiﬁed so as to direct the payment
of the fund to Hilton and Dickinson in equal moieties, and
to adjudge the costs against Devlin alone. Hilton took an
appeal to this court from this decree, “in so far as it modiﬁes
the decree of the court below, to wit, the special term in
This
equity,” and citation was issued to Dickinson alone.
*
*
" Dickinson
appeal was docketed here in due time.
now moves to dismiss the appeal of Hilton, on the ground
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that the value of the matter in dispute does not exceed $2,500.

i

#

O

WAITE, C. J. At the last term, in the case of The S. S.
Osborne, 105 U. S. 451, it was decided that “cross-appeals
must be prosecuted like other appeals.
Every appellant, to
entitle himself to be heard on his own appeal, must appear
here as an actor in his own behalf by having the appearance
of counsel entered, and giving the security required by the
rules.” "‘ * " The question is then presented whether upon
the face of this record it appears that the value of the matter
in dispute, for the purpose of our jurisdiction, exceeds $2,500,
and that depends on whether the “matter in dispute” is the
whole amount claimed by Hilton below, or only the difference
between what he has recovered and what he sued for. "‘ * *
In Wilson v. Daniel, decided in 1798, and reported in 3
Dall. 401, upon a writ of error brought by a defendant be
low from a judgment against him for less than $2,000, it
was held that the jurisdiction of this court depended, not on
the amount of the judgment, but “on the matter in dispute
when the action was instituted.” Chief Justice Ellsworth,
in his opinion, said:
“If the sum or value, found by a verdict, was considered
as the rule to ascertain the magnitude of the matter in dis
pute, then, whenever less than $2,000 was found, a defendant
could have no relief against the most erroneous and injurious
judgment, though the plaintiff would have a right of removal
and revision of the cause, his demand (which is alone to gov
It is not to be pre
ern him) being for more than $2,000.
legislature
intended to give any party such an
sumed that the
advantage over his antagonist; and it ought to be avoided,
as it may be avoided, by the fair and reasonable interpreta
tion, which has been pronounced.”
Mr. Justice Iredell, in a dissenting opinion, thus states
the argument on the other side:
“The true motive for introducing the provision, which is
under consideration, into the judicial act, is evident. When
the legislature allowed a writ of error to the supreme court,
it was considered that the court was held permanently at
the seat of the national government, remote from many parts
of the Union, and that it would be inconvenient and oppres
sive to bring suitors hither for objects of small importance.
Hence, it was provided, that unless the matter in dispute

‘
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the sum or value of $2,000, a writ of error should
not be issued. But the matter in dispute here meant, is the
matter in dispute on the writ of error.”
In Cooke v. Woodrow, 5 Cranch, 13 decided in 1809, trover
had been brought in the circuit court of the District of
Columbia for sundry household goods, and the judgment was
Upon a writ of error by the
in favor of the defendants.
plaintiff below, a question arose as to the way in which the
value of the matter in dispute should be ascertained, and
Chief Justice Marshall, in announcing the decision, said: “If
the judgment below be for the plaintiff, that judgment as
certains the value of the matter in dispute; but when the
judgment below is rendered for the defendant, this court
has not, by any rule or practice, ﬁxed the mode of ascertain
ing that value.”
exceeded

II

41

it

$

i

Q

Q

i

#

#

The case of Gordon v. Ogden, 3 Pet. 33, was decided in
1830.
There the action was instituted for the violation of a
patent, and the amount of the recovery in damages was $400
by the verdict of a jury. The damages laid in the declara
The defendant brought the writ of error,
tion were $2,600.
and on a motion to dismiss because the value of the matter
in dispute was not enough to give jurisdiction Chief Justice
Marshall, speaking for the court, said:
“The jurisdiction of the court has been supposed to de
pend on the sum or value of the matter in dispute in this
court, not on that which was in dispute in the circuit court.
If the writ of error be brought by the plaintiff below, then
the sum which his declaration shows to be due may be still
recovered should the judgment for a smaller sum be re
versed; and consequently the whole sum claimed is still in
dispute. But if the writ of error be brought by the defend
ant in the original action, the judgment of this court can
only aﬁirm that of the circuit court, and consequently the
matter in dispute cannot exceed the amount of the judgment.
Nothing but that judgment is in dispute between the
parties.”
The writ of error was consequently dismissed, all the
judges agreeing that there was no jurisdiction.
This case
was followed at the same term in Smith v. Honey, 3 Pet.
469.

Nothing further

of importance

connected with the par
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ticular question we are now considering appears in the re
ported cases until 1844, when, in Knapp 12. Banks, 2 How.
73, which was a writ of error brought by a defendant against
whom a judgment had been rendered for less than $2,000,
Mr. Justice Story said for the court:
“The distinction constantly maintained is this: Where
the plaintiff sues for an amount exceeding $2,000, and the
ad damnum exceeds $2,000, if by reason of any erroneous
ruling of the court below, the plaintiff recovers nothing, or
less than $2,000, there the sum claimed by the plaintiff is
the sum in controversy for which a writ of error will lie.
.But if a verdict is given against the defendant for a less
sum than $2,000, and a judgment passes against him accord
ingly, there it is obvious that there is, on the part of the de
fendant, nothing in controversy beyond the sum for which
the judgment was given; and consequently he is not entitled
to any writ of error. We cannot look beyond the time of the
judgment in order to ascertain whether a writ of error lies
or not.”
The rule as thus stated by Mr. Justice Story, was cited in
Walker v. U. S. 4 Wall. 163, and in Merrill '0. Patty, 16 Wall.
345. But these were cases in which the question was as to the
right of a defendant to bring up for review a judgment
against himself for less than $2,000.
In Ryan v. Bindley, 1 Wall. 66, the plaintiff below sued for
$2,000, and the defendant pleaded set-off to the amount of
$4,000.
Under such a plea, if the set-off had been sustained,
the defendant would have been entitled to a judgment for the
difference between the amount of his claim and that estab
lished by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff recovered a-judgment
for $575.85, and the defendant brought a writ of error, upon
which jurisdiction was sustained because the defendant
sought to defeat the judgment against him altogether, and
to recover a judgment in his own favor and against the
plaintiff for at least two thousand dollars, and possibly four
thousand. Thus the matter in dispute in this court exceeded
$2,000.
#

#

#

i

Q

1

i

#

$

1

We understand that Wilson v. Daniel is overruled by Gor
don v. Ogden, in which Chief Justice Marshall states the
opinion of the court to be that “the jurisdiction of the court
depends upon the sum in dispute between the parties, as
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the case stands upon the writ of error,” and that Wilson v.
Daniel was not followed because “a contrary practice had
since prevailed.”
It is undoubtedly true that until it is in
some way shown by the record that the sum demanded is not
the matter in dispute, that sum will govern in all questions
of jurisdiction, but it is equally true that when it is shown
that the sum demanded is not the real matter in dispute, the
sum shown, and not the sum demanded, will prevail. Lee v.
Watson, 1 Wall. 337; Schacker v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 93
U. S. 241; Gray v. Blanchard, 97 U. S. 565; Tintsman v.
National Bank, 100 U. S. 6; Banking Ass’n v. Insurance
Ass’n, 102 U. S. 121. Under this rule it has always been
assumed, since Cooke v. Woodrow, supra, that when a de
fendant brought a case here, the judgment or decree against
him governed our jurisdiction,“unless he had asked affirma
tive relief, which was denied; and this because, as to him,
jurisdiction depended on the matter in dispute here. As the
original demand against him was for more than our juris
dictional limit, and the recovery for less, the record shows
that he was successful below as to a part of his defense, and
that his object in bringing the case here was not to secure
what he had already got, but to get more. As to him, there
fore, the established rule is that, unless the additional amount
asked for is as much as our jurisdiction requires, we cannot
review the case.
We are unable to see any difference in principle between
the position of a plaintiff and that of a defendant as to such
The plaintiff sues for as much as, or more than,
a case.
the sum required to give us jurisdiction, and recovers less.
He does not, any more than a defendant, bring a case here
we
to secure what he has already got, but to get more.
take a case for him when the additional amount he asks to
recover is less than we can consider, he has “an advantage
over his antagonist,” such as, in the language of Chief Jus
tice Ellsworth, supra, “it is not to be presumed it was the
intention of the legislature to give,” Such a result ought to
be avoided, and it may be by holding, as we do, that, as to
both parties, the matter in dispute, on Which our jurisdic
tion depends, is the matter in dispute “between the parties
as the case stands upon the writ of error” or appeal; that is
That was the question in
to say, as it stands in this court.
that, to avoid giving one
where
it
was
held
Daniel,
Wilson 12.

If

Sec.

6]

WHAT IS REVIEWABLE

781

party an advantage over another, it was necessary to make
jurisdiction depend “on the matter in dispute when the ac
tion was instituted.” When, therefore, that case was over
ruled in Gordon 'v. Ogden, and it was held, as to a defendant,
that his rights depended on the matter in dispute in this
court, we entertain no doubt -it was the intention of the court
to adopt as an entirety the position of Mr. Justice Iredell in
his dissenting opinion, and to put both sides upon an equal
Certainly it could not have been intended to give
footing.
a plaintiff any advantage over a defendant, when there is
nothing in the law to show any such superiority in position.
Under this rule we have jurisdiction of a writ of error
or appeal by a plaintiff below when he sues for as much as
or more than our jurisdiction requires and recovers noth
ing, or recovers only a sum which, being deducted from the
amount or value sued for, leaves a sum equal to or more
than our jurisdictional limit, for which he failed to get a
judgmentor decree. And We have jurisdiction of a writ of
error or appeal by a defendant when the recovery against
him is as much in amount or value as is required to bring
a case here, and when, having pleaded a set-off or counter
claim for enough to give us jurisdiction, he is defeated upon
his plea altogether, or recovers only an amount or value
which, being deducted from his claim as pleaded, leaves
enough to give us jurisdiction, which has not been allowed.
In this connection it is to be remarked that the “amount as
stated in the body of the declaration, and not merely the
damages alleged, or the prayer for judgment, at its con
clusion, must be considered in determining whether this
Lee v. Watson, and the other
court can take jurisdiction.”
The same is true
cases cited in connection therewith, supra.
of the counter-claim or set-off. It is the actual matter in
dispute as shown by the record, and not the ad damnum
alone, which must be looked to.
Applying this rule to the present case, it is apparent we
The original matter in dispute was
have no jurisdiction.
$3,000.
On appeals from the supreme court of the District
of Columbia we have jurisdiction only when the matter in
Hilton recovered below one-half of
dispute exceeds $2,500.
the $3,000.
It follows that as to him the matter in dispute
in this court is only $1,500.
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The appeal of Hilton is dismissed for want of jurisdiction,

i

QB],

91 Where the statute made the sum stated in the writ or declaration
the basis for appeal, all other evidence of the matter in demand was
held to be excluded,—Burke v. Grace, (1885) 53 Conn. 513. Some statutes
base the right of review on the amount in controversy as shown in the
pleadings, in which cases the amount of the judgment is immaterial.
Hancock v. Hancock, (1907) 134 Ia. 475. Sometimes the value of the
property in controversy is to be ascertained from the certiﬁcate of the
trial judge, and in default of such a certiﬁcate there is no right of
appeal,—Matthews
v. Rising, (1899) 194 Pa. 217.
Under some statutes
the judgment alone determines
the amount in controversy,—Rupel v.
Ohio Oil Co., (1909) 172 Ind. 300. In Colorado the judgment or, in case
of replevin, the value as found by the court or jury, is the basis ot
jurisdiction,—Conly v. Boyvin, (1898) 25 Colo. 498. In California "the
demand" which determines the right of review is held to mean the
demand as alleged in the complaint, and this is the sole basis for esti
mating the jurisdictional amount,—Dashiell v. Slingerland, (1882) 60
Cal. 653; whether the appeal be taken by the plaintiff or defendant,—
Lord v. Goldberg, (1889) 81 Cal. 596.
Where the amount of the judgment is made the test, there is no
appeal from a judgment ot non-suit or that the plaintiff take nothing.-—
Timerman v. Real Estate Co., (1894) 20 Colo. 147; Meyer v. Brophy,
(1890) 15 Colo. 572; Sons of America Bldg. Assn. v. City of Denver,
(1890) 15 Colo. 592.

EDINBURGH LOMBARD
I

Supreme

v.

INVESTMENT

LIMITED,

COOPER.

Court of Kansas.
68

CO.

1904.

Kansas, 517.

ATKINSON, J. The Edinburgh Lombard Investment Com
pany, Limited, ﬁled its petition of foreclosure in the district
court of Rooks county on the 11th day of May, 1900, against
Emma Cooper et al., to foreclose a mortgage upon premises
in said county.
Defendants answered, claiming a set-off.
Upon the trial in the district court defendants were allowed
a set-off against the claim of plaintiff, and plaintiff recovered
judgment against defendants for the sum of $515.66, with
interest at 10 per cent. per annum, costs of suit, and fore
closure of mortgage.
Plaintiff prosecuted error to the Su
preme Court, and the judgment of the trial court was af
firmed. Edinburgh Lombard Investment Company, Limited,
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Emma Cooper et al., 64 Kan. 888, 68 Pac. 1127. On June
after the mandate of the Supreme Court had
been ﬁled in the district court, defendants ﬁled their motion
to correct the journal entry in said cause. A hearing was had
upon said motion, which was by the court sustained, and the
court made its order correcting said journal entry to show
plaintiff should not recover interest and costs on said judg
ment of $515.66.
To this order of the court correcting said
journal entry plaintiff excepted, and brought proceedings in
error to the Supreme Court. We have carefully examined
The amount in controversy,
the record ﬁled in this court.
costs,
exclusive of
would be the amount of loss in interest
plaintiff sustained by the order of said court correcting said
journal entry. This amount is less than $100. The appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court cannot be exercised in
any civil action unless the amount or value in controversy,
exclusive of costs, exceeds $100, except in certain cases; and
the present case does not come within any of the exceptions.
Gen. St. 1901, § 5019; Coal Co. '0. Barber, 47 Kan. 29, 27 Pac.
114; Loomis v. Bass, 48 Kan. 26, 28 Pac. 1012; Skoin 22. Lim
erick, 50 Kan. 465, 31 Pac. 1051.
As there is no jurisdiction to review the case, it will be
All the Justices concurring.
dismissed from this court.
v.

25, 1902, and

~___

ZECKENDORF
Supreme

v.

JOHNSON.

Court of the United States.
123

1887.

United States, 617.

WAITE, C. J. A judgment was rendered September 28,
1885, by the district court of Arizona, in and for the county
Zeckendorf & Co., the appellants, and
of Pima, against
Johnson,
the appellee, for $4,304.93, “with in
in favor of
terest on $2,800 of said sum, at the rate of two per cent.
per month from the date hereof until paid, and interest
on $1,504.33, at the rate of ten per cent. per annum from
This judgment was affirmed by
the date hereof until paid.”
the supreme court of the territory, on appeal, November 8,
From that judgment of aﬂirmance this appeal was
1886.

\
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taken, which the appellee moves to dismiss, on the ground
that the value of the matter in dispute does not exceed
Act March 3, 1885, c. 355,
$5,000, as now required by law.
The
matter
in dispute is to be de
St.
value
of
the
443.)
(23
termined by the amount due at the time of the judgment
brought here for review, to-wit, the judgment of the supreme
court of the territory, and not at the time of the judgment
of the district court. Adding the interest to the judgment
of the district court until the date of that of the supreme
court, as we must for the purpose of determining our juris
diction, (The Pata-psco, 12 Wall. 451; Railroad v. Bank, 118
U. S. 608, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 23), we ﬁnd that the amount due
at the time of the judgment of the supreme court was con
siderably more than $5,000. The motion to dismiss is there
fore denied.

I

Q

Q

I I

O

l i

O

III

Ii

Accord: Smith v. City of Rochester, (1887) 104 N. Y. 674. But
some courts hold otherwise.
"The amount involved in a suit is the
between the parties at the time the suit is
amount in controversy
brought, and interest accruing during the pendency of the suit cannot
be added in order to make up the amount necessary to an appeal to
this court."—Lydston v. Auburgh, (1905) 216 Ill. 210.

NORFOLK & WESTERN RAILROAD

CO. v.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.
92

Virginia,

CLARK.
1895.

118-.

HARRISON, J. In this case judgment was rendered by a
justice of the peace for Pulaski county in favor of P. B. Clark
against the Norfolk & Western Railroad Company for $10,
the sum claimed as damages for killing a steer, and costs of
judgment, $2.70, consisting of $1 magistrate’s fee, $1 wit
The justice de
nesses’ fees, and 70 cents constable’s fee.
nied an application for an appeal to the county court of
Pulaski, upon the ground that the matter in controversy did
Thereupon the defendant company pre
not exceed $10.
sented to the judge of the circuit court of Pulaski a petition
praying for a writ of mandamus to compel the justice to

O
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petition being refused,
This
error and supersedeas was awarded to this court.

.

785
a

writ of

The sole question presented by the record is whether, un
der section 2947, Code Va. 1887, as amended March 1, 1894,
costs are to be included as forming a part of the matter in
controversy in computing the sum ﬁxed by the statute as
the limit of appeal to the county court from the decision of
a justice.
As the matter in controversy, exclusive of interest, must
exceed $10, in order to give the right of appeal, the ques
tion arises, what is the matter in controversy?
These words have received judicial interpretation by this
Judge Burks, in Harman v. City of Lynchburg, 33
court.
Grat. 38, quotes with approval the following exposition of
their meaning by Mr. Justice Field in Lee v. Watson, 1 Wall.
337; “By ‘matter in dispute’ is meant the subject of litiga
tion, the matter for which the suit is brought, and upon
which issue is joined, and in relation to which jurors are
called, and witnesses examined.”
It is, however, contended
that the numerous decisions of the state and federal courts
holding costs to be no part of the matter in controversy are
not applicable in determining the right of appeal from a
justice, because they relate to the jurisdiction of the courts
by which they were pronounced, and in ﬁxing said jurisdic
tion costs are expressly excluded by statute. It is so mani
fest upon principle, and for reasons of public policy, that
costs should be included in determining the right of appeal,
that we do not doubt the decisions referred to would have
been the same if there had been no statute on the subject.
It is contended that the exclusion of costs by statute shows
the opinion of the legislature to have been that costs formed
a part of the matter in controversy.
You cannot exclude
what was never included, and therefore the legislative pur
pose seems rather to have been to put the question beyond
the realm of controversy, and to emphasize the fact that
costs did not form a part of the matter in controversy, and
The subject of controversy exists
could not be so regarded.
The suit is the result which fol
before the suit is brought.
lows the existence of a matter of controversy.
Costs follow
as an incident in the growth or progress of the suit. There
can be no costs until the matter in controversy has cul
minated in a suit, and costs can in no way alter the nature
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or change the character of the
in controversy.
So
matter
authorities,
had
access
far as we have
to
not one has been
found holding costs to be any part of the matter in contro
versy.
On the contrary, costs are everywhere regarded as
adventitious and merely incidental, and in no way affecting
the jurisdiction.
As an incident of the controversy, costs are
taxed under statutory authority, to pay officers who have
rendered services in the case, or for witnesses who have
testiﬁed.

Under the construction of this statute contended for by
the plaintiff in error, that costs are to be treated as part
of the matter in controversy, the judgment of a justice
could never be ﬁnal, notwithstanding the plain purpose of
the legislature to make it so, for the reason that, if the
litigants saw proper, either side could unnecessarily
in
crease the costs, and thus secure the right of appeal, no
matter how small the sum for which the suit was brought.
In this way the power and right of the legislature to regu
late the matter of appeals would be defeated, and transferred
to the litigants, to be determined as their caprice might
*
*
"
dictate.
For the foregoing reasons we are of opinion that the cir
cuit court properly refused to award the writ of mandamus
prayed for by the plaintiff in error, and its judgment is there
fore affirmed.”
$8Costs and interest are often expressly excluded by the statute.-—
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Stahl, (1908) 78 Kan. 528.; Wilson v. Faqua, (1912)
21 Colo. App. 449; Rupel v. Ohio Oil Co., (1909) 172 Ind. 300; Widman
v. Gay, (1898) 101 Wis. 325; Hartsook's Adm'r v. Crawford's Adm’r,
(1888) 85 Va. 413; Smith v. Rountree, (1900) 185 Ill. 219.
But in a new suit involving a former judgment which includes costs,
such costs will constitute part of the matter in dispute.—McClelland V.
Cragun, (1895) 54 Kan. 599; Nashville, C. & St. L. RR. Co. v. Mattingly,
(1897) 101 Ky. 219; Bank of Union v. Loeb, (1912) 71 W. Va. 494:
Mayo v. Hansen, (1896) 94 Wis. 610; Shipman v. Fletcher's Adm’r.
(1898)

95 Va.

585.
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FRASER.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

1901.

_

Missouri, 242.'

165

J.

The ﬁrst question with which we are con
fronted is with respect to the jurisdiction of the supreme
court over this appeal. The amount of the penalty of the
BURGESS,

instruments declared upon is $2,500 each, and, unless by the
consolidation of the suits the amounts are also consolidated,
it is, of course, without jurisdiction; the amount being less
By section 749, Rev. St. 1899, it is provided
than $4,500.
that whenever several suits, founded alone upon liquidated
demands, shall be pending in the same court by the same
plaintiff against the same defendant, or whenever several
such suits are pending in the same court against several de
fendants, the court in which the same shall be prosecuted
may, in its discretion, if it appear expedient, order such
Now, these suits
suits to be consolidated into one action.
against
plaintiff
defendants, but
by
same
the
same
were
the
on different causes of action; but, the court having ordered
their consolidation, thereafter, in contemplation of law, there
was but one action,—as much so as if there had been but
one in the ﬁrst place, with a separate count on each cause
of action,-while the amount to be found due, and for which
judgment should have been rendered in the event of plain
tiff’s recovery on both counts, would have to be consolidated,
and judgment rendered for the aggregate amount, f\,.', un
der our statute, but one ﬁnal judgment can be given in any
Section 773, Rev. St. 1899. Under this-view of the
action.
case, the amount involved is $5,000, which gives the supreme
court jurisdiction of the appeal.
it

*

t

i

1

ii

Q

#

F
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HA few cases have held that where suits aﬂectlng different parties
and tried together by consent, the appellee cannot
are consolidated
object to using the aggregate amount as the jurisdictional test.—Skinner
v. Cowley County,
(1901) 63 Kan. 557; Tuthill Spring Co. v. Smith,
(1894) 90 Ia. 331.

CHAPTER V.
METHODS OF REVIEW.
SEcTIoN

WRIT or ERRoR AND APPEAL.

1.

DOWER v. RICHARDS.
Court of the United States.

Supreme

151

1894.

United States, 658.

[This was an action of ejectment to recover possession of

two lots in the city of Nevada, Cal. The plaintiffs claimed
under a town-site patent from the United States granted in
1869; the defendants claimed under a mining location which,
if in existence at the time of the patent, took precedence of it.
The case was tried without a jury, and the court found as a
fact that the location had been abandoned for more than a
year before the issuance of the patent, and was not sought to
until many years thereafter. And as a
be re-established
matter of law the court held that the defendants wrongfully
withheld possession from the plaintiffs. On appeal to the
Supreme Court of California that court affirmed the judgment
for the plaintiffs, ﬁnding, upon the record before it, facts
substantially identical with the facts found below, and that
as a matter of law the town-site patent took precedence.
The
defendants thereupon sued out a writ of error in the Supreme
Court of the United States.]
GRAY,

J

.

*

*

*

The principal ground on which the plaintiffs in error seek
to reverse the judgment of the supreme court of California is
that its decision, in matter of fact, was erroneous, and con
trary to the weight of the evidence in the case; but to review
the decision of the state court upon the question of fact is not
within the jurisdiction of this court.
In the legislation of congress, from the foundation of the
government, a writ of error which brings up matter of law,
(788)
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only, has always been distinguished from an appeal, which,
unless expressly restricted, brings up both law and fact.
Wiseart v. D’Auchy, 3 Dall. 321; U. S. 12. Goodwin, 7 Cranch.
108; Cohens 'v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 410; Hemmenway v.
Fisher, 20 How. 255, 258; In re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1, 42, 10
Sup. Ct. 658.
In the ﬁrst judiciary act the whole appellate jurisdiction
of this court was limited to matters of law. While an appeal
lay from the district court to the circuit court in admiralty
cases, neither the judgments or decrees of the circuit court,
Whether in law, equity, or admiralty, nor judgments or de
crees of the highest court of a state, could be reviewed by this
court, except by writ of error. Act Sept. 24, 1789, c. 20,
§§ 19, 22-25, (1 Stat. 83-86).
Under that act it was held that a decree in admiralty could
not be reviewed by this court in matter of fact; and Chief
Justice Ellsworth, after laying down the rule that the appel
late jurisdiction of this court could only be exercised within
“It is to be
the regulations prescribed by congress, said:
considered, then, that the judicial statute of the United States
speaks of an ‘appeal’ and of a ‘writ of error;' but it does not
They are
confound the terms, nor use them promiscuously.
to be understood, when used, according to their ordinary ac
ceptation, unless something appears in the act itself to con
trol, modify, or change the ﬁxed and technical sense which
they have previously borne. An appeal is a process of civil
law origin, and removes a cause entirely, subjecting the fact,
as well as the law, to a review and retrial; but a writ of error
is a process of common-law origin, and it removes nothing for
re-examination but the law.” Wiscart 'v. D’Auchy, 3 Dall.
327; The Perseverance, 3 Dall. 336; The Charles Carter, 4

Dall. 22.

In

congress substituted an appeal from the circuit
court to this court, instead of a writ of error, in cases in
equity and in admiralty; and upon such an appeal the facts as
well as the law were open to review in both those classes of
cases until 1875, when the appeal in admiralty was restricted
to questions of law. Act March 3, 1803, c. 40, (2 Stat. 244;)
The San Pedro, 2 Wheat. 132; The Baltimore, 8 Wall. 377;
Rev. St. § 692; Act Feb. 16, 1875, c. 77, § 1, (18 Stat. 315;)
The Francis Wright, 105 U. S. 381.
Judgments of the circuit court in actions. at law have re
1803
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mained reviewable by writ of error only. Jones v. La Valette,
5 Wall. 579; Act July 4, 1840, c. 43, § 3, (5 Stat. 393;) Rev.
St. § 691. Upon such a writ of error, this court, as is well
settled, cannot review a decision of a question of fact, even
if by the local practice, as in Louisiana, the law and the facts
are tried together by the judge without a jury.
The only appellate jurisdiction which has ever been con
ferred by congress upon this court to review the judgments
or decrees, at law or in equity, of the highest court of a state.
has been by writ of error. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264,
410; " " "
That this court, in an action at law, at least, has no juris
diction to review the decision of the highest court of a state
upon a pure question of fact, although a federal question
would or would not be presented, according to the way in
which the question of fact was decided, is clearly settled by a
series of later decisions, some of them in cases very like the
one now before us.
U

8

i

ll

Q

I I

O

i

O

The case now before us is an action of ejectment. which
was submitted to the supreme court of the same state. accord
ing to the local practice, upon ﬁndings of fact and a statement
of evidence by an inferior court of the state. From the fore
going reasons and authorities it follows that this court can
not review the decision of the state court upon the question
of fact whether the ledge, at the time when the town-site pat
ennt took effect, was known to be valuable for mining pur
poses; and, the only question of federal law in the case having
been rightly decided by that court, its judgment is affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN concurred in the judgment of affirm
ance, but not in all the reasoning of the opinion."
25 The same limitation
is adhered to in chancery cases coming up
In Cedar Rapids Gas C0. v. Cedar Rapids, (1911)
from state courts.
223 U. S. 655, which was a chancery case, the plaintiff sought to argue
questions of tact in the United States Supreme Court, urging that this
was permissible under Rev. St. § 709 providing that a writ ot error to
a state court “shall have the same effect as if the judgment or decree
complained
of had been rendered or passed in a court of the United
But the court refused to so construe the statute, saying that
States."
although there had been a suggestion to that effect in Republican River
Bridge Co. v. Kan. Pac. Ry., 92 U. S. 315, the practice had always been

the other way.
“It was a well settled rule that all errors of the jury must be corrected
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where the trial was had.
It is true the Supreme Court
could, upon writ of error, take cognizance of errors of fact as well as
of law.
But it was only errors of
(Arnold v. Sanford, 14 Johns. 417.)
the court whether in fact or in law, which could be thus reviewed, cases
where, in consequence of some fact unknown or unnoticed, some irreg
ularity had occurred in the proceeding; such as permitting a married
woman or an infant to appear by attorney."—Thurber v. Townsend,
(1860) 22 N. Y. 517.
“Error in fact cannot be assigned where it contradicts the record, and
where the matter of fact might have been put in issue and tried, and
a jortiori, when it is put in issue and tried."—Riley v. Waugh, (1851)

in the court

Cushing (Mass.) 220.
“An assignment of errors is in the nature of a declaration, and is
either of error in fact, or error in law; The former consist of matters
of fact, not appearing on the face of the record, which if true, prove
the judgment to have been erroneous;
in the
as that the defendant
original action, being under age, appeared by attorney."—2 Saunders 101,
Williams’ note.
“ ‘When an
issue in fact has been decided, there is no appeal in the
English law from its decision, except in the way of motion for new trial,
and its being wrongly decided is not error in the technical sense to
which a writ of error refers. So if a matter of fact should exist which
was not brought into issue, but which, if brought into issue would
have led to a different judgment, the existence of such fact does not,
' ' " But
after judgment, amount to error in the proceedings.
there are certain facts which affect the validity and regularity of the
itself; such as that the defendant, while under age,
legal decision
appeared in a suit by attorney and not by guardian, or the plaintiff or
defendant having been a married woman when the suit was commenced.
Such facts as these, however late discovered and alleged, are errors in
fact, and sufficient to reverse the judgment upon writ of error.’ " ' *
Stephen on Pl. 142.
Thus a judgment against an infant without ﬁrst
appointing a guardian ad litem, is erroneous and may be reversed on
error. Swan 12. Horton, 14 Gray, 179; Crockett v. Drew, 5 Gray, 399.
So, if judgment be rendered against one non compos or insane, by de
fault, it will be reversed.
Leach v. Marsh, 47 Maine, 549."-—Denison v.
The Portland Co., (1872) 60 Me. 519. To the same effect see Teller v.
Wetherell, (1858) 6 Mich. 45.
Statutory provisions relative to the power of appellate courts are
frequently held to limit the writ of error to a. review of errors of law.
Vrooman v. Arnold, (1909) 29 R. I. 478; Styles v. Tyler, (1894) 64 Conn.
432; Beall v. Powell, (1848) 4 Ga. 525; Lane v. Goldsmith, (1867) 23
Ia. 240.
8
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NEAL.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
60 West
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1906.

Virginia, 106.

*

The ﬁrst question for consideration is whether or not the
plaintiff, Hannah Wingﬁeld was a pendente lite purchaser.
It is claimed by her ' " "‘ at the time she purchased, the
appeal was not pending, and that she was not a pendente lite
purchaser, but that she is a purchaser for value, without no
tice. But the appellees claim that she had actual knowledge
of the suit, and also that she purchased within the time al
lowed by law for an appeal, and that an appeal was taken
within that time, and, the decree of the circuit court being
reversed, her title fell with such reversal.
Y!

i l l I i

Q

U

I l

Was the appellant a pendente lite purchaser? The prop
erty was purchased by her about 20 months after the ﬁnal de
cree of the circuit court, and before the appellees procured an
appeal from this court, which was allowed only a few days
before the time for obtaining same would have expired by
limitation. In order to make her a pendente lite purchaser
there must be, at the time of the purchase, a pending suit.
If there is no pending suit, there can be no pendente lite pur
chaser. Therefore, in orderlto determine whether there was
a pending suit at the time of the purchase, it is necessary to
ascertain whether or not our statutory appeal is a continuing
suit. If it does not operate to continue the suit, then the suit
cannot be said to have been pending at the time of the pur
chase, because it ended with the ﬁnal decree of the circuit
court, and the appeal operated as a new suit, and the purchase
having been made in the interim, the purchaser could not
In order to deter
be regarded as a pendente lite purchaser.
proper
it
will
be
to
question
determine
the scope
mine this
and meaning of an appeal, in its origination, and in what Way
the remedy by appeal has been changed by statute, and then
to compare our statutory appeal with a writ of error, as it is
almost, if not universally, held that a writ of error is a new
action, and that one who purchases the subject of the litiga
tion between the time of the entry of the ﬁnal judgment and

I
4
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the suing out of the writ, is not regarded a pendente lite pur
chaser, but is"considered a purchaser for value, without no
tice. And it may be well to remark that whatever may be said
here in the discussion of this question is only intended to ap
ply to appeals from the circuit court to this court, without,
in any way, reflecting any views as to appeals from other
tribunals to the circuit court.
An appeal was unknown to the common law. In the civil
law and equity jurisprudence its object was to take the whole
case to the higher tribunal, there to be tried and determined
de nova, upon the issues between the parties, as though the
cause had originated in the appellate court. It will be found,
upon an examination of this question, that it is attended with
considerable confusion from the fact that in some of the
states the appellate proceeding is denominated “appeal,”
while in others the distinction between appeals in equity and
review upon petition in error is strictly adhered to. “Ap
peal” is sometimes used with us, in legal language, to denote
the nature of appellate jurisdiction as distinguished from
original jurisdiction, without regard to the particular mode
by which a cause is transmitted to a superior court. In fact
our Constitution, art. 8, § 3, so denominates it. Mr. Powell,
in his work on Appellate Proceedings (section 4, c. 6), says:
“Although the various modes of proceedings are prosecuted
in different ways and called by different appellations, as ‘ap
peal,’ ‘review,’ ‘error,’ and the like, and these names often
confounded and misapplied, yet the object to be attained is
one or the other of two results, either by an appeal to obtain
a rehearing and new trial of the case upon its facts and mer
its, or a review of alleged errors in law in the record of the
judgment and proceedings which will result either in the re
versal or affirming of the judgment, which are properly called
‘proceedings in error.’ By the ﬁrst—appeal—when perfected
in accordance with the statute and the rules of the court, the
whole case with its record and proceedings is taken from the
court below into the appellate court, there to be again tried
upon the issues between the parties as though the case origi
nated in such appellate court; which appeal has the effect to
set aside and vacate the original verdict and judgment in the
case; and the result remains wholly dependent on the future
judgment which may be rendered in the case upon the appeal
By the second proceeding—review and er
and new trial.
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ror—-the result depends entirely upon the question whether
the appellate court ﬁnds the alleged error in the record of the
judgment and proceedings of the court below.”
Where an appeal was taken, the judgment or decree did
not become operative until the cause was ﬁnally tried and
determined in the appellate court, as the appeal was taken
at the same term at which ﬁnal judgment or decree was en
tered in the lower court, and upon taking appeal the judg
ment or decree thereby became vacated.
“An appeal is a process of civil law origin, and is the ap
propriate mode of review for causes originating in a court
of chancery. Unless statutes otherwise provide, it removes
the whole cause, subjecting the facts as well as the law to re
view and retrial.” 2 Ency. Pl. & Pr. 31. “An appeal is a
process of civil-law origin, and removes a cause entirely, sub
jecting the facts, as well as the law, to a review and retrial;
but a writ of error is a suit of common-law origin and it re
moves nothing for retrial but the law.” Wiscart v. Dauchy,
3 Dall. (U. S.) 331, 1 L. Ed. 619; Dower 'v. Richards, 151 U.
S. 658, 14 Sup. Ct. 452, 38 L. Ed. 305; Elliott v. Toeppner,
187 U. S. 327, 23 Sup. Ct. 133, 47 L. Ed. 200; Lyles v. Barnes,
40 Miss. 608; Ketchum '0. Thatcher, 12 Mo. App. 185; State
v. Doane, 35 Neb. 707, 53 N. W. 611; U. S. "v. Goodwin, 7
Cranch (U. S.) 108, 3 L. Ed. 284; 4 Minor, 1059; 2 Cyc. 515;
.
3 Bl. Com. 453.
Having referred to the true meaning and scope of an ap
peal before statutory intervention, it will now be proper to
determine what is the scope of the remedy afforded by appeal
under our statute, and as compared with the remedy by writ
of error. The remedy by appeal, under our statute, is not
given as a matter of right, nor does it operate to remove the
cause to this court for trial de novo, neither is it required to
be taken at the same term at which the decree complained of
is rendered, nor is application made to the trial court for the
appeal, as under the civil law. It_is a process issuing out of
this court upon petition assigning errors, the same as upon
application for writ of error. In fact, the writ of error, and
appeal, under our statute, which are used to remove or bring
causes to this court, are only distinguishable in this—appeal
lies to equity proceedings, and writ of error to law causes.
Therefore our statutory appeal cannot be considered a con
tinuation of the same suit, because the decree of the lower
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court, when not suspended, becomes ﬁnal and operative upon
the adjournment of the term, unlike at the civil law, for there,
when an appeal was taken, it was done at the same term, upon
application to the trial court, and when done, the decree never
became ﬁnal.
This being so, the reason ceases for holding that an appeal
is a continuation of the suit, while the writ of error is a new
action. The decree appealed from is ﬁnal; so is the judgment.
If a writ of error is a new suit, why not an appeal? Under
our statute, the two proceedings are alike. The judgment and
decree are both ﬁnal, and become operative upon the adjourn
ment of the term at which they are rendered, if not sus
pended, and can only then be rendered inoperative by the
awarding of a writ of error and supersedeas, or an appeal
“Except where the
and supersedeas, as the case may be.
statutory proceeding called an appeal is nothing more than
a substitute for the common-law remedy, by writ of error, an
appeal differs from the writ of error in that it is not a new
suit, but a continuation of the suit below.” 2 Cyc. § 518. “It
is a well-established principle of appellate procedure that writ
of error is an independent action with the nature and with
the general characteristics of a new and original suit.” 7
Ency. Pl. & Pr. § 823. "‘ ‘ ‘
The authorities can be multiplied to show that a writ of
error is a new suit, and not a continuation of the suit, the
There are
proceedings of which are sought‘ to be reviewed.
contrary,
many
and
hold
the
which
which
hold
a few cases
that an appeal is a continuation of the suit, but this is not
where the statute has so restricted the appeal that in its’na
ture it only operates to review, as does a writ of error. En
tertaining the views we do, we must conclude that the suit
cannot be regarded as pending at the time that Hannah Wing
ﬁeld purchased, and therefore she could not be held to be a
purchaser pendente lite.
$I8

*

it

3

'

'

it

it

“We take
to be well settled that a writ
86 Statutory writs of error.
of the suit the
of error is a new suit, and not merely a continuance
is brought to reverse.
This doctrine is
judgment in which
not at all peculiar to the common law writ of error. It has been held
equally applicable to the statutory writ of error which is given in some
Ohio, 337, 354.
states, as in ours, in equity cases. Taylor v. Boyd,
Indeed, this writ is now regulated in England, and probably in most of
is
the American states, by statutes, as with us. But these statutes,
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conceived, do not create a new remedy; they merely deﬁne and regulate
a remedial process which existed at common law."—Plerce v. Stinde,
(1881) 11 Mo. App. 364.
Statutes 0/ten make appeals and writs of error alternative remedies.
“By our statute the right of appeal
Thus in Illinois, the court says:
is extended to common law causes and the right to a writ of error
to chancery causes, and the technical distinction between the practice in
the court of review in cases of appeal and writs of error is not observed,
but if the suit follows the course of the common law it is reviewed for
error, and if it is in the nature of a chancery cause it is considered
upon the merits.”—Anderson v. Steger, (1898) 173 Ill. 112, 116.
See
also Coston v. Coston, (1866) 25 Md. 500.
In Levering v. National Bank, (1912) 87 Ohio St. 117, the court said
that the abolition of writs of error and certiorari and the substitution
therefor of a petition in error, did not affect the character of the pro
ceeding in error as a new suit, because the statute required issuance
and service of a summons “as in the commencement of an action."
Whether the writ of error or its equivalent is used in a legal or
equitable action, it is equally deemed the commencement of a new suit.
Lessee of Taylor v. Boyd, (1828) 3 Ohio, 338; Cheever v. Minton, (1889)
12 Colo. 557; Macklin v. Allenberg, (1889) 100 M0. 337.

i>_~

STILES

v.

TOWN OF WINDSOR.

Supreme Court of Vermont.
45 Vermont,

1878.

520.

This was a complaint under the act for relief of the fam
ilies of insane persons, approved November 10, 1870, alleging
that the plaintiff was the wife of William L. Stiles, whose
legal settlement was in the defendant town, and who was
insane, and conﬁned in the insane asylum at Brattleboro,
Vermont; that the income of the said William's estate was not
sufficient for the maintenance and support of the plaintiff and
the minor children of the said William; and praying that the
defendant be ordered to maintain and support said William

" " "‘
at said asylum.
The defendant claimed that it was liable for the expense of
supporting him at the asylum, only from the rendition of the
judgment in this case. The plaintiff claimed that the defend
ant was liable to pay such expense from the time this com
plaint was served, and the court so held, and ordered the de
fendant to maintain and support the said William at said
asylum from and after the service of said complaint, and pay
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the costs of this proceeding; to which the defendant excepted.
Ross, . The defendant has taken exceptions to the pro
ceedings and action of the county court in making an order
upon it, under the act of 1870, ﬁxing the liability of the town
to support William L. Stiles, an insane person, the husband
The act makes the county court a special
of the complainant.
tribunal to determine and ﬁx. In a summary_manner, the lia
bility of towns in such cases. In its action, that court was not
exercising its jurisdiction “according to the course of the
common law,” but in a new course, different from that pre
scribed by the common law. By the common law, the town
would have had the right to a trial and determination of the
facts by a jury. By the act, the facts are all determined by
That court rendered no judgment directly
the county court.
complainant,
and only granted her relief indi
the
favor
of
in
rectly, by ordering the town to assume the burden of sup
porting the husband, and thus removed that burden from rest
ing upon his property, from which the complainant derives,
in part, her support. The jurisdiction is conferred upon that
court and its proceedings are prescribed by the act. Writs
of error or exceptions do not lie to the action of the county
court, except when it exercises its jurisdiction, substantially,
according to the course of the common law.
When it exer
cises its jurisdiction in a new course, different from that pre
scribed by the common law, the party aggrieved by its proceed
ings, must seek redress by certorari, or mandamus, or some
*
* “ We have not, therefore, consid
other proper writ.
ered the question attempted to be raised by the exceptions.
The exceptions are dismissed, with costs to the complainant."

J

The general rule, in the absence or statute, confines the ‘use of the
to cases in courts of record proceeding according to the course of
As to what is a court of record, see
the common law.
3 C. J. 308.
Thayer v. Commonwealth, (1846) 12 Metc. (Mass) 9. But in New Jersey
the scope of the writ has been enlarged by the court without a. statute.
Deﬁance Fruit Co. v. Fox, (1908) 76 N. J. L. 482.
21

writ
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1857.

California, 297.

On error; motion to quash the writ.
BURNETT,
.
The appellate power of the Supreme Court is
given by the fourth secton of the sixth article of the Constitu
tion, which expressly empowers this court to issue all writs
and process necessary to the exercise of its appellate jurisdic
tion. The Legislature, therefore, can pass no Act impairing
the exercise of this appellate power.
But while the Legislature cannot substantially impair the
right of appeal, it is certainly competent to regulate the mere
mode in which this right must be asserted.
The Constitu
tion only empowers this Court to issue such writs and process
as may be necessary to the exercise of its appellate jurisdic
tion; and if this appellate jurisdiction can be exercised with
out this process, then it cannot be necessary, and should not
be issued.
In the case of Savage '0. Gulliver, 4 Mass. 177, it was said
that “the statute, in giving an appeal, has, in our opinion,
taken away by reasonable implication, the remedy by error,
unless in cases where the aggrieved party, without laches on
his part, could not avail himself of an appeal.”
(See also, 6
4;
65;
2 Gil.
13 Ill. 144.)
Mass.
But the construction of our Practice Act is not left to rest
upon reasonable implication. The ninth article of the Act re
lates exclusively to appeals, and the three hundred and thirty
third section provides that “a judgment or order in a civil
action, except when expressly made ﬁnal by the Act, may b'e
reviewed as prescribed by this title, and not otherwise.”
This provision is plain and positive, that a judgment or
order may be received as prescribed by that title, and not
therefore, an appeal be given by that title in a
otherwise.
particular case, the judgment or order can only be reviewed
In reference to cases
in the manner therein ‘prescribed.
where no appeal is given, this negat. .'e provision, “not other
wise,” need not apply.
Our conclusion is that in all cases where appeal is given
by the statute, that remedy is exclusive and must be pursued,

J
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cases where no appeal

“

Motion sustained.”
88 Some cases hold that where the statute
gives an appeal the right
to use a writ of error is impliedly revoked,—Peebles
v. Rand, (1861) 43
N. H. 337; Monk v. Guild, (1841) 3 Metc. (Mass) 372; Lord v. Pierce,
But other cases hold that in such case the two
(1851) 33 Me. 350.
remedies are concurrent,—Wellmuth v. Rogers.
(1912) 52 Colo. 454;
Bowers v. Green, (1832) 1 Scam. (Ill.) 42; Baler v. Schermerhorn,_(1897)

Wis. 372.
The writ of error was a writ of right at common law,—Granat v.
Kruse, (1904) 213 Ill. 328; People v. Tweed, (1874) 67 Barb. (N. Y.)
496; Rochester
v. Roberts,
(1852) 25 N. H. 495; and it is frequently

96

made so by sta.tute,—-Smith v.
People, (1810) 6 Johns. (N. Y.)
stitution no statute can curtail
a writ ot right at the common

Moseley,

(1911) 234 Mo. 486; Yates v.
use is preserved by the con
it, but “whi1e this writ is in most cases
law, it may by statute, unless the con
stitution forbids, be limited or abolished altogether."—People v. Rich
mond, (1891) 16 Colo. 274, 282. And see note to 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 377.
337.

It its

IN RE BURNETTE.
Supreme Court of Kansas.
73

1906.

Kansas, 609.

BURCH, J. On September 2, 1903, the district court of
Sumner county rendered a judgment revoking the license of
Cleo D. Burnette to practice as an attorney and counsellor at
law. From that judgment an appeal was taken to this court
under the provisions of section 403, Gen. St. 1901, which
“In case of a removal or suspension being
reads as follows:
ordered by a district court, an appeal therefrom lies to the
Supreme Court, and all the original papers, together with a
transcript of the docket entries, shall thereupon be trans
ferred to the Supreme Court, to be there considered and ﬁnal
ly acted upon. A judgment of acquittal in the district court
is ﬁnal.” When the appeal was heard it was argued that the
judgment was erroneous, because the accusation had been
veriﬁed upon information and belief only, and because, after
appellant had failed to answer, the court, acting under section
402, Gen. St. 1901, rendered such judgment as the case re
quired without hearing evidence. Upon consultation it was
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understood that a majority of the court believed that the
judgment should be reversed, because it had been rendered
A minority
without evidence in support of the accusation.

thought the accusation to be insufficiently
veriﬁed.
Therefore an order was made remanding the cause to the dis
trict court, with instructions to set aside its judgment and to
proceed with a hearing upon the accusation.
Upon the return of the cause to the district court a trial
was had, and a judgment of disbarment was again entered,
from which the present appeal was taken. The accused now
claims this court had no power to remand the cause; that the
appeal is for the purpose of a hearing de novo; that the object
of ﬁling all original papers and a transcript of the docket en
tries in this court is that a trial de novo may be had; that,
when the original papers are transferred to this court, they
are to be considered independently of the judgment of the
district court; and that a ﬁnal judgment must be rendered
upon them here. " " ‘
In this state, except in certain speciﬁed matters, the Su
preme Court is a court of error and review. In criminal cases
it may reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment appealed from,
or may order a new trial. In civil cases it may affirm, re
verse, vacate, modify, or grant new trials, and, if the facts be
found or agreed to, may designate the character of judgment
to be entered. But in all appellate cases the Supreme Court
considers the conduct of the lower court. Error must be as
signed as inhering in the rulings, orders, and judgments ap
pealed from. The Supreme Court decides the questions thus
presented as they arise upon the record, and issues its man
date to the tribunal from which the appeal was taken to carry
Such being the gen
the judgment rendered into execution.
eral character of appellate procedure in this state, a trial de
novo here would be an anomaly and can take place only under
Elsewhere it
the compulsion of some sovereign command.
is held that trials de novo can be had in appellate courts only
by virtue of express authority, and statutes to that effect are
3 Cyc. 260.
It is doubtful if the
to be strictly construed.
is
of
this
state
of
the
peremptory kind re
statute
disbarment
The use of the word “appeal” does not alone import
quired.
also

atrial

de no-v0.

*

“

*

Appellant cites the case of State v. Mosher (Iowa) 103 N.
*
*
*
Contrary to
W. 105, in support of his contention.
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the law of Kansas, the practice of trying certain cases de nova
in the Supreme Court is an established feature of the judicial
system of Iowa. * " "
The jurisdiction to consider and decide causes de nova is in
its essence original. The manner in which a case reaches the
higher court is not the test. Jurisdiction being the power to
hear and determine, the nature of the functions to be exer
cised controls, whether they are brought into activity by pri
mary process or by removal from an inferior tribunal. Upon
a trial de noro the power of an appellate court in dealing with
the pleadings and the evidence, in the application of the law
and in the rendition of judgment according to the right of
the case, all independent of the action of the lower court, is
no different from what it would be if the case were begun
there originally, and hence is not “appellate,” within the
Lacy '0. Williams, 27
meaning of laws creating jurisdiction.
Mo. 280; C0. of St. Louis v. Sparks, 11 Mo. 203; Ex parts
Henderson, 6 Fla. 279; State ea: rel. '0. Vann, 19 Fla. 29.
In the case of Klein v. Valerius, 87 Wis. 54, 57 N. W. 1112,
22 L. R. A. 609, it was held that, since the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, under the Constitution of that
state, was appellate only, except in speciﬁed cases, a statute
attempting to make it the duty of the court to examine and
review the evidence preserved by bill of exceptions, and give
judgment according to the right of the case regardless of the
decision by the court below, upon questions of fact as well as
of law, was unconstitutional and void. "‘ * "‘
The statute in question does no more than to provide in
part a special method_ for bringing disbarment cases to this
court for consideration according to its constitutional juris
diction, which includes nothing except a revision of errors
appearing upon the record and power to enforce the decision
rendered.
Therefore the judgment upon the ﬁrst appeal, re
manding the cause, was valid, and invested the district court
~
with authority to proceed as directed.
¥

l

Q

1

#

U

3

Q

1

#29

89In State v. Williams. (1893) 40 S. C. 373, 378, the court held that
an appeal did not carry a right to a trial de nova, but rather “involves
the idea ot a review ot the proceedings had in a trial which has already
been had, and not a new trial ot the case."
In Ganoe v. The Scow Jack Robinson, (1869) 18 Mich. 455, it was
held that jurisdiction given to the Supreme Court under the water craft
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law in appeal cases was none the less appellate
testimony.

SULLIVAN
Supreme

v.

because it allowed

new

HAUG.

Court of Michigan.
82
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1890.

Michigan, 548.

CHAMPLIN, C. J. The relator shows that on the 20th of
March, 1890, he was arrested on a warrant issued by the po
lice justice of the city of Detroit, charging him with an as
sault and battery upon one Thomas P. Murrin, of the same
place, on March 17th; that he was arraigned, pleaded not
guilty, was tried, convicted, and sentenced to pay a ﬁne of
$12, and $3 costs, and in default of such payment he be im
prisoned in the Detroit House of Correction for the period of
20 days. He avers that his conviction and sentence is unjust;
that he was acting in self-defense; that on the 3d day of
April, 1890, under the general laws of this state authorizing
appeals from courts of justices of the peace, he executed a
bond in regular form, with ample and satisfactory sureties,
and so conceded by Hon. Edmund Haug, police justice, afore
said, and presented the same to him for the purpose of ap
pealing said suit to the recorder’s court of the city of Detroit,
but said Edmund Haug refused to act upon said bond, and so
notiﬁed relator, and told him that he should not, for the rea
son there was no section in the police court act which author
ized the taking of an appeal in a case like this.
Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

The relator asks for a mandamus to compel the police jus
tice to ﬁle his bond and certify the case to the circuit or re
corder’s court,_ chieﬂy upon two grounds:
( 1) That all per
sons accused of violation of the criminal laws of the state are
of right entitled to the same rights and remedies, regardless
of locality or the court in which he is tried. In other words,
the administration of the general criminal law must be the
same throughout the state.
(2) That the constitution hav
ing vested the several circuit courts with appellate jurisdic
tion from all inferior tribunals, it is not competent for the
legislature to deprive them of such appellate jurisdiction.
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What the constitution guaranties is that the accused shall
have the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
jury; to be informed of the nature of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compul
sory process for obtaining witnesses‘ in his favor, and have
the assistance of counsel for his defense; and that he shall
not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.
All of these have been accorded to relator.
But he complains that to allow a large portion of the citizens
of this state the right of appeal to a superior tribunal, and
deny, under the same circumstances and conditions, that right
to the citizens of Detroit, is a plain violation of the funda
mental principle of equality which underlies a republican
form of government, and recognized and guarantied by the
fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United
States. We think the position is fully met and answered in
the opinion of Mr. Justice Bradley, in Missouri '0. Lewis, 101
U. S., at page 30, where, speaking of a similar claim made in
that case, he said: “It is the right of every state ta establish
such courts as it sees ﬁt, and to prescribe their several juris
dictions as to territorial extent, subject-matter, and amount,
and the ﬁnality and effect of their decisions, provided it does
not encroach upon the proper jurisdiction of the United
States, and does not abridge the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States, and does not deprive any person
of his rights without due process of law, nor deny to any
person the equal protection of the laws, including the equal
right to resort to the appropriate court for redress. The last
restriction, as to the equal protection of the laws, is not vio
lated by any diversity in the jurisdiction of the several courts
amounts, or ﬁnally of decision, if all
as to subject-matter,
persons within the territorial limits of their respective juris
dictions have an equal right in like cases, and under like cir
cumstances, to resort to them for redress. Each state has the
right to make political subdivisions of its territory for mu
nicipal purposes, and to regulate their local government.
As
respects the administration of justice, it may establish one
system of courts for cities, and another for rural districts;
one system for one portion of its territory, and another sys
tem for another portion. Convenience, if not necessity, often
requires this to be done, and it would seriously interfere with
the power of a state to regulate its internal affairs to deny to
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And see Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, 7

Sup. Ct. Rep. 350.
Acting upon its own views of expediency, the legislature
organized and established the police court of the city of De
troit, andgave it jurisdiction over certain offenses, including
The legislature
the one for which relator was convicted.
deemed it expedient to provide for an appeal to the recorder’s
court in certain cases, and not in certain others when the
punishment inﬂicted was small. All persons residing or com
mitting offenses in the territorial limits of the city of Detroit
are subject to the same law.
It operates upon all classes
alike, who are within the jurisdiction of the court.
Assault
and battery is not a new offense, conﬁned to the city of De
troit. The offense is the same in every portion of the state,
and the limits to the punishment of ﬁne and imprisonment
the same. In this there is no discrimination in the law, either
for or against the relator. No person has a constitutional
right to a second trial, after having been duly convicted be
fore a court of competent jurisdiction, by an appeal to an
other tribunal; neither is there an inherent right to appeal
from a judgment of an inferior to a court of superior juris
diction for the purpose of securing a second trial upon the
merits.
The right to an appeal is and always has been statu
tory, and does not exist at common law. It is a remedy which
the legislature may in its discretion grant or take away, and
it may prescribe in what cases, and under what circum
stances, and from what courts, appeals may be taken; and,
unless the statute expressly or by plain implication provides
for an appeal from a judgment of a court of inferior jurisdic
tion, none can be taken. See The Constitution v. Woodworth,
1 Scam. 511; Ward v. People, 13 Ill. 635; Ex parte McCardle,
7 Wall. 506; Prout r. Berry, 2 Gill, 147; State 12. Railroad Co.,
18 Md. 193; Kundinger v. Saginaw, 59 Mich. 355, 26 N. W.
Rep. 634; Weed v. Lyon, Walk. (Mich.) 77; Demaray 'v. Lit
tle, 17 Mich. 386; Maxﬁeld v. Freeman, 39 Mich. 64; Cady 1:.
Manufacturing Co., 48 Mich. 133, 11 N. W. Rep. 839; Insur
ance C0. v. Whitte/more, 12 Mich. 311; People "v. Police Jus
"‘
*
*
tice, 7 Mich. 456; Clark '0. Raymond, 26 Mich. 415.
In Clark v. Raymond, 26 Mich. 415, this court held _that no
appeal lay from proceedings to enforce mechanics’ liens, un
der chapter 215 of the Compiled Laws of 1871, because the
legislature had not provided for an appeal in such law. And
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this although such proceedings were by petition to the circuit
court in chancery, and were to be carried on in analogy to
chancery proceedings.
In Cady '0. Manufacturing Co., 48
Mich- 133, 11 N. W. Rep. 839, Mr. Justice Campbell, in de
livering the opinion of the court, states the law as follows;
“No appeal lies in any case except when given by statute.”
That case was a proceeding in chancery for a voluntary dis
solution of a corporation. Nothing was said in the statute
authorizing such proceedings about the right of appeal, and
the court held that no appeal lies under our statute. ‘ * "‘
"‘
“
" It follows that unless the legislature provides a
statutory remedy by appeal, redress against judgments of in
feiior courts must be by certiorari or mandamus. The rela
tor in this case, if he wished a review and correction of er
rors committed by the police court, could have resorted to the
writ of certiorari, but this would not secure for him a retrial
of the case in the circuit court upon the merits. "‘ * *

I

J

think the mandamus should be denied.

LONG, GRANT, and CAHILL,

concur with CHAMPLIN, C.

~—

.

MORSE, _J.,

JJ.,

(dissenting).

CERTIORARI.

SECTION 2.

HAMILTON
Supreme

HARWOOD.

Court of Illinois.
113

J.

v.

1886.

Illinois, 154.

This is a petition for a common law
writ of certiorari. It is assumed by the petition that such a
writ may be used as a complete substitute for a writ of error
or an appeal, and that, by virtue of it, errors in ruling upon
the law and the evidence in the progress of the trial, and in
the application of the law to the facts in the rendition of
This is a grave misapprehen
judgment, may be corrected.
sion. The oﬁice of the writ is only to bring before the court
SCHOLFIELD,

C.
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awarding it, the record of the proceedings of the inferior tri
bunal, and the judgment must either be that the writ be
quashed and a procedendo awarded, or that the record of the
proceedings be quashed. Chicago and Rock Island Railroad
'L’. Fell, 22 Ill. 333; Com’rs.
of Sonora 1:. Supervisors of
_C’o.
Carthage, 27 id. 140. The rulings of the court upon the law
and the evidence in the progress of the trial, and in the ap
plication of the law to the facts in the rendition of judgment,
can not be reviewed in this manner.
We can only inquire,
when a return is made to the writ bringing the record before
us, whether the inferior court had jurisdiction and proceeded
legally,—i. e., followed the form of proceeding legally ap
plicable in such cases,—and not whether it correctly decided
the questions arising upon the admission or exclusion of evi
dence, the giving and refusing of instructions, and other like
questions, during the progress of the trial before the court
and jury, and in the overruling of motions for new trials and
in arrest of judgment, and the rendition of judgment after
verdict, etc. The rulings of a court may be erroneous, and
yet it may have jurisdiction and proceed legally.
If the position of counsel for the petitioners were correct,
the constitutional and statutory limitations would be utterly
useless, for in every case it would only be necessary to sue out
a certiorari to bring all the rulings of the inferior court be
fore the appellate court for review. Where decisions upon
questions of law and fact arising during the progress of the
trial or in the rendition of judgment, other than such as relate
to the question of jurisdiction or the legality of the proceed
ing, are reviewable upon certiorari, it is by virtue of some
statute which has no existence in this State.
No ground is shown in the petition for the issuing of the
writ. It concedes, tacitly, at least, that the court had juris
diction, and no attempt is made to point out illegality in the
proceeding, in the case sought to be reviewed.
Petition de
nied.9°
80 Statutes
in some states authorize the use of certiorari to review
questions other than those going to jurisdiction, making it a means
for correcting errors of law arising on questions within the jurisdiction
of the court:—Petition of Landatf, (1856) 34 N. H. 163; New York
Civil Practice Act, 1920, § 1304; Georgia, Code of 1911, § 5201; Mayor

V.

Pearl, (1850)

11

Humph.

(Tenn.)

249.
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1915.

Iowa, 598.

Certiorari proceeding brought in this court to test the le
gality of the action of the district court of Wapello county
(the defendant judge presiding) in the case of Goudy 12.
Timonds, pending in such court.
The alleged illegality com
plained of is that the defendant judge denied the petitioner
herein (defendant in that case) the right of trial by jury, and
refused to call the jury in such case upon the petitioner’s de
mand therefor, and compelled a hearing of the case before the
court without a jury. Writ sustained, and order complained
of annulled.
EVANS, . The case of Goudy v. Timonds was a proceeding
brought in the Wapello county district court under sections
3219 and 3220, whereby it was sought to have a guardian ap
pointed for the defendant therein on the ground that he was
The petitioner herein is the defendant
of unsound mind.
*
*
"
therein,
but before any judgment was entered

J

therein,

the defendant

sued out the

writ herein to test the

legality of the action of the court, and obtained a restraining
order whereby the district co_urt was restrained from entering
judgment until this proceeding could be heard. Because of
such restraining order no judgment has been entered in such
case.

Two questions are involved in the‘ case as made upon this
record: (1) Did the trial court err,in denying the defendant
jury trial? (2) Is the remedy of certiorari available to such
defendant to cure such error or illegality if any?
$

#

I i i

1

i

Q

F

$

that the defend
ant was entitled to demand a jury. * * * This demand be
ing repeated and insisted upon when this case was reached for
trial on May 11th, the refusal of the demand was not war
ranted under the statute.
’ II. This brings us to the necessary
consideration of the
more difficult question whether the error of the court was an
illegality for which no other plain, speedy and adequate rem
edy is provided within the meaning of section 4154. We have
The conclusion is unavoidable, therefore,
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held repeatedly that, where there is no excess of jurisdiction,
and Where the illegality is merely an erroneous conclusion for
which an adequate remedy is provided by appeal, a writ of
certiorari will not lie. The line of demarcation‘ between a
merely erroneous conclusion and an illegality for which no
other adequate remedy is provided cannot be very exactly de
ﬁned. In Butterﬁeld 'v. Treichler, 113 Iowa, 328, 85 N. W.
19, a jury trial was erroneously permitted, as was held later
in Porter 22. Butterﬁeld, 116 Iowa, 725, 89 N. W. 199. We
held, however, that the remedy by appeal was adequate, and
that the writ of certiorari would not lie to correct such error.
It is urged with force that such holding is decisive of the
present question; that is to say, if the writ will not lie to cor
rect an order erroneously granting a jury trial, it cannot lie
to correct the converse order erroneously refusing a jury
trial. It is urged that in either event a merely erroneous con
clusion Was involved, and no more. It is generally true that
illegality or excess of jurisdiction, if any, is necessarily pre
If the erroneous conclu
ceded by an erroneous conclusion.
sion results in an illegality within the meaning of section
4154, then there is an illegality, and not merely an erroneous
The right to a jury trial in this case was an ex
conclusion.
plicit statutory right. The defendant was deprived of it as
effectively as if the refusal had been arbitrary.
In'State '0.
Carman, 63 Iowa, 131, 18 N. W. 691, 50 Am. Rep. 741, it was
held that the district court had no jurisdiction to try a crim
inal case without a jury. In that case the defendant had ex
pressly waived a jury. This court held, however, that there
was no statutory provision authorizing the defendant to
waive a jury, and that such waiver was therefore ineffective.
The reasoning in that case is not necessarily applicable to :1
civil case, but it comes close to the general question whether
the trial judge has power to try a jury case without a jury in
It is clear that he has no
the face of a demand for a jury.
statutory authority to do so. It is also clear that the statute
gives to either litigant the express right to a jury trial. The
necessary effect of this provision is to withhold from the
trial judge the power or authority to try the issues of fact in
the case, except by the consent of the litigants, either express
or implied. In a broad sense the court had jurisdiction both
This jurisdiction was
of the parties and the subject-matter.
by
mere
errors.
In
a
sense
also the trial judge
not defeated
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is the court.
He is its head and its hand. In a jury case,
however, the jury is also a part of the court. Its function is
well deﬁned. Its power to determine issues of fact upon con
ﬂicting evidence is the power of the court to that end. That
power can be exercised by the trial judge in a jury case only
by the consent of the parties either express or implied.
To
refuse aproper demand for a jury and to exercise the jury
power over the objection of the demanding litigant is an exer
cise of power by the trial judge beyond the provision and con
templation of the statute. If this was not an illegality within
the meaning of section 4154, then it would be difficult to ap
ply the term to anything less than a defect of jurisdiction.
We reach the conclusion that the action complained of was
such illegality.
III. For this illegality had the defendant any other plain
speedy and adequate remedy?
The only other remedy avail
able to the defendant would have been by appeal. In order
to render such remedy available at all, he must ﬁrst submit to
adverse judgment.
The effect of such judgment would be to
ﬁx his status as a person of unsound mind. * * *
* "‘ "‘ This loss of status is an important consideration,
as bearing upon the question of whether the remedy by appeal
is adequate. It cannot be superseded by bond or otherwise.
It will operate to his immediate disability. "' " *
In brief, therefore, we think that the defendant is entitled
to maintain his status as presumptively compos mentis until
‘ “ "‘
the jury which he has demanded shall ﬁnd otherwise.
We think it must be said, therefore, that an appeal would
furnish the defendant no remedy against the immediate dis
ability to which adverse judgment must subject him. It is
therefore not adequate. The writ issued herein must be sus
tained, and the order complained of annulled.

Annulled.
LADD,

PRESTON, and GAYNOR,

JJ.,

concur.

DEEMER, C. J. (dissenting).
Certiorari will not lie unless
it be alleged and shown that the tribunal has exceeded its
proper jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally; and it must
also appear that there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy. Code, § 4154.
It will never lie to correct an error,
but is only to test the jurisdiction of the tribunal and the
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legality of its acts. State 'v. Roney, 37 Iowa, 30. Where a
party has the right of appeal, he cannot, as a rule, proceed by
certiorari. Ransom 11. Cummins, 66 Iowa, 137, 23 N. W. 301;
State 1;. Schmidtz, 65 Iowa, 556, 22 N. W. 673. Therefore,
when a court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, proceeds reg
ularly and according to the usual course of procedure, the
In
action will not lie, no matter how erroneous its decision.
the case now under consideration there is no question regard
ing the jurisdiction of the court, and it does not appear that
it acted irregularly or departed from the usual course of pro
cedure, or that its acts were in any way illegal, save that it
came to a wrong conclusion upon the evidence adduced, and
made an erroneous ruling. * * *
The only question of doubt in any of these cases as a rule
is whether or not the action of the court is “illegal,” as that
term is used in the statute. Our previous pronouncements
upon this question are very clear.
For example, in Eels 12.
Bailie, 118 Iowa, 521, 92 N. W. 669, the court said: “It is
fundamental that a writ of certiorari is never used to correct
a mere error, but only to test the jurisdiction of the tribunal
and the legality of its action. If the mistake complained of
was a mere matter of judgment, the writ will not ordinarily
lie, for the tribunal guilty thereof is not acting illegally.
*

*

#

*

Plaintiff invoked the jurisdiction, or rather the
action, of the district court over which defendants preside,
asked it to pass upon his motion to dismiss, and is now com
plaining of the rulings denying his motion. This is all there is
to the case as it is presented to us. Manifestly, the court, and
the defendants as the presiding officers thereof, had the right,
and it was their duty, to pass upon those motions to dismiss;
and, if they erred, it was an error of judgment, from which
an appeal may be taken in a proper case. But they were not
without jurisdiction, nor were they acting illegally in over
ruling the motions. * * *
In Finn v. Winneshiek District Court, 145 Iowa, 157, 123
N. W. 1066, we said: “Certiorari is, or may be, an original
proceeding in this court, and may be brought in all cases
where an inferior tribunal, exercising judicial functions, is
alleged to have exceeded its proper jurisdiction, or otherwise
acted illegally, and there is no other plain, speedy, and ade
quate remedy. "‘ * * The distinction between an erroneous
*

*
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and an illegal order is well pointed out in Tiedt v. Carstensen,
‘We are,
61 Iowa, 334 (16 N. W. 214), where it is said:
therefore, only to inquire, when is a tribunal “acting illegal
ly” in the contemplation of the statute? When the law pre
scribes proceedings to be had by an oﬁicer or tribunal in cases
pending before them, the omission of such proceedings is in
violation of law, and the court or officer omitting them would
therefore act illegally. In a word, if a tribunal, when deter
mining matters before it which are within its jurisdiction,
proceeds in a manner contrary to law, it acts illegally. But,
if a discretion is conferred upon the inferior tribunal, its ex
If it be clothed with authority to
ercise cannot be illegal.
decide upon facts submitted to it, the decision is not illegal,
whatever it may be, if the subject-matter and the parties are
within its jurisdiction; for the law intrusts the decision to
"
the discretion of the tribunal.’
3

#

Q

i

¥

Q

1

#

#

U

The rule has been applied in a variety of cases. For in
stance:
In an action where an order on a petition for a re
moval of the cause to the federal courts was involved, the
court having erroneously ordered a transfer to the federal
court, it was held that the action could not be reviewed by
certiorari. In one of the cases it was held that the erroneous
dismissal of an appeal from a justice’s court to the district
court could not be reviewed on certiorari.
In several cases it was held that the erroneous exclusion of
testimony 'or an order for the production of books or papers,
a motion for a change of place of trial, and various other mat
ters, could not be reviewed, save that the court was without
or acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
In a recent case it was held that an erroneous order deny
ing a change of [venue could not be reviewed on certiorari.
Barry v. Court, 149 N. W. 449. * ' “
It is very clear to my mind that the trial judge in this case
had jurisdiction, and that the most that can be said of his
order is that he erred in his conclusion either in the ﬁnding
of facts or in his conclusion of law. He did not act illegally,
nor were his proceedings irregular. He had full jurisdiction
of both parties and subject-matter, and it will not do, I think,
to say that, “if erroneous conclusions result in illegality, then
there is illegality,” and not merely an erroneous conclusion.
This, to my mind, is reasoning in a circle, otherwise all erro
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_it,

neous conclusions are illegal; and this is manifestly not true.
A case much like this one is Butter/ield 'v. Treichler, 113 Iowa,
328, 85 N. W. 19, wherein it was held that the writ of certio
rari would not lie because the court erroneously directed a
jury trial in a case where such was not permissible.
I can
hardly understand the logic of an opinion which holds that,
if a jury trial is denied where the parties are entitled to it,
then they are entitled to a writ of certiorari to review the
ruling; whereas, if granted when they are not entitled to
such writ will not lie.
"
shall not do more at this time than to quote from
learned opinion of the Louisiana court as follows:
certiorari are simply to ascertain the
“The functions of
validity of proceedings before
court of justice, either on the
charge of their invalidity, because the essential forms of the
law have not been observed, or on that of the want of jurisdic
tion in the court entertaining them. They have never been
to inquire into the correctness of the judgment rendered
where the forms of the law have been followed, and where
the court had jurisdiction, and was therefore competent.
has been held that the supervisory jurisdiction of
Hence
certiorari, must be restricted to an exam
this court, under
ination into the external validity of the proceedings-had in
It cannot be exercised to review the judg
the lower court.
ment as to its intrinsic correctness, either on the law or on
The supervisory powers of the court
the facts of the case.
must not be confounded with its appellate jurisdiction.
State ea: rel. Matranga 'v. Marr, 42 La. Ann. 1089,
South. 277, 10 L. R. A. 248.
resistance to the demand of the defendant for
There was
jury, and the trial court was compelled to pass upon the
merits of that resistance, and, as an incident thereto, on
whether something had occurred earlier that operated as a
waiver of jury trial; and some considerable reasoning
in
dulged in by the majority opinion as to whether what oc
admitted here that
curred operated as such waiver. It
whether
a
is
for
consideration
trial
was begun, and
there
thereby objection to trial without jury came too late in view
of the statutory provision that jury may be waived by going
demand for
jury,
to trial without objection and without
that,
majority
by
the
record
entry
said
made be
and
waiver of jury in the trial of the main case,
low discloses
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was such by implication only. Conceding for the purpose of
this dissent that, if a trial court arbitrarily denied a trial
by jury where in reason no question could be, and none was,
made as to the right to such trial, certiorari will lie. But does
that meet a case where the original jury“ trial was fairly in
contest, and its contest submitted to the court, and it decides
it in a way that we think it should not be decided? If the
majority is followed to the logical end, then certiorari lies in
every case where a trial by jury is denied when it should have
In some special proceedings such trial is, and
been allowed.
in others it is not, granted. Motion to transfer either to law
or to equity always involves whether there shall or shall not
be a jury trial.
Motions to direct verdict present whether
Is
the court, rather than the jury, shall decide the cause.
rulings
in
such
matters
as
certiorari entertained to test the
these just referred to?
U

SALINGER,

J

.,

O

i I i l l

O

O

concurs in this dissent.

MCCLATCHY
Supreme

v.

SUPERIOR COURT.

Court of California.
119

J

#

1897.

California, 413.

VAN FLEET, . Certiorari to review an order of respondent
adjudging petitioner guilty of contempt. While the cause of
Talmadge against Talmadge was on trial in the superior court
of Sacramento county an article appeared in the Sacramento
Bee, a newspaper published in the city of Sacramento, pur
porting to be an account of certain testimony given by one
of the witnesses; and when, at the opening of court next day,
its attention was called to the article by one of the attorneys
in the cause, the judge stated from the bench that he had no
hesitation in saying that the statement referred to was a
grossly false statement, a gross fabrication, and that there
was not the slightest ground in the testimony of the witness
upon which such a statement could be based. In the after
noon of that day the Bee published in its editorial columns the
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following article:
“The Bee will not keep in its employ a
reporter who garbles or who misstates, but when a news
gatherer does his duty and tells the truth it will not stand
silently by while an aggregation of attorneys tries to make
him out a liar, and while a prejudiced and vindictive czar
upon the bench aids and abets them in such a purpose.
The
Bee reasserts that in all material details the statement of
Talmadge, as given.in the Bee of yesterday, was the state
ment that he made upon the stand at Monday afternoon ses
sion. ‘ * “” The petitioner herein is the editor and one
of the proprietors of the Bee, and on June 2, 1896, upon an
affidavit of Mr. C. T. Jones, setting forth these publications,
and that the same was an interference with the proceedings
of the court in the trial of the cause, and constituted a con
tempt of said court, a citation was issued directing him to
show cause why he should not be punished for said contempt.
*
*
*
To prove the false character of the matter pub
lished by petitioner, the prosecution introduced the court re
porter, who testiﬁed that the matter published, purporting to
be a statement of the evidence as given in the action on trial
at the time, did not accord with his notes of such evidence;
and, to show that petitioner acted with malicious intent, it
was proved by the reporter that before the second publica
tion appeared he had furnished to petitioner what purported
to be a correct transcript of his notes of that portion of said
evidence to which the publication referred. This was sub
stantially the case of the people, the publications being ad
The substantive defense was that the publications
mitted.
were in fact true, and not made with any wrongful intent;
that the personal references therein to the judge were merely
in response to the aspersion of the latter cast upon petitioner
in characterizing the statements in his newspaper as false
and fabricated, when in fact they were not; and that such
personal references were not made for the purpose of inter
fering with the administration of justice. That this was :1

complete defense, if sustained by evidence, there can, We
think, be no doubt. "' * *
When the case of the people rested this occurred:
“Mr.
Reddy: We want to call witnesses to show that the publica
tion in the Bee was in point of fact true. The Judge: I will
not hear testimony further than what has already appeared
on that subject, as stated by the reporter. I will not allow
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‘_"”

this matter to degenerate into a controversy as to the cor
rectness of the reporter’s notes. Mr. Reddy: Then we will
not be allowed to introduce any evidence at all,—is that the
proposition ?—if these notes are to be taken as correct? The
Judge: I shall act only on the official notes, as given you by
*
*
the reporter. I will hear no other testimony.
That the result of this action of the court in thus requiring
petitioner, in effect, to submit his defense upon the evidence
for the people, was, in substance and effect, to deprive peti
tioner of the right to be heard in his defense, is, we think, ob
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*
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a

is

is

it
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vious. It is“ contended by respondent that, even
the action
was error merely, which cannot be
of the court was wrong,
that,
certiorari;
the court having jurisdiction of
reviewed on
the mere method in which
the person and subject-matter,
jurisdiction
cannot
be inquired into in this
exercised such
proceeding, which looks only to the question of jurisdiction.
If the premise were correct, the conclusion would undoubted
follow. But with the view that the action involved no
more than mere error we cannot coincide. It was error, cer
tainly, but
was more than that. It was a transgression of
right guarantied to every citizen charged
a fundamental
sought to be taken, of
with an offense, or whose property
Any
being heard before he is condemned to suffer injury.
departure from those recognized and established require
ments of law, however close the apparent adherence to mere
form in method of procedure, which has the ‘effect to deprive
as much an excess of jurisdic
constitutional right,
one of
tion as where there exists an inceptive lack of power. “The
substance and not the shadow determines the validity of the
Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 689,
exercise of the power.”
698, 15 Sup. Ct. 268, 360.
not
writ of error, “it
While the writ of certiorari
nevertheless,” as suggested in Schwarz v. Superior Court, 111
Cal. 112, 43 Pac. 582, “a means by which the power of the
court in the premises can be inquired into; and for this pur
pose the review extends, not only to the whole of the record
of the court below, but even to the evidence itself, when neces
sary to determine the jurisdictional fact.” If, then. by look
ing at the evidence, we can see that the court exceeded its
right to examine the evidence for that pur
power, we have
The evidence and proceedings in this case disclose
pose.
clearly to our minds such an excess.
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The order convicting him of contempt must be an

is so ordered.
GAROUTTE, .
MCFARLAND,
I concur in the judgment annulling the or
.
" " The weight of authority is to the
der under review.
point that this ruling, being a denial of appellant’s right to
make a defense, goes to the jurisdiction, and is reviewable on
certiorari. If petitioner had been allowed to introduce the
offered evidence, the case would have presented no difficulties.
‘ *
BEATTY, C. . (concurring).
"
"'
HARRISON, ., dissenting.
TEMPLE and HENSHAW, JJ., concurred in the dissenting
opinion.

I

concur:

J

J

'

'
'

J

J

MILLER

v.

TRUSTEES OF SCHOOLS.
Court of Illinois.

Supreme

88

Illinois,

1878.

26.

This was a petition for a common law writ of
CRAIG, J.
certiorari, to bring before the circuit court the record of the
proceedings of _the trustees of schools, in order to test the
legality of the action of the trustees in uniting certain school
At the term of court at
districts named in the petition.
which the writ was returnable the defendants appeared, and
upon motion, the court quashed the writ and dismissed the
This decision is assigned for error.
suit.
Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

The alleged illegal action of the trustees, here, appears
upon the face of the proceedings of the board, which the
court could determine by an inspection of the record con
taining the action of the trustees. The legislature has made
no provision for an appeal from the decision of trustees of
schools, for the purpose of reviewing their action, where they
have created new districts, or consolidated two or more old
districts into a new one; hence arises the necessity for the
exercise of the common law writ of certiorari.
This court has held, in a number of cases, that the com
mon law writ of certiorari may issue to all inferior tribunals
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and jurisdictions, in cases where they exceed their jurisdic
tion, and in cases where they proceed illegally, and there
is no appeal or other mode of directly reviewing their pro
ceedings.
Doolittle v. Galena and Chicago Union Railroad
Co., 14 Ill. 381; Commissioners, etc. 12. Supervisor of Car
thage, 27 id. 140; Commissioner v. Harper, 38 id. 103.
The rule adopted in the cases cited is in harmony with
the law as settled in England, and in this country.
Dillon
on Municipal Corporations, sec. 739, says: “In this country,
the rule has been very generally adopted by the courts,
where a new jurisdiction is created by statute, and the in
ferior court, board, tribunal or oﬂicer exercising it proceeds
in a summary manner, or in a course different from the
common law, that the circuit or district court of the State,
or other tribunal exercising general, original, common law
jurisdiction, has, in the absence of a speciﬁc remedy being
given, an inherent authority to revise the proceedings of
such inferior jurisdiction, by certiorari.”

I

#

i I i i I

Q

l i

The common law writ of certiorari was the appropriate
remedy to bring before the circuit court, for review, the
proceedings of the trustees of schools in uniting the school
districts named in the petition, and we are of opinion it was
error to quash the writ and dismiss the suit.
The judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded."
81 In some states the courts
have enlarged the scope oi the writ in
such cases.
Thus in Hartz v. Wayne Circuit Judge, (1910) 164 Mich.
231, the court said:—“'I‘he power of reviewing upon common-law
certi
orart even the judicial proceedings of interior tribunals and bodies,
which are not according to the course of the common law. has long
The right is not limited to an inquiry as to the juris
been exercised.
diction ot the interior tribunal or body over the particular subject mat
ter, but extends to the manner in which that jurisdiction is exercised.
It
may reach all errors oi law." In State ex rel. v. Dunn, (1902) 86 Minn.
301. the court says that this enlarged scope, in the case oi “an interior
court, board, or tribunal, or officer exercising judicial powers, whose
proceedings were summary and in a cause different from the common
law," is sustained “by the great weight ot modern authority." Accord,-—
Poe v. Machine Works, (1884) 24 W. Va. 517, 521; State v. Whittord,
(1882) 54 Wis. 150; Jackson v. People, (1860) 9 Mich. 111.
Where such special jurisdiction is conferred “subject to the right oi’
appeal to the Supreme Court according to law," this will be deemed
to authorize the use of any appropriate method, and not to be merely
declaratory of the common law right to a writ of cerliorarl,—'I‘ownship
ot Custer v. Dawson, (1914) 178 Mich. 367.
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IN RE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE

CO.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.
82

1913.

New Jersey Equity, 335.

GARRISON, J. This is a motion by the Prudential Insur
ance Company of America to dismiss an appeal taken by
certain of its stockholders from an order appointing three
disinterested persons to appraise the value of its capital
stock, made by the Chancellor of this state pursuant to the
provisions of an act entitled “An act to permit any stock
life insurance corporation of this state to acquire the capital
stock thereof for the beneﬁt of its policy holders and to con
vert such stock life insurance corporation into a mutual life

insurance corporation.” P. L. 1913, p. 152.
This enactment provides a special statutory proceeding
designed to accomplish the object expressed in its title and to
that end constitutes the Chancellor of this state as the legis
lative agent through whose instrumentality such proceeding
shall be administered.
1

*

i i

1

ii

Q

#

I

#

The constitutionality of this statutory proceeding is chal
lenged in limine by the owners of stock affected thereby; the
method of such challenge being the taking of an appeal from
the initial order made by the chancellor in the course of such
statutory proceeding directly to this court.
The propriety
by
corporation
challenged
the
at whose
of this appeal is now
instance the legislative machinery was set in motion.
Normally statutory proceedings of this nature are re
viewed by the Supreme Court by virtue of its prerogative
writ of certiorari, and there is nothing in the nature or ob
ject of the present proceeding to take it out of this general
rule. So that if the legislative agent designated in the pres
ent statute had been, let us say, the Commissioner of Bank
ing and Insurance, there would not be the slightest doubt but
that certiorari was the proper remedy by which to review
his action under such statute or to test the validity of the
statute under which such action was had.
Such’ supposititious case would be indistinguishable in
principle from the ordinary proceeding to condemn land in
which a justice of the Supreme Court as the legislative agent
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designated in the statute appoints three disinterested free
holders to appraise the value of the land sought to be taken
by compulsory purchase from the owner thereof, who may
by the writ of certiorari challenge in limine the right of the
condemning agent to acquire his land or the validity of the
statutory authority under which such right is claimed.
If, therefore, a different method of review obtains in the
present statutory proceeding, as it actually is, it must be
solely because of the oﬁicial character of the agency selected
by the Legislature to administer it, or rather because of the
nature of the judicial duties ordinarily performed by such
agent in some other capacity, for in no other respect does
the actual case differ from the supposititious one.
If such a distinction is valid, it establishes the novel and
highly important doctrine that the method by which a statu
tory proceeding shall be reviewed depends not upon the na
ture. of such proceeding but upon the personnel of the agency
selected to administer it, or rather upon the character of the
duties that are performed by such legislative agent in some
other oﬁicial capacity, so that, if such legislative agent be
also a court of general jurisdiction, the remedy under such
doctrine would be by an appeal which, in the case of the com
mon pleas, would go to the Supreme Court, in the case of the
circuit court would go either to the Supreme Court or to
this court, and in the case of the Court of Chancery would
go directly to this court by an appeal in equity.
It is ap
parent that by force of such doctrine the writ of certiorari
is entirely shorn of its prerogative character since the Legis
lature may in every case by the selection of one Legislative
agent rather than another determine that the method of re
view shall be other than by certiorari.
It is evident, therefore, that the present motion involves
considerations of the most important and far-reaching char
acter.
That such doctrine receives no support upon general prin
ciple from our existing institutions is shown by the fact that
the action of the common pleas in granting or refusing a
tavern license is and always has been reviewable by cert'io
rari, notwithstanding that such legislative agent is a court
of general jurisdiction, and the same is true of proceedings
to lay out public roads and other statutory proceedings
brought before that court as a legislative agent.
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The same is true of the circuit court, and the case of East
'0. Hussey, 70 N. J. Law, 244, 57 Atl. 1086, in which
this fact is established, is not only destructive of the sup
posed doctrine we are considering but is also necessarily dis
positive of the motion now before us.
Orange

1

4

It

1

i

Q

i

1

0

I

Applying these established rules to the motion now before
us, it necessarily follows that the present statutory proceed
ing is reviewable by certiorari only, regardless of the fact
that one of the agencies that took part in it is the Court of
Chancery, and that that circumstance cannot require the Su
preme Court to forego its writ of certiorari or to share it
with this court, which it would be required to do if an ag
grieved party may review such statutory proceeding in this
court upon a direct appeal.
The case cited so conclusively settles the principles per
tinent to the present motion that their further discussion
The appeal is dis
is neither requisite nor justiﬁable.
missed."
BB “According to the general rule the writ of error is the appropriate
remedy, when the proceedings are according to the course of the com
are of a
mon law, and the writ ot certiorari when the proceedings
‘ ‘ The proceedings before the county court
different character.
entirely unknown to the
were purely statutory and of a. character
common law, and unless the mode of supervising them by the circuit
court is controlled by statute, it would according to this general rule
v. Swinburn, (1879) 15 W. Va. 234,
be by writ of certiorari."—Dryden

'

251.

SWAN

v.

JUSTICES OF SUPERIOR COURT.

BAYLIES
Supreme
P

v.

SAME.

Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
222 Massachusetts,

1916.

51,2.

Petitions for certiorari by one Swan and one‘ Baylies to
the Justices of the Superior Court, Edward R. Hathaway, as
Mayor of the city of New Bedford, intervener.
Petitions dis
missed.
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RUGG, C. J.
These are petitions for writs of certiorari
directed to the justices of the superior court to correct errors
of law alleged to be apparent upon its records in proceedings
under R. L. c. 100, § 4, as amended by St. 1912, c. 389, relat
ing to review of removals of the petitioners as license com
missioners of the city of New Bedford by the intervener,
It is con
Edward R. Hathaway, as mayor of that city.
not
the
writ
of
certiorari
does
lie.
That
conten
tended that
tion is based upon the sentence in the statute to ‘the effect
that “there shall be no appeal from his [the superior court
judge's] decision.” Doubtless “the word ‘appeal’ here is used
in a broad general sense,” so as to cover all the ordinary
proceedings for a revision by this court. Dow v. Casey, 194
of
Mass. 48, 50, 79 N.
810.
But the writ of certiorari
extraordinary nature.
It
one of the ancient prerogative
writs, whose history stretches far back toward the begin
nings of the common law. Its common purpose
the beneﬁ
party who has no remedy by appeal,
cent one of enabling
exceptions, or other mode of correcting errors of law com
proceeding judicial or quasi
mitted against his rights in
judicial, to bring the true record, properly extended so.as to
higher court for
show the principles of the decision, before
examination as to material mistakes of law. Its appropriate
function
to relieve aggrieved parties from the injustice
arising from errors of law committed in proceedings affect
ing their justiciable rights when no other means of relief
highly remedial
are open. It always has been recognized as
salutary procedure, founded upon
sense of justice, to re
That wrongs
lieve against wrongs otherwise irremediable.
go unredressed because of
want of adequate methods would
grave reproach to any system of jurisprudence.
The
be
part of the common
writ of certiorari not only exists as
law, but
has been sedulously preserved by express statutes,
broad jurisdiction and super
which confer upon this court
jurisdiction “to correct
of
inferior
intendence of all courts
no other remedy
and prevent errors and abuses therein
3;
chapter
R. L. c. 156,
192,
expressly provided.”
4.
It would require words unmistakable in import to express
legislative purpose to deprive parties to any appropriate
The phrase of the
proceeding from the shelter of this writ.
instant statute falls far short of expressing that purpose.
It simply indicates that there to be no “appeal” in the sense
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in which that word is used in ordinary legal and equitable
procedure, and that the removal of such an ofﬁcer, which is in
large part an administrative measure, is not to be stayed
in its effect by the delays necessarily incident to the usual
prosecutions of exceptions or appeals.
But it does not dis
close a purpose to prevent the exercise of the extraordinary
power of this court to rectify errors which are so funda
mental in character as to warrant the invocation of the writ
of certiorari. The trend of legislation has been to broaden
the powers of this court as to that writ rather than to nar
row them. See St. 1902, c. 544, § 27; Boston & Lowell R. R.
'0. Co. Commissioners,
198 Mass. 584, 589, 85 N. E. 108.
1

i I

The clause in the governing statute, that “there shall be
no appeal" from the decision of the judge of the superior
court, does not prohibit an aggrieved party from invoking
the writ of certiorari in appropriate instances.
The only matter before the court on this petition is the
correction of substantial errors of law apparent on the rec
Findings of fact are not open to revision. Hogan v.
ord.
Collins, 183 Mass. 43, 46, 66 N. E. 429; Dunn v. Mayor of
Taunton, 200 Mass. 252, 258, 86 N. E. 313. The issuance of
the writ is not a matter of right. It is addressed to sound
judicial discretion.
It is not granted because of technical
errors, nor unless it is apparent that manifest injustice has
been done to substantial rights.
180
Sea-rs v. Worcester,
Mass. 288, 62 N. E. 269.
That principle is especially ap
plicable to cases like this.
1

"In

i

¥

#

$

$

#

i

$

#83

State ex rel. v. Morgan, (1907) 130 Wis. 293, the court said:—
“Since no such appeal or other direct review has been provided, the
action of the special tribunal is ﬁnal, provided, of course, that it acts
"
"
' In all cases, how
within and according to its jurisdiction.
rrver, the acts of such tribunals as above described [special tribunals not
proceeding according to the course of the common law] are subject to
rcwiew to the extent of ascertaining whether they are within the juris
Canal, etc., Co. v. Mitchell,
diction so conterred."
Accord:—Morris
(1864) 31 N. J. L. 99.
In some states the discretionary character of the writ has caused the
courts to develop a practice of hearing the merits of the case upon the
petition for the writ and practically deciding the whole case upon
that hearing.-—Davidson
v. Whitehlll,
(1914) 87 Vt. 499; Farmington
River Water Power Co. v. County Commissioners, (1873) 112 Mass.
206; Levant v. County Commissioners,
(1877) 67 Me. 434.
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Where the right to a review by error or appeal has been lost by a
party without his fault, the writ may be used:—-Poe v. Machine Works,
'
.
(1884) 24 W. Va. 517.
_

DAVIDSON

v.

WHITEHILL.

Supreme Court of Vermont.
87'

_

1914.

Vermont, 499.

TAYLOR, J. This is a petition for writ of certiorari to re
view the judgment and orders of the petitionees, the license
commissioners of the town of Groton, granting a second-class
license to one James Frost to sell intoxicating liquors in said
I
"‘
*
*
town.
$

#

#

U

Q

Q

1

1*

#
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The petition is challenged upon grounds that raise the
questions:
(1) Whether a board of license commissioners,
judicial capacity; and,
licenses,
acts in
granting
so,
in
disqualifying
persons
the
statute
certain
whether
from
(2)
acting in a judicial capacity (P. S. 1224) relates to officers
or boards in the discharge of administrative affairs.
At common law certiorari lies only to inferior courts and
ofﬁcers exercising judicial powers; not only so, but the act
to be reviewed must be judicial in its nature, and not merely
Dillon, Mun. Corp.
1593, and note.
ministerial.
Prac
tically all the courts of this country follow the common-law
rule, and hold that the purpose of the writ is to review none
can in no case
but judicial or quasi judicial acts, and that
ministerial,
reviewing
acts
that
to
are
legislative, or
extend
new or summary jurisdiction
When there
executive.
created, the proceeding so authorized, whether in court or
not, if of
judicial or quasi judicial character, and not sub
ject to review by other means, may be reviewed by this writ.
There is room for great difference of opinion, however,
whether certain proceedings are judicial or not. Confusion
arises in drawing the line between judicial and other acts
when the inquiry relates to officers or boards of municipal
ities, whose functions are primarily of an administrative
character, and there is considerable diversity of judicial opin
ion respecting its exact location.
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Does a board of license commissioners act in a judicial
It
capacity in granting or refusing applications for license
must be conceded at the outset that acts of'a judicial char
acter are not conﬁned to the courts.
It is the quality of the
act, and not the official classiﬁcation of the actor, that deter
mines this question. When considering whether a particular
act of a court, or of an officer charged with judicial or quasi
judicial functions, is judicial or ministerial, the exercise of
judgment and discretion is deemed the distinguishing test.
Fuller 12. Gould et al., 20 Vt. 643; Stearns '0. Miller et al., 25
Vt. 20; Davis v. Strong et al., 31 Vt. 332; Universalist So
ciety of Fletcher v. Leach et al., 35 Vt., 108; State v. How
ard, 83 Vt. 6, 74 Atl. 392. But this test fails to distinguish
judicial from purely executive or administrative functions.
Executive or administrative acts often involve the exercise
of discretion and judgment. An official act requiring the
exercise of discretion and judgment may be executive or ju
dicial according to the nature of the subject-matter.
State
As is said in People v. Board of Commis
'0. Howard, supra.
szoners, 97 N. Y. 37: “The fact that an act is discretionary,
and that in exercising discretion judgment must be employed,
does not prove that the act is judicial.”
Mr. Freeman, in his
note to Wulzen 'v. Board of Supervisors, 40 Am. St. Rep. 29,
after reviewing many cases, deduces the following as the more
approved test: “An action is necessarily judicial if the par
ties to be affected thereby have a right both to notice of the
proceeding and to a hearing in opposition to it before some
tribunal which is not otherwise authorized to proceed.” He
uses the word “tribunal” as embracing, not alone courts, but
also boards or individuals whose duty it is to decide.
Reference to a few among the many cases involving this
question will show the trend of decision in other jurisdic
tions: “If the proceeding is one that is ministerial, and in
which no person has a right to be heard, it is rarely deemed
Atty. Gen. v. Northampton, 143
reviewable on certiorari.”
Mass. 589, 10 N. E. 450. To the same effect is Townsend '0.
Copeland, 56 Cal. 612. Where there is no authority to pro
ceed without notice, and it is not given, the writ will lie.
Miller '0. School Trustees, 88 Ill. 26; State 12. Graham, 60 Wis.
1.

N. W. 359. "‘ “ *
Applying the test of notice and right to be heard, which
seems to us a satisfactory criterion, it would follow that the
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local board of license commissioners in disposing of appli
cations for license to sell intoxicating liquor act in a quasi
judicial capacity.
The statute authorizing such boards to
grant licenses provides both for notice and a public hearing
*
*
*
Public policy
before the license can be granted.
unﬁtness, or
any
applicant’s
demands that
one aware of the
of disqualifying facts, should have an opportunity to be heard
in objection, and such is the evident purpose of the statutory
requirement for notice to the public and a subsequent hear
ing.
The action of boards of license commissioners in respect of
granting licenses being quasi judicial, by the unanimous de
cisions of the courts certiorari will lie to review questions of
law affecting their judgments or orders. While
held in
some states that the revisory court can only inquire as to
the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal, the better opinion
seems to be that errors of law affecting the merits of the
case occurring in the course of the proceedings may be re
viewed. Donahue 'v. Will County, 100 Ill. 94; State v. Dodge
County, 56 Wis. 79, 13 N. W. 680; McAllilley u. Horton, 75
Dillon, Mun. Corp.
But even when the
Ala. 491;
1593.
is also discretionary,
act is judicial or quasi judicial, if
cannot be reviewed or set aside on certiorari, unless possibly,
manifest abuse of discretion, for in that case
to correct
mere error of judgment, and not
the act complained of
a violation of any rule of law. Ketchum v.‘ Superior Court,
Pac. 492; Tiedt v. Carstensen, 61 Iowa, 334, 16
65 Cal. 494,
N. W. 214; Livingstone v. Rector of Trinity Church, 45 N.

Law, 230.

2

I.

9

is

is

a

if

ever, reviewable upen cer
Questions of fact are rarely,
tiorari, so the decision of
question of fact upon evidence
hearing
at
the
before
the inferior tribunal will
introduced
not be reviewed, unless some question of law relating thereto
Farmington Co. v. County Commissioners, 112
raised.
Mass. 206. In some states the evidence may be examined to
any competent proof to justify the
discover whether there
adjudication. People 12. Board of Police, 69 N. Y. 408; State
v. Whitford, 54 Wis. 150, 11 N. W. 424; State u. Duluth, 53
Minn. 238, 55 N. W. 118, 39 Am. St. Rep. 595; Jackson v.
People,
Mich. 111, 77 Am. Dec. 491; Keenan 11. Goodwin, 17
649, 24 Atl. 148; Com. v. Gillespie, 146 Pa. 546, 23 Atl.
R.
393; Conover v. Davis, 48 N. J. Law, 112,
Atl. 667; State v.
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N. C. 373. In such case, however, the evidence is not
reviewed with reference to the credibility of witnesses or
the weight to be given conﬂicting testimony.
The inquiry
is directed solely to determining whether, from competent
evidence before it, the decision of the inferior tribunal is
sustainable, a question similar to that raised by a motion for
a directed verdict, or a motion to set aside a verdict as un
supported by the evidence.
Thus it is seen that the writ of certiorari serves much the
same purpose in reviewing the actions of inferior tribunals,
whose proceedings are summary, or in a course different
from the common law, as exceptions or writ of error in pro
ceedings according to the course of the common law. State
ea: rel. Page v. Smith et al., 48 Vt. 282.
It follows that cer
tiorari issues only when there is no other adequate remedy
at law (Sowles v. Bailey, 69 Vt. 277, 37 Atl. 751), and brings
up for review only substantial questions of law affecting the
merits of the case involved in the proceedings below (Stevens
v. Hill et al., 74 Vt. 164, 52 Atl. 437).
It will be observed
that, while power is vested in the court by certiorari to re
view the proceedings of all inferior jurisdictions, including
officers and boards acting in a judicial or quasi judicial capa
city, to correct jurisdictional errors, they will not review
their judgments on the merits.
The correctional power ex
tends no further than to keep them within the limits of their
jurisdiction, and‘ see that they exercise it with regularity.
Board of Aldermen v. Darrow, 13 Colo. 460, 22 Pac. 784, 16
Am. St. Rep. 215; Chase v. Miller, 41 Pac. 410.
35

It

remains to be considered whether the objection to
the action of the board of license commissioners of the town
of Groton, viz., that one of the commissioners was disquali
ﬁed from acting on the application of Frost by reason of
relationship, presents a jurisdictional question, or a material
question of law involved in their proceedings, as distin
*
"
*
guished from a mere question of discretion.
Does P. S. 1224, apply to administrative boards, like
boards, of license commissioners, when acting in a quasi ju
So far as necessary to the inquiry, that sec
dicial capacity?
tion provides:
“No chancellor, judge, justice, master in
chancery, juror or other person shall act in a judicial ca
pacity in or as trier of a cause or matter in which he
2.

Sec.
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is related to either party within the fourth degree
of consanguinity or affinity.”

#

i

#

$

i

#

#

#

Ill

*

it

it

*

*

*

A moment’s reﬂection as to its effect upon such
listers, auditors, school directors, civil
selectmen,
boards as
authority, makes
evident that the statute was not enacted
in contemplation of any such application as the petition con
should be so con
tends for, and public policy forbids that
strued.
to hold that the statute in question
not apply, and that the petition does not show error
of law in the proceedings. The writ must be denied.

We are constrained

-‘F

v.

RAILROAD COMMISSION.

Supreme Court of California.

_

*

¥

1

*

III

*

HOLABIRD

*

*

U

does

171

1916.

California, 691.

a

it

a

a

complaint with the Railroad Com
[Adolph Becker ﬁled
mission alleging that the California Delevopment Company
corporation engaged in distributing water for irriga
was
tion, that Holabird had been appointed and was acting as
receiver for the company, that Becker needed water for
irrigating his land and had demanded water from Holabird
and that Holabird had refused; and the prayer was that an
order be made requiring the receiver to deliver water to
Becker on the same terms granted to other persons receiving
water under the system. Holabird demurred on the ground
did not appear that the water system under the re
that
public utility. The Railroad Commis
ceiver's control was
sion overruled the demurrer and ordered the receiver to

*

*

*

”

*

*

J.

answer.]
SHAW,
It is this order which the petitioner here seeks to review.
At the close of its opinion, referred to in the above
order, the commission says:
“It will be understood, of course, that the present de

828

TRIAL AND APPELLATE

PRACTICE

[Chap. 5

deals only with the question of this commission's
If this decision stands, it by no means neces
jurisdiction.
sarily follows that complainants in any or all of these cases
will ultimately secure the relief for which they ask.”
Each case is still pending before the commission for ﬁnal
The orders asked for have not been made
determination.
No ﬁnal determination of either
and may yet be denied.

cision

It

may be that the receiver will not be
injured or the system he controls at all be affected by the
We think this proceeding is premature.
ﬁnal orders.
The writ of review lies only when the ﬁnal determination
of an inferior court, tribunal, or board is in excess of its
Code Civ. Proc. § 1068. The language of the
jurisdiction.
section limits it to cases where the tribunal “has exceeded"
its jurisdiction. It does not lie to determine the correctness,
in point of law, of rulings or decisions made by such court,
tribunal, or board, upon objections made or questions arising
in the course of the proceeding or cause preliminary and
prior to the ﬁnal determination regarding the action which
Wilson 'v. Sacramento
it is asked to take in the matter.
County, 3 Cal. 386; People 12. County Judge, 40 Cal. 479;
Aberding "0. Macham, 40 Cal. 656; Lamb v. Schottler, 54 Cal.
320; Sayers v. Superior Court, 84 Cal. 642, 24 Pac. 296;
In Wilson v. Sacra
Gauld v. Board, 122 Cal. 18, 54 Pac. 272.
supervisors
County
board
of
the
had overruled an
mento
objection that it had no jurisdiction over an application for
a ferry license, but had not granted or refused such license.
In People 'v. County Judge the judge had entertained an ap
plication of certain street commissioners asking him to ﬁx
the compensation which they should receive, and had set
the application for hearing, but had not otherwise acted upon
it. In Lamb '0. Schottler one of the points involved was the
right to a review of the action of the board of supervisors
upon a proposed resolution, which was still pending before
it and had not been adopted. In Sayers '0. Superior Court
the petitioner had been cited to show cause why he should
not be punished in contempt for disobeying an order of the
superior court, but he had not been adjudged guilty or tried
In Gauld v. Board an application had been
on the charge.
of supervisors for a telephone franchise
the
board
to
made
and certain proceedings had been taken under the statute
case has been made.

~
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toward the granting of such franchise, but none had been
granted.

'

In all these cases it was held that the application for a
writ of review was premature, and in each case the proceed
ing was accordingly dismissed or denied. In People v. County
Judge, the court said:
“The writ of certiorari is a writ of review.
Its office is
adjudications
determinations
bring
and
up‘ for review ﬁnal
to
of inferior tribunals, boards, or officers exercising judicial
functions, when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy. The writ is necessarily founded on a ﬁnal
determination.”
It was further said that, if such writ might issue at any
step in the proceedings of the inferior tribunal to annul its

rulings:
“This would be the exercise of original jurisdiction by the
court issuing the writ, and not a review of the determina
The matter complained of
tion of the inferior tribunal.
be,
not that the tribunal had exceeded, but that it was
would
about to exceed, its jurisdiction.”
In Sayers "v. Superior Court, the court said:
“The function of a writ of review is not to restrain the
proceedings of an inferior tribunal, but to annul proceedings
It cannot be
which have been taken without jurisdiction.
employed to prevent a threatened excess of jurisdiction.
It
is issued only when an inferior tribunal, board, or ofﬁcer
exercising judicial functions has exceeded the jurisdiction
of such tribunal, board, or officer.”
The present case cannot be distinguished from those above
There has been no ﬁnal adjudication.
cited.
The order

merely overrules a demurrer.
It does not decide the case.
The decision of the commission that the California Develop
ment Company, through the receiver, is conducting a public
utility, is preliminary only. Before proceeding to regulate
the commission must always ascertain that the person or
corporation to be regulated is one over whom it is given
authority, else it must refuse to act further.
As it is a
question affecting the jurisdiction of the commission to act
at all, it may revoke its ruling thereon at any time before the
action invoked by the complainant has been taken or refused,
or at any time before the authority to grant a rehearing has
expired.
A lack of jurisdiction of the subject-matter is suf
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ﬁcient cause for arresting a proceeding at any stage, when
ever it appears or is called to the attention of the tribunal,
and it is not bound by a preliminary decision thereon that it
has jurisdiction.
Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

Q

[Petition dismissed, without prejudice to any subsequent
proceeding.]

9*

84In Wallace v. Jameson, (1897) 179 Pa. St. 94, the court said:—
During its progress,
“The suit was a common law action for libel.
before its actual call for trial by jury, various dilatory motions were
made, for change of venue, to quash the array of jurors, a plea in
abatement to the jurisdiction
of the court as then constituted,
etc.
These matters are not ordinary subjects of ccrtiorari.
It is true they
are regulated by statute, and that certiorari is the proper writ to re
view proceedings out of the course of the common law, but these matters
were not statutory proceedings
in that sense, but mere interlocutory
steps in the course of common law action.
It has never been held that
in this way, merely
a. party can bring his case to this court piecemeal
because some of the preliminaries to the trial have been regulated by
statute somewhat at variance with ancient common law forms."
Two writs of ccrtiorari were known at common law, one to take
up a record or proceeding at any interlocutory stage and remove it
into a superior court to be there proceeded with to ﬁnal judgment, the
In
other to review a. record or proceeding after ﬁnal determination.
the United States, in the absence of statutory regulation, it has been
the general practice to use the writ only for review.
State ex rel. v.
Walbridge, (1894) 123 Mo. 524; Holmes v. Cole, (1908) 51 Ore. 483.

~.

ST. JOHN v. RICHTER.
Supreme

Court of Alabama.
167

1910.

Alabama, 656.

MAYFIELD, J. Appellant was one of a great number of
resident citizens of Cullman county who signed and ﬁled with
the probate judge of that county a petition praying that the
probate judge call an election, in said county, to determine
whether the sale of intoxicating liquors should be prohibited
in that county, under the provisions of the local option stat
ute of February 26, 1907, now embraced in sections 492-511
The election was accordingly or
of the Code of Alabama.
dered by the probate judge, and was held in accordance with
such order and the statute authorizing it, and resulted in

.'1.]
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a majority against the -sale of intoxicants. The returns of
the election were duly and properly made, and canvassed,
and the result was declared and certiﬁed as required by the
statute. On the 1st of January, 1908, the appellee, who was
resident citizen of said county, and who owned and oper
ated a saloon in said county, ﬁled with the probate judge
petition praying that the former order of the judge, calling
the election, and all subsequent proceedings had thereunder,
be set aside and held for naught, on the grounds:
(1) That
option
law under) which the election was ordered to
the local
had been repealed by the
be held was void; and (2) that
subsequent statute known as the state-wide prohibition act.
The probate judge granted the petition of Richter, and set
aside his former orders, declaring the election and all the
proceedings held thereunder void and of no effect. This ap
pellant then applied to the judge of the Eighth judicial cir
common
cuit (which circuit includes Cullman county) for
law certiorari to quash the proceedings of the probate judge
in setting aside the election as prayed in the petition of
Richter. The circuit judge ordered the writ to issue, in ac
cordance with appellant’s petition, directing the probate
judge to send up to the circulit court, for the consideration
full and complete record of the proceedings
of that court,
“The probate judge, though
had before such probate judge.
served with the writ of certiorari, made no return thereto.
The petitioner (appellant) then made several unsuccessful
attempts to have the circuit court compel the probate judge
to make his return of the proceedings as directed by the
writ. Before any return was ever made by the probate
judge to the writ, the appellee and the probate judge moved
the court to dismiss and quash the proceedings for certiorari,
assigning many grounds in support of the motion. The cir
cuit court granted the motion and dismissed the petition for
certiorari, and quashed the writ theretofore issued by the
circuit jud'ge, taxing the appellant with the costs of the
prose
proceedings, and from that judgment this appeal
cuted.

a

is

it

A

return to the writ of certiorari issued should have been
was
made or required, or an adequate reason shown why
not made, before dismissing the petition or quashing the
writ. The proper rule and practice in such cases has been
prerequisite to any review to
“The return
thus stated:
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be undertaken by the court out of ~which the writ issues;
and, until it is made, the court will not render any judg
ment or make any order except for the purpose of enforcing
obedience to the writ and compelling the making of a return.”
4 Ency. Pl. & Pr. p. 212, par. 2; People v. McCraney, 21
How. Prac. (N. Y.) 149. “Although it is the duty of the
officers to whom the writ is directed to prepare their return,
and although they may be compelled summarily to make a
return, yet it is incumbent upon the prosecutor of the writ,
rather than the adverse party to him, to see that the return
is made, and to invoke the aid of the court to compel the com
pliance with the mandate of the writ.” 4 Ency. Pl. & Pr. p.
213, par. 4; Derton v. Boyd, 21 Ark. 264; Bannister v. Allen,
1 Blackf. (Ind.) 414; State 'v. Gibbons, 4 N. J. Law, 45; State
v. Trenton, 36 N. J. Law, 499; Dean 12. Wade, 5 N. J. Law,
“The return should be made not later than the day on
719.
which the writ is returnable, though it may be made at any
time during such day, in the absence of statutory provisions
to the contrary.” 4 Ency. Pl. & Pr. 213, par. 5; Hill v. Young,
3 Mo. 337.
The return of the writ to the court is essential to the
The application for the writ
court’s jurisdiction to review.
is often made (as in this case) to the judge in vacation, and
not to the court, and the writ in such case is issued by the
judge, and not by the court, though it is made returnable
to the court; and, until a return is made, the court-—as dis
tinquished from the judge as such—acquires no jurisdiction
of the subject-matter or controversy.

l

#

1

Q

i

Q

#

¥

i

1

Reversed."
86 In a few states it is the practice
to hear the whole case on the
petition, before issuing the writ, and an answer then takes the place
of the return, but such answer is substantially the same as a return.-—
Davidson v. Whitehill, (1914) 87 Vt. 499; Levant v. Penobscot County,
(1877) 67 Me. 429; Tewksbury v. Mlddlesex County, (1875) 117 Mass.

563.

See

note 33, supra.

Sec.

2]

'

Msrnons or Rsvmw

WASKEY

EADIE

v.

v.

HAMMER.

CHAMBERS.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
102

833

1910.

Circuit Court of Appeals, 629; 179 Federal Rep. 273.

Before GILBERT and Ross, Circuit Judges, and WOLVERTON,
District Judge.
GILBERT, Circuit Judge. The mandate of this court was
issued to the District Court for Alaska in the ﬁrst of the
above-entitled cases on June 18, 1909, and in the second case
on October 11, 1909.
The petitioners now ask this court to
recall both mandates, on the ground that in each case the
Supreme Court on April 6, 1910, issued its writ of certiorari
directing this court to certify its record to that court for its
action thereon.
It is a conclusive answer to the petition in the ﬁrst case
to point to the fact that the term at which our mandate is
sued has long since expired.
This court has no power to
entertain a motion to recall its mandate after the expiration
of the term at which its judgment was rendered and its man
" "
"
date was issued.
But aside from the want of power in this court to recall
its mandate in the case ﬁrst mentioned, it is an insuperable
obstacle to the relief here sought in both cases that the
Supreme Court has issued to this court its writs of certiorari.
A certiorari to a subordinate court or tribunal operates as a
stay of proceedings from the time of its service or of formal
notice of its issuance, and if the court to which the writ
is directed thereafter proceeds, it is a contempt, and its
subsequent proceedings are void. 6 Cyc. 800, and cases there
cited. The proceedings of this court are not reversed by the
issuance of the writ and the stay resulting therefrom, but
are merely suspended until the further action of the review
ing court. Ewing u. Thompson, 43 Pa. 372. In that case
Judge Strong, afterwards a justice of the Supreme Court,
said of the effect’ of a writ of certiorari:
“Very many English as well as American authorities are
quoted in Patchin 11. Mayo, etc., 13 Wend. [N. Y.] 664. There
are very many others, all holding a common-law writ of
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ccrtiorari,

whether issued before or after judgment, to be
in effect a supersedeas. There are none to the contrary. In
some of them it is ruled that action by the inferior court
after the service of the writ is erroneous; in others it is
They all,
stated to be void and punishable as a contempt.
however, assert no more than that the power of the tribunal
to which the writ is directed is suspended by it, that the
judicial proceeding can proceed no farther in the lower
court.”

In State

Chicago & N. D. Ry. Co. v. Burnell, 102
Wis. 232, 78 N. W. 425, the court said:
“A writ of certiorari suspends the execution of the judg
It does not vacate such
ment or order challenged thereby.
Pending the hearing of such an order
judgment or order.
or judgment, it remains in full force, the same as in the case
of an appeal, where the statute regarding a stay of proceed
ings has been complied with."
And the court added that the sole effect of the writ of cer
tiorari “is to prevent any act being done to enforce the judg
ment or order affected by the stay.”
In McWilliams o. King, 32 N. . Law, 23 the court said:
“But it is to be remembered that the writ of certiorari is
of itself and propria vigore a supersedeas.”
*
"'
"‘
It would seem upon principle, in view of the
effect of the writ and the consequent stay, that all proceed
ings in this court, as well as in the District Court of Alaska
to which the mandates of this court were issued, are stayed
until the decision of the Supreme Court shall be rendered
upon its review of the judgment of this court, and that
notice of the issuance of the writ should be brought to the
attention of the District Court, in order that it may direct
a stay of further proceedings, and that this court is power
less to act in the premises.
The petitions are denied.
ex rel.

J
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KOEHN.

Supreme Court of Colorado.
53 Colorado,

J.

In a proceeding
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in certiorari, the district
court of Montezuma county annulled a judgment of the
county court that had been rendered in favor of Guillet
Brothers against Laura H. C. Koehn. In response to the writ
from the district court, the judge and ex oﬂicio clerk of the
county court certiﬁed the county court record in the case to
It was then the duty of the district court
the district court.
to try the matter upon the record so certiﬁed, and not upon
the allegations of the petition for the writ, nor upon facts
People 11. County C0m’rs, 27 Colo. 86,
outside the record."
Instead of doing this, the district court ap
59 Pac. 733.
matter on the allegations of the petition,
tried
the
parently
and, because certain of those allegations were not denied,
took them as true and annulled the judgment. The proced
ure to be followed in such cases becomes perfectly plain
from a reading of chapter 29 of the Revised Code, which
The application for the writ shall be
relates to certiorari.
The parties to this case and lawyers gen
made on afﬁdavit.
erally denominate this application a petition. When the writ
is granted and the inferior tribunal has certiﬁed the record,
the petition has served its purpose; for, as this court has
The
said, the matter then proceeds on the record returned.
any
require
petition.
an
answer
of
kind
to
the
not
Code does
Section 332 says that the court to whom application is made
for the writ may require a notice to be given to the adverse
party, or may grant an order to show cause why the writ
should not be allowed, or may grant the writ without
notice."
If notice is given, or an order to show cause is granted,
the application may be resisted upon the ground that the
petition is insufficient, or that the court is without jurisdic
tion to issue the writ, or that there is an appeal, or a plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy, or any other ground, if there
be one, showing that it is not a proper case for the writ.
The petition is inspected and taken to be true at this hear
MUSSER,
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ing.
Counter affidavits, parol evidence, or even the records
of the inferior tribunal, are not considered.
If the writ is granted without notice, the question whether
the case is a proper one for the issuance of the writ may be
tried in the same way on a motion to quash, made before
the return." 4 Ency. Pl. & Pr. 195-197.
This sufficiently
demonstrates the functions of the petition. If this was a
proper case for the issuance of the writ, which we do not
determine, the extent of the review upon the writ by the
district court should have been to ascertain from the record
whether the county court regularly pursued its authority.
Section 337, Rev. Code. It is to be taken from section 331
that if the county court exceeded its jurisdiction, or the
judge thereof greatly abused his discretion, the authority
was not regularly pursued.
_
An inspection of the record of the county court, as re
turned, reveals the following conditions: On the 7th day of
June Guillet Brothers ﬁled their complaint against Laura
H. C, Koehn on a cause of action within the junisdiction of
On the 3d day of July the defendant
the county court.
Koehn answered the complaint with a general denial. " * ‘
On September 24th, after the case had been set for trial,
the defendant ﬁled a motion for leave to amend her answer.
No aﬂidavit was ﬁled to support this motion. On the 30th
day of September the case was continued to the 5th day of
On October 2d the plaintiffs served notice on the
October.
defendant, calling up her motion to amend for October 5th.
On October 5th the case was continued until the 17th of
On the 17th of October the motion to amend was
October.
denied; the order denying the same reciting that the de
fendant had been duly notiﬁed that the hearing of the mo
tion was set for that day, and that she did not appear, either
And thereafter, on the 17th day
in person or by attorney.
of October, the case came on regularly for trial, and judg
On the 5th day
ment was rendered against the defendant.
of December a motion was made to vacate the judgment, on
the alleged grounds that the defendant had no notice that
the cause would be tried on the 17th of October, and that
it had never been regularly set for trial on that date. * ‘ "‘
From this record it appears that the case was regularly
set for trial, and thereafter continued until the day the
"
"
*
judgment was rendered,

2]
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The record recites that the defendant had due notice that
her motion to amend would be taken up on the 17th of Oc
That recital is not contradicted in any way in the
tober.
record, or otherwise,
and under such circumstances,
of
course, must be taken as true; for such a presumption must
be indulged in favor of the record of such a court as a county
court.
The matter most seriously complained of does not
appear in the record of the county court, but only in the p‘eti
tion for the writ; therefore it cannot be considered. It thus
appears that the county court had jurisdiction of the subject
matter of the action and the person of the defendant; that
the cause was regularly set for trial and regularly con
tinued ; that due notice of every step taken was given to the
defendant; and that it was her business to attend to her case.
Under these circumstances, the judgment of the district
court must be and is reversed, and the cause remanded, with
instructions to affirm the judgment of the county court.
Reversed and remanded with instructions."
The record oi.’ a court, unless enlarged by statute, consists of the
return, pleadings, verdict and judg'ment.—State
ex rel. v.
Goodrich, (1913) 257 Mo. 40; Prindle v. Anderson, (1838) 19 Wend.
(N. Y.) 391. Records oi boards consist of such documents and orders
as remain on ﬁle with them, together with such written accounts of
Central Paciﬁc RR. Co. v.
proceedings and evidence as they may make.
Board of Equalization, (1867) 34 Cal. 352.
While ordinarily there is no hearing on the application for the writ,
and no opportunity is given to resist its issuance, in a few states such
and the court is permitted to look beyond the
a hearing is provided
petition and the record to determine the propriety of issuing the writ.
11
O. J. 157;
White v. County Commissioners,
(1879) 70 Me. 317;
Fairbanks v. Fitchburg, (1881) 132 Mass. 42; In re Landaﬂ, (1856) 34
N. H. 163; Sumerow v. Johnson, (1892) 56 Ark. 85; District of Columbia
v. Brooks, (1907) 29 App. D. C. 563.
8'! This is the ordinary
provision in states having the “code" pro
cedure.—4 Encyc. Pl. & Pr. 196.
"Strictly speaking, the writ may be quashed only after the return,
but may be superseded before the return. The effect is much the same
and the distinction is not closely observed.—Hauser v. State, (1873) 33
Wis. 678; Ferguson v. Jones, (1834) 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 241.
89 Rule stated.
In Birdsall v. Phillips, (1837) 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 464.
“Wherever, were the suit at common law, the
470, the court said:
matter alleged for error is of such a nature that a bill of exceptions
would be essential to its review by writ of error, a certiorari will not
reach it, unless some statute has enlarged the effect of that writ in
the particular case."
The petition, aﬂidavit or complaint. upon which the writ is sought.
It should allege
is drawn according to the general rules of pleading.
of any facts necessary to make out a
the existence or nonexistence
prima tacie case, and allege that these facts appear of record, and
86

summons,
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it should contain a speciﬁc statement ot the errors complained
2 Spelling on Inj. and other Extraordinary
Rem. 5 1992.

oi.

is not uncommon,
statutes have enlarged
the scope of
giving it the force and effect oi’ an appeal, the petition may
set out not only errors of law but erroneous conclusions
of fact; in
which cases the petition is often voluminous, asuming the form and
of a. transcript or bill of exceptions, covering not only the
dimensions
Spelling on
record proper but the evidence and papers in the cause.
Inj. and other Extra. Rem. 5 1995. In such cases the return should
show the rulings made in the course ot the trial or hearing and so
much of the evidence as may be necessary to show the bearing ot
Id. 5 2006.
such rulings.
Where,

ccriiorari,

as

CITY OF LOS ANGELES

v.

Supreme Court of California.
118

YOUNG.
1897.

California, 295.

HENSHAW, J. This is an appeal from the judgment of
the superior court upon a writ of review vacating and an
nulling a judgment rendered in a justice’s court. One Mc
Combs, in the justice’s court of the township of Los Angeles,
had instituted a suit against the city of Los Angeles and
The defendants appeared in said action by
C. Compton.
their attorney, W. E. Dunn, and interposed demurrers to the
complaint.
Thereafter the justice of the peace heard and
passed upon the demurrers, overruled them, and granted
defendants two days’ time in which to answer.
Defendants
failed to answer, and judgment by default was entered for
plaintiff. The statutory period of 30 days during which an
appeal could have been taken to the superior court passed,
and afterwards the defendants in that action obtained from
After
the superior court of the county a writ of review.
hearing upon this writ, the superior court annulled the judg
ment of the justice’s court, and this appeal followed.
The contention of petitioners in the superior court was
that neither they nor their attorney had been served with
notice of the time set for the trial; that service of such
notice upon them is, under section 850 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, an imperative prerequisite to the jurisdiction of
the justice of the peace to try the cause; and that under the
Writ they were entitled to show, and did show, to the satis
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faction of the superior court, by legal and competent evi
dence, that no notice had in fact been served.
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Here the justice returned, as by the writ he was
commanded to do—First, a transcript of his docket entries,
appeared that on May 22d notice was issued,
by which
and, upon May 25th notice was returned and ﬁled; and, sec
ond, the papers and ﬁles in the case, among which is
written notice of the date set for the hearing of demurrer,
addressed to W. E. Dunn, attorney for defendants, dated
May 22d, and notifying defendants’ attorney that the de
murrer had been set for hearing upon the 25th day of May,
This notice bears the indorse
1896, at 1:30 o’clock p. m.
copy
of the within notice
ment: “Received
1896.
W.
E. Dunn, Attorney for Defendant. Served H. H. Y.” Upon
was permitted to be shown that “H. H. Y.”
the hearing
constable, and that he
are the initials of H. H. Yonken,
served the notice in question upon the 23d day of May, 1896,
copy thereof with
by leaving
man in the office of W. E.
Dunn, which man acknowledged service of the notice as
This testimony, intro
above set forth in the name of Dunn.
duced by petitioners, was followed under objection of appel
lants by the testimony of the attorney Dunn, who swore that
he did not know who signed his name to the notice; that
was not signed by any one authorized so to do; and that, in
fact, he had never received notice of the time set for the
hearing of the demurrer.
becomes necessary for the court of
Upon certiorari,
review to be put in possession of the facts upon which the
court below acted, and which are not technically of record,
competent for that court to require the lower court to
certify ‘such facts in its return to the writ, and this statement
part of the record.
Spell. Exr.
of facts would then be
Relief,
2020.
was not perhaps
Under this principle,
improper for the trial court to admit the evidence of Yonken,
not as contradicting the record of the justice, but as supple
mental thereto. People 11. San Francisco Fire Dept., 14 Cal.
479.
a

is

it

may be set down as a universal rule that as the
to review
record of an
province of the writ of certiorari
inferior court, board, or tribunal, and to determine from the
record whether such court, board, or tribunal has exceeded
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its jurisdiction, evidence dehors the record, and contradict
ing it, is never permitted.
The common-law‘ writ of certio
rari tried nothing but the jurisdiction, and incidentally the
regularity of the proceedings upon which the jurisdiction
depends. In many cases, therefore, under such writs, the
evidence upon which the court acted in determining its juris
diction was made a part of the record, and reviewed under
the writ; but the inquiry was always limited to the evidence
before the tribunal whose determination was under review.
If the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal depended upon a
question of fact, that fact was never tried d-e novo upon its
merits, but the inquiry thereupon was limited strictly to the
evidence upon which the inferior tribunal acted. People v.
"'
*
"‘
In this case the
San Francisco Fire Dept., supra.
court reaches its conclusion by admitting and considering
the parol testimony of the attorney Dunn to impeach and
contradict the record of the justice, which in itself was
legally suﬁicient to show jurisdiction. This may not be done.
The evidence of Dunn was inadmissible, and should not have
Therefore the judgment is reversed, and the
been admitted.
cause remanded."
40"The general rule undoubtedly is that the return to a certiorari
must show everything on which the plaintiff relies for relief, and that,
it the return is insuﬂlcient, he must cause it to be supplemented by
He cannot rely upon the affidavit tor certiorari to supply
amendment.
the deﬁciencies of the return."—-Whitbeck v. Common Council, (1883)
50 Mich. 86, quoted in McGurrin v. Township Board, (1915) 186 Mich.
475,

480.

PEOPLE EX REL. ROBINSON

v.

Court of Appeals of New York.
36

J

FERRIS.
1867.

New York, 218.

This is an appeal from an order of the Gen
eral Term of the Supreme Court, in the fourth district,
made in a case brought before that court by common law
'
certiorari.
Proceedings were taken, under the statute, to lay out a
public highway through the enclosed lands of the relator,
BOCKES,

.
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Gilbert Robinson and one Stephen Timmerman, in the town
of Argyle, Washington county, which resulted in an order
by the commissioners of highways of the town laying out
the proposed road. An appeal from this order was taken, as
provided by law, whereupon the county judge appointed three
referees to hear and determine the appeal.
The referees
having notiﬁed the parties entitled to notice, proceeded in
the execution of their duties, and ﬁnally (January 26th 1858)
made an order, concurred in and signed by two of their
number, by which they affirmed the order of the commis
sioners laying out the road. The relator sued out a common
law certiorari, directed to the referees, to which they made
return of their proceedings, and on which return the case
was heard and decided by the Supreme Court. That court
made an order as follows:
“Decision of the referees va
cated; order appointing them set aside, the appeal to stand,
to be determined by a new board of referees, to be appointed
by the county judge.”
The case is here on an appeal from the latter portion of
the order above italicized. It will be observed that the part
of the order vacating the decision of the referees is not ap
That was
pealed from, and, of course, is not under review.
equivalent to a reversal, by the Supreme Court, of the pro
ceedings and order of the referees, and to that extent the
The propriety
order stands unchallenged before this court.
or validity of the remaining portion of the order, is the sub
ject of the present examination.
The certiorari was directed to the referees and brought up
for review only the proceedings and determination of those
officers, and the only duty devolving on the Supreme Court
was to affirm or reverse their proceedings and decision. This
was the extent of the authority resting .in that court.
(10
It did not
Wend., 167; 3 Hill. 426; 5 id., 413; 7 id., 577.)
bring up the proceedings prior to their appointment, or pre
sent any question in regard to the regularity or correctness
of the order appointing them; and it must necessarily fol
low that it was erroneous in that court to set aside such
As above
order, and prescribe future action in the case.
Supreme
was
limited
authority
Court
of the
suggested, the
to a reversal or aflirmance of the order and proceedings of
the referees.
11

ii

i

1

i

$

#

1

Q

#
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“The only oﬂioe of the common law writ of certiorari

is to bring
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before the court the record of the proceedings of an interior tribunal
for inspection, and the only judgment to be rendered is, that the writ
be quashed or that the record of the proceedings he quashed."—Cass
v.
Duncan,
(1913) 260 Ill. 228.
“On a writ of error returnable in this court, which in judgment of
law removes the record, we may, on a reversal, award a venire de ﬂ-0150
returnable either in the court below or at the circuit. But there is no
There the only judgment is aﬂirmanee
such practice upon ccrtiorari.
or reversal, leaving the parties in the latter case to begin dc nova."
Luft v. Pope. (1843) 5 Hill (N. Y.) 413, 416. “The trial is not de no-vo,
but on the record; and the only matter to be determined is the quash
ing or the affirmation of the proceedings brought up for review."-—
Benedict v. Board of Revenue, (1912) 177 Ala. 52. Statutes sometimes
authorize the court to make such order, judgment or decree in the
premises as justice may require, or otherwise enlarge the common law
power of the court.-Farmington River Water Power Co. v. County
Commissioners,
(1873) 112 Mass. 206; Hoppie v. Best, (1879) 4 Colo.
555; Dryden v. Swinburn, (1879) 15 W. Va. 234; Bringold v. Spokane.
(1898) 19 Wash. 333; Barclay v. Cameron, (1860) 25 Tex. 232.
In Dryden v. Swinburn, supra, the court said:—"So tar as I have
been able to ascertain,
the State Supreme Courts generally, who upon
of an inferior court on a. writ of
the reversal of a. ﬁnal judgment
certiorari by a superior court have decided that the case should be tried
have so held, not because this was
de novo in the superior court,
common law, but because by the statutes of these States such a trial
in the superior court was in such case authorized,"—citing cases from
Indiana, Tennessee, Texas and Massachusetts.
Alabama,

SECTION 3.

MANDAMUS.

CROCKER v. JUSTICES OF SUPERIOR COURT.
Supreme

Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
208 Massachusetts,

J

1911.

162.

The petitioners were indicted for a felony. Sea
sonably they presented motions, suggesting that because of
“local prejudice and other causes” they could not have an im
partial trial in the county of Suffolk, and asking that the
proceeding be removed to another county for trial.
There
after, an order was entered by a justice of the superior court,
which as amended was as follows: “I refuse to hear the par
ties on the several motions of the defendants that the court
order a trial of these indictments in some county other than
the county of Suffolk, believing that I have no jurisdiction to
entertain or to grant such motions.”
This is a petition for
RUGG,

.
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a writ of mandamus to compel the superior court to enter
tain and decide the motions.
The ﬁrst question presented is whether mandamus lies in
a case of this sort.
It becomes necessary to determine the
meaning of the indorsement made in the superior court upon
the motions ﬁled by the defendants there, who are petitioners
here. . It is perhaps susceptible of two constructions, one that
the court has considered the subject-matter, and ruled as mat
ter of law that it has no jurisdiction of such motions, the
other that the court has abdicated its province and refused
to exercise its judicial function, adding by way of parenthe
sis that its excuse is a belief that it has no jurisdiction in the
premises.
We should ordinarily be loath to adopt the latter
But the language appears to be strongly
construction.
phrased with an evident intent to convey that thought, and an
examination of the papers discloses that, as originally en
tered, an unequivocal ruling of law was made disposing of the
motion. If that had stood as the ﬁnal action of the Superior
Court, the only remedy of the defendants would have been by
exception or appeal under Rev. Laws, c. 219, §§ 32, 34, and
But it did not so stand and the action of that court was
35.
changed to a statement of declination even to hear the par
ties. We are constrained therefore to interpret the order as
a refusal to act at all upon the motions.
The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and is
usually granted only when no other adequate relief can be
afforded.
It cannot be employed to supersede an appeal or
exceptions in ordinary cases, and does not lie to review a ﬁnal
Proceedings of inferior tribunals within their
judgment.
jurisdiction in the exercise of the power conﬁded in them
cannot be revised in this way. It does not lie to correct er
rors committed in the course of trial, even though there be
no remedy by exception or appeal. Selectmen of Gardner v.
Templeton St. Ry. Co., 184 Mass. 294, 297, 68 N. E. 340; Fin
lay v. Boston, 196 Mass. 267, 270, 82 N. E. 5; McCarty v. St.
Comm’rs, 188 Mass. 338, 74 N. E. 659; In re Key, 189 U. S.
84, 23 Sup. Ct. 624, 47 L. Ed. 720.
But one of the ancient
functions of this writ was to compel action by lower judicial
tribunals respecting matters properly before them and with
in their jurisdiction. If such courts refuse to exercise their
judicial functions for any reason or decline to decide matters
pending before them mandamus has always been regarded as

844
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the appropriate means by which to set in motion their j uris
dictional power. It lies to compel the performance of what
ever appertains to the duty of lower courts, where there has
been for any reason a refusal to act. Its agency in cases of
this class is conﬁned to settingvin motion the judicial activi
ties so that a decision will be reached, but it does not extend
to any direction as to what that decision ought to be. Chase
'0. Blackstone Canal Co., 10 Pick. 244; Rice v. Commissioners,
13 Pick. 225; Morse, Pet’r, 18 Pick. 443; Carpenter 'v. County
Com/rs, 21 Pick. 258; Smith v. Boston, 1 Gray, 72. See, also,
In re Winn, 213 U. S. 458, 29 Sup. Ct. 515. 53 L. Ed. 873. In
re Parker, Pet’r, 131 U. S. 221, 9 Sup. Ct. 708, 33 L. Ed. 123;
Rex 12. Stepney Corporation, (1902) 11 K. B. 317, 321. It was
the plain duty of the justices of the superior court to consider
and exercise their judicial faculty upon the subject-matter
presented by the motions ﬁled in that court, and either over
rule them as matter of law or in the exercise of a sound ju
dicial discretion determine whether they ought to be granted.
French v. Jones, 191 Mass. 522, 78 N. E. 118, 9 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 1096, 114 Am. St. Rep. 619; Cheney v. Barker, 198 Mass.
As we construe
356, 84 N. E. 492, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 436.
the indorsement of the superior court upon the motions to be
a mere refusal to act, and not the expression in pursuance of
judicial authority of any opinion or ruling, Rev. Laws, c. 219,
§§ 32 and 35, authorizing an aggrieved defendant in a crim
inal case to appeal from a judgment of the superior court
founded upon matter of law apparent upon the record and
to allege exceptions to an opinion, ruling, direction or judg
ment upon any question of law, does not apply, and there ap
pears to be no other adequate remedy open to the petitioners
except this petition.
The issuance of the writ of mandamus is rarely, if ever,
matter of right, and commonly rests in the sound judicial dis
It becomes necessary to determine
cretion of the court.
whether the superior court in fact does have jurisdiction to
entertain and decide the motions, for the reason that the writ
ought not to issue when it can subserve no useful purpose to
the petitioners.
*

*

*

¥

*

#

#

¥

#

I

Considerations based upon historical research, authority
and sound principle lead to the conclusion that it was within
the jurisdiction of the superior court to consider and grant
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the motions ﬁled by the several petitioners here, defendants
in that court, if upon investigation it was found that a trial
before an indifferent jury could not be had in Suffolk county.
1

i

U

Writtoissue.
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STATE EX REL. PUMP WORKS
Supreme Court of Missouri.
249

J

v.

HOMER.

1912.

Missouri, 58.

A short

statement will suffice in this case. In
November, 1909, the Texas Portland Cement Company, a cor
poration of West Virginia, sued the International Steam
Pump Company, a corporation of New Jersey, and the Snow
Steam Pump Works, a corporation of New York, in the cir
cuit court of the city of St. Louis. State ex rel. v. Sale, 232
Mo. loc. cit. 169, 132 S. W. 1119.
In this case pending in the said court the defendants spe
cially appeared and moved to quash the service. These mo
tions were sustained May 26, 1910, and on the next day the
plaintiff in that case ﬁled a motion to compel the defendants
in that case to plead to its petition. This motion the court
overruled, and upon June 28, 1910, the plaintiff in the circuit
court case as relator in this court applied for a writ of man
damus to compel the honorable Moses Sale, then judge of the
circuit court, to proceed with the case. Our alternative writ
* "'
issued to which Judge Sale made his return.
"'
" " The mere fact that there might be another remedy
is not sufficient to preclude the use of the writ of mandamus.
The other remedy must be adequate, and whether it is ade
quate is one appealing to the judgment and discretion of this
court when the circumstances of each case are laid before us.
GRAVES,

.

'

$1

¥

=l

There is much respectable authority to the effect that man
damus is the only proper remedy where a circuit court re
fuses to proceed with a case, because the court was of opinion
that it did not have jurisdiction of the cause, or of the parties
In the circuit court case the trial court refused
to the cause.
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to entertain jurisdiction and proceed with the case upon a
preliminary objection to the return of service to the process.
In the very early case of Castello v. St. Louis Circuit Court,
28 Mo. loc. cit. 274, we had up a very similar question.
The
question there was whether a notice of contest in a contest
election case was sufficient to give the circuit court jurisdic
tion to hear and determine the case upon its merits.
The
circuit court held the notice insufﬁcient and refused to pro
ceed further with the case.
This court issued its alternative
writ and then proceeded to determine whether or not the trial
court was right or wrong in refusing to proceed further. We
held that the trial court was right and that the notice was in
sufﬁcient, and denied the peremptory writ for that reason;
but in the course of the opinion we thus spoke upon the ques
tion in issue here: “Upon the facts disclosed in the petition
in this case for a mandamus upon the circuit court, a major
ity of this court determined that a conditional mandamus
should be awarded, and it was accordingly so ordered.
This
principle
determination was based upon the
that where an in
ferior judicial tribunal declines to hear a case upon what is
termed a preliminary objection, and that objection is purely
a matter of law, a mandamus will go, if the inferior court has
misconstrued the law. The cases of The King v. The Justices
of the First Riding of Yorkshire, 5 Barn. & Adol. 667, and
Rex v. The Justices of Middlescx, 5 B. & Ad. 1113, The King
1). Hewer, 3 Ad. & Ellis, 715, and Regina 1:. The Recorder of
Liverpool, 1 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 291, are believed to be con
clusive upon this point so far as the English authorities go;
and our attention had not been directed to any American
cases conﬂicting with this view of the law.
If the circuit
court declines to go into the merits of the case because the
party complaining has not given the notice required by the
statute, that was a preliminary objection upon a point of law
which this court can review upon a writ of mandamus; and
if this circuit court called for a notice which the statute did
not require, the mandamus ought to be made peremptory.
It
is not deemed important to go into any extended examination
of this question, since, upon the return of the conditional
mandamus by the circuit court, we were satisﬁed that the
construction which that court gave to the statute was cor
rect.”
So in the case at bar. The trial court entertained an ob
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jection to a preliminary matter and then refused to proceed
further. The return was before the court and was therefore
an undisputed fact, and it was thus a pure question of law as
to whether the court should hear the case upon its merits.
1

#

#
#
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“The court, in the course ot a long opinion, cites the following cases
as sustaining the views which it expresses:—King v. The Justices, 5
Barn. & Adol. 667; Rex v. The Justices, 5 Barn. & Adol. 1113; King v.
Hewes, 3 Ad. & Ellis 725; Regina v. The Recorder, 1 Eng. L. 8: Eq. R.
291; Bayha v. Philips, 97 Mo. 347; Hill v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. App.
307; In re Hohorst, 150 U. S. 663; People v. Judge, 22 Mich. 493; Ex parte
H111, 165 Ala. 365; State v. Judge, 49 Fla. 380; Ex parte Schollenberger,
96 U. S. 369.

__~

STATE EX REL. REYNOLDS
Supreme Court of Nebraska.
66

v.

GRAVES.
1902.

Nebraska, 17.

SULLIVAN, C. J. This action, brought for the purpose of
compelling respondent, as judge of the eighth judicial district.
to vacate two provisional injunctions allowed by him at the
instance of Oran B. Phillips, grows out of a controversy over
the right of possession of a quarter section of farming land
in Thurston county. One 80 of the land is owned by Blanche
R. Phillips, a minor, and the other 80 is part of the estate of
Mary V. Phillips, deceased. On August 28th, this year, Oran
B. Phillips instituted two actions, one as guardian of Blanche
R. Phillips and the other as administrator of the estate of
Mary V. Phillips, to enjoin the relator from going upon the
real estate in question and from interfering in any way with
the crops growing thereon. "‘ * *
The case now before us was brought on the theory that the
respondent exceeded his authority in granting the provisional
injunctions and that this court should by writ of mandamus
compel him to rescind his action. The submission of the case
was somewhat irregular, but from the pleadings and admis
sions made by counsel at the trial it is, we think, entirely
clear that relator was, and has been ever since March 1, 1901,
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in exclusive possession of the land under and by virtue of a
written lease executed to him by Oran B. Phillips, the hus
band of Mary and the father of Blanche.
It further appears
that the land is within the limits of the Omaha Indian reser
vation, and that it had been allotted to Mary and Blanche, as
members of the Omaha tribe of Indians, in accordance with
the acts of congress providing for the allotment in severalty
of tribal lands. The ground upon which Phillips proceeds in
the actions brought by him against the relator is that the re
lator’s lease is invalid, and his possession, therefore, unlaw
ful. Whether this position is tenable we need not determine.
It may be that the lease is void. Conceding that it is, the fact
still remains that relator entered under it, and was in actual,
exclusive, and peaceable possession of the land, and of the
crops growing thereon, at the time the injunctions were al
lowed. This being so, the necessary effect of the order made
by respondent, if heeded or enforced, would be to dispossess
the relator, exclude him from the property, and transfer his
possessory right to Phillips, who was left free to enter and

reap where he had not sown. Phillips was, it is true. claim
ing the land; but he did not occupy it; and the injunctions
were, therefore, not granted for the purpose of preventing a
Clearly
threatened invasion of a present actual possession.
attempting
respondent
in
of
to
take
from
relator,
the action
without a hearing or an opportunity to be heard, the posses
sion of real and personal property which he claimed, and still
claims, was rightfully his cannot be justiﬁed as an exercise
of judicial power. The provisional injunction was never de
signed to transfer the possession of property from one liti
A court or judge cannot thus dispossess a
gant to another.
party, and then compel him to produce evidence and establish
his title in order to obtain restitution. “It has been decided
repeatedly,” says Mr. Justice Campbell in Railroad Co. v.
Iosco Circuit Judge, 44 Mich. 479, 7 N. W. 65, “that any de
cree or order divesting possession or rights on a preliminary
inquiry is illegal and void so that no one need respect or obey
it.” In Calvert 11. State, 34 Neb. 616, 52 N. W. 687, a case
which is in no material feature distinguishable from the one
at bar, it was held that the provisional injunction allowed by
the district judge was absolutely null. In the opinion, writ
“A temporary injunction
ten by Maxwell, C. J., it is said:
merely prevents action until a hearing can be had. If it goes
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further, and divests a party of his possession or rights in
property, it is simply void.” This statement seems to be fully
sustained by the adjudged cases in other jurisdictions, and
we have found no decision giving color or countenance to a
contrary view. But whether the action of respondent be re
garded as absolutely void or only voidable, as his counsel con
tends, it is manifestly an abuse and perversion of process that
ought to be speedily corrected.
We have, of course, authority to review and reverse it in an
appellate proceeding; but, under the circumstances here dis
closed, that remedy is not, in our judgment, an adequate one.
The rights of the relator can be adequately protected only by
the prompt rescission of the orders of which he complains;
and the power to grant this relief by mandamus is certainly
vested in this court.
The superintendent authority of the
king’s bench over inferior tribunals is, to the extent that it
may be exercised by the use of the writ of mandamus, in
cluded in and part of the original jurisdiction given by the
constitution to the supreme court. In State '0. Beall, 48 Neb.
817, 67 N. W. 868, this court issued a mandamus requiring
the judge of the Tenth district to receive and enter of record
a verdict which was, in his judgment, defective both in form
Although no reference is made in the opin
and substance.
ion to the source of the authority under which the court acted,
what it did was undoubtedly an exercise of the revisory juris
diction or superintending control by which the king’s bench
from the earliest times kept inferior courts within their legiti
mate bounds.
Whether the verdict responded to the issues
made by the pleadings and was sufficient in form was a ques
tion which the trial court was bound to decide. It was a ju
dicial question, and the decision of it was, after ﬁnal judg
ment, subject to revision by this court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction.
The allowance of the writ of manda
mus was, therefore, justiﬁable only on the ground that the
decision of the trial court was erroneous and the ordinary
remedy for its correction inadequate. While the writ of man
damus cannot be made to perform the functions of an appeal
or proceeding in error, it may be, and commonly is, employed
to coerce judicial action in cases where courts or magistrates
have exceeded their jurisdiction; and, according to some au
thorities, its use is warranted even in cases where jurisdic
tion was not wanting, but power and discretion were ﬂag
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rantly abused. Some of the cases dealing with this question
are People 'v. Judge of St. Clair Circuit, 31 Mich. 456; People
'v. State Treasurer, 24 Mich. 468; Railroad Co. v. Iosco Cir
cuit Judge, 44 Mich. 479, 7 N. W. 65; Ex parte Bradley, 7
Wall. 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Ea: parte Pile, 9 Ark. 336; Wood '0.
Strother, 76 Cal. 545, 18 Pac. 766, 9 Am. St. Rep. 249; Have
meg/er 'v. Superior Court (Cal.) 24 Pac. 121, 10 L. R. A. 627,
18 Am. St. Rep. 192; City of Huron 1:. Campbell, 3 S. D. 1309,
53 N. W. 182; State v. Johnson, 103 Wis. 591, 79 N. W. 1081,
51 L. R. A. 33; State v. Laughlin, 75 Mo. 358.
In disposing of this case it is not necessary to determine
whether nuzndamus will ever issue to correct an error made
That
by an inferior court in the exercise. of jurisdiction.
question is not now before us, and we therefore go only to the
extent of holding that upon the facts in the present record the

writ should

43

be allowed.

Writ allowed."

Accord:—Bishop

v.

Fischer, (1915)

94

Kan.

105.

WOOD v. STROTHER.
Supreme Court of California.
76

1888.

California, 545.

HAYNE, C. This is an appeal from a judgment awarding a
writ of mandamus to the auditor of San Fancisco to counter
sign a street assessment warrant under the act of 1872. That
act provides that the warrant shall be countersigned by the
auditor, “who, before countersigning it, shall examine the
contract, the steps taken previous thereto, and the record of
assessments, and must be satisﬁed that the proceedings have
been legal and fair.” Laws 1871-72, p. 813, § 10. The Word
“fair” seems very loosely used in the above provision. In
common usage it would convey some idea of justice or equity.
But it is not possible that it could have been intended that in
a case where the proceedings are legal—that is to say, in ac
cordance with the requirements of the act—the auditor could
refuse to sign upon the ground that the law was not just, or
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upon his own undeﬁned notions of fairness. The word, thcre
fore, adds nothing tothe force of the word “legal,” but is one
of those expressions which are put in for the sake of the
*
"‘
*
sound, and which convey no deﬁnite meaning.
The proceedings being “legal,” the auditor was wrong in
his refusal to countersign the warrant; and the remaining
question is whether he can be compelled to sign by the writ of
mandamus; in other words, whether mandamus is the proper
remedy. The learned counsel for the appellant has directed
most of his argument to this question. The argument against
the writ is, in substance, that the statute requires the auditor
to examine the proceedings, and satisfy himself that they are
legal before signing; and that if he has examined them, and
become satisﬁed that they are not legal, the most that can be
said is that he has committed an error in a matter conﬁded to
his discretion; and that the function of the writ is not to re
view such exercise of discretion.
It must be acknowledged that this argument is exceedingly
There are innumerable cases in which it has been
plausible.
laid down that mandamus cannot issue to control discretion.
The rule-which is undoubtedly correct, when properly un
derstood—has been expressed in various forms. It has been
repeatedly said that the writ cannot perform the functions of
a writ of error; that it cannot issue to revise judicial action,
but can only compel the performance of ministerial functions;
and that it will issue to compel a tribunal to act in some way,
but not in any particular way. These formulas undoubtedly
express a truth; but they express it in an inaccurate and mis
leading manner. And by reasoning from them, as if literally
and in all cases true, courts have sometimes been led into
error, and have frequently been forced to call acts “minis
terial” which are plainly not so. An examination of the au
thorities will demonstrate the inaccuracy of the above
phrases.
Thus it is not accurate to say that the writ will not issue to
control discretion; for it is well settled that it may issue to
correct an abuse of discretion, if the case is otherwise proper.
Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall. 377; State 1:. Lafayette Co., 41 Mo.
226; Village of Glencoe 'v. People, 78 Ill. 389; People v. Supe
rior Court, 10 Wend. 285; Railroad Co. '0. Stockton, 51 Cal.
339; Tapp. Mand. 14.
So while, in one sense, it is correct to say that the writ can
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not be made to perform the functions of a writ of error, in
another sense it is not; for as was said by Chief Justice Mar
shall in Ex parte Crane, 5 Pet. 193: “A mandamus to an in
ferior court of the United States is in the nature of appellate
jurisdiction.”
See, also, People v. Bacon, 18 Mich. 253.
So it is not universally true that the writ will not issue to
control judicial action, or to compel a tribunal, to whom the
examination of a matter is intrusted, to act in a particular
way. The cases in our own state show this. Thus in Russell
'v. Elliott, 2 Cal. 245, the writ issued to compel a judge to en
ter judgment upon the report of a referee. Here the judge
had examined the matter, and had arrived at the conclusion
that it was not proper that the judgment should be entered
upon the report. But the higher court differed with him, and
commanded him to do what as a judge he had refused to do.
So in Mining Co. 'v. Fremont, 7 Cal. 130, the writ was issued
to compel the judge of a district court to issue an attachment
for contempt in disobeying an injunction. A motion had been
made to the judge to commit the offender, but the judge had
decided that he could not do so. Here the matter was certain
ly to be determined by the judge in the ﬁrst instance.
He
erred in his conclusion. And to say that a correction of such
error by mandamus is not revising judicial action, or not com
pelling the judge to act in a particular way, is a misuse of
language.
So it is Well settled that a mandamus may issue to compel a
judge to sign a bill of exceptions. People v. Lee, 14 Cal. 510;
People v. Rosborough, 29 Cal. 416; People '0. Keyser, 53 Cal.
184; Lin Tai 22. Hewill, 56 Cal. 118; People 'v. Crane, 60 Cal.
279. Whether the party has a right to have a bill, or whether
it is in time, are certainly judicial questions, and they are to
be decided in the ﬁrst instance by the judge, who, if he decide
them correctly, will not be compelled by the writ to take back
his decision. Clark v. Crane, 57 Cal. 629. Is anything gained
by calling such decision a “ministerial” act?

‘ '

i

"‘

Ii

#

$

1

$

ii
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In New York, where the formulas

Q

as to discretion,

judicial action, etc., have often been repeated, it has been held
that the writ may issue ‘to compel a judge to vacate an order
granting a new trial upon the ground of newly-discovered evi
which order was in violation of the established rules
that there must be no laches, and that the newly-discovered
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evidence must not be cumulative merely; there being no other
adequate remedy. People 0. Superior Court, 10 Wend. 285,
5 Wend. 114.
So where the court of common pleas set aside
the report of referees upon the merits, and erred in doing so,
the writ issued to correct the error. People v. Court of Com
mon Pleas, 12 Wend. 246.
So where the court of common
pleas granted the plaintiff leave to amend his declaration, but,
under an erroneous view of the law, refused to grant leave to
the defendant to plead, a higher court (per Bronson, J.)
awarded a mandamus commanding the inferior court, either
to allow the defendant to plead or refuse to allow the declara
tion to be amended. People 0. Court of Common Pleas, 18
Wend. 534.
In Michigan, the rule as to discretion, etc., prevails. See
Houghton Co. '0. Auditor General, 36 Mich. 273; Parks 0. Cir
cuit Judge, 38 Mich. 244; Wells 0. Circuit Judge, 39 Mich. 21;
Railroad Co. '0. Circuit Judge, 40 Mich. 168; Stork 0. Superior
Court, 41 Mich. 5. Yet in that state the writ has issued in
the following cases: To compel a judge to set aside a judg
ment rendered against the relator, because of an illegal notice
of trial, (People 0. Bacon, 18 Mich. 247;) to compel a court to
vacate an order overruling a motion-for relator’s discharge
from arrest, (Watson 0. Superior Court, 40 Mich. 730;) to
compel a judge to vacate an injunction, (Van Norman '0. Cir
cuit Judge, 45 Mich. 205, 7 N. W. Rep. 796;) to compel a
judge to vacate an order denying a motion to amend a record,
(Frederick '0. Circuit Judge, 52 Mich. 529, 18 N. W. Rep.
343.)

In Alabama the rule

as to discretion prevails. See Ea: parte
Co.,
44 Ala. 655, 656. But in that state the writ has
Railroad
issued in the following cases: In Ex parte Lowe, 20 Ala. 330,
the court had granted a new trial upon condition that costs
The costs were paid, but
were paid within a certain time.
not, as was claimed, within the time prescribed by the order.
The court took this view, and made the judgment absolute.
The higher court considered that the view of the lower court
was erroneous, and awarded a mandamus to compel a new
trial. * * "‘ And decisions similar in principle have been
made in other states. In Ea: parte Pile, 9 Ark. 336, a judge
was compelled by the writ to issue an injunction which ho
had refused to issue. In State 0. McArthur, 13 Wis. 407, the
writ issued to compel a change of venue. In Com. 0. Sessions
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Norfolk, 5 Mass. 435, it issued to compel a justice to accept
a verdict and render judgment thereon.
In view of the foregoing cases, it seems a mere perversion
of language to say that the writ will never issue to _control
judicial action, or to compel a tribunal to act in a particular
way. It is by no means intended to assert that the writ could
issue in this state in all the cases above referred to. The pro
priety of the issuance of the writ in any case must depend
upon whether, under the law of the state where the litigation
arises, the determination was intended to be ﬁnal; and, if not.
upon whether the system of practice furnishes any other ade
quate remedy. These things might be different in different
states. But the cases cited serve to show that the formulas
above mentioned are not universally and literally true, and
that it is dangerous to reason from them as if they were so.
In every case the tribunal that is to act must determine in the
ﬁrst instance whether the case is a proper one for its action.
And in our opinion the true tests are whether its determina
tion is intended by law to be ﬁnal, and, if not, whether there
is any other “plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.”
If the
determination of the tribunal was intended to be ﬁnal, it is
plain that it cannot be "disturbed, either on mandamus or in
any other way. If it was not intended to be ﬁnal, but there is
another “plain, speedy, and adequate remedy,” the writ can
not issue; for it was not designed to usurp the place of other
remedies. But if the determination was not intended to be
ﬁnal, and there is no other adequate remedy, the writ must
issue. Otherwise there would be an admitted wrong without
The writ issues in such case to prevent a failure
a remedy.
of justice. And this is its ancient office. * * *
It will generally happen that where discretion is committed
to an officer, or where a judicial tribunal is called upon to act,
its determination is either ﬁnal, or only subject to review in
certain prescribed ways. But, as above shown, this is not
universally true, and it is dangerous to reason as if it were
so. The ultimate test is, in our opinion, as we have stated. In
the present case there can be no doubt that the auditor was
to examine the proceedings, and satisfy himself that they
were legal, for the statute expressly says so; and if they were
found by the court to be illegal the writ could not issue. But,
being perfectly legal, the question is whether the determina
tion of the auditor was intended to be ﬁnal; and we can see no
-of
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ground for saying that it was. There is nothing in the lan
guage of the act which shows that it was intended to be ﬁnal.
It certainly would not be ﬁnal in favor of the contractor. In
the numerous cases in which street assessments have been
before the court we have never seen it suggested that the sig
nature of the auditor cured previous illegality, and it seems
clear that it would not do so. Why, then, should it be ﬁnal
against the contractor, and be conclusive that the proceedings
are illegal, when it is apparent that they are not so? If the
auditor’s determination of this purely legal question were in
tended to be ﬁnal, it would have been natural for the charter
to have given the parties interested a hearing. Nothing of
the kind is provided.
The proposition, therefore, must go to
this extent: that the auditor is clothed with absolute and
despotic authority over the rights of the contractor.
We are
not prepared to go so far. If the determination of the auditor
be not ﬁnal, then, upon the principles above stated, the writ
must issue; for under the street law the failure to sign the
warrant brings the proceedings to a complete stop, and there
is no other remedy in law or equity.
We advise, therefore,
that the judgment be aﬁirmed.
BELCHER, C. C., and FOOTE, C., concurred.
PER CURIAM: For the reasons given in the foregoing opin
ion the judgment is affirmed.“
44in some states mandamus has become a rather common means of
taking a summary appeal in cases where the ordinary means of review
by appeal. error or ccrtiorari are not available or are too slow or too
indirect to be satisfactory.
Thus, in Michigan the writ has been very liberally allowed.
In
People v. Swift, (1886) 59 Mich. 529, it was issued to review an order
quashing an indictment, the court saying that a writ of error, although
available, involves delay, and does not lead as readily as a mandamus
to a trial on the merits, which public policy requires should not be
unduly delayed."
In Townsend v. Circuit Judge, (1909) 157 Mich. 231,
its intention to follow its practice of reviewing by
declares
court
the
mandamus the action of circuit courts on retaxation of costs, notwith
In many cases, such as
standing that "the practice is anomolous.”
Siege] v. Circuit Judge, (1909) 155 Mich. 459, it is held that mandamus
is a proper remedy to get relief from temporary injunctions which
if left until they could be reviewed by
would operate oppressively
appeal; and the writ will regularly be allowed when the authority to
issue the injunctions turns solely upon a question of 1aw,—B. Siege! Co.
v. Circuit Judge, (1914) 183 Mich. 145. Mandamus is a proper means
to compel a judge £0 set aside a service of summons improperly made,—
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Jacobson v. Circuit Judge, (1889) 76 Mich. 234; Mitchell v. Circuit
Judge, (1881) 53 Mich. 541; to correct the action of the trial court in
ordering an unwarranted bill of particula.rs,—Van Vrankezn v. Circuit
Judge, (1891) 85 Mich. 140; to compel the vacation of an order dis
missing a bill in chancery,—Brown v. Pontiac Min. Co., (1895) 105
Mich. 653; to compel the setting aside of a verdict and granting a new
trial because of misconduct of the jury,—Churchill v. Circuit Judge,
(1885) 56 Mich. 536; to compel the quashing of a capias ad rcspondendum
improperly lssued,—Gardiner v. Circuit Judge, (1909) 155 Mich. 414; to
review the regularity of proceedings for change of venue.—County of
Montmorency v. Wiltse, (1900) 125 Mich. 47; Glinnan v. Recorder’s
Court, (1913) 173 Mich. 674; to vacate an improper order for pro
duction of business books,—-People Y. Circuit Judge, (1878) 38 Mich.
351;
to compel the dismissal of a bill for divorce which lacked the
required aﬂidavit,—Ayres v. Circuit Judge, (1892) 90 Mich. 380; to set
aside a default prematurely ta.ken,—Reid,
Murdock & Co. v. Circuit
Judge, (1897) 115 Mich. 418; to compel the court to grant a motion
to extend the time for settling a bill of exceptions,—Harper v. Circuit
Judge, (1909) 155 Mich. 543; to vacate an order closing proofs in a
chancery case,——Lansing Lumber Co. v. Circuit Judge, (1896) 108 Mich.
305, in which the court says, “It is with great hesitation that this court
acts in a matter involving the discretion of a circuit judge," and it
did so in this case largely "because of the importance of the issues
involved in the case, which ought not to be disposed of without the
proofs on both sides being taken."
It has been said, however, that the
court will not grant a writ of mandamus where the ruling can be
reviewed by a writ of error, Cosgrove v. Wayne Circuit Judge, (1906)
144 Mich. 682, although it has been done inadvertently where the im
propriety of the remedy was not called to the court's attention (Stock
v. Wayne Circuit Judge, (1906) 143 Mich. 489.
So in Alabama, the writ of mandamus has become a common method
of review where other methods are unavailable or are for any reason
unsatisfactory. See Ex parte Hill, (1910) 165 Ala. 365; Brickman v.
Wilson, (1910) 123 Ala. 259; State v. Miller, (1920) 204 Ala. 232;
Ingram v. Alabama Power Co., (1917) 201 Ala. 13; Ex parte Watters,
(1913) 180 Ala. 523; Ex parte Jones, (1901) 133 Ala. 212; Wilson v.
Duncan, (1896) 114 Ala. 659.

WINFREY
Supreme

v.

BENTON.

Court of Oklahoma.
25 Oklahoma,

J

1910.

445.

DUNN, . This case presents error from the district court
of Carter county, and submits for our consideration and de
termination the question of whether or not mandamus is the
proper remedy to be applied where a justice of the peace
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wrongfully denies a change of venue, where a party in his
court makes proper application for the same.
The general rule obtaining in such cases is stated by Mr.
Spelling in his work on Extraordinary Relief, at section 1390,
as follows:
“Manda-mus being an extraordinary remedial
process should never be employed where the party seeking it
may obtain redress in the ordinary course of judicial proceed
ings, in the one case by original action, and in the other by
employing the means afforded by law for the correction of
errors after a suit has been already instituted. In the latter
case this common reason is reinforced by the additional one
of the inconvenience and confusion which would result from
allowing litigants to resort to the appellate courts for cor
rection of errors in advance of opportunity on the part of the
lower court to correct its errors before ﬁnal judgment and
upon motion for new trial, and of the appellate court to re
view the entire record in the regular way, when it can enjoy
the advantage of having the whole case before it. It is un
important that the decision made was erroneous; the superior
court will not interfere, but leave the relator to pursue what
ever ordinary methods the law has provided for a review and
correction of errors.” The foregoing states the general rule
applicable to the use of this extraordinary writ wherever it is
invoked, and a number of courts have had occasion to pass
on the question where it involved the identical proposition
which we now have before us. Although there is some little
conﬂict among the authorities, the great weight holds that
mandamus is not the proper remedy, but that in such a case
the ruling is merely error, subject to be corrected, like all
other errors, on appeal, that the justice does not lose jurisdic
tion, and that the judgment rendered at the conclusion of the
This
case is not a nullity or void for the want of jurisdiction.
conclusion is sustained by the following authorities:
Barn
hart & Bro. 12. Davis et al., 30 Kan. 520, 2 Pac. 633; Ellis 12.
Whitaker et al., 62 Kan. 582, 64 Pac. 62; State ex rel. Proctor
et al. v. Cotton, 33 Neb. 560, 50 N. W. 688; City of Ottumwa
'0. Schaub, 52 Iowa, 515, 3 N. W. 529; County of San Joaquin
'0. Superior Court of San Joaquin County, 98 Cal. 602, 33 Pac.
482; State ex rel. Johnson 'v. Washburn, 22 Wis. 99; People
ex rel. Kindiel 12. Clerk of the District Court of Arapahoe
County, 22 Colo. 280, 44 Pac. 506; Galbraith '0. Williams, 106
Ky. 431; 50 S. W. 686; People ex rel. Clark et al. v. M cRaberts,
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Flagley v. Hubbard, 22 Cal. 35;
Err parte Chambers, 10 Mo. App. 240; Hamilton v. Smart, 78
Kan. 218, 95 Pac. 836.
It follows, therefore, that the petition of plaintiff in error
in this court is sustained, and the judgment of the trial court
is reversed, and the cause dismissed."
100

Ill. 458; People

ex rel.

KANE, C. J., and
WILLIAMS, J. dissents.

TURNER

and

HAYES,

JJ.,

concur

'15 Contra:
Ex parte Reeves, (1874) 51 Ala. 55; State v. Williams,
(1906) 127 Wis. 236; State v. District Court, (1899) 77 Minn. 302.

STATE EX REL. NASH

v.

SUPERIOR COURT.

Supreme Court of Washington.
82 Washington,

1914.

614.

Application ﬁled in the supreme court January 30, 1914,
., to
to compel the superior court for Paciﬁc county, Wright,
vacate an order for change of venue, and proceed with the
trial of the cause. Writ granted.

J

CROW,C.J.
*

*

*

*

*

*

‘

The plaintiff ﬁled her motion for a change of venue
from Paciﬁc county to Clarke county upon the ground of con
venience of witnesses and for the promotion of the ends of
justice. This motion was resisted by the defendant upon the
“ "‘ *
ground that the plaintiff’s showing was not suﬁicient,
Affidavits were ﬁled supporting and resisting the application.
The trial court granted plaintiff’s motion, and transferred the
cause to Clarke county. Thereupon the defendant Joseph H.
Nash, as relator, applied to this court for a writ of mandate
to compel the Honorable Edward H. Wright. as judge of the
superior court in and for Paciﬁc county, to vacate his order
granting the * * "‘ change of venue, and to proceed with
the trial of the cause in Paciﬁc county.
The respondent contends that the relator has no remedy
by writ of mandate, but that his remedy, if any, is by writ of
certiorari, evidently meaning an appeal. This contention can
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not be sustained. State ea: rel. Howell ‘L’. Superior Court, 144
Pac. 291.
In State ex rel. Scougale 1'. Superior Court, 55
Wash. 328, 104 Pac. 607, 133 Am. St. Rep. 1030, the superior
court entered an order granting a change of venue. There
upon the plaintiff, as relator, applied to this court for a writ
of mandate directing the lower court to proceed with the trial.
The respondent, by demurrer, interposed in this court, con
tended that the relator had an adequate remedy by appeal.
Disposing of this contention, we said:
If the change of venue was
“This view is not sustainable.
erroneously made, we cannot presume that the superior court
of Snohomish county will assume to exercise jurisdiction; nor
could we, upon an appeal from that court, direct the superior
court of Pierce county to proceed with the trial. The remedy
by appeal is therefore inadequate. State ex rel. W3/man, etc.,
Co. 'v. Superior Court, 40 Wash. 443, 82 Pac. 875, 2 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 568, 111 Am. St. Rep. 915 (5 Ann. Cas. 775) ; State
ex rel. Miller 'v. Superior Court, 40 Wash. 555, 82 Pac. 875, 2
L. R. A. (N. S.) 395, 111 Am. St. Rep. 925.”
No suﬁicient showing has been made that a change of venue
is necessary for the convenience of witnesses residing in this
state. The action should be retained for trial in Paciﬁc coun
ty. Let the writ issue.“
Accord:—Glinnan v. Judge of Recorder's Court, (1913) 173 Mich. 674.
See Ex parte Harding, (1910) 219 U. S. 363, where the court discusses
two inconsistent lines of cases in which it had granted or refused to
grant the writ to compel federal courts to remand cases to state courts,
showing the difficulty in drawing the line between the proper and im
proper use of the writ.
46

SECTION 4.

PROHIBITION.

QUIMBO APPO

v.

PEOPLE.

Court of Appeals of New York.
20

1860.

New York, 581.

Writ of error to the Supreme Court.

Quimbo Appo was
tried and convicted of murder, and sentenced to be executezl
therefor, by a Court of Oyer and Terminer held in and for
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the city and county of New York, in April, 1859. The court
adjourned sine die on the 16th of June following.
On the ﬁrst Monday of October, in the same year, a court
of Oyer and Terminer was held in and for the same city and
county, before Mr. Justice Roosevelt, and on the 17th of
October Appo made an application to the last mentioned court
to set aside his conviction and sentence, and grant him a new
trial. The application was founded on the minutes of Mr.
Justice Davies, before whom the conviction took place, and on
affidavits alleging injustice done him on his trial, newly dis
covered evidence, &c.
The district attorney denied the power of the court to en
tertain or grant such a motion and declined to answer it on
The court affirmed its power and announced its
the merits.
The district attorney there
intention to grant the motion.
upon sued out an alternative writ of prohibition, addressed to
Appo and the court, forbidding the exercise of this jurisdic
tion. The writ was returnable at the general term of the
Supreme Court on the ﬁrst Monday of December, 1859. On
the return day the court, on argument, rendered judgment,
awarding a prohibition absolute, from which judgment Appo
brought error to this court.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SELDEN, . The ﬁrst question to be considered is, whether
the writ of prohibition was a proper remedy, assuming that
the Court of Oyer and Terminer had no authority to grant a
new trial upon the merits after conviction and sentence for
the crime of murder.
The office of this writ is, to restrain subordinate courts and
inferior judicial tribunals of every kind from exceeding their
jurisdiction. It is an ancient and valuable writ, and one the
use of which in all proper cases should be upheld and encour
aged, as it is important to the due and regular administration
of justice that each tribunal should conﬁne itself to the exer
cise of those powers with which, under the Constitution and
laws of the State, it has been intrusted.
But it is said, that when the inferior court or tribunal has
jurisdiction of the action, or of the subject-matter before
any error in the exercise of that jurisdiction can neither be
writ of prohibition.
corrected nor prevented by
It
true that the most frequent occasions for the use of
writ
are where
subordinate tribunal assumes to enter
the

I

a

is

a

it,
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tain some cause or proceeding over which it has no control.
But the necessity for the writ is the same where, in a matter
of which such tribunal has jurisdiction, it goes beyond its
legitimate powers; and the authorities show that the writ is
equally applicable to such a case.
Mr. Jacob, in treating of
this writ, after saying that it may issue to inferior courts of
every description, whether ecclesiastical, temporal, military
or maritime, whenever they attempt to take cognizance of
causes over which they have no jurisdiction, adds: “or if, in
handling of matters clearly within their cognizance, they
transgress the bounds prescribed to them by the laws of Eng
land, as where they require two witnesses to prove the pay
ment of a legacy.”
(Jac. Law Dic., title, Prohibition.)
¥

#

#

#

ll

Ii

ii

i
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#

These cases prove that the writ lies to prevent the exercise
of any unauthorized power, in a cause or proceeding of which
the subordinate tribunal has jurisdiction, no less than when
the entire cause is without its jurisdiction. »The broad re
medial nature of this writ is shown by the brief statement of
In stating the various cases in which
a case by Fitzherbert.
“And if a man be sued in the
the writ will lie, he says:
Spiritual Court, and the judges there will not grant unto the
defendant the copy of the libel, then he shall have a prohibi
tion, directed unto them for a surcease,” &c., until they have
delivered the copy of the libel, according to-the statute made

in Anno 2 H., 5. (F. N. B., title Prohibition.)
This shows that the writ was never governed by any nar
row technical rules, but was resorted to as a convenient mode
of exercising a wholesome control over inferior tribunals.
The scope of this remedy ought not, I think, to be abridged, as
it is far better to prevent the exercise of an unauthorized
power than to be driven to the necessity of correcting the er
ror after it is committed‘. I have no hesitation, therefore, in
holding that this is a proper case for the use of the writ, if
the Supreme Court was right in the conclusion to which it
arrived at general term.
Had, then, the Court of Oyer and Terminer authority to
make the order granting to the defendant, Quimbo Appo, a
new

trial?

*

*

*

i

The whole course of judicial as well as legislative action in
this State, until the decision in The People v. Stone, 5 Wend.
39, indicates very clearly, I think, a general understanding
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that Courts of Oyer and Terminer could not grant new trials
in such cases. ‘ * "‘
The judgment should,

I

think, be affirmed."

47 “Lack of jurisdiction may exist with reference to subject-matter
gen
erally ie. g., the class to which the case belongs) or it may exist with
reference to the parties to the suit, or it may exist with reference to
excess oi jurisdiction in the concrete case itseif."—State ex rel. v. Mc
Quiliin, (1914) 262 Mo. 256, 266.
“We ﬂnd it stated by some judicial writers, following the old English
cases, that the writ may also be issued to prohibit the court, judge or
other tribunal from proceeding contrary to ‘the general laws of the land.’
This doubtless means nothing more than passing upon personal or prop
erty rights without a hearing.
It embraces cases where a petition, plead
ing or objection is duly served or ﬁled in accordance with the settled
law or practice, and a court, judge or other tribunal having jurisdiction
and whose duty it is to hear and determine the matter is proceeding to
' ' ' That I take it, would be an
a determination without a hearing.
jurisdiction."—People
ex rel. v. Fitzgerald, (1902) 73 N. Y.
excess of
App. Div. 339.
In Mooney v. Superior Court, (1920) 183 Cal. 705, 192 Pac. 542, it was
held that where a judgment has become ﬁnal and beyond the power of
the court to vacate, the court may be restrained from threatened action
by a writ of prohibition.

j~

STATE EX REL. TERMINAL RAILROAD ASS’N
TRACY.
Supreme Court of Missouri.
237

1911

v.

.

Missouri, 109.

[Original proceeding in prohibition. The petition alleged
that the relator was a terminal railroad company operating
in St. Louis, and that the respondent was acting justice of the
First District Police Court of that city; that there were pend
ing before respondent about 200 separate cases against rela
tor for alleged violation of a certain city ordinance; that 17
such cases had been prosecuted to ﬁnal judgment and ﬁnes
imposed aggregating $7,050; that new informations were con
tinually being ﬁled, and relator was obliged to keep its attor
neys constantly employed in defending same, ﬁling bonds and
perfecting appeals; that the said ordinance did not apply to
any of the cases brought under
and the relator had vainly
it,

~'
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tried to obtain the consent of the city to stop bringing suits
until an appeal in one of the cases could be ﬁnally determined
in this court; and that the said police court was “proceeding
The respondents return
in grievous abuse of its powers.”
substantially admitted the facts alleged in the petition.]
KENNISH, J. * * *
The remedy by writ of prohibition is of ancient origin in
our system of jurisprudence. The principles of law govern
ing its issuance and the facts necessary to warrant relief by
that extraordinary writ have frequently been the subject of
adjudication in this and other courtslof last resort, as well
It has
as the theme of much learning by the text-writers.
been likened to the equitable remedy by injunction against
proceedings at law. The object in each case is the restrain
ing of legal proceedings; but, as has been said: “This vital
difference, however, is to be observed between them:
An in
junction against proceedings at law is directed only to the
parties litigant, without in any manner interfering with the
court, while a prohibition is directed to the court itself, com
manding it to cease from the exercise of a jurisdiction to
which it has no legal claim.” High’s Extraordinary ‘Legal
Remedies (3d Ed.) § 763.
There is this further similarity
between the two remedies thus compared, which is of im
portance in the consideration of the case in hand, namely,
that, as the right to the remedy by injunction implies a wrong
threatened by the parties litigant against whom the relief is
sought, so the right to the writ of prohibition implies that
a wrong is about to be committed, not by the parties litigant
as in the case of injunction, but by the person or court assum
ing the exercise of judicial power and against whom the writ
is asked. Indeed, it may be said generally of all procedure in
courts of justice for the enforcement of civil rights that the
existence of a remedy on the one hand implies actionable
wrong on the other. It follows that, to entitle a relator to a
writ of prohibition, it should be made to appear that it is
within the power, and that it is the duty, of the person or
court proceeded against, to refrain from taking the threat
ened judicial action which is made the basis of the complaint.
The judicial wrong or fault which calls for the writ of pro
hibition does not mean an infraction of personal rights only,
but rather an offending of the court by an assumption of ju
dicial power and jurisdiction not authorized by law.
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Relator states in its brief that the writ of prohibition will
be ordered by a superior court to curb and restrain an in
“First, when the
ferior court in the following instances:
Second, when the lower
lower court has no jurisdiction.
court is proceeding in excess of its jurisdiction. Third, when
the instrumentalities of the lower court are being used for
the purposes of oppression, and the jurisdiction of the court
abused.”

The ﬁrst two grounds thus stated are recognized as settled
law in the adjudged cases, and if the facts of a given case
show either want of jurisdiction or excess thereof, together
with an absence of an adequate remedy at law or in equity, a
It should
case is made warranting the issuance of the writ.
be observed that, although want of jurisdiction and excess of
jurisdiction are commonly referred to and considered as sep
arate grounds for the issuance of the writ, there is in prin
ciple little distinction between them, as each means an at
tempt by a court or person to take judicial action without
judicial power or authority for such action.
The third ground, as stated by relator, is rather vague and
indeﬁnite and seems to assert the proposition that there exists
a basis for the issuance of the writ independent of and not
comprehended within either of the ﬁrst two grounds.
This
contention is the main question before us for decision, and a
consideration of the admitted facts of this case makes obvious
the importance and necessity to relator of its ability to main
tain that proposition.
An examination of the authorities upon the law governing
the issuance of this extraordinary writ has brought to our
attention, among others, the following:
“The sole question for determination upon an application
for the writ of prohibition is whether or not the inferior court
has usurped jurisdiction or exceeded its lawful powers, and
the writ is always refused where it appears that the court has
jurisdiction over the matter complained of.” 16 Am. & Eng.
Enc. Pl. & Pr. 1125.
“Upon an application for a writ of prohibition to stay the
action of an inferior court, the sole question to be determined
is the jurisdiction of that court.” High's Extraordinary Le
gal Remedies (3d Ed.) § 767b.
“* * * In all cases, therefore, where the inferior
court
has jurisdiction of the matter in controversy, the superior
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court will refuse to interfere by prohibition, and will leave
the party aggrieved to pursue the ordinary remedies for the
correction of errors, such as the writ of error or ce1'tiora'ri.
In the application of the principle it matters not Whether the
court below has decided correctly or erroneously; its jurisdic
tion being conceded, prohibition will not go to prevent an er
"‘
*
*" High’s Ex
roneous exercise of that jurisdiction.
traordinary Legal Remedies (3d Ed.) § 772.

a

is

a

ly

a

it

is

is

is

is

a

it
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Upon the foregoing authorities
may be safely asserted, as
settled law and without exception, that unless the court
sought to be prohibited
wanting in jurisdiction over the
class of cases to which the pending case belongs, or
attempt
ing to act in excess of its jurisdiction in
case of which
rightfully has cognizance, the writ will be denied.
It
contended by relator that the information fails to
state a cause of action, and therefore that the court
with
out jurisdiction and the Writ should be issued for that reason,
especially in view of the number of informations pending and
clearly untenable, and no
about to be ﬁled. This position
authority
If the lower court has juris
cited in its support.
diction of the class of cases to which the said prosecutions
belong, then there can be no doubt of its jurisdiction to deter
mine the sufficiency of the information, leaving the losing
party the right to have such judgment reviewed on appeal. It
stands admitted in this record that the police court has exclu
sive jurisdiction of all cases for the violation of city ordinances, and that the prosecutions complained of are for the
alleged violations of said ordinances.
It follows that said
court must have the right to determine whether the informa
charge or fail to charge
tions coming before
violation of
said ordinances, and the writ of prohibition “cannot be right
employed to compel a judicial oﬁicer, having full jurisdic
cause, to steer his oﬁicial course by
tion over the parties and
the judgment of some other judge, or to substitute the opinion
of another court for his own in dealing with the topics com
mitted by the law to his decision.”
“Where jurisdiction over the parties and the subject of the
cause
(as in this instance) clear, any error of the trial
ruling
on the suﬁiciency of the pleading forming the
court in
basis of the suit cannot be corrected by resort to
writ of
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Relator states in its brief:
ground of prohibition
when
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rel. v. Scarritt, 128 Mo., loc. cit. 338,
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prohibition.” State
340, 30 S. W. 1028.
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court permits multitudinous
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and innumerable prosecutions to be urged for purposes of
coercion and embarrassment, as in State ex rel. 'v. Eby, 170
Mo., loc. cit. 526 (71 S. W. 62), wherein the court said: ‘It
has, however, been urged by counsel for respondent that inas
much as relators have remedy by appeal, etc., in consequence
an errone
of this, prohibition cannot be granted. But this
this,
relators,
if they
where
ous view because in a case like
could not have the relief prayed, would be compelled to go to
trial in 1,203 cases; then, if defeated, would have to give bond
in each case, take an appeal in each case, pay for transcript
fee in each case, pay docket fee in each case of $10, such fees
amounting in the aggregate to $12,030, as well as counsel fees
must be conspicuously obvi
in each court. Consequently,
ous that such appeals would be, although available, “inade
quate to meet the emergencies of the case, or afford the re
Spelling,
entitled.”
dress to which the injured party
”
1725, and cases cited.’
Inj.
Extr. Rem. (2d Ed.)
Relator has misinterpreted the language quoted from the
Eby Case. It
apparent that the court was not there dealing
with the question as to the grounds upon which the writ
should be issued, but the question whether (one of the neces
sary grounds existing) the court should deny the writ for the
reason that the relator had an adequate remedy by appeal.
In the preceding part of the opinion the court had held that
the law upon which the prosecution in the trial court was
based was unconstitutional and had been repealed, and the
court (170 Mo., loc. cit. 522, 71 S. W. 60) said: “Under the
foregoing authorities, does this record present on its face the
posture of there being an absolute want of jurisdiction in the
lower court to try the 1,203 informations ﬁled against relators
does, we entertain no
in the Pike circuit court? That
again
Mo.,
doubt.” And
loc. cit. 526, 71 S. W. 62)
“Of
(170
course, if the law
unconstitutional which
made the basis
of the proceedings, the case
one where
obvious on the
face of such proceedings that the trial court has no jurisdic
tion, and prohibition will consequently lie.”
Respondents in that case had urged that, even if the trial
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court was without jurisdiction, the writ should not be granted
for the reason that the trial court had power to pass upon the
question of its own jurisdiction; that that was a proper mat
ter of defense, and there was an adequate remedy by appeal.
Responding to that contention, in the language quoted by the
relator, this court held that the remedy by appeal was not ade
quate, and that, as the trial court was without jurisdiction,
the facts of the case warranted the issuance of the writ. In
so holding this court was within the general law, as shown by
the foregoing authorities, and as applied to the facts of the
case before it.
The case of State em rel. ’t‘. Ross, 122 Mo. 435, 25 S. W. 947,
23 L. R. A. 534, is also cited and relied upon to sustain the
contention that the writ may properly be granted when want
of jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction is not shown as a
basis therefor. In the Ross Case it was held that when a cir
cuit court had acquired jurisdiction and appointed a receiver
in a proceeding pending therein, another court of concurrent
jurisdiction would be prohibited by this court from entertain
ing jurisdiction in a suit subsequently brought for the same
A construction has been placed upon that case as
purpose.
holding that, since the court in which the second proceeding
was instituted had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of
the person, it follows that this court countenanced the issu
ance of the writ where neither want nor excess of jurisdiction
was shown in the court prohibited. An examination of the
decision in that case will disclose that this court based its ac
tion in issuing the writ upon the ground of want of jurisdic
tion in the lower court, for, as stated in the syllabus, “where,
in the foregoing action, a receiver had been appointed, the pe
titioner is entitled to a writ of prohibition against inter
ference by another court and by its receiver appointed with
out jurisdiction.”
But the exclusive character of the
jurisdiction of the court in which the receivership action is
ﬁrst brought, and which also shows the ground upon which
the writ was issued in the Ross Case, supra, has been clearly
stated in a recent decision of this court. "‘ " "
In the case before us it appears from the admitted facts
that the respondent Tracy, as judge of the police court, pos
sessed not only jurisdiction, but exclusive jurisdiction, of the
prosecutions pending and threatened against relator in that
court. There is no fact alleged tending to show the exercise
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or threatened exercise of jurisdiction in excess of his judicial
power and authority, or that he has assumed or is about to
assume any power other than that conferred upon him by the
charter of the city and required of him by his oath of office.
While so acting in the line of his duty and within the scope
of his judicial power as prescribed by the charter, it cannot be
maintained, in the light of the authorities heretofore cited,
that he should be restrained and prohibited by the extraordi
nary writ of prohibition which issues only to prevent the
usurpation of judicial power. The prosecutions complained
of by relator may be vexatious because of their multiplicity.
but it is not alleged that respondent, as judge of said police
court, is in any manner responsible for the number of cases
so instituted by the prosecuting officers of the city, or that he
If the
has any authority to prevent the ﬁling of such cases.
police court was possessed of jurisdiction to hear and deter
mine one of said prosecutions against relator, it could not be
guilty of an abuse of judicial power or excess of jurisdiction
solely because it entertained jurisdiction of a larger number.
And it does not appear what respondent as such judge could
have done in the premises, other than what he has done, to
have avoided being visited by the extraordinary writ of this
court.

'

In the earlier part of this opinion it is suggested that if

relator is entitled to relief against the respondent, as judge of
the police court, it must be because he has taken, or is about
to take, some action which would be in violation of relator’s
rights. And the wrong which would warrant the issuance of
this writ can be only such a wrong or fault as amounts to
usurpation of judicial power. In the case of State ea: rel. v.
Stobie, 194 Mo. 14, loc. cit. 62, 92 S. W. 203, it was contended
that the prosecution pending before the justice of the peace
against whom the writ was asked was instituted in bad faith
by the prosecuting witness and that the writ should be issued
to prohibit the respondent justice of the peace from enter
taining further jurisdiction in the cause.
Answering that
contention, this court said: “It is immaterial, so far as con
ferring jurisdiction upon the justice, what the objects and
William Matthews was
purposes of the prosecution were.
in
said
cause
before
the justice, and ﬁled the
the complainant
charge against the relators, and must be treated, so far as
the disclosures of the petition are concerned, as the prosecut»
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ing witness ; hence the allegations upon which this contention
is predicated are directed solely to the respondent Matthews.
He made the charge, and the petition avers the improper ob
ject and purpose in making it. The said allegations apply to
the prosecution of the charge, and Matthews is the complain
ant and prosecuting witness; hence these allegations are ex
clusively directed to Matthews. There is an entire absence of
any charge in the petition that the justice of the peace ac
quired and assumed jurisdiction of said cause for the objects
and purposes attributed to Matthews in making the charge,
and in his prosecution of it, or that the justice had any knowl
edge of such objects and purposes.
The objects and purposes
of Matthews or any one else in making a charge and prose
cuting it against relators for the commission of a misde
meanor absolutely have- nothing to do with the jurisdiction
acquired by the justice, and can in no way affect such juris
diction. Even though the justice entertained the purposes at
tributed to Matthews, while it would be reprehensible in him
as an officer, and would furnish a sufficient reason to the re
lators to invoke the aid of the provisions of the statute pro
viding for changes of venue, it does not go to the jurisdiction
of the justice and furnish a basis for the issuance of the writ
of prohibition.”
After a full and careful consideration of this cause, we are
convinced that this court would not be warranted in issuing
its extraordinary writ of prohibition against the respondents,
and we hold that the preliminary rule should be quashed and
the writ denied. It is so ordered.
., who dissent."
and LAMM,

JJ

All

concur, except GRAVES

United Tel. System v. Filtner, (1920) 87 W. Va. 71, 104
prohibition to a Justice's court was held proper where a de
fendant had ﬁled a false and fictitious counterclaim for the purpose of
obtaining a jury and of giving jurisdiction by appeal in case of an ad
48111

S.
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verse judgment.

870

Tam.

AND

APPELLATE PRACTICE

STATE EX REL. CLEVELAND

TELEPHONE
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS.
Supreme
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5

CO.

v.

1918.

98 Ohio State, 164.

J

'DONAHUE,
.
The petition of the relator asks that a writ
issue prohibiting the common pleas court of Cuyahoga county
from exercising jurisdiction in a cause pending in that court,
in which cause it is sought to enjoin the relator from charg
ing or collecting within the city of Cleveland any other
or different rate for telephone service than that ﬁxed by an
ordinance of that city.
The common pleas courts of thisstate are courts of gen
eral jurisdiction.
Under the provisions of section 4, art. 4,
of the Constitution of Ohio, they are capable of receiving and
exercising to ﬁnal judgment all judicial powers conferred
upon them by the General Assembly of this state.
Sections 11876 and 11877, General Code, vest in the com
mon pleas courts authority to grant or refuse an injunction
in an action in which an injunction is the proper remedy,
or where it is necessary or incident to the relief sought. The
only limitation on this authority is found in section 549,
General Code (103 O. L. p. 816), which section provides that
no court other than the Supreme Court of this state shall
have authority to “review, suspend or delay any order made
by the [public utilities] commission, or enjoin, restrain or
interfere with the commission or any member thereof in the
performance of ofﬁcial duties.”
It appears from the petition of relator that the public
utilities commission of Ohio has made no order ﬁxing tele
phone rates to be charged in Cleveland; that that commis
sion and no member thereof is a party to cause No. 160905
on the docket of the common pleas court of Cuyahoga county;
and that the public utilities commission is proceeding to
hear and determine the questions arising upon the schedule
of rates ﬁled by the relator and the protests and complaints
against the reasonableness of such rates. It follows, there
fore, that under the provisions of sections 11876 and 11877,
General Code, the common pleas court of Cuyahoga county
has jurisdiction of the cause of action pending before it, and
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is entitled to exercise that jurisdiction to ﬁnal judgment.
The relator, if aggrieved by such ﬁnal judgment, has a full
" "‘ *
and adequate remedy at law.
In the case of State ex rel. Garrison '0. Brough, 94 Ohio St.
115, 113 N. E. 683, it was declared by this court, in the ﬁrst
paragraph of the syllabus, that: “The Writ of prohibition
is an extraordinary legal remedy, whose object is to prevent
a court or tribunal of peculiar, limited, or inferior power
from assuming jurisdiction of a matter beyond its cogniz
ance.
The writ cannot be made to serve the purpose of a
writ of error to correct mistakes of the lower court in decid
ing questions of law within its jurisdiction."
In the opinion it is said (94 Ohio St. on page 123, 113 N.
E. 685) that a writ of prohibition “does not lie to prevent a
subordinate court from deciding erroneously or from enforc
ing an erroneous judgment in a case in which it has a right
In all such cases the aggrieved party must
to adjudicate.
ordinary
pursue the
remedies for the correction of errors.”
#

$

Q

Q

$

#

$

Q

C

l

It is clear, therefore, that, no matter what may be the rule
in other jurisdictions, this court has consistently held that
a writ of prohibition will not issue against a court having
jurisdiction of the subject-matter of an action pending before
it, or to deprive such court of the authority vested in it by
the laws of this state to determine its own jurisdiction, or to
prevent a possible erroneous judgment, nor will it be made
to serve the purpose of a writ of error. It is equally well
settled that where a writ of prohibition is refused this court
will not presume to determine the issues joined by the plead
ings in the cause pending in the court against which the writ
of prohibition is sought. Nor will it offer any gratuitous
advice as to the judgment that court should enter upon such
issues.
$

#

8

#

#1

i l I I i

NICHOLS, C. J., and Jonusou, J., concur.
I concur in the judgment.
WANAMAKER, J. (concurring.)
I do not concur in the grounds of the judgment.
On January 11, 1918, the Cleveland Telephone Company
ﬁled an original action in this court asking for a writ of
prohibition against the common pleas court of Cuyahoga
county, to prohibit it from hearing and determining a case
theretofore ﬁled in that court, in which it was sought to en
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join the Cleveland Telephone Company from operating in
the city of Cleveland under a rate different and higher than
the rate theretofore ﬁxed, or attempted to be ﬁxed by an
ordinance of the Cleveland city council.
The pleadings in the case in this court were drawn by both
sides with the direct view and purpose of placing before
this court the one big, vital question, to wit: Does the stat
ute creating the state public utilities commission prevail over
the charter of the city of Cleveland in the ﬁxing of telephone
rates for the people of Cleveland?
The pleadings were not only prepared by able and eminent
counsel upon both sides for this single paramount purpose,
but the written briefs were likewise so prepared.
The great
utility
public
importance of the case to
corporations, as well
as to the millions of people residing in the municipalities of
Ohio, brought an early hearing, supposedly upon the merits
of the case. On January 23d of this year the case was orally
argued before this court and submitted all with a view of
obtaining a decision of this court upon this controlling ques

tion.
.
The only question that this court here and now decides
is the following: Is a writ of prohibition the proper remedy
against the court of common pleas?
Remedy, of course, has a keen professional interest, but
Both parties to
relief has a much greater public interest.
this cause, and those for whom they speak, are intensely and
justiﬁably concerned about this main question, and it should
be now and here decided.

The effect of ‘this judgment, by its refusal to determine
and decide this question, remands the whole matter back to
the court of common pleas of Cuyahoga county, simply to
pass upon the question, in the ﬁrst instance, as to whether or
After ﬁnal determination
not that court has jurisdiction.
by that court the defeated party may go to the court of ap
peals, and there the case be prepared,

heard, and determined

with considerable labor and no little expense. After the
adjudication of this question in the court of appeals, the
defeated party may come, as a matter of right, it being a
constitutional question, to this court, and then this court will
have again before it the identical question that the parties
sought to raise, believed they had raised, and which they
So that the decision of
conﬁdently submitted to this court.

—i
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this main question in this case at this time would avoid
three separate hearings, or trials, in three separate courts to
say nothing of the delays, the labor, and expense.
This I conceive to be a violation of both letter and spirit
of the obligations placed upon this court by the new Consti
tution of 1912, as to its original jurisdiction.
The people
of Ohio had, for years, grown weary of the numerous trials
in the numerous courts—the footballing of a case back and
forth from one court to another until the parties were almost
exhausted in patience and purse, with decisions ofttimes based
upon minor, immaterial questions, purely technical, or upon
matters of practice that did not go to the vital merits of the
case.

l

¥

ii

Ill

#

*

1*

#

#

Ill

In order to provide some direct and summary remedy for
many of these evils, which resulted not only in delays of
justice, but ofttimes in the denial of justice, the people of
Ohio made some radical changes in the judicial article of
their Constitution, among others increasing the original juris
diction of the Supreme Court by the addition of two writs,
prohibition and procedendo.
In plain phrase, by prohibition they intended to prohibit,
to stop, litigation in courts and quasi judicial bodies which
had no jurisdiction over the matter to be determined or in
which the relief sought was in excess of their jurisdiction.
By the second writ, procedendo, it was proposed to give the
Supreme Court of Ohio the right and power to order said
In
bodies to proceed to judgment without further delay.
short, it was self-evident that the great cardinal purpose of
the Constitutional Convention in this behalf was to get quick
action, ﬁnal action, economically and equitably administered,
through one fair trial and one review.

it

"‘

*

“‘

a

This court now holds, in effect, that this writ of prohibi
common pleas court upon
tion cannot be allowed against
the ground that that court has an inherent right to pass
upon its own jurisdiction, and that that question has to be
tested out according to the oldtime method of prosecuting
error through the various courts.
simply holds that the court of common pleas
In short,
what
this court will ﬁnally hold; that then the
may guess at
court of appeals may guess at what this court will ﬁnally
hold; and that then later, this court shall ultimately deter
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mine the identical question that is submitted in this case,
understand it.
and is now before this court, as

l
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I concur in this judgment, however, because hold that
the city of Cleveland, through its council, duly authorized
by its charter framed pursuant to the “home-rule” amend
ment to the Constitution of 1912, has clear and complete
power to ﬁx the rates, tolls, and charges between such com
pany and the inhabitants of the city of Cleveland, limiting
the same to service within the city of Cleveland.
t

8

8

Q

ii

#

i
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JONES, J. (dissenting).
Whether prohibition can be in
voked in this case depends upon the decisive question, Which
of these contending tribunals has jurisdiction over the rates
of this public utility, the common pleas court of Cuyahoga
county or the public utilities commission of the state?

i

#

$

But it is stated that the courts of common pleas of this
state are courts of general jurisdiction and competent to
No one questions this
decide upon their own jurisdiction.
established principle, but the complete answer to that propo
sition is that if the court of common pleas either lacks juris
diction, or usurps it, the writ will lie; otherwise we can have
no writ of prohibition against any court of general jurisdic
tion in this state. Of course if the jurisdiction of the court
depends upon a controverted fact necessary to give it juris
diction, the establishment of that fact by a court which is
competent to decide it precludes a superior court from issu
ing the writ, but, as stated in State er rel. Barbee '0. Allen,
Probate Judge, 96 Ohio St. 10, 15, 117 N. E. 13, in such cases
the subject-matter “was one properly before the court and
"
*
*
within its constitutional jurisdiction.”
To deny the writ of prohibition against a usurping court
of general jurisdiction for the reason that such court is com
petent to pass upon its own jurisdiction would result in the
adoption of a novel principle in the law relating to the issu
*
*
*
An inspection of the syllabi
ance of this writ.
of the Ohio cases clearly discloses that this writ is always
available where these courts usurp jurisdiction, although they
are competent to pass upon their own jurisdiction.
II
49
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*
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See comment on this case in 17 Mich. Law Rev. 165, showing,
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matters, that there is no general rule forbidding the use of the
writ oi prohibition against courts of general jurisdiction.

other

HAVEMEYER

SUPERIOR COURT.

v.

Supreme Court of California.
'

84

1890.

California, 827.

[The people of the state of California commenced an ac
tion against the American Sugar Reﬁning Co. for the pur
pose of forfeiting its charter, and a forfeiture was decreed.
An application was then made by the state for the appoint
ment of a receiver, and after the matter had been heard and
held under advisement for some weeks, an order was made
appointing a receiver for all the property of the company
including a certain reﬁnery in San Francisco. The receiver
instantly demanded possession of the reﬁnery, which the
petitioners contested on the ground that they had previously
purchased, and were now the owners of the same.
But the
application
their
for
a
modiﬁcation of the
court overruled
order appointing the receiver, and ordered the sheriﬁ‘ to
place the receiver in exclusive, full and complete possession
of the reﬁnery. The petitioners then applied to the Supreme
Court for a writ of prohibition.]
"‘
*
BEATTY, C. J. *
1

1

ll

#

#

i i

Q

i I

We come now to the questions as to the remedy. Prohibi
tion arrests the proceedings of an inferior judicial tribunal
or oﬁicer when such proceedings are without or in excess
of the jurisdiction of such tribunal or officer, and the writ
issues in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy, and ade
quate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Code Civ. Proc.
§§ 1102, 1103. We have shown that the superior court, in
appointing the receiver, exceeded its jurisdiction, and there
is no question that the petitioners are seriously injured by
If, then, they have no plain,
the enforcement of the order.
remedy
in ordinary course of law,
adequate
speedy, and
they are clearly entitled to the beneﬁt of the writ of pro
hibition to arrest the proceedings under the void order.
It is claimed, however, that, so far as the superior court
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is concerned, there is nothing to arrest, that its order was
made and executed before the alternative writ was issued,
that the receiver alone is now acting, and that the writ does
not run against him.
_
It is true the writ does not run against ministerial ofﬁcers,
and it is also true that its operation is preventive, rather
than remedial.
But property in the hands of a receiver is
in the hands of the court. The receiver is the mere instru
ment of the court, and what he does the court does.
It is
the court, therefore, and not the receiver which holds, ad
ministers, and disposes of the property in his hands; and, so
long as the property remains undisposed of, action by the
court is necessary.
In such case there is judicial action
to be arrested, injury to be prevented, and a writ of pro
hibition is appropriate for that purpose. The writ runs to
the court, and operates directly upon the court, but indirectly
upon the receiver.
If it is served upon the receiver, it is
only that he may have timely notice that the proceedings of
the court are arrested, and may stay his hand, as he is bound
to do, having no power to act independently of the court.
from which he derives all his authority.
In this case, when the petition was ﬁled, and our alterna
tive writ directed to issue, the receiver, as we shall see, was
still striving to gain complete possession of the reﬁnery and
other property claimed by the petitioners; and, even if he
had been in complete control, that would have been but the
ﬁrst of a series of steps to be taken in carrying out the pur
pose of his appointment. The keeping of the property in
The closing down of the
such a case is a continuous wrong.
works is an independent wrong. The use of a portion of the
property to preserve the rest is an unlawful interference
with "the rights of those lawfully in possession. Besides all
this, there remained to be carried out the sale and ﬁnal dis
tribution of the property.
By the very terms of the order appointing the receiver,
he is to hold the property subject to the further orders of
the court concerning it; and the necessity of such further
orders would be implied if it had not been expressly indi
cated.

As we understand the authorities on this point, the opera
tion of the writ of prohibition is excluded only in cases
where the action of the inferior tribunal is completed, and
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nothing remains to be done in pursuance of its void order.
If its action is not completed and ended, its further proceed
ings may be stayed; and, if it is necessary for the purpose
of affording complete and adequate relief, what has been
done will. be undone.
If this were not so, the inferior court, by proceeding ex
peditiously and arbitrarily, could defeat the remedy. Great
reliance is placed by counsel for respondent upon the de
cisions of this court, such as Chester v. Colby, 52 Cal. 517,
and Railroad C0. '0. Superior Court, 59 Cal. 476, to the effect
that, when an inferior court or tribunal is proceeding, or
threatening to proceed, in excess of its jurisdiction, the ob
jection to its want of jurisdiction must be ﬁrst submitted
to such inferior court or tribunal, and by it overruled, before
resort is had to a higher court for a writ of prohibition; and,
undoubtedly, such is the established rule of practice in this
state. But, if this is the law, it must inevitably happen in
every case, as it would probably happen in many cases un
der any rule, that the lower court will make its ruling on the
question of-jurisdiction before any prohibition can be sued
out; and, if it holds that it has jurisdiction, and makes
orders in consonance with that view, the writ of prohibition
will be of no avail unless it affords the means, not only of ar
resting future action, but of undoing past action. In other
words, the two positions contended for would practically
’
abolish the remedy.
No better illustration of the working of this theory can be
found than is afforded by the present case. When the order
to show cause why a receiver should not be appointed was
served, neither these petitioners, nor the defendant corpora
tion, nor its stockholders, could have got a writ to prohibit
the appointment of a receiver without ﬁrst objecting in the
superior court to its want of jurisdiction.
Such objection,
It would have been sufficient
as we have seen, was made.
to have objected that there was no application by a creditor
or stockholder for a receiver, and no grounds alleged for such
appointment; but the defendant corporation, or its stock
holders, went further. They showed affirmatively that there
were no creditors, and that all the stockholders desired the
statutory trustees to settle the business of the corporation.
They showed everything, in short, necessary to sustain their
objection to the jurisdiction; and the opinion of the su
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periorjudgc, supra, shows that their objections were strenu
ously argued and maturely considered.
But what happened?
After holding the matter under advisement for nearly la
month, the respondent ﬁled an opinion overruling the objec
tions to his jurisdiction, and on the same day appointed a
receiver, who on the same day qualiﬁed by taking the oath
and ﬁling his bond, procured an order approving his bond
and conﬁrming his powers, and actually, according to his
own views, had possession of the vast property in contro
versy, before the agent of the petitioners or their attorneys
had any notice that their objections to the jurisdiction had
If such proceedings, conducted with such
been overruled.
precipitate haste, can deprive the injured party of a remedy
to which he is clearly entitled, then our law must be lame
But happily there is no foundation
and impotent indeed.
for the claim that an inferior court can, by mere haste and
precipitancy, defeat the appropriate remedy for excesses of
jurisdiction, at least in a case where it may be intercepted
before its action is fully completed.
II
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Where the proceeding in the lower court has ended, and
the court has nothing further to do in pursuance or in com
pletion of its order, or where it has dismissed the proceeding,
prohibition is no remedy; but, where anything remains to be
done by the court, prohibition not only prevents what re
mains to be done, but gives complete relief by undoing what
See forms of writs cited, 2 Chit. Pr. 354,
has been done.
Ex parte Morgan Smith, 23 Ala. 94; Jones 12. Owen, 5
355.
Dowl. & L. 669; Marsden v. Wardle, 3 El. & Bl. 695, and
In
cases therein cited; Serjeant v. Dale, L. R. 2 Q. B. 558.
White v. Field, 12 C. B. (N. S.) 383, the court says (page
412:) “The writs in the register and elsewhere which con
clude with a mandamus to the Court Christian to recall an
already erroneously fulminated, or a se
excommunication
questration Wrongly issued, are all, as to the prohibitory
part, peremptory, and the mandamus to revoke the unau
thorized proceeding only accessory to the peremptory pro
hibition, and necessary to give it effect.”
Here is a clear indication of the extent of the remedial
It is primarily and principally preventive.
office of the writ.
Its oﬁice is to arrest proceedings; but, when a case arises in
which there are proceedings to be stayed or prevented, it
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as may be necessary

to make the remedy complete. The principle is that which
prevails in equity. When there is jurisdiction the court will
afford complete relief. A party will not be compelled to re
sort to more than one proceeding, or more than one court,
for redress of one injury. See, also, French 12. Noel, 22 Grat.
Many other cases are cited in the brief of counsel for
454.
petitioners to this point, and might be cited here, but it is
unnecessary.
#

1

Q

$
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But it is said that the order appointing the receiver was
appealable, and therefore prohibition will not lie. The stat
ute does not say that the writ will not issue in any case
where there is an appeal. There must not only be a right of
appeal, but the appeal must furnish an adequate remedy, in
A _number of
order to prevent the issuance of the writ.
cases have been decided in this court in which writs of pro
hibition have been refused because there was a right of ap
peal, but in all of those cases the appeal afforded a complete
and adequate remedy for the threatened excess of jurisdic
tion.
$

*
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The difference between this case and all those referred to
is that here an appeal would have afforded no remedy for
the wrong with which the petitioners were threatened.
By
appeal,
at
year
the
end
of
about
a
means of an
and a half,
in the ordinary course, they could have procured a reversal
of the order,—if, indeed, as strangers to the action in which
it was made they had any right to appeal; but in the mean
*
*
"‘
time they would have been irreparably damaged.
For in the mean time the receiver would have gained com
plete possession of the reﬁnery and other property, the re
ﬁnery would have been closed, stock injured, contracts
broken, employes discharged or kept in idleness, and every
possible damage inﬂicted, without any security for the loss.

In such a case, there was no adequate remedy except by a
proceeding which would prevent the receiver from taking
possession of the property; and the writ of prohibition was,
as has been shown, the appropriate remedy for that purpose.
IF

#

*

$

1

I

Q

i i

ii

is next suggested that the writ of prohibition does not
issue ex debito justitiw, but is to be granted or withheld in
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the sound discretion of the court, and that in this case it
ought not to be allowed in favor of these petitioners, because
they are members of the sugar trust, monopolists, and are
the tempters who seduced the American Sugar Reﬁnery into
the combination.
There is no competent proof before us of these facts; but,
assuming them to be so, the law is not such as counsel claim
it to be. A decision may be found here and there saying
in a loose way that the issuance of the writ is in the discre
tion of the court, and a statement in general terms to the
same effect may be cited from text-writers who merely echo
the decisions; but it never was the law that a court having
jurisdiction to issue the writ had any discretion to refuse it
when demanded by the real party in interest bringing him
If such an idea has obtained
self clearly within the law.
anywhere, it has been in consequence of a misunderstanding

of the English cases.
In England the practice in prohibition was analagous to
An original writ (of
the practice in other actions at law.
prohibition) issued for the purpose of securing an appear
ance, and after appearance the pleadings followed; that is,
the plaintiff declared, the defendant pleaded or demurred,
and so on. But there was this difference between the writ
of prohibition and other original writs; that, whereas the
writs in ordinary actions issued of course on application of
the plaintiff, the writ of prohibition did not issue of course,
but only upon affidavits showing grounds for its issuance.
Another difference was that not only the party injuriously
affected by the proceedings of the inferior court, but any
subject of the king, was allowed to interfere to prevent an
excess of jurisdiction; and, in case of suit by a stranger to
the proceeding to be stayed, the superior courts exercised
a discretion in granting or withholding the writ, but never
when the party affected was the plaintiff. This whole sub
ject is reviewed exhaustively in the case of Mayor v. Cor,
L. R. 2 H. L. 278, 280. The following quota-tion from an
opinion of Lord Chief Justice Cockburn therein cited (page
280) shows what the law on this point is:
“I entirely concur in the proposition that, although the
court will listen to a person who is a stranger, and who inter
feres to point out that some other court has exceeded its
jurisdiction, whereby some wrong or grievance has been sus
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tained, yet that it is not ex debito justitiaz, but a matter upon
which the court may properly exercise its discretion, as dis
tinguished from the case of a party aggrieved, who is en
titled to relief ea: debito justitiz if he suffers from the usur
pation of jurisdiction by another court.” In re Foster, 4
B. & S. 187.
In this state, it is always the party aggrieved who sues;
and, if he shows a case for the issuance of the writ, the
court cannot refuse it on the ground that he is a bad man,
and deserves the punishment he is threatened with, or upon
any other consideration which appeals to the mere discretion
of the judge."
We come ﬁnally to the proposition upon which counsel for
respondent insists most strenuously, viz., that the jurisdic
tion of the court to grant a peremptory writ of prohibition
depends absolutely upon the allegation and proof by peti
tioners that, before ﬁling their petition here, they had
pleaded to the jurisdiction of the superior court, and that
To sustain this proposition,
their plea had been overruled.
they cite the decisions of this court above referred to, (Ches
ter v. Colby, 52 Cal. 517, and Railroad Co. v. Superior Court,
59 Cal. 476,) and they cite a number of decisions from the
courts of other states. "‘ "‘ *
When a party has an opportunity of objecting in the lower
court that it is proceeding, or is asked to proceed, in a mat
ter without, or in a manner exceeding, its jurisdiction, he
It is only fair to the
ought to make the objection there.
brought
objection
should
be
to its attention
that
the
court
in some proper form. If no objection is made, the party
having every opportunity to object, the court may reason
ably infer that no ground of objection exists; and not only
is the court entitled to the. advice and suggestions of the
party with reference to objections apparent on the record,
—there are many cases in which the ground of objection
would not appear unless set forth by plea in some form, and
it is to be presumed that any valid objection, properly
brought to the attention of the court, would generally prevail,
and that all necessity for a writ of prohibition would be
obviated; therefore the interest of the public in preventing
unnecessary litigation, as well as consideration for the judge
of the lower court demand that the objection should be made
at the ﬁrst opportunity.
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These are the reasons of the rule, and they indicate its
and the extent of its application, as the authorities
very fully show. We have not time to review the cases,
other than those cited from the reports of the state; but
we refer to th'e case of Mayor v. Cox, supra, in which the
learning of the subject is exhausted. That was a case ap
pealed from the court of exchequer to the exchequer chamber,
and ﬁnally to the house of lords.
Before deciding it, the
lords requested the opinion of the justices of the queen’s
bench on two questions;
the second being as follows:
“Whether the garnishees in the lord mayor's court could
maintain an action for a prohibition without having pleaded
in the lord mayor's court ;” to which the justices unanimously
responded that they could. This was in accordance with the
unanimous decision both of the court of exchequer and ex
chequer chamber, which was accordingly affirmed in the
The answer of the justices, prepared by
house of lords.
Justice Willes, contains a full review of all the cases, show
ing that even in England the subject had not been clearly
understood, and that some inconsistent and erroneous de
cisions had been made. It is not surprising, therefore, that
in some of the United States the same confusion has arisen,
and that some cases have been erroneously decided, to the
effect, for instance, that the issuance of the writ is in the
discretion of the court, and that a formal plea to the juris
diction of the lower court is an essential prerequisite to its
issuance. Fortunately, no such decisions have been made in
this court, though, in deciding Chester v. Colby, supra, an
Arkansas case (Ex parte City of Little Rock, 26 Ark. 52) is
cited with approval which apparently does go to the extent
But we are fully at liberty, without
claimed by respondent.
authority
of any case decided in this court,
questioning the
to adopt the correct rule and doctrine as expounded and laid
,down in the case of Mayor v. Cox.“
Without going into the
niceties of the subject, it may be said that the following
propositions applicable to this case are fully supported by
the decision in that case:
(1) If a want of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of
the proceeding in the lower court, no plea or preliminary
objection is necessary before suing out the writ of prohibi
tion.
(2) If the proceeding in the lower court is not on its face
scope
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without the jurisdiction of such court, but is so in fact by
reason of the existence of some matter not disclosed, such
matter ought to be averred in some proper form in order to
make the want of jurisdiction appear.
(3) But this is not essential to the jurisdiction of the
superior court to grant prohibition. It is only laches, which
may or may not be excused, according to circumstances.
Accordingly, we ﬁnd that frequently a failure to plead in
the lower court was excused for the reason that it appeared
that the plea would have been rejected if made. The whole
question, in fact, was one of practice merely, not of juris
diction; and the objection which most frequently prevailed
to the granting of the writ was not that the application came
"‘
' "
too early, but that it came too late.
¥

*

*
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An absolute and peremptory writ of prohibition
will issue, in accordance with the views herein expressed.
"'

THROCKMORTON, J., being absent from the state, did not
participate in the decision.
In In re Rice, (1894) 155 U. S. 396, 402, the court says:—"Where
appears that the court whose action is sought to be prohibited has
clearly no jurisdiction of the cause originally, or of some collateral matter
arising therein, a party who has objected to the jurisdiction at the outset
and has no other remedy is entitled to a writ of prohibition as a matter
ot right. But where there is another legal remedy by appeal or other
wise, or where the question of the jurisdiction of the court is doubtful,
or depends on facts which are not made matter of record, or where the
application is made by a stranger, the granting or retusal of the writ
is discretionary."
51 Accoo-¢l:—State' ex rel. v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., (1909) 221 Mo. 227;
State ex rel. v. Bright, (1909) 224 Mo. 514; State v. Kelley, (1913) 32
S. D. 526; City of St. Marys v. Woods, (1910) 67 W. Va. 110; People v.
District Oourt, (1901) 29 Colo. 182: State v. White. (1898) 40 Fla. 297;
State v. Smith, (Wash. 1921) 200 Pac. 92. As a general rule of practice,
however, the writ will not be granted unless the jurisdictional objection
has been raised below:—Adams County Court v. People, (1910) 48 Colo.
539; State ex rel. v. Breckenridge, (1914) 43 Okl. 711; State v. District
Court, (1904) 12 Wyo. 547. Contra.'—State
v. Rose, (1909) 124 La. 526;
Reese v. Steel, (1904) 73 Ark. 66; Hill v. Tarver, (1900) 130 Ala. 592.
But see Nissen v. Elliott, (1920) 145 Ark. 540, where the appearance of
of jurisdiction was held to waive the
the respondent and assertion
presentation oi the objection below.
50

it

(
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SMITH.
1906.

New York, 96.

HISCOCK, J. The writ of prohibition granted herein in
effect restrained the prosecution of a civil action brought
before the appellant Smith as a justice of the peace by the
appellant Williams as plaintiff against the relator as defend
ant. We think that it was error to grant this writ, and that
the order appealed from must be reversed.
The facts upon which the writ was based are brieﬂy as
The defendant justice of the peace held oﬁice in
follows:
the town of Montgomery, Orange county, while the relator
resided in the. county of New York. The latter was brought
into the town of Montgomery under subpoana as a witness
Just as his examination was
in supplementary proceedings.
completed he was served with a summons in the action in
justice’s court of which prosecution has been prohibited.
Two days before the return day ﬁxed in the summons he
secured an alternative writ of prohibition, staying further
proceedings in said action, which was subsequently made
"
absolute.
It is substantially conceded, as it must be, that advantage
could not be taken of re1ator’s presence in the town of Mont
gomery under the circumstances to secure service of the sum
" * *
mons upon him.
The only question is whether his rights should be pro
tected in the manner adopted by him, or by some other
course, and in our judgment the answer to this question must
be in favor of the latter alternative.
The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy and
should be issued only in cases of unusual necessity. Without
attempting generally to deﬁne the cases wherein it may or
may not be granted, it is certainly well within the authorities
and principles of a wise judicial policy to state that it will
not be allowed in a case like this to guard against a future
apprehended error by an inferior tribunal, when, as matter
of fact, such tribunal upon due objection may not commit
such error, and when, if it does commit it, the aggrieved
party may be fully and adequately protected by ordinary

' '
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process of appeal from or review of its action.
We shall
suﬂiciently indicate the reasons for reversing relator’s
method of procedure in this instance, if we point out how
he might have asserted his rights before the justice and
by appeal might have corrected the latter’s action, if he erro
neously overruled those rights.
Relator’s privilege from service of a summons was one
to be asserted upon an application to get rid of the service
rather than by any plea or defense in connection with the
merits of the action. Matthews '0. Tufts, 87 N. Y. 568; War
ing v. McKinley, 62 Barb. 612, 621.
While a justice of the peace is an ofﬁcer of limited juris
diction, and while that authority by express terms may not
be conferred upon him, we have no doubt that the defendant
justice had the power upon the return of the summons to
entertain an application by relator to set aside its service
upon the grounds already stated. The right upon objection
to ascertain whether a summons has properly been served
so as to confer jurisdiction is so necessarily incidental to
the discharge of his duties by a justice that no violation
of any principle of law will be committed by regarding him
as invested therewith.
This being so, it would have been
the proper, natural, and adequate course for relator, upon
the return day, to have specially appeared before the justice,
and upon affidavits setting forth the facts upon which he
based his claim of privilege to have asked that the service of
the summons be set aside, and to have objected to further pro
ceedings in and with said action.
Such special appearance
would not have worked any waiver of his rights, and it would
have acquainted the justice in a lawful and official way with
the fact that relator not only had a privilege, but insisted
"
*
upon and did not waive it. "
If, upon proper proof of the facts and due objection, the
justice persisted in continuing the action, the proceedings
would have been part of the return upon appeal and subject
to review and any proper correction.
Code Civ. Proc. § 3053,
*
*
*
and cases last cited.
As we have stated at the
commencement, the demonstration of this affords a clear and
sufficient reason why the relator should not be allowed to
prosecute the unusual and more burdensome form of rem
* "‘ "‘
edy which he has attempted.

I
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Order reversed, etc."

In New York a defendant may save an exception to an adverse ruling
on a special appearance and plead to the merits without a. waiver of the
jurisdictional point. Avery v. Slack, (1837) 17 Wend. 85; Jones v. Jones,
(1888) 108 N. Y. 415. See Passsnviso A SPRciAr. APPEARANCE, by Edson
R. Sunderland, 9 Mich. Law Rev. 396, 403.
“Where other convenient and effective modes of reaching the same
result are open to the complaining party, the court may decline to award
the extraordinary remedy.
But it is not bound to decline because there
may be some concurrent remedy.
Whether other modes of relief are
equally effective is a question to be determined
in each. particular er
igencj/."—State ex rel. v. Elkin, (1895) 130 Mo. 90, 109. The entire want
of appellate jurisdiction in a. particular class of cases will not prevent
the supreme court from using the writ of prohibition to conﬁne the lower
court within its jurisdictional limits in such cases.—State ex rel. v.
Fort, (1903) 178 Mo. 518. But if, as in the case of the Supreme Court
in
ot Illinois, the constitution gives the court no original jurisdiction
prohibition, but appellate power only, it can employ the writ of prohibi
tion only in aid of its appellate power. but not to perform the functions
of an appeal or writ of error.—-People ex rel. v. Cook Circuit Court.
(1897) 169 Ill. 201.
Where the jurisdiction is dependent upon the amount in controversy,
prohibition will issue to restrain a court from entertaining actions in
excess of, or below, the jurisdictional amount,—James v.' Stokes. (1883)
77 Va. 225; State ex rel. v. Boone, (1890) 42 La. Ann. 982; Bullard v.
Thorpe, (1894) 66 Vt. 599. “It will lie to prohibit actions entertained
under unconstitutional grants ot judicial authorlty,—Pennington v. Wool
folk, (1880) 79 Ky. 13; or to restrain proceedings based upon void acts
58

or ordinances,—Hughes v. Recorder's Court, (1889) 75 Mich. 574; State
ex rel. v. Eby, (1902) 170 Mo. 497. It will be employed to prevent un
or disqualiﬁed individuals from usurping judicial power,—
authorized
Ex parte Roundtree, (1874) 51 Ala. 42; North Bloomﬁeld Gravel Min.
Co. v. Keyser, (1881) 58 Cal. 315; State ex rel. v. Board of Education,
(1898) 19 Wash. 8; Forest Coal Co. v. Doolittle, (1903) 54 W. Va. 210.
The writ is available even though facts aliunde may be necessary to
show want of jurisdiction,—Bullard
v. Thorp. (1894) 66 Vt. 599; but it
the determination of such facts can best be made in the court whose
jurisdiction is assailed, the writ will be withheld,—People v. District
Court, (1900) 28 Colo. 161, 165-6.
Where a court without jurisdiction is about to pronounce sentence or
ﬁnal judgment resulting in immediate imprisonment, prohibition will
issue on the ground that appeal or error is inadequate,—Pe0ple
v. Dis
trict Court, (1883) 6 Colo. 534; Mclnerney v. Denner, (1892) 17 Colo.
302; Terrill v. Superior Court, (Cal. 1899) 60 Pac. 38.
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SAME.

v.

Court of Wisconsin.
174

CO.

1921.

Wisconsin, 140.

Petitions for writs of prohibition to restrain the further
prosecution of two suits in the circuit court for Douglas
county on the ground that the summons had not been prop
erly served on the petitioner, which is a foreign corporation.
Writs allowed.
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The validity of such service is sought to be sustained by
an affidavit of C. R. Fridley, one of the attorneys for plain
tiffs, made upon information and belief to the effect that
defendant has property in this state consisting of oﬁice fur
niture, and ﬁxtures, a lease of the office occupied by its agent
C. M. Easterly in Milwaukee; that it also has credits for
manufactured products sold to residents of this state who
are solvent, and has manufactured products sold but un
delivered in this state, and upon personal knowledge it is
stated that the name of the defendant appears upon'the
outside door of the offices occupied by its agent C. M. East
erly at Milwaukee.
The opposing affidavits are made by D. P. Thompson, as
sistant to the president of the defendant, and by C. M.
Easterly, its agent at Milwaukee. They are made upon per
sonal knowledge, and deny that defendant has any property
in Wisconsin
“save such office stationery and supplies necessarily used by
C. M. Easterly as its soliciting agent in connection with his
*
"‘
"
and which stationery and supplies are of
duties
any
person
or corporation than to the defendant,
value
to
no
save and except such intrinsic value as they may have, sepa
rate and apart from their uses as the property of the defend
ant.”
8

VINJE,

J.

Q

#
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The conditions
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upon which this court

will ex
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ercise its superintending control in questions now before us
were thoroughly discussed in Re Petition of Pierce Arrow
Motor Car Co., 143 Wis. 282, 127 N. W. 998, and will not
The court there restricted its power to its
now be restated.
minimum sphere, and while there is no intent to overrule
the decision in that case upon the facts there present, it is
the opinion of the court that jurisdiction may properly be
exercised though the duty of the court below may not be
so plain as to permit of but one conclusion, if a careful con
sideration of all the facts shows that a valid service has not
In cases involving the validity of the service of
been made.
summons, extraordinary hardship is inherent when such
service is held valid by the trial court because the defendant
has to suffer a default judgment in order to test the question
of the validity of the service.
(Rio: 12. Sprague C. M. Co.,

Wis. 572, 147 N. W. 1001, 52 L. R. A. [N. S.] 583), or
else apply for a writ of prohibition, there being no appeal
from an order holding the service valid, and the rule of this
state being that if appearance is made on the merits the
question of jurisdiction is waived (Corbett v. Physicians’
Casualty Ass’n, 135 Wis. 505, 115 N. W. 365, 16 L. R. A.
[N. S.] 177). In one of these cases judgment in the sum of
$212,500 is demanded, and in the other in the sum of
$157,916.67, so the situation of defendant is quite serious.
It has to wager those amounts on the validity of the service
or ‘else waive that question.
Coming now to the merits, it will be seen from the state
ment of facts that the allegations of the plaintiffs as to the
defendant’s possession of property in this state are upon in
formation and belief, and that those of the defendant are
It appears that the only property
upon personal knowledge.
that the defendant has in this state consists in some oﬁice
Is this SlliIICl€I1t to give the court jurisdiction?
supplies.
" *
*
The mere ownership of some ofﬁce supplies is not
Strom v. Montana
enough to give the court jurisdiction.
Cent. Ry. Co., 81 Minn. 346, 84 N. W. 46; Barnes v. Mobile &
N. W. R. Co., 12 Hun, 126. We concur in such view, and
hold for that reason that no valid service was made upon the
" * "
defendant in either case.
Let Writs of prohibition issue, as prayed for in the peti
tion.
157
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J
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HABEAS CORPUS.

IN RE FREDERICK.
Supreme

Court of the United States.
149

1892.

United States, 70.

[Appeal from an order denying a Writ of habeas corpus.
Petitioner was tried for murder in a state court in Washing
ton, and was found guilty of murder in the ﬁrst degree.
The
Supreme Court of the state reversed the judgment and re
manded the case with directions to enter a new judgment
for murder in the second degree. This was done and peti
Claiming
tioner was sentenced under the new judgment.
that the Supreme Court of Washington had no authority
under the statute or otherwise, to modify the judgment, but
should have simply reversed it, petitioner asked for a fed
eral writ of habeas corpus on the ground that he was being
deprived of liberty without due process of law. The United
States Circuit Court refused the writ on the ground that the
proper remedy was a writ of error.]

Jacxson, J. * * *
While the writ of habeas corpus is one of the remedies
for the enforcement of the right to personal freedom, it will
not issue as a matter of course, and it should be cautiously
used by the federal courts in reference to state prisoners.
Being a civil process, it cannot be converted into a remedy
for the correction of mere errors of judgment or of proce
dure in the court having cognizance of the criminal offense.
Under the writ of habeas corpus this court can exercise no
appellate jurisdiction over the proceedings of the trial court
or courts of the state, nor review their conclusions of law or
fact, and pronounce them erroneous. The writ of habeas
corpus is not a proceeding for the correction of errors. Ea:
parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163; Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371;
Ex parte Curtis, 106 U. S. 371, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 381; Er parte
Carll, 106 U. S. 521, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 535; Ea: parte Bigelow,
113 U. S. 328, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 542; Ea: parte Yarbrough, 110
U. S. 651, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 152; Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S.
417, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 935; Ea: parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241, 6
Sup. Ct. Rep. 734; In re Snow, 120 U. S. 274, 7 Sup. Ct. 556;
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re Coy, 127 U. S. 731, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1263; In re Wight
U. S. 136, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 487; Stevens v. Fuller, 136
U. S. 468, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 911.
As was said by this court, speaking by Mr. Justice Harlan,
in Ex pwrte Royall, 117 U. S. 241, 252, 253, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep.
734, 741, “where a person is in custody, under process from
a state court of original jurisdiction, for an alleged offense
against the laws of such state, and it is claimed that he is
restrained of his liberty in violation of the constitution of
the United States, the circuit court has a discretion whether
it will discharge him, upon habeas corpus, in advance of his
trial in the court in~ which he is indicted; that discretion,
however, to be subordinated to any special circumstances re
quiring immediate action. When the state court shall have
ﬁnally acted upon the case, the circuit court has still a dis
cretion whether, under all the circumstances then existing,
the accused, if convicted, shall be put to his writ of error
from the highest court of the state, or whether it will pro
ceed by Writ of habeas corpus summarily to determine
Whether the petitioner is restrained of his liberty in viola
tion of the constitution of the United States.”
The ofﬁce of a writ of habeas corpus, and the cases in
which it will generally be awarded, was clearly stated by Mr.
Justice Bradley, speaking for the court in Ea: parte Siebold,
“The only ground on which
100 U. S. 371, 375, as follows:
this court, or any court, without some special statute au
thorizing it, will give relief on habeas corpus to a prisoner
under conviction and sentence of another court, is the want
of jurisdiction in such court over the person or the cause, or
This dis
some other matter rendering its proceedings void.
tinction between an erroneous judgment, and one that is il
legal or void, is well illustrated by the two cases of Ex parts
In
La/n-ge, 18 Wall. 163, and Ex parte Parks, 93 U. S. 18.
the former case we held that the judgment was void, and re
leased the prisoner accordingly; in the latter, We held that
the judgment, whether erroneous or not, was not void, be
cause the court had jurisdiction of the cause, and we refused
to interfere.” The reason of this rule lies in the fact that
a habecw corpus proceeding is a collateral attack, of a civil
nature, ‘to impeach the validity of a judgment or sentence of
another court in a criminal proceeding, and it should there
fore be limited to cases in which the judgment or sentence
134
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attacked is clearly void, by reason of its having been ren
dered without jurisdiction, or by reason of the court’s hav
ing exceeded its jurisdiction in the premises.
It is said in Ea: parte Royall, supra, that after a prisoner
is convicted of a crime in the highest court of the state in
which a conviction could be had, if such conviction was ob
tained in disregard or in violation of rights secured to him
by the constitution and laws of the United States, two reme
dies are open to him for relief in the federal courts:
He
may either take his writ of error from this court, under
section 709 of the Revised Statutes, and have his case re
examined in that Way on the question of whether the state
court has denied him any right, privilege, or immunity guar
anteed him by the constitution and laws of the United States,
or he may apply for a writ of habeas corpus to be discharged
from custody under such conviction, on the ground that the
state court had no jurisdiction of either his person or the
offense charged against him, or had for some reason lost or
its jurisdiction, so as to render its judgment a
exceeded
nullity, in which latter proceeding the federal courts could
not review the action or rulings of the state court, which
could be reviewed by this court upon a writ of error. But,
as already stated, the circuit court has a discretion as to
which of these remedies it will require the petitioner to
adopt. This was expressly ruled in Ex parte Royall, supra,
In the
and has been repeatedly followed since that case.
recent case of In re Wood, 140 U. S. 278, 290, 11 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 738, after reaffirming the rule laid down in Ex parte
“After the ﬁnal disposition of the
Royall, the court added:
case by the highest court of the state, the circuit court, in
its discretion, may put the party who has been denied a right,
privilege, or immunity claimed under the constitution or laws
of the United States to his writ of error from this court,
father than interfere by writ of habeas corpus.”
We adhere to the views expressed in that case. It is cer
tainly the better practice, in cases of this kind, to put the
prisoner to his remedy by writ of error from this court,
under section 709 of the Revised Statutes, than to award
him a writ of habeas corpus; for, under proceedings by writ
of error, the validity of the judgment against him can be
called in question, and the federal court left in a position to
correct the wrong, if any, done the petitioner, and at the
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same time leave the state authorities in a position to deal
with him thereafter, within the limits of proper authority,
instead of discharging him by habeas corpus proceedings.
and thereby depriving the state of the opportunity of assert
ing further jurisdiction over his person in respect to the
crime with which he is charged.
In some instances, as in Medley, Petitioner, 134 U. S. 160,
10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 384, the proceeding by habeas corpus has
been entertained, although a writ of error could be prose
cuted; but the general rule, and better practice, in the ab
sence of special facts and circumstances,
is to require a
prisoner who claims that the judgment of a state court vio
lates his rights under the constitution or laws of the United
States to seek a review thereof by writ of error, instead of
resorting to the writ of habeas corpus.
In the present case we agree with the court below that
the petitioner had open to him the remedy by writ of error
from this court for the correction of whatever injury may
have been done to him by the action of the state courts, and
that he should have been put to that remedy, rather than
given the remedy by writ of habeas corpus.
The circuit
court had authority to exercise its discretion in the premises,
and we do not see that there was any improper exercise of
that discretion, under the facts and circumstances.
Without passing, therefore, upon the merits of the ques
tion as to the constitutionality of the provision of the Code
under which the supreme court proceeded in disposing of the
case when it was before it, or upon the question of the valid
ity of the judgments rendered by the state courts in the
case, we are of opinion, for the reasons stated, that the
order of the circuit court refusing the application for the
writ of habeas corpus was correct, and it is accordingly

Aﬂirmed."
The full statement of facts in this case will be found in Chapter X,
3(e). infra.
See comprehensive note on the use of Habeas Corpus to review errors
in 11 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 105L
58
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CERTIFICATE.

CITY OF WATERVILLE
Supreme

893

v.

VAN SLYKE.

Court of the United States.

1886.

116 United States, 699.

MILLER, J. This is a writ of error to the circuit court
for the district of Kansas. In that court there was a judg
ment against the plaintiff in error for the sum of $1,282.06.
The amount is too small to give this court jurisdiction on a
writ of error to a circuit court. There is, however, a cer
tiﬁcate of division of opinion between the circuit judge and
the district judge sitting at the trial without a jury. We
have decided that under the act of 1872 a case may be
brought to this court on a certiﬁcate of division, without re
gard to the amount in controversy.
Dow 1). Johnson, 100
U. S. 158. But that decision was based upon a valid cer
tiﬁcate which presented properly questions material to the
If this were not necessary to our juris
decision of the case.
diction, a form of certiﬁcate which might present no ques
tion that this court can consider might be used to require
of it a review of other matters than those on which the
court divided, though the amount in controversy is insig
It is therefore only where the certiﬁcate does
niﬁcant.
present, in accordance with the statute, a division of opinion
in such a manner and on such a question as to give this court
jurisdiction that the amount in controversy can be disre
garded as an element of jurisdiction.
As to the character of the certiﬁcate on which this court
will act, the statute of 1872 and the Revised Statutes have
made no change, and the decisions of this court are full on
that subject. The substance of these decisions, as applicable
to the case before us, is that each question so certiﬁed must
contain a distinct proposition of law which this court can
answer negatively or aﬁirmatively, and that the whole case
cannot be presented by a recital of the evidence and inter
rogatories so framed as to require this court to decide the
whole case on mixed propositions of law and fact. In short,
while such a statement of facts must accompany the cer
tiﬁcate as to show that the question of law is applicable to
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the case, the point on which the judges differed must be a
distinct question of law, clearly stated.
1

In the

1

l

1

#

l I

1

of U. S. o. Briggs,

#

#

How. 208, on a demurrer
to indictment, the judges certiﬁed a division of opinion as
to whether the demurrer was well taken; and, though the
record showed the grounds of demurrer, the court said:
“The question upon which the disagreement took plade is not
certiﬁed.
The difference of opinion is, indeed, stated to have
been upon the point whether the demurrer should be sus
tained.
But such a question can hardly be called a point
case,
within the nieaning of the act of congress, for it
in the
does not show whether the diﬁiculty arose upon the con
struction of the act of congress on which the indictment is
founded, or upon the form of proceeding adopted to inﬂict
the punishment, or upon any supposed defects in the indict
On the contrary, the whole case is ordered to be
ment.
certiﬁed upon the indictment, demurrer, and joinder, leav
ing this court to look into the record, and determine for it
self whether any sufficient objection can be made in bar of
the prosecution, and without informing us what questions
had been raised in the circuit court upon which they dif
fered.” Having said that the causes of demurrer could not
inform the court on that subject, the chief justice added:
“But we are bound to look to the certiﬁcate alone for the
question which occurred and for the point on which they dif
fered, and as this does not appear, we have no jurisdiction
in the case.” * * "
Applying these principles to the case before us, we think
it must be dismissed. The record shows a ﬁnding of facts
upon the whole case, as it was submitted to the court without
a jury. This ﬁnding is stated to be made under the laws of
Kansas in such cases, and not under the act of congress con
cerning a review when a jury is waived, nor under the act
concerning differences of opinion between the judges to be
The ﬁnding is in fact nothing but a
certiﬁed to this court.
recital of the evidence on which the presiding justice ren
dered judgment in favor of plaintiff. They number 11 sepa
rate ﬁndings of fact, and were excepted to by counsel, and
exception was taken to the evidence received to support them.
This is accompanied by the following certiﬁcate:
“Be it remembered, that upon the trial of this action, upon
case
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issue joined upon petition of plaintiff, answer of defendant,
and reply of plaintiff, the cause havingbeen duly heard and
taken under advisement by the court, was considered by said
two judges, and thereupon the said two judges were divided
in opinion upon questions of interest and importance arising
upon the conclusions of fact found and stated by the court
upon the said trial, viz.:
(1) Had the defendant, as such
city, power to issue such bonds for the said purpose in the
original issue thereof, 1872, and did such want of power or
such power appear upon the face thereof ?
(2) Did defend
ant issue the said bonds sued on?
(3) If issued by defend
ant, had defendant power, as such city, to issue such bonds
sued on for the said purpose therein expressed, and did such
want of power, if not existing, appear upon the face of
such bonds?
(4) If such bonds sued on were issued by de
fendant, and disposed of in open market for value, without
other notice to purchasers than such as all persons were
bound to take from the public character thereof, is the de
fendant estopped from denying its liability thereon to plain
tiff? (5) Upon the conclusions of fact so found and stated
upon the trial of this action, is the plaintiff entitled to judg
ment for said amount stated, the said circuit judge being of
opinion that such questions should be determined in favor of
the plaintiff and judgment rendered in his favor for the said
amount stated, and the said district judge differing there

from?
“And judgment having been ordered in favor of plaintiff,
and defendant having duly excepted thereto, it is now here
ordered that the said questions as above stated, and upon
which the said judges were divided in opinion as aforesaid,
that same shall be forthwith stated under the direction of
said judges, and certiﬁed and entered of record in said cause
for writ of error to the supreme court of the United States,
and which is now accordingly done in open court at said
term thereof, and writ of error from such judgment is now
allowed to said defendant, and bond ﬁxed therefor to oper
ate as supersedeas in the sum of $2,000.
“Done and certiﬁed this third day of March, A. D. 1885, in
open court.”
We do not see that any distinct question of law is stated
In every instance it is what
on which the judges differed.
from
the facts found in the case,
inference should be drawn
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or rather from the evidence. Take the ﬁrst “question.
Does
it refer to want of legislative action in regard to the power,
or to want of constitutional power, in the legislature? Or
does it refer to the want of proper action by the town au
thorities, or to want of the recital of their action on the face
of the bond? As to the second question, it appears to pre~
sent a simple question of fact as to the actual issue of the
The third is very much like the
bonds by the defendants.
ﬁrst. The fourth and ﬁfth are still less presentations of any
distinct propositions of law, but are mixed propositions of
law and fact, in regard to which the court cannot know pre
cisely where the division of opinion arose on a question of
law alone. And, ﬁnally, it is very clear that the whole case
has been sent here for us to decide, with the aid of a few
suggestions from the circuit judges of the difiiculties they
have found in doing so. It presents nothing like as clear a
case as that of a demurrer to an indictment, which demurrer
recited the grounds on which it was made, but which this
court held presented no statement of the question of law on
U. S. 'v. Briggs, 5 How. 208.
which the judges differed.
We repeat that this procedure is not intended to enable
the parties in the circuit court to bring up the entire case
to be retried here. It is meant to meet a case where, two
judges sitting, a clear and distinct proposition of law, mate
rial to the decision of the case, arises, on which, differing,
they may make such a certiﬁcate as will enable this court to
If in reality more than one such ques
decide that question.
occurs,
they
may
be embraced in the certiﬁcate; but
tion
where it is apparent that the Whole case is presented to this
court for decision, with all its propositions of fact and of
law, the case will not be entertained.
Such a case is this,
and it is accordingly dismissed.“
54“In a number of jurisdictions, provision is made by the constitution
or statutes for reservation, certiﬁcation or report of cases or questions
for or to an appellate court, under speciﬁed circumstances, by courts of
original jurisdiction or intermediate appellate courts."—3 C. J. 989, where
the practice is shown in Alabama (certiﬁcation of constitutional ques~
tions from the court of appeals to the supreme court), Connecticut
(reservation of any question of law), Georgia (certiﬁcation of constitu
tional and other questions from the court of appeals to the supreme
court), Illinois (certiﬁcation of important questions from appellate court
to supreme court), Indiana (reservation or questions of law), Iowa,
Kansas and Wisconsin (certiﬁcation of questions of law in cases not
otherwise appealable), Louisiana (certiﬁcation ot questions of law from
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courts of appeal to supreme court), Maine (certiﬁcation of cases involv
ing controlling questions oi law from the equity court to the law court).
Massachusetts
(reservation of questions of law for the full court).
Missouri (certiﬁcation ot entire case from court of appeals to supreme
court), New Jersey (certiﬁcation of any case of doubt or difficulty from
the circuit to the supreme court), New York (certiﬁcation oi questions
of law from appellate division to court of appeals), North Dakota (cer
tiﬁcation ot questions of law in tax cases), Pennsylvania (reservation
of questions of law for the full court or certiﬁcation of important ques
tions of law from superior to supreme court), Texas (certiﬁcation oi
questions of law from court of civil appeals to supreme court), and
Vermont (certiﬁcation oi exceptions to supreme court).

SECTION 7.

SUPERINTENDING

CONTROL.

STATE EX REL. FOURTH NAT. BANK
Supreme

Court of Wisconsin.
103 Wisconsin,

v.

JOHNSON.

1899.

591.

Proceeding in mandamus and certiorari on relation of the
Fourth National Bank of Philadelphia and others against
Daniel H. Johnson, judge of the circuit court of Milwaukee
county, and G. Ringenoldus, clerk of said court. Peremptory
writ of mandamus awarded.
WINsLOW,
.
The constitution of this state (section 3, art.
7) provides: “The supreme court, except in cases otherwise
provided in this constitution, shall have appellate jurisdiction
only, which shall be co-extensive with the state; but in no
case removed to the supreme court shall a trial by jury be
The supreme court shall have a general superin
allowed.
tending control over all inferior courts; it shall have power
to issue writs of habeas corpus; mandamus, injunction, quo
warm-nto, certiorari, and other original and remedial writs,
and to hear and determine the same.” Very early in the his
tory of this court and of the state the question of the con
struction and meaning of the section was presented to this
court, and learnedly discussed by Justice Smith in the opinion
in the case of Attorney General 12. Blossom, 1 Wis. 317. That
case was an information ﬁled in this court by the attorney
general in the nature of a quo warranto against Blossom and
others, and motion was made to dismiss the cause for lack of

J
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jurisdiction, on the ground that the granting of the writs in
the third clause of the constitutional provision above quoted
gave no additional jurisdiction, but that those writs were sim
ply named as instrumentalities by which the appellate pow
er and the superintending control were to be exercised. This
contention

was repudiated

by the court, and the conclusion

distinctly reached and clearly stated that the constitutional
provision contained three separate grants of jurisdiction to
this court, namely, (1) the appellate jurisdiction; (2) the
superintending control over inferior courts; and (3) the orig
inal jurisdiction to be exercised by means of the writs named
in the third clause to protect the sovereignty of the state, pre
serve the liberty of the people, and secure the rights of its
In discussing the second clause of the section,
citizens.
namely, “the supreme court shall have a general superintend
ing control over all inferior courts," it was said: “This sen
tence contains a clear grant of power.
We will not under
take to say that without this grant the power would not be in
We
the court. It is not necessary to discuss that question.
are endeavoring to arrive at the proper construction of the
law. It is a grant of power. It is unlimited in extent. It is
indeﬁnite in character.
It is unsupplied with means and in
strumentalities. The constitution leaves us wholly in the
dark as to the means of exercising this clear, unequivocal
grant of power. It gives, indeed, the jurisdiction, but does
not pretend to intimate its instruments or agencies.” Again,
in discussing the third clause of the section, it was said:
“Here, also, is a distinct grant of power. The ﬁrst of the
section is restrictive,—one of limitation merely.
The two
grants
power,
gives
are
clear
of
the
last
the one of which
the
power of a superintending control over inferior courts; the
other giving the power to issue certain writs in appropriate
cases, and to hear and determine the same.”
The section
came before this court again in the great case of Atty. Gen.
v. Railroad Cos., 35 Wis. 425, and the exhaustive discussion
by Chief Justice Ryan in that case of the original jurisdiction
of this court under the third clause of the section will ever
stand as a monument to the legal learning and ability of that
distinguished justice.
In that discussion the conclusion
reached in the Blossom Case to the effect that there were
three separate and independent grants of jurisdiction in the
section quoted was fully approved, and the court said (page
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seq.): “The framers of the constitution appear to
have well understood that with appellate jurisdiction the
court took all common-law writs applicable to it, and with
superintending control all common-law writs applicable to
that; and that failing adequate common-law writs, the court
might well devise new ones, as Lord Coke tells us, as ‘a secret
in law.’ Hence the constitution names no writ for the exer
cise of the appellate or superintending jurisdiction of the
515

et

" "‘ *
court.”
It is very apparent that when the makers of the constitu
tion used the words “superintending control over all inferior
courts" they deﬁnitely referred to that well-known superin
tending jurisdiction of the court of king’s bench. In England
it was a branch of the king’s power lodged with the king’s
court; in this country it is a branch of the sovereign power
of the people, committed by them as a sacred charge to this
court, not to be exercised upon light occasion, or when other
and ordinary remedies are sufficient, but to be wisely used
for the beneﬁt of any citizen when an inferior court either re
fuses to act within its jurisdiction, or acts beyond its juris
diction to the serious prejudice of the citizen‘. 2 Spell. Extr.
Relief, § 1388. The two great writs by which this super
intending jurisdiction was principally exercised by the court
of King's bench were the writs of mandamus and prohibi
tion; the one directing action by the inferior court, and the
Of these writs and their peculiar
other forbidding action.
ofﬁce, when directed to an inferior court, Blackstone says
(Comm. bk. 3, c. 7, p. 110) : “For it is the peculiar business
of the court of king’s bench to superintend all inferior tribu
nals, and therein enforce the due exercise of those judicial or
ministerial powers with which the crown or legislature have
invested them, and this not only by restraining their excesses,
but also by quickening their negligence, and obviating their
denial of justice.” In addition to these two prerogative writs,
the superintending control over inferior courts was at com
mon law sometimes exercised by means of the writs of certio
rari and procedendo, the ﬁrst of which issued either from the
king’s bench or from chancery, and the second from the court
of chancery alone, which court was also invested with a part
of the superintending power. Harris, Certiorari, § 3, p. 4;
Bl. Comm. bk. 3, c. 7, p. 109. As to the writ of certioralri, it
is used so frequently, and its ordinary functions are so Well
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known, that discussion of it is unnecessary; and as to the writ
of procedendo it may be said that it has practically fallen into
disuse, its functions being fully performed by the writ of
High, Extr. Rem. (3d Ed.) §§ 147, 148.
mandamus.
It
would hardly be helpful to enter into any extended investiga
tion as to whether there were other writs at common law by
which the superintending power was exercised.
The writs
already named form a veritable arsenal of legal weapons by
means of which all ordinary excesses or defaults on the part
of inferior courts which call for the exercise of such power
Nor, for the same reason, is
can be corrected and controlled.
it necessary to consider the suggestion of Chief Justice Ryan
in the Railroad Cases to the effect that the court may devise
new writs in case of the inadequacy of the common-law writs
to meet the case in hand.
The conclusion is inevitable that
with the constitutional grant of superintending control this
court took at the same time all the ancient writs necessary to
enable it to exercise that high power including certainly the
writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, and procedendo.
#

$

II

There seems to have been no extended discussion of the
general character and limits of the superintending jurisdic
tion of supreme courts in the decisions of other states, al
though the constitutions of Missouri, Michigan, and Colorado
contain provisions very similar to our provision granting to
the supreme court superintending control over all inferior
courts; while in Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa, North and South
Carolina the superintending control is given in somewhat dif
However, we have found no decisions
ferent phraseology.
nor intimations contradictory to the views hereinbefore ex
pressed, while We ﬁnd the writs of mandamus and prohibition
to have been frequently used in the exercise of this jurisdic
I
tion. * * "‘
Having thus demonstrated that the constitutional grant of
superintending control over all inferior courts vested in this
court an independent and separate jurisdiction enabling and
requiring it, upon suﬁicient occasion, by the use of all proper
and necessary writs to promptly restrain the excesses and
quicken the neglects of inferior courts in the absence of other
adequate remedy, the question arises whether the case pre
sented is one within that jurisdiction, and, if so, whether man
damus is an appropriate and eﬂicient remedy.
The present
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controversy arises out of the administration of the affairs of
an insolvent bank with nominal assets of over a million and
a half, and debts nearly as large. By the deed of assignment
these assets became substantially the property of the credi
tors to the amount of their just claims held in trust for their
beneﬁt by the assignee, to be converted into money, under the
direction of the court, and applied in liquidation of their
claims.
The creditors were the real owners, the assignee
their trustee, and, in a sense, their mere agent. * * *
It seems to us manifest that there has been in this court a
denial of several absolute and valuable rights which the law
guaranties to the creditors of an insolvent estate. They had
a statutory right to have an account rendered by the assignee
in substantial conformity with the terms of the statute; they
had a statutory right to ﬁle objections to such an account after
examination thereof (section 1701, Rev. St.); they had a
statutory right to inspect the books of the assignor, and ex
amine the officers of the assignor and other witnesses prior to
the ﬁnal adjustment and approval of such account (section
1693b, Id.; Berles 'v. Comstock, 104 Mich. 129, 62 N. W. 148) ;
and they had a common-law right, arising from their rela
tions to the property and to the assignee, to examine the books
of the assignee, and the assignee himself, prior to the ﬁnal
approval of such account. All these rights were valuable
and absolute rights, to be exercised within reasonable limits,
but which, in the present case, were wholly denied to the
creditors; and," unless there be adequate remedy for such de
nial in the regular exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of
this court, it is difficult to see why the superintending juris
diction should not be exercised to quash the neglect or refusal
of the circuit court, and compel it to act within its jurisdic
tion. Merrill, Mand. § 204. * * *
*
“
*
Appeals from such orders could not, in the ordi
nary course of appellate proceedings, be heard and decided
before late in the autumn or in the winter of 1899. It is very
plain that, if the creditors are to exercise their rights with
any prospect of beneﬁt, they must exercise them promptly.
The delay attending upon the presentation and consideration
of an appeal would be fatal to any effective relief.
#

$

*

#

#

#

#

*

#

ll

Judgment is ordered that a peremptory writ of mandamus
issue in accordance with this opinion, and that the record
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transmitted to this court in response to thewrit of certiorari
be at once remitted to the trial court."
This case is very exhaustively annotated in 51 L. R. A. 33. with
ot constitutional provisions in the various states and full
See also State ex
citation oi.’ cases in which they have been construed.
rel. Lemke v. District Court, (1921) — N. D. -—, 186 N. W. 381; State
In
ex rel. Shater v. District Court, (1923) -—- N. D. —, 194 N. W. 745.
Montana a “writ of supervisory control" is provided, which is used when
no adequate remedy by appeal or other constitutional writ is appro
priate.—-State ex rel. Peel v. District Court, (1921) 59 Mont. 505, 197
65

quotation

Pac. 741.

l

t
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CHAPTER VI.

PARTIES TO PROCEEDINGS FOR REVIEW.
SECTION

1.

W110 ENTITLED

WHITE BRASS CASTINGS

CO. V.
CO.

UNION METAL MFG.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
232

T0 REVIEW.

1908.

Illinois, 165.

J

DUNN, . The White Brass Castings Company ﬁled its bill
in the superior court of Cook county against the Union Metal
Manufacturing Company and others, by which it sought to
have canceled a certain agreement between the two corpora
tions so far as it related to the issue of 600 shares of the
capital stock of the complainant, and also sought to have said
600 shares canceled unless the holders of the certiﬁcates
therefor would pay for them. Answers were ﬁled, and, after
a reference to the master, a hearing was had upon his report,
and a decree was entered dismissing the bill. The complain
ant appealed, and the Appellate Court for the First District
The appellant in that court, complain
affirmed the decree.
ant below, prayed a further appeal to this court, but did not
ﬁle any bond. Subsequently a writ of error was issued out
of this court to the Appellate Court for the First District at
the suit of the White Brass Castings Company, John H. Win
terburn, and Nicholas E. Murray against the Union Metal
Manufacturing Company and others. As a return to that
writ there has been ﬁled the record in the case of the White
Brass Castings Company against the Union Metal Manufac
turing Company and others.
Neither John H. Winterburn nor Nicholas E. Murray was
a party to the bill of the White Brass Castings Company
against the Union Metal Manufacturing Company and others.
(903)
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They were the owners of 210 of the 1,000 shares of the stock
of the complainant, 600 shares of which stock, being the
shares in controversy herein, were held by ‘the defendants:
the remaining 190 shares never having been issued. On the
ﬁrst day of the last term a motion was made on behalf of
the White Brass Castings Company to dismiss the writ of
error as to it, and it was made to appear that neither Winter
burn and Murray nor their attorneys were authorized by that
company to sue out the writ of error. It was inadvertently
overlooked that Winterburn aind Murray were not parties to
the proceedings in the superior court or the Appellate Court,
and the motion was overruled on the ground that, having a
right to sue out the writ of error themselves, they might join
the White Brass Castings Company as plaintiff in error. But
the White Brass Castings Company alone had the right to sue
out a writ of error. It was the only complainant—the only
party against whom the decree and the judgment of affirm
Winterburn and Murray could not sue
ance were rendered.
out a writ of error in their own names, and they could not,
without the authority of the White Brass Castings Company.
Their only interest in the
use its name for that purpose.
Stockholders cannot in their own
decree was as stockholders.
names prosecute a writ of error to reverse a judgment against
They do not represent the corporation,
the corporation.
though to a certain extent the corporation represents them.
N o person is entitled to sue out a writ of error who is not a
party or privy to the record, or who is not shown by the rec
Granat 22. Kruse, 213
ord to be prejudiced by the judgment.
Ill. 328, 72 N. E. 744; Hauger v. Gage, 168 Ill. 365, 48 N. E.
142; Anderson "U. Steger, 173 Ill. 112, 50 N. E. 665; McIntyre
Winterburn and Murray
'v. Sholty, 139 Ill. 171, 29 N. E. 43.
were not parties to the record.
Nor can they be said to be
privies to the record. “By ‘privies,’ within the meaning of
the rule, are meant heirs, executors, administrators. terre
tenants, or those having an interest in remainder or reversion.
or one who is made a party by the law.” 7 Ency. of Pl. & Pr.
857; Anderson v. Steger, supra.
Nor can it be said that Winterburn and Murray are shown
by the record to be prejudiced by the decree.
The prejudice
suing
the
of
will
out
a
writ
authorize
of error must be
which
such that the person suing out the writ takes or loses some
thing directly by the judgment or decree. Bail cannot have a
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judgment against his principal nor
the principal to reverse a judgment against his bail, nor can
they join in the writ; nor has a creditor of any one, whether
a corporation or an individual, against whom a judgment has
been pronounced, a right to prosecute a writ of error in the
name of such corporation or individual. Mclntyre 1:. Sholty,
supra.
The indirect interest arising from the fact that the
value of their stock may be increased or diminished by a judg
ment or decree against the corporation does not authorize
each one, or a majority, or all of the stockholders, in their
own names, to prosecute a writ of error to reverse such judg
ment or decree.
The plaintiffs in error Winterburn and Murray had no
right to sue out the writ of error, and the White Brass Cast
ings Company, the only proper plaintiff in error, should have
been permitted to dismiss the writ as to it. It will therefore
be ordered that the order made at the October term denying
the motion of the White Brass Castings Company to dismiss
the writ as to it be set aside, and that the writ of error be dis
missed as to all the plaintiffs in error.
Writ dismissed."
a

by an order
56 In some states it is held that no one can be "aggrieved"
except a party to the record, and hence only a party can appeal.—Turner
v. Williamson, (1906) 77 Ark. 586; Elliott v. Superior Court, (1904) 144
Cal. 501.
In any event, only those persons who are so related to the controversy
that they might properly become parties, can be deemed to be aggrieved
by the order or judgment of the court.—Chandler v. Railroad Commis
sioners, (1886) 141 Mass. 208.
“No person can bring a writ ot error, unless
The common law rule.
he is a party, or privy to the record, or is prejudiced by the judgment;
the rule upon the subject being, that a writ of error can only be brought
by him who would have had the thing, it the erroneous judgment had
not been given."—Note to William v. Gwyn, 2 Saund. a 46.
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1900.

Maine, 455.

In the municipal court
charged
upon a disclosure admitting an in
the trustee was
On appeal
debtedness of $13.37 to the principal defendant.
defendant
in
sitting
prius
the
to the supreme court
at nisi
sisted upon the right to relitigate the question of the trustee’s
liability, the plaintiff contending that there was no such right.
The court allowed the defendant to have a hearing anew upon
the liability of the trustee, and the trustee was discharged.
Exceptions by the plaintiff]
WISWELL,
This is an action of assumpsit to recover one
.
installment due upon a nonnegotiable note given by the de
fendant to the plaintiffs for the purchase of a sewing machine.
The suit was commenced in the Auburn municipal court, and,
the exceptions state, “was there tried, and appealed to this
court by the principal defendant.”
In the lower court the alleged trustee ﬁled a disclosure
showing that, at the time of the service of the writ upon him,
there was due from him to the principal defendant the sum
of $13.37 as wages for her personal labor performed within
In that court the trustee
30 days next before such service.
was adjudged trustee, and charged for the above amount.
In this court at nisi prius, where the case was taken by the
defendant on appeal, she was defaulted by consent for the
sum of $10, and the alleged trustee was discharged for the
reason that the amount due from the trustee to the principal
defendant was due her as wages for her personal labor for a
time not exceeding one month next preceding the service of
the process, and because the suit was not to recover for neces
saries furnished her. Two questions are raised by the plain
tiffs’ exceptions relative to the liability of the trustee.
It is claimed on the part of the plaintiffs that the ad
1.
judication of the lower court charging the trustee was not va
cated by the defendant’s appeal; that, therefore, the question
was not opened for a rehearing and decision in the appellate
court, and that in fact a principal defendant has no such legal
interest in the adjudication of the question whether the al
[Assumpsit with trustee process.

J

7i‘
.\

7
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leged trustee should be charged or not as to give him a right
of appeal ; that he cannot be aggrieved by any adjudication of
this question.
In support of this position various cases are cited by the
plaintiﬁ"s counsel, some of which go fully to the extent
claimed by him. For instance, in Kellogg '0. Waite, 99 M3.S£~
501, this is said in the opinion of the court:
“The defendant
in a trustee process has no legal interest in the question
whether the trustee shall be charged or discharged.
It does
not bind him in any subsequent suit as an adjudication either
of the fact or the amount of the indebtedness of the trustee to
him. Nor is the pendency of the trustee process any defense
to a suit by the defendant therein against the trustee.”
This is not the law in this state, under our statutes relating
to trustee process. Under our statutes a principal defendant
has a legal interest in the adjudication of the alleged trustee's
liability to be charged, and, in a subsequent suit brought by
such defendant, he is estopped by the previous judgment, fol
lowed by a delivery or payment by the trustee of the goods,
effects, and credits for which he was charged.
By Rev. St. c. 86, § 30, it is provided that the answers and
statements sworn to by a trustee shall be deemed true, in de
ciding how far he is chargeable, until the contrary is proved,
“but the plaintiff, defendant and trustee may allege and prove
any facts material in deciding that question.”
Various sections of the chapter of the Revised Statutes re
lating to trustee process provide for the proceedings when
two cases are pending at the same time, one against a_defend
ant and trustee, and the other where the defendant therein is
plaintiff in a suit directly against the trustee, which need not
be here particularly referred to. But that a principal defend
ant has a legal interest in the adjudication upon the question
of liability of a person summoned as his trustee is conclusive
ly shown by section 76 of that chapter, which is as follows:
“The judgment against any person as trustee discharges him
from all demands by the principal defendant, or his executors
or administrators, for all goods, effects and credits, paid, de
livered or accounted for by the trustee thereon; and if he is
afterwards sued for the same by the defendant, or his execu
tors or administrators, such judgments, and disposal of the
goods, effects and-credits as above stated, being proved, shall
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be a bar to the action for the amount so paid or delivered by
him.”
In a case of this kind, where there is no claimant for the
funds in the trustee’s possession, and no controversy as to the
amount due, and where the only question is whether or not
the funds in the trustee's hands are exempted from attach
ment by this process, because of the provision of the statute
that an amount due the principal defendant as wages for his
personal labor performed within one month next before the
service of the process, except where the suit is for necessaries,
cannot be thus attached, the principal defendant is the only
one, except the plaintiff, who has any real interest in the de
termination of the question.

It would be an anomaly if a person thus interested could
not appeal from an adjudication charging the trustee, because
he is not aggrieved by such adjudication, when, by force of
the statute above referred to, he is estopped by such judgment
to claim the funds in the trustee’s hands.
We have no doubt that, under the circumstances of this
case, the principal defendant had the right of appeal, and
that her appeal carried the whole case to the appellate court.

i

#

i l

1

SHOLTY
Supreme

Q

$

$

I

MCINTYRE.

Court of Illinois.
139

J

v.

$

1891.

Illinois, 171.

C. . This is an action of trespass brought in
court
of McLean county by the widow and heirs
the circuit
of Jacob Sholty, deceased, including Levi W. Sholty, against
Robert S. McIntyre, as administrator of the estate of Benja
The suit was brought in the name
min D. Sholty, deceased.
heirs,
for the use of the Patrons’ Mutu
but
and
of said widow
al Fire & Lightning Insurance Company of Stamford, Conn.
Upon the trial in the circuit court the jury found the defend
ant guilty, and assessed the damages at $2,500.
Motions for
judgment
of
were overruled, and
a new trial and in arrest
judgment was rendered on the verdict.
MAGRUDER,
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A writ of error was prosecuted from the appellate court to
the circuit court by Levi W. Sholty, one of the nominal plain
tiffs below, in the name of McIntyre, the administrator, who
was the defendant below, but without the knowledge or con
McIntyre, as administrator of Benjamin
sent of the latter.
estate,
Sholty’s
being
D.
the sole defendant against whom
the judgment was rendered in the circuit court, and being the
plaintiff in error in whose name the writ of error was sued
out in the appellate court, made a motion in the latter court
to dismiss the writ of error, which motion was allowed. The
case is brought before us by writ of error to the appellate
court to review the action of the appellate court in so dismiss
ing the writ of error pending in that court.
A motion is also made in this court by McIntyre, adminis
trator, who is the plaintiff in error here, to dismiss the pres
ent writ of error, upon the ground that the writ was sued out
by Levi W. Sholty without the consent or authority of the
plaintiff in error.
Did McIntyre, administrator, the plaintiff in error in the
appellate court, have the right to dismiss the writ of error
sued out there in his name? Has he the right to dismiss the
writ of error sued out from this court in his name?
Levi W. Sholty, who has sued out these writs of error in
the name of the original defendant in the judgment, below, is
a brother and heir of Benjamin D. Sholty, deceased, the latter
having died unmarried.
He is also a creditor of his deceased
right and in his own name he has
his
own
brother's estate. In
a judgment against Benjamin D. Sholty’s estate for $2,250,
and, as administrator of his deceased wife, he has another
judgment against said estate for $2,500. M clntyre v. Sholty,
121 Ill. 660, 13 N. E. Rep. 239. It is conceded that said estate
is insolvent, and insufficient to pay the two last-named judg

ments; so that, if said judgments were paid, there would be
nothing left to apply upon the judgment of the present de

fendant in error.

It

is a general rule that no person can sue out a writ of er
ror who is not a party or privy to the record, or who is not
shown by the record to be prejudiced by the judgment.
Colman v. Oil Co., 25 W. Va. 148; Howse v. Judson, 1 Fla. 133;
Townsend v. Davis, 1 Ga. 495; Porter v. Rummery, 10 Mass.
64; Steel v. Bridenbach, 7 Watts & S. 150; Heirs oi Hill 1:.
Hill's E:z:’rs, 6 Ala. 166; Dale v. Roosevelt, 8 Cow. 333'7
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Jaqueth v. Jackson, 17 Wend. 434; 2 Tidd Pr. 1135, and note
a; 6 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 817. Levi W. Sholty was one
of ﬁve or six nominal plaintiffs suing in the court below for
the use of the insurance company. He made a motion in that
court to have the suit dismissed as to him, upon the ground
that he had not authorized it to be prosecuted in his name;
but this motion was overruled, and judgment was rendered in
his favor, and in favor of his co-plaintiffs, for the use of the
insurance company, against McIntyre, administrator of said
estate. The writ of error is usually brought by the party or
parties against whom the judgment was rendered. 2 Tidd.
Pr. p. 1134. Here it has been brought in the name of the
party against whom the judgment was rendered, but without
his consent, his name being made use of by one of the parties
in whose favor the judgment was rendered.
It has been said that a writ of error may be brought by a
plaintiff to reverse his own judgment, if erroneous, in order
to enable him to bring another action. 2 Tidd. Pr. p. 1134;
Johnson v. Jebb, 3 Burrows, 1772. In the Jebb Case, it would
appear that the judgment was for a less amount than the
plaintiff claimed that it ought to be.
Whether or not Levi W. Sholty could prosecute a writ of
error under the circumstances of this case is a question which
it is not necessary to pass upon, further than to say that, if
he could do so, he would be under the necessity of suing it out
in the name of all the plaintiffs in the judgment below, includ
ing his own. All the plaintiffs or defendants in the original
suit who are alive must join in the writ of error, and it is
competent for one to join the others without their consent.
The reasons for this rule are that the writ must agree with
the record, and that, if one of a number of plaintiffs, or one
of a number of defendants, who have not distinct and several
interests, should be permitted to bring a writ of error, every
one might do the same, and such a practice would tend to
multiply suits. If the parties whose names are thus used by
a co-plaintiff or co-defendant choose to abide an erroneous
judgment, and refuse to appear and assign errors, they must
be summoned and severed, and then, after the severance, the
writ may be prosecuted in the name of such co-plaintiff or co
Jameson v. Colburn, 1 Stew. & P. (Ala.) 253;
defendant.
Watson '0. Whaley, 2 Bibb, 392; Deneale 12. Archer, 8 Pet. 526;

1

~

_

_

<-—
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Tidd, Pr. 1162, 1163, note a; Harding v. Larkin, 41 Ill. 413;
Page v. People, 99 Ill. 418.
We are therefore of the opinion that Levi W. Sholty is not
such a party to the record in the present case as that he has
the right to sue out a writ of error in the name of the defend
ant below without the latter’s consent.
It cannot be said that Levi W. Sholty is in any way privy
to the record. There are privies in blood, as the heir is to the
ancestor; privies in representation, as is the executor or ad
ministrator to the deceased; privies in estate, as lessor and
lessee, etc. If this judgment had been rendered against Ben
jamin D. Sholty in his life-time, then Levi W. Sholty, being a
brother and heir, might be entitled to sue out a writ of error
as a privy in blood. But there can be no relation of privity
between an heir of the deceased and the administrator of the
deceased’s estate.
Nor can it be said that Levi W. Sholty is shown by the rec
ord in this case to be prejudiced by the judgment below. It
being admitted that the estate of Benjamin D. Sholty is in
solvent, and that it will not be sufficient to pay the judgments
in favor of Levi W. Sholty in his own right and as his wife’s
administrator, then Levi W. Sholty cannot be prejudiced as
his brother's heir whether the judgment of the insurance
company in this case is reversed or is allowed to stand. The
heirs can take nothing until the debts are paid, and the estate
will not be able to pay the debts not involved in this suit.
It is true that, as a creditor of his brother's estate, Levi W.
Sholty will be indirectly prejudiced if the judgment in favor
of defendants in error is allowed to stand, because the assets
of the estate will in such case be applied to the payment of
their judgment as well as to the payment of his judgments,
and thereby the amount received by him will be lessened.
But it has never been held that, where one creditor obtains a
judgment against a debtor, another creditor can prosecute a
writ of error from such judgment against the debtor's con
sent. In Colman '12. Oil Co., supra, the supreme court of West
Virginia say: “No creditor of any one, whether a corpora
tion or an individual, against whom a judgment has been pro
nounced, has a right in the name of such corporation or indi
See, also, Steel v.
vidual to prosecute a writ of error.”
Rridenbach, supra, and Townsend v. Davis, supra. Bail can
not have a writ of error to reverse a judgment against his
2
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principal, nor can the principal sue out the writ to reverse a
judgment against the bail, nor can they join in the writ, the
judgments being distinct and affecting different persons.
2
.
Tidd. Pr. 1135.
A writ of error is a writ of right by the common law, and,
in this state, it lies from either this court, or the appellate
court, to all inferior courts of record, to review their ﬁnal de
terminations in all cases involving property rights or personal
liberty, where no appeal is given from such inferior court of
record. “This right exists independently of any statutory or
constitutional provisions by force of the common law, in all
cases in which the jurisdiction of such inferior court is exer
cised according to the course of the common law.” Haines 2:.
People, 97 Ill. 161; Unknown Heirs v. Baker, 23 Ill. 484;
Kingsbury 1:. Sperry, 119 Ill. 279, 10 N. E. Rep. 8. But, as
the right thus existing at common law can only be exercised
by one who is a party or privy to the record, or is shown by
the record to be prejudiced by the judgment, and as Levi W.
Sholty does not occupy the position upon the record desig
nated by the rule, he had no right to sue out the writ of error
in the name of McIntyre, administrator, either in the appel
late court or in this court; and the motion of the plaintiff in
error to dismiss the writ of error in the appellate court was
properly granted in that court, and must be allowed in this
court, unless there is some statute which changes or contra
venes the rule already considered.
1

i

#

SHERER
Supreme

i I

$

$

v.

#

i I

SHERER.

Judicial Court of Maine.
93

1899.

Maine, 210.

Exceptions from supreme judicial court, Knox county.
This was an appeal by Charles Sherer, administrator of the
goods and estate of Reuben Sherer, from a decree of the
judge of probate for the county of Knox authorizing Fred
Sherer to commence a suit on the probate bond of said ad
ministrator for the beneﬁt of said estate.
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When the appeal came on to be heard, the presiding justice
ruled, as a matter of law, that Charles Sherer, the adminis
trator, had no right to appeal from the decision of the judge
of probate authorizing the commencing of a suit on his pro
bate bond, under any circumstances, or upon any state of
facts. To this ruling the appellant, Charles Sherer, excepted.

Overruled.
The exceptions present only the legal proposition as stated
in the ruling of the court. The facts upon which the appeal
was based are not stated.

The material portion of the statute (Rev. St. c. 63, § 23)
under which the right of appeal was claimed is as follows:
“Sec. 23. The supreme judicial court is the supreme court
of probate, and has appellate jurisdiction in all matters de
terminable by the several judges of probate; and any person
aggrieved by any order, sentence, decree, or denial of such
judges, except the appointment of a special administrator,
may appeal therefrom to the supreme court to be held within
the county,” etc.
The decree of the judge of probate authorizing the com
mencement of a suit on a probate bond is by virtue of the
provisions of Rev. St. c. 72, § 16, which reads as follows, so

far

as

material:

“Sec. 16. The judge of probate may expressly authorize
any party interested, to commence a suit on a probate bond
for the beneﬁt of the estate, and such authority shall be al
leged in the process.”
EMERY, J. * ‘ "‘
*
“
* Only persons “aggrieved” by a decree can appeal
therefrom (Rev. St. c. 63, § 23), but it is now long and well
settled that a person is not “aggrieved,” in the statutory sense
of that word, unless he would be concluded by the decree from
the assertion of some claim of personal or property right.
The mere fact that a person is hurt in his feelings, wounded
in his affections, or subjected to inconvenience, annoyance,
discomfort, or even expense, by a decree, does not entitle him
to appeal from it, as long as he is not thereby concluded from
asserting or defending his claims of personal or property
rights in any proper court. Thus, a debtor of a deceased per
son cannot appeal from the appointment of a particular per
son as administrator, notwithstanding his argument that the
person appointed would act oppressively towards him. Swan
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person claiming property under a
a decree charg
ing the administrator with the property, and ordering its dis
tribution among the next of kin, notwithstanding the argu
ment that such decree would subject him to the annoyance
and expense of a lawsuit. Lewis v. Bolitho, 6 Gray, 137. A
creditor cannot appeal from a decree denying a petition for
license to sell real estate for the payment of debts, though
such denial may compel him to incur the expense of an action
and levy. Henry '0. Estey, 13 Gray, 336. The stepmother of
minor children, whose parents are both dead, cannot appeal
from a decree appointing some other person as guardian,
though such decree may deprive her of their custody and com
panionship. Lawless v. Reagan, 128 Mass. 592. Trustees of
a fund bequeathed to a minor cannot appeal from a decree ap
pointing a particular person as guardian for the minor, how
ever much they may prefer some one else, or even no guard
ian. Deering 12. Adams, 34 Me. 41. A sister to a person of
unsound mind cannot appeal from a decree appointing some
other person to be the guardian of her relative, unless at least
she has an interest in the estate of her relative, as heir.
Briard v. Goodale, 86 Me. 100, 29 Atl. 946.
Tested by the rule above stated and illustrated, the admin
istrator in this case is not aggrieved by, and cannot appeal
from, the decree allowing a suit upon his bond. He is not
concluded by it from asserting or defending any claim of per
sonal or property right with respect to the estate, the heirs,
legatees, or creditors.
It does not even conclude him from
asking the court to allow him in his account the expenses of
His appeal, therefore, was rightfully dismissed.
the suit.
12.

Picquet,

3

Pick. 443.

gift to him causa mortis cannot appeal from

*

*

O

v
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IN RE SWITZER.
SWITZER.

V.

SWITZER.

Supreme Court of Missouri.
201

Fox,

J

It

.

“

*

1906.

Missouri, 66.

"

is manifest from the brief of learned counsel for ap
pellant that the vital and most important question involved in
this proceeding is the right of the sureties on the guardian’s
bond to appeal from the ﬁnal settlement of the guardian,
made and approved by the probate court of Jackson county.
This proposition necessitates the consideration of the statutes
conferring the right of appeal. The sections of the statute
pertinent to this question, are, ﬁrst, section 278, Rev. St. 1899,
which provides that the right of appeal in cases involving the
administration of estate shall extend to any heir, devisee,
legatee, creditor, or other person having an interest in the es
tate under administration.
Section 3535, Rev. St. 1899, pro
right
appeal
from any ﬁnal order or judgment
vides for the
of
of the probate court in guardianship matters in like manner
and in the same effect as in appeal in cases of administration.
The question to be answered in this proceeding is, have the
sureties upon the guardian’s bond such an interest in the ad
ministration of the estate of a minor to bring them within the
provisions of the statute conferring the right of appeal in
such cases?
It is earnestly insisted by learned counsel for appellant that
the sureties upon Mrs. Switzer’s bond as guardian for the ap
pellant were not parties to the proceeding in the probate
court, had nothing to do with the ﬁnal settlement, and there
fore have no right of appeal. We are unable to give our as
The very terms of the statute indi
sent to this contention.
cate that the Legislature did not intend to limit the right of
appeal to simply those who were parties to the proceeding.
The statute applicable to administration of estates gives the
right of appeal to any heir, devisee, legatee, creditor, or other
person having an interest in the estate. This provision cer
tainly does not contemplate as a condition precedent to the
right of appeal that the persons enumerated must necessarily
1.
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to the proceeding.
We are unable to conceive of
any persons who are more interested in the administration of
a minor’s estate (other than the minor himself) than the
sureties on the guardian’s bond.
Their contract upon the
bond makes them responsible for all the acts of the guardian
respecting the administration of his ward’s estate; therefore,
they are deeply interested in the fair and proper administra
tion of the estate and the distribution of the assets. Upon a
careful consideration of the provisions of the statute applic
able to appeals in cases of this character, we are decidedly
inclined to the opinion that the sureties on the guardian’s
bond are persons that have such an interest in the adminis
tration of the estate as confer upon them the right of appeal
from a judgment approving the ﬁnal settlement of the
guardian, for whose acts and conduct they are sureties.
In vol. 2, Cyc. 638, in the text, we ﬁnd this general rule an
nounced:
“The sureties on an oﬁicial bond become parties to
the record by a judgment against the principal on the bond,
and may appeal from such judgment.” Numerous authori
ties are cited in support of the rule announced in the text
from various states, including our own state. The reason as
signed for this rule (and we confess that it is a good one) is
that, “in the absence of fraud or collusion, a judgment against
a principal is conclusive as against his surety,” therefore, we
can readily see the interest the surety has in a judgment,
which, so far as the record is concerned, only purports to af
fect the principal.
be parties

i I

S
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This court in Nolan v. Johns, 108 Mo. 431, 18 S. W. 1107,
very clearly announces the rule applicable to the right of ap
peal. While in that case the court had in judgment the stat
ute applicable to appeals from the circuit court in civil cases,
yet the principles announced are clearly applicable to the
proposition now confronting us in this proceeding. The dis
tinction between the statute in judgment before the court in
that case and the statute applicable to the case at bar is very
slight. Section 3710, Rev. St. 1879, gave the right of appeal
to every person aggrieved by any ﬁnal judgment or decision
The statute as ap
of any circuit court in any civil cause.
plicable to this case gives the right of appeal to any heir,
devisee, legatee, creditor, or other person interested in the
estate under administration. In the case last cited the ques
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tion of the rights of sureties upon an injunction bond were
involved.
There was a judgment in the circuit court against
the principal in the bond alone, and the sureties sought to be

heard, but were refused, and they prosecuted an appeal. It
was insisted in that case, as it is in the case at bar, that there
Judge
was no right of appeal on the part of the sureties.
MacFarlane, in speaking for this court, thus clearly treated
the question. He said: “It is clear that it was not intended
that the right of appeal should be limited to persons who were
technically parties to the suit, and ‘against whom the judg
ment was directly rendered.
‘Every person aggrieved’ in
cludes every person whose rights were in any respect con
cluded by the judgment.
The use of the designation ‘person’
instead of ‘party’ in a chapter of the statute treating exclu
sively of practice and proceedings in civil cases is itself sug
gestive that others than those technically parties to a suit
and judgment should have the right of appeal. Furthermore,
it is right and just that any person whose interests are inj uri
ously affected and concluded by a judgment should have the
right to a review by the appellate court of the proceedings
which resulted in such judgment.” During the course of the
opinion, the learned judge, in further treating of the question
presented, said: “But it is insisted that, as no judgment was
in fact rendered against the sureties, their rights are not
affected by the judgment against the principal alone. We do
not think the conclusion follows. The conditions of the bond
were that plaintiff ‘shall pay all sums of money, damages, and
costs that shall be adjudged against him (the principal) if the
injunction shall be dissolved.’ The rule is that ‘wherever a
surety has contracted in reference to the conduct of one of the
parties in some suit or proceeding in the courts, he is con
cluded by the judgment’ if free from fraud and collusion.
"'
*
"‘
We conclude that the appeal was properly taken by
the sureties.”

i
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BOARD OF REGENTS.

Court of Colorado.
46 Colorado,

1909.

100.

J

BAILEY, . This appeal is by the executor Thomas V. Wil
son from an order of the court directing a partial distribu
tion of the residuum of the estate of Andrew J. Macky, de
ceased. Upon appellee’s motion to dismiss the same we have
examined the record with the utmost care and are unable to
ascertain therefrom that the appellant has any appealable in
terest therein whatsoever.
Indeed there is no real contro
versy or issue presented by this appeal for determination by
the court. Appeals are not allowed for the mere purpose of
delay, or to present purely abstract legal questions however
important or interesting, but to correct errors injuriously af
fecting the rights of some party to the litigation. Only par
ties aggrieved may appeal. The word “aggrieved” refers to
a substantial grievance; the denial to the party of some claim
of right, either of property or of person, or the imposition
It is not apparent
upon him of some burden or obligation.
that appellant is thus affected by the order complained of.
He is not concerned in the slightest degree, in any legal sense,
with the question of the proposed partial distribution of the
residuum of said estate. There is no dispute anywhere as to
whom it rightfully belongs and lawfully must go. He has no
personal interest in it; he acts purely in a representative and
It is not for him, on his own motion, repre
official capacity.
senting no one in interest and no one aggrieved by such ac
tion, to question, dispute and deny the order of the court in
this behalf. Nevertheless he brings this matter here by ap
peal, in behalf of no one but himself, speaking for no one but
himself, and for no other interest, except such as seem purely
personal.
It has been necessary to examine the facts of the case, suffi
ciently at least, to determine appellant's right of appeal,
which is the vital question at issue on this motion. No one
having a direct or other interest in and to, or claim upon, the
estate, in whole or in part, objects to or complains of the or
der of partial distribution. The executor alone does this, the
result of which is simply to keep in his hands this large prop
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so ordered.

BOSWORTH v. TERMINAL RAILWAY ASS’N.
Circuit

80

it

1

~_i.

The appeal should be dismissed, and

is

Ill

Q!

l

*

=8

III

erty, upon which, and upon no part of which, has he any per
sonal claim whatever.
True it is that a possible balance of fees may yet be allowed
him as executor, with a possible further allowance for an at
to'rney, to cover which, upon any possible contingency, clearly
an abundant amount under the court’s order is retained in
his hands.
Moreover a bond of $50,000 is required to be
given by the Regents of the State University to the executor,
as such, to protect him against any and every possible future
adverse happening.
If the contention of the appellant is correct and to be up
held, the power is placed in the hands of such a representative
oﬂicial to indeﬁnitely tie up and postpone the settlement and
distribution of any estate, where no dispute of substance
whatever exists, and upon ﬂimsy and triﬂing pretexts, in the
interest only of one seeking in his oﬁicial capacity to retain
The law does not con
possession of the property involved.
template or approve such action, and courts should neither al
low nor sanction it when properly called to their attention.

Court of Appeals,

Seventh

Circuit.

1897.

Federal Reporter, 969; 26 Circuit Court of Appeals, 279.

&

a

In a suit brought by the Mercantile Trust Company on the
21st day of September, A. D. 1893, to foreclose
mortgage
upon the Chicago, Peoria
St. Louis Railway, the court ap
pointed a receiver, with the authority usually conferred upon
receivers in the charge and operation of railways and in the
general administration of the estate, and required the re
ceiver to pay (1) all past-due taxes; (2) all current operat
ing expenses; (3) all past-due wages; (4) “all claims for
materials and supplies which have been incurred in the op
eration and maintenance of said property during the six
months last past, and all ticket, trackage, and traffic balances
To this last item the Mercantile
due from said railroad.”
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Trust Company objected, which objection the court overruled.
On the 27th day of May, 1895, the Terminal Railroad Associa
tion of St. Louis, the appellee, ﬁled its intervening petition.
asserting a claim against the railway company, amounting to
$8,162.11, for switching, engine and car repairs, etc., done
within six months prior to the date of the order appointing a
receiver, and asking_for the allowance of the claim as a pref
erential claim under the order of the court appointing the
receiver. An answer was ﬁled to this petition by the receiver.
asserting that the facts stated might be true for anything
known to the contrary, but, being stranger to the matters, he
demanded strict proof, and denying that the petitioner was
entitled to the relief demanded.
The intervening petition,
under a general order of reference, went to the master, whose
report was to the effect that the claim was a just one, and that
the amount is a lien upon the property of the railway com
pany prior and superior to the claims of the mortgage bond
holders under the order appointing the receiver, and that it
should be paid out of the surplus income, or from a sale of the
property of the railway company. To this report the receiver
ﬁled exceptions, not impugning the ﬁnding of the master that
the claim was a just one against the company, but to the ﬁnd
ing that the claim should be paid from the surplus income, or
from a sale of the property of the railway company, “wbere

as,” the exception proceeds, “the said master should have
found that the aforesaid amount is due the said petitioner, but
is not a lien upon the property of the railway company prior
or superior to the lien of the mortgage bondholders.”
Upon
hearing, the court, on July 30, 1896, overruled the exceptions,
and entered a decree allowing the claim at the amount stated,
and declaring that it was a claim of the character embraced
in the order appointing the receiver, to be paid as a preferred
claim, and directing that the receiver pay to the intervener
the amount of the claim “out of the income of said receiver
ship, if any such income is in his hands, and, in case he has
not the funds in hand for this purpose, it is ordered, ad
judged, and decreed that the same be paid out of the proceeds
of the sale of the mortgaged premises in preference to the
mortgage debt, and, until paid, the same is hereby declared a
lien upon the said mortgaged estate superior to the lien of the
mortgage herein.”
To this decree the receiver assigned error,
substance,
effect that the court erred in adjudging
to
the
in
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that the claim of the intervening petitioner was entitled to
priority to the mortgage debt. The receiver thereupon prayed
an appeal, which was allowed.
Before Woons, JENKINS, and SHOWALTER, Circuit Judges.
JENKINS, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).
The contention of the receiver is thus stated in the brief of
his counsel:
“The question thus presented to this court for determina
tion is one as to the displacement of vested contract liens by
unsecured creditors. There is no controversy as to the labor
having been performed or the materials furnished within the
six months next prior to the appointment of the receiver of
the insolvent corporation, nor as to the value of the same.
The only controversy is as to whether or not the appellee is
entitled, on its petition and proof made thereunder, to have
the vested lien of the mortgagee displaced to the extent of
his claim.”
*
*
"‘
The broad ground is taken that a court of equity,
assuming, at the request of a trustee, the operation of a rail
way, has not the right to provide for the payment, out of the
income or the corpus of the road, of operating expenses in
curred within a limited time prior to the suit, unless there
has been diversion of income, and then only to the extent of
such diversion.
It is, however, objected by the appellee that with this ques
tion the receiver is not concerned, and that, the justice of the
debt being conceded, it is none of his affair that it is preferred
This contention, we
by the decree to the mortgage debt.
think, must be sustained. While it is true that a receiver is
the instrument of the court for the conservation of the estate
which the court has taken into its possession for administra
tion, it is also true that in a sense he represents all parties in
His duty is to defend the estate against all claims
interest.
which he deems to be unjust. His duty is to conserve the es
tate as a whole for its distribution by the court among those
He represents the es
who shall be adjudged to be entitled.
tate, with right to sue to recover demands due to it, with
right to defend it against claims asserted. In this respect we
concur with the circuit court of appeals for the Fourth cir
cuit that this duty carries with it the right and the duty, in
case of doubtful claim, to take the judgment of the court of
last resort. Thom v. Pittard, 8 U. S. App. 597, 10 C. C. A.
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This right and duty should, however,
limited in its exercise to those cases in which the estate, as
a whole, is interested to enforce a right or to defend against

352, and 62 Fed. 232.
be

a claim asserted.

In respect to many matters the receiver has

no right of appeal, while in respect to others his right to ap
Thus, he may rightfully ap
peal may not be gainsaid.
peal from a decree refusing him compensation, or disallowing
his accounts, or establishing a claim against the estate, or
denying a claim asserted for the estate. He has no right to
appeal from a decree removing him from his position, for that
is matter of discretion with the court appointing him, and he
holds his position by the sufferance of the court; nor has he
the right of appeal from a decree authorizing an issue of re
ceivers’ certiﬁcates, or directing a particular management of
the trust property, or directing sale of the mortgaged prop
erty, or conﬁrming its sale, or directing the turning over of
property in his hands; for he is neither the censor of the
court, nor interested in the event. Illustrations might be mul
tiplied. The true line of demarcation we think to be this: He
has the right of appeal with respect to any claim asserted by
or against the estate, for therein he is the representative of
the entire estate. He has the right of appeal from any decree
which affects his personal right, for therein he has an inter
est. But he has not the right of appeal from a decree declar
ing the respective equities of parties to the suit. He should
therein be indifferent, and not a partisan. His duty is to all
parties in common. He should not become the advocate of one
against another.
Trust Co. v. Sullivan, 46 U. S. App. 601,
603, 23 C. C. A. 458, and 77 Fed. 778.
"
*
*
Neither the trustee nor the bondholders nor the
Who made the receiver the
purchaser is here objecting.
guardian of their interests in this regard? What duty is im
posed upon him to assert the supposed right of one creditor
over another in respect to a common fund; and this, whether
the estate remains in his custody or has passed from his pos
session and control under decree and sale? By what right
does he become the partisan advocate when his duty demands
of him impartiality and indifference with respect to the divi
sion of this common fund? By what authority may he assert
By what right does he undertake
the rights of a purchaser?
to prevent the enforcement of this claim against the pur
chased estate, presumably by the decree of sale charged as a
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it?

He has no such right. He is, in so doing, an
interloper, obtruding himself, in breach of his duty, where he
has no right, and in a matter with which he is not concerned.
To sanction such action is to encourage vexatious litigation at
the expense of the estate, which should be cast upon the inter
lien upon

1

l

i

#

1

¥

¥

Ill
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ested parties, and to hold out the temptation to a receiver and
his counsel to swell the cost of administration by assuming
litigation with which he has not right to interfere.

The appeal will be dismissed.

MCFARLAND

v.

PIERCE.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
151

1897.

Indiana, 546.

is

is it

it

a

a

a.

a

.

J

HACKNEY,
The appellees sued the appellants Abraham
corpora
W. McFarland, the Ridgeville Milling Company,
tion, and two others, seeking an accounting by said McFar
land and others, as the ofﬁcers and managers of said com
receiver,
pany, and the appointment, without notice, of
pending the litigation, to take the custody of the property,
books, and effects of said milling company. The circuit court,
receiver as prayed; and on the
on April 20, 1896, appointed
April,
day
by
the bill of exceptions, but on
of
as
shown
21st
the 22d day of April, as shown by the order-book entry, said
McFarland and said milling company entered a special ap
pearance “for the special purpose of making objections and
taking exceptions to the appointment of
receiver.”
Upon
the face of the documents ﬁled by them in entering such ap
recited that the same
pearance, and in the objections,
recited also that said re
were ﬁled April 20, 1896, and
Said objections were over
ceiver had then been appointed.
ruled; an exception was reserved; and this appeal was per
fected. The assignment of error is by “the appellants Abra
ham W. McFarland and the Ridgeville Milling Company”
jointly, and of the numerous speciﬁcations of error counsel
say they “bring in review before this court the suﬁiciency of
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the complaint to justify the appointment of a receiver ea:
parte without notice.”
Appellees object to a consideration by us of any question
assignable by said milling company alone, and they insist that
said company alone could complain of the appointment of a
receiver, and, since it has not separately assigned error, no
question arises for decision. By Rev. St. 1894, § 1245 (Rev.
St. 1881, § 1231), the right of appeal from the appointment
Our
of a receiver is given only to “the party aggrieved.”
whether,
legal
inquiry,
sense,
therefore,
in
a
ﬁrst
is as to
McFarland was aggrieved by said appointment, for, if he was
not, and the milling company has joined him in the assign
ment of error, when there is no available error as to him,
there can be no joint assignment made available.
Medical
College v. Commingore, 140 Ind. 296, 39 N. E. 744; Goss 21.
Wallace, 140 Ind. 541, 39 N. E. 920; Armstrong 12. Dunn, 143
Ind. 433, 41 N. E. 540. The allegations of the complaint
sought nothing with reference to the separate property of
McFarland, and nothing with reference to joint property of
McFarland was a
McFarland and the milling company.
.stockholder in the milling company, and was charged with
misconducting the affairs of said company, and appropriat
ing its moneys to his own uses. The allegations as to an ac
counting are not before us to determine McFarland’s interest
in the suit, inasmuch as that branch of the controversy has
not reached this court. As a stockholder, his interest in the
company was held in common with the other stockholders;
and the interests, as such, of all stockholders, were represent
He was not a party
ed in and by the corporation defendants.
to the complaint, because he was a stockholder; and, for the
purposes of the appointment of a receiver, it cannot be main
tained that, as a stockholder, he was a proper or necessary
party. He was made a party to respond to the primary alle
gations of the complaint and cause of action wherein he was
charged personally with bad faith, and it was sought to re
quire him to account and pay to the use of the company the
funds belonging to and withheld from it. “The word ‘ag
grieved,’ in the statute refers to a substantial grievance, a
denial of some personal or property right, or the imposition
People v. Kent, 4 N.
upon a party of a burden or obligation.
Y. Wkly. Dig. 62; Reid v. Vatnderheyden, 5 Cow. 719; Steele
'0. White, 2 Paige, 478; Golden v. Botts, 12 Wend. 234; Kelly
'\
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Israel, 11 Paige, 147; Card v. Bird, 10 Paige, 426; Bush v.
Bank, 48 N. Y. 659; Hall 'v. Brooks, 89 N. Y. 33; Grow 12. Garr
loclc, 29 Hun, 598; People v. Common Council of City of Troy,
82 N. Y. 575.
“To be ‘aggrieved’ is to have a legal right, the
infringement of which by the decree complained of will cause
pecuniary injury.” Hewitt’s Appeal, 58 Conn. 226, 20 Atl.
453; Dickerson’s Appeal, 55 Conn. 223, 10 Atl. 194, and 15
Atl. 99; Andress 'v. Andress, 46 N. J. Eq. 528, 22 Atl. 124;
Swackhamer 'v. Kline's Adm’r, 25 N. J. Eq. 503; Parker v.
Reynolds, 32 N. . Eq. 293. The appellant must have a legal
interest which will be enlarged or diminished by the result of
the appeal. Woodward v. Spear, 10 Vt. 420; Hemmenway o.
Corey, 16 Vt. 225; 2 Enc. Pl. & Prac. p. 170; Wiggin v. Swett,
6 Metc. (Mass.) 194; Lewis o. Bolitho, 6 Gray, 137; Lawless
1'. Reagan, 128 Mass. 592; Deering 'v. Adams, 34 Me. 41.
Un
der any of these deﬁnitions, the appellant McFarland has no
appealable interest in the one question now in this court,If he has any interest to be
the appointment of a receiver.
affected by that action, it is but remote and contingent, and
that interest is of a corporate character, and its legal repre
That interest may be protected alone
sentative is in court.
by such legal proceedings as the corporation may employ, and
the stockholder cannot, in his individual capacity, dictate the
course, nor set up his judgment against the course chosen by
the corporation, so long as it does not act ultra uires. Having
concluded that McFarland had no appealable interest, the
joint assignment of himself and the company presented no
question in favor of the company alone.
The judgment is
v.

J

affirmed.
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING.

HACKNEY,

J.

Our holding that McFarland had no appeal
able interest in the matter of the appointment of a receiver
for the milling company is questioned-First, because McFar
land, employed as the manager of the milling plant, had a
ﬁnancial interest in the question to the extent of his com
pensation as manager; and, second, because, as such manager,
he was in possession of the property. His possession is that
of the corporation. He is the mere agent of and custodian
for the corporation, with no alleged interest above that of a
In his own right he makes no claim of possession.
servant.
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and his every interest in possession is merged in that of the
corporation. His ﬁnancial interest is that of a salaried agent
of the corporation. To maintain a possessory or ﬁnancial
interest in the property in behalf of McFarland would render
it necessary, in every case of the appointment of a receiver
for a corporation, to make defendants and give an appealable
interest to the servants drawing salaries and, as servants.
holding custody of all or any part of the corporate property.
The superintendent of a railway, the manager of a gas plant
or a manufactory, would certainly possess no appealable in
terest in a proceeding against any such corporation for the
appointment of a receiver of the corporate property. If Mc
Farland, by reason of the fact that a receiver might cut off his
salary as an agent of the company, could interpose to deny
the right to such receiver, the same could be said of any em
ploye of any corporation. When it is remembered that the
servant has no interest in the corporate property or its pos
session above that of the corporation itself, it at once appears
that that which precludes the corporation precludes such
servant.
The petition is overruled.

iii

AGNEW
Supreme

v.

BALDWIN.

Court of Wisconsin.
186 Wisconsin,

1908.

263.

[Action for breach of a contract to deliver lumber, plaintiff
claiming $368.56 damages. Defendant ﬁled a counterclaim
for breach of the same contract by the plaintiff, claiming
$180 damages.

At

the

trial the answer was amended

so as to

ﬁx the damages on the counterclaim at $500.]
The jury returned a general verdict for the defendant for
$1.56, thus allowing the counterclaim at a triﬂe more than the
plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff moved to set aside the verdict and
for a new trial, which motion was granted, unless the defend
ant should ﬁle a stipulation consenting to remit all but the
sum of $180 from his damages and allow plaintiff a judgment
of $188.46 as tendered in the original answer with costs, and,
in the case of the ﬁling of such stipulation, denying the mo
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tion. The defendant ﬁled the stipulation speciﬁed in the or
der of the court, and judgment was entered in A accordance
therewith, from which both parties appeal.
WINSLOW, C. J. It seems plain that by stipulating to the
entry of the judgment the defendant waived his right of ap
peal therefrom. The circuit judge evidently granted a new
trial in the exercise of his discretion because he was dissatis
ﬁed with the damages allowed by the jury on the counter
claim, but granted to the defendant the privilege of averting
a new trial by reducing his damages to a sum which the court
deemed reasonable.
The defendant could take any one of
three courses—he could appeal from the order if he deemed
that the court’s discretion had been abused, or he could sub
mit to the new trial, or he could ﬁle his stipulation and avoid
another trial. He had his choice, and he chose to stipulate
for the entry of the very judgment which was entered. In so
doing he did not act under compulsion in any legal sense. A
party cannot voluntarily stipulate that a certain judgment be
entered, and then appeal from it after its entry.
He cannot
be heard to complain of an act to which he deliberately con
sents. “Consensus tollit errorem.”
The plaintiff, however, has done nothing to forfeit his right
of appeal. He promptly moved for a new trial, and his mo
tion was granted, subject to defendant’s right to stipulate to
reduce his damages. He did not even move for judgment on
the stipulation, and has done nothing to waive his claim to
recover the entire amount of the balance due on the lumber
His appeal must therefore be
contract without reduction.
considered.
ii
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"If a judgment be rendered against a. party by his consent, he cannot
On
said to be aggrieved.”—Poweli v. Turner, (1885) 139 Mass. 97.
this ground no appeal lies (in the absence of statute to the contrary)
from a Judgment by confession, which amounts to a release of errors,
Garner v. Burleson, (1862) 26 Tex. 348; Manderviiie v. Holey, (1828)
1 Pet.
(U. S.) 136; or from a. decree taken pro c0n]‘(‘ss0.—NeW Jersey
Bldg. Loan & Inv. Co. v. Lord, (1903) 66 N. J. Eq. 344; Murphy v. Am.
Life Ins. Co., (1840) 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 249; or from a judgment by
default,-—McLean
v. Territory, (1903) 8 Ariz. 195; Schwartz v. Flaherty,
(1905) 99 Me. 463; Thompson v. Haselton, (1885) 34 Minn. 12; Flake
v. Van Wagenen, (1873) 54 N. Y. 25; State v. Simpson, (1914) 69 Ore.
93; Bank v. Ralphsnyder, (1903) 54 W. Va. 231, except on the ground
of the record to sustain the judgment,—-Benton
v.
of the insufficiency
Holliday, (1884) 44 Ark. 56; White v. Iltis, (1877) 24 Minn. 43; Gadsden
But some cases allow appeals
v. Home Fertilizer Co., (1911) S9 S. C. 483.
57
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generally from default judgments.—Jameson v. Simonds Saw Co., (1904)
144 Cal. 3; Lovejoy v. Stutsman.
(1915) 46 Okl. 122; Rhode Island Mtg.
C0. v. Spokane,

(1898) 19 Wash.

616.

In Hart v. State Fire Marshal, (1914) 178 Mich. 609. two cases in
volving the validity of the same law were heard together.
The court
held the law invalid in the ﬁrst case, and when the second case was
taken up the attorneys suggested that they did not care to go into the
merits in view of the court's opinion on the law and proposed that the
court merely make the same order as in the other case, in order to make
This the court did, stating that it was done to
a basis for an appeal.
enable the matter to be tested in the Supreme Court. The appeal, when
taken, was dismissed on the ground that the order was made with the
consent of the appellant and was therefore not appealable.
The express reservation of the right to appeal will not be effective
against a judgment entered by consent.—'I‘witchell v. Risley, (1910) 56
Ore. 226; Jarvis v. Palmer, (1846) 1 Barb. ch. (N. Y.) 379; Cameron v.
Smith, (1912) 171 Mich. 333; McBride v. Hunter, (1880) 64 Ga. 655.

UNITED STATES
Supreme

SANGES.

Court of the United States.
144

J

v.

United States, 310.

1892.

I

.
The jurisdiction of this court is invoked by the
States
under that provision of the judiciary act of
United
1891 by which “appeals or writs of error may be taken from
the district courts or from the existing circuit courts direct
to the supreme court,” “in any case that involves the con
struction or application of the constitution of the United
States.” Act March 3, 1891, c. 517, § 5, (26 St. pp. 827, 828.)
But the question which lies at the very threshold is whether
this provision has conferred upon the United States the right
to sue out a writ of error in any criminal case.
This statute, like all acts of congress, and even the consti
tution itself, is to be read in the light of the common law,
from which our system of jurisprudence is derived. Charles
River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 545; Rice r.
Railroad Co., 1 Black, 358, 374, 375; U. S. v. Carll, 105 U. S.
611; Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, 422, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 935;
As aids, therefore, in its interpretation,
1 Kent, Comm. 336.
we naturally turn to the decisions in England and in the sev
eral states of the Union, whose laws have the same source.
The law of England on this matter is not wholly free from

GRAY,
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doubt. But the theory that at common law the king could
have a writ of error in a. criminal case after judgment for the
defendant has little support beyond sayings of Lord Coke and
Lord Hale, seeming to imply, but by no means affirming it;
two attempts in the house of lords, near the end of the sev
enteenth century, to reverse a reversal of an attainder; and
an Irish case and two or three English cases, decided more
than sixty years after the Declaration of Independence; in
none of which does the question of the right of the crown in
this respect appear to have been suggested by counsel or con
sidered by the court. 3 Inst. 214; 2 Hale, P. C. 247, 248, 394,
395; Rex '0. Walcott, Show. Parl. Cas. 127; Rex 'v. Tucker,
Show. Parl. Cas. 186, 1 Ld. Raym. 1; Regina '0. Houston,
(1841), 2 Craw. & D. 191; The Queen 12. Mills, (1843), 10
Clark & F. 534; The Queen u. Wilson, (1844), 6 Q. B. 620;
The Queen '0. Chadwick, (1847), 11 Q. B. 173, 205. And from
the time of Lord Hale to that of Chadwick's Case, just cited,
the text-books, with hardly an exception, either assume or as
is the only
sert that the defendant (or his representative)
party who can have either a new trial or a writ of error in a
criminal case, and that a judgment in his favor is ﬁnal and
conclusive.
See 2 Hawk. P. C. c. 47, § 12; Id. c. 50, § 10 et
seq.; Bac. Abr. “Trial,” L. 9, “Error,” B; 1 Chit. Crim. Law,
657, 747; Starkie; Crim. Pl. (2d Ed.) 357, 367, 371; Archb.
Crim. Pl. (12th Eng. & 6th Amer. Ed.) 177, 199.
But whatever may have been, or may be, the law of Eng
land upon that question, it is settled by an overwhelming
weight of American authority that the state has no right to
sue out a writ of error upon a judgment in favor of the de
fendant in a criminal case, except under and in accordance
with express statutes, whether that judgment was rendered
upon a verdict of acquittal, or upon the determination by the
court of a question of law.
In a few states decisions denying a writ of error to the
state after judgment for the defendant on a verdict of acquit
tal have preceeded upon the ground that to grant it would be
to put him twice in jeopardy, in violation of a constitutional
provision. See State 12. Anderson, (1844), 3 Smedes & M.
751; State v. Hand, (1845), 6 Ark. 169; State v. Burris,
(1848), 3 Tex. 118; People 'v. Webb, (1869), 38 Cal. 467;
People 'v. Swift, (1886), 59 Mich. 529, 541, 26 N. W. Rep.
694.
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But the courts of many states, including some of great au
thority, have denied, upon broader grounds, the right of the
state to bring a writ of error in any criminal case whatever,
even when the discharge of the defendant was upon the de
cision of an issue of law by the court, as on demurrer to the
indictment, motion to quash, special verdict, or motion in ar
’
rest of judgment.

l i i i

Q

I I i

Q

I

In many of the states, indeed, including some of those above
mentioned, the right to sue out a writ of error, or to take an
appeal in the nature of a writ of error, in criminal cases, has
been given to the state by positive statute.

But the decisions

above cited conclusively show that under the common law, as
generally understood and administered in the United States,
and in the absence of any statute expressly giving the right
to the state, a writ of error cannot be sued out in a criminal
case after a ﬁnal judgment in favor of the defendant, whether
that judgment has been rendered upon a verdict of acquittal,
or upon a determination by the court of an issue of law. In
either case, the defendant, having been once put upon his

trial and discharged by the court, is not to be again vexed
for the same cause, unless the legislature, acting within its
constitutional authority, has made express provision for a re

8

i

$

i

1

¥

It

i

1!
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view of the judgment at the instance of the government.
In the light of these decisions, we come to the consideration
of the acts of congress on the subject of writs of error in
criminal cases.

In none of the provisions of this act, deﬁning the appellate

is

a

is

jurisdiction, either of this court or of the circuit court of ap
there any indication of an intention to confer upon
peals,
criminal case of any
the United States the right to bring up
below
in
favor
the
judgment
grade after
of
defendant.
It
impossible to presume an intention on the part of congress to
make so serious and far-reaching an innovation in the crim
inal jurisprudence of the United States.
Writ of error dismissed for want of jurisdiction."

58 Statutes
usually allow appeals by the state only where no general
verdict of acquittal of the defendant has been found by the jury.—State
v. Allen, (1920) 107 Kan. 407; United States v. Evans. (1907) 30 App.
V. Fore, (1914) 158 Ky. 465; State v. Finstad.
D. C. 58; Commonwealth
(1903) 16 S. D. 422; State v. Marshall, (1894) 124 Mo. 483; State v.

Sec.

2]

PARTIES T0 PROCEEDINGS

ror: REVIEW

931

Minnick,

(1898) 33 Ore. 158; State v. Hubbell, (1898) 18 Wash. 482;
.
State v. Savery, (1900) 126 N. C. 1083.
When allowed in case of a. verdict of not guilty the appeal serves only
the purpose of authoritatively expounding
the law.—State v. Kinney,
(1876) 44 Ia. 444; State v. Spear, (1916) 123 Ark. 449; State v. Brown,
But see
(1912) 8 Okl. Cr. 40; State v..Laughlin,
(1908) 171 Ind. 66.
State v. Miller, (1913) 14 Ariz. 440, holding that such an appeal pre
sented a moot case of which the appellate court had no jurisdiction.
If the statute attempts to give the state a right of appeal for the pur
pose of reversing the judgment on a verdict of not guilty, it is uncon
stitutional as involving double jeopardy.——People v. Webb, (1869) 38 Cal.
467; People v. Miner, (1893) 144 Ill. 308.
On appeals by the state in criminal cases see monographic note to Peo
ple v. Miner, 19 L. R. A. 342, and 19 Mich. L. Rev. 79.

SECTION 2.

Wno Musr as JOINED.

MASTERSON
Supreme

v.

HERNDON.

Court of the United States.
10 Wallace,

'

1870.

416.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Western District
of Texas; the case being thus:
Howard and others ﬁled in the court below a bill of peace
and for the conveyance of pretended title to a tract of land
described, against S. A. Maverick, and J. H. Herndon, and on
that bill the court decreed that the complainant “have and
recover of the said S. A. Maverick and ‘the said J. H. Hern
don the tract of land in the bill described, and that their
title to the same is hereby decreed to be free from all clouds
cast thereon by the said defendants.”
From this decree Herndon appealed. In regard to Maver
ick, the petition, which was signed by counsel only, and was
not sworn to, was thus:
“Your petitioner says that his co-defendant, Maverick,
refuses to prosecute this appeal with him.”
*

i i

$

#

$

#

#

#

i

MILLER, J., after stating that a careful examination of
the record satisﬁed the court that the decree was a joint
decree, and that the appeal was clearly taken by Herndon
alone, delivered its opinion as follows;
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It is the established doctrine of this court that in cases at
law, where the judgment is joint, all the parties against
whom it is rendered must join in the writ of error; and in
chancery cases, all the parties against whom a joint decree
is rendered must join in the appeal, or they will be dis
1.
missed. There are two reasons for this:
That the suc
cessful party may be at liberty to proceed in the enforce
ment of his judgment or decree against the parties who do
2.
That the appellate tri
not desire to have it reviewed.
bunal shall not be required to decide a second or third time
the same question on the same record.
In the case of Williams ‘U. Bank of the United States, 11
Wheat. 414, the court says that where one of the parties
refuses to join in a writ of error, it is worthy of consider
ation whether the other may not have remedy by summons
and severance; and in the case of Todd 'v. Daniel, 16 Pet.
521, it is said distinctly that such is the proper course.
This
remedy is one which has fallen into disuse in modern prac
tice, and is unfamiliar to the profession; but it was, as we
ﬁnd from an examination of the books, allowed generally,
when more than one person was interested jointly in a cause
of action or other proceeding, and one of them refused to
participate in the legal assertion of the joint rights involved
In such case the other party issued a writ
in the matter.
of summons, by which the one who refused to proceed was
brought before the court, and if he still refused, an order or
judgment of severance was made by the court, whereby the
party who wished to do so could sue alone. One of the ef
fects of this judgment of severance was to bar the party
who refused to proceed, from prosecuting the same right in
an other action, as the defendant could not be harassed by
two separate actions on a joint obligation, or on account
of the same cause of action, it being joint in its nature. This
remedy was applied to cases of writs of error when one of
the plaintiffs refused to join in assigning errors, and in
principle is no doubt as applicable to cases where there is a
refusal to join in obtaining a writ of error or in an appeal.
The appellant in this case seems to have been conscious that
something of the kind was necessary, for it is alleged in his
petition to the Circuit Court for an appeal, that 'Maverick
refused to prosecute the appeal with him.
We do not attach importance to the technical mode of pro
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ceeding called summons and severance.‘
We should have
held this appeal good if it had appeared‘ in any way by the
record that Maverick had been notiﬁed in writing to appear,
and that he had failed to appear, or, if appearing, had re
fused to join. But the mere allegation of his refusal, in
the petition of appellant, does not prove this.
We think
there should be a written notice and due service, or the rec
ord should show his appearance and refusal, and that the
court on that ground granted an appeal to the party who
prayed for it, as to his own interest.
Such a proceeding
would remove the objections made to permitting one to ap
peal without joining the other, that is, it would enable the
court below to execute its decree so far as it could be exe
cuted on the party who refused to join, and it would estop
that party from bringing another appeal for the same mat
ter. The latter point is one to which this court has always
attached much importance, and it has strictly adhered to
the rule under which this case must be dismissed and also
to the general_ proposition that no decree can be appealed
from which is not ﬁnal in the sense of disposing of the whole
matter in controversy, so far as it has been possible to ad
here to it without hazarding the substantial rights of parties
interested.
We dismiss this appeal with the less regret,
as there is still time to obtain another on proceedings not
liable to the objection taken to this.“
59 Where a liability is both joint and several,.and
the parties are sued
jointly, they must join in an appeal.—Bassett v. Loewenstein, (1901) 22
R. I. 468; 48 Atl. 934.
“The absence of a party to a joint judgment who will necessarily be
or reversal defeats the jurisdiction of the
affected by a modiﬁcation
court, and there can be no review of any part ot the judgment.”—Barber
Asphalt Paving Co. v. Botstord, (1893) 50 Kan. 331. Accord, Hamilton
v. Blair, (1892) 23 Ore. 64. But statutes sometimes allow any party to
of the nature of the judgment against him,—Senter
appeal irrespective
v. De Bernal, (1869) 38 Cal. 637; Johnson v. Reed, (1896) 47 Neb. 322;
Indiana, Burns St., 1914, 55 674, 676.
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WORMLEY.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
207 Illinois,
*

II

'

*

ii

*

Q

*

i

.

1=

Ii

J

Ill

MAGRUDER,

1,11.

Ill

'

I

1904.

Q

934

&

a

a

a

a

is

it

is

3

if

a

is

is

is

it

is

3.
It
further claimed by the defendants in error that
the writ of -error should be dismissed for misjoinder of par
ties. All of the defendants in error, except John T. Worm
ley, were co-complainants in the court below with the present
plaintiff in error, George D. Wormley, and claimed the same
rights; and
said that they should have been joined here
as plaintiffs in error with George D. Wormley. The general
rule undoubtedly is that all the plaintiffs or defendants
against whom a joint judgment
rendered must be joined as
writ of error
sued out by one or
plaintiffs in error where
more of them. Section 70 of the practice act, provides that,
in all cases where a judgment or decree shall be rendered
against two or more persons, either one of them may remove
such suit to the Appellate Court by appeal or writ of error,
and for that purpose shall be permitted to use the names of
necessary.
C. Ann. St. 1896
Starr
all such persons,
Mclntyre
Sholty,
3099;
171, 29 N. E.
'0.
139
Ill.
p.
(2d Ed.)
43; Cooke v. Cooke, 194 Ill. 225, 62 N. E. 536. It
true that
the present plaintiff in error, George D. Wormley, could have
used the names of all his co-complainants in the court below
as co-plaintiffs in error with himself in suing out the present
writ of error. As was said in McIntyre v. Sholty, 139 Ill. 176,
29 N. E. 44: “A1l the plaintiffs or defendants in the original
suit who are alive must join in the writ of error, and
competent for one to join the others without their consent.
The reasons for this rule are that the writ must agree with
number of plaintiffs, or one
the record, and that, if one of
of number of defendants, who have not distinct and several
interests, should be permitted to bring a writ of error, ever_\'
practice would tend to
one might do the same, and such
multiply suits. If the parties whose names are thus used by
coplaintiff or codefendant choose to abide an erroneous
judgment, and refuse to appear and assign errors, they must
be summoned and severed, and then after the severance the
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in the name of such coplaintiff or co
present
in
defendant.”
the
case George D. Wormley had
sued out the writ of error in his own name, and also in the
names of the other co-complainants with him in the court be
low, and if they had refused, when their names were so used,
to join in the prosecution of the writ, he could have sum
moned them into court, and obtained a judgment of sever
ance against them, so that then he could have prosecuted the
writ alone, and as sole plaintiff in error. 7 Ency. of Pl. & Pr.
pp. 860-862.
While this was not done in the present case, yet,
when George D. Wormley sued out the writ of error alone in
his own name, he made all of his co-complainants below de
fendants in error with the defendant below, John T. W orni
ley. All of his co-complainants have been served as defend
ants in error, or have entered their appearance as defendants
in error. They are therefore before this court. They might
have assigned cross-errors, or they might have asked to be
joined with George D. Wormley as coplaintiffs in error for
They have
the purpose of prosecuting the writ of error.
not taken any such steps. But being before the court as de
fendants in error by entry of appearance, the case stands in
be prosecuted

If

the same position as though there had been a summons and
They are in court, and this would be the only
a severance.
effect which could result from a summons. Where there are
several defendants in an action, all may plead jointly one
and the same defense, or each may plead a separate defense
for himself, and in the latter case he is said to sever; and his
doing so is termed “severance in pleading.”
25 Am. & Eng.
Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) p. 631. In the present case there is
an actual severance, because the plaintiff in error, George D.
Wormley, is prosecuting this writ of error alone, and not
jointly with the other complainants in the bill. Their action
in declining or neglecting to assign cross-errors, or to unite
with him in the prosecution of the writ of error while they
are in court by their entry of appearance, operates to create
a severance, and justiﬁes him in prosecuting the writ of error
alone. For these reasons, the motion to dismiss the writ of
#
*
$60
error is overruled.

i

1!

#
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by the one wishing to ap
60 The use of the names of other appellants
peal is proper in the absence of any statute.—Van Buskirk v. Hoboken
& N. Y. RR. Co., (1865) 31 N. J. L. 367; Flournoy v. Burke, (1840) 4
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337; 2 Saund. 1011.’.
But in any case the appeal is not
thereby taken in behalf of the rest; each one who wishes the beneﬁt
of the appeal must take steps to become a party to the appeal.-Ham
mond v. The People, (1897) 164 Ill. 455.

How. (Miss)

.

AYRES

v.

POLSDORFER.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
105

1900.

Federal Reporter, 737; 45 Circuit Court of Appeals,

2.4.

Before LURTON and SEVERENS, Circuit Judges, and EVANS,
District Judge.
SEVERENS, Circuit Judge. This is an action of ejectment
brought by Polsdorfer and wife, the defendants in error,
against Ayres, the plaintiff in error, Thomas Price, and
others, to recover several thousand acres of land fronting
other lands owned by the plaintiffs in the suit, on the east
ern shore of the Mississippi river) in Louderdale county.
Tenn.
Their right to recover the lands in question, which
had been formed in the bed of the river by changes in the
current and the deposit of alluvion, was rested upon the
claim that they were accretions to the land which they owned
along the shore. The parties defendant were made such under
the provisions of the statute of Tennessee (Shannon's Code,
§ 4972 [3231]) which provides that, if there be no actual
occupant of the lands, the action is to be brought “against
any person claiming an interest therein, or exercising acts
of ownership at'the commencement of the suit.” "‘ ' "
Ayres ﬁled the general plea of not guilty, and a special plea
Price pleaded
of the statute of limitations of Tennessee.
not guilty. For the purposes of the decision of this court, it
is unnecessary to detail the proceedings in the suit which
The case
relate to or were taken by the other defendants.
jury.
The plaintiffs gave evidence
came on for trial before a
of their ownership of the land on the Tennessee shore, and of
facts on which the accretion of the land in question was
claimed to have inured to them by virtue of such ownership.
The defendant Ayres (now plaintiff in error) gave evidence,
to support his claim to the land, of a grant from the state of
Arkansas, to a person from whom he deraigned title, of lands
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constituting an island or islands in the river, lying west of
the middle of the channel, which constituted the boundary
of the states, and of facts tending to support his contention
that the lands in suit were accretions to that ownership.
Price defended his claim to the lands under a grant of the
lands by the state of Tennessee of recent date, contending
that the plaintiff’s ownership extended only to the shore, and
that the made land was between that to which the plaintiff
had title and the middle thread of the river, and rested upon
that which had never passed from the state until its-grant
to that defendant.
At the close of the evidence the jury,
under direction of the court, rendered a verdict for the plain
tiffs against both Ayres and Price for all thevland claimed
by each of them, except a portion claimed by Price only. The
Judg
defendants excepted to this direction of the verdict.
ment was entered thereon as follows:
“It is therefore considered, ordered, and adjudged that
the plaintiffs do have and recover of and from the defend
ants, severally, the lands hereinbefore described, found by
the verdict of the jury to belong to them in fee, and that
the plaintiffs do have and retain the possession of such lands
under and in accordance with their said title, and that as to
the lands herein sued for, not embraced by the verdict of the
jury in favor of the plaintiffs, the defendants go hence with
out day, and that the plaintiffs recover of the defendants all
their costs herein expended, and that execution issue there

for.”
Ayres tendered a bill of exceptions, which was settled and
ﬁled, and, without taking notice of Price, who appears to
have been the only other contestant for the lands recov
ered, sued out this writ of error. Upon the hearing, coun
sel for defendants in error raised the objection that Ayres
alone prosecuted the writ, without having obtained any order
permitting him (Ayres) to proceed alone, or taking any
equivalent steps in that regard to justify himself in suing
out the writ without the joinder of Price, and this presents
The rule is ﬁrmly
a question which we must ﬁrst consider.
established, at least in the appellate courts of the United
States, that, where a judgment or decree is rendered against
two or more jointly, all must join in suing out the writ of

error'or prosecuting

an appeal, unless those who are not
joined have been invited to come in and have refused; and
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proof that this has been done must be made to appear by the
record of the circuit court, before a writ of error or an
"‘
"‘
*
In
appeal by less than the whole can be allowed.
its enforcement a dubious question has frequently arisen,
as to whether the judgment or decree was in legal contem
plation a joint or several one, and in solving it the courts
have looked to its substance rather than its form. See the
above-cited cases, and those which follow.
In many cases
the rule has been held not applicable where the party claim
ing to be aggrieved, although he is one of several parties
against whom the judgment was rendered, yet alone repre
sents some distinct and substantive subject-matter, in which
the others have no concern, or are only incidentally con
cerned by reason of the allowance or rejection of the claim in
question.
Cox '0. U. S., 6 Pet. 172, 8 L. Ed. 359; Todd T.
Daniel, 16 Pet. 521, 10 L. Ed. 1054; Germain v. Mason, 12
Wall. 259, 20 L. Ed. 392; Hanriclc v. Patrick, 119 U. S. 156,
7 Sup. Ct. 147, 30 L. Ed. 396; Gilﬁllan v. McKee, 159 U. S.
303, 16 Sup. Ct. 6, 40 L. Ed. 161; The New York (decided
by this court Oct. term, 1900) 104 Fed. 561. It is earnestly
insisted by counsel for the plaintiff in error that this case
falls within the class of cases last mentioned, because it ap
pears that Ayres and Price founded their claim to the land
But it was the
upon wholly distinct and antagonistic titles.
land itself which was the subject of the suit, and the titles
which each of these defendants advanced amounted to no
more than separate means to a joint defense. Each of these
means was also available to both defendants, for the plaintiff
must recover upon the strength of his own title as against
all others. The rule is that separate pleas and separate de
fenses, founded upon distinct sources of right, do not make
the judgment several, when they are brought forward in
defense of a single cause of action, upon which the judg
In many
ment is recovered. The res is not thereby divided.
unity
already
was
cases
cited
there
no
of
title
between
the
of
the parties bound by the judgment from which the appeal
was taken,—cases wherein the appeal was held ineffectual,
because parties not joined had an interest in‘the question
whether the judgment should stand or be reversed.
I!
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GERMAIN
Supreme

v.

-

939

MASON.

Court of the United States.

1870.

12 Wallace, '25:).

Motion by Mr. Nathaniel Wilson to dismiss a writ of error
to the Supreme Court of Montana Territory; the case as it
seemed, from a not very clear record, being thus:
and L. B. Duke brought suit in the court below
. Mason
against Jules Germain to recover a balance due for work and
materials furnished in building a house, and to enforce a
mechanic's lien against the house and the lot on which it
was built for the debt. One C. L. Dahler, A. . Davis, and
eighteen other persons, who the petition stated “had or
claimed to have some interest, claim, or lien on the incum

J

J

bered premises,” were made defendants, but the petition
alleged that their interest, claim, or lien, if any, had accrued
subsequently to that of the plaintiffs; and it prayed “for
judgment against the said Jules Gernutin in the sum of
$6651,” and that it be adjudged that the defendants, C. L.
Dahler, A. J. Davis, and the eighteen others named, and all
persons claiming under them subsequently to the commence
ment of the action, be barred and foreclosed of all right,
claim, lien, &c., in, on, or to the incumbered premises, “and
that the premises be decreed to be sold,” &c. The court
decided that the lien of the plaintiffs was paramount to that
of all other persons, and gave judgment against Germain in
personam for the debt, with an order that if it could not
otherwise be made out of him, the real estate on which the
lien was claimed should be sold, and out of the proceeds of
the sale the debt of the plaintiffs should be ﬁrst paid.
To
alone
sued
out
a
judgment
Germain
writ
of
this
error.
*

#

ll
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The cases relied on for the dismissal of the writ
are all reviewed in Mussina v. Ca/vazos, 6 Wallace, 355, and it
is there said that they rest upon the principle that all the
parties to the original judgment must, when it is a joint
judgment, be brought before this court, and that this is not
done by a writ which does not give their names.
MILLER,

In the case before us the writ is sued out by Germain
alone, who is the only party mentioned as damaged by the
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alleged error of the court, and who alone gives the appeal
bond. If, therefore, Germain can bring the writ without
joining other parties as plaintiffs in error, the writ is not
defective.
We have examined the record—a very confused one--but
from it we gather enough to satisfy us that the judgment
of which Germain complains is such a separate judgment
against him as authorizes him to ask a review of it here
without joining his co-defendants in the court below, who
have not thought proper to disturb the judgment.
Master
son v. Herndon, 10 Wallace, 416.
_
The lien creditors, co-defendants with Germain, have not
sought to reverse the judgment; but German, who has a
separate, distinct, personal judgment against him for money,
in which the other defendants have no interest, has a right,
we think, to prosecute a writ of error in his own name with
out joining them.
Motion overruled.

HUMPHREY
Supreme

v.

HUNT.

Court of Oklahoma.
9

Oklahoma,

1899.

196.

J.

This action was commenced in the district
court of Kingﬁsher county by Maggie Hunt against Lewis
Humphrey, Grant Humphrey, Joseph C. Post, Lewis Wolf,
E. A. Davis, . W. Watkins, Joseph H. Lowry, C. P. Blakely,
and Fred Belt for $10,000 damages for the death of her
husband, which plaintiff alleges was caused by the falling
of a defective cotton-gin building upon her husband while
the deceased was in the employ of the above-named defend
A change of venue was granted, and the cause re
ants.
moved to Grant county, where a trial by jury was had,
which resulted in a verdict and judgment for plaintiff for
$2,100 against Lewis Humphrey, Grant Humphrey, Lewis
Wolf, E. A. Davis, J. W. Watkins, Joseph H. Lowry, and
C. P. Blakely, and a verdict and judgment in favor of Fred
Belt and against plaintiff. No verdict was rendered either
BURWELL,

J
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Post.
The defendants against whom
the judgment was rendered appealed therefrom to this court.
The plaintiff, Maggie Hunt, was the only party served with
the case-made, and she has ﬁled a motion to dismiss the
appeal for the reason that all of the parties who would be
affected by a reversal of the judgment were not served with
the case-made, and are not made parties to the appeal.
It is
clear that Belt might‘ be affected by a reversal of the judg
ment by which he was discharged from all liability to the
plaintiff, and, if it should be vacated and set aside and a new
trial granted, he would have to defend in another trial, and
take the chances of a verdict being rendered against him. If
he had been made a party, he could urge any reason he may
have why the judgment should stand; but, from this record,
the law presumes that he has no knowledge of the pendency
of this appeal, and he cannot, therefore, be expected to enter
In the case of Gillette 12. Murphy, 7 Okl.
an appearance.
91, 54 Pac. 413, it was held, by implication, that if a party
can, by a reversal or modiﬁcation of the judgment appealed
from, be in any way affected, he is a necessary party. " “‘ "‘
It might be argued that, inasmuch as Mrs. Hunt failed to
appeal from the judgment in favor of Belt, it became ﬁnal
This, however, cannot be true.
The plaintiff
as to him.
submitted the entire matter to the jury, and, while she failed
to recover a judgment against all of the parties whom she
sued, she was satisﬁed with it, because she failed to appeal.
But the judgment was a joint judgment, and all of the par
ties affected thereby must be made parties, and given an
opportunity to be heard, or the judgment will not be dis
turbed.
ii

C.
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t
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#

#
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Q
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.For the reasons herein stated, the appeal is hereby dis
missed, at the cost of the appellant, and the case remanded
to the lower court, with direction that the judgment rendered
All of the
by the district court be carried into execution.
J.,
who presided at the
justices concurring, except MCATEE,
trial below, and BURFORD, C. J., who was of counsel, not
sitting.
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JACKSON COUNTY
Supreme

v.

BLOOMER.

Court of Oregon.
28 Oregon,

[Chap. 6

1895.

110.

This is an action brought by the County of Jackson against
George E. Bloomer and the sureties on his bond as treasurer
of such county, to recover for his alleged defalcation as such
oﬁicial.
The complaint, inter alia, alleges the qualiﬁcation of
Bloomer by giving the bond in suit, and that between the
dates mentioned in the complaint he, as such treasurer, col
lected and received something over seven thousand eight
hundred dollars belonging to the county, which, in breach
of his trust, and in violation of the conditions of his under
taking, he failed and neglected to account for or pay over.
Bloomer, although served with summons, made default, and
the sureties answered jointly, denying the defalcation alleged
in the complaint, and upon the issues thus made the cause
was tried, and a judgment rendered in their favor on the
From this judgment the plaintiff appealed, without
merits.
serving a notice on Bloomer. For this reason the respondents
move to dismiss the appeal, claiming that Bloomer is an ad
verse party to the appellant, and should have been served
'
with notice.
BEAN, C. . The rule is well settled in this state that every
party to a litigation whose interest in relation to the judg
ment or decree appealed from is in conﬂict with the modiﬁca
tion or reversal sought by the appeal is an “adverse party”
within the meaning of section 537 of Hill’s Code, and must
be served with the notice of appeal; and if such party is not
served the appeal must be dismissed.
And the fact that-a
party whose interests are adverse to the appellant, has made
default, does not preclude the necessity of serving such no
tice of appeal upon him: The Victorian, 24 Or. 121; Moody
If, then,
v. Miller, 24 Or. 179; Hamilton v. Blair, 23 Or. 64.
Bloomer has an interest in sustaining the judgment from
which this appeal is taken, he is an adverse party to the
appellant, and the failure to serve him with notice of the
Now,
appeal is fatal, and the appeal should be dismissed.
the undertaking on which this action was brought is a joint
obligation of Bloomer and the sureties, in so far, at least, as

J
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that all are liable or none, and, therefore, although he made
default, the defense successfully made by the other defend
ants, going as it did to the merits and showing that the
plaintiff had no right of action against any of th,e defendants,
inures to his beneﬁt, and prevents the entry of judgment
against him on his_ default.
The rule on this question is
by
Mr. Black in section 209 of his work on
thus clearly stated
Judgments:
“In an action of contract against several de
fendants, if one of them suffers default, and another, under
the general issue, sets up and maintains a defense which
negatives the plaintiff's right to recover against either of the
defendants, and shows that he has no cause of action, the
plaintiff will not be entitled to judgment against the one who
was defaulted, but, on the contrary, the successful defense
will inure to the latter’s beneﬁt, and judgment must be ren
And to this effect are the
dered for both the defendants.”
authorities: French v. Neal, 24 Pick. 55; State v. Gibson, 21
Ark. 140; Morrison v. Stoner, 7 Ia. 493; Adderton v. Collier,
32 Mo. 507; Waugh v. Suter, 3 Ill. App. 271; Stapp v. Davis,
From this it seems manifest that Bloomer’s
78 Ind. 128.
interests would be materially affected by the reversal of this
judgment, for the reason that it appears from the record as
it now stands that plaintiff has no right of action against
him or his sureties for a breach of the conditions of his un
dertaking on account of any of the matters or things alleged
in the complaint, and so long as the judgment stands unre
versed it is in effect a judgment in his favor, and prevents
He is, therefore,
the entry of a judgment on his default.
vitally interested in sustaining the judgment as it now stands,
and consequently is an adverse party to this appeal.

i

Q

I

Q

¥

l l i

It

8

Dismissed.
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DAVIS
Supreme

v.

MERCANTILE TRUST

Court of the United States.
152

[Chap.

6

CO.
1894.

United States 590.

On February 18, 1889, the Mercantile Trust Company of
New York ﬁled in the circuit court of the United States for
the southern district of Ohio its bill against the Kanawha &
Ohio Railway Company. The bill alleged that on May 1,
1886, the defendant, the Kanawha & Ohio Railway Company,
issued a series of bonds, and on the same day executed to
the Mercantile Trust Company its mortgage or deed of trust
to secure the payment of the principal and interest of such
It alleged a default in the payment of interest due
bonds.
January
1, 1889, as well as the existence of a large ﬂoat
on
ing debt, and prayed the appointment of a receiver, and a
On February 19th the de
decree of foreclosure and sale.
fendant entered its appearance, and on the same day a re
ceiver was appointed, who qualiﬁed, and took possession of
the mortgaged property. Subsequently, and on July 24th,
an amended bill was ﬁled, making additional parties defend
ant the Toledo & Ohio Central Railway_Company and the
Shawnee & Muskingum River Railway Company.
On Oc
tober 26th a decree pro confesso was entered against the
latter company. On October 30th, Erwin Davis, the present
appellant, ﬁled a petition alleging that he was the owner of
more than $100,000 of the bonds secured by the mortgage
or deed of trust sought to be foreclosed in this suit, and also
the owner of more than $500,000, p-ar value, of each class
of stock of the defendant the Kanawha & Ohio Railway Com
pany, to wit, ﬁrst and second preferred, and common, and
asking for the removal of the receiver on the ground of his
incompetency, and the appointment of some capable and dis
On the same day a de
interested person as such receiver.
cree pro confesso was entered against the Kanawha & Ohio
Railway Company.
On November 13th the petition of Davis
for the removal of the receiver, and the appointment of an
other in his stead, was denied, and at the same time this
“It is further ordered that said Erwin
order was made:
Davis be and is permitted to intervene herein, and that he
have liberty to be heard upon any and all proceedings herein
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for the protection of his interests as bondholder and stock
holder of the Kanawha & Ohio Railway Company.”
On November 29th the Toledo & Ohio Central Railway
Company ﬁled its consent to the entry of a decree according
to the prayer of the amended bill of complaint, and that the
“cause proceed in like manner as if an order pro confesso
had been duly entered against it more than thirty days
prior” thereto. On December 5th Davis ﬁled a second peti
tion, reciting his interest as before, and in addition alleging
the existence of certain prior mortgage liens upon the prop
erty described in the plaintiff's bill, or part of it; that in the
bill there was claimed that the Kanawha & Ohio Railway
Company had a ﬂoating debt of about $330,000; that since
the ﬁling of the bill that company had confessed Judgment
in favor of the Kanawha Improvement Company in a court
of West Virginia for the sum of $285,232.20; and that as a
bondholder and stockholder of Kanawha & Ohio Railway
Company, on behalf of himself and all other stockholders
and creditors, he had ﬁled a bill in the circuit court of the
United States for the district of West Virginia, attacking
such judgment so confessed, on the ground of fraud, and
praying that it be canceled, set aside, and held for naught.
He attached a copy of this bill, and closed the petition in
these words:
“Your petitioner respectfully represents that he is advised
that no decree of sale of the property included in said mort
gage should be decreed until a reference is had to ascertain
the liens which shall have been ﬁrst ascertained thereon,
the amounts thereof, and the order of their priorities; that
a sale should not be decreed until the validity of the judg
ment referred to shall have been ﬁrst adjudicated.
“Petitioner therefore prays that this his petition be read
and considered at the hearing; that your honors will not at
said hearing enter a decree of foreclosure, as prayed for
in said bill, until the matters of this petition have been fully
heard and a proper reference to a master be made to as
certain all liens upon said railroad, and the order of their
priorities, and that petitioner have full relief in the prem
ises; and, as in duty bound, he will ever pray,” etc.
On the same day, to wit, December 5, 1889, a decree of
foreclosure and sale was entered. That decree found a de
fault in the payment of interest, and decreed a sale unless
I
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such interest should be paid within 30 days. At the close
“Thereupon, came the inter
of the decree was this entry:
vening petitioner, Erwin Davis, and prayed the court for
the allowance of an appeal, with supersedea-s, from the fore
going decree, and the court thereupon refused the appeal.”
Subsequently, an application was made to Mr. Justice
Harlan, of this court, for an appeal; and on February 11,
1890, it was allowed.
The only security given on this ap
peal was a cost bond, in the sum of $500, executed by Davis
and his surety to the appellee, the Mercantile Trust Com
This bond was approved February 27, 1890,
pany, alone.
and a citation was then signed by Mr. Justice Harlan; the
citation running to the Mercantile Trust Company, the
Kanawha & Ohio Railway Company, the Toledo & Ohio Cen
tral Railway Company, and the Shawnee & Muskingum
This was served on the Mercan
River Railway Company.
tile Trust Company, the Toledo & Ohio Central Railway
Company, and the Shawnee & Muskingum River Railroad
Company, but not on the Kanawha & Ohio Railway Com
No supersedeas bond having been exe
pany, the mortgagor.
cuted, a sale was had under the decree on March 4, 1890,
and the property struck off to Nelson Robinson and William
B. Post for the sum of $505,000.
On April 7, 1890, this sale
was conﬁrmed, and a deed ordered. From such order of con
ﬁrmation, Davis prayed an appeal, which was allowed. On
such appeal, also, a cost bond to the Mercantile Trust Com
pany, alone, was given, and a citation issued, running only to
the Mercantile Trust Company.
BREWER, ., (after stating the facts in the foregoing lan
guage). As a preliminary matter, the standing of the appel
lant in this court is challenged. In the court below he was
not a party to the record, either plaintiff or defendant; was
never substituted for either; ﬁled no bill, cross bill, or an
swer; but was simply permitted to intervene, with liberty to
be heard upon any and all proceedings for the protection of
his interests as bondholder and stockholder.
Assuming, un
der the authority of Williams ’U. Morgan, 111 U. S. 684, 698,
4 Sup. Ct. 638, that this gave him a right of appeal from any
decision of the circuit court affecting his interests, it did not
change the ordinary rules respecting appeals, one of which
is that all the parties to the record, who appear to have any
interest in the order or ruling challenged, must be given an
\

J

I
Sec.

2]

PARTIES

TO

Paocsnnmos FOR Rsvlsw

947

opportunity to be heard on such appeal. The rule, and the
reasons therefor, are fully stated in Masterson v. Herndon,
10 Wall. 416, and restated in Hardee 'v. Wilson, 146 U. S. 179,
181, _13 Sup. Ct. 39, and need not, therefore, be again re
peated. See, also, Inglehart v. Stansbury, 151 U. S. 68, 14
Sup. Ct. 237.
In this case the appellant has taken two appeals,—one from
the decree, and the other from the order confirming the sale.
These appeals being taken separately, each must stand or fall
Noticing ﬁrst the appeal from the order
on its own merits.
of conﬁrmation, it will be seen that the sale conﬁrmed was of
the mortgaged property to Robinson and Post for the sum of
$505,000, of which sum $50,000 had been paid in cash by
the purchasers, and the balance secured by a deposit of
$1,069,000, ﬁrst mortgage bonds of the Kanawha & Ohio Rail
way Company,—the bonds in suit. Who is more vitally inter
ested in the question whether such sale and conﬁrmation
If the sale be set aside,
shall stand than these purchasers?
they lose the purchased premises, and all the proﬁt which
might result from their purchase, and assume all the risks
and delay in recovering that which they have paid into court.
In Kneeland 2:. Trust Co., 136 U. S. 89, 95, 10 Sup. Ct. 950,
this court said that “supported by sound reasons are the fol
lowing propositions: First, a party bidding at a foreclosure
sale makes himself, thereby, a'party to the,proceedings,
and
subject to the jurisdiction of the court, for all orders neces
sary to compel the perfecting of his purchase, and with a
right to be heard on all questions thereafter arising, affecting
his bid, which are not foreclosed by the terms of the decree
of sale, or are expressly reserved to him by such decree.”
Again, not only is the purchaser interested, but also the
mortgagor.
He may be satisﬁed with the sale which was
made,—may believe that at no other sale would it be possible
to realize so much in satisfaction of his indebtedness. At any
rate, the setting aside of one sale, and the ordering of an
other, may aﬂ'ect, prejudicially or beneﬁcially, his interests,
and because of that he has a right to be heard upon the ques
tion of setting it aside. Now, the only party respondent to
this appeal is the trustee. It is the only party named as obli
gee in the cost bond. The citation, in terms, runs to it, only;
and there is no pretense that the mortgagor or the other de
fendants, or the purchasers at the sale, have ever been

948

TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE

[Chap.

6

brought into this court to respond to this appeal. Manifestly,
it would be the grossest injustice to attempt to determine the
question of the validity of this sale in the absence of these so
vitally interested parties.
_
Neither does the appeal from the decree stand in any bet
ter condition.
In a decree for the foreclosure of a mortgage,
the two parties principally and primarily interested are the
mortgagee and the mortgagor. No third party should be per
mitted to disturb such a decree, unless and until both mortga
gee and mortgagor are given an opportunity to be heard.
The mortgagor may be unwilling that the decree should be
set aside, notwithstanding irregularities in. prior proceedings,
for fear that on a subsequent hearing a larger sum may be
decreed against him.
It is not necessary, in any given case,
to determine that his interests would or would not be pro
moted by the setting aside of the decree. It is enough that in
that matter he has a direct interest, and because of this in
terest common justice requires that no change shall be made
in the terms of that decree, nor shall it be set aside, without
giving him a chance to be heard in its defense. Ordinarily,
it may be presumed that all the parties to the record are in
terested, and so it is often said that all such parties must be
joined as appellants or appellees, plaintiffs in error or defend
ants in error; but it is unnecessary to rest this case upon the
mere fact that the mortgagor in this case was a party to the
record,—the only defendant in the ﬁrst instance. It was not
only such a party, but is also one directly and vitally inter
ested in the question whether the decree of foreclosure and
sale shall stand, and yet it is not before us. The trustee is
the only obligee named in the appeal bond, and while the cita
tion, on its face, runs to all the parties to the record, it was
not served on the mortgagor, the Kanawha & Ohio Railway
Company; and that company has never been brought into
this court, and never entered an appearance here. This is
fatal to the appeal. The appellant seems to have assumed
that he was authorized to represent the corporation mortga
gor, and all the stockholders, but this is obviously a mistake.
He was not by order of court substituted for the defendant
mortgagor, nor was he allowed to represent the mortgagor, or
to carry on its defense. The only authority given to him was
to intervene for the protection of his personal interests as
The corporation mortgagor
bondholder and stockholder.
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still represented all the other stockholders, as did the trustee
all the other bondholders; and while the appellant appears to
have had a considerable interest, both as stockholder and
bondholder, it was only a minor fraction. Out of 1,160 bonds,
1,069 (all but 91) were tendered by the purchasers upon ap
plication for conﬁrmation of sale; and, while he claims to be
the owner of $1,500,000 of the stock, it appears that the total
amount thereof was $12,200,000.
So that, in fact, he was the
owner of less than one-eleventh of the bonds, and one-eighth
of the stock. No authority from these other bondholders or
stockholders to him to act for them is shown. So that neither
in fact nor in law was he representing the corporation mort
gagor in this litigation; and as that mortgagor was inter
ested in, and affected by, the decree of foreclosure and sale, it
should have been made a party to this appeal, and brought
into this court, and because of the failure so to do the appeal
cannot be maintained.
For the reasons above given both- appeals are dismissed.
JACKSON, J., did not hear the argument,
in the decision of this case.

SECTION 3.

DEATH AND TRANSFER

KUHNERT
Supreme

v.

or INTEREST.

CONDE.

Court of Kansas.
39

or take any part

1888.

Kansas, 265.

VALENTINE, J. On April 22, 1886, a judgment was ren
dered in the district court of Atchison county in an action
of ejectment, in favor of Peter C. Conde, the plaintiff, and
against William F. Kuhnert, the defendant.
On January 23,
1887, Conde died. On April 2, 1887, a petition in error and
case were ﬁled by W. D. Webb as attorney for Kuhnert in the
office of the clerk of the supreme court, making Kuhnert the
plaintiff in error, and purporting to make Peter C. Conde the
defendant in error, and praying for a reversal of said judg
ment. Webb was-=the attorney of record for Kuhnert. L. F.
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Bird, who had formerly been an attorney in the case for
Conde, waived the issuance of summons and the service there
of, and no summons was ever issued in the case. On October
11, 1887, a notice was served by Samuel Woodworth, the at
torney and next friend of the representatives and successors
of Conde, upon Kuhnert’s attorney of record, Webb, of an ap
plication to revive the judgment aforesaid, in the district
court, in the names of the representatives and successors of
This notice gave the names of the representatives
Conde.
and "successors of Conde, and was signed by Bird as attorney
for plaintiﬁ‘. Webb, as the attorney of Kuhnert, accepted
service of the notice, and consented to the revivor. After
wards, and on January 11, 1888, the judgment was revived
by order of the judge of the district court. On April 3, 1888,
Woodworth and Bird, as the representatives and attorneys
of the representatives and successors of Conde, appeared spe
cially in this court, and moved that the case be dismissed. It
will be observed that at the time of Conde’s death the case
was wholly and entirely in the district court, and there is no
pretense that anything connected therewith was in the su
preme court.
No attempt had yet been made to bring the
case or anything connected therewith to the supreme court.
Hence no revivor could at that time have been had either of
the action or of the judgment except in the district court; and
no revivor was attempted in that court, or in any other court,
within one year after the time of the rendition of the judg
ment or of Conde’s death. Before any revivor was had or
even attempted, an attempt was made to bring the case to the
supreme court. Of course that attempt was abortive.
It was
attempted to make Conde the defendant in error, but as Conde
was dead, he could not be made a defendant in error. He
could not appear in any court and defend.
Nor could Bird,
nor anyone else, legally appear for him, as an attorney or

Bird ceased to be an attorney for Conde when
otherwise.
No service of summons could be made upon
Conde died.
death, and no waiver of service or of sum
after
his
Conde
mons could be had by the consent of Bird, or otherwise, and
no attempt was made to make the representatives or succes
sors of Conde parties to the proceedings in this court; and
they have never been made parties to any such proceedings.
Indeed, there never has been any defendant in error in this
court. The case has never legally been brwght to this court,
I

\
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and in law has never been in this court at all, and it is now
too late to bring it here. A proceeding in error to reverse an
order or judgment of the district court can be brought to the
supreme court only within one year after the order or judg
ment complained of has been made or rendered.
Civil Code,
judgment
of,
complained
556.
In
a
is
case
and that
§
this
judgment was rendered more than two years ago, and yet, in
legal contemplation, no part of the case in which the judgment
was rendered has ever been brought to this court; for, as be
fore stated, there has never been any defendant in error in
this court. It was about nine months after the time when
the judgment was rendered before Conde’s death took place,
and nearly two years before the judgment was revived in the
district court, and yet the deceased, Conde, after his decease,
is and has been the only defendant in error, or supposed de
fendant in error, in this court. The case has never legally
been in this court, and it will be dismissed.“
61 “It can make no difference
whether the deceased is the appellant,
or moving party, or the respondent in the prooeeding."—-Judson
v. Love.

(1868) 35 Cal. 463.

ALEXANDER

v.

REA.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
50 Alabama,

J

1873.

64.

PETERS, C. . The appellee makes a motion in this court to
1.
That one of the
dismiss this appeal, on two grounds:
appellants, said William Williams, died between the rendi
tion of the decree in the court below and the taking of this
appeal. “ "‘ *
Appeals, in our practice, take the place of writs of error
at common law. For this reason, they must be governed, to
a very great extent, by the same rules and reasons of prac
tice that apply to writs of error. In writs of error, where a
party has died after judgment, and before the appeal is
taken, and such deceased party is not the sole party to the
judgment, the survivor may take the writ of error in his own
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name, after suggesting the death of the party who has died,
and as such survivor he may proceed in the writ of error. 2
Tidd’s Pr. pp. 1135, 1136; Perrine v. Babcock, 6 Porter, 391.
The appellant in this case will be permitted to amend and
correct his appeal, by striking out the name of William
Williams, who is dead, and to assign errors and proceed in
the name of Lewis Alexander, as surviving defendant in the
court below. Rev. Code, 4420. The motion to dismiss is de
nied, with costs.

GREEN
Supreme

v.

WATKINS.

Court of the United States.

1821.

6 Wheaton, 260.

B. Hardin, for the defendant in error,
moved to dismiss the writ of error, in this case, which was a
real action, upon a suggestion of the death of the demandant
and plaintiff in error, pending the proceedings in this court.
March’ 1st, 1821.

1

i

ii

J

The preliminary question which has
.
STORY,
is,
whether the writ of error in this
argued
at
the
bar
been
case, which is a writ of right, has abated by the death of the
demandant, who is the plaintiff in error, pending proceedings
There is a material distinction between the
in this court.
death of parties, before judgment and after judgment, and
while a writ of error is depending. In the former case, all
personal actions, by the common law, abate; and it required
the aid of some statute, like that of the 31st section of the
judiciary act of 1789, ch. 20, to enable the action to be prose
cuted by or against the personal representative of the de
In real actions,
ceased, when the cause of action survived.
stronger
prevails,
for
a
still
principle
reason, for, by
like
the
the death of either party, the right descends to the heir, and
a new cause of action springs up; and the plea is not, there
fore, in the same condition as it was in the lifetime of the
March 8th.

party.
But in cases of writs of error upon judgments already ren
In personal actions, ff the
dered, a different rule prevails.
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plaintiff in error dies, before assignment of error, it is said,
that by the course of proceedings at common law, the writ
abates; but if, after assignment of errors, it is otherwise.
In
this latter case, the defendant may join in error, and proceed
to get the judgment affirmed, if not erroneous; and he may
then revive it against the representatives of the plaintiff.
But in no case, does a writ of error, in personal actions, abate
by the death of the defendant in error, whether it happen
before or after errors assigned. If it happen before, and the
plaintiff will not assign errors, the representatives of the
defendant may have a scire facias quare ezvecutio non, in or
der to compel him; if it happen after, they must proceed as
if the defendant were living, till judgment be affirmed, and
then revive by scire facias. And the plaintiff, in order to
compel the representatives of the defendant in error, to join
in error, may sue out a scire facias ad audiendum errores,
either generally, or naming them. Such is the doctrine of
approved authorities. -2 Tidd’s Pr. ch. 43, Error, p. 1096. It
is clear, therefore, that at common law, in these cases, a writ
of error does ‘not necessarily abate; and that the personal
representatives may not only be admitted voluntarily to be
come parties, but a scire facias may issue to require them to
And such has been the practice hitherto
become parties.
adopted in this court, in all personal actions, whether there
has been an assignment of errors or not; for a speciﬁc assign
ment of errorslhas never been insisted on here, as a prelim
inary to the argument, or decision of the cause.
In respect to real actions, this is the ﬁrst time the question
has presented itself upon a writ of error, where the death of
either party has occurred pendente lite. There is no doubt,
that the heir, or privy in estate, who is injured by an errone
ous judgment, may prosecute a writ of error to reverse it.
And there seems no good reason why, in case of the death of
his ancestor, pending proceedings, he may not be admitted to
become a party, or be cited to become a party, to pursue or
defend the writ, in the same manner as in personal actions.
The death of neither party produces any change in the con
dition of the cause, or in the rights of the parties. It would
seem reasonable, therefore, that the suit should proceed, and
not be dismissed or abated. In the absence of all authority
which binds the court to a different course, we are disposed
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rule

6! Whether the heir or personal representative
should be made a party
to the appellate proceedings. or the cause should proceed as though the
decedent were alive, to be subsequently revived, is a matter upon which
the practice differs in ditterent jurisdictions.
3 C. J. §§ 978, 987.
If the succesors in-interest are to be substituted, the method of ac
complishing the substitution dviffers. In some states it is done by motion,
—Reed v. Farrand, (1910) 198 N. Y. 207; in some by writ of error and
citation,-—McClane
v. Boon, (1867) 6 Wall. (U. S.) 244; in some by sug
County Common v. Holcomb,
gestion of death and scire jacias,-—Newcastle
(1856) 6 Del. 293; Mayer v. McLure, (1858) 36 Miss. 389.

O’SULLIVAN
Supreme

v.

PEOPLE.

Court of Illinois.
11,4

1892.

Illinois, 604.

PER CURIAM. Patrick O’Sullivan and others were convicted
in the criminal court of Cook county of the crime of murder,
and sentenced to be punished therefor by conﬁnement in the
penitentiary. He sued out of this court a writ of error upon
the record. Errors were assigned on his behalf upon that rec
ord, and there was joinder in error by the attorney general;
and the questions thus presented were discussed in printed
arguments presented to us at our March term, 1891. But.the
record being unusually voluminous, and the questions dis
cussed numerous, and requiring for their examination and
solution the careful reading of hundreds of printed pages of
evidence, and many legal authorities, it was impossible for us
to give judgment thereon at that term, and so we then took
the case under advisement. It is now made known to us that,
on the 5th day of May, 1892, and before we had caused j udg
ment to be entered upon the record or in any manner indi
cated to the parties or the public what our judgment would
be, Patrick O’Sullivan died, intestate, leaving personal prop
erty which has been administered upon pursuant to law.
It
has been suggested to us, by one of the attorneys represent
ing O’Sullivan in his lifetime, as amicus curiae, that we now
cause judgment to be entered in the case, nunc pro time, as of
our March term, 1891, or as of some day subsequently, but be
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fore the death of O’Sullivan ;- and the administrator of O’Sul
livan’s estate, by his attorneys, makes a motion to that effect.
We do not question either our power or the propriety of our
causing judgments to be entered of record in cases pending
before us, after the death of a party to the record subsequent
to the submission of the case to us for decision, as of a day
before his death, where the delay in causing judgment to be
entered has been purely for the convenience of the court or
of some of its members, and in certain other cases, where in
justice will otherwise result to one or both of the parties to
the record, provided the judgment thus to be entered of rec
ord can be operative and effective as a judgment from the
day as of which it is entered. But no case has been cited to
us which holds that a judgment should be entered nunc pro
tunc when it can be no more operative and effective than
where it is entered of record as of a present date; and, since
a court is never required to do a useless act, we do not think
that any well-reasoned case so holding can be found. Judg
ments in civil cases, whether in actions upon contracts or
upon torts, are for the recovery or the denial of something
either speciﬁcally or in the form of damages of some pecuni
ary value. If the plaintiff recovers, he thereby becomes en
titled to have, and the defendant must lose, something which,
but for that recovery, he would not have had and the defend
ant would not have lost. But in criminal cases, under indict
ments for felonies, the sole purpose of the action is not to
give the people anything,‘ but to punish the defendant in his
person; and the primary judgment, when the defendant is
found guilty, is, simply, the defendant being found guilty,
that he be punished, specifying how. It is true that, under
our statute, judgment is also rendered for costs; but this is
incidental only, and it stands or falls with the primary judg
The inquiry upon the
ment that the defendant be punished.
trial is only whether the defendant be guilty, and, if guilty,
the punishment that shall be inﬂicted upon his person; the
question of costs being neither submitted nor considered, and
the judgment therefor resulting solely as a legal consequence
It is therefore apparent that, in
of the primary judgment.
rights are more or less di
cases,
property
in
civil
judgments
rectly aifected; and such rights, under statute, are made to
descend to and be obligatory upon the representatives, after
death, of either or all of the parties to the judgment.
But in
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criminal cases, where judgments are rendered against the de
fendants under indictment for felony, the people acquire no
property rights, and the representatives of the defendant do
not take that which is affected by the primary judgment,
namely, the person of the defendant. It would therefore seem
to inevitably followthat the common-law rule in civil cases,
that a writ of error does not abate by the death of the plain
tiff in error, after error joined, (2 Tidd. Pr. 1086), can have
no application to criminal cases, since that rule rests upon
the right of the defendant in error to have the judgment re
vived against the personal representatives of the plaintiff in
error, and to thus enforce against them the judgment against
him whom they represent.
The only instance found in the
books in which a writ of error can, at common law, be prose
cuted by the representatives of a deceased person, upon the
record of his conviction in a criminal case, is that of an at
tainder for treason or felony. The effect of such attainder
at common law was forfeiture of all estate, both real and per
sonal, and corruption of blood. 4 Bl. Comm. p. 382. And it
was held that a writ of error may be brought by the party at
tainted, “or, after his death, by his heirs or executors, to re
verse an attainder of treason or felony, but by no other per
sons, whatever interest they may claim in the reversal.” 1
Chit. Crim. Law, 746, 747. But, since our constitution pro
vides that “no conviction shall work corruption of blood or
forfeiture of estate." (article 2, § _11, Const.,) there can be
no attainders for treason or felony here, and hence no case
upon which the heir or executor can prosecute a writ of error
The principle upon which the heir
to reverse an attainder.
or executor was allowed to prosecute a writ of error to re
verse the attainder was that the direct effect of the attainder
was to take from them, and give to the government, property
belonging to them as representatives of the person attainted.

i i
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Nor can it be said that the common-law rule does
not extend this far, simply because at common law there was
no judgment for costs to be paid out of the estate of the de
fendant, for ﬁnes for misdemeanors were, at common law,
collectible out of the estate of the defendant, and a scire
1 Chit. Crim. Law,
facias would issue for their collection.
809, 810. And, upon the death of the defendant, the executor
or administrator was chargeable with their payment out of
*
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assets of the deceased in their hands for administration. 2
Wms. Ex’rs, (7th Ed.) 1740.
And yet we have hunted in
vain for authority, common-law or statutory, for an executor
or administrator of a deceased person, convicted and ﬁned for
a misdemeanor in his lifetime, to prosecute a writ of error
upon the record of such conviction.
1

' '

i

*

#

#

C

1

Q

Q

C

We think the conclusion is inevitable that the writ
of error abated upon the death of O’Sullivan, and that a judg
The motion
ment nunc pro tune cannot prevent that result.
The writ of
to enter judgment nunc pro tunc is overruled.
error is abated. No judgment will be entered for the costs
of either party.“
"‘

For the form of such an order entered nunc pro tune, see Holloway
Galliac,
v.
(1874) 49 Cal. 149.
68

MOSES

v.

WOOSTER.

Supreme Court of the United States.
115

1885.

United States, 285.

On Motion.
WAITE, C. . The suit below was in equity and brought by
George H. Wooster, the appellee, against Solomon Moses,
Gotcho Blum, and Solomon Weil, partners under the name of
Moses, Blum & Weil, for an infringement of letters patent.
A ﬁnal decree for an injunction and damages was rendered
against the defendants, May 23, 1883. From this decree all
the defendants appealed, and the appeal was docketed here
October 12, 1883. Blum died January 2, 1884. On the elev
enth of April, 1885, Wooster appeared in this court and sug
gested his death; whereupon the usual order under rule 15,
should be
§ 1, was entered, that unless his representatives
term,
come parties within the ﬁrst 10 days of this
the appeal
would be dismissed. Proof of the due publication of a copy of
this order has been made, but the representatives of the de
ceased appellant have not appeared.
The surviving appel
lants now move that the action abate as to the decedent, but
that it proceed at their suit as survivors. The judiciary act

J
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of 1789, (1 St. 90, c. 20, § 31), provided that “if there be tw-W
or more plaintiffs or defendants, and one or more of them
shall die, if the cause of action shall survive to the surviving
plaintiff or plaintiffs, or against the surviving defendant or
defendants, the writ or action shall not be thereby abated,
but such death being suggested upon the record, the action
shall proceed at the suit of the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs
against the surviving defendant or defendants.”
This was re-enacted in the Revised Statutes as section 956,
and is substantially a copy of the act of 8 and 9 Wm. III, c. 11,
§ 7, which it was held in Clarke 12. Rippon, 1 Barn. & Ald.
587, was applicable to writs of error. Lord Ellenborough, in
giving that judgment, said: “The proceeding is an action
which is commenced by a writ, and the cause of action is the
damage 'sustained by the parties from the error in the pre
vious judgment, and this damage equally attaches on the sur
This court gave the
vivor in this as in any other action.”
same effect to our statute in McKinney v. Carroll, 12 Pet. 66.
Appeals to this court from the circuit and district courts
are “subject to the same rules, regulations, and restrictions
as are or may be prescribed by law in cases of writs of error.”
Rev. St. § 1012. The cause of action in this appeal, that is to
say, “the damage sustained by the parties in the previous de
cree,” attaches to the surviving appellants.
All the defend
ants were enjoined from infringing the patented machine,
and all were made liable for the payment of the damages
which the patentee had sustained by their joint act as part
ners. Clearly, therefore, the casle is within the statute, and
The cause of action is
may be proceeded with accordingly.
Undoubtedly
one that survives to the surviving appellants.
cases may arise in which the presence of the representatives
of a deceased appellant will be required for the due prosecu
tion of an appeal, notwithstanding the survivorship of others.
If that should be so, the court can, with propriety, direct that
the appeal be dismissed, unless it be properly revived within
The house of lords made such an order in
a limited time.
Blake v. Bugle, a note of which is found in Macqueen’s Pr. H.
L. 244. Here, however, there is no need of a revivor that sub
stantial justice may be done. The decree below was against
all the defendants jointly, upon a joint cause of action. It
affected all alike, and the interest of the decedent is in no way
separate or distinct from the others. If the representatives
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appellant voluntarily come in and ask to be
parties,
they
may be admitted.
made
Such a course was
adopted by the house of lords in Thorpe 11. Mattingley, 1 Phil.
200.
In the present case the representatives of the decedent,
although notiﬁed, do not appear. It is proper, therefore, that
the appeal should proceed under the statute at the suit of the
survivors, and an entry to that effect may be made.“

of a deceased

84 Where an application for the substitution
of the personal repre
sentatives ot a deceased appellant was made by the other appellants, it
was said:—“The substitution is wholly unnecessary for the purposes oi.’
It the order ap
this appeal, to protect the rights of any of the parties.
pealed trom should be reversed it is apparent that the substitution would
be useless; and it aﬁlrmed, the judgment can be enforced against any
property of the plaintiffs, both living and dead, upon which it is a lien,
and can be enforced in the same manner as it all were living. (3 R. S.
It the judgment shall be satisﬁed out ol’
5th Ed. 642, § 30, 649, § 41).
the personal property of the remaining plaintiffs, as it could have been
before the death of William McGregor, such survivors. if compelled to
pay more than their share, can seek contribution from the estate of the
deceased."—McGregor
v. Oomstock, (1863) 28 N. Y. 237.

BAKER

V.

NORTHWEST BUILDING

&

INVESTMENT

CO.
Supreme Court of Washington.
33 Washington,

1903.

677.

PER CURIAM: This was an application by Peter A. Berg
to be substituted as plaintiff and “respondent in this case in
place of John S. Baker. The action was brought in the lower
court by John S. Baker to restrain the continuance of a public
The complaint alleges, in
nuisance in the city of Tacoma.
substance, that the plaintiff was the owner of three certain
lots of land in Tacoma, adjoining property upon which a
bawdyhouse was being maintained by defendants, and that,
by reason of the proximity of said bawdyhouse to his said
lots, plaintiff was specially injured in a manner different from
Upon a hearing in the lower court, de
the general public.
fendants’ demurrer to the complaint was overruled, and an
injunction pendente lite was issued. From the order over
ruling this demurrer and granting the restraining order, the
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defendants appealed to this court. After the appeal had been
taken, the respondent Baker sold all his interest in and to the
lots owned by him, and described in the complaint, to the ap
plicant, Peter A. Berg. Mr. Berg now moves this court to be
substituted as respondent in place of Mr. Baker.
We think the application should be granted.
Section 4824,
Ballinger’s Ann. Codes & St., provides that every action shall
be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.
Sec
tion 4837 provides that no action shall abate by the transfer
of any interest therein, if the cause of action survive or con
tinue, but the court may allow the action to be continued by
the successor in interest.
Under code provisions similar to
our own, substitution has been allowed in the following cases:
McKinnis v. Mortgage Co., 55 Kan. 259, 39 Pac. 1018; Keough
v. McNitt, 7 Minn. 29 (Gil. 15) ; and Nickerson v. Crawford
(Sup.) 11 N. Y. Supp. 503. The respondent, having sold and
assigned all of his right, title, and ‘interest in and to the
property affected by the nuisance, has no further special in
The fact that he was the owner of the
terest in the case.
property described, and that this property was specially af
fected differently from other property in the community, gave
him standing to maintain the action in a court of equity.
Without these facts appearing, he was not entitled to main
tain the action for injunctive relief. When he parted with the
property, he parted with his right to maintain the action.
The cause of action, however, continued with the property.
The new owner has the same right to maintain the action as
the old owner had. When the applicant purchased the prop
erty, he succeeded to all the rights of the respondent, and, un
der the plain terms of the statute above named, is entitled to
be substituted as respondent, and to have exclusive control of
the litigation.
The application is therefore granted, and the applicant is
substituted as respondent in place of John S. Baker.“
65 Statutes
providing that no transfer of interest pending suit shall
abate the action are found in most states (1 Cyc. 116), but some do not
Thus, in Emerson v.
authorize or require any substitution of parties.
"By Code, section 3476, it
Miller, (1902) 115 Ia. 315, the court said:
is provided that no action shall abate by the transfer of any interest
*
"
"
It has been repeatedly held that
therein during its pendency.
the transfer of an interest in an action pending does not necessitate
"
‘
Moreover, the mere fact oi’
the substitution of a new party.
an assignment does not show that plaintiff is not still the real party in
The assignment may have been for the purpose of collection,
interest.

'
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or to secure an indebtedness, or for other purposes."
In Culver v. Randle.
(1904) 45 Ore. 491, the court held that substitution of parties involved
questions oi fact diﬂicult to determine, and would not be ordered in the
absence oi‘ a statute expressly conmmanding
it.
See also Trumbull v.
Jefferson County, (1910) 60 Wash. 479, holding that the assignee may
either become substituted or he may allow the action and appeal to
proceed in the name ot his assignor tor his own beneﬁt.

\

CHAPTER VII.

LAYING A FOUNDATION FOR REVIEW.
SECTION

OBJECTION

1.

GELSTON

v.

AND

ExCEPTIoN.

HOYT.

Court of Errors of New York.
13

1816.

Johnson, 561.

The Chancellor.
The suit in the Supreme Court between
these parties was an action of trespass, in which Hoyt de
clared against Gelston and Schenck, for seizing, taking, and
carrying away his ship, called the American Eagle. To this
charge the defendants plead, not only the general issue, but
two special pleas in bar; and to these pleas there was a gen
eral demurrer and joinder, and judgment for the plaintiff.
‘F

ll

ll

*

ll

ii

#

i i

#

The ﬁrst error assigned on the part of the plaintiffs in
error, is, that the matters contained in the 2d and 3d pleas in
bar, and which appear upon the record, amounted,-in law, to
a justiﬁcation, and that the judgment on the demurrer ought
to have been in favor of those pleas. * ‘ "‘
The judges of the Supreme Court have not assigned rea
sons for the judgment which they pronounced on the demur
rer; because, as was stated by Mr. Justice Spencer, in behalf
of that Court, “when the cause was called, (meaning the issue
joined on the demurrer,) the defendant’s counsel appeared.
and declined to argue; whereupon judgment was given for the
plaintiffs, on the defendant’s counsel declining the argument.”
Are, then, the plaintiffs in error to be permitted to come
here and argue the questions arising upon the demurrer,
This
when they declined the argument in the Court below?
is an important question, and it meets us in the very thresh
old of the case.
(962)
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I am of opinion that they are precluded, and for the fol
lowing reasons:
1.
In the ﬁrst place, it is an unfair pleading, for it takes
from the party demurring an advantage which he would
have been entitled to in the Supreme Court, if the inclination
of that Court had been against him, of withdrawing his de
murrer and replying to the pleas. I presume this Court can
not grant such a favor. If it can, the favor would be over
loaded with costs. I know of no such precedent. It is not a
case of amendment, and not within the ordinary province of a
Court merely of review. A party acts against good conscience
if he will not come forward and disclose his reasons, when
called upon by the proper tribunal, but reserves himself for
another Court, and for the cold, hard purpose of accumulating
costs, or of depriving his adversary of the opportunity of
correcting his error.
This point is within the reason of the decision of this
2.
court, at the last session, in the case of Sands 12. Hildreth.
(12 John. Rep. 493). There the appeal was dismissed be
cause the appellant‘ did not appear in the Court of Chancery
after the cause had been regularly set down for hearing, on
due notice, but voluntarily suffered a decree to pass against
him by default. That decision was not founded on any new
principle, and it equally applies to this case. There is the
same rule in the English house of lords; and in Dean v. Abel,
(Dicken’s Rep. 287), an appeal was dismissed without going
into the merits, because the party, at the hearing in chancery,
had made default, and suffered a decree to be pronounced
against him. So, again, in a late case, (2 Schoale & Lefroy,
712). Lord Eldon said it was well known as an established
rule, that no point not made in the Court below, could be made
on appeal to the house of lords.
This is a just and wise rule; for the very theory and
3.
constitution of a Court of appellate jurisdiction only, is the
correction of errors which a Court below may have commit
ted; and a Court below cannot be said to have committed an
error when their judgment was never called into exercise, and
the point of law was never taken into consideration, but was
abandoned, by the acquiescence or default of the party who
raised it. To assume the discussion and consideration of a
matter of law, which the party would not discuss in the Su
preme Court, and which that_Court, therefore, did not con
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sider, is to assume, in effect, original jurisdiction.
It is im
possible to calculate all the mischiefs to which such a course
of proceeding would lead. Either party would then be able.
in every case, to bring his question of law, as new, undis
cussed points, before this Court.
This would, indeed, be
Court,
leaving the Supreme
with its plenitude of power, to
enjoy the oiium cum dignitate in harmless repose; but this
was never the intention of the constitution. That Court was
created, with all its competence and organs, to be the great
trustee, the tutelary guardian of the vast body of the com
mon law. What good motive can a party have, who will not
argue a law question in the Supreme Court, but insists on
bringing it here to be exclusively discussed? It is according
to the genius of our whole judicial establishment, that the
Court which originally decides a cause, should be subject to
review by another Court; but on the plan pursued in the
present case, this Court, though only a Court of review, will
be the ﬁrst and the last, originally, and ﬁnally, to decide the
law. Why should not a party be obliged to obtain the opinion
How can he
of the Supreme Court before he comes 'here?
might
opinion
have
that
such
saved
him the ex
but
know
pense, and us the trouble, of the writ of error? It is certain
ly as much as we can do well, and I fear more than we can
do with despatch, to hear and decide questions of law after
they have been maturely considered in the Supreme Court,
and with the assistance of all the light and knowledge which
can be imparted to the subject, from the researches of that

tribunal.
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have thought it to be my duty to ab
stain from any consideration of the ﬁrst point, in the plain
tiff’s case, respecting the demurrer to the second and third
p1eaS_

an

=0:

For these reasons,

#86

J.

necessary to the review of legal and equitable cases
86 It ls equally
that the points made on appeal should have been passed on below.——
Lumber C0. v. Clinton Hill Lumber Co., (1898) 57 N.
Cumberland
Eq. 627; Carrlngton v. Basshor Co., (1913) 121 Md. 71; Copper Belle
Mining Co. v. Costello, (1908) 11 Ariz. 334; Van Namee v. Groot, (1868)
40 Vt. 74; Elliott v. Page, (1914) 98 S. C. 400.
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BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.
1,7918

Wyoming,

1904.

1.

The action was brought by M. V. Nichols against the Board
of County Commissioners of the County of Weston and others
to set aside a tax sale. From a judgment in favor of the de
fendants and quieting the title in one of the defendants to the
property in controversy, the plaintiff brought error.
Gibson, Clark and S. A. Osborn, for plaintiff in error.
The denial in an answer of the allegations of the petition
constitutes, if established, a mere bar to plaintiff’s suit and
furnishes no ground for afiirmative relief. (Pomeroy’s Code
Rem., sec. 88.) If the second defense of the answer.is to be
considered as in the nature of a counter-claim or cross-peti
tion, it is wholly insufficient.
It does not allege that defend
ants, or any of them, are, or ever were, in possession of the
property, which allegation is necessary in a suit to quiet title
(R. S., sec. 4104; Pomeroy’s Code Rem., sec. 369; 3 Pomeroy
Eq. Jur., sec. 1396; Thomas 12. White, 2 O. St. 540). The
necessary allegation is not made that the plaintiff or anyone
is making any claim to the property adverse to the defendant
“
"
"‘
A tax sale of
cattle company.
(R. S., sec. 4104).
dams and ditches cannot of itself vest in the purchaser the
title and all rights to the property, for the reason that such
property is real and not personal in character, and the pur
chaser would not acquire a legal title, but only a right to a
certiﬁcate of sale entitling him to a deed in the event that the
"‘
"
property is not redeemed in three years.
CORN, C.

J

Q
.
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This suit was brought by plaintiff in error to
of certain dams and irrigation ditches for

set aside a sale

The defendants
taxes claimed to be due to Weston county.
answered, ﬁrst, by a general denial.
For a second defense
they allege that “the county treasurer of said Weston county
proceeded to advertise the property in controversy as re
quired by law, and the defendant the Kent-Bissell Cattle Com
pany were the purchasers thereof for value and in good faith,
and they are now, and ever since have been, the absolute and
unqualiﬁed owners thereof.”
And the answer concludes with
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the prayer:
“That the said sale be approved by this court.
and the property in controversy and the title thereto be quiet
ed in the defendant the Kent-Bissell Cattle Company, and for
such other and further relief as the court may deem just and
The court, upon a hearing, found
proper in the premises.”
that the sale for taxes was regular and legal, and vested the
title to the property in the defendant cattle company, and
ordered that the sale be approved and the title quieted in the
said company. No exception was taken by the plaintiff to any
of the proceedings or orders of the court below, and there was
no motion to set aside or modify the judgment, but the case
is before us, without any bill of exceptions, upon the record
proper of the district court.
Plaintiff in error urges that under the pleadings and the
ﬁndings of the court, as set forth in the order and judgment,
it had no jurisdiction or power to render any judgment
against the plaintiff other than to dismiss his petition and al
low costs against him in favor of the defendants, and that the
judgment, in so far as it attempts to quiet the title of the
company to the property and to enjoin plaintiff from making
any claim thereto, is not supported by the pleadings or the
ﬁndings of the court, and should be reversed. Defendants in
error, upon the other hand, contend that, in the absence of
any bill of exceptions or transcript of the evidence, and no
exception noted upon the record to the entry of judgment in
the court below, the objection will not be heard or entertained
in the ﬁrst instance in this court. It is not contended by de
fendants in error that the judgment is supported by the
pleadings or the ﬁndings, but the case is submitted by them
upon the single proposition that, in the absence of any sort of
exception by the plaintiff in the court below, the judgment is
not before this court for review. The question is scarcely an
The Supreme Court of Ohio, from
open one in this court.
of our statutes bearing upon the
provision
which state the
subject of exceptions were taken, long ago decided that “they
manifestly relate to decisions which are made by the court
upon questions of law which arise during the progress of the
trial.” And they say “these provisions of the Code do not
relate to the ﬁnal judgment of the court, which, at the close
of the trial, deﬁnitely ﬁxes the rights of the parties in the
action. The judgment is not properly a part of the trial, but
forms the subject of a distinct title in the Code. If the record
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shows such ﬁnal judgment to be erroneous, it is the right of
the party aggrieved to have it reversed, vacated, or modiﬁed,
on petition in error, to the proper reviewing court. To note
an exception to a ﬁnal judgment, in the court which renders
it, after the controversy is there ended, would seem to be ut
terly futile.” Com. Nat. Bank 7). Buckingham, 12 Ohio St.
402. Other states adopting the Ohio Code of Procedure have,
so far as we have been able to ascertain,-all adopted this view
of the meaning of these provisions. Welton v. Beltezore, 17
Neb. 399, 23 N. W. 1; Black 12. Winterstein, 6 Neb. 225;
Koehler 12. Ball, 2 Kan. 169, 83 Am. Dec. 451; Lender '0. Cald
well, 4 Kan. 346; Wils0n'v. Fuller, 9 Kan. 176; Wood '0. Nicol
son, 43 Kan. 462, 23 Pac. 587.
In the last-named case the
plaintiff obtained judgment quieting his title under a tax
deed.
The defendant did not preserve any exception and did
not appear or answer in the lower court, but took the case to
the Supreme Court, alleging that the petition did not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against her.
The Supreme Court found, upon an examination of the rec
ord, that the petition was fatally defective, and reversed the
judgment.
The court say: “Any material error apparent in
the ﬁnal judgment of a district court may be corrected by
proceedings in error in this court, although no exception was
taken by the party complaining, and no appearance by him at
the trial and judgment, and no motion made to set aside the
judgment.” And the Supreme Court of this territory, prior
to the adoption of the Ohio Code in this jurisdiction, decided
the point in the same way, citing Ins. Co. v. Piaggio, 16 Wall.

L. Ed. 358, Mitchell v. Anderson, 1 Hill (S. C.) 69, 26
Am. Dec. 158, and McNamara o. O’Brien, 2 Wyo. 441. These
authorities are applicable to the case under consideration,
and we think they are binding upon this court.
Counsel for defendants in error, however, referring to 8
Ency. Pl. & Pr. 287, and the cases there cited, maintain that
the Supreme Court of the United States and the courts of 24
of the states establish a different rule. But this is a miscon
It is true that matters occurring
ception of the decisions.
in the trial, not vital to the question of jurisdiction or the
foundation of right, and not in the record proper, will not be
noticed by the reviewing court unless they are excepted to at
the time and brought into the record by a bill of exceptions.
They are presumed to have been waived. But error of a sub
378, 21
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stantial kind appearing upon the face of the record proper is
erro'r in law, and will be corrected by the reviewing court
without any exception having been taken, and, of course, no
bill of exceptions is necessary to bring such matters into the
record.
Andrews’ Stephen’s Pleadings 204. This principle
is repeated over and over again by the Supreme Court of the
United States. In Slacum 22. Pomery, 6 Cranch, 221, 3 L. Ed.
204, the court found that the omission of a certain averment
was fatal to the declaration, and they say: “Had this error
been moved in arrest of j udgment, it is presumable the judg
ment would have been arrested; but it is not too late to allege
as error, in this court, a fault in the declaration, which ought
to have prevented the rendition of a judgment in the court
In Bennett v. Butterworth, 11 How. 676, 13 L. Ed.
below.”
859, the verdict was held not to support the judgment, and
the court say: “As these errors are patent upon the record,
they are open to revision here, without any motion in arrest
of judgment or exception taken in the district court.” Sny
dam 21. Williamson, 20 How. 433, 15 L. Ed. 978; Pomeroy v.
Bank, 1 Wall. 600, 17 L. Ed. 638; Rogers 11. Burlington, 3
Wall. 661, 18 L. Ed. 79; Thompson "v. R. R. Co., 6 Wall. 137,
18 L. Ed. 765; Ky. Life Ins. C0. '0. Hamilton, 63 Fed. 93, 11
C. C. A. 42.
The rule is the same in all the states whose decisions we
*
"‘
*
The judgment will be reversed and
have examined.
vacated, and the cause remanded for such further proceedings
in the court below as may be proper upon the record.

am

Reversed and remanded.

MARTIN
Supreme

v.

FOULKE.

Court of Illinois.
114

Illinois, 206.

1885.
.

MULKEY, J. This is an appeal from a judgment rendered
by the circuit court of Will county, in an action of ejectment,
wherein the appellees were plaintiffs and the appellants de
*

"‘

*

fendants.
In the view we take of this case

it is unnecessary to inquire
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whether any of the above errors are well assigned or not, for
an examination of the record shows that no exception was
taken to the ﬁndings of the court or to the rendering of the
judgment, and that not even a motion for a new triall was
made. * “ "‘ The position of appellants, as we understand
it, is this: that if the court, upon the trial of a cause, makes
an improper ruling against a party, to which no exception is
taken, he may, nevertheless, on appeal, assign for error the
improper ruling; and if the opposite party joins in error, the
only inquiry then will be, whether, as matter of fact, the er
ror occurred, and if it did, the complaining party may avail
himself of it precisely in the same way, and to the same ex
tent, as if the proper exception had been taken.
Whatever
may be the rule in this respect elsewhere, it certainly can not
be the law here.
The Reports of this State abound with in
stances of erroneous rulings by trial courts which this court
has uniformly refused to consider on the ground no excep
tions were taken to them, in all of which, except, perhaps, in
a case now and then omitted through inadvertence, there was
a joinder in error.
Miere v. Brush, 3 Scam. 21; Armstrong
'v. Mock, 17 Ill. 166; Gridley v. Capen, 72 id. 11; Hill -v. Hard
ing, 93 id. 77. This practice is of too long standing, and the
rule too ﬁrmly established, to admit of change now.
The only error complained of being such as we can not
consider, the judgment must be affirmed.

Judgment aﬂirmed."
67 The necessity
for exceptions is the same when the review is had
upon case-made as when had upon a regular bill oi! exceptions and writ
of error.—Turner v. Grand Rapids, (1870) 20 Mich. 390. And the rule
is the same in equity as at law.—Phipps v. Penn, (1867) 23 Ia. 30; J.
Walter Thompson C0. v. Whitehed, (1900) 185 Ill. 454; Gunn v. Brantly,
(1852) 21 Ala. 633.
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BRIGGS

v.

J

7

WALDRON.

Court of Appeals of New York.
83

[Chap

1881.

New York, 582.

RAPALLO,
.
This case was decided on the ground, among
others, that although upon the trial some objections were
taken on the part of the defendant which should have been
sustained, the rulings of the court upon them were not ex
cepted to. The counsel for the defendant now moves for a
reargument, claiming that this court must have overlooked a
statement contained in the case showing that it was under
stood upon the trial that an exception followed every objec
tion. It does appear that at the beginning of the trial, upon
an objection being overruled and an exception taken, the
court directed that to whatever should be objected the sten
ographer should enter an exception, and the defendant’s
“We will have it understood that
counsel thereupon stated:
an exception follows every objection on this trial ;” which
statement does not appear to have been dissented from. This
court did not overlook the alleged stipulation, but regarded
it simply as entitling the defendant, on the settlement of the
case, to have exceptions entered to such rulings as he might
desire to have reviewed upon appeal. If it went farther and
was intended to govern the action of the appellate tribunals.
and require them to review rulings to which no exception was
entered in the case, we cannot give effect to it. The provi
sions of law which require a party, desiring to review rulings
upon a trial, to take exceptions in proper form, are estab
lished for the convenience of the courts as well as for the
protection of the parties, and the latter cannot, by stipulation,
have their cases heard on appeal Without regard to those
provisions.
The direction given by the court was that an exception
should be noted by the stenographer whenever an objection
The court did not undertake to order that its
was taken.
decisions might be reviewed without inserting exceptions in
the case. It was the duty of the appellant to see that all ex
ceptions, upon which he intended to rely, were properly noted.
This seems also to have been his understanding, for numerous
exceptions are noted to rulings made after this direction was
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given; andthese are the only rulings open to review here.

WECK

v.

Supreme

*

"

*

If the objections which we thought well taken were sub
stantial and could have affected the ﬁnal result, we might
have been inclined to afford the appellant an opportunity to
apply to the court below for a resettlement of his case, and
the insertion of the proper exceptions. But they relate wholly
to matters of form and do not affect the merits.

RENO TRACTION CO.
Court of Nevada.

1915.

38 Nevada, 285.

a

Action by Charles E. Weck against the Reno Traction Com
judgment for the
From
pany for damage to an automobile.
plaintiff and denial of its motion for a new trial, defendant
*

*

a

it

if

is

a

a

is

a
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is

it
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*

appeals.
COLEMAN, J.
It
also.contended that the trial court erred in giving
instruction No. 13, for the further reason that
alludes to
braking appliances, as there is no testimony in the case con
cerning the condition of the brakes. -It
general rule of
law that
error to give an instruction which
correct in
law. but which
not based upon evidence (White 21. City of
Trinidad, 10 Colo. App. 327, 52 Pac. 216; Spiking 11. Con. Ry.
P. Co., 33 Utah, 313, 93 Pac. 844) but the objection and ex
ception taken to the instruction at the time
was given do
not point out that this portion of the instruction was not
reading of the exception,
based upon any evidence. From
apparent that counsel did not have this point in mind at
but
that his objection went only to the last clear chance
all.
appear that this point was urged as
phase. Nor does
trial,
necessary before
as
can be consid
g_I1QL1nd for
n¢W_
ered by this court. Section 5328, Revised Laws. This court,
in the case of Paul '0. Cragnaz, 25 Nev. on page 325, 50 Pac.
857, 60 Pac. 983, 47 L. R. A. 540, which was
case in which
by
covered
were
the
propositions
instruction,
several
said:
well established that in such case,
“We think the rule
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any portion excepted to is sound, the exception cannot be sus
tained. Morrill v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 Atl. 829, 33 L. R. A.
411, and cases cited.
‘Exceptions should be speciﬁc, and
should be directed, not to the charge as a whole, but to the
portion or portions thereof which are considered objection
able. It is only where the charge is erroneous in its whole
scope and meaning or where the charge, in effect, asserts but a
single proposition, that a general exception will be available.’
8 Enc. Pl. & Prac. 257.
See citations given of many cases in
25 state courts, and numerous cases in the federal courts.”
See, also, Schollay v. Moﬂit-lVest Drug Co., 17 Colo. App.
126, 67 Pac. 182; City of Denver v. Strobridge, 19 Colo. App.
435, 75 Pac. 1076; Hain 'v. Mattes, 34 Colo. 345, 83 Pac. 127.
Since the instruction covered two points, and the objection
and exception went to one of them only, and that the one not
complained of here, the alleged error should not be considered
by this court.

GRAVES v. BONNESS.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
97

J

1906.

Minnesota, 278.

This was an action brought to recover pay
ment for three seasons’ cut of saw logs, delivered by the
plaintiff and respondent to defendant and appellant.
Plain
The answer prayed
tiff demanded judgment for $73,842.73.
the judgment of the court that the plaintiff recover against
the defendant the sum of $584.62, and no more. The main
issue tried to a jury concerned the contract between the par
From an
ties. The jury brought in a verdict of $37,827.23.
order of the district court denying defendant’s motion for
a new trial, this appeal was taken.
The principal assignment of error was addressed to a
1.
ruling on the part of the trial court in receiving in evidence
a letter of defendant’s bookkeeper, Rosche, to the plaintiff.
JAGGARD,

.

For present purposes, it is conceded that, if the objection tc

the offer of this letter was sufficient, the case must be re
versed, and that Exhibit 3 was originally offered in evidence
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after defendant had, on cross-examination by plaintiff, testi
ﬁed as to Rosche’s charge of the business, when the defendant
was away, and as to his connection with the ﬁrm correspond
The objection was on the ground “that it is incompe
ence.
tent, irrelevant, and immaterial, and no foundation laid.”
The court then sustained the objection at that time on the
/
ground of insufﬁcient foundation. Subsequently the deposi
tion of Rosche, the writer of the letter, was introduced, inter \
alia. It strongly tended to show Rosche’s authority to write
the letter for defendant.
The record of its ﬁnal admission
in evidence is as follows: “Mr. Barker: Now, Exhibit 3 is
not in, I believe. That has been offered, and it Was refused
at that time.
It seems to me that at the present time this
exhibit is perfectly proper, I will offer it again. Mr. Brown:
Objected to upon the ground it is incompetent, irrelevant, im
material, and no foundation laid. The Court:
The objec
testimony
deposition
the
tion is overruled.
I think the
in
since this letter was offered would make the letter compe
tent.”
It is obvious that the point, and the only point, to which the
attention of the court and of opposing counsel was in fact
directed, was the authority of Rosche, as agent for the de
fendant, to write the letter.
In the brief of counsel for de
fendant in this court it‘ is said: “The remark of the court
concerning the admissibility of the letter (which has just been
quoted) would seem to indicate that he had in his mind at
that time only one phase of the matter, so far as the founda
tion for the letter was concerned, and that he ruled upon the
objection to it without sufficiently considering all of the rea
sons against its reception presented by the objection to its
competency.”
It was not the province of the trial court to
see that counsel offering evidence had rendered that evidence
competent for admission by laying sufficient foundation, or
that objecting counsel had formulated an appropriate and
speciﬁc objection; but to rule upon the objections as reason
ably and fairly interpreted in the light of the immediate cir
cumstances.
When the court and opposing counsel, as in
this case, are clearly misled by the ambiguous character of
the objections in connection with the previous course of the
testimony, it is not material whether the objecting counsel de
liberately tried to “draw the wool over the court's eyes,” or
resorted to the dialectical strategy of a masked battery, or
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allowed the point to escape him. A reversal in an appellate
court because of error in a consequent ruling by the trial
court will not reward such deceit, sharp practice, or inad
vertence.
There is nothing in this record, however, which
imputes bad faith to the objecting counsel. It fairly appears
from the record that the point now made was not in mind at
However,
they
the time the objection
was interposed.
waived the point that plaintiff’s counsel failed to show deliv
ery of the letter, alike whether that point did not suggest it
self to them or whether they saw it, but were silent because
the plaintiff, who produced the letter, which on its face pur
ported to be in answer to previous correspondence between
the parties, was in court apparently able to supply the miss
ing link. In any view of the case the defendant cannot now
be heard to complain of the admission of the letter in evi
dence, because of their omission in fact to interpose a correct
and speciﬁc objection.
This conclusion is fully sustained by authorities, general
and speciﬁc. “A party objecting to the introduction of evi
dence must state his point so deﬁnitely that the court may
intelligently rule upon it and the opposing party may, if the
case admit of it, remove the objections by other evidence.”
Gilﬁllan, C. J., in Gilbert 11. Thompson. 14 Minn. 544 (Gil. 414,
416). And see U. S. v. McMasters, 4 Wall. 680, 18 L. Ed. 311;
Burton v. D-riggs, 20 Wall. 125, 22 L. Ed. 299; Wood v.
Weimar, 104 U. S. 795, 26 L. Ed. 779. “The rule is universal
that, when an objection is so general as not to indicate the spe
ciﬁc grounds upon which it is made, it is unavailing on appeal,
unless it be of such a character that it could not have been
Mr. Justice Field in Noomm v. Caledonia Gold
obviated.”
Min. Co., 7 Sup. Ct. 911, 30 L. Ed. 1061. And see cases col
lected 8 Enc. Plead & Prac. 218. This “cardinal principle, no
sooner repeated by the courts than it is forgotten by counsel”
(1 Wigmore on Ev. § 18), has been applied with unwavering
rigidity in uncounted hundreds of cases to the permutations
and combinations of the conventional words “incompetent,”
“irrelevant,” and “immaterial.” 46 Cent. Dig. cols. 944 to
967, §§ 194, 211; 4 Current Law, p. 1392, § 8.
It has been
reiterated time after time by this court.
The almost unanimous concurrence of all these cases in an
emphatic refusal to treat as reversible error the admission of
evidence upon an objection not clear and speciﬁc enough to
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point out to the court exactly what question was raised shows
how unjustiﬁed are the current criticisms that American ap
pellate courts rule on such questions to sustain or reverse the
trial courts because of convictions as to the merits of the case’,
or for other reasons which they are unwilling or unable to
express; and that American courts, to a deplorable extent,
avoid verdicts for trivial violations of merely technical re
quirements of the rules of evidence which are unknown in
other common-law countries.
The reasoning of the law in this connection is admirably
“The object of requiring the
set forth by Dunne, C. J.:
grounds of objections to be stated, which may seem to be a
technicality, is really to avoid technicalities and prevent de
lay in the administration of justice. When evidence is offered
to which there is some objection, substantial justice requires
that the objection be speciﬁed, so that the party offering the
evidence can remove it, if possible, and let the case be tried
If it is objected that the question is leading,
on its merits.
the form may be changed; if that the evidence is irrelevant,
the relevancy may be shown; if that it is incompetent, the in
competency may be removed; if that it is immaterial, its ma
teriality may be established; if to the order of introduction,
it may be withdrawn and offered at another time-and thus
appeals could often be saved, delays avoided, and substantial
Counsel are held to the grounds of ob
justice administered.
jection stated at the time they call for a decision of the judge
below, because they are supposed to know the law of their
case, and, if they do not offer other objections, they are sup
posed to waive them, and evidence admitted without valid ob
jection should stand. Counsel must not be permitted to wink
at the introduction of evidence to which they think there
is a valid objection, hoping that it may beneﬁt them, and, if it
goes the other way, move to exclude it; neither must they be
It is their busi
permitted to plead inattention as an excuse.
ness to be attentive on a trial, and, if they miss a point by
Neither can we allow them to
neglect, they must lose it.
strike between wind and water on the trial, and then go home
to their books and study out other objections and urge them
here. They must stand or fall upon the ease they made be
low, for this court is not a forum to discuss new points of
this character, but simply a court of review to determine
whether the rulings of the court below on the case as pre
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sented were correct or not.” Rush v. French, 1 Ariz. 99, 124
25 Pac. 816. And see 1 Thomp. on Trials, § 693.
This general rule has been applied to almost every possible
formula of objection and exception. The courts have refused
to regard as sufficient basis for reversible error at one ex
treme, ambitious, obvious or humorous generalities, like “sub
ject to all legal objections” (Willard u. Pike, 59 Vt. 202, 9
Atl. 907), or “on all grounds ever known or heard of” (Johns
ton v. Clements, 25 Kan. 376), and, at the other extreme, ob
jections apparently speciﬁc, but really equivocal and some
times dangerously deceptive, including those which are ad
The objection to
dressed to preliminary proof in general.
such proof will not be reviewed unless it distinctly appears
that the paper was objected to at the trial on the particular
ground assigned as error on appeal. Morris 11. Henderson, 37
Miss. 492, 501; Norton '0. Webber, 69 App. Div. 130, 74 N. Y.
Supp. 524; Crawford v. Witherbee, 77 Wis. 419, 46 N. W.
545, 9 L. R. A. 561; Payne v. South Springﬁeld, 161 Ill. 285,
44 N. E. 105; Drow u. Drum, 44 Mo. App. 25; Conway u. Case,

Ill.

Enc. P. P. 235.
There is an especial reason for enforcing the rule where
the objection is calculated in effect, if not also in intention, to
mislead the trial court into ruling correctly upon one aspect
of an equivocal objection, and where it is then sought in an
appellate court to reverse his holding, because of another as
pect of the case not presented on trial. Stillman v. Railway
Co., 34 Minn. 420, 26 N. W. 399, Bedal 7.‘. Spur, 33 Minn. 207,
22 N. W. 390; Nelson 12. Railway Co., 35 Minn. 170, 28 N. W.
215; Swaim v. Swaim, 134 Ind. 596, 33 N. E. 792; Chicago,
etc., Ry. Co. u. Champion, 9-Ind. App. 510, 36 N. E. 221, 37
N. E. 21, 53 Am. St. Rep. 357. The rule is enforced in order
to promote frankness and fair dealing in the trial of cases.
Cannady '0. Lynch, 27 Minn. 439, 8 N. W. 164. It is not per
missible to so frame an objection that it will serve to save an
exception for the action of the court of review, and yet con
Boggs, J., in
ceal the real complaint from the trial court.
Barry,
App.
587,
C.
v.
Ill.
C.
Co.
56
590.
In accord
Coﬁeen
ance with the general principle that parties must abide by
the consequences of their own acts, a party cannot, on appeal,
complain of an error in the lower court which he was instru
mental in causing or which he invited, whether error was
committed by himself alone or by the court at his instance.
22

127.

And see

8

Sec.

1]

LAYING FOUNDATION

FOR,

REVIEW

977

Current Law, 1590. Accordingly, where the conduct of a
party is such as to induce the opposing counsel and the court
to act upon the assumption that further preliminary proof
was waived, he cannot be heard, on review, to complain of the
failure of preliminary proof. Thomasson v. Wilson, 146 Ill.
385, 34 N. E. 432; Huling v. F'ort’s Administrator, 12 Ky. 193.
The objection that no sufficient foundation is laid might be
sustained because of failure to show a number of different
matters of necessary proof. In some cases it amounts to little
more than the general objection of incompetency.
In others
it may be suﬁiciently deﬁnite in fact. But whenever it clearly
results in the reasonable and natural misdirection of the at
tention of the trial court and of opposing counsel to only
certain of a larger number of possible phases of preliminary
proof, and in a correct ruling thereon, an appellate court will
not reverse a cause because of failure of preliminary proof
upon different phases in the absence of any reason why that
proof might not have been supplied. McElroy v. Williams,
2

14 Wash. 627, 45 Pac. 306; De Braelceleer 11. Schwabeland, 86
Hun, 143, 33 N. Y. Supp. 212; Stahl v. Duluth, 71 Minn. 347,

N. W. 143; First Nat. Bank 12. Schmitz (Minn.) 95 N. W.
And see Cox 12. Gerkin, 38 Ill. App. 340; McDaneld v.
577.
McDa/neld, 136 Ind. 607, 36 N. E. 286; Mathews v. Herron,
102 Iowa, 45, 67 N. W. 226, 70 N. W. 736; Ingram v. Smith,
38 Tenn. 411. Cf. Kenosha Stove C0. 'v. Shedd, 82 Iowa, 546,
In this case a verdict of $37,827.23 will not
48 N. W. 933.
be set aside merely because of defendant’s own omission to
74

interpose an unequivocal and speciﬁc objection whereby the
testimony might have been excluded or the missing link sup
plied. The assignment of error fails because under the cir
cumstances of this case the objection was fatally ambiguous,
and, in fact, misled the court.
1
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Supreme Court of Indiana.
163
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7

FINE.

1904.

Indiana, 617.

Action by Andrew J. Fine against the Southern Indiana
Railway Company.
A judgment was rendered in favor of
plaintiff, from which defendant appealed to the Appellate
Court, and the case was transferred to the Supreme Court
under Burns’ Ann. St. 1901, § 1337u.
Aﬁirmed.

GILLETT, J. * * *
It is disclosed by a bill of exceptions that in making the
closing argument one of the attorneys for appellee said to
the jury: “Find your general verdict, inserting the amount
you will give the plaintiff. Then take each interrogatory, and
answer each so that it may dovetail in and agree with your
general verdict, and”— At this point the argument was in
terrupted by one of appcllant’s attorneys, who objected to
(said statements, and moved the court to withdraw the sub~
mission of the cause from the jury on account of the miscon
duct of counsel, and he further objected to proceeding with
<
It is disclosed that the court overruled the objec
the cause.
tions and motions, and that it stated that it would instruct
the jury to answer the interrogatories according to the evi
dence, to each of which rulings, as the bill states, appellant
Upon the conclusion of the incident. appellee’s
excepted.
stated,
in proceeding with his argument, “that the
counsel
plaintiff did not desire a verdict of any kind that was not
Among the instructions after
based upon the evidence.”
wards given is one which directed the jury to “answer each
of the interrogatories submitted as the evidence warrants,
without reference to your general verdict.”
* * * But we have no hesitation in stating that the sug
gestion made by counsel for appellee in arguing the cause to
The objection to the statement in
the jury was improper.
question lay in its strong, if not necessary, implication that,
having reached a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the
jurors should not approach the task of answering interroga
tories with ingenuous minds, but that they should do so with
the predominant purpose of making such answers as would
not be out of accord with a general verdict in favor of the
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If

in the argument of a cause counsel go beyond the
conﬁnes of legitimate argument, the court, as a minister of
justice, should interfere; and this it should do whether oppo
site counsel are objecting or not. It does not follow, how
ever, that a litigant who claims to have been prejudiced by im
proper argument can successfully complain of the failure of
the court to so interfere. A duty is devolved upon his counsel
directly to bring the matter to the attention of the court, to
make speciﬁc statement, if reasonably required, of the ground
of the objection, and, if the wrong is not incurable, to request
the court to admonish the jury not to consider the statement
to which the objection is made. Coppenhcwer v. State, 160
Ind. 540, 67 N. E. 453; Robb o. State, 144 Ind. 569, 43 N. E.
642; Worley v. Moore, 97 Ind. 15; Morrison 'v. State, 76 Ind.

An exception, is deﬁned by Civil Code as “an objection
335.
taken to the decision of the court upon a matter of law.”
-\
Section 637, Burns’ Ann. St. 1901. It therefore follows that
an exception cannot be reserved to the argument of opposite
counsel. Robb 12. State, supra; Coppcnhaver v. State, supra.
It is only where the court has refused to sustain a proper mo
tion that an exception can be reserved in case of improper
argument.
The making of the statements here under con
sideration furnished no ground for setting aside the submis
Appellant was only entitled to have the
sion of the cause.
jury sufficiently admonished without delay that the state
ments should not be considered. Blume o. State, 154 Ind. 343,
56 N. E. 771. We may assume that appellant’s bill of excep
tions concerning the incident states the facts as strongly as
was warranted, and we may therefore presume that the state
ment of the court that it would instruct the jury to answer
the interrogatories according to the evidence was made in
the presence and hearing of the jury. This was ultimately
followed, as we have seen, by an instruction that the jury was
to answer each of the interrogatories without reference to the
general verdict. While the court might, with propriety, have
given a seasonable and emphatic admonition to the j ury, yet,
apart from the failure to reserve an exception to the refusal
to grant a proper motion, we think that appellant has no just
cause to complain of the failure of the court to go further
than it did. While much is made of the incident in appellant’s
brief, yet it appears to us that the failure of the court to duly
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and seasonably admonish the jury was quite as much the
of the complaining party as it was of the court.
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SECTION 2.

CAMPBELL
The Supreme

v.

BOYREAU.

Court of the United States.
21

1858.

Howard, 228.

TANEY, C. J. This is an action of ejectment (although the
pleadings are not in the form prescribed by the common law)
to recover a tract of land called San Leandro, situated in
California. It was brought in the Circuit Court of the United
States for that district. The parties agreed to waive a trial
of the facts by a jury, and that the facts as well as the law
should be decided by the court, upon the evidence adduced by
the parties.
In pursuance of this agreement, evidence was offered on
both sides; and the court proceeded to decide the facts in dis
pute, and then proceeded to decide the questions of law aris
ing on the facts so found by the court; and ﬁnally gave judg
ment against the plaintiffs in error, who were defendants in
the court below. And this writ of error is brought to revise
that judgment.
It appears by the transcript that several exceptions to the
opinion of the court were taken at the trial by the plaintiffs
in error—some to the admissibility of evidence, and others to
the construction and legal effect which the court gave to cer
But it is unnecessary to state
tain instruments of writing.
them particularly; for it has been repeatedly decided by this
court, that, in the mode of proceeding which the parties have
seen proper to adopt, none of the questions, whether of fact
or of law, decided by the court below, can be re-examined and
revised in this court upon a writ of error.
It will be sufﬁcient, in order to show the grounds upon
which this doctrine has been maintained, and how ﬁrmly it
has been settled in this court, to refer to two or three recent
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without enumerating the various decisions previously
which maintain the same principles. The point was
directly decided in Gould and others 11. Frontin, 18 How., 135;
which, like the present, was a case from California, where a
court of the United States had adopted the same mode of pro
ceeding with that followed in the present instance. And the
decision in that case was again reaffirmed in the case of
Suydam v. Williamson and others, 20 How. 432; and again
in the case of Kelsey and others v. Forsyth, decided at the
cases,

made,

present term.
Indeed, under the acts of Congress establishing and or
ganizing the courts of the United States, it is clear that the
decision could not be otherwise; for, so far as questions of
law are concerned, they are regulated in their modes of pro
ceeding according to the rules and principles of the common
law, with the single exception of the courts in the State of
Louisiana, of which we shall presently speak. And by the
established and familiar rules and principles which govern
common-law proceedings, no question of the law can be re
viewed and re-examined in an appellate court upon writ of
error, (except only where it arises upon the process, plead r
ings, or judgment, in the cause), unless the facts are found
by a jury, by a general or special verdict, or are admitted by
the parties, upon a case stated in the nature of a special
verdict stating the facts, and referring the questions of law
to the court.
The ﬁnding of issues in fact by the court upon the evidence
is altogether unknown to a common-law court, and cannot be
recognized as a judicial act. Such questions are exclusively!
within the province of the jury; and if, by agreement of par
ties, the questions of fact in dispute are submitted for de
cision to the judge upon the evidence, he does not exercise
judicial authority in deciding, but acts rather in the charac
And this court, therefore, cannot re
ter of an arbitrator.
gard the facts so found as judicially determined in the court
below. nor examine the questions of law, as if those facts had
been conclusively determined by a jury or settled by the ad
Nor can any exception be taken to
mission of the parties.
an opinion of the court upon the admission or rejection of
testimony, or upon any other question of law which may
grow out of the evidence, unless a jury was actually impan
elled, and the exception reserved while they were still at
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the bar. The statute which gives the exception in a trial at
common law gives it only in such cases.
And as this court
cannot regard the facts found by the judge as having been
judicially determined in the court below, there are no facts
before us upon which questions of law may legally and judi
cially have arisen in the inferior court, and no questions,
therefore, open to our revision as an appellate tribunal.
Consequently, as the Circuit Court had jurisdiction of the
subject-matter and the parties, and there is no question of
law or fact open to our re-examination, its judgment must
be presumed to be right, and on that ground only affirmed.
The cases referred to in the argument,- which were brought
up by writs of error to a Circuit Court of Louisiana, do not
apply to this case. The act of Congress of May 26, 1824, (4
Stat., 62) adopted the practice of the State courts in the
courts of the United States. And a writ of error to a Circuit
Court of that State, therefore, is governed by diiferent prin
ciples from a like writ to the Circuit Court of any other State.
And as, by the laws of Louisiana, the facts, by consent of par
ties, may be tried and found by the court Without the inter
vention of a jury, this court is bound, upon a writ of error,
to regard them as judicially determined, and treat them as
if they had been found by the special verdict; and the ques
tions of law which arise on them are consequently open to the
revision of this court.
But the practice in relation to the decisions in that State is
an exception to the general rules and principles which regu
late the proceedings of the courts of the United States; nor
can the laws or the practice of any other State authorize a
proceeding in the courts of the United States different from
that which was established by the acts of 1789 and 1803, and
the subsequent laws carrying out the same principles and
modes of proceeding.
Upon the grounds above stated, the judgment in this case
must be affirmed. But it must at the same time be understood
that this court express no opinion as to the facts or the law
as decided by the Circuit Court, and that the whole case is
open to re-examination and revision here, if the questions of
fact or law should hereafter be brought legally before us.
and in a shape that would enable this court to exercise its ap
pellate jurisdiction.“
68

Statutes

are now very

common

which provide

for ﬁndings of

far!

__-
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by the court, and they are usually construed to give such ﬁndings the
force and effect of a special verdict.—Bard v. Kleeb, (1890) 1 Wash.
370; Simmons v. Hamilton, (1880) 56 Cal. 493; Hill v. City of Clnrlnda,
(1897) 103 Ia. 409; Leavitt v. Taylor, (1901) 163 Mo. 158; Smith v.
Spencer, (1899) 8 Okl. 459; McClung v. McPherson, (1905) 47 Ore. 73;
but this is true to its full extent only in law cases, since in equity cases
v.
the court on appeal is not bound by the ﬁndings below.—Wa1ker
Sedgwick,
(1855) 5 Cal. 192; Wilson v. Wilson, (1911, 256 Mo. 5-11;
Finlen v. Heinze, (1905) 32 Mont. 354; Coad v. Coad, (1910) 87 Neb.
290; McNair v. Benson, (1912) 63 Ore. 66; Stockett v. Ryan, (1896) 176
Pa. 71; Roberts v. Washington Nat. Bank, (1895) 11 Wash. 550.
Special ﬁndings of fact are therefore usually necessary where the case
is tried by the court without a jury, if it is desired to challenge on appeal
the suﬂiciency ot the facts to sustain the judgment.—Lehnen v. Dickson,
(1892) 148 U. S. 71; Robson v. Dayton, (1897) 111 Mich. 440; City of
Oskaloosa v. Pinkerton, (1879) 51 Ia. 697; Lacy v. Dunn, (1870) 5 Kan.
567; First Nat. Bank v. Woolen Mills, (1906) 146 Ala. 610.
Special ﬁndings of law may also be necessary in order to raise ques
tions on review as to the law of the case.—McIntyre v. Sholty. (1887)
121 Ill. 660; McCullough v. Biedler, (1886) 66 Md. 283; Sell v. Bretelle,
(1901) 162 Mo. 373; Martinton v. Fairbanks, (1884) 112 U. S. 670.

SECTION 3.

NECESSITY

or MOTION

1-“on

NEW TRIAL.

SUTHERLAND v. PUTNAM.
Supreme

Court of Arizona.
3

J

1890.

Arizona, 182.

* ‘ "
KIBBEY,
.
,
It is assigned as error that the evidence is insufficient to
justify the decision of the court below. This error, if it is
error, is good cause for a new trial. Our Code (section 833)
provides that new trials may be granted on motion for
good cause shown; and section 593, cl. 2, confers upon this
court jurisdiction to review an order granting or refusing
a new trial, sustaining or overruling a demurrer, or af
fecting a substantial right in an action or a proceeding.
The only relief that appellants ask in this court, and all
that this court can grant, is a new trial of the cause in the
trial court. If it be true that the evidence is insufficient to
warrant the decision, it is error. If it is error, We must pre
sume that the court bclow would, upon application, have cor
rected it. If, however, the court below had denied the motion
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for a new trial, such ruling could have been presented here
for review. It is provided by the statute that the only rem
J

edy appellants seek here may have been awarded to them by
That method is prompt, effica
the court below on motion.
cious, and inexpensive; and we think the appellants should
ﬁrst resort Q it before coming to the appellate court. In a
very early case in Texas, the supreme court of that state
(Foster 'v. Smith, 1 Tex. 70) say: “We will here take occa
sion to say that, according to what is believed to be the cor
rect rule of practice, no judgment ought to be reversed in
this court, merely on the ground that the verdict was not sup
ported by the testimony, unless a motion had been made in
the court where the verdict was rendered for a new trial and
overruled.” And see, also, following this case, Hart v. Ware,
8 Tex. 115; King v. Gray, 17 Tex. 62; Pg/ron v. Grinder, 25
Tex. 159; Cain v. Mack, 33 Tex. 135; Harrell '0. Cattle Co.,
(Tex.) 11 S. W. Rep. 863; Jacobs v. Hawkins, 63 Tex. 1. And
in Morris 'v. Gordon, 36 Tex. 71, that court, in referring to a
statute which made the overruling of a motion for a new trial
a prerequisite to an appeal to the supreme court, says: “And
this is only a reiteration of the general rule that a party will
not be heard in an appellate court until he has exhausted his
remedies in the lower court.” And this seems to us to be
the true rule. It would be useless legislation to confer spe
ciﬁcally upon this court jurisdiction to review orders refus
ing or granting new trials if it be held that, without such mo
tion having been made and ruled upon, this court can review
the very errors that are grounds for new trial upon appeal
Section 833 gives the right to
simply from the judgment.
apply for a new trial. Section 834 provides that the grounds
upon which it is founded shall be speciﬁcally stated, and that
Section 842 provides that the
no others shall be considered.
motion, if overruled, may be embodied in a bill of exceptions,
and so presented to, and the ruling thereon reviewed by, the
supreme court. To hold that this court may consider errors
occurring at the trial which are not urged upon motion below
as grounds for a new trial, and which therefore, could not
have been considered by the court below, is inconsistent and
illogical. * " "‘

f
\

*

*

*

This court cannot consider any error which would

for a new trial unless a motion for a new trial
upon that ground had been made to the court below, and the
be good cause
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motion had been overruled, and the ruling excepted to, and“)
the motion embodied in a bill of exceptions, and the ruling;
assigned as error by a proper assignment.
We have not cited
the decisions of many, if not most, of the states, which, upon
similar or analogous statutes, sustain the view we have taken,
as a discussion of them would take too broad a scope; and
for the same reason we do not notice others which seem to
sustain a contrary view.
1!

ll

It

It

Q

Q

Q

Q

1

#69

69Accord,—Blonde v. Merriam, (1913) 21 Wyo. 513; Barnes v. Noel.
(1914) 131 Tenn. 126; Maplegreen Realty Co. v. Trust Co., (1911) 237
M0. 350; Eggleston v. Williams, (1911) 30 Okl. 129; Root V. Glissmann,
(1909) 85 Nebr. 576; Acme Mills & Elevator Co. v. Rives, (1911) 141
Ky. 783; Hinton v. Falls City Sav. & Loan Assn., (1916) 60 Ind. App.
470;
Geter v. Central Coal Co., (1907) 149 Ala. 578; St. Louis Iron
Mountain & So. Ry. Co. v. Raines, (1909) 90 Ark. 482; Carpenter V.
Savage, (1908) 93 Miss. 233; McGraw v. Roller, (1903) 53 W. Va. 75
(under a statute reading “No writ of error or supcrsedcas shall be
awarded or entertained by an appellate court for any matter tor which
a judgment is liable to be reversed on motion by the court which ren
dered the judgment, until such motion be made and overruled in whole
or in part”).
The rule applies in many states equally to cases at law and in equity.
—Swenson v. Snell, (1900) 22 Utah, 191; Spingler v. Brown, (1875) 26
Oh. St. 389; Deputy v. Stepletord
(1861) 19 Cal. 302; Berry v. Rood.
(1907) 209 Mo. 662;, Burbank v. Rivers, (1887) 20 Nev. 81; Danforth
But other courts hold a motion for a
v. Fowler, (1903) 68 Neb. 452.
new trial unnecessary in equity cases.—Harrison v. Murphy, (1912) 35
Okl. 135; Le May v. Johnson, (1879) 35 Ark. 225; Nickels v. Collins,
(1913) 153 Ky. 219; Ribordy v. Murray, (1896) 70 Ill. App. 527; Felch
v. Lee, (1862) 15 Wis. 265; Fort Worth Imp. Dist. v. Fort Worth, (1913)
106 Tex. 148.
A stipulation by the parties dispensing with a motion for a new trial
County v. Tomi!
as the basis tor an appeal is ineiIectual.—Independence
son, (1910) 95 Ark. 565.

LAW

v.

SMITH.

Supreme Court of Utah.

1908.

84 Utah, 394.

FRICK, J. On April 25, 1907, appellant, as the county at
torney of Cache county, Utah, ﬁled an accusation in writing
against respondent, the duly elected, qualiﬁed, and acting
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After the evidence had all been submitted and the parties
had rested, the appellant moved the court to direct the jury
to ﬁnd the respondent guilty upon two paragraphs, and the
respondent asked that the court direct the jury to ﬁnd him
not guilty upon all the paragraphs of the accusation.
The
jury
motion,
and directed the
to re
court denied appellant's
turn a verdict of not guilty upon all the charges, which the
jury did, and the court entered judgment discharging the
respondent, from which this appeal is prosecuted.
The appellant excepted both to the refusal of the court to
direct a verdict against respondent and to the giving of the
instruction in which the jury were directed to ﬁnd him not
guilty, and now assigns the rulings of the court in that re
gard as error. Appellant did not. ﬁle a motion for a new
trial, but presents the case upon the evidence produced and ex
ceptions taken at the trial, all of which are preserved in a bill
of exceptions which was duly settled and allowed by the trial
court. Respondent's counsel insist that, in order to determine
whether the court erred in directing a verdict, we must exam
ine into and pass upon the evidence, and we cannot do so unless
a motion for a new trial is ﬁled and overruled in the court
This contention is based upon the decision in Touse
below.
Ry. & Power Co., 29 Utah, 95, 80 Pac. 506.
'0. Consolidated
In that case it was held by a divided court that rulings made
in admitting or excluding evidence, in charging the jury, and
in refusing to charge as requested, including a request to
direct a verdict, although duly excepted to and properly pre
served in a bill of exceptions and assigned as error, were not
before this court, unless a motion for a new trial was made
and overruled by the court. If the decision in the Touse Case
is to be adhered to, it would lead to an afﬁrmance of the
judgment in this case upon the sole ground that there is noth
ing before us for review.
_
In view that the decision in the Touse Case involves no
property rights, but does affect an important question of
practice on appeal, we have felt constrained to re-examine
From such an exam
the propositions decided in that case.
ination, we have become convinced that the majority of the
court misconceived the purpose the Legislature had in view
in making the amendment to section 3304 as contained in
Laws 1901, p. 25, c. 27. This amendment now constitutes
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section 3304, Comp. Laws 1907, and as in force when the
Touse Case was decided and as now in force reads as follows:
Upon an appeal from
judgment, all orders,
Sec. 3304.
rulings and decisions in the action or proceeding to which
exceptions have been taken in the court below, or which are
deemed excepted to, as provided in this Code, are before the
*
*
*
Supreme Court for review.
*
*
*
When “all orders, rulings and decisions in the
action or proceeding to which exceptions have been taken in
the court below, or which are deemed excepted to, as pro
vided by this Code,” were declared to be before this court
for review without a motion for a new trial, it certainly in
cluded every question that was submitted to the trial court
requiring an order, a ruling, or a decision during the trial.
Is there any act that a trial court can be called upon to make
in any action or proceeding during a trial that does not di
rectly come within one or more of those terms? We confess
that we cannot conceive of a single act that can be required
of a trial court during the trial that is not covered by the
terms, orders, rulings, or decisions.
The Legislature added
the word “rulings” to make assurance doubly sure that every
possible question upon which the trial court directly passes
during the trial and on which he may err may be presented
to this court for review without a motion for a new trial,
provided the order, ruling or decision is duly excepted to, or
*
*
"‘
when a statutory exception is implied.

if

a

a a

a

if

a

a

a

it
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The decision in the Touse Case entirely misconceived the
motion for a new trial under the
object and purpose of
new
practice in force in this state. The right to move for
trial is present in every case whether legal or equitable, or
party thinks he can
whether tried to a court or jury. If
committed prejudicial error
convince the trial court that
new trial without an appeal, he may
and will grant him
make his motion and obtain a ruling upon it; but, where he
has obtained one ruling from that court and has taken or is
statutory exception, he need not require the court
given
review of the
to repeat the error before he is entitled to
Moreover,
taken,
he
has
not
court.
or
the
by
this
error
statute does not give him an exception to any ruling or de
motion for a new trial, he cannot
cision before the ﬁling of
ruling by simply ﬁling
motion
review of such
obtain

1.
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and getting an adverse ruling upon it, and then except to
new trial does not enlarge
The motion for
such ruling.
the matters that may be reviewed by this court, except upon
matters which the trial court could not, and did not, pass on
These are speciﬁed in section 3292, and, in
at the trial.
brief, are:
(1) Irregularity in the proceeding of the court
or jury; (2) misconduct of the jury or the adverse party; (3)
accident and surprise; (4) newly discovered evidence; (5)
excessive damages allowed by the jury; and (6) the insuf
ﬁciency of the evidence to justify the verdict.
In granting or
refusing the motion the trial court may exercise
sound
discretion which the losing party may invoke in the light of
This court cannot exer
the whole proceedings in the case.
cise such discretion, but is ordinarily limited to the review
It
manifest
of speciﬁc rulings made by the trial court.
that all the matters enumerated in most all of the foregoing
grounds for which the motion for new trial may be granted
can be submitted to the trial court but once for a ruling.
If
suﬁicient as to those grounds, why
not one
one ruling
ruling and exception equally sufficient with regard to all other
the evident purpose of the law relat
errors of law? This
ing to the review of the rulings and decisions of the trial
If the trial court has passed upon
court by this court.
a trial and an exception
in
the
course
of
taken or
matter
given by the statute, the ruling or decision made by the trial
court, if assigned as error,
before this court for review on
If, therefore,
matter comes up after the trial, or
appeal.
where some irregularity in the proceedings during the trial,
or some of the matters arise which are enumerated in the
ﬁrst ﬁve grounds for a new trial to which we have directed
attention, they must be brought to the attention of the trial
motion for a new trial, and his ruling upon them
court by
They cannot be re
may then be reviewed by this court.
viewed otherwise, since the trial court cannot pass upon them
motion for
new trial.
except in passing on
So, like
wise, in a case a party desires to challenge the verdict of
jury upon the ground that the verdict is not sustained by the
evidence, he must do so by a motion for
new trial, unless
legal
question involved by
during the trial he raised the
directed verdict.
motion for a nonsuit or for
Unless he has
motion for a nonsuit or for
presented either
directed ver
dict, the trial court has had no opportunity to pass upon the
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legal sufficiency of the evidence during the trial, and cannot
do so unless a motion for a new trial upon the ground of the
insufficiency of the evidence is presented to it. When, how
ever, a motion for a nonsuit or a motion for a directed ver
dict has been made and ruled upon, the court has had the
opportunity to pass upon the legal sufficiency of the evidence
precisely the same as upon a motion for a new trial, and
hence the latter motion, for the purposes of a review, may
In this way all the orders rulings, and
be dispensed with.
decisions of the trial court, whether made during the trial
or on motion for a new trial, can be brought before this court
for review, and on all of them the court need to pass judg
Any other holding would bring about the
ment but once.
incongruity of requiring the trial court to pass twice on some
matters, while it may do so but once on others.
Where, as
in some jurisdictions, the motion for a new trial constitutes
the foundation for a review, and where nothing can be con
sidered by the appellate court except such matters as are
incorporated into a motion for a new trial, the trial court is
given the opportunity to pass upon the same question twice.
The argument that a motion for a new trial was intended
by the Legislature to give the trial court an opportunity to
review the ruling made during the haste of a trial is far
more plausible than sound. If the Legislature had intended
such to be the procedure, it would have been easy to have
said so, and thus make the statute read so as to make the
court’s ruling upon the motion for a new trial the basis of a
The Legislature, however did not do this, but in
review.
unmistakable terms has said that all the orders, rulings, and
decisions which are duly excepted to in the trial court, are
before this court for review without a motion for a new
trial. By section 3298 it is provided that the court may grant
a new trial on its own motion in case the jury have plainly
disregarded the instructions, or where a verdict is rendered
under misapprehension of the instructions, or is based upon
Moreover, in case of an error,
either passion or prejudice.
the losing party may always move for a new trial, and, if the
error is prejudicial, the trial court, no doubt, will grant a new
trial without compelling the applicant to come to this court
for relief. In view, therefore, that under the statutes of this
state, the review of errors of the trial courts is direct, and
does not depend upon a motion for a new trial except for
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matters upon which the trial court had no opportunity to
pass during the trial, we have no right to impose duties upon
the appellant which the law does not require of them.
It is
our duty to review all questions that are brought here in
accordance with the statute giving the right of review.
Where a statute is as clear, as is section 3304, we have no right
to disregard it, and, if this court has made a palpable error
in construing it, it is our duty to correct the error, when, as is
the case here, the correction will not inﬂict serious injury on
any one-and will enforce the legislative intent.
We refrain
referring
general
further to the
law upon this subject.
from
We are thoroughly satisﬁed with, and adopt and reiterate,
the same as it is stated by Mr. Justice Straup in his dissent
ing opinion in the Touse Case.
From What has been said it necessarily follows that all the
rulings, and decisions made by the trial court dur
orders,
I
) ing the trial, including his ruling in directing or in refusing
to direct a verdict, and all questions of fact in equity cases
on which the trial court has passed, including the ﬁndings,
and also all errors in ﬁndings of fact and conclusions of law
made by the court in law cases, are before this court for
review without a motion for a new trial. The Touse Case,
therefore, so far as it is in conﬂict with these conclusions,
ought to be, and accordingly is, overruled.
#70

7

&

&

&

5

&

70 Accord,—Birch v. Abercrombie,
(1913) 74 Wash. 486; National Coun
Mercantile Co. v.
cil v. McGinn, (1914) 70 Ore. 457; Jones Lumber
Faris, (1894)
S. D. 348; Caldwell v. Parks, (1874) 47 Cal. 640; Earp
v. Railroad Co., (1861) 12 Oh. St. 621; Stitt v. Rat Portage Lumber Co..
Alton Ry. Co., (1908) 235 Ill.
(1906) 98 Minn. 52; Yarber v. Chicago
589; Tubbs v. Roberts,
(1907) 40 Colo. 498; Stewart v. Equitable Life
Ass’n, (1900) 110 Ia. 528; Fintrock v. Nor. Cent. Ry. Co., (1915) 59 Pa
A. RR. Co., (1891) 28 Fla. 251:
Super. 530; Parrish v. Pensacola
Levert v. Berthelot, (1910) 127 La. Ann. 1004; McDonald v. Champion
Steel Co., (1905) 140 Mich. 401; Cooper v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins.
Iron
Co., (1871)
Nev. 116; Dring v. St. Lawrence Twp., (1909) 23 S. D.
624; McKinnon v. Morrison, (1889) 104 N. C. 354; Armstrong v. White
head, (1902) 81 Miss. 35.
But the motion has been held necessary when the matter has not other
wise been brought to the attention of the trial court.—McCue v. Detroit
United Ry., (1920) 210 Mich. 554; Dubcich v. Grand Lodge, (1903) 33

Wash.

651.
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KELLOGG

v.

SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
13 Oklahoma,

991
10.

1903.

285.

C. J. The plaintiff in error, Harry H. Kellogg,
brought this action in the district court of Comanche county
to enjoin the defendant in error, School District No. 10 of
Comanche county, from erecting four schoolhouses in said
district, and from creating a debt against said school dis
trict for the construction of said buildings. * "' *
The issues were closed by a reply, and the cause submitted
to the court upon the pleadings and oral testimony.
The dis
judgment
trict court rendered
for the defendants in error,
Kellogg appeals, and the
and dismissed plaintiff’s action.
case is here for review.
It is contended by counsel for defendant in error that there
is no sufficient assignment of error to present any question
for the consideration of this court. This contention is not
gu
\
Without some merit. In the trial court the plaintiff in
{IF
ﬁled his motion for new trial, on which his only grounderror‘
as
.¢
signed was: Errors of law occurring at the trial, and duly
excepted to by the plaintiff.”// This is the eighth cause for
new trial, as embraced in the Code (Wilson’s Rev. & Ann. St. /
§ 4493), and will present to the trial court any objection‘
or exception properly saved during the progress of the trial.
Boyd v. Bryan, 11 Okl. 56, 65 Pac. 940. And an assignment
of error in this court to the effect that the trial court erred
in overruling the motion for new trial will bring before this
court for review every exception saved by the complaining
party during the progress of the trial. But the errors com
plained of in this case do not belong to that class embraced
in the term “occurring at the trial.” This speciﬁcation em
braces every ruling and decision of the trial court upon the
trial of the cause, from the time the trial begins until the
cause is submitted to the jury for its verdict, or the court
for its decision. But it does not include an erroneous ver
dict by the jury, or decision by the court upon the facts. The
\
sixth cause for new trial is “that the verdict, report or de
evidence,
by
sufficient
or
contrary
is
cision is not sustained
to law.” This cause was not set out in the motion for new
‘I r."
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trial, but the contention of the plaintiff in error is, in this
court, that the judgment of the court is contrary to law, upon
the pleadings and undisputed facts.
The contention of coun
sel for defendant in error is correct—that the motion for new
trial does not present the objections urged by counsel for
plaintiff
error in his brief. However,
does not neces
sarily follow that there
nothing presented by the record
that this court can consider.
There are some errors that
may be presented for the ﬁrst time in this court. It
gen
eral rule that the appellate court will not review any alleged
errors which were not presented to the trial court for its
reconsideration, yet there are some exceptions to this rule.
apparent upon the face of the judgment
When the error
roll, or, as We say in more modern language, upon the face of
the record proper, then such error will be considered by the
appellate court, although not presented to the trial court in
the motion for new trial. Territory ea: rel. Taylor 12. Ca-ﬁrey,
Okl. 193, 57 Pac. 204; Caﬁrey 12. Overholser,
Okl. 202, 57
In this case the record proper, or judgment roll,
Pac. 206.
consists of the petition, answer, reply, orders of the court,
The fourth assignment in the petition
and ﬁnal judgment.
in error is: “Said court erred in not rendering judgment
for the plaintiff in error upon the pleadings and undisputed
testimony.”
This assignment sufficiently presents to this
court any error apparent upon the face of the judgment roll.
While we cannot go into the testimony under any assignment
the judgment is
of errors contained in the record, yet,
contrary to law, as appears from the facts alleged and ad
mitted in the pleadings, then this court is required to reverse
Territory ex rel. Taylor 12. Caﬁrey, supra.
such judgment.
It appears from the undisputed facts contained in the plead
ings that the school district and its ofﬁcers are proceeding to
erect four separate and several sohoolhouses upon four sev
eral and separate sites in the same school district, and to con
duct and maintain four several and separate schools in said
district, from the common funds of said school district, and
that none of said sites are within one-half mile of the center
of said district; also that the school board
expending the
for
said
four
several schoolhouses, and
funds of the district
has issued a warrant for $1,500 against the funds of
that
for material to erect said four
said district, and traded
schoolhouses. It further appears that this
country school
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district, and there is no allegation or contention that any of
said schoolhouses are for colored pupils.
These facts being
conceded, the trial court denied an injunction.
This appears
upon the face of the record.
If there is no power or author
ity vested in an urban school district to erect more than one
schoolhouse for white children, and no authority given to
conduct more than one white school in a school district, and
no authority given to erect a schoolhouse on a site more than
a half mile from the center of the school district, then, or
in either such case, the school board is acting without author
ity, and is misappropriating the funds of the district, and the
judgment of the court is contrary to law.

SECTION 4.

SAME THEORY T0 BE Puasuso
APPELLATE Couars.

LESSER COTTON

IN TRIAL AND

LOUIS IRON MOUNTAIN
SOUTHERN RY. CO.
CO. v. ST.

United States Circuit Court of Appeals (8th Circuit.)

&

1902.

114 Federal Reporter, 133; 52 Circuit Court of Appeals, 95.

[Action for damages for negligently setting ﬁre to plain
tiff's cotton by means of sparks from defendant’s locomotive.
Verdict for defendant, and plaintiff appealed.]
Before CALDWELL, SANBORN and THAYER, Circuit Judges.
*
"
"‘
SANBORN, Circuit Judge.
Another objection to the portion of the charge here chal
lenged now urged is that the defendant was operating its
engine and freight train on Sunday; that this act was in vio
lation of the law of Arkansas, which forbids work of this
character on that day (Sand. & H. Dig. § 1887); and that
the defendant is consequently liable for the damages resulting
from its violation of the law, without regard to the question
of negligence.
But under the record presented by the bill
of exceptions this court has no power or jurisdiction to con
sider or determine this question in this case.
It was not
presented to the court below, and no ruling was made upon
it in that court. Counsel for the plaintiffs presented to" the
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SAVANNAH, FLORIDA AND WESTERN RAILWAY

CO.

TALBOT.

v.

Supreme Court of Georgia.
123 Georgia,
'

1905.

378.

*

*

EVANS,
The plaintiff in error further contends that the judg
2.
erroneous for the reason that the evi
ment of the court
is

d,._

a

is

it

,_-r"

1

N

They were all based
upon the theory that the issue to be tried was whether or
not the defendant was guilty of negligence in setting out the
ﬁre. They contained no request or suggestion that the court
ought to instruct the jury that they were entitled to recover
in the absence of negligence, because the defendant had vio
late'd the Sunday law.
The portion of the charge now chal
lenged was excepted to at the close of the trial, but the ex
ception was general, and contained no statement that this
excerpt was erroneous because the plaintiffs were entitled to
recover on account of a violation of the Arkansas statute
appears that the issue
prohibiting labor on Sunday. Thus
of law here urged upon our consideration was not presented
to, considered, or ruled by, the court below.
It not, there
fore, here for our consideration, and we must decline to enter
upon its discussion.
In an action at law, this is
court for
the correction of the errors of the court below, exclusively.
Questions which were not presented to nor decided by that
court are not open for review here, because the trial court
ruling
has never made
cannot be guilty of any error in
which
upon an issue to
its attention has never been called.
Association '0. Wilson, 100 Fed. 368, 373, 40 C. C. A. 411, 416;
Railway C0. v. Henson, 58 Fed. 531, 532,
C. C. A. 349, 351,
19 U. S. App. 169, 171; Schneider Brewing Co. v. American
Ice Mach. Co., 77 Fed. 138, 149, 23 C. C. A. 89, 100, 40 U. S.
App. 382, 403; Board v. Sutlijf, 97 Fed. 270, 38 C. C. A. 167;
Railroad Co. v. Krohne, 29 C. C. A. 674, 86 Fed. 230, 235;
N. W. 809.
Davis v. Town of Fulton, 52 Wis. 657,

*
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J." court nine requests for instructions.
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disclosed that the plaintiff had an adequate and com
plete remedy at law by an action of trover. If the defendant
desired to avail itself of the objections that the owner had
‘r
gone into a court of equity and invoked the aid of that court,
L9,?
when his remedy at law was complete, it should have done
It cannot submit the determina .u
so by appropriate demurrer.
equity, and, after an adverse
a
court
of
tion of the case to
judgment, for the ﬁrst time raise the point that the plain
tiff has not pursued the proper remedy. The only prayer in
The only issue submitted
the petition was for injunction.
to the court by the pleadings was whether, under the facts,
the plaintiff was entitled to relief by injunction. The failure
of the railroad company to demur at the proper time, and the
trial of the case by the judge without a jury, amounted to a
consent that the issue made by the pleadings should be de
termined in that manner; and it is now too late, after the case
has been decided, to raise the question that the plaintiff's legal
remedy was ample, and that there was therefore no necessity
to invoke the extraordinary powers of a court of equity.
See
V‘
247,
248,
44
Collins,
118 Ga.
S. E. 1002.
Hay v.
J
All the Justices concur, except SIM-:‘°:':;_, -1
Judgment aﬁirmed.
,,,j..- ",“,..-‘
MONS, C. ., absent on account of sickness."

dence

w"

J

..~
\- r.»
u

V

1‘,

But where the action is one over which the court of equity has no
jurisdiction, the objection can be made at any time.—-Stout v. Cook,
(1866) 41 ill. 447; Collins v. Sutton, (1896) 94 Va. 127; H. W. Metcalt
Co. v. Martin, (1907) 54 Fla. 531; Allen v. Pullman's Palace Car Co.,
7!

(1891) 139 U. S. 658.

STATE
Supreme

v.

GARCIA.

Court of New Mexico.
19

1914.

New Mexico, 414.

J.

A curious fact appears in the
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Appellants were indicted for murder, and were
manslaughter.
voluntary
convicted of
PARKER,

5.

case.
Francisco Garcia,
of the defendants, became engaged in an altercation with
the deceased, whereupon deceased shot Garcia and he fell to

one

u

.
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the ﬂoor, and remained there, unconscious, during the whole
Cipriano Garcia, his
of the remainder of the diﬂiculty.
brother, was at the time at the back end of the saloon where
the difficulty occurred, and took no part in the same up to
this time. Upon hearing the shot and seeing his brother fall
to the ﬂoor, he rushed to his rescue, encountered the deceased,
No proof of concerted action on the part
and killed him.
of the brother is shown. It thus appears that it was physi
cally impossible for Francisco Garcia to be guilty of any crime
in this connection, and he was entitled to an instruction to the
jury to acquit him. Had the matter been called to the atten
tion of the court before instructing the jury, no doubt he
would have so directed them. But counsel sat quiet, specu
lated upon the result before the jury, and afterwards com
Nor did counsel call the atten
plained of an adverse result.
proposition
in the motion for a new
to
this
tion of the court
trial. Under such circumstances, no relief can be granted
here. No question is here for decision; the court below never
The proposition, as presented,
having decided the point.
amounts to an appeal to this court for the ﬁrst time to award
a new trial to a defendant on the ground of the absence of
evidence to convict him, when the lower court has never been
asked to so decide. 'This is not available.
In People v. Smith, 106 Mich. 431, 434, 64 N. W. 200, the
court said: “The difficulty with this defense is that no such
No request was made
contention was made at the trial.”
*
"‘
objection
“This
verdict.
instructed
an
comes
for

'

too late.”

In Clarke

v. State, 78

Ala. 474, 477, 56 Am. Rep. 45, the

court said:
“There was evidence showing that the offense was com
No instruction was given or
mitted in Jefferson county.
sufficiency.
its
respect
in
to
Without a decision
requested
by the superior court made the subject of exceptions and in
volving an inquiry into the sufficiency of the evidence, this
court cannot interfere.”
In State '0. Secrest, 80 N. C. 450, 453, the court said:
“No such point seems to have been made at the trial, and
no such instruction asked of the court.”
The same doctrine prevails in the federal courts. In Mc
Donnell iv. United States, 133 Fed. 293, 294, 66 C. C. A. 671,
672, it is said:

Sec.
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“It is well settled that where no motion is made for an
instructed verdict, and, without objection, the court is per
mitted to charge the jury on the assumption that there is
sufficient evidence to justify the submission of the case to
them, the objection that there was no evidence to support the
verdict cannot be heard and considered in an appellate court.”
See, also, 12 Cyc. 813; People 11. Crowley, 100 Cal. 478, 483,
35 Pac. 84; Foley '0. People, 22 Mich. 227, 228; Hubbard 12.
State, 72 Ala. 164; Pearson v. State, 5 Ala.. App. 68, 59 South.
526, 527; State v. Brady, 104 N. C. 737, 738, 10 S. E. 261;
State v. Taylor, 65 Or. 266, 132 Pac. 713.
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The remedy of the defendant, Francisco, is an application
to the Governor for pardon.
This disposes of all the assignments of error which have
been argued in the briefs, and for the reasons stated, the
judgment of the lower court will be affirmed; and it is so
ordered.
ON MOTION

J.

FOR REHEARING.

We have determined to make a different
disposition of the point discussed in the last paragraph of the
former opinion.
We held that no motion for an instruct
ed verdict having been made in behalf of the defendant,
Francisco Garcia, he could not complain of the verdict against
him, notwithstanding the fact that there was, not only no
evidence against him to support the verdict, but the evidence
established, conclusively, that he was innocent.
This is cor
provisions
chapter 57,
in
the
of
section
view
of
37
of
rect
Laws of 1907, which requires parties to take exceptions at
the time a ruling is made, and which prohibits the taking of
exceptions in this court to any proceedings in the district
court except such as shall have been expressly decided in
Whether Francisco Garcia was entitled to an
that court.
instructed verdict in his favor was not expressly decided in
the district court, because the court was not requested to so
decide, and he cannot now insist upon his right here. This
is also in accord with the current of authority in the other
states, as we pointed out in our opinion.
There exists in every court, however, an inherent power
to see that a man’s fundamental rights are protected in every
PARKER,

7-:-<1-_|_

998

TRIAL AND APPELLATE

PRAcTIcE

[Chap.

7

Where a man’s fundamental rights have been violated.
while he may be precluded by the terms of the statute or the
rules of appellate procedure from insisting in this court upon
relief from the same, this court has the power, in its discre
tion, to relieve him and to see that injustice is not done.
The
restrictions of the statute apply to the parties, not to this
A man has been convicted and sentenced to imprison
court.
ment for a term of years where there is not only no evidence
to support the verdict, but where the evidence conclusively
established his innocence. Under such circumstances we can
not permit such an injustice to be done. For a similar case,
and a similar holding, see Sykes 12. U. S.,_ 204 Fed. 909, 123
C. C. A. 205, per Sanborn, Circuit Judge.
It follows that the judgment as to Cipriano Garcia will
stand affirmed, and as to Francisco Garcia it will be reversed
and the cause remanded to the district court, with instruc
tions to award a new trial; and it is so ordered.
case.

RAUB

v.

NISBETT.

Supreme Court of Michigan.
111

1896.

Michigan, 38.

GRANT, J. Plaintiff ﬁled with the probate court a claim
“Bill of Particulars of Unsettled Claim
entitled as follows:
of Samuel F. Raub against the Estate of Stephen F. Wil
cox, Deceased.” The ﬁrst item was dated September 27, 1887,
and the last, October, 1889, the total claim being $15,145.49.
The property described in the claim consisted of shingles, a
shingle mill, and land.
The affidavit attached to the claim
stated that the estate was indebted to him in about the sum
of $4,000, as near as he could estimate the same. The claim
Plaintiff appealed, and
was disallowed by the commissioners.
in the circuit court obtained a judgment.
There is nothing
upon the face of the claim to indicate the basis upon which
it was made. It does not appear whether it is based upon the
theory of the sale of the property described in the claim, or
Upon its face it is as consistent with
upon a trust relation.
one theory as with the other. It is evident from the affidavit
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attached to the claim that Mr. Wilcox received the property
It there
under some relation by which he was to account.
the
required
evidence
before
the
commissioners
to
show
fore
basis of recovery.
The three commissioners were produced
upon the trial in the circuit, and all testiﬁed that Mr. J. M.
Raub, who was the sole witness before the commissioners
to prove the basis of the claim against the estate, and who
had died before the trial in the circuit, testiﬁed that the prop
erty was transferred to Mr. Wilcox in trust, to be manufac
tured and sold by him, the proceeds to be applied in payment
of a debt due Wilcox, and other debts, amounting to about
$4,000, and that Wilcox was to take the shingle mill as it
then was, and the shingles on hand, dispose of them to the
best advantage, operate the mill, advance money to pay ex
penses, and to ﬁnally make an accounting; the balance, if
any, to be turned over to Mr. Raub.
There was no testi
mony to contradict that of the commissioners, and this evi
dence established the fact that the claim was presented to
the commissioners on the basis of a trust. The lumber con
veyed had all been manufactured, and, with the shingles on
hand at the time of _the conveyance, had been sold by Mr.
Wilcox, and the mill plant also sold; and Mr. Wilcox had ren
dered an account showing that he had paid all the debts, and
that there was a small balance due him. In the circuit court
the plaintiff sought to establish his right of recovery, not
upon a trust relationship, but upon the theory of an absolute
sale. The law did not permit him to change the issue upon
the trial in the circuit, and the court should, as requested,
have directed the jury that there could be no recovery upon
The two theories are utterly inconsistent,
the basis of a sale.
and, if plaintiff had presented his claim upon these two
theories, the court would have compelled him to elect upon
which he would proceed. Meyers 'v. McQueen, 85 Mich. 156,
The issue before the commissioners was
48 N. W. 553.
whether the estate was indebted to the plaintiff upon an ac
This issue continued the same on ap
counting as trustee.
Ha.theway’s Appeal, 52 Mich. 112,
peal to the circuit court.
17

N. W. 718.
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SULT,v. HOCHSTETTER OIL CO.
Supreme Court of Appeals of West
63 West

Virginia.

1908.

Virginia, 819.

POFFENBARGER, P. The A. Hochstetter Oil Company,
a
corporation, having entered upon a certain small tract of land
in Ritchie county, known as the “Linch farm,” and com
menced the production of oil therefrom, Peter J. Sult, claim
ing under a prior lease, obtained a decree appointing a special
receiver to take charge of the wells, machinery, and appli
ances on the land and operate the same for the production
of oil and gas, and enjoining and restraining said company,
its servants, agents and employés, from interfering in any
way with the receiver's custody and operation of the wells
and machinery, and the Eureka Pipe Line Company from
delivering to the Hochstetter Company oil produced from the
land; from which decree, as well as several other orders pre
viously made in the cause, said company and J. O. Linch, its
lessor, have appealed.

i

1

#

#

¥

I

#

i I I

Reversal of the decree in Whole and in part is sought on
the ground that it places in the possession of the receiver the
machinery, tools, and appliances of the defendant, and au
thorizes him to use the same in operating the wells. Ordi
narily the court cannot commit to the possession of its
receiver property other than that in controversy in the suit.
High, Rec. § 378; Smith, Rec. § 53; Noyes '0. Rich. 52 Me.
115; Wormser v. Bank, 49 Ark. 117, 4 S. W. 198.
The plain
tiff does not claim title to the tools and machinery used in
the operation of the wells in question here. They are con
fessedly the property of the defendant; but they were, at the
time of the appointment of the receiver, used by it in the
operation of what it then claimed, and still claims, as its own
Its desire both to have these wells operated and to
wells.
have its machinery and tools used in the operation thereof
was manifested by its own conduct respecting both the wells
It had devoted and applied its tools to that
and the tools.
beneﬁt, and the operation of the wells and
its
own
for
work
use of the tools under the receivership is conditionally for its
beneﬁt. It did not, at the time of the appointment, disclaim

_.,_-1"
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title to the wells, or express a desire to have operation thereof
discontinued, or to withdraw its tools for use elsewhere, or
to have then relieved from the burden of use by the receiver,
and accordingly demand the possession thereof.
Had it done
so, it may be that the court would have been compelled to
allow removal of such of them as could have been detached
without doing serious injury to the wells; but by its silence
and acquiescence it has thus far waived any right of that kind
it may have had. From its silence, taken in connectiion
with its alleged ownership of the wells and consequent op
eration thereof for its own beneﬁt, its consent to the use of
its tools by the receiver may be presumed.
If it intended
otherwise, fairness to the court and the opposite party im
posed the duty of giving notice to the contrary at the time of
the appointment of the receiver.
Had the court, without its
consent, ordered a cessation of operation by the receiver for
the purpose of removing defendant’s machinery and in
stalling some other, and thereby endangered the wells or sub
jected the land to drainage by means of wells on adjacent
property, it may well be assumed that a protest would have
been made on that ground more vigorous, and perhaps better
founded, than the one now entered on the other ground. Two
courses were open to the court and the parties. The court and
the plaintiff took one, presumably with the consent of the de
fendant. To allow it to reverse the decree for the cause shown
would sanction a “fast and loose" method of practice on the
part of the litigants which has not hitherto been recognized,
and cannot be introduced without greatly embarrassing the
administration of justice. Courts will not tolerate in par
Town 11. Ralston,
ties the taking of inconsistent positions.
48 W. Va. 186, 36 S. E. 446; 11 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 446;
Bigelow on Estoppel, 687; Ellis v. White, 61 Iowa, 644, 17
N. W. 28. These observations are limited to the appeal fromx
this interlocutory decree. It is not intended here to say the
tools and machinery cannot hereafter be withdrawn from
the wells, or that they should not be excepted from a ﬁnal
decree, perpetuating an injunction and adjudging title to the
In the
wells to be in the plaintiff, in such a case as this.
rendition of its ﬁnal decree, as well as at any time before
ﬁnal decree, the court has power to modify any or all of its
interlocutory decrees and orders. Our conclusion here is to
deny to the appellant the right to reverse or modify the order

\
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to give relief it never asked for
did not want, and the right to
have waived, until It shall have
in the court below.
8

l
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OOLITIC STONE

CO. v.

Supreme Court of

Indium.

l

U

RIDGE.
1908.

169 India/na, 639.

J

MONKS, C. . This action was brought by appellee to re
cover damages for personal injuries received by him while in
A trial of said cause resulted in
the employ of appellant.
a verdict for appellee, and over a motion for a new trial judg
ment was rendered thereon against appellant.
The theory adopted in the court below by the court and
parties was that this action was under subdivision 2 of sec
tion 1 of the employer's liability act (Acts 1893, p. 294, c.
130; section 7083, Burns’ Ann. St. 1901). It was upon this
theory that the court below instructed the jury that there
could be no recovery by appellee, except under said employer's
liability act. It is claimed by appellant that the employer’s
liability act, except as applied to railroads, is in violation of
the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United
States, and therefore the court erred in overruling its de
murrer to the amended complaint, and its motion for a new
trial. It is urged by appellee that said “employer’s liability
act is valid and constitutional, and that even if this cause is
to be determined on this appeal on the theory that the case
was instituted and prosecuted under said act, the judgment
of the trial court should be aﬁirmed.” Since said briefs were
ﬁled in this case, this court, on March 1, 1907, in Bedford
Quarries C0. 11. Bough (Ind.) 80 N. E. 529, held that said
employer's liability act was unconstitutional and void so far
as it applied to corporations of the class to which the appel
lant belongs. It is insisted, however, by appellee in his said
brief that said amended complaint, which is in one paragraph,
stated a good cause of action at common law as well as under
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the employer's liability act in favor of appellee against appel
lant, and that therefore this cause should not be reversed,
even if said act is unconstitutional as applied to appellant.
#

$

‘

ii

1

__‘

When two or more theories are outlined in a pleading, and
the record does not disclose which was adopted in the trialg
court, this court on appeal will determine the theory of
~$
each pleading, the sufficiency of which is properly challenged, ,
from its general scope and tenor and not from fragmentary
statements or conclusions, or, as stated in some of the cases
cited, the court will construe such pleading by proceeding
upon the theory which is most apparent and most clearly
outlined by the facts alleged.
But where, as in this case, a
.
parties
theory has been adopted by the
and the trial court,
and the case has been tried upon that theory, it must be ad
Elliott, App. Proc. §§ 489-496, and au
hered toon appeal.
"‘
*
"
thorities cited.
__
As the theory adopted in the trial court was that this sf‘ &f"'
action was brought under the second subdivision of
@~5*"’»‘
of the employer's liability act of 1893, under the authorities
section%““
I
cited, that theory must be adhered to in this court. As said
applies to appellant,
unconstitutional so far as
act
follows that the court below erred in overruling appellant's
demurrer to the amended complaint, and in overruling its
new trial.
motion for
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APPEAL.

CITY OF MUSCATINE.

Supreme Court of Iowa.
104

[Action for personal

189?‘.

Iowa, 183.

injuries

caused by

defect

in

a

v.

a

REED

is

it

is

J

street.]
but one question in the case which
DEEMER, . There
of suﬁicient importance to be noticed in an opinion.
The
day
22d
of March, 1895; and
petition was filed on the
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is alleged that the injury occurred on the 24th day of Au
gust, 1894,—more than six months prior to the ﬁling of the
petition.
There is no allegation that plaintiff gave the defend
ant notice of the happening of the accident, as required by
section 1, c. 25, Acts 22d Gen. Assem. Defendant did not de
mur to the petition, nor did it raise the question of want of
notice, in any manner, in the trial court.
It has ﬁled in this
court, however, what its counsel have seen ﬁt to denominate
a “motion to reverse the judgment and dismiss the case."
This motion is bottomed upon the proposition that the notice
is jurisdictional, and that, in the absence of allegations that
the notice was given, the trial court had no right or authority
to hear the case, and that, as the question is jurisdictional,
it may be raised for the ﬁrst time in this court. “Jurisdic
tion” has been deﬁned to be the “power to hear and determine
the subject-matter in controversy between parties to a suit;
to adjudicate or exercise any judicial power over them.”
It is conceded
Rhode Island 'v. Massachiusetts, 12 Pet. 718.
that the court had jurisdiction over the parties, but it is
argued that it had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter.
The subject-matter is the right which one party claims
against the other, and demands judgment of the court upon.

Miller, 41 Mich. 93, 1 N. W. 1013. In this case
it was the right which plaintiff had to compensation for in
juries received through the negligence of the defendant. The
district court had the right to consider the question, and
In deter
therefore had jurisdiction of the subject-matter.
mining such questions, it is important to distinguish between
jurisdiction of the general subject and jurisdiction of the
particular subject; for, if it be found that the case under
consideration belongs to the former class, then it is within
the jurisdiction of the court, and neither insuﬁiciency of alle
gation nor informality in proceedings will affect that jurisdic
See Brown, Jur. § 1; Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282;
tion.
Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N. Y. 217. As said by Judge Elliott in his
work on General Practice (volume 1, § 240), “Where there
is authority to make a judicial inquiry, there is jurisdiction,
and it is evident that this authority exists wherever there is
power over a general class of cases.” The distinction is also
pointed out in Brown, Jur. § 10. Objections to the jurisdic
tion of the general subject may be made at any stage of the
But, as a general
proceedings, for they cannot be waived.
Jacobson

'0.
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if

there is jurisdiction of the general subject there may
be a waiver of objections to the jurisdiction of the particular
subject.
That is to say, if the court has the right to decide
the general class of cases to which the one in question belongs,
its- decision, although erroneous, cannot be collaterally at
tacked, and, if no objection or exception be taken, it will be
I
considered as waived.
The difference between a right to de
cide and a right decision clearly and brieﬂy illustrates the
distinction we are trying to elucidate. We have a case where f
there is unquestioned authority over the general subject, but
it is claimed that there is no jurisdiction of the particular
case, because of the absence of allegations as to notice.
Such
objection does not go to the jurisdiction of the subject-mat
ter, but rather to the correctness of the decision in the par
ticular case, and cannot be raised for the ﬁrst time in this
Plaintiff's failure to give notice simply affects his I ,Q0‘~l\
court.
right to recover, and does not go to the jurisdiction of the .~“'
4
court. The case is quite like that of Sheel v. City of
Appleton,'i»::'-ice}
49 Wis. 125, 5 N. W. 27, wherein it is held that failure to give .\
\)
notice simply affects the plaintiif’s right to sue, and does not
deprive the court of jurisdiction of the subject-matter.
See,
also, Gould 12. Hurt, 61 Iowa, 47, 15 N. W. 588; Bridgam "v. l
Wilcut, 4 G. Greene, 563; Oskaloosa College v. W. U. Fuel
Co., 90 Iowa, 387, 54 N. W. 152, and 57 N. W. 903. None of
the authorities relied upon by appellant announces a contrary
In each and every of them the question was raised
doctrine.
in the trial court by demurrer, motion in arrest, or otherwise.
The motion to reverse and dismiss is overruled.
,
rule,

.‘)X

Q
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BERMUDEZ ASPHALT PAVING

Supreme Court of Illinois.
17!;

Illinois,

CO.

1898.

466.

J

MAGRUDER,
.
The appellate court reversed the judgment
of the court below upon the ground that the agreement sued
on in this cause was against public policy and void, and that,

therefore,

the appellants

were not entitled

to recover upon
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the same.
The only question which we deem it necessary to
discuss in the case is whether the contract sued on is such
a contract as the courts will refuse to enforce.
If it is a con
tract which is against public policy, the maxim, “Ea: turrpi
causa. non oritur actio,” applies.
U

I l

U

F

Q

1

I

O

I

It is clear to our minds that the contract now under con
sideration is a contract which provides for a contingent com
pensation for obtaining ordinances for paving. An ordinance
passed by the common council, providing for the paving of a
public street, is a species of legislation, as much as an act
passed by the legislature, though the body passing it is sub
ordinate in its character, and created by the legislature
self. The rule, therefore, which makes void a contract for
a contingent compensation for obtaining legislation, applies
as well to the common council of a city as to the legislature
of a state. * * "
It is urged that the question of the invalidity of this
3.
contract is not raised by the pleadings in the court below,
nor by objections to the introduction of evidence. Where a
contract is in terms contra bonos mores, it is not necessary
for the defendant to plead the objections. A court will not
proceed to judgment upon it, even where both parties assent
thereto. In such cases there can be no waiver.
The defense
is allowed, not for the sake of the parties, but for the sake
of the law itself. “The principle is indispensable to the pur
ity of its administration. It will not enforce what it has
forbidden and denounced. The maxim, ‘E2: dolo malo non ori
tur actio,’ is limited by no such qualiﬁcation.
Whenever the
illegality appears, whether the evidence comes from one side
or the other, the disclosure is fatal to the case. No consent
of the defendant can neutralize its effect. A stipulation in
the most solemn form to waive the objection would be tainted
by the vice of the original contract, and void for the same
reasons. Wherever the contamination reaches, it destroys.
The principle to be extracted from all the cases is that the
law will not lend its support to a claim founded on its vio
lation.” Shenk v. Phelps, supra; Co-ppell v. Hall, 7 Wall. 542;
Collins 12. Blantern, 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. 630, and notes.
Where an action is founded upon an illegal contract, the law
will leave the parties where it found them, and grant no
relief to either of them. In Wight v. Rindskopt, 43 Wis.

it
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344, which was an action begun for a failure to perform a
contract, one of the considerations of which was an agree
ment to stiﬂe prosecution, the point that this agreement was
contrary to public policy was not raised in the pleadings or
at the trial in the court below.
But the supreme court of
Wisconsin took cognizance of the question, saying in their
" "' " It is judicial duty always to turn a suitor
opinion:
upon such a contract out of court whenever and however the
character of the contract is made to appear.”
Morrill 12.
Nightingale, 93 Cal. 452, 28 Pac. 1068; Handy '0. Publishing
Co., 41 Minn. 188, 42 N. W. 872.
In Gravier '0. Carrabj/s
Ex'r, 17 La. 132, where the objection that an agreement was
contrary to public policy had not been raised in the court
below, and it was urged that the upper court could not con
sider it, the supreme court of Louisiana said: “Where an
exception is put in at the argument in the supreme court,
suggesting that the contracts between the parties to the suit
are illegal, immoral, and contrary to public policy, the court
is bound to notice it, even without any plea; and in such
Trust Co. v. Goodrich, 75 Ill.
cases no recovery can be had.”
554.
For the reasons above stated the judgment of the appel
Judgment affirmed.
late court is affirmed.

SYKES
Supreme

v.

KRUSE.

Court of Colorado.
49 Colorado,

1911.

560.

CAMPBELL, C. J. This action was brought by H. Jacob
Kruse, as indorsee of the Rocky Mountain National Bank,
against the Kansas-Burroughs Consolidated Mining Company,
the plaintiff in error Sykes, and one Hoffman, upon six prom
issory notes. The complaint contained six separately stated
causes of action upon these several notes. Of ﬁve of them the
mining company and plaintiff in error Sykes were indorsers
merely; of one he was the maker. Sykes ﬁled a separate de
murrer to the complaint in its entirety, on the ground that it
did not set forth facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
He then ﬁled a
action against him, which was overruled.
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‘ The court ren
separate answer and counterclaim.
dered judgment for plaintiff against defendant Sykes in the
aggregate sum of about $40,000, being the full amount of the
principal of the notes and the interest. This judgment was
excepted to by Sykes, and he is here with his writ of error.

l i

Q

Thecomplaint

nor does the proof show,
that there was any presentment of these notes indorsed by
defendant for payment, or notice of dishonor given; nor were
any facts that would excuse presentment, demand, or notice
pleaded or proved. That there must be presentment for pay
ment and the giving of notice of dishonor, under our statute,
in order to ﬁx an indorser’s liability, is conceded.
This is
the general rule, and this case, as pleaded, does not come
within any exception. Sess. Laws 1897, pp. 225, 228, §§ 70,
89. It was the rule of the law merchant; our negotiable in
struments act being substantially a codiﬁcation thereof.
14
Enc. P. & P. 534 et seq.,' Commercial National Bank v. Zim
merman, 185 N. Y. 210, 77 N. E. 1020; Ford v. Booker, 53
Ind. 395; Bosch 12. Kassing, 64 Iowa, 312, 20 N. W. 454;
Knott '0. Hicks, 21 Tenn. 162; Baxter 11. Erwin, 1 Shan. Cas.
(Tenn.) 113; Slacum 12. Pomery, 6 Cranch, 221, 3 L. Ed. 205;
Rushton 12. Aspinall, 2 Doug. Court of Kings Bench, 679;
Harlan v. Dew. 3 Head (Tenn.) 505. Indeed, plaintiff does
not question this rule of law, but seeks to escape its a{;)li
cation upon the ground that defendant did not speciﬁcally call
the attention of the trial court to the absence from the com
plaint of an allegation concerning presentment and notice of
The authorities already cited hold that in a case of
dishonor.
this kind a complaint must contain these allegations, other
wise it is fatally defective; and some of the cases say that a
judgment by default is not supported by such a complaint,
and the defect is not cured by verdict.
The complaint being
thus fatally defective and not stating a cause of action upon
the ﬁve causes of action, which were based upon the notes of
which the defendant Sykes was merely an indorser, the ob
jection under the express provision of section 55 of our Code
may be raised at any time, even for the ﬁrst time upon the
review, though a general demurrer was not ﬁled in the trial
Plaintiff, however, says, since the general demurrer
court.
went to the whole complaint, there being one good cause of
action stated, the one based on the note of which defendant
does not allege,
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Unquestionably
Sykes was maker, it was properly overruled.
this is true, since there was one good cause of action. Down
ing v. Hews, 33 Colo. 344, 81 Pac. 33. This fact, however/
does not preclude defendant‘from raising, at any time, the
objection that the complaint does not state a good cause of
action as against him upon the other ﬁve causes of action.
Plaintiff cites the case of Edward Malley Co. v. Londmzer, 41
Colo. 436, 93 Pac. 488, to the proposition that, though a fail
ure of the complaint to state a cause of action may be raised
for the ﬁrst time on review, it will not be entertained by the
reviewing court, if the attention of the trial court was not
speciﬁcally called to such defects therein as might have been
The decision
obviated by a slight amendment upon the trial.
in that case must be taken in connection with its own facts.
It is apparent that this court did not intend to abrogate the
express provision of section 55 of the Code, or overturn many
of its own previous decisions that the objection that the com
plaint does not state a cause of action may be taken for the
ﬁrst time on review, even though not interposed below. The
Malley Case was a suit against a father for necessaries fur
nished to his minor son, and defendant questioned the suf
ﬁciency of the complaint, because there was no allegation
therein that the father had refused to supply the necessaries,
and also on the ground that it was not alleged that the son
was at the time a minor. The court expressed no opinion as
to whether it was necessary for the complaint to contain the
ﬁrst allegation, but in answer to the contention, made for the
ﬁrst time on appeal, that the complaint was silent as to the
status of the son, said that the defect, if any, could have been
cured by a slight amendment at the trial and was not a mat
ter for reversal. The complaint in that case did contain an
averment that “defendant was a minor, and supported by
and at the expense of the defendant herein." This was un
questionably a slip of the pleader, who intended to say that
the son, not the defendant (the father), was a minor. The
context clearly shows it, and the court might well say that
It was not an in
the mistake, after verdict, was cured.
stance where the complaint lacked an essential allegation,
but where the allegation was defectively or ambiguously stated
when the thought of the pleader was clear, and the mistake
could have been corrected by the change of a single word—
by writing “son” instead of “defendant.”
Such is not this

TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE

1010

[Chap.

7

The defect in the complaint here which is entirely
silent with respect thereto, would require a distinct para
graph in such cause of action, expressly alleging presentment
and notice of dishonor, or giving some excuse for their omis
case.

sion.
*

*

It appears that defendant is in a position to
question here the sufficiency of the complaint and lack of
proof as to such essential matters.
*

U

"Accord,

l i i

t

i

Q

i

#
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by statute or not,—Cushing v. Pires,
(1912) 17 N. Mex. 137; Lang
(1899)
!ord v. Issenhuth, (1912) 28 S. D. 451; Fritz v. Hathaway, (1890) 135
Pa. 274; Leforce v. I-Iaymes, (1909) 25 Okl. 190.
Contra,-Travellers Indemnity Co. v. Fawkes, (1913) 120 Minn. 353:
Schaffhauser Bros. v. Hemmer, (1911) 152 Ia. 200; Montgomery v. Rob
inson, (1912) 93 S. C. 247 (holding that the statute providing that there
shall be no waiver of the objection that no cause of action is stated by
failure to demur, applies to the trial court only).
whether

124 Cal.

LOUISVILLE

663;

&

so

provided

Daily

v.

Fitzgerald.

NASHVILLE

RAILROAD

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
132

CO. v.

BELL.

1908.

Kentucky Law Reporter, 1812.

Hoason, J. “ * "
There was no reply ﬁled to the answer.
The affirmative
part of the answer was an allegation that the plaintiff was a
trespasser on the trestle and that her injury was caused
wholly by her own negligence.
But no question was
raised in the circuit court on the ground that there had
The evidence was all
been no reply ﬁled to the answer.
objection,
without
and
the
instructions
heard
of the court
submitted the case to the jury solely on the question whether
the injury to the plaintiff might have been avoided by ordi
nary care on the part of the defendant’s agents after her
peril was discovered. No motion was made for a judgment
for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict, and in the
motion for a new trial no objection was made on the ground
that there had been no reply ﬁled to the answer. The par
ties having treated the answer as controverted in the circuit.
court, the question cannot be raised for the ﬁrst time in this

_
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court that no reply had been ﬁled to the answer.
aﬂirmed."
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Judgment

‘I8 Same rule applied
where no answer is ﬂied.-—Gray v. Blackwood,
Compare Frederick v. Buckminster, (1909) 83
(1914) 112 Ark. 332.
Neb. 135, where the court assumes that unless the answer can be held
good by liberal construction, judgment for defendant may be attacked
on that ground for the first time on appeal.

SHEARER. v. MURPHY.
Supreme

Court of Kansas.
63

J

Kansas,

1901.

587'.

DOSTER, C. . This was an action of injunction to restrain
the collection of taxes on real estate. It was brought by de
fendants in error against plaintiff in error, as county treas
urer, and also against the city of Empire. The board of
county commissioners was not made a party. Subsequently
defendants in error, plaintiffs in the court below, dismissed
the action as to the city, leaving it to stand against the county
treasurer alone. A demurrer to the petition on the single
ground of the insufficiency of the facts alleged to constitute a
cause of action was ﬁled and overruled.
The defendant the
county treasurer elected to stand on his demurrer, whereupon
a judgment of permanent injunction was rendered against
him. From the order overruling the demurrer, and from the
order of ﬁnal judgment in injunction, error has been prose
However, no objection to the judgment
cuted to this court.
was made in the court below, nor objection made in any form
Notwithstanding this omission, the
to the defect of parties.
judgment must be reversed for the lack of that necessary
party defendant upon whom, to be effectual, it must operate.
Jeﬁries-Ba Som v. Nation (Kan. Sup.) 65 Pac. 226, was an
action against the county treasurer and sheriff to enjoin the
It was held that the
collection of personal property taxes.
proceeding could not be maintained because of the lack of the
In the opinion
board of commissioners as a party defendant.
authorities,
many
that: “While
it was said, with a citation to
the treasurer and sheriff are proper parties to the suit, yet
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they are mere nominal parties.
The board of county commis
sioners of the county is the real party in interest.
It has long
been the settled law of this state that a permanent injunction
will not be granted until all whose legal rights are to be di
However, in
rectly affected are made parties to the action.”
that case, and perhaps in all others, the defect of parties was
speciﬁcally pointed out in the court below by demurrer or
In this case it was not so done. The objection is
otherwise.
Nevertheless, we are
made for the ﬁrst time in this court.
of the opinion that the lack in the court below of a party
defendant so necessary to the rendition of a judgment enjoin
ing the collection of taxes as is the board of county commis
sioners is a defect which would deprive a judgment of affirm
ance, should it be rendered, of any operative effect, and will
therefore justify us in refusing to render such a judgment in
this case, even though the demurrer to the petition on the
A judgment can oper
ground alleged was rightly overruled.
court, and, if an in
before
the
properly
only
parties
ate
on the
dispensable party is not before the court, so as to be bound
by the judgment, it would be as futile for a reviewing tribu
nal to affirm it as it was for the trial court to render it.
*
‘ "‘ Such being the case, the rule is quite plain. That
rule is the one which prevailed in the equity practice before
the adoption of the Code, and which has not been changed by
the Code. It was quite well stated and explained by the su
preme court of Alabama, which held that “the omission of
one who is an indispensable party to the bill is a defect that
will reverse the decree on appeal or writ of error, although
the objection is taken for the ﬁrst time in this court.” Mc
Maken 11. McMaken, 18 Ala. 576. * "‘ * The demurrer to
the petition is not passed on, but the judgment of the court
below is reversed, with directions for such proceedings as
may be properly taken. All the justices concurring."
parties is often called a. jurisdictional detect.
‘IQ Want of necessary
Thus, in Hartley v. Langkamp, (1914) 243 Pa. 550, 556. the court said:
"It is a settled rule of equity jurisprudence that as the absence of an
party goes to the jurisdiction of the court, an objection
indispensable
to the proceeding on that ground may be raised at any time, during the
hearing or on an appeal from the-decree of the trial court.” But com
pare Tod v. Crisman, (1904) 123 Ia. 693, where the court said that this
was not a jurisdictional defect in the true sense, for while it was good
ground for dismissing the suit, because it rendered the adjudication
ineffectual, yet the decree would be binding upon those present and
therefore
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CHAPTER VIII.
PROCEEDINGS

FOR

SECTION 1.

TRANSFER TO REVIEWING
COURT.

TIME FOR OBTAINING REVIEW.

WILLIAMS

v.

LONG.

Supreme Court of California.
130

1900.

California, 58.

J

VHENSHAW, . This is a motion to dismiss defendants’ ap
peal from the judgment. upon the ground that the appeal was
taken after the statutory period had elapsed. This fact is
not denied, but in resisting the motion it is shown that some
18 days before the expiration of the 6 months allowed for ap
peal the plaintiff, in whose favor the judgment was rendered,
had died, and that only after the expiration of the 6 months
was an administratrix of his estate appointed, upon whom
service with due diligence was made. Under this showing, it
is contended that the running of the statute of limitations
should be held to have been suspended from the date of the
death of plaintiff to the date of the appointment of his per
sonal representative.
The statutes limiting the time of ap
Henry v. Merguire,
peal are jurisdictional and mandatory.
111 Cal. 1, 43 Pac. 387. In the absence of an express authori
zation in the statute itself, a court has no power to extend
the time for taking an appeal, or to relieve an appellant from
the effects of misfortune, accident, surprise, or mistake.
No
such authorization is found in the statutes of this state. In
this case the statute had begun to run, and had been running
against this appellant for more than ﬁve months before the
death of the plaintiff. It is a well-settled rule and principle
of law, except as modiﬁed by positive enactment, that when
the statute of limitations has begun to run no subsequent dis
(1013),
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ability will suspend its operation.
In Pace v. Ficklin’s E1-'.r,
76 Va. 292, the time in which an appeal should have been
taken was limited to two years.
Judgment was rendered
against an assignee in bankruptcy, and during the two years
the assignee died, and a successor was appointed.
In support
of the appeal it was urged that the period between the death
of the ﬁrst assignee and the appointment of his successor
should be deducted from the statutory time. But the court
said: “In answer to this it is suﬁicient to say that the stat
utes deﬁning and limiting the right of appeal makes no such
exception or restriction, and there is no rule or principle in
law which authorizes the courts to do so. "' " “ In this
case Pace was alive at the date of the decree.
The limitation
run,
then commenced to
and so continued, notwithstanding
his death at a subsequent period. H The motion to dismiss is
granted?‘
'16 The rule as to the non-effectiveness
of subsequently accruing dis
abilities, is established on a thorough review ot the authorities in Mc
Donald v. Hovey, (1883) 110 U. S. 619.
Many statutes allow the court-——trial or appellate—to extend the time
for taking an appeal under speciﬁed circumstances.-3 C. J. 1070. Such
power of extension is often quite largely discretionary.-—Oakley v. David
son, (1899) 103 Wis. 98; Klotz v. Circuit Judge, (1910) 159 Mich. 639.
Accident and mistake are frequently statutory grounds tor extension.
Matteson v. Smith Co., (1909) 30 R. I. 424; McFeely v. Scott, (1879)

16; Chase v. Bates, (1889) 81 Me. 182.
“Cross-appeals
must be prosecuted like other appeals, and therefore
the cross-appeal is not taken until brought to the attention of the oourt
Although the record may have been removed
whose decree it questions.
to this court upon appeal. yet the court below may allow a cross-appeal,
sign a citation, and approve a bond within the two years prescribed.
As
in this case, the petition, order and bond were not ﬁled in the Circuit
Court until after the two years had elapsed from the date of the entry of
the decree, the cross-appeal must be dismissed."—Farrar
v. Churchill,
(1889) 135 U. S. 609, 612.
Delay due to fraud of appellee. It has been held that the court has
inherent power to relieve an appellant in such a case.—Smythe v. Bos
well, (1888) 117 Ind. 365.
Delay due to the <'0urt.—“We cannot think the legislature intended to
deprive a party of his right to an appeal because not taken within a
time ﬁxed from circumstances
beyond his control. ‘
Where the
delay is caused by officers of the court over whom he has no control,
and without fault or want of due diligence on his part, we are of opinion
that a settlement made after the period of three months will be good."—
Cameron v. Calkins, (1880) 43 Mich. 191. .-ic('0rd.—Burns v. Keas, (1865)
20 Ia. 16; Mount v. Van Ness, (1881) 34 N. J. Eq. 523; Clapp v. Graves,
(1859) 9 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 20; Schmuck v. M. K. & T. Ry. Co., (1911)
128 Mass.

' '

85

Kan.

447.
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MUSGRAVE.

Supreme Court of Iowa.
128

COURT

1904.

Iowa, 585.

*

motion to dismiss the appeal in this case presents a
question of practice which is of considerable importance.
It
appears that, within a few days after the entry of judgment
in ‘the district court, an appeal to this court was perfected,
but, for reasons not material to this opinion, the appellant on
December 23, 1902, ﬁled in the office of the clerk of the dis
trict court a dismissal of said appeal, and on the following
day ﬁled in this court a certiﬁed copy of the judgment below,
and a voluntary dismissal of the appeal taken, as above stated.
After the dismissal had been thus effected, the appellant at
once, and (as claimed) still within six months after the date
of the judgment in the district court, again served notice of
appeal; and it is upon this latter service that the case is now
before us. The appellee takes the position that the taking of
the ﬁrst appeal and the dismissal thereof exhausted the ap
pellant’s right to a review of the case in this court.
Stated
brieﬂy, the question is, may an appellant voluntarily dismiss
an appeal once perfected, and thereafter, and within six
months from the date of the judgment sought to be reviewed,
take a second appeal? We are inclined to hold in the affirma
There would seem to be no good reason for denying
tive.
such right, and, as we shall see, the practice ﬁnds much sup
port in the decisions of the courts. The statute allows a party
six months in which to take an appeal. Experience has dem
onstrated that lawyers are not wholly exempt from liability
to mistakes, and if, having attempted to effect an appeal,
counsel ﬁnd that by some error or oversight their appeal is
likely to be lost without a hearing upon its merits, and the
statutory limitation has not yet run, why should they not be
allowed to take advantage of this locus pwnitentiw to dismiss
By analogy with the
the ineffectual appeal and begin anew?
right freely exercised to dismiss an original action and to re
new the same, it would seem that such practice is entirely
Among the cases in which this question has been
legitimate.
inferentially
passed upon, see, Harris v. Ferris, 1%?
directly or
2.
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Fla. 81; Sanders v. Moore, 52 Ark. 376, 12 S. W. 783; Ga1-rick
11. Chamberlain, 97 Ill. 620; Beller '0. Stevens, 40 Mich. 168;
Power v. Frick, 2 Grant, Cas. 306; Martinez v. Gallardo, 5
Cal. 155; Williams v. La Penotiere (Fla.) 7 South. 869; Rob
erts 'v. Tucker, 1 Wash. T. 179; Tex. R. Co. v. Hare (Tex. Civ.
App.) 23 S. W. 42; State v. McFarland, 38 Kan. 664, 17 Pac.
654; Marshall v. R. R., 20 Wis. 644; Long v. Emery, 49 Ind.
200; Ward v. Hollins, 14 Md. 158; Roebuck v. Duprey, 2 Ala.
352; Evans '0. Bank, 134 U. S. 330, 10 Sup. Ct. 493, 33 L. Ed.
917. This last case, with others cited in Rose’s Notes thereto,
>
is directly in point.

~i.

I

BLACKWOOD v. SHAFFER.
Supreme

Court of Kansds.
Kansas, 273.

44

VALENTINE,

‘

"

J ' '
.

1890.

‘

A preliminary

question is presented in this court
The defendant in error claims
by the defendant in error.
that this court cannot consider the question as to whether
the ruling of the court below upon the demurrer was right or
not, for the reason that the demurrer was sustained on May
8, 1886, and this proceeding in error was not brought to this
court until July 6, 1888, more than one year—indeed, more
than two years—after the ruling of the court below upon the
When the court below sustained the demurrer
demurrer.
the defendant below might have immediately brought that
order to the supreme court for review, (Civil Code, § 542) ;
but he could not wait two years, nor more than one year, and
then bring it to the supreme court, (Id. § 556.) As the ruling
of the court below upon'the third paragraph of the defend
ant’s answer virtually swept such third paragraph out of ex
istence, and as no amendment was ever made to such third
paragraph, nor any leave asked for or given to so amend it,
the ruling on the demurrer was a ﬁnal order, and such ruling
was not subsequently involved in any other ruling of the court
below. When a case is brought to the supreme court for the
purpose of having any judgment or order of the court below
"‘
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everything necessarily involved in such judgment
order
or
is reviewable in the supreme court; but the order oi‘
the court below in this case, sustaining the demurrer to the
third paragraph of the defendant’s answer, is not involved in
any other order, or in any judgment of the court below, and
hence it is not reviewable upon this principle. If the demur
rer had been overruled a different rule would apply. Also, if
the trial of the case upon its merits had been had in a short
time after the ruling on the demurrer, so that the entire case,
the ruling on the demurrer, and all, could have been brought
to this court within less than one year after the sustaining of
the demurrer, and if the entire case had been so brought to
this court within less than one year after the sustaining of
the demurrer, then we could determine whether the order
sustaining the demurrer was erroneous or not; but such is
not this case. As every alleged error except the ruling of the
court below upon the demurrer is now abandoned by the
plaintiff in error, and as no error is shown to have been com
mitted by the court below, unless such court committed error
in sustaining the aforesaid demurrer, the order of the court
below sustaining the demurrer is virtually the only action of
the court below brought to this court for review; and it was
brought here too late.
The judgment of the court below will be affirmed. All the
justices concurring."
reviewed,

78 Where all interlocutory orders are brought up for review on appeal
from the ﬁnal judgment the time tor reviewing them on such appeal
dates from the ﬁnal judg'ment,—Hess v. Hess, (1908) 108 Va. 483; Lesure
Lumber Co. v. Fire Ins. Co., (1897) 101 Ia. 514. But where appealable
interlocutory orders are not brought up on such an appeal, the time for
review of each must be reckoned from the date when each was rendered
or ﬁled,—Holland v. Beaver, (1911) 29 Okl. 115; Stout Y. Philippi Mtg.
Co., (1895) 41 W. Va. 339.
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ROSE.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.
80

‘

1906‘.

Arkansas, 518.

J

RIDDICK,
.
In his brief ﬁled in this case counsel for ap
pellant contends with much force that the chancellor erred
in holding that the value of the stock of merchandise was
only $1,509.16 and the value of the lease was only $100, and
that he erred in holding that the defendant should be com
pelled to account only for those sums and the amount of cash
on hand. But this judgment of the chancellor was rendered
over a year before the appeal was taken and we have there
fore no right to disturb it. Kirby's Dig. § 1199; Moon v.
Henderson, 74 Ark. 181, 85 S. W. 237; Cooper 11. Ryan, 73
Ark. 37, 83 S. W. 328.
It is true that the judgment conﬁrming the report of the
master was made less than a year before the appeal was
taken, but this report only followed the decree which ad
judged and ﬁxed the amount which the defendant was to be
charged for the property. A decree which settles the rights
of the parties and leaves nothing to the master but a state
ment of an account on a basis ﬁxed by the decree is a ﬁnal
judgment.
As no appeal was taken from this judgment with
in the time allowed by statute, it must, on this appeal, be
treated as the law of the case, and, that being so, the subse
quent decree conﬁrming the report of the master made in
obedience to the ﬁrst decree cannot be questioned. A report
of a master is not subject to exceptions where it simply fol
lows the decree directing the reference and makes a report
based on ﬁnding contained in that decree, for, in such a case,
if there be error, it is in the original decree and not in the
report of the master whose duty it was to obey the decree.
Musgrove v. Lusk, 2 Tenn. Ch. 576; 17 Enc. Plead. & Prac.
1050.

Judgment aﬂirmed."
77 Some statutes
limit the time tor appeal from the rendition. others
from the actual entry, of the judgment or order.—3 C. J. 1055-57. And
it is frequently provided that an appeal shall be taken within a speciﬁed
time from the service of notice of the order or judgment by the appellee
upon the appellant.—Lawver v. Great Nor. Ry. Co., (1910) 110 Minn
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(order); Falker v. N. Y., W. S. & B. Ry. Co., (1885) 100 N. Y. 86
(judgment or order); Fisher v. Fisher, (1913) 164 N. C. 105 (judgment
rendered out of term); Brooks v. Bigelow, (1896) 9 S. D. 179 (order);
Ellis v. Barron County, (1904) 120 Wis. 390 (order).
414

MUELLER LUMBER

CO. v.

MCCAFFREY.

Supreme Court of Iowa.
141

J

1908.

Iowa, 730.

LADD, C.
.
The appeal was not perfected within six
months from the entry of judgment, and for this reason er
rors in the record other than disclosed in the motion for new
trial cannot be considered. The order overruling the motion
for new trial was within six months before the appeal, and
for this reason is reviewable in this court. Section 4110 pro
“Appeals from the superior and district courts
vides that:
may be taken to the supreme court at any time within six
months from rendition of the judgment in any cause or order
appealed from and not afterward.” Section 4106 obviates the
necessity of ﬁling a motion in order to challenge any ruling
in the record, and this even though such motion be pending at
the time. Hunt v. Railway, 86 Iowa, 15, 52 N. W. 668, 41 Am.
St. Rep. 473. The ruling by which a motion for new trial is
overruled remains an appealable order, however, and the sub
ject of review. In re Estate of Bishop, 130 Iowa, 250, 106 N.
W. 637. The result is, a litigant may, but is not required to,
challenge the correctness of the court’s rulings a second time.
Section 3755 of the Code expressly authorized a motion for
new trial based on any or all of nine grounds.
These need
enough
present
is
for
purposes to say
It
not be enumerated.
that one of these is “for error of law occurring at the trial,
excepted to by the party making the application,” and an
other that the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence.
The manifest design of such motion is to enable the court to
review its rulings entered during the trial at greater leisure
and upon full investigation, to the end that, if errors are dis
covered, these may be corrected, rather than the parties be
put to the trouble and expense of an appeal. The ruling on
each point raised, though it may be but a repetition of a
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previous ruling, is quite as decisive.
The statute expressly
authorizes either party to challenge the correctness of any
ruling during the trial by motion for new trial, and he is en
titled to a ruling thereon. This involves a decision covering
each ground of the motion, and, as the order granting or de
nying a new trial, is appealable. This necessarily authorizes
a review of each of the several grounds asserted.
For this
reason, separate assignments of error were exacted under a
former statute requiring assignments of error.
Moﬁit v.
Albert, 97 Iowa, 213, 66 N. W. 162. Because errors asserted
in a motion for new trial appear in the record and might be
taken advantage of on appeal, had no such motion been ﬁled,
furnishes no ground for saying that they may not be reviewed
when raised in a motion for new trial, if the appeal from the
ruling thereon be timely, even though more than sixmonths
Kendall v. Lucas County, 26
has elapsed since judgment.
Iowa, 395. Otherwise, the right to appeal from the ruling on
a motion for new trial, save because of something transpiring
subsequent to the verdict or decree, would be valueless.
In
the recent case of McLaughlin v. Hubinger Bros. Co., 135
Iowa, 595, 113 N. W. 475, it appears to have been held in such
a case that only errors not inhering in the judgment may be
The decision last above cited, in which the con
reviewed.
trary was held, evidently was overlooked, and the authorities
relied on do not appear, upon closer examination, to support
*
" There are decisions in other juris
"‘
the conclusion.
dictions to the effect that time of appeal may not be extended
by delay in ruling on motions for new trial, but these are
based on statutes limiting the period within which an appeal
may be taken from the entry of judgment and not, as in this
state, from the entry “of judgment or other orders.” Houser
v. Hargrove, 29 Cal. 90, 61 Pac. 661; Vickers 'v. Tyndall, 168
Ill. 616, 48 N. E. 214; Hill v. Hill, 114 Mich. 599, 72 N. W.
597; Patterson v. Greenville National Bank, 101 Tenn. 511,
48 S. W. 225. Other authorities are to the effect that, where a
motion for new trial is essential to a review of errors as
signed, there is no ﬁnal judgment, within the meaning of the
statute relating to appeals, until the ruling on the motion.
Atkinson v. Williams, 151 Ind. 431, 51 N. E. 721; Thompson,
Trials, § 2730; Sharp v. Brown, 34 Neb. 406, 51 N. W. 1030;
Snow v. Rich, 22 Utah, 123, 61 Pac. 336.
The theory of these last decisions is that, though judgment
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has been entered, if the motion is ﬁled in proper time, the pro
ceeding is in ﬁeri until the motion is denied, and until then
the judgment must be considered as in paper or as suspended
as a role, in the common-law sense by the motion. All this is
obviated by the statutes of this state, which authorize an ap
peal from the judgment or order entered on the motion for
new trial.
The appeal may be prosecuted notwithstanding
the pendency of the motion. Hunt 7.‘. Railway, 86 Iowa, 15,
52 N. W. 668, 41 Am. St. Rep. 473. And there is no apparent
reason for saying that the ruling on the different grounds set
up in the motion for new trial may not be reviewed, even
though the time has elapsed in which the original record
might furnish the basis of review.
Certainly, the errors al
leged in the motion have not been waived, for the statute ex
pressly authorizes presenting them in this way.
The Code
seems to contemplate the entry of judgment immediately up
on the return of the verdict or announcement of its ﬁnding by
the court, and, unless a litigant may rely on the correction of
errors in an appeal from the order sustaining or overruling
the motion for new trial, he will be driven in many cases to
carry his case to the appellate tribunal before he can know
whether the relief will be granted by the nisi prius court. If
anything, the ruling on the motion for new trial is of greater
signiﬁcance than that originally made, being with greater de
liberation and with an adequate perspective of the entire trial.
Errors therein should be quite as available on appeal as when
For the reasons
made during the previous trial or hearing.
stated, we are inclined to recede from the ruling in McLaugh
lin v. Hubinger Bros. Co., 135 Iowa, 595, 113 N. W. 475, and
follow the rule as announced in Kendall o. Lucas County, 26
Iowa, 395, more than 40 years ago.
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EFFECTING

TRANSFER

OLD NICK WILLIAMS CO.
Supreme

v.

or JURISDICTION.

UNITED STATES.

Court of the United States.
215

[Chap. 8

1910.

United States, 541.

FULLER, C. J. The rule has long been settled that a “writ
of error is not brought, in the legal meaning of the term, un
til it is ﬁled in the court which rendered the judgment. It is
the ﬁling of the writ that removes the record from the infe
rior to the appellate court, and the period of limitation pre
scribed by the act of Congress must be calculated according
ly.” Taney, Ch. J., in Brooks '0. Norris, 11 How. 204, 13 L.
ed. 665; Polleys 'v. Black River Improv. Co., 113 U. S. 81, 28
L. ed. 938, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 369; Credit Co. u. Arkansas C. R.
Co., 128 U. S. 258, 32 L. ed. 448, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 107; Far-rar
'v. Churchill, 135 U. S. 609, 34 L. ed. 246, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep.
771; Conboy v. First Nat. Bank, 203 U. S. 141, 51 L. ed. 128,
27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 50.
The same rule is applicable to appeals as to writs of error.
Rev. Stat. § 1012, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 716.
As Mr.
1;.
Co.,
Bradley
said
in
Credit
C0.
Arkansas
C.
R.
Justice
128
U. S. 261, 32 L. ed. 449, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 107:
“An appeal cannot be said to be ‘taken’ any more than a
writ of error can be said to be ‘brought’ until it is, in some
way, presented to the court which made the decree appealed
from, thereby putting an end to its jurisdiction over the
cause, and making it its duty to send it to the appellate

court.”
There the appeal was allowed by Mr. Justice Miller on the
last day on which an appeal could be taken (Rev. Stat.
§ 1008), but was not presented to the court below nor ﬁled
with the clerk until ﬁve days after the prescribed time had
expired.

It

was held that the appeal must be dismissed, and

Mr. Justice Bradley added:
“The attempt made, in this case, to anticipate the actual
time of presenting and ﬁling the appeal, by entering an order
nunc pro tunc, does not help the case. When the time for tak
ing an appeal has expired, it cannot be arrested or called back
by a simple order of court. If it could be, the law whi<;l_I lim

Sec.
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its the time within which an appeal can be taken would be a
dead letter.”

I

1

.#

#

#

#

i

$

#

#

The delay in the present case in taking out the writ of er
ror was not the act of the court, but of petitioner. At all
events, petitioner might have brought its writ of error within
the time prescribed by statute, and the court had no power
to allow it after the time limited had expired.
Judgment aﬂirmed.

ai-~

PEOPLE

v.

ELDRIDGE.

Supreme Court of New York.
7

1852.

Howard's Practice Reports, 108.

[Application for a writ of prohibition to restrain the
County Court from proceeding with an appeal, on the ground
that the notice of appeal was not served on the respondent
personally, but only upon his atb0rney.]
BARCULO, Justice.
1.
The question is whether service of
the affidavit and notice of appeal upon the justice, perfected
the appeal so as to give the County Court jurisdiction of the
cause. The Code, § 354, provides that “the affidavit and no
tice of appeal must within the like time (20 days), be served
on the justice and a notice of the appeal on the respondent
personally, or by leaving it at his residence with some person
of suitable age and discretion.” This constitutes, as I under
I can not concur with the counsel for
stand it, the appeal.
the defence in assuming that the service of notice is merely
directory, and may be dispensed with; or that its absence
may be supplied by other proof of information conveyed to
The section requires that certain things
the respondent.
shall be done within the twenty days; and if they are not all
done, there is no appeal.
This is obvious from the context as
well as the rule of construction which has been applied to
superior courts. Thus section 359 declares that “when the
affidavit and notices of appeal shall have been served, the re
spondent may supply or correct material omissions or mis
statements therein, by an afﬁdavit on his part, a copy of
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which shall be served on the j ustice, and also on the attorney,
if any, who prosecutes the appeal, or if there be none, on the
appellant, within ten days after receiving notice of the ap
peal.”
“The court (§ 360) shall thereupon, after ten days,
and within thirty days after the service of the notice of ap
peal make a return,” etc. From these provisions it appears
that the notice of appeal must be served on the respond
ent within the twenty days, to authorize him to supply or
correct the affidavit of the appellant within the thirty days
given to the justice to make the return. Otherwise the re
spondent loses the opportunity of furnishing an affidavit on
his part, as the justice, in making his return, must be gov
erned by the notice served on him. The case before us illus
trates this matter.
The affidavit and notice of appeal were
served on the justice on the 4th of March, he makes his re
turn the fore part of April, as he is required; and on the
19th April the appellant ﬁrst serves notice of the appeal upon
the respondent, so that the latter is cut off from his right to
It is not intended to
correct the aﬂidavits of the appellant.
be said that the County Court could not relieve a party under
such circumstances, who should come in and submit to the
jurisdiction and ask for an amended return; but these sec
tions show that the notice to the respondent is a part of the
appeal, without which it is imperfect.
2.
We will now look at the analogous case of appeals in
superior courts. Section 327 provides that “an appeal must
be made by the service of a notice in writing, on the adverse
party, and on the clerk,” &c. In the case of Tripp agt. De
Bow (5 Pr. R. 144), the notice of appeal from a judgment of
the County Court to this court was served upon the party in
On a motion to dismiss the appeal
stead of his attorney.
made at the Ontario special term, the justice held that the
notice should have been served on the attorney, and that the
statute not having been complied with, nor the error waived
by an appearance, the court had acquired no jurisdiction, and
This decision
the appeal sought to be taken was a nullity.
term;
general
the
at
the
court
declaring
it to be
was affirmed
a “jurisdictional question,” which “the party has a right to
take advantage of at any time, provided he has not appeared
or answered, or proceeded in such a manner as to give the
court thereby jurisdiction in the case.”
Now the essential difference between the two provisions

\
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of the statute is, that in regard to appeals in the superior
courts, the notice must be served on the attorney, and in ap
peals from a justice of the peace, the notice must be served
on the party personally, or by leaving it at his residence with
some person of suitable age and discretion.
If then it was
correctly held, of which I have no doubt, in Tripp agt. De Bow,
that a notice served on the party and not on the attorney in
an appeal to the Supreme Court was a nullity, the converse,
as applied to the present case, must also be true that the no
tice being served on the attorney and not on the party, as
required by the statute, is a nullity, and consequently that
there was no appeal by which the County Court could obtain
jurisdiction. The county judge, therefore, in holding this to
be a case'of mere irregularity overlooked the broad distinc
tion between a question of practice and a question of juris
diction.
The former may be waived by delay; but the latter
can never be waived by mere lapse of time, but only by some
positive act of submission to the tribunal whose jurisdiction
is questioned.
3.
But it is claimed that the affidavits show that the re
spondent had verbal notice of the appeal, or, in other words,
that he admitted and stated in conversation, the judgment
This, however, can not affect the ques
had been appealed.
tion unless it can be shown» that a written notice is unneces
sary. But the section itself negatives the idea, by providing
as an alternative, that it may be served “by leaving it at his
residence.”
Again, section 408 deﬁnes what is meant by a notice, by
declaring that “all notices shall be in writing,” and although
that chapter may not be intended particularly to apply to
these appeals, it furnishes a strong presumption that the
Code makers intended by the term “notice,” whenever used
generally, to designate a written, and not an oral communi
cation.
4.
But it is contended that the defect is amendable. To
this two answers may be given. First, the appellant has not
applied to the County Court to amend, nor has any amend
ment been ordered. Secondly, there is nothing to amend, nor
to amend by. If the notice had been served, and been de
fective in some matter of form, or perhaps, of substance, I
But here is
could understand what is meant by “amending.”
head
party,
notice,
amendments,
the
under
the
of
and
no
asks

\
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to bring an appeal after the time limited by statute has ex
pired. This no court has the authority to do in my judgment.
We may just as well extend the time for bringing an action
beyond the period ﬁxed by the statute of limitations, or order
an execution to run beyond the time ﬁxed for the lien of a

judgment.

i i i I i l I l

O

U

The right of appeal is a restricted right. The legislature
and control it as they please. The presumption is
ﬁrst tribunal is competent to dispose properly of the
submitted to it, and that its decisions are correct.
however, gives an opportunity to review the ﬁrst ad
judication, upon a compliance with certain conditions on the
part of the party feeling aggrieved. Among those conditions
is found a limitation as to time, which, while it gives a full
opportunity to appeal, is designed to cut off that right for
ever if the parties do not avail themselves of it in season.
The party who loses the privilege by his delay or negligence.
has no one to blame but himself. The courts can not help
him without abolishing the law and substituting themselves
in the place of the legislature.
In the present case the County Court, unless restrained,
will proceed to judgment on the return. In that event it is
diﬂicult to see how the relator can avail himself of this defect
I am inclined to think he has no remedy if
of jurisdiction.
the application is denied. I shall, therefore, direct an alterna
tive Writ to be issued, that the question may be examined at
the general term. Writ of prohibition granted."
regulate
that the
matters
The law,

very commonly require both ﬁling o_t notice with the clerk
78 Statutes
and service ot the notice upon the adverse party as concurrent steps
necessary to take or perfect an appeal.—Tyri-ell v. Baldwin, (1887) 72
Cal. 192; Vollmer v. Estate of Read, (1904) 10 Ida. 196; Wedd v. Gates,
(1905) 15 01:1. 602; Munk v. Anderson, (1896) 94 Wis. 27; Independent
Dist. of Sheldon v. Apnerle, (1888) 76 Ia. 238; Barkley V. Logan, (1875)
2 Mont. 296; Peran v. Monroe.
(1865) 1 Nev. 408; Johnson v. Stephenson,
(1885) 104 Ind. 368; Carr v. Kansas, (1863) 1 Kan. 331.
But there is considerable variety. Some statutes also require a bond
v. Anderson, (1896) 94 Wis. 27; some
as a condition precedent,—Munk
require nothing but a. bond.— Kimbrell v. Rogers, (1889) 90 Ala. 339;
under some statutes failure to serve notice or failure to ﬁle 3 bond
operates as a condition subsequent and relates back to destroy the ap
peal,-McDonald v. Ketchum, (1895) 53 Oh. St. 519; Lowell v. Lowell,
(1880) 55 Cal. 316.
In some states an allowance of the appeal by order of court is required.
—Carne v. Peacock, (1885) 114 Ill. 347; Squire v. McDonald, (1893) 138
N. Y. 554; Williamson v. Gayle, (1847) 4 Gratt. (Va.) 180; Graves’ Com
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(1915) 166 Ky. 446; Drainage Dist. v. Stuart, (1912)
McKnight v. Denouvion, (1870) 22 La. Ann. 373. Under
the federal practice the acceptance of security operates as an order of
allowance.—Sage
v. Railroad Co., (1877) 96 U. S. 712.
In the absence of statute a writ of error needs no order of allowance,
as it is a writ of right.—Van Antwerp v. Newman, (1825) 4 Cow. (N. Y.)
82; Anonymous,
(1837) 16 N. J. L. 271; Ex parte Virginia. Commis
sioners, (1884) 112 U. S. 177; 2 Tidd's Prac. 1141.
But some statutes
make such allowance necessa.ry.—State
of Florida v. Vinzant, (1905)
49 Fla. 130.
mittee
104

v. Lyons,

Ark.

113;

MONROE COUNTY v. STRONG.
Court of Mississippi.
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ALEXANDER, Sp.

1901.

Mississippi, 565.
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The objection ﬁrst made here on reargument that the cir
cuit court was without jurisdiction because no bond for ap
peal from the order of the board of supervisors was executed
No bond was necessary. At common
cannot be sustained.
law, writs of error issued without bail or security, and so
has been held by this court as to writs of error where the
statute providing for them does require a bond. Swann v.
Horne, 54 Miss. 337; Winters 7}. Claitor, Id. 341. Appeals,
both as to the right and the procedure, are statutory, and, un
less the statute providing for and regulating an appeal re
bond, none
necessary. Pow. App. Proc. 104, 396;
quires
Eng. Enc. Pl.
Am.
Prac. 965, and cases cited. Section
79, Code 1892, giving the right of appeal to the circuit court
from the board of supervisors, and prescribing the manner
of perfecting the appeal, makes no provision for
bond.
Other sections of the chapter regulating appeals to the circuit
court and writs of certiorari to inferior tribunals expressly
bond.

It

may be that, since section 79 gives the
is

right of appeal to any person aggrieved, and
available in
favor of taxpayers who appeal merely to vindicate private
rights, but‘ in the interest of the public, and since the county
as such cannot ordinarily suffer pecuniary loss or damage as
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sessable on appeal against appellants, the legislature deemed
their liability for costs a sufﬁcient protection against ill-ad
vised or vexatious appeals. Whatever may have been the rea
son, no bond is provided for by statute, and none was re
quired.

'

"

"

Aﬂirmed.

DENNISON
Supreme

v.

TALMAGE.

Court of Ohio.

1876.

29 Ohio State, 438.

[The plaintiffs in error were duly appointed executors of
William Neil, deceased, by the Probate Court of Franklin
county, Ohio, and qualiﬁed as such, but in accordance with the
provisions of the will they ﬁled no ofﬁcial bond as such execu
tors. Talmage brought an action in the court of common pleas
against Dennison and Neil as executors, and secured a judg
The executors appealed to the district
ment in his favor.
court, but ﬁled no bond, and their appeal was dismissed.
They then moved in the supreme court for leave to ﬁle a
petition in error to the district court.]
WELCH, C. . The right of appeal rests solely upon statu
tory provisions, and unless those provisions are complied
with, the right can not be made available. The statute allow
ing appeals to the district court (2 S. & C. 1162, sec. 2) re
quires the appellant, in order to perfect his appeal, to give
an undertaking within thirty days from the rising of the
court. This is the general provision, and the only exception
to it, or at least the only exception applicable to cases like the
present where the executors or administrators were original
parties, is contained in the 6th section of the same statute.
By this latter section it is provided, that “in no case shall ad
ministrators or executors (and guardians), who may have
given bond with security in this state according to law, be
compelled to give bond and security in order to perfect their
The same provision as to executors and adminis
appeal.”
trators is found in section 243 of the statute for the settle
ment of estates of deceased persons (S. & C. 612), which ex
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empts from the necessity of giving appeal bonds executors
and administrators “who may have given bond and security
in this state according to law.”
A simple reading of these provisions would seem to be all
that is necessary to show that they were not complied with
in this case by the executors. They gave no appeal bond, nor
had they “given bond with security in this state,” as such
executors. They have neither complied with the general rule,
nor have they brought themselves within the exception, if
the apparently plain reading of the statute is to prevail.
is

it

also claimed by counsel for the executors, that the
But
court of common pleas had power to decide the question
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it

whether executors should be required to give an appeal bond,
duly exercised that power
and that its journal shows that
by ordering that no bond should be required.

it

is

*

*

*

That the court had no such power we all agree.
As we understand the law in such cases, after the court has
lim
rendered its ﬁnal judgment its power in that respect
ited to two things—namely, ﬁxing the amount of the bond,
shall be made payable; and
and deciding to which party
these powers can only be exercised in speciﬁed cases.
Doubt
less this was a proper case for the exercise of that power.
But the court has no more power to dispense with the bond,

is

a

is

is

It

a is

it

it

a

is is

it

required by law, than
has to require
where one
bond
not required by law. If the court can dispense
where one
with the bond in favor of executors and administrators,
in favor of individual parties in all cases
can dispense with
authorized to ﬁx the amount of the bond.
where the court
power to the court would be to nullify the
To concede such
plain provisions of the law requiring appeal bonds.
the
law, and not the court, that determines the cases in which
The power of the court is merely to
bonds shall be given.
determine the amount and the obligee of the bond, and
lim
ited in its effect to cases in which the law itself requires the
given case, the law requires an appeal
bond. Whether, in
to be determined by the appellate court, when the case
bond
comes there, subject only to review on error; and parties
must, at their own peril, and within the thirty days allowed
by law, decide the question for themselves, just as they must
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for themselves many other questions on which the

jurisdiction of the appellate court is made to depend.
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VANDYKE

v.

WEIL.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
18 Wisconsin,

1864.

291.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Washington County.
This was an action founded upon an undertaking on appeal.
The plaintiffs’ intestate, in 1859, obtained in the circuit court
for Milwaukee County, a judgment against Baruch S. Weil,
Eliza Adelaide Weil, his wife, and others, foreclosing a mort
gage and directing a sale of the mortgaged premises, and also
that said Baruch S. and Eliza A. Weil should pay the amount
of any deﬁciency in the proceeds of the sale.
The defend
ants last named appealed from this judgment; and thereupon
the defendants in this action, to wit, Baruch S. Weil, as prin
cipal, and Schleisinger and Pick as sureties, executed an un
dertaking by which, after reciting the pendency of such ap
peal, they undertake “that during the possession of said
property by the appellants, they will not commit or suffer to
be committed any waste thereon, and that if the judgment be
affirmed they will pay the value of the use and occupation of
the property from the time of appeal until the delivery of
the possession thereof, pursuant to said judgment. not ex
ceeding the sum of $1,000, and the deﬁciency arising on the
sale thereof pursuant to said judgment, and that the appel
lants will also pay all costs and damages which may be
awarded against them on the appeal, not exceeding two hun
dred and ﬁfty dollars.” The judgment having been reversed
in so far as it directed payment of the deﬁciency by Mrs. Weil.
but aﬁirmed in all other respects (12 Wis., 664), the sheriff
sold the property and reported a deﬁciency of about $10,000;
and the court conﬁrmed the report and sale, and rendered
judgment against Baruch S. Weil for the deﬁciency.
The complainant, in his action, after alleging th< above
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facts, and also that Baruch S. Weil had had the use and occu
pancy of the mortgaged premises for one year during the
pendency of the appeal, and that the same was worth $1,000,
demanded judgment against the defendants for that amount
A de
and for the deﬁciency above stated, with interest.
murrer to the complaint as not stating a cause of action, was
*
"‘
“
sustained by the circuit court.
'
*
*
"'
By the Court, DIXON, C. J.
As to the undertaking, we think it would be deviating from
the statute and violating the plain purpose of the legislature,
to hold the sureties discharged in a case like this. Joint ap
peals and joint undertakings on the part of two or more
plaintiffs or defendants are authorized by statute. Such has
been the constant .practice, and it has never been questioned
A strictly literal construction of the lan
by the profession.
guage of the undertaking in such cases, would defeat the main
object of the law in requiring it to be given. /In very few
cases, where the words of the statute had been pursued, could
if the makers
a recovery be had upon the undertaking,
The intention of the legislature
thought proper to object.
clearly was to make the undertaking effectual, to secure some
beneﬁt to the respondent, in case the judgment was affirmed
in any part, or as to any of the appellants; and to attain that
object, a liberal interpretation is allowable.
Such is the lan
guage of the authorities, and, no doubt, the correct rule of
law. We are to construe the undertaking in conformity to
the intention of the act under which it was made, and with
reference to which the makers must be supposed to have exe
cuted and delivered it, giving to both a fair and liberal in
terpretation to attain the end in view. If it be conceded, then,
that it was a joint appeal and undertaking on the part of Mr.
and Mrs. Weil, still the sureties are bound--bound for Mr.
Weil individually, as they would have been for both, had
judgment against both been affirmed. In legal effect, it is
the same as if the words of the condition had been joint and
several, or as if separate undertakings had been given for
each.

The judgment of the circuit court must, therefore, be re
versed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings ac
cording to law.
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J
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JOHNSON.

Supreme Court of the United States.
24

[Chap.

1860.

Howard, 195.

CLIFFORD, . This case comes before the court upon a writ
of error to the District Court of the United States for the
western district of Texas. It was a petitory suit, commenced
by the present defendants, and was founded upon a certain
ﬁnal decree rendered at the April term, 1854, by the district
chancery court, held at Carrollton, in the State of Mississippi,
for the northern district of that State. Among other things,
the petitioners allege that * * "‘ they prosecuted a writ
of error to the high court of errors and appeals in that State,
and that the decree of the district court of chancery was there
reversed, and a decree entered in their favor., "' * "
" " * It is not now questioned that a writ of error, un
der the circumstances of the case, was the proper process, by
the law of that State, for the removal of the cause into the
appellate court; but it is insisted that the subsequent decrees
are void, because the respondents were not legally notiﬁed of
the pendency of the writ of error. Personal service was not
made on either of the respondents, and they never appeared
in the appellate court. On the contrary, it appears that the
attorney of the complainants, on the eighteenth day of Janu
ary, 1852, ﬁled an affidavit in the cause, that the defendants
in error were not residents of the State, and that they had
no attorney of record on whom process could be served. Pro
vision, however, is made by the law of that State for service
By the act of the
by publication in cases of this description.
twenty-ninth of January, 1829, it is provided, that “whenecer
a cause shall be removed to the Supreme Court by writ of
error, and the court is satisﬁed that the defendant in error is
a non-resident, and has no attorney of record within this
State, it shall be the duty of said court to cause notice of the
pendency of said cause to be published for three weeks in
some public newspaper, the ﬁrst of which shall be at least
three months before the sitting of the next term of the court
in which the case is pending, within this State; on proof of
which publication, the court shall proceed to hear and deter
mine said cause, in the same manner as if process had been
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Hutchison’s Dig.,

p. 931.

That regulation, by a subsequent act passed on the second
day of March, 1833, is made applicable to the high court of
errors and appeals, and it was conceded at the argument that
"‘
*
“
the publication was made under that provision.
Personal service was made upon the defendants in this case
by due process of law in the court of original jurisdiction,
and the question here is, whether a party duly served with
notice in a subordinate court, after he has appeared and an
swered to the suit, and secured an erroneous judgment in his
favor, may voluntarily absent himself from the jurisdiction
of the appellate tribunal, so as to render it impossible to give
him personal notice of an appeal, and still have a right to
complain that notice was served by publication, pursuant‘ to
the law of the jurisdiction from which he has thus volun
tarily withdrawn. We think not. To admit the proposition,
would be to deprive the other party of all means of removing
the cause to the appellate tribunal, and would enable a party,
who knew he had wrongfully prevailed in the court below, to
secure the fruits of an erroneous judgment, by defeating the
jurisdiction of the appellate court.
Actual notice ought to
be given in all cases where it is practicable, even in appellate
tribunals; but whenever personal service has been rendered
impossible by the removal of the appellee or defendant in er
ror from the jurisdiction, service by publication is sufficient
to give the appellate tribunal jurisdiction of the subject and
the person, provided it appears in the record that personal
notice was given in the subordinate court, and that the party
there appeared, and litigated the merits of the controversy.
Contrary to the views of the counsel for the present plain
tiffs, we think there is some distinction between the notice
required to be given to an appellee or defendant in error and
the service of process in the original suit. A writ of error is
said to be an original writ, because, at common law, it was
issued out of the court of chancery; but its operation is
rather upon the record, than the person. Under the judiciary
act, says Marshall, Ch. ., the effect of a writ of error is sim
ply to bring the record into court, and submit the judgment of
It does not in any
the inferior tribunal to re-examination.
manner act upon the parties; it acts only on the record, by
removing the record into the supervising tribunal. Suits can

J
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not, under the judiciary act, be commenced against the United
States; and yet writs of error, accompanied by citations, have
uniformly issued for the removal of judgments recovered in
favor of the United States into this court for re-examination.
Such cases are of daily occurrence, and the judgments are
here reversed or affirmed, as they are with or without error;
and it has never been supposed that the writ of error in such
cases, though sometimes involving large amounts, was a suit
against the United States. Plainly, therefore, there is a dis
tinction between a writ of error and the original suit. Ac
cording to the practice in this court, it is rather a continua
tion of the original litigation than the commencement of a
new action; and such, it is believed, is the general understand
ing of the legal profession in the United States. Cohens v.
Virginia, 6 Pet., 410; Clark v. Matthewson, 12 Pet., 170.
* * “‘ Common justice requires that a party, in cases of
this description, should have some mode of giving notice to
his adversary; and where, as in this case, the record shows
that the defendant appeared in the subordinate court, and
litigated the merits there to ﬁnal judgment, it cannot be ad
mitted that he can defeat an appeal by removing from the
jurisdiction, so as to render a personal service of the citation
impossible.
On that state of facts, service by publication, ac
cording to the law of the jurisdiction and the practice of the
court, we think, is free from objection, and is amply sufficient
to support the judgment of the appellate court.
Mandeville
et al. v. Riggs, 2 Pet., p. 489; Hunt et al. 12. Wickliﬂe, 2 Pet.,
*

*

*

#

*

8

#

*

Ill

214.
#19

There is the same necessity tor service of notice in cases of appeals
as in proceedings in error.—Da.yt0n v. Lash, (1876) 94 U. S. 112.
The form and character of the notice or citation to be served upon
At common law it was
the appellee is frequently provided by statute.
sc-ire facias ad audicndum errorcs:—Rochester v. Roberts,
(1852) 25 N.
H. 495.
Service on the adverse party's attorney of record is suiﬁcient.—-Bacon
Black (U. S.) 38; Rose v. Mesmer, (1901) 134 Cal. 459;
v. Hart, (1861)
Yerg.
Kinney v. Hickox, (1888) 24 Neb. 167; Love v. Hall, (1832)
(Tenn.) 408. Although this is sometimes allowed only in case oi non
resident or absent parties.—-Weston v. Bonney, (1896) 37 Fla. 374.
The voluntary appearance of the appellee without service of citation
is enough to give the appellate court jurisdiction oi.’ his person.-Lane
v. Soulard, (1853) 15 Ill. 120.
Where an appeal is taken in open court, no notice or citation to the
appellee is necessary.—Brown v. McConnell, (1887) 124 U. S. 489;
Wilson v. Bennett, (1892) 132 Ind. 210 (taken in same term).
3

1

a
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REED.

Supreme Court of California.
25

1-035

1864.

California, 479.

SAWYER, J. The respondent made a preliminary motion
to dismiss the appeal, on the ground that the record contains
no statement on appeal, and no assignment of errors, or state
ment of the grounds upon which appellant relies. The motion
to dismiss was argued orally, and the case at the same time
submitted on its merits on briefs, subject to the motion to
dismiss.
We have frequently had motions to dismiss appeals from
orders denying new trials, and from judgments, on the gen
eral ground that there was no assignment of errors in the rec
ord. But the term, “assignment of errors,” seems to be used
somewhat loosely and vaguely.
The real difficulty to be
reached—-though frequently the point is not distinctly pre
sented-is, that there is no such statement of the grounds
intended to be relied on, on motion for new trial, or on ap
peal, as is required by the statute; and this is the point of
the objection in this case. Notwithstanding the repeated de
cisions on the point, there still seems to be a misapprehension
as to what is required, under the statute, to constitute a valid
statement of the grounds relied on in such cases, and there is
more or less discussion upon the subject whenever these mo
tions are made. For this reason, we propose now to exam
ir.e these questions, and, once for all, lay down the rule which
we suppose to be contemplated by the statute, and established
by the decisions.
The term assignment of errors is not used in our Practice
Act. An assignment of errors, in the strict common law
sense of the term, was in the nature of a pleading, to which
there was a demurrer or joinder in error.
(2 Tidd's Pr.
644;
1168; 3 Steph. Com.
2 Burr. Pr. 147.)
It did not con
stitute a part of the transcript, but was founded upon it, and
was ﬁled in the appellate court at, or subsequent to the time
of ﬁling the transcript. It is hardly necessary to say, that
the ﬁling of such an assignment of errors was never required
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under the system of practice in this State. Yet we ﬁnd the
term often used in our reports in a sense somewhat different
from, but analogous to its common law sense. Thus, in Peo
ple v. Goldbury, 10 Cal. 312; People v. Comedo, 11 Cal. 70, and
Sayre v. Smith, 11 Cal. 129—generally cited in these discus
sions-—the appeals were dismissed; and in Squires Iv. Foor
man, 10 Cal. 298, the judgment was affirmed for want of “an
" So far as we are able to as
assignment of errors.” "
certain the facts from the records, the appeals in these sev
eral cases were not dismissed, nor the judgments aﬁirmed on
motion of the respondents’ counsel, for defects existing in the
statements or transcripts. But on the contrary, the Court, on
taking up the cases for examination and decision, seems to
have found no speciﬁc statement of the errors, or anything in
the nature of a brief, or points on ﬁle on the part of the ap
pellant to direct attention to the points relied on, or aid in
the examination of the record. If anything was found—as in
the case of Squires '0. Foorman, in which a paper indorsed,
“assignment of errors” was ﬁled—the speciﬁcation of the er
rors was in such general terms as to afford the Court no as
sistance.
In such cases the Court, (not feeling called upon to per
form the duties of counsel,) upon its own motion—-as this
Court has also done in several similar instances-either
afﬁrmed the judgment, or dismissed the appeal for want of
the aid of what was termed, an “assignment of err0rs;” that
is to say, a speciﬁcation of the points or particular errors re
lied on ﬁled in the case, which seems to be the sense in which
the term was used by the Court.
In Squires 'v. Foorman, the appeal was from a judgment on
The appellant ﬁled a paper (which was no part
demurrer.
of the transcript) purporting to be an “assignment of er
rors,” in the following words: “1. The Court erred in over
ruling the demurrer.
2. The Court erred in rendering judg
ment.
3.
The Court erred in rendering judgment by de

'

fault.”
There was no brief, and no other statement of the points.
Mr. Justice Field, in deciding the case, said: “There is not,
in the strict common law sense of the term, any assignment of
What is meant
errors required to be ﬁled by the appellant.
by
is,
used
this
Court
by the term as heretofore
that a speciﬁ
cation must be ﬁled of the errors upon which the appellant

Sec.

3]

Tamsrsa TOTREVIEWING Couar

will rely, with such fullness as will give aid

1037

Court in
the examination of the transcript.
The assignment in this
case gives no such aid, but leaves the Court to grope its way
through the record in search of possible errors. We have
neither the time nor disposition to make such investigation.”
It
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The case of Barrett '0. Tewksbury, 15 Cal. 354, presents a
different question. The question in that case was, whether
the document purporting to be a statement contained a sulﬁ
cient speciﬁcation of the grounds on which the appellant re
lied, to constitute a valid statement, and render it available on
appeal. And this is the question which is, or should be pre
sented, when objections are taken to statements on the mo
tions so frequently made in this Court.
Section three hundred and thirty-eight of the Practice Act
of eighteen hundred and ﬁfty-one, in force at the time the
statement in that case was prepared, provides, that the state
ment shall “contain the grounds upon which he (the appel
lant) intends to rely on the appeal, and shall contain so much
of the evidence as may be necessary to explain the grounds,
and no more.”
In deciding the case Mr. Chief Justice Field says: “The
speciﬁcation of the grounds is the essential element of a state
It is the statement
ment; the evidence is the mere incident.
‘of the case,’ and not of the evidence, which is to be annexed
to the record of the judgment or order appealed from. Thc
case on appeal consists of the questions of law or of fact
These must be distinctly set forth and accompanied
raised.
with only so much of the evidence as may be necessary to ex
plain and show their pertinency and materiality, and no more.
The speciﬁcation is necessary, in the preparation of the state
ment, to enable the adverse party to suggest, intelligently,
such amendments as he may deem important to the just de
Without it neither the adverse
termination of the case.
party, nor the Judge, can well know how much of the evidence
It often happens that, of numerous
should be set forth.
points taken in the progress of the trial, the greater number,
after mature consideration, are abandoned by counsel, and
the appeal made to rest on one or two of them. In such in
stances, a large portion of the testimony actually given be
comes entirely immaterial on appeal; but Without a speciﬁca
tion of the grounds on which the appellant intends to rely,
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the adverse party will be ignorant of the materiality of that
which is inserted or omitted in the statement.”
(15 Cal.
356-7.)
And again, p. 358: “In all future cases, the speciﬁcations
must be made when the statements are originally prepared.
Nor is there any difficulty in pursuing this course; but on the
contrary, the labor of the parties, as well as their expenses,
will be thereby greatly lessened. It is certainly a very simple
matter for the party appealing to allege, either at the com
mencement or conclusion of his statement, that on appeal he
will rely upon certain errors committed by the Court; as, for
example, in admitting the testimony of a particular witness,
or in excluding certain documents, or in giving or refusing
certain instructions, or in making particular rulings upon
When the grounds
the contract or subject in controversy.
are thus speciﬁed it will be an easy matter to state so much
of the evidence "as may be necessary to explain and point
them, and the adverse party will be enabled to suggest read
ily and intelligently such amendments to the statements as
There
he may deem important to their just determination.
may be cases where equitable relief is sought. as suggested
by the learned counsel of the petitioners in which the general
ground of appeal will be that the decree is not warranted by
the evidence; yet, even then the general ground will be found,
in a great majority of instances, subject to more particular
speciﬁcations—as that the evidence does not establish a con
tract, or show a tender, or compliance with particular con
dition precedent, or the like, which will constitute the mat
ters urged upon the Court.”
(For further illustrations see
opinion in the case cited.)
III

#

Q

$

Q

$

$

i l i

The only statement of the grounds is an enumeration of
the causes for new trial speciﬁed in the ﬁfth, sixth, and sev
enth clauses of section one hundred and ninety-three, very
nearly in the words of the statute, as follows:
First-—Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict.
Second-The verdict and judgment are against law.
Third—Excessive damages as given by the jury.
Fourth—Error in law occurring at the trial and excepted
to by the defendants; without in the remotest degree indi
cating wherein the evidence was insuﬂicient, the verdict
against law, or the error in law at the trial occurred.

Sec.

3]

TRANSFER T0 REVIEWING

Courvr

1039

The third speciﬁcation, as here stated, is not recognized by
the statute as a cause for a new trial, for there is no aver
ment or pretense that the damages were “given under the in
ﬂuence of passion or prejudice.”
We do not think the grounds are “speciﬁcally set forth,”
There
_within the meaning of the statute as before construed.
is nothin'g here that indicates the speciﬁc errors or grounds
relied on. The speciﬁcation affords to the other party no in
formation that is of any service to him in suggesting amend
*
“
*
ments to the statement.
Such a statement affords
no information whatever, and so far as any useful purpose is.
concerned, it might just as well be altogether omitted.
We
are disposed to carry out these provisions of the Practice Act
according to the letter and spirit; and the construction given
*
"
"*
them, as we conceive, will accomplish that result.

Judgment aj_‘ﬁrmed.°°
B0 In some jurisdictions
the court will notice “plain errors" not as
Heights Realty Co. v. Rudolph, (1909)
signed or speciﬁed.-—Columbia
217 U. S. 547; Santaella v. Lange Co., (1907) 155 Fed. 719, 84 C. C. A.
145; Weems v. United States, (1909) 217 U. S. 349; Lee v. Dozier, (1866)
40 Miss. 477; Canole v. Allen, (1908) 222 Pa. 156; Waxham v. Fink,
'(1910) 86 Neb. 180.
In many jurisdictions "fundamental errors apparent on the face of the
v. Balize,
record" may be considered in the absence of assignment.—State
(1886) 38 La. Ann. 542; Houston Oil Co. v. Kimball, (1910) 103. Tex.
94; Maricopa County v. Jordan, (1900) 7 Ariz. 4; Windsor Reservoir &
Canal Co. v. Ditch Co., (1908) 44 Colo. 214; Crandall v. State, (1834)
10 Conn. 339; Prall v. Prall, (1909) 58 Fla. 496; Voorhees v. Arnold,
(1899) 108 Ia. 77; Ullery v. Guthrie, (1908) 148 N. C. 417.
Jurisdictional questions will usually be considered although not as
signed.—Bryan v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., (1907) 119 Tenn. 349;
Fore-River Shipbuilding Co. v. Hagg, (1910) 219 U. S. 175; Tuskaloosa
Cotton-seed Oil Co. v. Perry, (1887) 85 Ala. 158; Robertson v. Robertson,
(1913) 178 Mo. App. 478; Davis v. Council, (1885) 92 N. C. 725; Weiss
man v. Russell, (1881) 10 Ore. 73.
Where assignment should appear. The assignments of error are gen
erally prepared as a distinct and separate pa.per.—Farrar v. Churchill,
(1889) 135 U. S. 609; Central Trust Co. v. Trust Co., (1898) 86 Fed.
517; Armstrong's Appeal, (1871) 68 Pa. 409; Cameron v. Roemele, (1883)
59 Tex. 238.
Under the practice in other states the speciﬁcation or assignment of
errors is made only in the brief ﬁled in the appellate court.—Waxham
v. Fink, (1910) 86 Neb. 180; Iowa Supreme Court Rules, sec. 53, 128
N. W. xi; McReavy v. Eshelman, (1892) 4 Wash. 757.
'In some states the errors are speciﬁed in a petition in error,—Green
await v. Natrona Imp. Co., (1907) 16 Wyo. 226; Mosetnan v. State, (1900)
59 Neb. 629; Homes v. Henrietta, (1897) 91 Tex. 318: in others they are
pointed out in the notice of appeal,—Archbishop Y. Hack, (1893) 23 Ore.
536; Ingraham v. County Treasurer, (1895) 91 Hun (N. Y.) 53; in other
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v. Hay
states the speciﬁcation is made in the bill of exceptions:-Later
wood (1908) 14 Ida. 45; Patterson v. Beck, (1909) 133 Ga. 701; Talbott
& Sons. v. Padgett. (1888) 30 S. C. 167; Jones v. Atl. Coast Line RR. Co.,
(1910) 153 N. C. 419.
The necessity for a speciﬁcation of errors ls the same in equity cases
as in actions at law. See New Jersey Bldg. Loan Co. v. Lord (1903) 66
N. J. Eq. 341; Wood v. Wilbert (1912) 226 U. S. 384; Stephens v. Johnson
.
(1912) 265 Ill. 610; Prosser v. Manley (1913) 122 Minn. 448.

NATIONAL AUTOMATIC FURNACE
Supreme Court of Colorado.
41

Colorado,

CO. v.

WILMER.

1907.

.313.

J

MAXWELL,
This was an action by appellee, plaintiff be
.
low, against appellants and three others, upon a promissory
note. It appears from the complaint that the note was the
joint and several note of appellant corporation and three
other defendants; that at the maturity of the note appellant
Wilson, who was the president of the corporation, executed
the note as a maker, in consideration of an extension of the
time of payment, and agreed to pay the note at the expira
Appellant's joint and several answer
tion~ of the extension.
admitted the execution of the note by the corporation, sub
stantially denied all other allegations of the complaint, and set
up as affirmative defenses, a failure of consideration, and
that the note was executed by the corporation in fraud of
appellants’ rights. A trial to the court without a jury re
sulted in a ﬁnding in favor of appellee and against appel
lants; no evidence having been oifered in the court below by
the appellants or either of them. A joint motion for a new
trial was ﬁled by appellants, which being denied judgment
was rendered against appellants for the amount of the note
A joint appeal was prayed by appellants and
and interest.
allowed. A joint appeal bond was ﬁled by them, and they ﬁle
their joint assignments of error.
The only assignments of error discussed by counsel for ap
pellants are the second and fourth.
The second assignment of error is based upon the proposi
tion that there was a material variance between the complaint
and the evidence adduced at the trial, which sought to charge
\

,

-ii
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appellant Wilson with liability as a maker of the note. It is
evident that, if the error assigned was committed, it affects
appellant Wilson alone. “Where several parties unite in one
assignment of error, they will encounter defeat, unless the
assignment is good as to all. If the errors affect the parties
severally and not jointly, the proper practice is for each
party to assign errors, for the rule is well settled that a
joint assignment will not permit one of several parties to
avail himself of errors alleged upon rulings which affect him
alone, and not those with whom he unites in the assignment.
The rule that a joint assignment of errors must be good as
to all who unite in it is in harmony with the general prin
ciple of pleading which requires a demurrer, an answer, or
a motion to be good as to all who join in it.” Elliott, Appel
late Procedure, 318; 2 Cyc. 1003, and cases cited; 2 Ency.
P. & P. 933, and cases cited. The rule above stated is pecu
liarly applicable to this case. No attempt was made at the

trial to establish

for the appellant

corporation.
There is no pretense upon the part of appellants, if error
there be in the error assigned, of any injury thereby to the
Injury must result from the error
appellant corporation.
complained of to the party complaining to affect a reversal
of the judgment of the court below. Joining the corporation
with himself in this appeal, appellant Wilson protected it
against the execution of a just judgment against it. If he
had felt aggrieved at errors committed against himself, the
action being joint and several, the Code provides a method
by which he might have had such errors reviewed and cor
rected, if they existed.
The fourth assignment of error is that the court erred in
entering ﬁnal judgment against appellants without having
disposed of the issues raised by the answer of the other
three defendants.
This question was not presented to or
passed upon by the court below, and under the well-settled
practice of this court will not be considered. Marean 'v. Stan
ley, 21 Colo. 43, 39 Pac. 1086.
The judgment will be aﬂirrned."
a defense

B1 In Fisher v. Thirkell,
(1870) 21 Mich. 1, the court held that an as
signment of error would be taken to be “joint and several or joint or
several according to the nature of the error assigned."
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[Chap.

8

MANN.

Court of Errors of Connecticut.
80 Connecticut,

1907.

86.

THAYER, J. The only errors claimed in the appellant’s
reasons of appeal are that the court erred in its charge, ﬁrst,
“in that it did not instruct the jury as to the legal effect of
the evidence tending to show that the defendant, within six
years before the commencement of the action, had disputed
the claims of the plaintiff”; second, “in that it did not instruct
the jury as to the legal effect of the evidence tending to show
accord and satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim”; and, third,
“in not charging the jury as requested.”
The evidence referred to in the ﬁrst assignment of error
It does not appear that the
is not recited in the record.
court was requested to instruct the jury as to its legal effect,
or that a proper consideration of the evidence by the jury
called for such instruction. The assignment is clearly.inade
quate to raise the point, urged by the defendant’s counsel that
payments made upon a disputed claim within six years before
the bringing of the action would not suspend the running of
the statute of limitations.
The second assignment raises no question for considera
tion, because the record does not show that any evidence of
an accord and satisfaction was offered upon the trial.
The third assignment of error does not comply with sec
tion 802 of the General Statutes of 1902, which requires that
the precise error claimed shall be speciﬁcally stated in the
A mere general statement, as that the
reason of appeal.
charging
as it did, or in refusing to charge as
court erred in
requested, where as in this case, there were numerous re
quests covering a number of different subjects, is insuﬁicient.
This court has repeatedly refused to consider claimed errors
which were attempted to be raised by such general assign
“
*
*
ments of error.
There is therefore no question of law properly raised on
the record for our consideration.
There is no error."
88 In Ferrier v. Ferrier,
(1883) 64 Cal. 23, the court said: “It does no!
appear that the defendant gave any evidence on the trial in suppoﬂ
of the matters set up in the third defense. We observe that it is stated
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by counsel in their assignment of errors, that such was the fact; but
If such was the
of course we cannot accept that statement as true.
rule there would be few, if any, cases in which an assignment of errors
appears, that would not have to be reversed."

WHIPPLE

v.

GEDDIS.

Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.
25

1905.

Appeal Cases, District of Columbia, 333.

'

DUELL, J. " "
It appears that the plaintiff originally brought suit in
one of the justice courts of the District to recover the sum of
$150, a balance alleged to be due him upon the sale and pur
chase of certain real estate. A judgment for the full amount,
with interest and costs, was rendered in favor of the plain
tiff, which was thereafter assigned to Campbell.
Thereafter
a second trial was had in the supreme court of the District,
and, under the instructions of the court, the jury found a
verdict for the plaintiff-appellee for the full amount claimed,
with interest and costs. A motion for a new trial was made,
denied, and judgment upon the verdict ordered.
The assignment of errors other than the general one that
the court erred in directing the jury to return a verdict for
First. In refusing to permit the
the plaintiff, are these:
appellant to explain to what encumbrances the expression
“certain existing encumbrances” mentioned in the deed, re
ferred; second, in holding, as a matter of law, that the appel
lant was bound by the terms of the deed to assume the en
cumbrances including taxes and assessments.
In order to decide whether these assignments of error are
well founded, or even warranted, we must turn to the record
to learn what transpired at the trial. The plaintiff was the
only witness called in his own behalf, and he testiﬁed that
he sold the defendant certain houses for $300; that the de
fendant paid one-half of this amount and refused to pay the
balance; that there were two trusts upon each house. Upon
cross-examination he was shown the deed which showed that
he had made certain incorrect statements which, however,
The
have no special bearing on the point in controversy.
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at or prior to the time of the payment
of the $150, but the examination of the title had not then
been completed by the Columbia Title Company.
The de
fendant, the only witness called in his behalf, gave his ver
sion of the transaction and testiﬁed, without objection, that
the plaintiff assured him that the taxes were paid, but if
anything was due he would pay. This, upon being recalled,
and without objection, the plaintiff denied. The deed which
was received by defendant, and by him promptly recorded,
discloses that the property was sold subject to “certain ex
isting encumbrances”.
The defendant was asked upon his
direct examination “in what sense the words ‘existing encum
brances’ was used by them [the parties] in the deed for the
houses.” The court, of its own motion, refused to permit the
witness to answer the question, on the ground that the under
standing of the witness was incompetent, as the writing spoke
for itself. The ﬁrst assigned error purports to be based
upon this ruling, but upon comparing it with the record it
Will be seen that there is a fatal variance between them.
The appellant was asked to explain the sense in which the
words “existing encumbrances” were used, while the error
is predicated upon the court’s refusal to permit the witness
to explain the expression “certain existing encumbrances,"
quite a different expression, as admitted by appellant’s coun
deed was delivered

sel.

‘

"

*

The record fails to disclose that the attention of the court
was called to what is contended to be a qualifying word, i. e.,
“certain,”. and we have no right to assume anything which
We must take it as presented,
does not appear in the record.
and decline to pass upon a question not raised below.
The
ﬁrst assignment of error is not based upon anything appear
ing in the record, and is therefore found not to be well taken.
We ﬁnd no ground for reversing the judgment of the court
below, and it is therefore affirmed, with costs.
Aﬂirmed.
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CO.

1905.

Idaho, 583.

SULLIVAN,
.
This action was brought by the respondent
against the appellant corporation to recover $2,000 damages
alleged to have been sustained because of the appellant's acts
in temporarily blockading a certain logging road which
crossed the appellant's railroad track in Kootenai county,
and over which railroad track and crossing the respondent
was hauling logs. The answer put in issue the main allega
tions of the complaint.
The cause was tried by the court with
a jury, and a verdict and judgment was rendered and entered
in favor of the respondent for $1,500. This appeal is from
the order denying a new trial.
It is ﬁrst contended by counsel for respondent that this
court cannot consider the sufficiency of the evidence to sup
port the verdict.
It is contended that the speciﬁcations of
the particulars in which the evidence is alleged to be insuf
ﬁcient to sustain the verdict are not sufficient speciﬁcations,
and for that reason the evidence cannot be considered on
this appeal. The speciﬁcations are as follows:
“And as
signs and specifies the following particulars in which said
evidence was and is insufficient:
(1) The evidence is un
disputed that the road in question was a private road.
(2)
The evidence is undisputed that this road has not been built
or used longer than the period of four years prior to the com
mencement of this action.
(3) The evidence is undisputed
crossing
in question was not on the land of the
that the
plaintiff in this case.” There are many of the early decisions
in California that are very technical upon the point under con
sideration, but the more recent decisions are more liberal and
"‘
*
*
have overruled some of the earlier cases.
See
Co.,
141
168,
Cal.
74
iv.
M.
&
P.
Pac.
Occidental
700.
In
Swift
that case the court said: “The substance of all these de
cisions is that the object of the rule requiring these speciﬁca
tions, is, ﬁrst, to shorten the statement of the evidence by
excluding everything irrelevant to the speciﬁed fact; and, sec
ond, to notify the opposite party of the particular ﬁnding
called in question, in order that he may see that the state
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fairly and fully presents the evidence bearing upon that

particular matter.

This object accomplished, the statute is
satisﬁed, and the more recent decisions of the court have
shown a disposition to construe speciﬁcations liberally in
favor, rather than strictly against, the right of the moving
party to be heard.”
See Stun/rt v. Lord (Cal.) 72 Pac. 142.
This court in Bernier 1:. Anderson, 70 Pac. 1027, said: “If
the speciﬁcations designate some particular fact, and aver
that it is not justiﬁed by, or not sustained by, or contrary to,
In the case at bar the
the evidence, they are sufﬁcient.”
main point in question was whether the road in controversy
was a public highway or a private road, and whether it had
been traveled by the public for a period of ﬁve years, and
whether the crossing in question was on the land of the plain
tiff. The speciﬁcations of the insufficiency of the evidence
on those points are clear and speciﬁc, and could not mislead
any one. The speciﬁcations were suﬁicient.
O

#

11

I!

i

U

F

C

Q

#83

88 But a mere statement
that the evidence ls insufficient to sustain
& Co. v.
the.verdict or ﬁndings is not a good speciﬁcation.—Reeves
McGee, (1914) 33 S. D. 276: Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, (1891) 144
U. S. 408; Bills v. Stevens Co.. (1906) 146 Mich. 515; Hamilton Buggy
Co. v. Iowa Buggy Co., (1893) 88 Ia. 364; Stroberg v. Merrill, (1913)
67

Ore. 409;

~i

Rousseau v. Cohn, (1912) 20 Cal.
(1914) 25 Colo. App. 348.

Ry. Co. v. Jenkins,

DALE
Supreme

v.

469;

C010.

& S0.

PURVIS.

Court of California.
78

App.

1889.

California, 113.

Woaxs, J. * * "‘
Appellant contends that certain of the instructions given
by the court were erroneous.
Counsel in their points and
authorities object to the instructions, in the language of their
speciﬁcations of errors of law:
“The court erred in giving
respondent’s instruction 4.” The only commendable feature
of such a mode of attack is its extreme brevity; and, although
brevity, in the argument of counsel, is pleasing to the court.
we think, in the present instance, it has been a little over
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We respectfully suggest to counsel that, in order to
call upon us to review the action of the court below, they
should point out in what respect the instruction attempted
Such a requirement
to be brought in question is erroneous.
is absolutely necessary to the proper dispatch of the business
of this court, and should in fairness to opposing counsel be
insisted upon if the point is seriously urged. We have, how
ever, examined the instructions, and ﬁnd no error in them.
This failure on our part may further tend to convince coun
sel of the necessity of greater particularity in pointing out
defects relied upon. We see no error in the record, and feel
satisﬁed that a correct result was reached.
Judgment and order denying a new trial affirmed.
We concur: SHARPSTEIN, J.; PATERSON, J.; THORNTON,
.
J,; MCFARLAND, J.
*
*
"4
BEATTY, C. J.
(dissenting)
dissent.

done.

I

B4 Some courts, however, do not require a statement of reasons why an
instruction is erroneous.—Davis v. Missouri, etc., RR. Co., (1897) 17 Tex.
Civ. App. 199; Denver 8: Rio Grade RR. Co. v. Young. (1902) 30 Colo.
349; Hammer v. Chicago, R. I. & P. RR. Co., (1885) 70 Ia. 623.

Q

PATTERSON

v.

BECK.

Supreme Court of Georgia.
1.93

1910.

Georgia, 701.

LUMPKIN, J. On May 2, 1908, Patterson, as receiver in
bankruptcy of the Newcomer-Manry Company, under author
ity from the court of bankruptcy, instituted a suit in the
city court of Atlanta against the Southern Construction Com
pany, and caused summons of garnishment to issue and be
served on the Fourth National Bank of Atlanta.
The gar
nishee had funds of the defendant in its hands.
On the same
day the stockholders of the defendant company held a meet
ing and unanimously passed resolutions that, for certain
reasons recited, “the charter of the Southern Electrical Con
struction Company and all its franchises and right thereun
der, be now voluntarily surrendered to the state,” and that
attorneys be authorized in the name of the stockholders to
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ﬁle a petition making known to the court the surrender of
the charter, and asking that the court take charge of and
administer all assets through a receiver. The Southern Elec
trical Construction Company and the Southern Construction
Company were names of the same company. The attorneys,
accordingly, ﬁled the petition, to which the company, through
its president, consented, and the judge of the superior court
passed an order reciting that “the corporation has been dis
solved by the surrender of its charter, which surrender is
hereby accepted by the court, so far as is necessary under
the law.” He appointed a receiver, with instructions as to
assets, operations, etc., and declared that “all the creditors
of said Southern Construction Company may, by interven
tion, set up any valid claim against said company herein,
and all such creditors are enjoined from proceeding on said
claims in any other case or any other court.” Patterson, as
receiver in bankruptcy of the Newcomer-Manry Company,
ﬁled his petition setting out the facts, and praying that “an
order be passed by this honorable court, either modifying
the order heretofore passed in the above-entitled cause so
as to allow your petitioner to proceed with the suit in the
city court of Atlanta, or, if said order is not so modiﬁed, that
it be allowed to foreclose its lien in this honorable court, and
that an order be directed to the Fourth National Bank of
Atlanta, ordering said Fourth National Bank of Atlanta to
make answer to the summons of garnishment to this hon
orable court.”
The case was submitted to the presiding judge on an
In addition to What appears
agreed statement of facts.
above, it was recited that, by order of the court, the Fourth
National Bank made answer to the garnishment to the su
perior court, admitting that it had certain funds on hand,
but claiming the right to apply a part of them to an indebted
ness by the corporation to it; that the balance admitted to be
due was paid over to the receiver, and by order of the court
held separately from other funds, “all parties agreeing that
any issues arising out of the suit in garnishment should be
*
*
*
The question being left to
heard in this court.
determination as to whether the garnishing creditor obtained
any right to the funds so caught under the garnishment pro
ceeding, this question is now before the court.” The court
reserved the question as to whether the bank was entitled to
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by it, and apply thereto a_ part of the
fund which was on deposit. An order was passed declaring
that “intervener has no lien upon the fund garnished in the
hands of the Fourth National Bank, and is entitled to no
priority over creditors in said fund.” The previous order
requiring receivers to hold the fund separately from the gen
eral fund was revoked.
The intervener excepted. The as
signment of error is set out in the ﬁrst headnote."
A motion to dismiss the writ of error was made, on
1.
the ground that there was no sufficient assignment of error.
It is denied. In support of the motion, counsel for defend
ant in error cited Fidelity & Deposit Co. 0. Anderson, 102
Ga. 551, 28 S. E. 382; Mayor, etc., of Brunswick 0. Moore,
74 Ga. 409; Mutual Building & Loan Ass’n v. Glessner, 99
Ga. 747, 27 S. E. 187; Kimball 0. Williams & McCurdy, 108
Ga. 812, 33 S. E. 994; Wheeler 0. Worley, 110 Ga. 513, 35
S. E. 639; Collins 0. Carr, 111 Ga. 867, 36 S. E. 959; Carter
& Woolfolk 0. Jackson, 115 Ga. 679, 42 S. E. 46. We granted
leave to review such of these cases and the cases cited in
them as apparently might conﬂict with the ruling now made.
When carefully considered, none of them essentially conflict
with the present ruling, though a misapplication of certain
expressions used in some of them might lead to such a con
clusion. A statement in Wheeler v. Worley, and one in Kim
ball 0. Williams, approach more nearly to adverse declarations
than any of the others. Section 5527 of the Civil Code of
1895 provides that the “bill of exceptions shall specify plainly
the decision complained of, and the alleged error.”
Section
5583 declares that “the Supreme Court shall not decide any
question unless it is made by a special assignment of error
in the bill of exceptions, and shall decide any question made
by a speciﬁc assignment of error in the bill of exceptions.”
Both of these sections have long been in force. In 1893 (Acts
1893, p. 52) the Legislature passed an act, which is now
codiﬁed in section 5569 of the Civil Code of 1895, whereby it
is declared that “it shall be unlawful for the Supreme Court
of Georgia to dismiss any case for want of technical con
formity to the statutes or rules regulating the practice in
carrying cases to that court, Where there is enough in the
bill of exceptions or transcript of the record presented, or
both together, to enable the court to ascertain substantially
the real questions in the case which the parties seek to have
set off the claim held
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decided therein.” Construing these sections together, they
furnish a rule for bringing before this court questions for
decision.
The last-mentioned act was evidently intended to
liberalize somewhat the former ones, or at least the construc
tion which had sometimes been given to them. Rules of this
character are made for a substantial purpose, not as mere
technical pitfalls to catch the unwary.
The decision com
plained of and the error alleged to exist therein ought to ap
pear plainly.
This is fair to the judge whose judgment it
is sought to reverse, so that he can make such facts appear,
or require such evidence and record to be brought to this
court as may be necessary for a proper consideration of the
errors complained of. Civ. Code 1895, § 5528. To allow a
mere general assignment which, without more, would not
direct the attention of the judge to the real question, and
then to hunt for something covered up in such generalities
as a ground for reversal, would be very much like allowing
him to be ambushed. It is fair to the adverse counsel or
party, in order that he may know what he must meet in this
court.
It is fair to this court, in order that there may be
clearcut questions for them to decide, and not an indeﬁnite
complaint for them to wander through in search for ques
tions to determine and errors to reverse.
This is not a court of appeals, but a court for the correc
tion of errors; and in order for it to deal wth alleged errors
intelligently the questions to be decided should be made to
appear.
Let us take a few illustrations, that the necessity
and propriety of such a rule duly applied, may_be shown.
Suppose that a case were submitted to a judge without a
jury, in which there were various issues of law and of fact,
and that he should render a general judgment in favor of
the plaintiff for a sum of money. What question would a
mere general exception that this was error present to this
court for decision?
Would it mean that the judgment on
the facts was contrary to the evidence, or without evidence
to support it, or that the judgment was far too large a sum‘?
Or that, without complaining of the ﬁnding on the facts, there
was some error of law? And what error?
Thus in Wade
Watson,
judge
922,
passed
"v.
the
on issues both of
66 S. E.
law and fact, and there was a mere general exception. Even
where there was an agreed statement of facts, it has some
times been held that a mere exception to a general judgment
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by the judge without a jury was insufficient, as the real‘ com
plaint might be that the judgment was too large or too small,
or bore interest, or that the rate of interest used was wrong,
or that there should be no recovery at all under the law, or
Other instances might be added,
perhaps other matters.
but these will suffice. Where there are several things involved
in a judgment, the thing complained of ought to be made to
appear.
This rule, however, is one of substantial practice,
rather than a Procrustean rule of words. When this is borne
in mind; and the language used in the various decisions is
considered in the light of the facts of the respective cases
before the court, if not all apparent conﬂict, at least most
Where a motion for a new
of it, practically disappears.
trial has been overruled and exception taken to such judg
ment, one assignment of error in the bill of exceptions is
sufficient to reach all of the grounds of the motion which
themselves contain sufficient assignments of error. Supreme
Court Rule 6 (57 S. E. v.).°° Taking the motion with the
bill of exceptions, the error complained of is apparent, and
the assignment need not be repeated. So of an exception to
an assignment of error on overruling or sustaining a de
murrer, where the grounds themselves show the points made
and ruled on, and in connection with the bill of exceptions
clearly show the errors assigned. Huwford v. Southern Pine
Co., 124 Ga. 181, 52 S. E. 439; Johnson v. Porter, 115 Ga.
Again, where a verdict was directed and
403, 41 S. E. 644.
the bill of exceptions excepted to such overruling and as
signed it as error, this was held to be sufficient, as meaning
that the judge committed error in holding that the evidence,
viewed in the light of the pleadings, demanded a ﬁnding
against the plaintiff in error. Howell v. Pennington, 118 Ga.
So likewise as to an exception to the
494, 45 S. E. 272.
grant of a nonsuit. Randolph v. Brunswick & B. R. Co., 120
Ga. 969, 48 S. E. 396. And where a single distinct question
was raised in regard to a motion to dismiss an appeal, on
the ground that it was not entered by the adverse party in
the j ustice’s court, but by a third party, and over objection
an amendment was allowed changing the name of the appel
lant, a bill of exceptions reciting the speciﬁc ruling of law
made, excepting to the judgment and assigning the ruling
Head 12. Marietta Guano Co.,
as error, was held sufficient.
124 Ga. 983, 53 S. E. 676.
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E. 187, where a case involving questions both of law
and fact was tried by the judge without a jury, and a judg
ment was rendered for the plaintiff, and direct exception
taken without a motion for a new trial, a mere statement
that the defendant excepted and assigned the judgment as
error was held insufficient. It was said that it ought at least
to have been stated whether the judgment was complained of
as contrary to the evidence or to law, or to both, and that “it
was never contemplated that this court should search around
in a loose and general way to discover errors not brought to
its attention with, at least, a reasonable degree of certainty.”
In Hart '0. Phenix Ins. Co., 113 Ga. 859, 39 S. E. 304, in an ac
tion on promissory notes, the court, on general and special
demurrer, struck an answer, rejected an amendment, and
rendered judgment for the plaintiff.
The bill of exceptions
speciﬁcally assigned error on the order in regard to the
amendment, and also in general terms complained of the
Under this general assignment it was argued
judgment.
that the judgment was not correct as to the amount, that the
contract was not unconditional, and that the court had no
authority to render a judgment without a jury. This court
decided the question raised by proper assignment of error,
but declined to pass on the points thus sought to be set up
under the general assignment, saying that there was noth
ing in the bill of exceptions to show that any such points were
made or passed on by the trial court. In Carter & W oolfolk,
'0. Jackson, 115 Ga. 676, 42 S. E. 46, it was said that if the
bill of exceptions meant to allege that the general judgment
was based on certain speciﬁed “holdings,” and that these
were erroneous, this was sufficient; and, construing the bill
of exceptions in the light of the record, it was held that such
We think what has been said will serve
was the meaning.
to show the propriety of the rule, but at the same time that
it is a rule of substance, not of words—a requirement based
not a mere ﬁligree of technical formula.
on sound.reason,
also,
See,
discussion in Lyndon '0. Georgia Ry. &- El. Co., 129
Ga. 353, 58 S. E. 1047; Crossley '0. Leslie, 130 Ga. 782, 61
S. E. 851.
Applying these principles to the present case, it is clear
It is distinctly
that the motion to dismiss must be overruled.
shown that there was no controversy about facts, that only
27 S.
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of law was submitted to the court, that the court
decided it adversely to the contention of the plaintiff in error,
and entered a judgment against him, and that the latter
excepted and assigned this as error. Good practice required
no more. Nothing more could well be said, except that the
ruling as to this question of law was error because it was
wrong.
The main line
The law requires no such repetition.
of decision involved in the cases reviewed is right, when
properly applied. Only such expressions as may conﬂict with
what is here ruled are modiﬁed. In regard to cases of injunc
tion, where the question usually is whether a judge abused
his discretion in granting or refusing the writ, a somewhat
more general assignment of error has been held sufficient to
withstand a motion to dismiss. Anderson 12. Newton, 123 Ga.
512, 51 S. E. 508; Kirkland v. Atlantic & Birmingham Ry.
C0,, 126 Ga. 246, 55 S. E. 23. But even in such cases, under
one question

alone, such special questions as the con
stitutionality of an act, the legality of time of the hearing,
whether there was suﬁicient service, or the like, not shown
to have been passed on, do not arise for decision.
We are
aware that this is a long discussion of a rule of practice, but
we trust that it will not be unproﬁtable.
The point is raised
in this court again and again. Like Banquo’s ghost, it will not
down.
a general assignment

l

1

i

#

$

U

t

l

t

$88

86 The hill of exceptions
stated that “the plaintiff in error excepts to
said order of December 5, 1908, and assigns the same as error."
88 But a, frequently approved
rule requires more than this, and the
speciﬁc grounds upon which it is claimed that the motion was erroneously
overruled must be stated in the assignment even when the motion itself
speciﬁes fully the grounds upon which it is based.—Lytle v. Prescott,
(1894) 57 Minn. 128; Sisson v. Kaper, (1898) 105 Ia. 599; Charouleau
v. Shields & Price, (1904) 9 Ariz. 73; Louisville, C. & L. RR. Co. v.
Sullivan, (1884) 81 Ky. 624; Walker v. Allen. (1899) 58 Neb. 537.
So where error is assigned to the overruling of a motion to direct a
verdict, and the motion is based upon several grounds, the assignment
should specify the particular ground or grounds in respect to which
error is claimed.—Hamilton Buggy Co. v. Iowa Buggy Co., (1893) 88
Ia. 364. The same principle applies to motions in arrest .ot Judgment.
Sanford v. Ainsa, (1911) 13 Ariz. 287; Reeves & Co. v, Lamm Bros.,
(1903) 120 Ia. 283.
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ELLIOTT, C. J. The appellees assigned cross-errors, and
gave notice to the parties who did not join in the appeal.
After the assignment of cross-errors was ﬁled, the appellants
moved to dismiss the appeal, and obtained an order dis
missing it. Very soon after this order was entered, the
appellees moved to reinstate the appeal upon their assignment
of cross-errors, and their motion was sustained. The appel
lants now move to vacate the order reinstating the appeal of
the appellees.
,
The contention of the appellants is that the dismissal of
the appeal by them carried the entire case, while the appel
lees contend that the appellants’ dismissal did not carry the
appeal, so far as it is affected by the assignment of cross
errors. It is true, as appellants contend, that our Code makes
no provision for the assignment of cross-errors by the appel
lee. But the practice has been so long and so often recognized
as an appropriate one that it must be regarded as one of the
Johnson 0. Culver, 19 N. E.
unwritten rules of procedure.
Rep. 129; Rochester 0. Levering, 104 Ind. 562-575, 4 N. E.
Rep. 203; Rail-road Co. '0. Mosier, 114 Ind. 447, 17 N. E. Rep.
109; Thomas 0. Simmons, 103 Ind. 538, 2 N. E. Rep. 203, and
3 N. E. Rep. 381; Kammerling 0. Armington, 58 Ind. 384;
Jenkins 0. Peckinpaugh, 40 Ind. 133; Adler 0. Sewell, 29 Ind.
598; Nutter 0. Railroad Co., 13 Ind. 479; White 0. Allen, 9
Ind. 561. A rule of this court which has long been in force
recognizes the right to assign cross-errors.
See rule 14. The
rule has so long and so steadily prevailed that it falls within
the operation of the maxim that “the practice of the court is
the law of the court.” Broom, Leg. Mex. 133. The rule has
much to commend it. Under its operation one appeal brings
By the one
to the appellate court the entire controversy.
appeal as much can be accomplished as by two distinct ap
peals. If separate appeals were taken, then the only method
of avoiding confusion would be to consolidate the cases; and
this, while it would accomplish no more than a single appeal,
would greatly increase the record, and augment the costs.

Sec.

3]

Trmusrsn T0 REVIEWING

COURT

1-055

The,rule is in harmony with the spirit of our Code, since it
tends to bring the merits of a controversy before the court
in a short and simple method. It is consistent with the lead
ing purpose elsewhere manifested in our system of proce
dure, to bring all the parties concerned in a controversy, and
all the questions growing out of a legal dispute, into court
in one proceeding, so that by one judgment or decree the
whole controversy may, if possible, be forever put at. rest.
In many cases the appellant may not bring such a record
to this court as will present other questions than those aris
ing on his assignment of errors, and in such a case the as
signment of cross-errors would be unavailing. We do not
mean to hold that the appellant is always bound to bring
here a record that will beneﬁt his adversary as well as him
self, but there are many cases, and this is one of them, in
which the whole record, with all the material questions, is
necessarily brought before this court.
With such a record
before us, all questions should be decided, for otherwise the
assignment of cross-errors would be an idle ceremony.
It
is a general rule that if a court acquires jurisdiction for one
Field v. Holzman,
purpose it will retain it for all purposes.
93 Ind. 205; Wood '0. Ostram, 29 Ind. 177. We can conceive
no reason why this familiar rule should not apply to appel
If a cause is in this court for the purpose
late proceedings.
of having an adjudication upon the questions presented by
the appellant’s assignment of errors, there is no reason why
it should not be held here for the purpose of adjudicating
upon the questions properly presented by the record and the
appellee’s assignment of cross-errors. Our Code means that
this court shall decide upon the substantial merits of a con
troversy, where it can be properly done; and it can, we be
lieve, be properly done where there is a suﬁicient record, a
proper assignment of cross-errors, and all the parties are
before the court in due course of law. The motion to vacate
the order reinstating the appeal is overruled.

i

1

Q

I

1

¥

i

$

$
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The practice in many states permits the assignment of cross errors.—
v. Slaughter, (1909) 241 Ill. 215; Page v. People, (1381) 99 Ill.
418 (held to be a cumulative remedy, and a separate appeal is also per
mitted); Wickllﬂo v. Buckman, (1851) 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 424 (cumulative,
not exclusive); Kindel v. Colo. & So. Ry. Co., (1914) 57 Colo. 1; Long
v. Campbell,
(1901) 133 Ala. 353; Gay v. Whidden, (1912) 64 Fla. 295.
See Elliott App. Prac. § 418.
B‘!

Pelouze

TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE

1056

[Chap.

8

But generally the appellee cannot be heard to complain of adverse
rulings unless he takes out a separate writ of error or appeal.—Botles
v. Outing Co., (1899) 175 U. S. 262.
See many cases cited in 4 C. J.
§

2598.

.._.iii___i__
SECTION 4.

Rncono

SUYDAM
Supreme

AND
v.

BILLs or EXCEPTIONS.

WILLIAMSON.

Court of the United States.
20

.

1857.

Howard, 427.

[The record brought up on writ of error showed the plead
ings, suggestion of death and substitution of other parties,
empanelling of jury, verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and
a document entitled in the cause and signed by the judge, as
follows:
“This is an action of ejectment for two lots in the 16th
ward of the city of New York. The declaration is in the
usual form; the plea is not guilty. Either party may refer to
the pleadings as part of this case.
“The plaintiffs gave in evidence an exempliﬁed copy of the
will, etc., etc.
“The plaintiff's then rested.
“The defendant’s counsel then proved [specifying various
matters] ; these were all objected to by the plaintiffs’ counsel,
and were read subject to the objection.
“The defendants’ counsel then offered in evidence a deed

[specifying it].
“The paintiffs’ counsel then offered to prove—[specifying
6 different matters.]
“The defendants’ counsel objected; the objections were sus
tained. The plaintiffs’ counsel excepted.
“A verdict was then by direction of the court, taken for
the plaintiffs for the premises claimed, subject to the opin
ion of the court upon the questions of law, with liberty to
either party to turn this case into a special verdict or a
bill of exceptions/’]
CLIFFORD, . This was a writ of error to the Circuit Court
of the United States for the southern district of New York.

J
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The view we have taken of this case, as it is exhibited in
the record, renders an extended statement of the facts en
tirely unnecessary. It was an action of ejectment brought in
the court below to recover the possession of a certain parcel
of land, with the appurtenances, situated in the sixteenth
ward of the city of New York, and described as lots sixty
four and sixty-ﬁve, according to a certain map made by
George B. Smith. The declaration, which was in the usual
form, was ﬁled in the Circuit Court for the southern district
of New York on the 15th day of August, 1845, and the de
fendant, James H. Suydam, appeared, by his attorney, and
pleaded that he was not guilty of unlawfully withholding
the premises claimed by the plaintiffs, as was alleged in the
declaration, and tendered an issue, which was duly joined by
*
*
*
The declaration contained on its
the plaintiffs.
face a good cause of action, and the general issue and joinder
were regularly ﬁled in the cause, and were entirely sufficient
to make up a valid issue between the parties to the suit;
and the verdict, which was strictly formal and legal, was in

67

every respect responsive to the issue formed.
It appears
that the jury found, in the very words of the issue, that the
defendant was guilty of unlawfully withholding the prem
ises claimed by the plaintiffs, as alleged in the declaration;
and the judgment followed the verdict, and was founded upon
it, for the premises as they set forth and described in the
Every step in the cause, from the ﬁling of the
pleadings.
declaration to the issuing of the writ of possession, was in
exact conformity to the most approved practice and prece
dents in the Federal courts.
We do not understand that the pleadings or the regularity
of the proceedings are in any manner called in question, ex
cept as the foundation of a judgment, which it is insisted
was erroneous, for reasons altogether aside from any con
nection with mere matters of form. The real controversy
between the parties has reference more especially to the
right of possession, and consequently extends to the title
of the premises described in the declaration, and necessarily
involves the principal questions which were presented to this
court at the December term, 1850, in the case of Williamson
v. Berry, 8 How., 495; and we regret that the facts of the
case, and the rulings of the court below, are not now ex
hibited in a manner to justify this court in giving the sub
»
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The difﬁculty, however, in
ject a re-examination
insurmount
the way of any such examination at this time,
able, for the reason that the record does not contain either
bill of exceptions, special verdict, or an agreed statement
of facts. Some of the questions discussed at the bar might
special verdict, or
have been satisfactorily presented in
by an agreed statement of facts, while in respect to others,
apparently regarded as important, such as the rulings of the
proper to re
court, in admitting or rejecting evidence,
mark that they could only be brought to this court for re
bill of exceptions. Such rulings are never prop
vision by
erly included in special verdict, any more than in an agreed
statement of facts. A special verdict is where the jury ﬁnd
the facts of the case, and refer the decision of the cause upon
those facts to the court, with a conditional conclusion, that
if the court should be of opinion, upon the whole matter thus
found, that the plaintiff has
good cause of action, they
otherwise, they then ﬁnd
then ﬁnd for the plaintiff; and
special
of the very essence of
for the defendant; and
verdict, that the jury should ﬁnd the facts on which the court
is to pronounce the judgment according to law, and the court
in giving judgment, is conﬁned to the facts so found; and
every special verdict, in order to enable the appellate court
to act upon it, must ﬁnd the facts, and not merely state the
states the evidence
evidence of facts; so that, where
merely, without stating the conclusions of the jury,
court
of error cannot act upon matters so found. In practice, the
formal preparation of such
verdict
made by the coun
is usually settled by them, subject
sel of the parties, and
to the correction of the court, according to the state of facts
as found by the jury, with respect to all particulars on
which-they have passed, and with respect to other particu
lars, according to the state of facts which
agreed they

is

it

is

ought to ﬁnd upon the evidence before them.
After the
arranged, and
special verdict
is reduced to form, it is
together
entered
on
the
with the other proceed
record,
then
ings in the cause, and the questions of law arising on the
facts found are then decided by the court, as in case of a de
murrer; and if either party
dissatisﬁed with the decision,
error,
he may resort to a court of
where nothing is open
for revision, except the questions of law inferentially aris
ing on the facts stated in the special verdict; and we here

\
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remark, for the purpose of illustration, that it is not so much
because the proceeding is denominated a special verdict, that
the party by virtue of it is authorized to invoke the aid of
a revisory tribunal, as it is because it has the effect to in
corporate the facts of the case into the record, which other
wise would have rested in parol, and therefore could not have
been reached on a writ of error; and the same remark ap
plies to a bill of exceptions, which is a still more compre
hensive method of enlarging the record by incorporating into
it not only the facts of the case, but the rulings of the court
in admitting and rejecting evidence, and the instructions
given to the jury; and after it is signed, sealed, and ﬁled in
the case, it becomes a part of the record, and the matters
therein set forth can no more be disputed than those con
tained in any other part of the same record, and are alike
subject to revision in a court of error. It is a mistake, how
ever, to suppose that in such cases the writ of error operates
only on the bill of exceptions. Such is never the fact, unless
the whole record is set forth in the bill of exceptions; as the
operation of the writ of error addresses itself to the record
as an entirety, and not to any separate portion of it as dis
tinct from the residue; and when the cause is removed into
the appellate court, any errorapparent in any part of the
record is within the revisory power of such tribunal.
The
rule is, that whenever the error is apparent on the record,
it is open to revision, whether it be made to appear by bill
of exceptions, or in any other manner.
(Bennett 12. Butter
worth, 11 How., 669; Slacum '0. Pomeroy, 6 Cranch, 221;
Garland v. Davis, 4 How., 131; Cohen v. Virginia, 6 Wheat.,
410.)
When a party is dissatisﬁed with the decision of his cause
in an inferior court, and intends to seek a revision of the
law applied to the case in a superior jurisdiction, he must
take care to raise the questions of law to be revised, and put
the facts on the record for the information of the appellate
tribunal; and if he omits to do so in any of the methods
known to the practice of such court, he must be content to
abide the consequences of his own neglect.
Evidence,
whether written or oral, and whether given to the court or
to the jury, does not become a part of the record, unless
made so by some regular proceeding at the time of the trial
Whatever the
and before the rendition of the judgment.

I
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error may be, and in whatever stage of the cause it may have
occurred, it must appear in the record, else it cannot be
revised in a court of error exercising jurisdiction according
A bill of exceptions un
to the course of the common law.
doubtedly is the safest method, as it is the most compre
hensive one in its operation; and where the facts are dis
puted, and cannot be arranged except from evidence admitted
under the ruling of the court as to its admissibility, often
times it becomes the only effectual mode by which all the
rights of the complaining party can be preserved.
On the
other hand, where there is no dispute in regard to the facts,
and consequently no necessity for any ruling of the court in
admitting or rejecting evidence, the same purpose may be
safely accomplished by a special verdict, or, according to the
rule established in this court, by an agreed statement of
facts.
(United States 12. Ellason, 16 Pet., 291; Stimson 1'.
Railroad Company, 10 How., 329; Graham 22. Bayne, 18 How.,
Where the facts are without dispute, and agreed be
60.)
tween the parties, a statement of the same may be drawn
up and entered on the record, and submitted directly to the
court, for its decision, without the intervention of a jury;
or a general verdict may be taken, subject to the opinion of
the court upon the facts so agreed; and in either case, the
aggrieved party may bring error after ﬁnal judgment, and
have the questions of law, arising upon the facts thus spread
upon the record, re-examined, as in the case of a special
verdict.
(Faw v. Bordean, 3 Cran., 174; Brent v. Chap-morn,
5 Cran., 358.)
It should be observed, however, that the rulings previ
ously made by the court, in admitting or rejecting evidence
during the progress of the trial, are no more revisable on
a special case, as

it is called, when the verdict‘ is taken sub

ject to the opinion of the court on an agreed state of facts,
than where the agreed statement is submitted directly to the
court, without the intervention of the jury; and for the
obvious reason that, in the one case as much as in the other,
the foundation laid for the action of the revisory tribunal is
based upon the consent of the parties to the suit, and conse
quently the action of the appellate court must be conﬁned to
the facts as they were agreed, and as they appear in the rec
*
“
“
ord of the case.
Other modes are known to the practice of this court, by
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which the evidence produced against a party may in certain
cases be put on the record either in whole or in part, accord
ing to the circumstances, so as to secure the right to have
the questions of law arising upon it revised on a writ of
error; but every proceeding of that kind is either so limited
in its application or so tied up by conditions, that they are
seldom of much practical importance, and are only referred
to on the present occasion to conﬁrm the proposition already
advanced, that no ancillary step in the cause is of any avail
to a party as laying the foundation to support a writ of
error, any farther than it has the effect to place on the
Formerly it
record what otherwise would rest in parol.
party
might
always
demur to the evi
was considered that a
dence produced against him, as a matter of right; and while
that was so, a demurrer to evidence was equally effectual
with a bill of exceptions to the extent of its operation.
(4
The bill of exceptions
Chitt. Gen. Prac., 7; 2 Inst., 427.)

was always the more comprehensive remedy, because it ex
tended, as it still does, not only to the facts in the case, but
also to the rulings of the court in admitting or rejecting evi
dence, and to the instructions given to the jury upon its
legal effect. A demurrer to the evidence, while its operation
in one respect is nearly the same as that of the bill of excep
tions, in another is very different.
It extends only to the
evidence produced, as the term imports, and has no effect
at all upon the rulings of the court by which it was received;
and as a necessary consequence, where the error of the court
consists in having admitted improper evidence, the effect
of a demurrer to it would be to waive the objection to the
ruling, instead of laying the foundation to correct the error.
ll!

*

¥

Another method by which certain evidence may be incor
into the record at the nisi prius trial is by oyer,
which occurs where the plaintiff in his declaration, or the
defendant in his p-lea, ﬁnds it necessary to make a profert of
a deed, probate, letters of administration, or other instru
ment, under seal, and the other party prays that it may be
read to him, which in such a case cannot, as a general rule,
be denied, by the court; and the effect of the proceeding, in
certain cases, is to make the instrument a part of the plead
ings, and, consequently, to place it within the operation of a
writ of error, which, in every case where the proceeding is
porated
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according to the course of the common law, brings up the
whole record; and in all these cases, as well as in the one
ﬁrst named, it is because the evidence, whatever it may be,
is made a part of the record by the proceeding, that the
questions of law arising upon it become a proper subject of
revision on the writ of error.
(1 Chitt. on Plead., 10th
Am. ed., 431; 1 Tidd. Prac., 3d Am. ed., 586.) And the same
effect is produced and the same object is attained when the
defendant demurs to the declaration, or when either party
demurs to a material portion of the pleadings on which the
cause depends; and so it must have been understood by this
court in German et al. 'v. Lenox, 15 Pet., 115, where it was
held, in accordance with the principle here advanced, that
the action of the Circuit Court of this District, in sustaining
a demurrer to a plea of performance in a suit on a replevin
bond, was the subject of revision on a writ of error; and
the rule adopted in that case was undoubtedly correct, as the
effect of the demurrer was to make the error apparent in the
record; and when that is so, it becomes the subject of re
vision just as much as when it is made to appear by a bill
of exceptions or a special verdict.
We have now adverted to the several methods acknowl
edged by courts of error, by which matters resting in parol
at the trial in the subordinate tribunal may be put on the
record, so as to lay a proper foundation for revision of the
legal questions arising out of them in the appellate court,
and there are no others which can be recognized in this
court in cases where the proceedings are required to be ac
cording to the course of the common law.
(Dougherty 1’.
Campbell, 1 Blackf., 24; Cole 1:. Driskell, 1 Blackf. 16.)
A writ of error is an original writ, and lies only when a
party is aggrieved by some error in the foundation, pro
ceedings, judgment, or execution, of a suit in a court of
record, and is deﬁned to be a commission, by which the
judges of one court are authorized to examine a record upon
which a judgment was given in another court, and, on such
examination, to affirm or reverse; and it was expressly held
by this court, in Cohens v. Virginia, (6 Wheat, 410,) that the
writ of error operated upon the record, and that its effect,
under the judiciary act, was to bring it into this court, and
submit it to a re-examination; and it is also laid down by the
best writers on pleadings, that nothing will be error in law

——_‘ﬁ-ii
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that does not appear on the face of the record, for matters
not so appearing are not supposed to have entered into the
(Steph. on Plea., 121.)
consideration of the judges.
The writ of error in this case was issued on the eighteenth
day of December, 1854, and on the twenty-ninth day of
January, 1855, an additional paper was ﬁled, which in the
transcript is denominated the “case,” and is the one which
furnished all the materials for the discussion at the bar. It
purports to contain all the evidence introduced at the trial
in the court below, as well that given by the defendant as
that given by the plaintiffs, and certain offers of proof on
the part of the plaintiffs, which were objected to by the de
fendant, and excluded by the court.
This mass of evidence,
with the exhibits, ﬁlling sixty pages of the transcript, has
respect, on the one said or the other, to the title and right of
possession to the premises described in the declaration, and
comprises all the evidences of title which were before this
court on the former occasion; and, in addition thereto, cer
tain admissions of the parties and other parol evidence. It is
now drawn up in the form of a report of the judge who pre
sided at the trial, and is signed by him, and is under seal;
and, as we understand the endorsement, is certiﬁed to be
correct by the counsel of the plaintiffs.
The conclusionof
the report is as follows:
“A verdict was then, by direction of the court, taken for
the plaintiffs, for the premises claimed, subject to the opini
ion of the court upon the questions of law, with liberty to
either party to turn this case into a special verdict or bill of
exceptions.”

Whatever might have been the right of the parties under
that report, it is too plain for argument, that no one con
nected with its preparation could have regarded it either as
a special verdict or a bill of exceptions.
All that it professed
to do was to give either party the liberty to turn the case
into one or the other of those forms of proceeding; and it is
a sufficient answer to any pretensions under the report to

for some rea
court,
right
son unknown to this
the
to make the change, if
such it was, has never been exercised; and that it is now
presented here in the form in which it was prepared when it
is too late to make the alteration. And we also say, that
this court cannot so far depart from the settled practice and
say, that the change has not been made; that,
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regular course of proceeding as to give an effect to the paper
which neither its contents nor terms would warrant; nor
can we attempt to do for the plaintiff in error what it was
his duty to have done at the trial, and before the writ of
error was sued out; nor are we prepared to admit that the
option given to turn the case either into a special verdict or
a bill of exceptions could have been exercised by either party
under the concluding portion of that report, without the
assent of the judge who presided at the trial, and irrespect
ive of his authority.
On the contrary, we conclude that,
“where a case shall be made with leave to turn the same into
a special verdict or bill of exceptions, the party shall not be
at liberty to do either, at his election, but the court may,
if they think proper, prescribe the one which he shall adopt.”
(Conk. Trea., 3d ed., p. 444.)
Nothing less than the presence and assent of the court,
we think, can give any legal validity to a special verdict;
and in respect to a bill of exceptions, it must always be
signed and sealed by the judge, or else it would be a nullity.
(Phelps v. Mayer, 15 How., 160.)
A special verdict ought
always to be settled under the correction of the judge who
presided at the trial, and, whether prepared at the time or
subsequently, it should be ﬁled as of the term when the trial
took place.
(Turner 12. Yates, 16 How., 14; Shappard u. Wil
son, 6 How., 275.)
The necessary effect of the proceeding,
where the verdict is taken subject to the opinion of the court,
would be to postpone the preparation of the special verdict
till after the parties were heard, and the opinion given; and
to that extent the delay is allowable, though we are by no
means prepared to admit that it may be done after the cause
has been removed into this court.
The result is, we have
conclusion,
come to the
on this branch of the case, that the
paper in the transcript denominated the “case” must be con
sidered merely as a report of the judge who presided at the
trial; that it is not a part of the record, and, consequently,
must be wholly disregarded by this court, in determining
whether the judgment of the court below ought to be re
Having come to that conclusion, it be
versed or afﬁrmed.
comes unnecessary to notice any of the rulings of the court
in admitting or excluding evidence, as no part of that report
*
*
*
can be taken into consideration.
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is certain, therefore, that there is no error in the record;
Q

The judgment of the Circuit Court is therefore affirmed,
with costs."
Lessee v. Bank of Indiana (1863) 1 Wall. (U. S.)
similar case was criticized.
Bill of Exceptions of Statutory 0rigin.—-"Ai: common law a writ of
error lay for an error apparent in the record, or for an error in fact,
where either party died before judgment.
It did not lie for an error
of law not appearing in the record, and hence where the plaintiff or
defendant alleged anything ore tenus, which was overruled by the judge,
this could not be assigned.
It was not an error appearing upon the
record, nor an error in fact, but in law, and the party aggrieved by it
was without a remedy.
Bacon's Abr. Title, “Bill of Exceptions,” vol. 1,
788.
To obviate this evil the statute of Westminster, 13 Edw. I, was
passed, authorizing the parties to allege exceptions, and requiring the
justices to allow and put their seals to them when they became a part
of the roll. The practice of allowing exceptions had its origin under
that statute of which all subsequent statutes have been substantially
copies."—Dunbar v. Hollinshead, (1860) 10 Wis. 505.
“The statute of Westminster (13 Edw. I, c. 31) as an ancient statute,
has become a part of the common law of this country, and under it the
right to a bill of exceptions in civil cases at law and in superior courts
has been ﬁrmly established."
Duncan v. Landis, (1901) 106 Fed. 839, 45
C. C. A. 666.
‘
Form or BILL or Exci-:I>-rioxs.
(Taken from Puterbaugh's Pl. <£ Pr. (Com. L.) Ninth E<l., p. .990.)
Term. 19-—-.
In the
Court.
A. B.
Assumpslt.
v.
83

Compare Pomeroy's

592, where a

C. D.
Be it remembered, that on the trial of this cause, in this term, the
plaintiff gave in evidence on his behalf as follows, that is to say:
J. K., being duly sworn, testiﬁed: My name is J. K.: I am acquainted
with, etc.
(Objections made and erceptions taken in the course of the
Thereupon the counsel
c.'ram.ination may be set forth in this manner:)
What, etc. To which
for the plaintiff asked the witness this question:
question the defendant, by his counsel, then and there objected, for the
reason, etc.; but the court overruled the objection, and permitted the
witness to answer the question, which he thereupon did as follows:
I heard, etc. To which ruling and decision of the court, in permitting
this question to be so asked and answered, the defendant, by his counsel,
then and there excepted. (Proceed with the tcstimony thus:) And there
I acted for the plaintiff, etc.
upon the witness further testified:
by the counsel for the defendant, this witness
On cross-examination
I was not present, etc.
testified:
(Procecrl in like manner with the testimony of any othcr witness for
the plaintlﬂ.)
And thereupon the defendant gave in evidence on his behalf as fol
lows, that is to say:
(Here insert thc testimony for the defendant, with any objections made
and exceptions taken by him.)
The foregoing was all the evidence introduced on the trial of this
cause.
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And thereupon the court gave to the jury, on behalf of the plaintiff,
the following instructions, to wit:
(Here insert the instructions for the plaintiﬁ.)
To the giving of each and all of which instructions the defendant, by
his counsel_then and there excepted.
And thereupon the court gave to the jury, on behalf of the defendant,
the following instructions, to wit:
_
(Here insert the instructions given for the defendant.)
And the defendant, by his counsel, then and there asked the court to
also give to the jury the following instructions, to wit:
(Here insert the refused instructions.)
But the court refused to give these instructions to the jury; to which
rulings and decision of the court in refusing to give the same and each
of them, to the jury, the defendant, by his counsel, then and there
excepted.

I

O

I I

O

I

U

I

O

U

the jury rendered a verdict against the defendant;
whereupon
the defendant, by his counsel, then and there moved the
court to set aside the verdict so rendered, and grant a new trial of
this cause, and filed the following reasons in writing for his motion,
to wit:
(Here insert the reasons ﬁled.)
But the court denied the motion, and gave judgment on the verdict
against the defendant; to each of which decisions of the court, in deny
ing such motion, and in rendering such judgment, the defendant by his
counsel, then and there severally excepted.
And forasmuch as the matters above set forth do not fully appear of
record, the defendant tenders this his bill of exceptions, and prays that
the same may be signed by the judge of this court pursuant to the
day
statute in such case made; which is done accordingly, this
of, etc.
STATUTORY
EQUIVALENTS FOR BILL or ExcEP'rIoNs.
Statutes often provide for substitutes
for the bill of exceptions, but
they are very similar in their form and purpose.
“The ‘transcript or record on appeal’ consists of the
Case on Appeal.
‘record proper,’ i. e., summons, pleadings and judgment and the ‘case
on appeal’ which last is the exceptions taken and such of the evidence,
charge, prayers and other matters occurring at the trial as are neces
sary to present the matters excepted to, for review."—Cressler v. Ash
ville, (1905) 138 N. C. 482.
Statement
"Counsel for the appellants say the paper
of the Case.
relied upon may be treated either as a statement of the case, or as a
*
This is strictly true.
bill of exceptions.
We have never been
able to understand why a statement was provided for in the code, and
having been provided for, we are equally at a, loss to know why it
A bill of exceptions has always
should ever be resorted to in practice.
been a well-known means of preserving exceptions and bringing up the
‘ * If attorneys could be induced to abandon
"
evidence 011 appeal.
entirely the practice of using or attempting to use a statement of the
case, and resort exclusively to a bill of exceptions, much of the uncer
tainty and confusion that has crept into the practice on appeal to this
v. Clark, (1889) 81 Cal.
court might in time be removed."—-Brandt

And thereupon

L

' '

634, 638.

Transcript of Evidence.
A statutory record in lieu of a bill of ex
ceptions.-—-Christenson Lumber Co. v. Seawell, (1910) 157 Cal. 405.
“
Statement of Facts.
‘Sec. 4. In all cases and proceedings in which

\
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an appeal lies to the supreme court, any party feeling himself aggrieved
may have any material fact or facts, not already a part of the record,
*‘
"
‘Sec. 5. In cases of equitable
made so by a statement of facts.
cognizance where the appeal is from the ﬁnal judgment, the said state
ment of facts shall contain all the testimony on which the cause was
tried below, together with any exceptions or objections taken to the
reception or rejection of testimony.
In cases at law the statement of
facts need contain no more than was necessary or proper in a bill- of
*
exceptions.’
the appellant, instead
‘Sec. 6. In actions at law
*
‘
"‘
settling
may
of
have his exceptions and
a statement of facts
such facts as are material to the same made a part of the record by bill
*
"’
"
of exceptions.
It is not contemplated that the facts of the
part
same case should in
be presented by bill of exceptions and partly
by a statement of facts, although there is now little or no difference be
tween them, except in the manner oi.’ the settlement."—J0nes v. Jenkins,
(1891) 3 Wash. 17.
Statement on Appeal.
“There is no statement on appeal.
Where there is no statement properly authenticated, only errors appear
ing on the face of the judgment roll can be considered on the appeal."-—
Quinn v. Quinn, (1903) 27 Nev. 156, 174.
"
Case. “No mention is made of a bill of exceptions in the Code.
‘
"
quite
But it is
evident
that the proposed case for which pro
vision is made in the Code, embraces what was formerly known as a bill
of exceptions."—Hubbard v. Chapman, (1898) 28 N. Y. App. Div. 577.
Settled Case. "The omce of a bill of exceptions or a settled case is to
place in the record matters showing alleged errors which do not appear
upon the face of the record proper, which consists of the summons,
pleadings, verdict and judgment."—Peach v. Reed, (1902) 87 Minn. 375.
Case-made.
"The oﬁioe of a case made is certainly no broader than
that of a writ of error and bill of exceptions, and perhaps the scope our
statute at present gives to it will enable it to be carried no farther than
to bring under review such actual rulings involving questions of law
as might be presented by a bill of exceptions and writ of error."—Earle
v. Fire Ins. Co., (1874) 29 Mich. 414.
In some states a case-made includes both the record proper and a bill
of exceptions.—Shumaker v. O'Brien, (1878) 19 Kan. 476.
Statement of the Evidence and Ext-options.
“This statement took the
place of the bill of exceptions under our former system of practice, and
the provision for it was general in its application to all causes under the
code, whether of a legal or equitable nature."—Blatchley v. Coles, (1881)
6 Colo. 82.
Abstract. While it is said that under the Iowa practice the complete
transcript of the stenographer’s notes constitutes a bill of exceptions,
Howerton v. Augustine, (1911) 153 Ia. 17,—the abstract prepared by the
attorneys is in form and contents much more closely analogous to a bill
of exceptions.
See 3 Deemer’s Iowa Pl. & Pr. 2002~2005.
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TAYLOR.

Court of the United States.

1892.

147 United States, 695.

This was a petition by the clerk of the Circuit Court of the
United States for the Eastern District of Tennessee for fees
earned between July 1, 1887, and December 23. 1889, which
had been disallowed in the settlement of the accounts rendered
by him to the Treasury Department.
The court directed
judgment to be entered in his favor for $1066, (45 Fed. Rep.
531,) and the United States appealed.
BROWN, . The government objected to the allowance by
the court below of the following items:
$

Q

¥

#

l

ll

¥

ill

$

#

J

In

a

670.

V

fornia Civ. Code,

§

§

it

is

a

is

is

ii

is

a

9

Item
includes charges for papers entered by the clerk
5.
upon the ﬁnal record of the cases, and disallowed by the
Comptroller as forming no proper part of the judgment rec
ord, and unnecessarily burdensome to the government.
When
particular State or district requires
judg
the practice of
case,
up
in
of
to
be
made
each
course
the clerk
ment record
entitled to his fees for services actually and necessarily
United States 0. Van Duzee,
performed in that connection.
9. But as to what shall be incorporated
140 U. S. 169, 176,
no settled practice and some diversity
in such record, there
of opinion.
substantially
written history of the proceed
A record
ings from the beginning to the end of the case, but nothing
not properly matter of record can be made such by
which
inserting
therein.
In several of the States the matters
properly incorporated in judgment rolls are enumerated by
New York Code of Civil Procedure,
191; Cali
statute.

is

A

a

is

a

if

it

6

Call, 78, the Court of Appeals of
Perry,
Virginia, in answering the question “what this court will
consider as constituting the record of which
to take no
“I answer, the writ for
tice in cases of common law,” says:
necessary, the Whole plead
the purpose of amending by,
Papers of which profert
ings between the parties.
made.
or oyer demanded. And such as have been specially submit
ted to the consideration of the court by a bill of exceptions,
Ma-n.de'0ille 0.
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demurrer to evidence, or a special verdict, or are inseparably
connected with some paper or evidence so referred to. These,
with the several proceedings at the rules or in court, until the
rendition of the judgment, constitute the record in any com
mon law suits, and are to be noticed by the court, and no
"‘
“
"‘
others.”
Perhaps the most satisfactory deﬁnition of
a common law record in a criminal case under the American
practice is found in McKinney '0. People, 7 Illinois, 540, 551,
wherein it is said: “In a criminal case, after the caption
stating the time and place of holding the court, the record
should consist of the indictment properly indorsed, as found
by the grand jury; the arraignment of the accused, his plea,
the impanelling of the traverse jury, their verdict, and the
judgment of the court. This in general is all that the record
need state.”
And in Dyson 12. State, 26 Mississippi, 362, 383,
it is stated that “the record must aﬁirmatively show those in
dispensable facts, without which the judgment would be void
—such as the organization of the court; its jurisdiction of
the subject-matter and of the parties; that the cause was
made up for trial; that it was submitted to a jury sworn to
try it, (if it be a case proper for a jury) ; that a verdict was
rendered, and judgment awarded.”
Mr. Freeman, in his work upon Judgments, section 79, thus
summarizes from the authorities “the matters which are not
(unless made so by bill of exceptions or by consent, or by or
der of the court) matters of record,” namely: “Matters of
evidence, written or oral, including note, bond or mortgage
ﬁled in the case, and upon which suit is brought; an agreed
statement of facts not in nature of special verdict; all mo
tions, including motions to quash the writ, to amend the
pleadings, for extensions of time, for continuances, for bonds,
for prosecution, for bills of particulars; pleas stricken from
the ﬁles, notices of motions, afﬁdavits of claimants; bonds for
trial of -rights of property, aﬁidavits in relation to conduct of
jurors; all aﬁidavits taken during the progress of the cause,
memorandum of costs; power of attorney to confess the judg
ment, and afﬁdavit in relation to the death of the maker there
of; report of judge of proceedings at the trial, reasons for
his opinion in rendering judgment or in deciding application
for a new trial; rulings of the court upon the admission of
evidence; the instructions to the jury; statement of facts
made by the judge for the purpose of taking the advice of the
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appellate court; and the ruling of the court upon an applica
tion to strike out a portion of the pleadings.”
The extent to which a judgment record should go in its re
cital of the proceedings depends largely upon the purpose
for which it is to be used. If it is designed for use in the
review by the appellate court of the rulings of the court be
low, upon the introduction of testimony, or of the validity of
the charge to the jury, it must contain in a bill of exceptions
so much of the testimony or charge as is necessary to a clear
understanding of the questions involved.
But if, upon the
other hand, it be designed only for the purpose of preserving
a record of the conviction in perpetuam rei memoriam, little
more is necessary than to set forth the process and return
thereto, the pleadings, journal entries, verdict and judgment.
All the authorities agree that, in a criminal case, it should
show what the prisoner is charged with, that the court had
jurisdiction of the case, that the defendant was duly convicted
and the sentence. It may be said, in general, that anything
which is not necessary to support the validity of the judg
ment is, presumptively at least, no part of the record, how
ever material it may have been in the progress of the case.

This disposes of all the questions raised upon the assign
ment of errors, and the judgment of the court below is, there

fore,

Reversed, and the case remanded
conformity with this opinion."

for further proceedings in

3

a

89 "Record
proper” ls
term of somewhat uncertain meaning, and is
differently deﬁned in different states. It always includes the pleadings,
summons, verdict and judgment,-—Pickel
v. Pickel, (1913) 176 Mo. App.
673; Grand Pac. Hotel Co. v. Pinkerton, (1905) 217 Ill. 61; Williams v.
Boise Basin. etc., Co., (1905) 11 Ida. 233; Putnam v. Putnam, (1890)
Ariz. 182; Tribal Dev. Co. v. White Bros., (1911) 28 Okl. 525; Cressier
v. Ashville, (1905) 138 N. C. 482; Reed v. Gardner, (1873) 17 Wall. (U.

S.)

409.

Statutes

often enlarge

it.

Exhibits attached to pleadings are often held to be no essential parts
thereof and not to be part of the record proper.—Majors v. Maxwell.
(1906) 120 Mo. App. 281', Hippach v. First Nat. Bank, (189?) 169 Ill.
515; Commonwealth
v. Chandet, (1907) 125 Ky. 111.
A bill of partic
ulars has been held to be no part of the record proper.—Edelnan v. Mc
Fryer

Donell,

(1899) 126 Cal. 210; Saxton v. Musselman,
v. Breese, (1891) 16 Colo. 323; Eggleston
v.

1923)

97

(1903)

17

S.

D. 35:

Buck, (1860) 24 Ill.
262; State St. M. E. Church v. Gordon, (1865) 31 N. J. L. 264.
The bill of exceptions, when made up, is “not a part of the record of
the trial court but of the supreme court/’—State v. Brewer, (Ala. App.
So. 160.
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MERRIAM.
1901.

Missouri, 655.

MARSHALL,
.
This is a suit to collect back taxes alleged to
have been levied and assessed upon 36 different tracts of land
in various townships and ranges in Ozark county, of which
the defendants are alleged to be the owners, which taxes are
averred to be $153.64 “for interest and sinking fund tax for
the year 1895,” and $156.57 for the same purpose for the year
1896; and judgment is prayed for this amount, with interest
and costs. The petition alleges that the lands were returned
delinquent by the collector, and that the county clerk made
out and delivered to the collector a back-tax book, as pro
vided by law, and that the lands described in the back-tax
book remain unredeemed, and the taxes unpaid.
The answer
is a general denial, with an admission that the defendants
The transcript in the case before this court
own the land.
consists of the petition; a paper consisting of eight pages, and
purporting to be a certiﬁcate that the back taxes on the prop
erty remain delinquent; the answer; a stipulation signed by
the attorneys and ﬁled in the cause, as follows: “It is hereby
stipulated and agreed that the taxes on which this suit is
based were levied for the purpose of creating a sinking fund
for the payment of certain bonded indebtedness of Ozark
county, Mo., issued in August, 1889, and an interest fund for
the payment of the interest thereon, and said taxes constitute
no part of the taxes levied for ordinary county expenses; that
the county court of Ozark county did not prior to the levy of
said taxes for either year, through the county attorney or
otherwise, ask for or receive from the circuit judge of the
Twentieth judicial circuit an order authorizing the levy of
said taxes or any part thereof ;” and the judgment, as follows:
“Now, on this day this cause coming on to be heard, the par
ties appear and announce ready for trial, and all and singular
the matters in issue being submitted to and by the court
seen; and the court, after hearing the evidence, ﬁnds that the
taxes for which this suit is brought are illegal and void, and
that plaintiff is not entitled to recover herein. It is therefore
considered and adjudged that the lien for said taxes be set
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[Chap. 8

TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE

for naught held and

(description of land
It is further considered and adjudged that the
omitted).
plaintiff take nothing by its suit, and that defendants recover
their costs.” There was no bill of exceptions or motion for
new trial ﬁled, and no appeal taken, but the matter remained
in this shape from the date of the judgment on August 12,
1897, until May 3, 1898, when this writ of error was sued out.
It is contended by plaintiff that the stipulation herein set
out constitutes an agreed case, or agreed statement of the
case, and occupies the same footing as, and stands in lieu of,
a special verdict; that it stands precisely as if a jury had
found a verdict in that form, and that when ﬁled it became a
part of the record proper, and hence no bill of exceptions
was necessary to make it a part of the record; and that, as it
is a part of the record proper, no motion for new trial was
necessary, but that it is the duty of this court to examine the
case so made, and if error is apparent on the face of the
record proper, so constituted, to reverse the judgment below,
and enter such judgment as the trial court ought to have en
tered. It is manifest that this is not an agreed case, within
the meaning of section 793, Rev. St. 1899, which authorizes
parties to a question of difference, without action, to agree
upon a case containing the facts upon which the controversy
depends, and submit the same to a court of competent juris
diction for decision; for such an agreed case is “without ac
tion,” which means without ﬁling a suit, having summons
issued, and the defendant brought into court against his will,
followed by the usual steps in a suit. It is clearly a suit
regularly begun, issues made up, and, to save the trouble of
introducing testimony to support all or any of the questions
at issue, the parties stipulate as to the existence or nonexist
Such a stipulation is commonly
ence of the facts in issue.
facts,” and does not constitute
“agreed
statement
of
an
called
an agreed case under the statute or at common law. The
primary question in this case is whether such an agreed state
ment of facts becomes a part of the record proper by being
ﬁled with the clerk of the trial court, or whether it constitutes
matters of exception, which can only be made a part of the
The exact question was de
record by a bill of exceptions.
cided by this court in Kennerly v. Mer'ry, 11 Mo. 214; and
Napton, J., disposed of the matter very brieﬂy, as follows:
“This is a petition for dower in a lot in St. Louis. There is
aside, and

esteemed

_

_

__'_ __4\__<
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no bill of exceptions in the case, and no motion for a new
trial. A statement of facts agreed on by the counsel is copied
by the clerk in the record, but it is not made a part of the
record by bill of exceptions. The judgment will therefore be
affirmed." Thus as early as 1847 it was distinctly held that
“a statement of facts agreed on by counsel," and “copied by
the clerk in the record,” is not a part of the record, unless
made so by a bill of exceptions.
Such is the exact condition
in this case. The decision cited has never been overruled.
Many times since it has been said that such an agreed state
ment dispenses with proof of the facts therein stated. City
of St. Charles v. Haclcman, 133 Mo. 634, 34 S. W. 878. No
declarations of law are necessary to secure a review of the
case, but upon the agreed facts this court will apply the true
law, and enter such a judgment as the trial court ought to
have entered. City of St. Charles v. Hackman, 133 Mo. 634,
34 S. W. 878; Carr 'v. Coal Co., 96 Mo. 149, 8 S. W. 907; Gage
It has also been held that such an
'0. Gates, 62 Mo. 412.
agreed statement of facts “occupies the same footing and
stands in lieu of a special verdict.” Carr v. Coal Co., 96 Mo.,
loc. cit. 155, 8 S. W. 907; Gage v. Gates, 62 Mo. 412; Munford
'v. Wilson, 15 Mo. 540.
But it has never been held, since Ken
nerly v. Merry, supra, that the rule therein stated is not still
the law, nor that such an agreed statement of facts becomes
a part of the record proper by simply ﬁling it with the clerk,
or by having the clerk copy it into the transcript, nor that it
can be made a part of the record in any other way than by a
bill of exceptions. It is like any other agreement or stipula
tion of counsel, and can only be made a part of the record by
a bill of exceptions (Eystra '0. Capelle, 61 Mo. 578; State 'v.
Bachelor, 15 Mo. 208); or like instructions, which the clerk
copies into a transcript, but which are not made a part of
the record by a bill of exceptions (State 12. Shehane, 25 Mo.
565; Thompson 12. Russell, 30 Mo. 498; Sturdivant v. Watkins,
47 M0. 177) ; or like exhibits attached to a petition, which are
copied into a transcript without being made a part of the
record by a bill of exceptions (State ’U. Eldridge, 65 Mo. 584;
Kearney v. Woodson, 4 Mo. 114) ; or like a motion for execu
tion against a stockholder (Kohn v. Lucas, 17 Mo. App. 29).
The statement of facts agreed upon by the counsel is not a
part of the record proper, and has not been made a part of
the record by bill of exceptions, and it cannot, therefore, be

I
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considered by this court. This leaves only errors apparent on
the face of the record proper to be reviewed.
The record
proper consists of the petition, summons, and all subsequent
pleadings (in this case the answer), including the verdict and
judgment.
Bateson '0. Clark, 37 Mo., loc. cit. 34; Railway Co.
Carlisle,
94 Mo., loc. cit. 169, 7 S. W. 102.
v.
The petition is
in proper form, the answer is a general denial, and the j udg
ment is that parties appeared, the court heard the evidence,
and declared the taxes illegal and void, set aside the lien for
the taxes on the land, and entered a decree that plaintiff take
nothing by his suit, and that defendants recover their costs.
No error is apparent on the face of this record, and nothing
in the way of exception having been incorporated in the rec
ord, showing any error in the trial, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed. All concur."
90 Statutes
in many states provide for an "agreed case" which is not
merely a statement of facts shown in evidence or admitted by way of
Under such statutes
proof, but the sole basis for the action of the court.
See Indiana, Code Civ. Pro.
the agreed case is a part of the record.
§§ 579, 580; California, Code Civ. Pro. §§ 1138, 1139; Michigan, C. L.
1915, § 12754; Montana,
Rev. Codes 1921, § 9372; Nebraska, Comp. St
1911, §§ 7140, 7141; Washington, R. & B.'s Codes, §§ 378, 379; and other
similar statutes.
In Burr v. Des Moines RR. & Nev. Co., (1863) 1 Wall. (U. S.) 99, 102.
the court said:—“The agreed statement of facts must. in some manner
in the court below, be made a part of the record in the case. The case
ot United States v. Eliason. 16 Pet. 291, shows that it was strongly urged
upon this court that it had been laid down by Sir Wm. Blackstone in his
Commentaries,
and by Stephen in his Treatise on Pleadings, that error
The court, however, said that the reason
did not lie on such a. statement.
for this was, that in the English practice, the agreed statement was not
like a special verdict entered on the record, and the appellate court could
not therefore notice it. But that in the practice of our courts such agree
ments are signed by ‘the counsel, and spread upon the record at large
And thus they become technically a part 01.’ the record,
as part thereof.’
into which the appellate court look, with the other parts of it, to ascer
tain if there be error."
The English practice also tailed to make a special case part oi the
record when a general verdict was rendered subject to such special case
(2 Tidd’s Prac. 898) but the practice of the United States Supreme Court
was contra, as the cases above cited show.

~_
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Supreme Court of Illinois.
40

COURT

1865.

Illinois, 100.

This was a writ of error to reverse a decree in chancery. A
deposition, which was suppressed on the hearing in the court
below, having been copied into the transcript of the record,
a motion was made in this court to strike that deposition from
the record.
The question is presented, whether the deposi
tion, notwithstanding its suppression, did not still remain a
part of the record, and herein, of the necessity or propriety of
the use of bills of exceptions in chancery practice.
PER CURIAM: This is a motion to strike from the record
the deposition of a witness.
It was suppressed on the hear
ing in the court below. This order of the court is assigned

for error; but, inasmuch

is merely copied
into the record by the clerk, without being preserved in a bill
of exceptions, and inasmuch as no exception was taken to the
ruling of the court below suppressing it, it is urged that the
deposition is improperly in the record.
The proceeding,
however was in chancery. The rules of chancery practice do
not require that exceptions should be taken to the various
decisions of the court made in the progress of the cause. The
entire proceedings are matter of record, and are all subject
to review in this court without the taking of technical excep
tions. The twenty-ﬁrst section of the practice act has been
always understood to apply only to the common law side of
the court.
There seems to be some misapprehension as to what the
court has said in various cases in regard to the preservation
of the evidence by bills of exceptions in chancery proceedings.
We have merely mentioned them as one of the modes by
which the oral testimony may be preserved since the passage
of the law allowing such evidence, without intending to inti
mate that they are to be introduced into chancery practice
for any other purpose, or with a view of alleging exceptions
Indeed a certiﬁcate of evidence
to the rulings of the court.
signed by the judge is, as a matter of form, preferable to a
bill of exceptions, because more in harmony with chancery
practice. But when the evidence is presented by a deposition
as the deposition
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or by a master’s report, they are as much a part of the record
as before the passage of the law above named.
If a certiﬁ
cate of evidence is taken it need contain only the oral testi
mony. The depositions or the master’s report will properly
come to this court with the record, and as a part of it, without
being incorporated into the certiﬁcate of evidence signed by
the judge, or the bill of exceptions, if the oral evidence is pre
served in that mode.
If a deposition is suppressed and the
party against whom such order is made desires to bring the
record to this court for the purpose of taking its opinion as
to the propriety of such order, and as to the effect of the dep
osition, if such order was erroneous, he has a right to have
such deposition incorporated into the record. Although sup
pressed at the hearing, it remains a part of the proceedings
in the cause, together with the order suppressing it. Maccabe
'0. Hussey, 5 Bligh. 758; 1st Sect. of Chancery Act, R. S. 93.91
91"It is said by Ch. J. Taney, in Ex parte Story, 12 Pet. 343, ‘A bill
of exceptions is altogether unknown in chancery practice.’
This is cer
tainly true. Bills of exception were unknown to the common law. They
were introduced by the Statute of Westminster 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 31, the
principles of which have been genera.lly adopted in this country.
State
v. Ned, 7 Port. 187; Bourne v. State, 8 Port. 458.
'l‘he English statute,
in terms, conﬁned them to civil causes at common law. The statute of
this state, authorizing bills of exceptions, is framed evidently with a view
to trials at law, and not to trials in chancery."——Barnett v. Railroad
Co., (1874) 51 Ala. 555. See also Dodge v. Norlin, (1904) 133 Fed. 363,
66

C. C.

A.

425.

Statutes often require a statement of the case or bill of exceptions in
Blatchley v. Coles, (1881) 6 Colo. 82. “The
chancery as in law cases.
modern equity practice largely permits the hearing of oral evidence, and
the mode of preserving the evidence in the record for purposes of review
has approached the practice in actions at common law, and while some
cases hold that such testimony need not be made part of the record by
bill of exceptions or otherwise, it is becoming the general rule, following
the statutory changes in procedure, that such evidence must be duly
incorporated
into the appeal record by bill of exceptions, by recitals in
the decree, or by certiﬁcate ot the judge, embodying all the evidence
relating to the matters in issue."—4 C. J. 188.
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OREGON RAILWAY & NAVIGATION CO.
p

Supreme Court of Oregon.

1892.

-

22 Oregon, 497.

J

BEAN, . This is an action to recover from defendant $710
for certain stock alleged to have been killed by its trains, and
for damages, caused by ﬁres, alleged to have originated from
sparks escaping from its engines. The complaint contains
six separate causes of action, three of which are for stock
killed, and the remaining three for damages done by ﬁre. At
the close of the plaintiff’s testimony the defendant moved for
a nonsuit as to all the causes of action, and its motion was
granted as to the sixth cause of action, and denied as to each
of the others. The jury found a verdict in favor of plaintiff
for $693.50, upon which judgment was entered, and the de
fendant appeals.
As appears from the brief of counsel for appellant, the er
rors relied on here are in overruling a motion for nonsuit, in
the admission of a certain letter in evidence, and the giving
of a certain instruction to the jury. These assignments of
error are claimed to be presented by What counsel terms a
“bill of exceptions,” but which is nothing more nor less than
the whole testimony and proceedings of the trial as it took
place, extended from a stenographer’s notes. The testimony
alone covers more than 100 pages of typewritten matter, the
larger proportion of which has no relevancy or applicability
to the question sought to be presented for our consideration.
Scattered through this mass of testimony are the objections
of counsel, the enterings of the court, and the exceptions
taken thereto. The whole proceedings of the trial have been
certiﬁed up here as a bill of exceptions, and We are expected
to labor through this voluminous record, segregate and classi
fy it, and out of it to constriict a bill of exceptions, and then
determine whether the assignments of error ‘are well taken.
This practice is in utter disregard of the plain provisions of
the Civil Code, which requires that the exception should be
stated with so much of the evidence or other matter as may
be necessary to explain it, and nothing more, (section 232,)
and has repeatedly received the disapproval of this court.
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The provisions of our statute introduce no new rule in this
matter, but are merely declaratory of the law, as it already
existed. In Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 15, Mr. Justice Story
condemned the irregularity, inconvenience, and expense of
putting the entire evidence of a case into the bill of excep
tions, and expressed the regret of the court that such a prac
tice should prevail. "‘ ‘ ‘ Again, in Lincoln 22. Claﬂin, 7
Wall. 136, Mr. Justice Field, in delivering the opinion of the
court, uses this language:
“A bill of exceptions should only
rulings
present the
of the court upon some matter of law,
as upon the admission or exclusion of evidence,--and should
contain only so much of the testimony, or such a statement of
the proofs made or offered, as may be necessary to explain
If the
the bearing of the rulings upon the issues involved.
facts upon which the rulings were made are admitted, the bill
should state them brieﬂy, as the result of the testimony.
the facts are disputed, it will be sufficient if the bill alleges
that testimony was produced tending to prove [them]. If a
defect in the proofs is the ground of the exception, such de
fect should be mentioned without a detail of the testimony.
Indeed, it can seldom be necessary for the just determination
of any question raised at the trial to set forth the entire evi
dence given; and the practice in some districts—quite com
mon of late—of sending up to this court bills made up in this
way—ﬁlled with superﬂuous and irrelevant matter—must be
condemned.”
The object of a bill of exceptions is to bring into the record
the particular matter excepted to, and which the record would
otherwise not disclose. It should therefore be drawn up con
cisely, but as explicitly as possible, with a view to the stating
of all the facts and circumstances necessary to the statement
of the point of law intended to be raised. State v. Drake, 11
Or. 396, 4 Pac. Rep. 1204; Pow. App. Proc. 225; Green, Pl. &
Pr. § 1140. The object is to present the naked, legal question,
and only such facts as are necessary to explain its relevancy
to the particular case should be stated. With such a record it
is only necessary for this court to consider and determine the
question of law presented, and not be compelled to labor
through a voluminous record, to ascertain the facts upon
which the question is based, and, having done so, to meet with
a petition for rehearing, as is not unfrequently the case, in
which the legal conclusions are not controverted, but "respect
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fully but earnestly insisting that the court is mistaken as to
the facts.” If counsel desire the entire proceedings of the
trial to be made a part of the record, there perhaps can be
no objection; but ordinarily it should be attached to and made
a part of the bill of exceptions, as an exhibit, or in some other
appropriate way, and not massed together, entitled a “bill of

and certiﬁed here for us to examine, and ascer
tain whether the trial court erred. Cases may, and often do,
arise, in which it is necessary for this court to examine the
evidence upon the entire case, or upon some particular point.
In such cases the bill of exceptions must, of course, contain
the evidence; but there should be embodied in it only the evi
dence bearing upon the particular point presented.
We do
not desire or intend to enforce any technical or reﬁned rule in
this matter, and when the question sought to be presented is
clearly stated, and readily understood, we shall examine and
decide it, although the same may contain much irrelevant and
immaterial matter. But where, as in this case, the questions
of law depend entirely upon facts which are in dispute be
tween counsel, we cannot be expected to examine the entire
record of the trial, separate the material from the immaterial
matter, and undertake to decide with whom the facts are. It
was the duty of counsel, in the preparation of the bill of ex
ceptions, to have segregated the evidence, and brought here
only such as is applicable to the point raised, and then we
could have determined the question intelligently. If the prac
tice adopted in this case is to prevail, the statute becomes
meaningless, and the ofﬁce of a bill of exceptions entirely ab
rogated, and it is only necessary, in all cases, to embody in the
record a copy of the stenographic report of the trial as and
for a bill of exceptions. Such a labor-saving process cannot
receive the approval of this court.
This case is an apt illustration of the vice of such a prac
tice. In support of the motion for a nonsuit, it is concluded
that no evidence was introduced in the trial tending to prove
ownership or operation by the defendant of the railroad men
tioned in the complaint, or the engine or cars used thereon.
In place of this point being stated with only the facts or evi
dence bearing upon it, if any, and if not, a statement to that
effect, the record contains, embodied in the bill of exceptions.
the whole of the evidence, as given at the trial, upon all the
issues, including not only the evidence upon the ﬁve causes of
exceptions,”

1
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action submitted to the jury, but also upon the one to which
the court sustained the motion for a nonsuit.
The objection‘ urged to the instruction is that “it omitted
any reference to the contributory negligence of the plaintiif
or his servants as to the ﬁre mentioned in the ﬁfth cause of
action, as clearly shown to exist by the evidence.” Here again
the facts, if any, tending to show contributory negligence. are
not stated, nor is the evidence upon this question separated
or segregated from the mass of testimony, but we are expected
to hunt through the entire record of a long and protracted
trial, to see whether there is any such evidence. So also, in
relation to the letter of Mr. Smith, admitted in evidence, the
objections are (1) it does not relate to the ﬁre mentioned in
the complaint; (2) there is no evidence that Smith was an
agent of the defendant; and, (3) if he was an agent of defend
ant, there is no evidence that he was authorized to make the
admission said to be contained in the letter.
It will thus be observed that all the questions sought to be
presented in this appeal depend largely upon questions of fact
or inferences to be drawn from certain portions of the testi
mony. The point of each exception should have been particu
larly stated, complete within itself, accompanied with so much
of the evidence or other matter necessary to explain it, and
no more, and not all thrown together in one indiscriminate
mass, as was done in this case. We conclude, therefore, that
the bill of exceptions points no question for our consideration,
" '*
*9‘
and the judgment must be aﬁirmed.
v. Eldred, (1891) 143 U. S. 293, Gray, J.,
“The duty of seasonably drawing up and tendering a bill of ex
ceptions, stating distinctly the rulings complained of and the exceptions
taken to them, belongs to the excepting party, and not to the court; the
trial court has only to consider whether the bill tendered by the party
to the truth; and the
is in due time, in legal form. and conformable
duty of the court of error is limited to determining the validity of ex.
Hanna v. Maas, 122 U. S. 24.
ceptions duly tendered andiallowed.
Any fault or omission in framing or tendering a bill of exceptions, being
the act of the party and not of the court, cannot be amended at a sub
sequent term, as a misprision ot the clerk in recording inaccurately or
omitting to record an order of the court might be."
A literal transcript of the evidence, by question and answer, is seldom
necessary, and it is usually preferable to reduce it to narrative torm.
Willey v. Herrett, (1913) 66 Ore. 348; Whaley v. Vidal, (1910) 26 S. D.
300; Boyett v. Standard Chem. Co., (1906) 146 Ala. 554; Cole v. Ingham
Cir. Judge, (1889) 77 Mich. 619; District of Columbia v. Frazer, (1903)
21 App. (D. C.) 154; Cornell-Andrews Smelting Co. v. Boston & Prov
98

In Michigan Ins. Bank
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569.

Since an appeal in equity is a rehearing upon the whole case, all the
evidence should usually be set out in the case, certiﬁcate, bill of excep
tions or statement on appeal. Johnson v. Johnson, (1855) 4 Wis. 135;
Nickey v. Leader, (1911) 235 Mo. 30; Wal
1 Whitehouse Eq. Pr. § 514;
lick v. Wallick, (1897) 102 Ia. 746.
If counsel disagree, judge must decide upon bill. “Counsel should make
an effort immediately after the trial of a case, to agree upon a proper
bill of exceptions; and if they are unable to reach such an agreement
the matter should speedily be brought to the attention of the trial jus
tice, whose plain duty it will then be to adjust the differences of counsel
and settle a bill of exceptions in conformity with the rules of this court."
Geo. A. Fuller Co. v. McCloskey, (1910) 35 App. D. C. 595.

COPPER RIVER & NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY CO.

REEDER.

United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
211

Federal Reporter, 280; 127 Circuit Court of Appeals,

V.

1914.
6./,8.

Before GILBERT and Ross, Circuit Judges, and WOLVERTON,
District Judge.
WOLVERTON, District Judge. The plaintiffs in error were
defendants below. A judgment was rendered against them,
and in favor of the defendant in error, from which this writ
is prosecuted.
The action was for damages on account of
personal injuries sustained by plaintiff, occasioned by the
breaking down of the roof of the tunnel in which he was at
work, thus permitting the timbers and earth and gravel to be
precipitated upon him.
The complaint alleges that the defendants were doing busi
ness as common carriers; that plaintiff was in their employ
at the time, namely, August 7, 1911, and was at work upon
the line of railway extending from Cordova up the Copper
river into the interior of Alaska. It is then further alleged
that the accident by which plaintiff was injured as aforesaid
was caused by the negligent failure of the defendants to fur
nish the plaintiff with a reasonably safe place to work; that
said place was unsafe and dangerous by reason of the negli
gent failure of the defendants to suitably timber said tunnel
and protect the workmen employed therein from the danger
of cave-ins, and the falling of material constituting the roof
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of the bore thereof, all of which was known to the defendants,
or by the use of reasonable diligence could have been so
known, but was unknown to the plaintiff.
Defendants answered separately.
The Copper River &
Northwestern Railway Company admits that at the time it
was doing business as a common carrier, but denies that the
plaintiff was in its employ. The Katalla Company denies that
it was doing business at the time as a common carrier, but
admits that plaintiff was in its employ. Both deny the alle
gations of negligence. Both interpose two separate defenses:
First, that the plaintiff assumed the risk; and, second, that
the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow servant.
The record as it comes here contains what are denominated
“Minutes of Trial.” Under this head are found minutes of
the impaneling of the jury, of the swearing of certain wit
nesses, naming them, of the introduction of certain exhibits,
of the ﬁling of a motion for nonsuit at the close of plaintiff’s
case on the part of the Katalla Company, and also on the part
of the Copper River & Northwestern Railway Company, and
at the close of all the testimony a motion on the part of each
for a directed verdict, of the denial of each of these motions
and allowance of exceptions to the ruling of the court. These
motions are then set out in full, and all appear to have been
ﬁled April 25, 1913. Under the same title, “Minutes of Trial,”
it appears that on April 26th arguments of counsel were had,
and the j ury, having retired for deliberation, in due time re
turned a verdict, which verdict is set out in the record.
Thereafter the record contains what is styled “Transcript
of Testimony,” etc. After entitling the cause, the record re

;

cites:
“Be it remembered that the above-entitled cause came on
"'
*
"‘
duly and regularly to be heard
on Thursday, the
24th day of April, 1913, at 10 o’clock a. m., before the Honor
able Peter D. Overﬁeld, Judge of said court and a jury"
—in the usual form of introduction to a bill of exceptions.
Thereafter the record contains the examination of some of
the jurors and the ruling of the court touching their compe
tency to sit, some exceptions being reserved.
Then follows
what appears to be the testimony of the witnesses. At the
close of plaintiff’s testimony, and when the plaintiff had rested
his case, the record shows that the defendants each ﬁled a
separate motion for a nonsuit, which motions were argued,

_~€
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and nonsuit refused by the court, and exceptions were al
lowed. Thereafter follows the testimony of the defendants.
At the close of the case the record shows that the defendants
ﬁled separate motions for a directed verdict.
These motions,
after argument, were denied, and exceptions allowed. Then
follow the instructions of the court, and thereafter are ap
pended, as appears from the record, two certiﬁcates of Fred
M. Brown, Judge, one settling, allowing, and certifying the
bill of exceptions, and the other entitled “Certiﬁcate to Bill
of Exceptions.” Thereafter the transcript of record contains
plaintiff’s requests for instructions in two items of the same
designation, instructions requested by Copper River & North
western Railway Company, instructions requested by Katalla
Company, and defendants’ exceptions to the court's instruc
tions to the jury. Under this head there appear 21 excep
tions, and at the foot thereof this recital:
“Exceptions allowed this the 5th day of May, A. D. 1913.
Peter D. Overﬁeld, Judge.”
Following this are the verdict and motions for a new trial
on the part of each of the defendants, order denying motions
Then follow the usual or
‘for new trial, and the judgment.
ders attending the allowance of a writ of error, including the
assignments of error and citation. To all this are again ap
pended the two orders, one allowing, settling and certifying
bill of exceptions, and the other entitled “Certiﬁcate to Bill
Thereafter appear transcripts of exhibits,
of exceptions."
supposedly such as were introduced in evidence.
The defendant in error has ﬁled a motion here to strike
from the transcript the motions of the Katalla Company and
the Copper River & Northwestern Railway Company for non
suit and directed verdict, for the reason that they are not
embodied in the bill of exceptions, and, further, for the same
reason, to strike from such transcript plaintiff's requests for
instructions, instructions requested by both the Copper River
& Northwestern Railway Company and the Katalla Company,
and their exceptions to the court's instructions, also the mo
tion for a new trial made on behalf of each of said companies.
The defendant in error also moves the court to strike from
the transcript the document or paper entitled “Transcript of
Testimony,” etc., for the reason that said transcript, although
intended as a bill of exceptions, is not signed by the judge of
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the court below, or otherwise properly authenticated so as to
become a part of the record on writ of error.
The ﬁrst questions to be disposed of arise upon the motion
to strike parts of the transcript of record because not incor
porated in the bill of exceptions.
The motions for-a nonsuit
and for a directed verdict are clearly not so incorporated.
While they appear to have been ﬁled with the proceedings
during the course of the trial, the verity of the court’s rulings
respecting them, and the allowance of the exceptions, is not
authenticated by the judge, and they cannot within them
selves be termed a bill of exceptions, or treated as such. Fur
thermore, standing by themselves, they are wholly futile in
bringing error to this court because no testimony accompanies
them, and, without the testimony, no error can be made to
appear touching the ruling of the court concerning them. The
motion to strike as to these motions must be allowed.
Neither is any part of the record following the ﬁrst two
certiﬁcates of the judge, settling, allowing, identifying, and
certifying the purported bill of exceptions, the ﬁrst contained
in the record, a part of such bill. We say “purported” to dis‘
tinguish this from the supposed bill of exceptions contained
further on in the record, now to be noted.
It seems to be the contention of counsel for plaintiff in error
that the requested instructions of the two defendant com
panies, together with the 21 exceptions noted thereto, and the
allowance of such exceptions by the judge, constitute within
themselves a bill of exceptions, and should be so treated. This
contention is based upon the provisions of the Alaska Code,
citing sections 1053 and 1055 of the Compiled Laws of the
territory of Alaska. These statutes are sections 221 and 223
of the Civil Code of Procedure adopted by Congress. 1 Fed
eral Statutes Annotated, page 92. Section 221 provides that:
“The point of the exception shall be particularly stated,
and may be delivered, in writing, to the judge or entered in
his minutes, and at the time or afterwards be corrected until
made conformable to the truth.”
And section 223 that:
“The statement of the exception, when settled and allowed,
shall be signed by the judge and ﬁled with the clerk, and
thereafter it shall be deemed and taken to be a part of the
record of the cause.”

~
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be noted that “an exception”

is

deﬁned by section 220 as:
“An objection taken at the trial to a decision upon a matter
of law, whether such trial be by jury or court, and whether
the decision be made during the formation of a jury, or in
the admission of evidence, or in the charge to the j ury, or at
any other time from the calling of the action for trial to the
rendering of the verdict or decison.”
These sections are taken bodily from the Oregon Code, and
contemplate that the exceptions shall be taken at the trial
and may be delivered in writing to the judge or entered in his
minutes.
Such a statement and exception, when settled and
allowed by the judge and signed by him and ﬁled with the
clerk, shall be deemed and taken to be a part of the record.
Such a statement, made in conformity with the Code, would
by statutory intendment constitute a bill of exceptions. Un
der this Code, as under the Revised Statutes of the United
States, a bill of exceptions is to be deemed sufficiently au
thenticated if signed by the judge of the court in which the
cause was tried. Section 1932, Rose's Code of Federal Pro
cedure. The seal of the court or judge is therefore no longer
necessary for proper authentication, as it seemed to be for
merly. Pomeroy’s Lessee 1:. Bank of Indiana, 1 Wall. 592, 17

L. Ed.

638.

A bill of exceptions may be perfected, settled, and allowed
involving but a single point in the controversy, or more than
one bill of exceptions may be allowed in a single case, or, as
is usually the case, all the points relied upon as error may
be incorporated
in a single bill of exceptions.
Po~meroy’s
Lessee '0. Bank of Indiana, supra; Lees v. United States, 150
U. S. 476, 14 Sup. Ct; 163, 37 L. Ed. 1150. In order, however,
that a party may avail himself of an alleged error committed
at the trial of an action at law in an appellate tribunal, it is
essential that the objection be made, the ruling of the court
be had, and the exception saved, all at the time of the trial.
Such is the holding of the Supreme Court of Oregon.
“If a party desires to raise a question in this court,” says
the court [State 12. Foot You, 24 Or. 61, 67, 32 Pac. 1031,
1033], “as to the competency of evidence offered in the trial
court, or of any other supposed irregularity of that court,
either of omission or commission, he must, at the time, make
his objection, and thereby obtain a ruling of the court, and,
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if

adverse, he must save an exception, and bring it here by a
proper bill of exceptions.”
Such is also the practice in the federal courts.
Bates on
Federal Practice, § 1140; Michigan Ins. Bank v. Eldred, 143
U. S. 293, 298, 12 Sup. Ct. 450, 36 L. Ed. 162.
Now, turning to this supposed bill of exceptions. The au
thentication in the form “Exceptions allowed this the 5th day
of May, A. D. 1913,” and signed by the judge, may be suffi
cient, but this we need not determine now. The printing of
the court’s certiﬁcates and allowance of the purported bill of
exceptions again in the record subsequent to this supposed
bill of exceptions adds nothing to its authentication.
Such
certiﬁcates found in such a place in the record are worthless
for any purpose. The trial of the case was had extending
from April 24, to 26, 1913, inclusive, and defendants’ excep
tions to the instructions of the court were not allowed, and
presumably not saved, until May 5th. They were not ﬁled
until that date, and there is no statement in the record what
ever indicating when such exceptions were saved—-manifestly
not at the time of the trial. It is also a rule of practice in
the federal courts that objections and exceptions to the in
structions given a jury, or requested and refused, must be
Bates, Federal
made and reserved before the jury retires.
Procedure, § 1144.
For the reason. therefore, that it does
not appear that the objections and exceptions to the instruc
tions of the court were made and saved at the time of the
trial and prior to the retirement of the jury, this supposed
Another vital objec
bill of exceptions is wholly nugatory.
tion to such supposed bill of exceptions is that it contains no
evidence taken at the trial from which the court may deter
mine whether the instructions given or refused were proper
or improper, and hence it presents no alleged errors for this
court to consider. Manifestly this separate bill of exceptions
cannot be considered in connection with that which precedes
it in the record for the purpose of aiding its statement. Each
bill of exceptions must stand upon its own statement, and
will not be aided by another separate bill of exceptions. al
though both are settled and allowed in the same case.
The
motion, therefore, as it relates to the items designated “Plain
tiffs’ request for instructions,” “Instructions requested” by
each of the defendants, and “Exceptions to court’s instruc
tions,” must also be allowed,
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As it pertains to the motions for a new trial, they are
dressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and

ad
no

question of the court’s abuse of that discretion is presented
here for our determination.
The Code of Alaska relative to
the subject, being section 1058 of the Compiled Laws, and
section 226 of the Code of Civil Procedure as adopted by Con
gress, is taken again from the Oregon Code, and under the
decisions of the state court a motion for a new trial. based
upon insuﬁiciency of the evidence or excessive damages, is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its
decisions respecting the same are not reviewable except for
a manifest abuse of such discretion.
State v. Foot You, su
pra; State 12. Gardner, 33 Or. 149, 152, 54 Pac. 809; Coos Bay
Navigation Co. v. Endicott, 34 Or. 573, 578, 57 Pac. 61. And
it is the doctrine of the Supreme Court of the United States
that the refusal of the trial court to grant a new trial cannot
be assigned for error in that court.
Addington '0. United
States, 165 U. S. 184, 17 Sup. Ct. 288, 41 L. Ed. 679; Erie
Railroad C0. '0. Winter, 143 U. S. 60, 75, 12 Sup. Ct. 356, 36

L. Ed.

71.

The paper entitled, “Transcript of Testimony,” etc., should
not be stricken. This document is sufficiently certiﬁed by the
judge to entitle it to the dignity of a bill of exceptions. True,
the bill of exceptions was settled, allowed, and certiﬁed by a
judge other than the person who presided at the trial, but we
will assume that there existed sufﬁcient reason for that. The
record does not show what the reason was.
This disposes of the last 26 of the 35 assignments of error,
being all of such assignments which have relation to alleged
errors of the trial court in giving and refusing instructions to
the jury and in denying the motions for a new trial.
It" is strenuously urged notwithstanding the motions for
nonsuit and directed verdicts in the transcript of record may
not be considered to be incorporated in the bill of exceptions,
yet that the bill of exceptions contains a suﬁicient statement
concerning them to bring up the questions relating thereto
for consideration by this court. The bill of exceptions shows
that at the close of plaintiff's testimony, and when he had
rested his case, the defendants each moved the court for a
nonsuit, which motions were overruled and exceptions al
lowed. The motions themselves are not set out. The same
thing is shown with reference to the motions for a directed
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verdict, which were interposed at the close of the entire testi
mony.
The insuperable object.ion to our considering these
motions in any event is that the certiﬁcate of the judge in
settling the bill of exceptions and certifying the same contains
no statement that such bill of exceptions contains all the
testimony given at the trial, or bearing upon the question of
nonsuit or directed verdict. Such is the rule both in the Ore
gon state court and the federal courts. Keady v. United Rail
ways Co., 57 Or. 325, 333, 100 Pac. 658, 108 Pac. 197; Sterne11
berg et al. '0. Mailhos, 99 Fed. 43,- 39 C. C. A. 408.
There
is found in the bill of exceptions a statement by the stenogra
pher, occurring at the close of the testimony, to the effect that
the above is a full and correct transcript of the shorthand
notes taken by him at the trial. This statement may be all
true, and yet the shorthand notes taken by him at the trial
may not comprise all the testimony in the case. At any rate
the certiﬁcate of the stenographer to the verity of the ex
tended transcript is not enough. The trial judge must indi
cate his approval of its. correctness by due authentication un
der his own hand. 3 Encyc. Pld. & Prac. 437.
We come the more readily to this conclusion having care
fully read and digested the entire evidence contained in the
record, and ﬁnding that the questions predicated upon the mo
tions for, nonsuit and directed verdict are without merit.
This disposes of assignments of error Nos. 8 and 9.
Assignments of error 1 to 4, inclusive, are not insisted upon
here. Assignments 5 to 7, inclusive, relate to the admission
in evidence, over objections, of certain bills of lading intro
duced for the purpose of showing that the Katalla Company
was a common carrier by railway in Alaska. They have a
tendency in some measure, though slight it may be, to estab
lish that alleged fact, and were therefore pertinent.
The judgment of the trial court will be aﬁirmed.
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Supreme Court of Kansas.
19

CO. v.

1089
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1877.

Kansas, 885.

BREWER, J.; This was an action in the district court of
Atchison county to recover damages for personal injuries, in
which judgment was rendered in favor of defendant in error.
The contest in this court has been conducted with vigor and
bitterness.
There has been that irritation and suspicion on
the part of counsel which is both unfortunate and unpleasant.
Passing by all the personal allusions and complaints in the
briefs, we shall consider simply the legal questions involved.
And at the threshold we ﬁnd on the part of the defendant in
error a challenge of substantially the whole record. In the
transcript ﬁled with the petition in error appear three bills of
exceptions; and a motion was made to strike them out, on
the ground that they are not copies of the bills as signed and
now on ﬁle in the district court. Upon this motion the origi
nal bills were produced and offered in evidence, together with
much other testimony.
The bills when signed were what are
sometimes called “skeleton bills”—that is, with blanks con
taining directions to the clerk, “here insert,” etc. Such bills
it is claimed are nullities, and the clerk has no power in copy
ing to make the insertions, but must follow the very letter of
the bill as signed. It is not disputed that the allowance of a
bill of exceptions is the act of the trial judge. A paper pur
porting to be a bill of exceptions, if unsigned by him, will not
be noticed in the supreme court; Waysman v. Updegraph,
McCahon, 89; Couse o. Phelps, 11 Kas. 445; Kshinka o.
Cawker, 16 Kas. 63. The agreements of counsel are insuffi
cient: Hogden v. Comm’rs of Ellsworth Co., 10 Kas. 637;
The State v. Bohan, ante, 28. The certiﬁcate of the clerk
will not answer: McAuthur v. Mitchell, 7 Kas. 173; The
State v. Bohan, supra.
The language of the statute is plain:
“The party excepting must reduce his exceptions to writing
and present it to the judge for his allowance. If true, it shall
be the duty of the judge to allow and sign it.”
Gen. Stat.,
p. 686, code, 303.

It

would seem to follow from this that when the bill re
ceives the signature of the judge it should be complete, and
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this we understand to be the substance and spirit of all the
decisions.
There is to be no further discussion, no further
discretion; the record is made. “The ofﬁce of a bill of excep
tions is to bring upon the record some portion of those pro
ceedings which do not of right and of course go upon the
record.”
It is itself a
(Stoner v. Jackson, 17 Kas. 607.)
part of the record. But a record must speak for itself. It
must show upon its face all that it is. It must be its own evi
dence of all that it contains.
No part of its contents may
upon
rest
the discretion of the clerk, the recollection of the
judge, or the testimony of counsel. But to insure this cer
tainty, is it essential that everything be written out in full,
every document and writing copied into the bill before sig
nature? Such appears to be the import of some of the au
thorities cited; but that seems to us unnecessary stringency,
and to impose needless clerical labor. Where a deposition or
other writing is to be made a part of a bill it can be referred
to with such marks of identiﬁcation as to exclude all doubt.
That surely ought to be suﬁicient; and so we think the better
authorities hold. But these things must exist to exclude all
doubt:
The bill in referring to such extrinsic document must
purport to incorporate it into and make it a part of the bill.
A mere reference to the document, although such as to identi
f_v it beyond doubt, or a statement that it was in evidence, is
not sufficient, for such reference and statement do not make
it certain that judge or counsel intended that it should be
copied into and made a part of the bill.
2d.
The document itself must be in existence, written out
and complete at the time of the signature of the bill; other
wise the door is open for dispute as to its language, and the
bill may not in fact be allowed by the judge within the statu
tory time. A reference to the testimony of some witness to
be thereafter written out by him and as written out to be
inserted, is improper; and such testimony, though written
out and inserted, must be disregarded; for that in effect
places in the bill the witness’s statement of the testimony,
and not the judge’s.
So also, if a document has been totally
or partially destroyed, it must be restored before the signa
ture, and the paper as restored clearly identiﬁed.
And again:
Suppose a paper in a foreign language is received in evidence
and translated to the jury by some Witness on the stand; it
1st.
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translation to be thereafter written out by any one, not even
the witness who translated it to the jury; but the translation
must be written out and properly referred to, so that the
judge may approve it as the one given on the trial. The same
principle renders it proper that short-hand notes be written
out before the signature; for the notes of the stenographer,
are not a record; they are not conclusive as to what in fact
was the testimony; they are not good against the certiﬁcate
of the judge, and are no substitute for it. Whatever reliance
the judge may place upon such notes, he after all must deter
mine what was and what was not the testimony; and until
those notes are written out, neither he nor counsel can deter
mine what they will show as the testimony.
3d.
And in this we appropriate the language of the su
preme court of the United States in the case of Leftwich 7).
Leeann, 4 Wall. 187, in which the court says:
“If a paper
which is to constitute a part of a bill of exceptions is not in
corporated into the body of the bill, it must be annexed to it,
or so marked by letter, number, or other means of identiﬁca
tion mentioned in the bill, as to leave no doubt, when found
in the record, that it is the one referred to in the bill of ex
ceptions.” And these means of identiﬁcation must be obvious
to all.
No mere memorandum, intelligible it may be to a
single person, even the clerk, but indicating nothing to any
They must be such that any one
one else, will be sufficient.
going to the record can determine what document is to be in-\
serted, or, after insertion, that the clerk has made no mistake.
The record must prove itself, and not the record and the testi
mony of the clerk.
The clerk changes; the record endures.
And long after judge and clerk are both gone, the record, if
good must carry on itself the evidence of its own integrity.
*

*

*

*

*

*

#

*

i i

Applying the rules above given to the case at bar, and what
is the result? Bill of exceptions No. 3 is the one purporting
to preserve the testimony taken on the trial. In the original
bill of exceptions, as allowed and signed by the trial judge,
the only identiﬁcation of the evidence offered by plaintiff is as
follows-—quoting from the bill:
“As will appear from a stenographic record thereof as fol
lows: (Here copy record of testimony as kept by stenogrz.The said deposi
pher, down to resting of plaintiff’s case.)
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tions taken by plaintiff, to-wit:
(Here copy names of
witnesses, and depositions, as read.)”
And the only identiﬁcation of evidence offered by the de
fendant to be inserted in said bill of exceptions is as follows:
“Defendant, to maintain the issue upon its part, offered evi
dence which was received by the court of the kind and in or
der as follows, as also kept by such stenographer:
(Here
copy defendant’s evidence.)”
"And the evidence of plaintiff in rebuttal is not even identi
ﬁed by the stenographic record, but it is stated that, “The
plaintiff offered evidence in rebuttal which was received by
the court as follows:
(Here copy evidence in rebuttal.)”
Among the papers brought from the office of the clerk of the
district court, and offered in evidence on the motion, is a
large roll which upon examination reads as the testimony of
witnesses given upon this trial, and which appears to have
been copied into the transcript ﬁled in this court as the testi
mony referred to in the original bill. But upon this roll we
ﬁnd no ﬁlemarks, or other marks of identiﬁcation.
From an
examination of this roll no one could tell when it was placed
among the papers of the clerk’s oﬂice, or even when it was
Written out; and if the clerk had produced any other roll or
paper reading as testimony given upon that trial, no one could
from inspection have told which was correct, or which was
intended to be inserted, or which (if either) was written out
Indeed, the only means of identiﬁcation
by a stenographer.
which appear are, the facts that it reads as testimony given
upon the trial and that it is found among the papers of the
To hold such means sufficient, would open the door to
case.
Again, as a part of plaintiff’s evidence
the loosest practice.
the original bill directs—“(Here copy names of witnesses and
Who is to decide what depositions
depositions as read.)”
The court certainly by signing such a bill does
were read?
It is a matter to be thereafter settled, and by
not determine.
whom? Still again: The only identiﬁcation of rebutting tes
timony is—“(Here copy evidence in rebuttal.)”
Whence is
the clerk to get it? Who is to decide what was then given in
It does not even
evidence? Such a direction settles nothing.
purport to settle anything. We have refrained thus far from
noting anything outside of that which appears upon the face
of the papers, for we think as indicated heretofore, that the
identiﬁcation should be apparent from the record itself, and

—
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obvious to all.
In reference to the extrinsic testimony of
which we received quite an amount on the hearing of the mo
tion subject to further consideration as to its competency, we
simply say this—that its contradictions only enforce the con
viction that the record must be tried by itself, that the marks
of identiﬁcation must be on the papers, and in the record; and
that such contradictions make it painfully certain that it
would be in the highest degree dangerous to trust to the recol
lections of clerk, or counsel or court. So far then as the mo
tion refers to that portion of the bill of exceptions No. 3
which purports to give the testimony on the trial, it must be
sustained.

I I

Q

I I

U

O

U

¥

#

We cannot forbear noticing at this point a matter which
seems to have escaped the attention of counsel, and which
tends to show how uncertain “skeleton bills” of exceptions
are, even in their best estate. The skeleton bill, after refer
ring to the motions to suppress depositions, states, that in
support thereof defendant read “two certain affidavits as fol
lows: (Here copy two ﬁrst affidavits made by W. W. Guthrie
and F. M. Pierce.)”
The transcript ﬁled with us shows at
this place two affidavits of these gentlemen, of date November
10th. Further on the skeleton bill reads, “Plaintiff then read
contra. the certain affidavits of B. P. Waggener, P. S. Noble,
and A. H. Horton, which are copied as follows:
(Here copy
The transcript here shows three affidavits
such affidavits)”
The bill then further
of these three gentlemen respectively.
reads, “Defendant then read contra the certain other affida
vits of Guthrie and Pierce, which are copied as follows:
(Here copy such affidavits)" And the transcript shows ‘two
such affidavits of date November 12th. Then according to
the bill come the depositions themselves which were sought to
be suppressed; but in the transcript there appear two more
affidavits of P. S. Noble and one of B. P. Waggener, and which
upon their face refer to the matters in the motion, and which
Now, were these
are also veriﬁed on the 12th of November.
last affidavits really read upon the motion? Was it intended
that they should be inserted in the bill of exceptions as copied
for this court? Or was this simply the act of ‘the clerk, or
copyist, thinking they ought to be in? So also, where it is
said that plaintiff read the certain affidavits of B. P. Wag
gener, etc., and the direction was to copy such affidavits, was
l
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it intended that the clerk should copy

one affidavit apiece of
these gentlemen? or, all aﬁidavits of theirs he might ﬁnd on
ﬁle before the date of the motion? or, only such as upon ex
amination he might deem pertinent to the matters in the mo
tion? or, such as according to his memory were actually
read? These questions ﬁnd no satisfactory answer in the rec
ord. The transcript as it comes before us is doubtless correct,
at any rate we may presume it to be so, as no question is
made; but if it were challenged we should be at a loss from
anything in the original bill to determine how many affidavits
were properly copied into the record by the clerk.
$

¥

O

#

8

1

i

#

,#

i

The judgment will be aﬂirmed. VALENTINE, J., concurring.
C. ., not sitting, having been of counsel in the case.

HORTON,

J

\

HILL

v.

HILL.

Supreme Court of Michigan.
112

J

1897'.

Michigan, 638.

MONTGOMERY, . * * ‘
It appears that the case was tried before Judge Simpson,
sitting at the time in the Wayne circuit court, and the bill of
exceptions was settled before Judge Hosmer.
The statute (2
How. Ann. St. § 7613) provides that the bill of exceptions
shall be settled before the judge who tried the case, except in
case of his death, resignation, expiration of term of oﬁice, or
vacancy in ofﬁce from other cause.
It is assigned as a reason
for the settlement of the bill before Judge Hosmer that Judge
Simpson was absent from Wayne county, and his attendance
could not be procured there. But the case might have been
settled before him at his home.
See Oliver '0. Town, 24 Wis.
512; Ex parte Nelson, 62 Ala. 377. It appears that the attor
neys for plaintiff assented to the settlement of this bill of ex
ceptions before Judge Hosmer.
But it has been repeatedly
parties
stipulate
held that
cannot
to a bill of exceptions.
As
the time has once been extended beyond the term, we have no
doubt that Judge Simpson will, upon application, settle the
bill, and, if the proper showing can be made, this court pos
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sesses the power to extend the time for suing out a. writ of
error for six months beyond the one year ﬁxed by statute.
This motion will be granted, without costs to either party.
The other justices concurred."
98 Accord,
that another judge cannot settle the bill of exceptions by
stipulation of the parties.
State v. Weiskittle, (1883) 61 Md. 48; Maher
Contra, Philadelphia Fire Ass'n v.
v. Renshaw,
(1909) 45 Colo. 567.
Ruby, (1896) 49 Nebr. 584; Brethold v. Village of Wilmette, (1897) 168

Ill.

162.

Statutes frequently provide tor other methods for the settlement of
the case or bill of exceptions in the event ot the death, sickness or ab~
In the absence of such provision
sence oi! the judge who tried the case.
parties may in such cases lose their right to appeal.—Qavis v. Menasha.
(1865) 20 Wis. 194. The cases are in conﬂict as to whether the retiring
judge who tried the case, or his successor, should sign the bill of ex
ceptions.—4 C. J. 252.
At common law where the settling of a bill of exceptions became im
possible by reason ot the death, sickness or absence ot the trial judge,
a new trial was the proper remedy.—Maloney
v. Adsit, (1899) 175 U.
S. 281.

It is quite commonly provided by statute
Certiﬁcation by bystanders.
it the judge neglects or refuses to sign a bill of exceptions, such

that

bill

may be authenticated
by the certiﬁcate of bystanders, who are not
interested in the suit and who are actually cognizant of the facts stated
in the bill.—Williams v. Pitt, (1896) 38 Fla. 162; Wright v. Nichols,
(1808) 1 Bibb (Ky.) 298; St. John v. Wallace, (1868) 25 Ia. 21; Bowen
v. Lazalere,
(1869) 44 Mo. 383; Gay Oil Co. v. Akins, (1911) 100 Ark.
552; Diamond Tunnel, etc., Co. v. Faulkner, (1891) 17 Colo. 9.
A bystanders’ bill is sometimes allowed in case of the death of the
judge.—Mercer County Board v. Rankin, (Ky. 1911) 132 S. W. 1026.
Filing. After being settled and signed by the judge or other author
ized person, the bill of exceptions must usually be ﬁled with the clerk
The place and time for ﬁling are generally ﬁxed by
of the trial court.
statute, and unless these are observed the appellate court will not con
London v. Hutchens, (1906) 80 Ark. 410;
sider the bill ot exceptions.
Adkins v. Adkins, (1874) 48 Ind. 12; Louisville Ry. Co. v. Wellington,
(1910) 137 Ky. 719; Cartwright v. Telephone Co., (1907) 205 M0. 126;
Robinson v. N. Y., N. H. & H. RA. Co., (R. I. 1907) 67 Atl. 424.

0
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CROWE v. CORPORATION
Supreme

Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
62 West

SANDERS,

[Chap. 8

1.907.

Virginia, 91.

P. The plaintiff, M. A. Crowe, brought an action

of trespass on the case against the corporation of Charles
Town in the circuit court of Jefferson county, for the purpose
of recovering damages alleged to have been sustained by her
by reason of a change in the grade of one of its streets, upon
which certain property owned by her abutted, and which re
sulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and the
defendant applied for and obtained a writ of error.
#

i

#

#

i

#

Q

1

Q

¥

There are many other assignments of error, but we are pre
cluded from passing upon them, as their determination in
volves a consideration of the evidence, which we ﬁnd has not
Prior to the passage of our
been made a part of the record.
statute (section 9, c. 131, Code 1899 [section 3979, Code
1906], bills of exceptions were required to be taken at the
term at which the trial was had and judgment pronounced;
but by this statute it is provided that they may be taken,
signed, and certiﬁed to the clerk, and made a part of the rec
ord within 30 days from the adjournment of the term.
But
for this enactment no bill of exceptions after the term ended
could be signed and made a part of the record, and the only
authority that a judge has for doing so now is by virtue there
of. This court has repeatedly held that it must be do11e in the
30 days provided for, and cannot be done after that time; but
this case now presents a different question to any that has
been before this court for consideration, in this:
It is claimed
that the attorneys for the plaintiff and defendant agreed in
Writing that the bill of exceptions could be signed and certi
ﬁed after the expiration of 30 days, and be made a part of the
record the same as if done within the 30 days. In disposing
of this question, it may be well to review the decisions and
statutes of this state and Virginia, and of some of the other
states.
*
*
*
In Winston 0. Giles, 27 Grat. 530, an action at
law was submitted to the judgment of the court without a
jury. and the court rendered judgment, to which one of the
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It being near the end of the term, the court
gave counsel time until the ﬁrst day of the next term to pre
pare a bill of exceptions; but judgment was rendered, and it
was held that the court could not give the leave, and that the
bill of exceptions could not be made a part of the record.
There is no expression in any of the adjudicated cases which
would indicate that, even under the practice which existed
prior to the passage of the act giving time after the term
within which bills of exceptions could be signed, the parties
could agree that such bills could be signed after the adjourn
ment of the term, "‘ "' * If the time is extended beyond the
period speciﬁed in the statute, it is clear that the court loses
control of the matter, just as it formerly lost control by the
lapse of the term. "‘ * "'
In the courts of the United States, owing to the fact that
there is no express statutory provision governing the signing
of bills of exceptions, the rule as to signing such bills is much
more elastic than in those jurisdictions where statutes have
been enacted limiting the time within which such bills may
be signed; and, while the circuit courts may adopt the prac
tice of the state courts as to the signing, yet, when so adopted,
the rule is not absolutely binding, as in the case of United
States 'v. Breitling, 20 How. 252, 15 L. Ed. 900, the judge of
the Circuit Court of the United States in Alabama, by a gen
eral rule, adopted the practice of the state courts, which is
regulated by a statute providing that no bill of exceptions
can be signed after the adjournment of the term, unless with
the consent of counsel; but where the judge holding the Cir
cuit Court in Alabama signed a bill of exceptions under spe
cial circumstances, after adjournment, and without the con
sent of counsel, the Supreme Court of the United States
considered the exceptions as properly before it, it being said:
“It is in the power of a court to suspend its own rules, or ex
cept a particular case from them, to subserve the purposes of
justice.” While the general rule in these courts is that the
bill should be given to the judge for his signature during the
trial, yet the judges may, and often do, sign bills of excep
tion mmc pro tune after the trial, which, it is said in Shep
pard 11. Wilson, 6 How. 260, 12 L. Ed. 430, is the English
practice, under the statute (Westminster 2), which gave the
right to bills of exceptions, and the practice recognized in the
Supreme Court of the United States. ‘ "
parties excepted.

'
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The practice in Illinois, while there is no statute allowing
it, is to allow time within which to present bills of exceptions,
by an order entered of record, or by a written stipulation of
parties ﬁled in the case, and this practice is recognized by
the Supreme Court of that state. But by an unbroken line of
decisions it is held that such bills must be signed within the
time limited in the~order or stipulation. In Hake r. Strubel,
121 Ill. 321, 12 N. E. 676, the judge trying the case entered an
order giving 60 days in which to prepare and have signed a
bill of exceptions, and it was held that he had no power, even
within the 60 days limited, to extend the time, and, if he ap
proves and signs a bill after the 60 days, the act of so approv
ing and signing will be treated as a nullity. Village of Mar
seilles v. Howland, 136 Ill. 81, 26 N. E. 495; Hawes 12. People,
129 Ill. 123, 21 N. E. 777. But while there is no provision un
der the statute of that state expressly authorizing the court
to extend the time beyond the term, yet the statute is silent
as to just when the bills are to be signed, unlike ours, wherein
the act of doing so is limited to a certain time.
We ﬁnd that the Supreme Court of Kansas holds that a bill
of exceptions must be reduced to writing, presented for signa
ture, and signed before the expiration of the term at which
ﬁnal judgment was given, and that even by consent the time
for signing cannot be extended beyond that term. State v.
Bohan, 19 Kan. 28. * * *
The Supreme Court of Alabama holds that the bill of ex
ceptions may be signed in term or within a certain time there
after, pursuant to written consent of parties for that pur
pose, but there they have a statute providing that no bill of
exceptions can be signed after the adjournment of the term
during which the exception was taken, unless by consent or
agreement of counsel in writing, except in such cases as is
otherwise provided for, and the decisions say it must affirma
tively appear that the bill was signed in term time, or if after
the adjournment, then pursuant to an agreement in writing
of counsel. Stephens v. State, 47 Ala. 696; Rubber Co. '12.
Mitchell, 37 Ala. 314; Stein v. McArdle, 25 Ala. 56].; Mark
land 12. Albes, 81 Ala. 433, 2 South. 123; Maddox '0. Broyles,
* * *
42 Ala. 436.
In Missouri, it is competent for the parties to stipulate that
bills of exceptions may be signed and ﬁled on or before a
given date after the expiration of the term. S-wank 12. Swank,

~n
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85 Mo. 198. But this is by virtue of a statute which express
Thompson on
authorizes it to be done by agreement.
Trials, § 2813, says that bills of exceptions may be signed and
made a part of the record by stipulation of the parties after
the expiration of the term, but no authority is cited to sup
port this text except the case of Swank v. Swank, supra, the
decision of which, as We have observed, is based upon a stat
ute expressly authorizing the extension by consent of parties.
*

#

IF

IF

i

*

Ii

#

#

III

ly

is

it

There can be found many decisions of other states, which
are fully in accord with the ones herein cited and referred to,
but we hardly deem it necessary to multiply decisions upon
this subject. In so far as we have attempted to review the
decisions of other states, we have endeavored to refer to the
statutes of those states, because, in estimating the value of
needful to
adjudications of other states as authority,

a

a

*

*

"‘

a

is

it

is

a

is

it

it

a

it

a

a

understand the statutes and the practice under them, and my
search has led me to believe that no case can be found which
part of the record
bill
authorizes the signing and making
of exceptions after the time given by statute to do so has
passed, where the statute makes such provision, and where
is not provided that the court may, by consent of the par
ties, further extend the time. In fact, where the statute gives
certain time within which to prepare bills of exceptions,
without qualiﬁcation,
seems that all the courts hold that the
bill of exceptions must be signed by the court within this time,
nullity, and cannot be considered
part of
otherwise
rendered, and the court
When ﬁnal judgment
the record.
thereby loses jurisdiction of
adjourns ﬁnally for the term,
the person and of the subject-matter, unless such jurisdiction
in some way reserved by law. Our statute does reserve to
the court the right, within the limited time of 30 days after
the adjournment, to sign and make bills of exceptions
part
of the record; but beyond this limit the court cannot go, either
by its own act or the act of the parties.
Our conclusion is:
That the court was without power or authority to sign the
bills of exceptions after the expiration of the time given in
That there was no jurisdiction for so doing; the
the statute.
court having lost jurisdiction of the subject-matter, as well as
the parties, at the expiration of that time.
We ﬁnd that the bills of exceptions were not signed and
part of the record within 30 days, and,
certiﬁed and made
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this not having been done, they cannot be treated as a part
of the record, and we therefore aﬁirm the judgment of the
circuit court.“

"The federal practice ls fully discussed
Co. v. Heldmaler, (1902) 116 Fed. 179.

TIGHE
Supreme

v.

MARYLAND CASUALTY

Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
216 Massachusetts,

J.

in Western Dredge

8'.

Imp.

CO.
1914.

459.

This is a motion presented to the full court,
signed by counsel representing all parties, that a bill of ex
ceptions regularly allowed by a judge of the superior court
It is
be amended by the addition of a material statement.
grant
petitions of this nature is con
urged that power to
ferred by St. 1913, c. 716, entitled “An act to simplify legal
procedure.”
It is provided by section 3 that “the Supreme
Judicial Court, upon any appeal, bill of exceptions, report, or
other proceeding, in the nature of an appeal in any civil ac
tion, suit or proceeding, shall have all the powers of amend
The word “amendment," when
ment of the court below.”
found in statutes relating to procedure and practice, com
monly refers only to pleadings and process. " " *
There are inherent obstacles in giving the statute any other
The word “amendment" does not easily lend
construction.
itself to an interpretation applicable to bills of exceptions, re
ports or appeals. These constitute the record ofthe action
Facts upon which his conduct, rulings
of the trial judge.
and decision were founded cannot in the nature of things be
changed justly without his consent. Allowance of a bill of
exceptions by a judge is a certiﬁcate by him of its truth. So
long as he is alive and not incapacitated, he alone with pro
priety can determine whether a modiﬁcation is needed to ex
press the full truth. A report presents for the consideration
of this court a deﬁnite question or questions of law. This is
the act of the judge. It is difﬁcult to conceive of a change in
such a matter made by any one other than the judge who has
framed and signed the report.
RUGG, C.

Sec.
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The proper way to accomplish that which this petition
prays for—since the enactment of St. 1913, c. 716, as well as
before—is to ask that the exceptions may be discharged for
Ashley v. Root, 4
purpose of correction by the trial judge.
Allen, 504. Petition dismissed."
95 It is commonly
held that after the time for settling the bill of ex
ceptions has expired, the trial court may allow an amendment to show
the truth,—Knights of Pythias v. Bond, (1913) 109 Ark. 543; Ross v.
K. 0., Ft. S. & M. RR. Co., (1897) 141 Mo. 390; Harris v. Tomlinson.
Such amendment may be allowed even after an
(1891) 130 Ind. 426.
appeal has been taken, by direct application to trial court,—Matter of
Lamb, (1892) 95 Oal. 397; North Chilllcothe v. Burr, (1899) 178 Ill. 218;
Ferrari v. Beaver Hill Coal Co., (1909) 54 Ore. 210; or the appellate court
may allow the bill of exceptions to be withdrawn for amendment by the
trial court,—-Catlin, etc., Land Co. v. Burke, (1886) 22 Colo. 419; or
the appellate court may remand the bill ot exceptions for amendment,
Brennan-Love C0. v. McIntosh, (1898) 56 Neb. 140; or the appellate court
may, on motion, order the parties to add to the copy of the record when
the fault is with the copy and not with the original,—Suchocki v. Calumet
Ins. Co., (1909) 158 Mich. 62. In Richardson v. Bohney, (1910) 18 Ida.
329, it was said that the trial court had no jurisdiction
to allow an
amendment until the remand of the case.
An amendment of a bill of exceptions cannot be eifected by consent.—
State v. Libby, (1907) 203 Mo. 596; Shepard v. Hull, (1856) 42 Me. 577.
A few cases hold that after the bill of exceptions has been signed and
v. Kuykendall, (1881) 58 Miss.
delivered it cannot be amended.—Bridges
828, citing several cases.

SECTION 5.

Tan TRANSCRIPT.

WHITNEY
Supreme

J .:

At

HARRIS.

Court of Kansas.
21

VALENTINE,

v.

1878.

Kansas, 96.

the time that this case was instituted
in the supreme court, the following statute was in force, to
wit: “That in all actions hereafter instituted by petition
in error in the supreme court, the plaintiff in error shall
attach to and ﬁle with the petition in error the original case
made, ﬁled in the court below, or a certiﬁed transcript of the
record of said court.”
(Laws of 1877, pages 243, 244.)
Prior to the passage of this statute, the following statute was
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in force, to wit: “The plaintiff in error shall ﬁle with his
petition a transcﬁpt of the proceedings, containing the ﬁnal
judgment or order sought to be reversed, vacated or modiﬁed,
or the original case-made as hereinafter provided, or a copy
thereof.” (Code, 546 as amended, Laws of 1870, page 169.)
The plaintiff in error in this case has not complied with
either of these statutes. She has not ﬁled with her petition in
error “the original case-made,” “or a copy thereof,” nor “a
certiﬁed transcript of the record of said (district) court,”
nor “a transcript of the proceedings, containing the ﬁnal
judgment or order sought to be reversed, vacated or modi
ﬁed;” but all that she has ﬁled therewith is only a copy of a
mere bill of exceptions, certiﬁed to the clerk of the district
court of Mitchell county, as follows: “I certify that the fore
going is a correct copy of the bill of exceptions in the above
entitled cause now on ﬁle in my oﬁice.” This bill of excep
tions does not purport or profess to give the full “record” of
the case in the court below, nor does it profess to give all the
Therefore, how much of
“proceedings” had in such case.
the “record" or how much of the “proceedings” is not brought
to this court, We cannot tell. And that portion of the “rec
ord” or “proceedings” not brought to this court may be very
essential. It may be necessary to any correct understanding
of the case, and might explain all the supposed errors com
plained of by the plaintiffs in error. It is true that the bill
of exceptions contains many things which ought not to be
put into a bill of exceptions: for instance, it purports to con
tain copies of the pleadings, or, at least, copies of a portion
of the pleadings; but, of course, these supposed copies are
not properly authenticated.
The clerk, who is the custodian
of the pleadings, and who is the only person who can prop
erly certify to the correctness of copies thereof, does not
certify that these copies are true copies of the original
pleadings.
At most, he only certiﬁes that they are true
copies of copies of such of the pleadings as are copied into
It is well said, in the case of Shu
the bill of exceptions.
malcer 1;. O'Brien, 19 Kans. 476, 477, that “the object of” a
bill of exceptions “is generally to bring upon the record for
review a decision of the court upon a matter of law which
the record would not otherwise show, in which case it must
be reduced to writing, allowed, signed and ﬁled at the term
the decision complained of is made.
Nor is it correct prac

__?~——
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tice to set out the pleadings in the action in the bill of ex
ceptions; neither should the judgment nor orders of the
court be embraced in it. They tend to burden that record and
increase the expense of the transcript without any beneﬁt.
The bill of exceptions is only a portion of the record,” etc.
In order for us to review the proceeding of the court below,
as we have not received a “case-made” we should have “a
certiﬁed transcript of the record”—a “transcript of the pro
But, instead of that, we have a transcript of
ceedings.”
only a portion of the record. If it be said that this portion
of the record shows what the other portion is, it may be
answered, that we cannot know that such is the case. There
may be much of the proceedings that this bill of exceptions
Besides, we are entitled to copies of the
does not contain.
original proceedings, to copies of the original pleadings, pro
cess, motions, orders, journal entries, and judgment; but we
have not obtained them. We have only copies of supposed
copies of a portion of these things. A portion of these things
is erroneously copied into a bill of exceptions, and then we
get only copies of these copies. But how are we to know
that these original pleadings and proceedings are correctly
The party drawing the
copied into the bill of exceptions?
bill copies these things into the bill of exceptions himself.
The other side does not necessarily see the bill until after it
The judge signing and allowing the
is allowed and signed.
bill does not have the custody of the records, and cannot con
veniently know what they contain; and what is already in
the record should not again go into the record by placing

it

Parties have no right to duplicate
in a bill of exceptions.
placing things already of record
by
triplicate
the
record
or
in the bill of exceptions, and thereby needlessly incumber
the record, and increase the costs and expenses of the case.
Besides, the judge does not have authority to certify to the
correctness of copies of the record, or copies of any of the
proceedings which are already of record.
It is the duty of
original
record is made up
the judge only to see that the
properly, and that it speaks the truth; and the clerk then
certiﬁes to the correctness of copies thereof, or to copies or
But the clerk does not, and has not in this
portions thereof.
case, certiﬁed to the correctness of the copies of the pleadings
That is, while the clerk
copied into this bill of exceptions.
certiﬁes that the copy of the bill of exceptions brought to
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this court is a correct copy of the original bill of exceptions,
yet he does not certify that the original pleadings or pro
ceedings, or any of them, were correctly copied into the orig
inal bill of exceptions, and he does not certify that the copies
of pleadings and proceedings found in the copy of the bill
of exceptions brought to this court are true copies of the
original pleadings and proceedings.
We think it will be seen from the foregoing, that this
court could not reverse a judgment upon a mere bill of ex
ceptions.
The judgment of the court below, we think, how
ever, was right, and if any error did intervene, it was mere
technical error.
Said judgment will therefore be aﬁirmed."
in

96A complete precedent for a record in a criminal case may be found
4 Bl. Comm. Appendix, reprinted in Bishop's Directions and Forms.

§ 1070.

In some states the original record, rather than a transcript oi’ the
same, is sent up to the appellate court.-—State v. Paxton, (1905) 75 Neb.
214 (original bill of exceptions and copy oi the record proper);
Becker
v. Becker, (1899) 24 Nev. 476 (optional to send up transcript or original
record); Superior Consol. Land Co. v. City of Superior, (1899) 104 Wis.
463; Michigan, C. L. 1915, sec. 13759 (in chancery appeals).
In case the transcript of the record is incomplete, a diminution of the
record may be suggested and a ccrtiorari asked and issued to supply
Flannery v. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. Ry. Co., (1886) 23
the defect.
Mo. App. 120; Thomas v. O'Brien Lumber Co., (1900) 185 Ill. 374; O'Kane
v. West End Dry Goods Store, (1898) 79 Ill. App. 191; Price v. Hud
dleston, (1906) 167 Ind. 536; Atkinson v. People's Nat. Bank, (1893)
85 Me. 368.
Abstracts. In a number of states the full transcript of the record is
not submitted to the reviewing court, but the parties prepare so-called
abstracts oi the record or transcript, and counter abstracts, and the case
is reviewed upon these abstracts, and only in case oi! controversy as to
the actual record will it be looked int.o.—O‘Neal v. Simonton, (1895) 111
Ala. 176; St. L. & S. F. RR. C0. v. Newman, (1912) 105 Ark. 63; Files
v. Tebbs.
(1911) 101 Ark. 207; Haley v. Elliott, (1891) 16 Colo. 159;
Lake v. Lower, (1889) 30 Ill. App. 500; Johnson v. Hartman, (1905) 119
Ill. App. 206; Williams v. Nottingham, (1867) 27 Ind. 461; Allen V
Lewls, (1896) 38 Fla. 115; Western Storage & Warehouse Co. v. Giasner,
(1899) 150 Mo. 426; Keen v. Keen, (1907) 49 Ore. 362; Ollar-Robinson
Co. v. O'Neill, (1914) 80 Wash. 1; Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Conlon.
(1908) 77 Kan. 324.
“The commingling ot record entries with the bill of exceptions so that
matter ot the one class could not be differentiated
from matter of the
other, led this court to aiﬁrm a sentence of ten years in the penitentiary
on a conviction of murder in the second degree."—Lam1n,
P. J., in
Kolok as v. Railroad, (1909) 223 Mo. 455, 461.

~——
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BRIEFS.

SUN VAPOR STREET-LIGHT CO.

United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. 1894.
59

Federal Reporter, 756: 8 Circuit Court of Appeals. 253.
Before

CALDWELL

and

SANBORN,

Circuit

Judges,

and

THAYER, District Judge.

Circuit Judge. The city of Lincoln, Neb., the
plaintiff in error, insists that the circuit court for the dis
trict of Nebraska erred in rendering judgment against it
for damages for the breach of a contract between that city
and the Sun Vapor Street-Light Company of Canton, Ohio,
the defendant in error. The contract was for lighting the
city of Lincoln. The case was tried to a jury, and the judg
In this court it was not argued
ment is upon the verdict.
orally, but was submitted on briefs. When the writ of error
was sued out, counsel for the city assigned 21 errors.
‘The twenty-fourth rule of this court provides that the
brief of the plaintiff in error in this court “shall contain, in
order here stated:
“(1) A concise abstract or statement of the case, pre
senting succinctly the questions involved, and the manner in
which they are raised.
“(2) A speciﬁcation of the errors relied upon which, in
cases brought up by writ of error, shall set out separately
and particularly each error asserted and intended to be
urged; and in cases brought up by appeal the speciﬁcation
shall state, as particularly as may be, in what the decree is
alleged to be erroneous.
When the error alleged is to the
admission or to the rejection of evidence, the speciﬁcation
shall quote the full substance of the evidence admitted or
rejected.
When the error alleged is to the charge of the
court, the speciﬁcation shall set out the part referred to toti
dem rerbis, whether it be in instructions given or in instruc
When the error alleged is to a ruling upon
tions refused.
the report of a master, the speciﬁcations shall state the ex
ception to the report and the action of the court upon it.
“(3) A brief of the argument, exhibiting a clear state
ment of the points of law or fact to be discussed, with a ref
SANBORN,
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erence to the pages of the record and the authorities relied
When a statute of a state is
upon in support of each point.
cited, so much thereof as may be deemed necessary to the
*
*
"
decision of the case shall be printed at length.
“(4) When there is no assignment of errors, as required
by section 997 of the Revised Statutes, counsel will not be
heard, except at the request of the court; and errors not
speciﬁed according to this rule will be disregarded; but the
court, at its option, may notice a plain error not assigned
or speciﬁed.” 47 Fed. xi.
The entire rule is a copy of the twenty-ﬁrst rule of the
Only the portion of it
supreme court.
3 Sup. Ct. xii.
material in this case is quoted here. In our opinion, the
strict and careful observance of this rule directs the atten
tion of counsel and the court to the merits of the case pre
sented, to the vital questions at issue, and excludes from
If
their consideration frivolous and immaterial questions.
the rule is observed, the arguments of counsel and the con
sideration of the court are concentrated upon the important
questions in controversy, instead of being scattered and dis
sipated by the argument and consideration of numerous side
issues, that, if at all material, are generally governed by the
decision of the main questions, and in this way a just result
It often occurs that,
is more speedily and certainly attained.
through abundance of caution, counsel assign many errors,
when they obtain their Writ of error, which they ﬁnd it en
tirely unnecessary to refer to, and themselves abandon upon
reﬂection, and after an examination of the authorities upon
which they intend to rely in the presentation of their case to
this court. Every gentleman of the bar understands and ap
preciates the necessity of concentrating and conﬁning his
own attention and investigation, as well as the attention and
consideration of the court, to the crucial questions in his
This rule enables him to accomplish this result after
case.
carefully examined the authorities and considered
has
he
the reasons which support his position, and when he is best
prepared to select the errors he deems of importance.
The
rule should be carefully observed.
The brief of counsel for the plaintiff in error contains 23
printed pages. The record contains pleadings, evidence, in
structions given and instructions refused, the verdict, judg
ment, assignment of errors, and writ of error, and covers

H
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printed pages. No speciﬁcation of the errors relied on
which sets out separately or particularly each error asserted
and intended to be urged in a separate subdivision of the
brief is found. After the statement of the case, and before
the argument, the following statement appears, which is the
nearest approach to such a speciﬁcation found in this brief:
“In discussing the law of this case We desire to urge the
following points, on each of which we think the record shows
that reversible error was committed in the trial court:
“(1) That under the law of the state governing the city
it was necessary for the city, by its proper officers, to have
ﬁrst passed an ordinance authorizing such a contract before
the contract could have been entered into by the city officers,
and there could be no ratiﬁcation of a contract made by the
oﬁicers of a city without authority. The contract being void,
no ratiﬁcation was possible.
_
'
any
binding
That
before
valid
and
contract
can be
“(2)
oﬁicers,
made by city
it is necessary that an appropriation
shall ﬁrst have been made to meet the expenses incurred, or
to be incurred, under such contract.
“(3) ‘That, in order to maintain a suit for unliquidated
damages against the city, the plaintiff must have ﬁrst ﬁled
with the city clerk a statement of his claim, giving his full
name, the time, place, nature, circumstance, and cause of in
jury or damages complained of, and that such statement must
have been ﬁled within three months of the time when his
cause of action accrued.
“(4) That the verdict is contrary to, and in direct vio
lation of the instructions of the court as given to the jury.”
Whether the reversible error here complained of was in
the admission or rejection of evidence, or in the charge of
the court, does not appear from this speciﬁcation, nor does
the substance of any evidence admitted or rejected, or any
portion of the charge of the court, appear from it, nor is
there any reference to the pages of the record where any of
Argument follows the statement we
this may be found.
have quoted. But there is only one reference in the entire
brief to any page of the record in support of any of the
assertions or points contained in it, and that is to page 161,
while the entire record contains but 62 pages.
The rule
declares that “errors not speciﬁed according to this rule will
be disregarded ;" and it is the intention of this court to en
62
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force this rule. This is the ﬁrst case in which we have so
sharply called attention to it, and, that no injustice may be
the
done, we have carefully read this record, considered
four points urged in the statement in this brief, and are
"
" "
satisﬁed that neither of them can be sustained.
It

#

I

1

I l

Q

Q

ii

i

The judgment of the circuit court is accordingly aﬂirmed,
with costs."
9'! Parties will not
be permitted
to submit cases without briefs by
stipulation,-—-Disse
v. Frank,
(1873) 52 Mo. 551; and the penalty for
failure ot an appellant to ﬁle a brief will usually be the aﬂirmance oi
the case or dismissal ot the appeal,—Ryau v. Koch, (1872) 17 Wall.
(U. S.) 19; Smith v. Stilwell, (1905) 9 Ariz. 226; Drexler v. Tobacco
Co., (1889) 78 Cal. 624; Beams v. Crawford, (1892) 86 Ia. 753; Clarke
v. Express Co., (1894) 33 Fla. 617; Busch v. Fisher, (1891) 89 Mich.
192; Killhomic v. Nuss, (1900) 24 Mont. 292; Hazard v. Wood-working
Co., (1911) 78 N. J. Eq. 568; Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Board of Com
missioners, (1914) 42 Okl. 618; Steiger v. Fronhoter, (1903) 43 Ore.
178: Dakota Nat. Bank v. Klienschmidt, (1913) 31 S. D. 35; Saltzstein
v. Nahmens,
(1913) 153 Wis. 272.
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1.

CRAWFORD

v.

CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC

RAILWAY

Court of Missouri.

Supreme

171

GANTT,

J

.

*

*

CO.
1902.

Missouri, 68.

*

The facts of record are that on December 18, 1900, Thomas
Crawford ﬁled his petition in the circuit court of Buchanan
county, alleging that by the negligence of defendant he re
ceived personal injuries and was damaged in the sum of
$2,000.
At the January term, 1901, defendant ﬁled its an
swer, and the said Crawford his reply.
The cause came on
January
term, 1901, and resulted in a verdict
for trial at the
for said plaintiff, Crawford, for $2,000; and judgment was
rendered accordingly on the 12th day of February, 1901.
Afterwards, on the 15th of February, 1901,.the defendant
"
"‘
“
moved the court for a new trial.
This motion was
*
*
*
sustained, and a new trial awarded defendant.
To the action of the court in granting a new trial the said
plaintiff, Crawford, then and there duly excepted, and then
and there, on March 6, 1901, ﬁled his aﬁidavit for appeal
from the order granting a new trial, and his appeal was
allowed, and a transcript of the judgment and the order al
lowing the appeal was duly certiﬁed to this court by the clerk
of the circuit court on the 15th of March, 1901; and the
docket fee having been paid March 23, 1901, the_ said tran
script was ﬁled in the office of the clerk of this court. On
March 30, 1901, said plaintiff, Crawford, died; and on April
(1109),
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his death was suggested on the record of this court,
and no further step was taken at the April term of this court
in the cause.
After the death of Thomas Crawford, Lewis
C. Gabbert was appointed administrator of his estate in the
probate court of Buchanan county, and qualiﬁed as such;
and thereafter on May 4, 1901, and during the same term at
which the judgment had been rendered in favor of said Craw
ford, and the motion for new trial sustained, the said Lewis
C. Gabbert entered his appearance to said action in the cir
cuit court of Buchanan county, and the defendant herein en
tered its appearance, and said Gabbert was made party plain
tiff; and thereupon, by the agreement of both parties, said
administrator was granted leave to ﬁle his bill of exceptions
during the May term, 1901, of said Buchanan circuit court.
And afterwards, and during said May term, said administra
tor ﬁled his bill of exceptions, which was signed by the judge
of said court, and made a part of the record of this cause;
and thereupon, on October 8, 1901, said administrator moved
this court as aforesaid to entitle this cause as “Lewis C. Gab
bert, Adm’r of Thos. Crawford, Dec’d, Appellant, vs. The
Chicago, Rock Island & Paciﬁc Railroad Company, R.3pond
ent,” and his right to have the same done presents the ques
tion for decision at this time.
The objection by the defendant is that the order of the
circuit court purporting to revive the suit in the name of
Gabbert, the administrator, was void, and said court was
without jurisdiction to do so, because by the allowance of
the appeal that court lost jurisdiction of said case, and had
no power to permit such revivor.
In the determination of
this controversy, we must call to our aid certain fundamental
principles. Thus, it is settled law in this state that during
the whole of the term in which any judicial act is done the
25, 1901,

proceedings

are considered

to continue

in ﬁeri, and even

after a judgment has been rendered the record remains in
the breast of the judges of the court, and is therefore sub
ject to amendment or alteration as they may direct, but they
cannot, after the lapse of the term, further than by nunc pro
tune entries, make the record speak the exact truth of what
did occur.

And it is equally well determined that this power of the
court over its own records, and its right to amend, correct,
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and complete the same, is not affected by the fact that an
appeal has been taken from its judgment.
=l=

$

t

lk

#

*

*

ii

*

*

Proceeding a step further: By statute law, since the ad
mission of this state into the Union, whenever, in the pro
gress of any trial in any civil suit pending in any court of
record, either party shall except to the opinion of the court,
and shall write his exceptions, and pray the court to allow
and sign the same, the person composing the court, if such
bill be true, shall sign the same, and every bill of exceptions
so signed by the judge, and ﬁled in court or with the clerk by
order of the court, shall form a part of the record of the
"‘
*
*
cause in which it is ﬁled.
Coming now to the record before us, it appears that the
record was not complete when the original plaintiff, Thomas
Crawford, took his appeal. A trial had occurred, in which
and a new trial had been
he had recovered judgment,
granted, to which action he had excepted. He had the right
to appeal from that order granting a new trial by virtue of
the amendment of 1891 to section 2246, Rev. St. 1889.
See
Laws 1891, p. 70. And in order to present his appeal in an
intelligible form to this court, he was entitled to have his
exceptions taken in the circuit court made a part of the rec
ord of that court; and it was a part of the inherent jurisdic
tion of that court to complete the full record of the trial in
that court, and cause its rulings therein to be embodied in a
bill of exceptions approved and signed by the judge thereof,
and ﬁled in said court. This right it had irrespective of any
appeal that might be taken from its said order, or any writ
of error that might issue to it from this court, without in
any manner infringing upon the jurisdiction of this court
In so doing it would
to determine said case on appeal.
merely be completing its own record.
And it had the power
to do this at any time during the term, or could by its order
of record extend the time beyond the term. * * " It was
the practice of this court to refuse to aﬁirm a judgment for
failure to ﬁle the transcript where the term of the circuit
court extended beyond the time allowed to ﬁle the transcript
in this court, on the theory that the circuit court might modify
or set aside its judgment at any time before the ﬁnal adjourn
ment of the term at which it was rendered.
What, then, re
sults? If the original plaintiff, Crawford, had lived until the
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end of the January term, 1901, no doubt whatever could
exist that he could have ﬁled his bill of exceptions at any time
He had perfected his appeal, as We
before its adjournment.
now hold he should have done, by the short method, without
prejudicing his right to have his exceptions incorporated
into the record, and the circuit court still retained jurisdic
tion for that purpose. This being true, did his death forever
Could not his administrator have those
cut off his right?
exceptions made part of the record?
We think he could, by
having the cause revived in his name during that term of
This we say, assuming that it was a cause of action
court.
which survived to the personal representative, which we will
discuss later on. The court made the order substituting the
plaintiff without a scire facias to defendant to show cause
against it, and the defendant, as the record shows, volun
tarily entered its appearance, and agreed with said adminis
trator that he should have until the May term to ﬁle the bill
of exceptions. When the defendant thus entered its appear
ance and made this stipulation, the cause stood revived with
This has been the rule for many years
out further process.
"‘
*
in this state.
We have, then, a court of record, with the unquestioned
right to correct, amend and perfect its record, with full
power to set aside its judgment during the term, with a co
incident right in the plaintiff to have his bill of exceptions
ﬁled and the record completed; and, this being so, when both
parties consent, we cannot see why this revivor, had in this
way, is not an incident of that court’s jurisdiction to perfect
its own record; and, the cause having been revived once, it
is not necessary to do a useless thing, and revive it again in
Holding, then, as we do, that, in reviving the
this court.
cause to enable the administrator to ﬁle the bill of exceptions
taken in the lifetime of his intestate, the circuit court, dur
ing the term at which the judgment was taken, was proceed
ing within its own jurisdiction, and in no manner infring
ing upon any prerogative of this court, it is plain that this
court was without jurisdiction to complete said record, or
allow for that court a bill of exceptions to its rulings. * * *
But we are here confronted with a long list of cases to the
effect that after the appeal was taken the cause was pending
in this court, and the circuit court could take no step. We
have seen that this in no sense interferes with the power

'
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of the circuit court over its own records to amend and per
fect the same; but, as to the statement that after appeal
taken the cause is pending in the appellate court, it will be
found, in every one of the cases cited, this was said of the
effect of the appeal after the close of the term of the circuit
court; and it will be found that none of these cases denies
the power of the circuit court during the term to set aside
the order granting the appeal itself, or denies that during
the term the circuit court had plenary jurisdiction of the
case, and until the term ended it did not lose the right to
*
*
"
correct or set aside its own judgments.
Accordingly we hold that the mere taking of the appeal
from the order granting a new trial, and ﬁling the short
transcript in this court, did not deprive the circuit court of
its original jurisdiction to make any and all proper orders
to perfect its own record during that term; and, as an inci
dent of that jurisdiction, it had the power to permit the
cause to be revived in order to let the administrator ﬁle the
bill of exceptions already taken, when the administrator had
appeared and asked to be substituted, and defendant ap
peared and consented to the order of May 4, 1901,—all dur
ing the same term. * “ "
Buscnss, C. J., and SHERWOOD, ROBINSON, BRACE, and
VALLIANT, JJ., concur. MARSHALL, J., dissents."
writ of error without a supersedeas divest the court below
to proceed judicially in the cause covered by such writ ot
error, it would not follow that a. party might not. through the sheriff,
proceed with ministerial acts to realize the money due upon a
fa."
Cummings v. Clegg, (1889) 82 Ga. 763.
98

of

“Did

a

power

Supreme Court
157

of

CITY OF PASADENA

v.

fl.

iii-ii

SUPERIOR COURT.

California.

1910.

California, 781.

&

&

a

is

J.

LORIGAN,
This
an application for
writ of prohibi
tion. On March 25, 1908, the Sunset Telephone
Telegraph
Company, in conjunction with the Paciﬁc Telephone
Tele
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graph Company, brought an action in the superior court of
Los Angeles county against the city of Pasadena, and certain
of its officers, to enjoin and restrain said city from enforc
ing one of its municipal ordinances relative to the use of
streets thereof by telegraph and telephone companies requir
ing franchises and ﬁxing charges to be paid for such use, and
forbidding the maintenance of certain telegraph and tele
phone lines, and declaring them nuisances, and to restrain
and enjoin the city from destroying or removing (as it was
alleged the city threatened and intended to do under said
ordinance) the poles, wires, and appliances of the plaintiffs
erected and used in the streets, alleys, and public places of
said city.

A temporary restraining order was issued on the ﬁling
of the complaint and thereafter, on November 12, 1908, upon
a hearing it was ordered that an injunction pendente lite is
A trial of the cause being had, the court, on May 27,
sue.
1909, entered an order directing a judgment for the city for
costs and “that the temporary injunction theretofore issued
be forthwith dissolved,” and immediately thereafter the city,
through its officers, without notice to plaintiffs, “commenced
the destruction of the companies’ telephone system in Pasa
dena, by cutting 12 of their cables, a total of 1,350 pairs of
wires, disconnecting 2,400 subscribers and 3 exchanges, be
sides 4 toll lines.
The next day a conference was had be
*
*
"‘
tween the attorneys for the respective parties.
An agreement could not be reached and plaintiff moved the
court to restore and continue in force such preliminary in
junction pending the ﬁnal determination of the cause which,
on June 28, 1909, the court granted, being of opinion, as de
clared in its order, that the status quo between the parties
should be maintained pending the ﬁnal determination of the
action. This order was made by the court on certain condi
tions, namely, that plaintiff should within 10 days perfect
their appeal to the Supreme Court from the judgment in the
*
*
*
action.
On July 7, 1909, the defendant city moved the court to
vacate said order of June 28, 1909, on several grounds, to
wit, that no preliminary injunction had in fact ever been
issued or been in effect in said action, and, further, that the
court was without power or authority to make said order
continuing in force the injunction until the ﬁnal determina;
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tion of the action. This motion was denied. " * *
The main -question in this controversy is whether a su
perior court in an action brought to obtain a perpetual
injunction can, by an order made concurrently with the
granting of a ﬁnal judgment in the action denying the in
junction, continue in force a preliminary injunction, or make
an original injunctive order, restraining the successful party,
pending an appeal by his adversary against whom the judg
ment, denying a right to any injunction whatever, runs.
Ii

i

$

#

#

#

#

$

IF

#

We think, on an examination of the authorities, that it is
hardly open to serious question but that the superior court
has the power in its ﬁnal judgment to continue in force a
preliminary injunction so as to maintain the status quo of
the subject-matter of litigation pending an appeal, notwith
standing that the right to a perpetual injunction, which was
the primary object of the action, may have been denied by
the judgment itself. By article 6, § 5, of the Constitution
of this state, the superior court is vested _with “original
jurisdiction in all cases in equity.” A similar constitutional
provision as to the jurisdiction of the district courts (prede
cessors to the present superior courts) is found in the old
Constitution of 1849 as amended in 1862 (article 6, § 6),
and as to such a provision it is said in People v. Davidson,
30 Cal. 379, 390, and likewise in Rosenberg v. Frank, 58 Cal.
387, 400, that “the equity jurisdiction with which the dis
trict courts are invested under the Constitution is that ad
ministered in the high courts of chancery in England.” To
this same effect is Bacon ’L’. Bacon, 150 Cal. 477, 89 Pac. 317.
It being determined, therefore, that the superior court has
equity powers equal to those exercised by the chancery courts
in England, it only remains to ascertain whether such courts
possessed the power to maintain the status quo of the subject
of litigation by continuing an injunction pending an appeal.
While this is the ﬁrst time that this exact question has been
presented to this court for determination, we have no doubt
that the power existed in the chancery courts in England, and
that under the authorities from our sister states it is a power
with which courts of general equity jurisdiction in this coun
try are invested, certainly at least in the absence of any limi
tation by constitutional provision or legislative enactment.
_In some of the authorities, to be cited or quoted from, some
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is had as to the power of the appellate court, on
application therefor, to grant an injunction pending the ap
peal, as well as the right of the lower court under its original
equitable power to do so. We are not now concerned with
what may be the power of the appellate court in that respect,
but are dealing solely with thelright of the trial court in an
equitable action to do so in its ﬁnal decree, and limit our
selves to a consideration of this sole proposition.”
Now as to the power of the English courts of chancery to
preserve the subject-matter of litigation in statu quo, pend
ing the ﬁnal determination of a controversy, there can be
no question. The existence of this power in such courts, and
their right to exercise it in an equity suit, is thus generally
“Where an action has been altogether dismissed
declared:
by a divisional court, the Court of Appeals will in a proper
case grant an injunction to restrain any of the parties from
parting with the property till the hearing of the appeal. If
an appeal is dismissed by the court, the jurisdiction of the
court is gone, and no order can be made to bind the parties
pending an appeal to the House of Lords. Where a plaintiff
discussion

whose appeal is about to be dismissed intends to appeal to
the House of Lords he should ask that the decree dismissing
the bill should be so framed as to keep alive the jurisdiction
of the court. But the court has power on a proper case
being made out, to restrain by injunction all dealings with
a fund pending appeal to the House of Lords, although the
court has decided against the title of the plaintiff and dis
The jurisdiction, however, will be exer
missed the action.
cised With care and so as not to encourage any one to pre
sent appeals for the purpose of delay.” Kerr on Injunctions
(3d Ed.) pp. 29, 30.
In Howey v. McDonald, 109 U. S. 150, 160, 3 Sup. Ct. 136,
142 (27 L. Ed. 888), this power in the English courts of
chancery is recognized, where the court says:
“In England,
until the year 1772, an appeal from a decree or order in
chancery suspended all proceedings; but since that time a
contrary rule has prevailed there. The subject was reviewed
by the House of Lords in 1807, and an order was made estab
lishing the right of the chancellor to determine whether and
how far an appeal should be suspensive of proceedings, sub
JPCt to the order of the House on the same subject.
see
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Palmer’s Pract. H. L. 9, 10; 15 Vesey, 184; [Hart & Hoyt
'0. Mayor of Albany] 3 Paige, 383, 385.”
And in that case, the court, referring to the Slaughter
House Cases, 10 Wall. 273, 19 L. Ed. 915, and still consid
ering the power of the chancery courts of England to main
tain by their order the status quo of the subject-matter of
litigation pending appeal, says as to what was, and was not,
“It was decided that neither a de
decided by those cases:
cree for an injunction nor a decree dissolving an injunction
was suspended in its effect by the writ of error, though all
the requirements for a supersedeas were complied with. It
was not decided that the court below had no power, if the
purposes of justice required it, to order a continuance of the
status quo until a decision should be made by the appellate
court, or until that court should order the contrary. This
power undoubtedly exists, and should always be exercised,
when any irremediable injury may result from the effect of
the decree as rendered; but it is a discretionary power, and
its exercise or nonexercise is not an appealable matter.”
I
1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

In our sister states, where the question has arisen as to
the power of courts of general equity jurisdiction to make
orders maintaining the status quo of the subject-matter till
ﬁnal determination on appeal, the existence of such power
has been conﬁrmed by the appellate tribunals.
Hart v.
Mayor, etc., of Albany, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 381; Messzmnier v.
Kauman, 3 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 66; Disbro v. Disbro, 37 How.
Prac. (N. Y.) 147; Jewett v. Dringer, 29 N. J. Eq. 199;
State ex rel. v. Dearing, 180 Mo. 53, 79 S. W. 454.
1

*

It

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

11

is nevertheless contended by counsel for peti
tioner that such general equity jurisdiction is subject to legis
lative control as far as provisional remedies are concerned,
as such remedies are mere incidents to the jurisdiction of
the courts, and are no part of its essential jurisdiction.
On this assumption, and in connection with it, it is urged
that under the Code provisions of this state the superior
courts, notwithstanding they are courts of general equity
jurisdiction, are without power to issue injunctions, either
permanent or provisional, except in such cases as are pro
vided by the Code, and which it is insisted do not embrace
power to continue in force pending an appeal, a temporary
"'

"‘

i
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injunction theretofore issued. Conceding, without deciding.
all that petitioner contends for, still, if the Legislature has
not by some provision curtailed the power which, as courts
of general equity jurisdiction invested with all the power
exercised by courts of chancery in England, our superior
If
courts possess, this power remains and may be exercised.
legislation,
respect
by
it
power
in
this
it has been shorn of
must be found in the code provisions as to the matter of
injunctions, and a careful examination of these provisions,
both in the Civil Code and Code of Civil Procedure, discloses
nothing whereby the exercise of power in question has been
curtailed.
#

#

l

U

ii

l

*

Q

t

Q

Did we deem the possession of this power in the court
doubtful by virtue of the code provisions to which petitioner
refers, We would neverthelessbe constrained to hold that the
power existed as necessary to the ends of justice, because a
decree denying an injunction or dissolving a preliminary in
junction is not suspended pending the appeal therefrom, and
it is a debatable question whether there is any power in our
appellate courts, by original, injunctive order, to maintain
the status quo of the litigated subject-matter pending appeal.
Hence, unless the superior court possesses the power by pro
visional injunction to maintain the status quo of the subject
matter of litigation, there is no remedy afforded plaintiffs
whereby their property could be saved from destruction while
the question of the right of the city to require its removal
from its streets was, in good faith, being litigated.
_The petition for a writ is denied.
99 It has frequently been held that the power to preserve the status quo
during an appeal by appropriate orders also resides in the appellate
court.—-—Doughty
v. Somerville & Easton RR. Co.. (1848) 7 N. J. Eq. 629
(containing a very full and able discussion); Merrimack River Sav. Bank
v. Clay Center, (1911) 219 U. S. 527; Campbell Lumber Co. v. Logging
Co., (1912) 68 Yvash. 431; Farmers Nat. Bank v. Backus,
(1895) 63
Minn. 115.
1 Even after the appeal has been taken, the trial court may make any
injunctive order necessary to preserve the status quo pending the ﬁnal
determination.—Ajax Gold Min. Co. v. Hilkey, (1902) 30 Colo. 115. See
also Herring v. Pugh, (1900) 146 N. C. 852. So the trial court may place
property in a receiver's hands in order to preserve it during the pen
dency of an appeal.—Morbeck
v. Bradford-Kennedy Co., (1910) 18 Ida. 458.
See extensive note in 67 Am. St. Rep. 714-722, on the implied powers
of courts to supersede orders or judgments.
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St. Louis Court of Appeals.
153

SALE.

1910.

Missouri Appeal, 278.

'

[Hemm and Juede were partners engaged in the retail
drug business. Rieﬁing sued them for damages for negli
gence in ﬁlling a physicians prescription.
While that suit
was pending Hemm brought an action in the circuit court
against Juede to dissolve the partnership, and dissolution
was decreed and a receiver appointed to dispose of the assets
and distribute the proceeds. Thereafter uede was adjudged
a. bankrupt and his trustee moved in the dissolution
suit for
an order directing the receiver to pay him Juede’s share
of the partnership proceeds, which motion was granted and
Hemm appealed. Rieﬁing subsequently won his damage suit
and ﬁled an intervening petition in the dissolution suit pray
ing for an order that the receiver pay his judgment out of
The court_held that
the partnership assets in his hands.
because of Hemm’s appeal it had no jurisdiction to pass on
the intervention petition until the cause was remanded.
Rieﬁing thereupon brought this action in mandamus to com
pel the circuit court to act upon his petition.]
CAULFIELD, J. The circuit court having refused to enter
tain relator’s intervening petition on the ground of an al
leged want of jurisdiction, it is the duty of this court to de
termine whether the circuit court has such jurisdiction.
It is undoubtedly the rule that an appeal divests the juris
diction of the trial court and places it in the appellate court.
*
*
"‘
And in stating the rule our courts have used the
broadest language. Thus it was said at an early day, “when

J

an

appeal has once been granted,

the power over the sub

ject is functus ojﬁcio, and cannot be exercised a second time.”
Brill 12. Meek, 20 Mo. 358. “When an appeal is perfected, the
cause is pending in the appellate court, and not in the trial
court,” and, unless the order allowing the appeal is vacated
during the term, the trial court “can make no other or fur
ther order.” Oberkoetter 0. Luebbering, 4 Mo. App. 481.
In State ex rel. 0. Gates, 143 Mo. 63, 69, 44 S. W. 739, our
Supreme Court said that the effect of the order allowing the
appeal “is to transfer the jurisdiction of the case from the
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court to the appellate court. "' " ' In other
words, the effect‘ of the order granting the appeal is to sus
pend all further exercise of judicial functions in the case
by the court from which the appeal is taken, and to transfer
the same to the appellate court, where further judicial pro
ceeding is continued until the case is disposed of. The bond
does not operate at all upon the judicial functions of the
court; they are suspended by the appeal, bond or no bond."
But the mere language of a decision is not to be looked to
It is the con
to discover the extent of the rule announced.
clusion only, and not the reasoning by which it was reached,
which is the decision of the court, and constitutes our guide.
Koerner 'v. St. Louis Car Co., 209 Mo. 141, 156, 107 S. W. 481,
The decisions of our courts have
17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 292.
not been consistent with the literal meaning of the broad
It has been held that the
language employed as aforesaid.
appeal does not affect the power of the trial court over its
own records; or its right to amend, collect and complete
them; or its power during the term to set aside the order
allowing the appeal; or to set aside the judgment appealed
from; or to sign and allow a bill of exceptions; or to revive
the cause in the name of an administrator; or, there being
no supersedeas, to execute the judgment appealed from. In
Crawford 12. C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 171 Mo. 68, 66 S. W. 350,
our Supreme Court said that the statement “after appeal is
taken, the cause is pending in the appellate court so as to de
prive the circuit court of further jurisdiction over the cause,”
applies only to the effect of the appeal after the close of the
term of the trial court at which the appeal was taken.
circuit

1

Ii

i

There can be no reason for the rule under consideration
other than that confusion might arise if the trial court and
the appellate court were dealing with the same subject at the
Thus our Supreme Court said, in holding that
same time.
the trial court could not proceed to try the case while an
appeal was pending from its action in granting a new trial:
“The trial of the case going on in the lower court and the
question of the right of such court to try the case, pending
in the appellate court undetermined, at the same time, would
be a strange condition for any case to fall into.” State ea: -rel.
We have examined the cases declaring the
v. Gates, supra.
rule under consideration with a view to ascertaining the
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nature of the judgment or order appealed from, and we dis
cover that in each case it disposes of the entire case, or is
of such a nature that action by the appellate court might be
interfered with by further proceedings, or the proceeding

attempted to be had, by the trial court, pending appeal; the
inhibited exercise of jurisdiction in some manner involves
the order or judgment appealed from. Our attention has not
been called to any case, applying the rule to a state of facts
even remotely resembling that presented by the case at bar.
It would seem to be the true rule that, whatever the judg
ment below legitimately covers, the appeal embraces, and the
jurisdiction of the lower court over all matters so covered
and embraced is suspended pending the appeal; and, that
matters independent of and distinct from the questions in
volved in the appeal are not taken from the jurisdiction of the
trial court. Elliott, Appellate Procedure, § 545.
The necessity for such distinction becomes apparent in ex
tensive receivership proceedings where, owing to the vast
ness of the business, the receiver may have taken hold of
many pieces or lots of personal property having, respect
It is customary for such owners to
ively, many owners.
intervening petition filed in the re
by
property
claim their
ceivership proceedings.
These claims may be very numerous,
property
the value of which is insigniﬁcant when
and for
compared to the magnitude of the property and interests
It would seem ab
involved in the receivership proceedings.
surd to hold that every time an appeal is taken from an
order sustaining or rejecting one of these numerous and
insigniﬁcant claims, the jurisdiction of the
comparatively
court over the entire receivership proceeding, its power to
make orders and to pass upon all other claims, would be
suspended.
Yet to hold that every appeal in a cause sus
pends the trial court's jurisdiction must lead to that result.
We do not believe that the decisions of our Supreme Court

that far.
The intervening petition which respondent refused to en
tertain had no connection with the matter on appeal.
It
involved a different right which could not be affected by the
action of the appellate court upon said appeal. The appeal
involved the right of the trustee in bankruptcy to have
Juede’s share of the partnership assets as against Francis
Relator was not concerned with that except in an
Hemm.
go
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abstract sense. His right, if it existed at all, was against all
of them. The determination of their rights between them
selves could not affect his alleged‘ superior claim against all
of them} It is true that his petition prayed that the order
appealed from should be set aside, and the jurisdiction of
the trial court as to that order was suspended by the appeal
therefrom, but the proper remedy, if there was any, was
represented by the prayer that the receiver be directed to
pay relator’s judgment out of the assets in his hands, and
the jurisdiction to grant that prayer was unaffected by the
appeal.
Because relator included in his petition along with
proper relief prayed for, a prayer for action which the court
was without jurisdiction to take, did not deprive the court of
jurisdiction to grant such proper relief. The prayer for un
authorized action may be ignored.
#8

the trial court had jurisdiction to
take cognizance of, consider, determine, and decide on its
merits the intervening petition of relator, notwithstanding the
pendency of the appeal from its action upon the petition of
peremptory writ will be awarded.
the trustee,
a

Being of the opinion

Estate of Heaton, (1904) 142 Cal. 116; Mingo County Bank
Coke Co., (1910) 67 W. Va. 9; Herbert v. Wagg, (1911) 27
Okl. 674. So, where
case has been appealed only as to the rights of
may proceed in the trial court as to the separate rights
certain parties,
of others.—Hayes v. Frey, (1882) 54 Wis. 503; Glass v. Greathouse.
(1851) 20 Ohio, 503.
"In all matters pertaining to the appeal itself, and to the proper hear
ing thereby, this court has jurisdiction, and also in regard to all ap
plications which by statute may be made to this court after the taking
of an appeal, but as to all other applications the case is regarded as
still pending in the court of original jurisdiction."—-People ex rel. v.
Board of Education, (1894) 141 N. Y. 86.
it

a

&

8Accord:

v. Coal
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DUTCHER.

Supreme Court of Iowa.
128

WEAVER,

J.

*

*

*

#

#

¥

$

1905.

Iowa, 413.

1

IF

¥

Q

I

Q

When the pleadings were ﬁnally settled, and before
trial was begun, the appellant moved to have the cause set
This motion was over
down for trial as an equitable action.
ruled, and the appellant appealed from said order and ﬁled
This it is said deprived the court of
a supersedeas bond.
jurisdiction to proceed with the trial to a jury, and the judg
ment rendered upon the verdict is therefore void. The order
appealed from was self-executing, requiring no writ or pro
cess of any kind to carry it into effect. There was nothing
to supersede by the giving of a bond, and the ﬁling of such an
instrument could have no effect to deprive the court of juris
See second paragraph of
diction to proceed with the trial.
the opinion in Allen 12. Church, 101 Iowa, 123, 70 N. W. 127.
To hold otherwise, and say that by appealing from an inter
locutory ruling a party may deprive the trial court of juris
diction to take any farther step in the case until in the slow
course of appellate procedure it is remanded, only to begin
another round through the appellate tribunal from the next
adverse ruling, would be to deprive courts of the power to
administer substantial justice and prolong litigation until
Jarndyce v. Jarndyce would cease to be any exaggeration of
the law's delays. Of course, the party who proceeds with a
case after his adversary has taken an interlocutory appeal as
sumes the risk of the effect which an adverse decision by the
appellate court may have upon his rights; but that risk is
often preferable to waiting until time and change have de
prived the main issue of signiﬁcance and value.
There is
little to choose between indeﬁnite delay and absolute denial
of right. Owing to variance in the terms of the practice
acts in the several states, we do not derive much aid from
decided cases in determining to what extent an appeal from
an interlocutory order affects the jurisdiction of the trial
But, as affording more or less direct support to the
court.
conclusion we have announced, see People v. Whitney, 47 Cal.
5.

TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRAcTIcE

1124

[Chap.

9

David, 3 Abb. Prac. 385; Fisk v. Railroad, 41
Bramley v. Tyree, 69 Tenn. 531; Barrow 0.
365;
How. Prac.
Rhinelmnder, 3 Johns. Ch. 120; Gorha-m v. Farson, 18 Ill.
App. 520; State 0. Judge, 17 La. 511; Forbes 0. Tucke~rma»n,
115 Mass. 115; Barker v. Wing, 58 Barb. 73; Henry v. Henry,
4 Dem. Sur. (N. Y.) 253; Shea,ﬁ’er’s Appeal, 100 Pa. 379;
Eq. 161, 16 Atl. 683; Insurance Co.
Barton 0. Long, 45 N.
v. Lemar, 10 Paige, 505.
It should be said in this connection that, in any case where
an interlocutory appeal is taken from some ruling not involv
ing the merits of the controversy and not subject to super
sedeas under the statute, the trial court doubtless has the
inherent power to order a stay of proceedings pending the
disposition of the appeal, either upon its own motion or upon
application by a party. No such order was asked in this
*
*
case. The only question raised is one of jurisdiction.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.‘
588;

Ford

v.

J.

'

~.

lAfter

an interlocutory order appointing a receiver has been made
appealed from, the rest of the case still remains pending in the
lower court.—Guynn v. Newman, (1909) 174 Ind. 161; Cuyler v. Atl.
etc., RR. Co., (1904) 132 Fed. 568; Wabash RR. Co. v. Dykeman, (1892)
and

133

Ind.

56.

KNOWLES
Supreme

J.

THOMPSON.

Court of California.
133

VAN DYKE,

v.

»

California,

1901.

2./,5.

Mandamus to compel the respondent, clerk
of the county of San Mateo, to issue an execution in a case
in which the petitioner is plaintiff, and the Crocker Estate
Company, a corporation, and Ernest A. Leigh, are defend
ants.
The petition shows that on the trial of said cause,
which was an action of forcible entry and detainer, a verdict
was rendered in favor of the plaintiff therein January 5,
1900, and on the 6th day of January judgment was rendered
on said verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against said de
fendants; that thereupon the defendants in said action per
fected an appeal from said judgment to this court, February
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staying all proceedings upon said judgment so ap
pealed from; that on November 5, 1900, upon motion of the
respondent in such appeal, plaintiff in said action, after due
notice given, this court dismissed the appeal on the ground
that the appellants therein, the defendants in said action, ha.l
failed to ﬁle a transcript of the record therein.
It also ap
pears from said petition that, after the appeal had been taken
in said action as stated, to wit, on the 7th day of May, 1900,
the superior court in which said action was pending duly
made and entered an order granting a new trial therein,
which order has not been vacated nor set aside, and no appeal
taken therefrom. On March 26, 1901, the remittitur on the
dismissal of the appeal from the judgment in said cause hav
ing theretofore been ﬁled, and the clerk of said court having
refused to issue an execution on said judgment, the petition
er applied to said superior court for a writ of mandamus to
compel said clerk, the respondent herein, to issue said execu
tion. But the court below refused to issue said writ on the
ground, stated in the petition herein, that a new trial in said
action had been granted.
Respondent demurs to the petition
The main grounds
ﬁled herein, and also answers the same.
in support of the demurrer are: First, that the judgment in
the case on which it is sought to have an execution issued has
been vacated and set aside by the order granting a new trial
in said action; second, that the petitioner has a plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in due course of law by an appeal from
the order of the superior court denying his application for
mandamus therein.
1.
It is contended by the petitioner that upon perfecting
the appeal from the judgment rendered in the lower court by
the ﬁling of a supersedeas or stay bond, all further proceed
ings, including any action on the motion for a new trial, were
suspended. This, however, is not so. Only such matters as
are embraced within the judgment or order appealed from
are stayed. Code Civ. Proc. § 946. Proceedings on motion
for a new trial are not in direct line of the judgment, but are
independent and collateral thereto. The judgment may be at
once entered, and even executed, while a motion for a new
trial is pending. The motion may be heard and decided and
an appeal taken on its own independent record while the pro
ceedings on and subsequent to the judgment may be still regu
larly going on, and even an independent appeal taken in that
9, 1900,
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line. Spancgel 'v. Dellinger, 38 Cal. 284; 1 Hayne, New Trial
& App. p. 27. An appeal from the judgment does not de
pend upon the motion for a new trial.
The latter is subse
quent to the judgment, and the appeal from the judgment may
be taken without waiting for the determination of the motion
for a new trial, and such appeal from the judgment may go
on after the appeal from the order has been dismissed.
Towdy 'v. Ellis, 22 Cal. 659. And an afﬁrmance of the judg
ment on a direct appeal therefrom does not prevent the court
below from setting aside the verdict or ﬁnding and judgment
based thereon, and granting a new trial. McDonald r. Mc
Conkey, 57 Cal. 326; Naglee 12. Spencer, 60 Cal. 10. And the
dismissal of an appeal from the judgment is no bar to an ap
peal by the same party from an order denying his motion for
a new trial. Fulton v. Cox, 40 Cal. 105. But an order grant
ing a new trial has the effect of vacating the judgment, and
the party cannot thereafter proceed on said judgment by ap
Kower 12. Gluck, 33 Cal. 407;
peal therefrom or otherwise.
Bronner v. Wetzla-r, 55 Cal. 420; Thompson 'v. Smith, 28 Cal.
534; Rayner v. Jones, 90 Cal. 78, 27 Pac. 24.
2.
An appeal lies from the judgment of the superior court
denying the writ of mandate. Code Civ. Proc. § 939; Pale-che
'0. Hunt, 64 Cal. 474, 2 Pac. 245; People v. Perry, 79 Cal. 109,
21 Pac. 423; Heinlein '0. Phillips, 88 Cal. 557, 26 Pac. 366.
This furnishes a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy to the
petitioner in the ordinary course of law. Santa Cruz Gap
Turnpike Joint Co. '0. Board of Sup’rs of Santa Clara Co., 62
Cal. 40. The demurrer to the petition must be sustained, and
the writ denied, and it is so ordered.‘
4Accord: Rice v. Parrott, (1906) 76 Neb. 501; Henry v. Allen, (1395)
N. Y. 346; Molt v. Nor. Pac. Ry. Co., (1911) 44 Mont. 471; Elliott
v. Whltmore, (1895) 11 Utah, 308. But other cases hold that the motion
for a new trial is so directly in the line of the judgment that after an
appeal has been taken the lower court has no more jurisdiction over
motions for new trials based on grounds occurring at the trial.—Mink
kinen v. Quincy Min. Co., (1912) 169 Minn. 279; McArdle v. McA1-die.
(1866) 12 Minn. 122 (even on the ground of newly discoveredevidenoe);
Hudson v. Bauer Grocery Co., (1894) 105 Ala. 200; Elgin Lumber Co.
v. Langman, (1887) 23 Ill. App. 250; Skinner v. Bland, (188?) 67 N. C. 168.
Where, however, a. motion for a new trial is based upon newly dis
covered evidence or other ground recognized as suﬂi-ient which may
become available only after an appeal has been taken, the pendency of
the appeal cannot affect the right of the trial court to grant the new
v. Smith, (1882) 58 Ia. 607; Hellman v. Adler, (1900) 60
tria.l.—Cook
580;
v. Manly (1853) 15 Ill. 140;‘ Louisville & Nash. RR.
Gibson
Neb.
147
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v. Ueltschi's Ex’rs, (1907) 126 Ky. 556; Mills v. Atl. Ooast Line
RR. 00., (1908) 82 S. C. 126; Fuller v. United States, (1900) 182 U. S.
v. McElhaney, (1873) 111 Mass. 439; State v. Cir
562; Commonwealth
cuit Court, (1888) 71 Wis. 595.
Co.

v.
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&

“
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SECTION 2.

COAL co.

Supreme Court
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of
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California.

1893.

California, 304.
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a

if

a

&

a

HARRISON, J. At
meeting of the stockholders of the Pa
corporation, held at San Diego,
ciﬁc Wood
Coal Company,
1892,
for the election of ﬁve directors for the
November 17,
year then next ensuing, the appellant Clugston was declared
elected as one of the directors.
The respondent herein
claimed that certain votes offered to be cast for himself at
the election should have been received, and that,
they had
been received, the result of the election would have been
shown that he was elected instead of Clugston.
On the 10th
of December, 1892, Dulin ﬁled his petition in the superior
court of the county of San Diego, under the provisions of
section 315 of the Civil Code, making the corporation and
Clugston defendants, and praying the court to set aside the
director, and to conﬁrm the election
election of Clugston as
of himself as such director, and for such other relief in the
The matter was heard by
premises as might seem proper.
the court, and on the 25th of January, 1893,
rendered its
judgment that, at the said election, Dulin was elected one of
the directors of the corporation, and that his election be con
ﬁrmed, and that Clugston was not elected, and had not, since
the 17th day of November, 1892, been
director in said cor
poration.
On the same day the defendants appealed from the
judgment, and now ask for an order “staying the proceedings
in this action, and restraining the respondent Dulin from do
ing any act as director, president, or manager of the appel
Coal Company, or interfering with
lant the Paciﬁc Wood
the management of the business of said company by the ap
pellant Clugston as director and president, and the other di
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rectors thereof.” Each of the contestants herein states in
his affidavit ﬁled upon this motion that after the election in
November he was duly elected president of the corporation,
the respondent Dulin stating that he “was by said board of‘
directors duly elected president of said corporation,” and the
appellant Clugston that he “was duly elected president of
said corporation by the votes of himself, James Wells, and L.
Clugston, being a majority of said board,”--from which it
would appear that, after the election, two of the directors
recognized the appellant as having been elected one of their
number, while two others recognized the respondent, and that
each of the contestants thereafter assumed to act as such
It also appears from the affidavits that, after
president.
judgment had been entered herein, the corporation brought
an action against the appellant Clugston for the purpose of
preventing him from trespassing upon its property or inter
fering with its business, and- that, by virtue of the process
issued therein, Clugston was ejected from certain premises
belonging to the corporation, and Dulin took possession there
of, and assumed to act as a director and its president, and
that Clugston was excluded from the management thereof.
The appellants contend that by virtue of their appeal the re
spondent is prohibited from doing these acts, and they now
ask for this order in support of their contention.
The writ of supersedeas is “an auxiliary process designed
to supersede the enforcement of the judgment of the court
below, brought up by writ of error for review.” Williams v.
Originally it was a writ directed to
Brujffy, 102 U. S. 249.
officer,
him
commanding
to desist from enforcing the exe
an
cution of another writ which he was about to execute, or
which might come into his hands. In modern times the term
is often used synonymously with a “stay of proceedings,” and
is employed to designate the effect of an act or proceeding
which of itself suspends the enforcement of a judgment. In
this state the writ is frequently granted by this court for the
purpose of staying proceedings in the superior court, when
a review of the action of that court is sought in this court,
either upon direct proceeding or on appeal, and is directed to
the court whose action is under review, or to an officer of
that court, who may be about to enforce its judgment.
Section 949, Code Civil Proc., declares that in cases like the
present the perfecting of an appeal “stays proceedings in the
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court below upon the judgment or order appealed from,” thus
creating a statutory supersedeas, or “a suspension of the pow
er of the court below to issue an execution on the judgment or
decree appealed from, or, if a writ of execution is issued, a
prohibition against the execution of the writ.” Honey v. M c
Donald, 109 U. S. 159, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 136. If, after such
appeal, the court below seeks to enforce its judgment. this
court will grant a special order or writ restraining its action.
The writ itself is directed to the court whose action is sought
to be restrained, or to some one of its officers, and is limited
to restraining any action upon the judgment appealed from.
It cannot be used to perform the functions of an injunction
against the parties to the action, restraining them from any
act in the assertion of their rights, other than to prevent them
from using the process of the court below to enforce the judg
ment, nor can the writ be employed for any purpose upon
persons not parties to the judgment.
Its effect is merely ‘to
leave the parties to the judgment in the same position as they
were prior to its entry, and to prevent the appellant from
being prejudiced by its enforcement.
There are many judg
ments, however, Which are self-executing, or which have an
intrinsic effect, upon which there are no proceedings to be
stayed, and which will not be affected by an appeal therefrom.
A judgment granting or dissolving an injunction, or,deter
mining the status of an individual, granting or denying a di
vorce or an annulment of marriage, quieting title to a tract of
land, setting aside the execution of a deed, are instances of
such judgments. | In Walls v. Palmer, 64 Ind. 496, a judgment
had been rendered suspending the petitioner from practicing
as an attorney, and it was urged that an appeal therefrom
had the effect of restoring him to his right to practice during
The court, however, held that
the pendency of the appeal.
appeal
would be to reverse the judg
give
effect
to
the
that
to
ment of the suspension before the appeal was judicially de
cided; saying: “The eifect of the appeal and supcrsedeas is
to stay the judgment of suspension as it is, and prevent fur

It does not reverse,
ther proceedings against the petitioner.
That re
suspend, or supersede the force of the judgment.
judgment
requires
same.
The
itself
mains in all respects the
It executes itself
no further execution than its own terms.
costs,
which is stayed by the
except as to the collection of
The only effect of an appeal to a
appeal and supersedeas.
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court of error, when perfected .and while pending, is to stay
execution upon the judgment from which it is taken.” And
herein should be observed the distinction between the effect
of an appeal from a judgment in staying further proceedings
thereon, and its effect in depriving the judgment itself of any
efficacy as evidence of the fact determined.
The appeal sus
pends its force as a conclusive determination of the rights of
the parties, but the stay ‘of proceedings consequent upon the
appeal is limited to the enforcement of the judgment itself,
and does not destroy or impair its character.
The purpose of the present application is not to prevent
the court from taking any action to enforce its judgment, but
to prevent Dulin from acting as one of the directors of the
corporation. His assuming to be such director, while it may
be in consequence of the judgment, is not a proceeding upon
The acts done and threatened by him were
the judgment.
not done by virtue of the judgment, but in consequence of the
recognition by his fellow directors of his right to co-operate
with them. The fact that the judgment was rendered in his
favor may have been a motive governing the other directors
in recognizing him as a fellow director, and in admitting him
to their counsels and excluding Clugston therefrom, but such
action is independent of the proceeding in court. The stay of
proceedings upon the enforcement of the judgment resulting
from the appeal cannot prevent the moral support which the
rendition of the judgment may give to the other directors, or
form the basis of an injunction against them, nor can it be in
voked to prevent the respondent from committing a trespass
against the appellant. Its only effect is to leave the parties in
the same situation, with reference to the rights involved in the
action, as they were prior to the rendition of the judgment.
They still have, notwithstanding the appeal, the same right
to assert, outside of the court, or in any other proceeding,
their respective rights, as they had prior thereto. While this
proceeding was pending in the court below, that court had
no authority, by virtue thereof, to enjoin Dulin from assum
ing to act as a director, and, after it had adjudged that he had
been duly elected one of the directors, there would have been
a manifest inconsistency in enjoining him from acting as
The appeal from that judgment cannot con
such director.
fer upon Clugston any greater right to an injunction against
Dulin than he had prior to its rendition. The court limited
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its action to ascertaining the result of the election, and did
not grant any relief in the premises other than to conﬁrm the
election of Dulin, and to declare that Clugston was not elected.
No other proceedings have been had or attempted in the court
below upon this judgment, and the judgment itself does not
contemplate or authorize any other proceedings, or any pro
cess to enforce it. The motion is denied.‘
l5Although the operation of a judgment is suspended on an appeal.
the judgment is still effective as a bar to another action.-—Mo0re v. Wil
liams, (1890) 132 Ill. 589; Bank of North America v. Wheeler, (1859)
28 Conn. 433; Nill v. Comparet,_(1861) 16 Ind. 107; Burgess v. Poole,
(1885) 45 Ark. 373; Willard v. Ostrander, (1893) 51 Kan. 481; Creighton
v. Keith, (1897) 50 Neb. 810; Watson v. Richardson, (1899) 110 Ia. 698;
Smith v. Smith,
Parkhurst v. Berdell, (1888) 110 N. Y. 386. Contra.
(1901) 134 Cal. 117; Glenn v. Brush. (1876) 3 Colo. 26; Hershey v.
Meeker County Bank, (1898) 71 Minn. 255, 269. And an action may be
brought on a foreign judgment notwithstanding a pending appeal from
the judgment of the foreign oourt.—Merchants’ Ins. Co. v. De Wolf, (1859)
33 Pa. St. 45; Faber v. Hovey, (1875) 117 Mass. 107.
1

SAGE v. CENTRAL RAILROAD CO.
Supreme

Court of the United States.
98

United States,

1876‘.

.412.

[The Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co., trustee for bondholders
of the Central Railroad Co. of Iowa, brought suit on Oct. 14,
1874, to foreclose the mortgage securing the bonds.
While
the suit was pending, Sage and his associates, being holders
of bonds issued by the Central Railroad Co., presented certain
requests to the Trust Co. relative to the form of the decree,
and thereafter a decree was agreed upon by the parties to the
suit and duly entered on Oct. 22, 1875. So far Sage and his
associates had not become parties to the suit. On December
16, 1875, the Trust Co. prayed an appeal on behalf of Sage
and his associates, which was denied. On January 11, 1876,
Sage and two of his associates ﬁled a petition for intervention
in order to protect their interests, and a lnotion to set aside
the decree of October 22. The court made an order on Janu
ary 14 denying the motion to set aside the decree, but as to
the petition allowed the petitioners to intervene in order to
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prosecute an appeal to the Supreme Court, and further or
dered that if the appeal was to operate as a supersedeas a
bond for $1,000,000 should be ﬁled within 30 days, in which
case the appeal should be regarded as perfected on December
16, 1875; but if not to operate as a supersedeas, the bond
should be $2,000.
No bond was ﬁled under this order, but on
February 16, 1876, a petition for an appeal was presented to.
and allowed by, Mr. Justice Miller of the Supreme Court, and
a supersedeas bond for $20,000 executed.]
WAITE, C. J. " * ‘
1.
As to the supersedeas.
In Kitchen 12. Randolph, 93 U. S., 86, we held that it was
not within the power of a justice of this court to grant a
supersedeas on a writ of error or upon an appeal, unless the
writ of error was sued out and served or the appeal taken
within sixty days, Sundays exclusive, after the rendition of
the judgment or decree complained of.
The decree in this case was rendered October 22, 1875. At
that time, the present appellants were not parties to the suit,
and consequently could not appeal. The application of De
cember 16, though made in their interest, was in form by the
This application was
Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company.
denied; and properly so, because an appeal was only asked so
far as it affected the interests of these appellants. The trus
tee represents all the bondholders; and as the decree is in
divisible, it must appeal for the whole, or none. No applica
tion was then made by the appellants for leave to intervene
and become parties, and consequently the court could not then
have been asked to allow them an appeal as parties.
Such an
application was, however, made January 11; and January 14
they were admitted as parties for the purpose of appealing.
An appeal was then allowed to them; but they did not avail
themselves of it, either by giving a supersedeas bond or a
bond for costs. And if they had done so, it could not have
had the effect of a supersedeas, because.it was not allowed
until after the expiration of the sixty days. The order of
the court, to the effect that if the bond should be given the
appeal might be regarded as taken and perfected December
16, was of no effect for the purposes of a supersedeas.
While
it is true that the court may enter an order in a cause nunc
pro tuna, where the action asked for has beenidelayed by or
for the convenience of the court (Perry 12. Wilson, 7 Mass.
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sedeas must be granted.

Ill

394), it is never done where the parties themselves have been
at fault (F‘ishmongers’ Company v. Robertson, 3 Man., Gr. &
S. 974), or where it will work injustice.
A supersedeas is a statutory remedy. It is only obtained
by a strict compliance with all the required conditions, none
of which can be dispensed with. Hogan v. Ross, 11 How. 297;
Railroad Co. v. Harris, 7 Wall. 575. Time is an essential ele
ment in the proceeding, and one which neither the court nor
the judges can disregard.
If a delay beyond the limited time
occurs, the right to the remedy is gone, and the successful
party holds his judgment or_decree freed and discharged from
this means of staying proceedings for its collection or en
forcement.
This is a right which he has acquired, and of
which he cannot be deprived without due process of law. The
court can no more give eifect to a supersedeas by ordering
that the appeal shall relate back to a time Within the sixty
days, than it can to an'appeal taken after the expiration of
two years, by dating it back to a time within the limitation.
To make a nuns pro tunc order effectual for such purposes, it
must appear that the delay was the act of the court and not
of the parties, and that injustice will not be done.
A slight examination of the facts in this case will be sufl‘i~
cient to show that the failure to take this appeal in time is
attributable entirely to the parties. " * *
From this it follows that the motion to vacate the super

dissented on the ground that the

a

trial court was justiﬁed in considering the application of De
proper application for an appeal,
cember 16 as in substance
a

it

as of that date, in which case the
and in ﬁnally allowing
supersedeas.]°
$20,000 bond would operate as

a

not

1

6

a rule of almost universal application that a perfected appeal
stay the execution of the judgment or order appealed from,
must be com
and that to obtain a stay certain statutory requirements
plied with either as to giving an undertaking or getting an order ot the
court."—Matter of Meyer, (1913) 209 N. Y. 59, 65.
writ of error, without any
At Common Law. “By the common law
security, was ot itself a supcrsedeas of execution from the time of its
allowance or recognition by the court to which it was directed; and even
before, it the defendant in error had notice of it; or, in the Common
Pleas, from the time of its delivery to the clerk ot the errors of that
court, whose business it was, amongst other things, to prepare the re
Tidd's Pract. 530, 1145; Impey's Pract. C. P. 16; Petersd. Abr.
turns.

“It is

does
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tit. Error, I. (N. a)
The presentation of the writ issuing from tho
superior court stopped all further proceedings except such as were in
But as
cidental to a compliance with its command to certify the record.
writs of error came to be sued out tor the purpose of delay, various acts
0! Parliament were passed, requiring security in certain cases, in order
that the writ might operate as a supcrsedeas ' * '"—Kountze v. Omaha
Hotel Co., (1882) 107 U. S. 378, 381.
“' ' ' The jurisdiction of the house ot lords in
In Chancery.
England, relative to appeals from the court of chancery, * * ' was for
"
' ' During this contest, it was a matter
a long time contested.
oi.’ course that the lords, for the purpose ot sustaining the jurisdiction
which they claimed, should prohibit the respondents from taking any
' _* ‘
steps in the cause, in the court of chancery pending the appeal.
Hence it became the law of the appellate court, that the mere presenting
an appeal to the house ot lords, suspended all proceedings whatever in
the court below. And so tar was this principle carried, that as late as
1772 it was supposed that an appeal had the effect oi! totally suspending
the jurisdiction of the lord chancellor as to the whole suit, until the
decision of the lords on the appeal.
But in the case oi‘. Lord Pomtret
v. Smith, which came before Lord Apsley at that time, he decided that
his jurisdiction was suspended only as to the matter appealed from:
but that it was not totally suspended, so as to prevent a proceeding as
to any other matter in the cause. (Palmer's Pr. H. of L. 9.)
The juris
diction of the lords being ﬁnally established, and having remained for
a long time undisputed, they saw the necessity of permitting the court
of chancery, during the recess ot parliament, to take such proceedings
in the cause, pending the appeal, as the lord chancellor might deem
requisite tor the preservation of the rights of the parties. At length this
practice became so fully established, that in the case of Burke v. Brown.
in 1807, (Palmer's Pr. 10; 15 Vesey, 184) the lords decided that an appeal
did not stay any ot the proceedings, even upon the point appealed trom,
without an express order oi! the appellate court; unless the lord chan
cellor, in the exercise oi? a judicial discretion, thought proper to suspend
the proceedings wholly or in part pending the appeal.
This country
having separated from England before this change in the practice had
been established, the courts of this state followed the practice, as settled
by Lord Apsley, in 1772, of considering the appeal as a stay of the pro
ceedings upon the point of the appeal.
The same reasons, which had
produced a change in the practice in England, caused a modiﬁcation
here, so as to make the appeal only a stay of the proceedings in the ﬁrst
instance, subject to the right of the respondent to apply to the chan
cellor for leave to proceed notwithstanding the appeal.”—Hart Y. Mayor,
etc. ot Albany, (1832) 3 Paige (N. Y.) 381.
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Supreme Court of ‘Wyoming.
20 Wyoming,

1912.

376.

POTTER, J. This action was brought in a justice’s court by
the defendant in error against the principal and surety upon
an undertaking given upon an appeal from the judgment of a
justice of the peace to the district court. "' * * [By the
terms of the bond the appellant and his surety undertook that
the appellant should prosecute his appeal with effect and with
out unnecessary delay, and if judgment were rendered against
appellant or the appeal dismissed, they would satisfy such
judgment and costs.]
To the petition an answer was ﬁled alleging: “(1) That
the said bond on which plaintiff bases his action was without
consideration; (2) that the said attempted appeal was dis
missed in the district court upon the motion of plaintiff, H.
C. Dunkin, for the reason that said bond was insufficient
either as an appeal bond or a supersedeas bond, and was de
clared by the judge of said court as utterly void and invalid,
as nowhere in the bond does it appear to what court an ap
peal was attempted, and for other reasons.” To this answer a
general demurrer was ﬁled. The justice sustained the de
murrer, and, the defendants failing to further plead, rendered
judgment in favor of the plaintiff‘ upon the pleadings for
$152.65 against the defendants Bortree and Lindley. The de
That court also sus
fendants appealed to the district court.
tained the demurrer to the answer, and thereupon, reciting in
the order that the defendants failed and refused to further
plead to the petition, judgment was entered for the plaintiff
against the said defendants and John Hecht, their surety.
The case is here on error.
*
*
"‘
The answer alleged that the ground of the dismis
sal was the insufficiency of the undertaking as an ap'peal bond
or as a supersedeas bond. But it is apparent from our stat
utes that the question of the sufficiency of the bond or under
taking for the purpose of staying execution was not before
the court upon the motion to dismiss the appeal, whatever the
Section 5261, Compiled Stat
grounds stated in the motion.
utes, provides that any person desiring to appeal from a judg

1136

TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE

[Chap. 9

ment rendered by a justice of the peace shall, within 15 days
after the rendition of the judgment, ﬁle with the justice a no
tice of such desire, and either pay all the costs of the cause up
to the time of the transmission of the papers to the district
court, including $1.50 for the transcript allowed to the justice
for allowing the appeal and making a transcript, or shall give
bond in double the amount of all such costs to the effect that he
will pay the same in case judgment be rendered against him
therefor in the district court, “and such undertaking may be
included in the undertaking in stay of execution hereinafter
provided for in case such undertaking in stay shall be given.”
Section 5266 provides that no appeal shall operate as a stay
of execution unless the party appealing shall enter into an
undertaking to the adverse party with at least one good and
suﬂicient surety to be approved by the justice, in a sum not
less than $50 in any case, nor less than double the amount of
the judgment rendered, conditioned:
(1) That the applicant
will prosecute his appeal without unnecessary delay; (2) that
the party appealing shall abide by the decision of the district
court in such case and satisfy any judgment that may there
In case
be rendered against him on account of such appeal.
the action is forcible entry and detainer, other conditions are
provided for.
It is clear that the only bond or undertaking necessary to
perfect an appeal is one for the costs accruing up to the time
of the transmission of the papers, including the prescribed
fee for allowing the appeal and making the transcript, and
that bond is only necessary where such costs are not paid.
The fact that no undertaking in stay of execution has been
given is not a ground for dismissing the appeal, and hence, if
one given for that purpose be insuﬁicient in form or sub
stance, it constitutes no ground for dismissing the appeal.
For that reason the fact, as alleged in the answer, that the
judge, in determining the motion to dismiss, declared the bond
to be utterly void and invalid is immaterial. If the costs
which the’ statute requires to be paid as a condition to the ap
peal were not paid or properly secured, then the appeal might
Upon the allegations of the answer, the only
be dismissed.
question relating to the undertaking that was before the dis
trict court on the motion to dismiss the appeal was whether
the instrument was a sufficient bond for the payment of the

_i_
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court under the provisions of section

5261.

Where a bond or undertaking is required to perfect an ap
peal or to give the appellate court jurisdiction, and the ap
pellee, refusing to accept or recognize as sufficient a bond exe
cuted and ﬁled for that purpose, procures a dismissal of the
appeal upon the ground that the bond or undertaking is in
sufficient, it is held that the appellee cannot thereafter recover
upon it. The reasoning of the decisions to that effect is that
the appellant, under such circumstances, does not receive the
beneﬁt sought by the giving of the bond, viz., a hearing of the
case upon appeal, and that it is inconsistent for the appellee
to seek a recovery against the surety as upon a valid and
binding obligation after having declined to accept it as such
and caused the appeal to be dismissed on the ground that it
was not an effectual obligation for the purposes of the ap
peal. Columbia P. S. R. Co. v. Braillard, 12 Wash. 22, 40
Pac. 382; Reilly v. Atchiuson, 4 Ariz. 72, 32 Pac. 262; Tilden
12. Worrell, 30 Pa. 272; Van Riper 'v. Scott, 11 N. J. Law, 315.
it

#

#

The rule declaring the sureties discharged from liability
upon an undertaking on appeal or for the stay of proceedings
or execution where the appeal has been dismissed on the
ground of the insufficiency of the undertaking is usually lim
ited, if recognized at all, to cases where it appears that, by
the dismissal of the appeal, the appellant has lost the only
beneﬁt to be derived from the undertaking, thus leaving it
By the statute of Michigan an
without any. consideration.
appeal could not be dismissed on account of any informality
or imperfection in the bond. But, where the bond was insuffi
cient and a ﬁnal order of dismissal was entered after an order
had been made, which was not complied with by the appellant,
that the appeal be dismissed unless a new and suﬁicient bond
be ﬁled within a speciﬁed time, a suit was held to be main
tainable upon the bond. The court said that the lower court
had no power to dismiss the appeal in the ﬁrst instance, but
could order a new bond, and, in default of compliance with
that order, then the appeal might be dismissed. Replying to
the contention that the appellee could not be heard to claim
anything on the bond, after he had deliberately refused to
receive it and had destroyed the only consideration
for
which it was given, the court said: “We are unable to agree
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with this contention.
The bond operated as a stay of pro
ceedings, and the party appealing had, the right * " * to
amend the bond or ﬁle a new one. * " * The appellee, in
moving to dismiss in default of a new and sufficient bond, was
only exercising his right to have a sufﬁcient bond to cover the
damages and costs, as the statute prescribes. He did not,
however, in taking that action, release his rights under the
former bond until the order of the court had been complied
with and a new bond ﬁled.” Hascall v. Brooks, 105 Mich. 383,
And a similar ruling was made in Missouri
63 N. W. 413.
where the appellant might have avoided a dismissal for a de
fect in the aﬁidavit upon the bond by correcting it or ﬁling a
proper and competent bond. Skidmore v. Hull, 33 Mo. App.
41.
#

It

$

1

Q

Q

i

$

I

#

l

is not a good defense to an action upon a bond or under
taking given to stay execution pending appeal that it was
insufﬁcient for that purpose and that the appellee might for
that reason have proceeded to enforce the judgment, where
the appellee has not taken such action, or in some other ef
fective manner rejected the instrument for the purpose of
the stay. In the notes to the case of Babcock v. Carter, 67
Am. St. Rep. 193, 199, it is said: “So far as we have been
able to discover, the courts have unhesitatingly and with en
tire unanimity overruled defenses of this character, and have
regarded the fact that no proceedings were taken to enforce
the judgment as sufﬁcient evidence that the bond had accom
plished the object for which it was given, namely, to procure
a stay of the execution, and, such being the case, that it is
by a sufficient consideration
supported
and enforceable
“ * ""’
against the sureties as a common-law obligation.
It is not necessary to decide in this case whether a surety
upon a mere cost bond given pursuant to the provisions of
section 5261 to avoid the immediate payment of the costs and
perfect the appeal would be discharged from liability upon a
dismissal of the appeal upon the ground that the bond was
Nor is the question here to be decided whether
insufﬁcient.
the bond in question was suﬁicient as a cost bond to take the
place of the payment of the costs, for the order of the court
in dismissing the appeal in the action wherein the bond or
undertaking was given is not here for review. The petition
alleges that the costs were not paid, and it may be that the

Sec. 2]

Errscr or Tsxnsrsn

1139

undertaking was intended to secure their payment and thus
perfect the appeal. But, whether it was so intended or not, it
was plainly intended as an undertaking to stay execution dur
ing the pendency of the appeal. The petition alleges the fact
that execution of the judgment was stayed until the appeal
was dismissed, and this is not denied by the answer. The un
dertaking was ﬁled December 12, 1908, and the appeal was
dismissed July 15, 1910. There is no allegation in either the
petition or answer that the plaintiff took any steps during

the period between those dates to collect the judgment.
It ap
pears therefore that execution was stayed for a period of 19
months. A stay of execution having been one of the purposes
of the undertaking, and, if not its only or chief purpose, at
least an important one, the appellant had all the beneﬁt that
could be derived from giving an undertaking for such pur
pose.
There is nothing inconsistent on the part of the plain
tiif in bringing this action upon the undertaking after he had
procured a dismissal of the appeal on the ground of its insuffi
ciency as a bond to secure the payment of the costs which had
accrued in the j ustice’s court, for an effectual bond for that
purpose was necessary to the appeal if the costs were not
paid, while an undertaking to stay execution was not. "‘ * *
For the reasons above stated, we think that the demurrer
to the answer was properly sustained and that the judgment
for the plaintiff below was proper upon the facts alleged.’
'1The amount of the bond necessary for appeal or for supersedeas or
for both is usually ﬁxed with more or less exactness by statute.
See
many cases cited in 3 C. J. § 1433. Kountze v. Omaha Hotel Co., (1882)
of the considera
107 U. S. 378, contains a very illuminating discussion
tions which should enter lnto the determination of the amount of a bond
tor damages and costs in a foreclosure suit.
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DULUTH STREET RAILWAY CO.

Supreme

Court of Minnesota.
47

1891.

Minnesota, 369.

After the appeal taken from the order dissolving the

ea:

injunction, as stated in the opinion, the defendant, the
Duluth Street Railway Company, entered upon the premises
of Richardson, the plaintiff in the action, and with a large
force of men, proceeded to construct thereon a road-bed for its
electric street railway. The plaintiff thereupon procured an
order to show cause why the defendant should not be pun
At the
ished for contempt for violating the injunction.
hearing, before Mills,
., the defendant moved that the order
be_discharged for want of jurisdiction.
The motion was de
nied, a hearing had, and the defendant adjudged to be in con
The defendant thereupon
tempt and to pay a ﬁne of $50.
brought the proceedings to this court by certiorari.
GILFILLAN, C. . One Richardson brought an action in the
district court in the eleventh district against the Duluth
Street-Railway Company, and at the commencement of the
action procured from a judge of the court an ea: parte order
for an injunction against the defendant, and the injunction
was issued and served, and the defendant thereupon procured
an order to show cause why the injunction should not be
vacated, returnable before the court, and on its return the
court made an order vacating and dissolving the injunction.
From this order the plaintiff in the action appealed to this
court, and executed and ﬁled the proper stay-bond, as pro
vided in Gen. St. 1878, c. 86, § 10.
The only question brought here by this proceeding is, what
was the effect of the appeal and stay upon the order vacating
Did it suspend the operation of that order,
the injunction?
so as to leave the injunction in force? This must be deter
Section 10 provides:
mined by the statute.
“Such appeal,
when taken from an order, shall stay all proceedings thereon,
and save all rights affected thereby,” if the appellant shall
No class of orders from which
execute the bond required.
appeal is allowed is excepted from this provision. Whether,
because of the possible hardship in some cases to the party
procuring an order from the suspension of its operation, any

ymrte
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class of orders ought to be excepted from the provision, is for
There is no
the legislature, and not for the court, to say.
suggested
by the rela
in
room
the statute for the distinction
tor, between what might be termed “active orders,” or those
contemplating or directing something to be done to make
them effectual, and what the counsel designates “passive or
ders,” which of themselves, and without anything further, ef
Perhaps that distinction might be
fect the desired end.
if
the
claimed
statute stopped with the clause, “shall stay all
proceedings thereon.” But those words, with the words, “and
save all rights affected thereby,” show more than the intent
to merely arrest aﬁirmative action on the order; show the in
tent that the order, when appealed from and stayed, shall
not affect any rights,—in other words, that it shall be inopera
tive pending the appeal. In this case the right affected by the
order was the right to the continuance and operation of the
injunction. The appeal and stay saved that right so that it
“
continued, notwithstanding the order appealed from. "
The order removed here by certiorari is affirmed.‘
MITCHELL, J., (dissenting.) According to the opinion of
the court, although a plaintiff's papers are so insufficient on
their face or so false in their allegations that, if he should ap
ply on notice for an injunction, any court would, on a hear
ing, promptly refuse to grant one, yet, if he can ﬁnd any
where in the state a judge or court commissioner who will
improvidently grant one ea: parte, which the court on the ﬁrst
and only hearing ever had dissolves, he can by appealing and
ﬁling a bond make the ex parte injunction impervious to all
judicial interference until the appeal is determined in this
court. I cannot believe that the statute was ever intended to
thus permit the trial'court to be deprived of its discretion,
(which is really never exercised at all until the hearing on the
motion to dissolve,) and the opposite party to be thus tricked
out of his rights without a hearing, leaving him no redress ex
cept an action on the supersedeas bond for damages, which
Such a result is so un
are often incapable of measurement.
just, and so utterly inconsistent with all known rules of equity
practice, that no court should adopt such a construction un
less absolutely put up to it by the clear and unequivocal lan
guage of the statute. Considering the nature and ofﬁce of an
injunction penrlcnte lite, and the former equity rules on the
subject, I think it may well admit of doubt whether the

'
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phrase, “and save all rights affected thereby," were intended
in any case to have the effect of reviving or continuing in
‘ *
force an injunction after an order dissolving it.
The hearing upon the motion to dissolve an ea: parts injunc
tion is the ﬁrst hearing ever had in the matter, and, while the
order made may be in form one dissolving, it is essentially
one refusing to grant an injunction, and the legal status of
the matter is, in effect, the same.
I do not think that this
view is assuming any unwarranted liberty with the language
of the statute. Nothing is more common in the construction
of statutes than, under certain circumstances, to ingraft upon
general language implied limitations and exceptions.
We
have a notable instance of this in our construction of this very
statute relating to appeals.
The general doctrine of this
court is that no appeal will lie directly from orders or judg
ments made or rendered ea: parte or on default, but that a
party must ﬁrst apply to the district court for relief. No such
limitation or exception is to be found in the language of the
statute, but is implied on the common-sense idea that it could
not have been intended to grant a right of appeal on a matter
upon which there never has been a hearing, and upon which
the court below has never in fact exercised its judgment. I
am authorized to say that Justice Collins concurs with me in
these views, and joins in this dissent.’

'

8 Some cases hold on general principles of appellate
practice that the
stay of execution on a. decree dissolving an injunction reinstates the
injunction.—Hamilton v. State, (1869) 32 Md. 348; Kimball, Raymond &
Co. v. Alcorn, (1871) 45 Miss. 145; Quarnberg v. City of Chamberlain,
(1912) 29 S. D. 377; Turner v. Scott, (1827) 5 Rand. (Va.) 332; Mc
Michael v. Echman, (1890) 26 Fla. 43; Williams v. Pouns, (1877) 48
Tex. 141; Elizabethtown, etc., RR. Co. v. St. Ry. Co., (1893) 94 Ky. 478.
Other cases hold the contrary.—Knox County v. Harshman, (1889)
132 U. S. 14; Hovey v. McDonald, (1883) 109 U. S. 150; Griﬂin v. Branch
Bank, (1846) 9 Ala. 201; Nacoochee Hydro. Min. Co. v. Davis, (1869)
40 Ga. 309: Manning v. Poling, (1901) 114 Ia. 20; Brown v. Wilkerson,
(1910) 82 Kan. 553; Hulan v. Circuit Judge, (1910) 159 Mich. 605; Rey
burn v. Sawyer, (1901) 128 N. C. 8.
9See State v. District Court, (1900) 78 Minn. 464, stating that the
opinion in the Duluth St. Ry. Case is unsound, but following it on tho
basis of stare decisis.
Statutes sometimes expressly provide that appeals from decrees dis
solving injunctions shall not have the effect of continuing the injunctions
in force.—New York Exch. Bank v. Reed, (1908) 232 Ill. 123.
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CHICAGO TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION.

Supreme

Court of Illinois.
282

1908.

Illinois, 402.

CARTWRIGHT, J. The appellees, a number of printing ﬁrms
in Chicago, who are members of the voluntary association
known as the Chicago Typothetae, organized for the promo
tion of their business interests, ﬁled their bill of complaint in
the superior court of Cook county against Chicago Typo
graphical Union No. 16, the appellant, and certain individu
als who were oﬁicers of the union, praying for an injunction
restraining the defendants from picketing the "premises of
complainants, interfering with their employes, congregating
about their premises for the_ purposes of compelling, inducing,
or soliciting said employes to leave their service, or doing
other acts of that nature speciﬁed in the prayer of the bill.
On October 11, 1905, a preliminary injunction was ordered as
prayed for, and a writ was issued and served. The defend
ants appeared and demurred to the bill, and, their demurrer
being overruled, elected to stand by it. The court thereupon
entered a ﬁnal decree in the cause, enjoining and restraining
the defendants, their agents, and servants from doing any of
the acts set forth in the prayer of the bill and the preliminary
injunction. From that decree the appellant and other de
fendants appealed to the Appellate Court for the First Dis
trict. On October 28, 1905, an appeal bond was ﬁled and ap
proved, in accordance with the order granting the appeal.
The defendants continued to do the same acts from which
they were enjoined after the entry of the decree, and on De
cember 9, 1905, the appellees ﬁled their petition in said su
perior court against the appellant, and Edward R. Wright and
Edward E. Bessett, two of its oﬁicers, praying for a rule
against them to show cause why they should not be punished
for contempt of court for violating the injunction. Appel
lant and said oﬂicers appeared and made defense, and upon a
hearing the court ﬁned appellant $1,000 for contempt of the
court in violating th'e injunction. From the judgment impos
ing the ﬁne the appellant again appealed to the Appellate
Court for the First District and the branch of that court
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affirmed the judgment.
This appeal was then prosecuted
from the judgment of the Appellate Court.

l

Q

#

Q

Q

i I

U

i I

The important question in the case, and the one to which
the argument is almost wholly devoted, relates to the juris
diction of the superior court to entertain this proceeding and
punish appellant for violating the injunction after an appeal
The law is that an appeal
had been taken from the decree.
[from a decree] enjoining a defendant from doing an act
does not suspend the operation of the injunction, stay it in
any manner, or disturb its operative force. The appeal does
not have the effect of dissolving or suspending the injunction
and the defendant acquires no right to disregard it by the
execution of an appeal bond. The doing of the act enjoined
may be punished as a contempt notwithstanding the appeal,
and the contempt is a contempt _of the court which granted
the injunction. There is no controversy between counsel on
this question, and a reference to the works where the numer
ous authorities are collated will be sufficient. 2 High on In
junctions (4th Ed.) § 1698a; Elliott on Appellate Procedure,
§ 391; 2 Cyc. 913; 22 Cyc. 1010; 7 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law
(2d Ed.) 55; 16 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 436; 20 Ency. of

Pl. & Pr.

1231.

*

"'

"1°

The question being by what court the contempt can be pun
ished, the natural answer would be by the court whose order is
disobeyed, and whose dignity and authority are deﬁed.
And,
indeed, it does not seem to be disputed that if the proceeding
is in the name of the people, for the purpose of maintaining
the dignity and authority of the court, an appeal would pre
sent no obstacle to it. Such a proceeding is wholly independ
ent of the appeal or any question to be considered by the ap
pellate tribunal, and we see no substantial distinction between
a prosecution for contempt instituted for the purpose of pun
ishing a person for disobeying an order of the court on the
ground that its authority or dignity is in question and one
which is instituted to enforce the authority of the court in the
administration of justice between litigants.
The question
whether the injunction was properly awarded or whether the
decree was erroneous is not involved in either.
A defendant
cannot refuse to obey an injunction, however improvidently
or erroneously granted, but he is bound, at his peril, to obey it
while it remains in force. Tolman "0. Jones, 114 Ill. 147, 38, N.

1 }
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12. People, 140 Ill. 552, 30 N. E. 348; Swedish
American Telephone Co. '0. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New
York, 208 Ill. 562, 70 N. E. 768.
Counsel for appellant says that this_proceeding, being for
a civil contempt, partakes of the nature of the original ac
tion; and that while a proceeding for criminal contempt is a
separate and independent suit, the prosecution of which can
not be delayed by an appeal taken in the civil suit, in this case
the proceeding is a part of the same suit and the court is de
prived of jurisdiction to enter any further order until the
appeal is ﬁnally disposed of. It is true that the appeal oper
ated as a supersedeas in the suit in which the appeal was
taken and that the court could not enter any further orders
in the execution of the decree, butjit does not follow that the
court could not punish appellant for doing an act prohibited
by the decree. If a decree is of a nature to require something
to be done or a writ to be issued and served, an appeal oper
ates to supersede and prevent the issuing and service of such
a writ. But the decree in this case requires no process or ac
tion for its enforcement.
The cases relied upon by counsel
are all of a nature requiring something to be done which was
*
*
*
superseded by an appeal.
In the case of People '0.
Prendergast. 117 Ill. 588, 6 N. E. 695, and other like cases,
there were appeals from orders to pay over money or to do
some act of an afﬁrmative nature, and, if a decree is of that
character, an appeal prevents its execution.
An attach
ment for contempt for disobedience of an order to pay money
is a civil execution for the beneﬁt of the injured party. though
carried on in the form of a criminal process for contempt of
the authority of the court. Buck 1:. Buck, 60 Ill. 105.
There are judgments and decrees which require something
to be done for their enforcement, and there are others which
are simply prohibitory or self-executing, and others partake
of the nature of both. A prohibitory decree which does not
require anything to be done is self-executing.
It requires no
process, but by force of the decree itself the party is bound to
desist from the prohibited act. If an injunction is of a man
datory character, requiring something to be done, or if nega
tive in terms, but with the same effect, a proceeding for con
tempt in refusing to obey it is in the nature of an execution
to enforce the command. An injunction, the effect of which
is to authorize one party to take possession of property or to
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in form as against
the other party and merely commands the latter not to ob
struct the former in taking possession of the property or
doing the act, is in reality aiﬁrmative in its nature, and a pro
ceeding for contempt would have for its object to accomplish
the doing of the act. An appeal would stay any such pro
ceeding, while it would have no such effect with respect to
the power of the court to compel obedience to a self-executing
decree.
That distinction is clearly drawn in both High on
Injunctions and Elliott on Appellate Procedure, above cited.
Mr. High applies the rule to prohibitory injunctions, and says
that the court which granted the injunction still has power
to punish its violation notwithstanding the appeal, and Judge
Elliott says that a supersedeas does not operate -upon a self
executing judgment, and, where the judgment in one part re
quires an execution for its enforcement and in another part
does not require such a writ, the supersedeas may operate
only upon part of the judgment.
To adopt a rule that the court granting an injunction must
stand idly by and see it violated while an appeal is pending,
and after the case is reinstated in that court may then pro
ceed to punish, would be attended with evil consequences. All
that it would be necessary for a defendant to do to secure im
munity until the case should be reinstated in the court would
be to pray an appeal and ﬁle a bond. “ * ‘ The Appellate
Court reviews the record brought to it by the appeal, which
includes nothing happening after the decree is entered, and
the question whether the injunction was obeyed or disobeyed
is not involved in the appeal. No reason is apparent to us
why the superior court should be refused the right to main
tain its authority as to a matter not affected in any way by
the appeal, and which is not dependent in any respect on the
ﬁnal outcome of the suit until the decree has been affirmed by
the Appellate Court, since the question whether the decree
was erroneous or not is in no way involved in maintaining the
existing status. If the court should be denied the right to
compel obedience to the prohibition of the decree until the
original case has completed its rounds through the courts,
the appellees might lose all the beneﬁts of their litigation and
have their business ruined, although the decree should ﬁnally
do some act, although

it may

be negative

,~

be aﬂirmed.
a doctrine.

We are not prepared
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10 This is the doctrine of the federal courts.
Thus in Knox County
"The general rule is
v. Harshman, (1889) 132 U. S. 14, the court said:
well settled that an appeal from a decree granting, refusing, or dissolving
To the same effect
an injunction, does not disturb its operative effect."
see,—St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Miller, (1907) 84 Ark. 494; Albers
Commission Co. V. Spencer, (1911) 236 Mo. 608; Hawkins v. State, (1890)
126 Ind. 294; Bullion, etc., Min. Co. v. Min. Co., (1887) 5 Utah, 151.
Some courts, however, hold that a suporsedeas in an appeal from a.
decree granting an injunction has the effect to wholly suspend the in
junction during the appeal, and there can be no contempt in regard
thereto.—Powell v. Fla. Land & Imp. Co., (1899) 41 Fla. 494; Penn. RR.
Co. v. Nat. Docks Ry. Co., (1896) 54 N. J. Eq. 647; Haley v. Walker,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1911) 141 S. W. 166.
11 Accord,
on the point that contempt proceedings are not in execu
tion of the judgment‘ and hence not stayed by supcrscdcas, Sixth Ave.
RR. Co. v. Elev. RR. Co., (1877) 71 N. Y. 430.
The United States Supreme Court holds, in Merrimack River Sav. Bk.
v. Clay Center, (1911) 219 U. S. 527, that while the trial court has in
herent power to continue an injunction pending an appeal, in order to
preserve the status quo, it does not follow that violation of the injunc
tion is not also a contempt of the appellate jurisdiction.
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FARMERS’ NATIONAL BANK

v.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.
63

J

BACKUS.
1895.

Minnesota, 115.

.
Order to show cause why a receiver of certain
real property, in possession, should not be required to turn
over and deliver such possession to appellant, Burdic, pending
the determination of an appeal taken to the court from an
The nature of the main ac
order appointing such receiver.
tion may be seen by reference to State v. Egan, 64 N. W. 813,
in which we held that such order was appealable.
Immediately upon the making and ﬁling of the order in the
court below, and before an appeal was taken, the receiver
named entered into possession of the premises involved, pro
ceeded to collect the rents, incomes, and proﬁts thereof, as far
as possible, and has ever since been in possession and collect~
ing and receiving such rents, incomes, and proﬁts
When

COLLINS,
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taking the appeal, Burdic duly executed a proper and suffi
cient supersedeas bond, in accordance with the provisions of
Gen. St. 1894, § 6142, which bond was duly approved and
ﬁled. The important question now is, was the appellant en
titled, upon executing and ﬁling such supersedeas bond, upon
taking such appeal, and upon procuring a complete return to
be made and ﬁled in this court, to have restitution of the

premises, and to be restored to actual possession, including
such powers and rights as are incidental to possession?
We
are satisﬁed that he was. The general rule is that, if an ap
peal with a supersedeas be taken from an interlocutory order,
that part of the case which is appealed is completely removed
from the jurisdiction of the lower court, and wholly trans
ferred to that of the higher or appellate tribunal. Elliott,
App. Proc. § 542. Pierson v. McCahill, 23 Cal. 250. And the
statute (section 6142, supra) expressly provides that the ef
fect of the appeal with the bond is to “stay all proceedings”
on the order, and to “save all rights affected thereby."
This
was the legal effect of a supersedeas at common law. The
statutory bond stands as indemnity to the party to whom it is
given—it stands in place of the action of the receiver—until
the matter is heard and disposed of on appeal. The super
sedeas does not undo or render nugatory any action of the
receiver already had under the order before the appeal was
taken and the bond duly ﬁled, but it terminates the right of
the lower court and of its officer from further acting in the
It suspends the operation of the order, or, as has
matter.
said,
“paralyzes” the arm of the receiver. His authority
been
to proceed is absolutely stayed and suspended by operation of
law. The rights and powers of the receiver being suspended,
of which he was duly notiﬁed, he should have restored pos
session of the premises to the appellant; for, his authority to
take being inoperative by the suspension, his authority to’
hold was equally so, both being derived from the same order.
The legal effect of the appeal and supersedeas was to with
draw from the receiver the right to the possession of the
property, and vest that right in the party from whom it had
State 12. Johnson, 13 Fla. 33 (a leading and ex
been taken.
tremely well-considered case); Buckley '0. George, 71 Miss_
580, 15 South. 46; Blondheim v. Moore, 11 Md. 365; North
western Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Park Hotel Co., 37 Wis. 125;
High. Rec. 190; 2-0 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 110. We have
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That
not overlooked the cases cited by counsel for plaintiff.
of Swing v. Townsend, 24 Ohio St. 1, merely decides that the
office of certain receivers was not vacated by an appeal,nothing more. In Re Real-Estate Associates, 58 Cal. 356, it
was held that, pending an appeal from an order adj udicating
a person as insolvent, the functions of the receiver were not
suspended, but in that case there was no supersedeas bond
ﬁled, simply an ordinary bond on appeal. That of Bristow v.
Catlin (Va.), 20 S. E. 946, seems to have been decided upon
the somewhat peculiar circumstances, before the court, in
We do not
a proceeding to punish a receiver for contempt.
regard either of these cases as opposed to the doctrine we
have adopted.
II
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The order of this court is that the receiver restore posses
sion to the appellant pending the appeal, and also that he
account and turn over to appellant all sums which have come
into his hands as rents, incomes, and proﬁts of said property
from the day on which the supersedeas bond was ﬁled in the
court below."
BUCK,
., took no part.
CANTY, J. (dissenting).
cannot concur in the foregoing
If the appeal had been taken and the supersedeas
opinion.
bond given before the receiver took possession, it would have
prevented his taking possession; but the receiver was in pos
session about 11 days before the appeal was taken and the
bond given. It seems to me that the ﬁling of a supersedeas
bond does not have the effect of a writ of restitution issued
and executed. It does not ipso facto undo what has been
done.
If the receiver took possession before the ﬁling of the
bond, such ﬁling does not ipso facto oust him of possession,
but his possession continues.
If he was in full possession be
fore the bond was ﬁled, he continues in full possession after
wards,-not in half possession, emasculated possession, or
paralyzed possession, but in the same possession as he was
before; and one of the incidents or attributes of that posses
sion is the right to collect the rents.
Of course, the order
would stay all acts and proceedings which did not consist in
exercising the possession, and would therefore prevent the
receiver from paying over the rents after he had collected
them.
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In many such instances, instead of making an immediate
proﬁt out of his possession, the receiver is compelled to ex
pend large amounts of money in purchasing stock, payin-__r
current expenses, etc. But, according to the decision of the
majority, the appellant has, for 30 days after the order ap
pointing the receiver, the right and the power to cut off his
authority, and oust him on a moment’s notice, and to seek the
time for doing this which will cause the greatest loss and
embarrassment to the receiver, and give the appellant the
greatest amount of the fruits of the receiver’s labor and ex

Then, if the appellant prevails, the receiver will
penditure.
remain ousted with no way to reimburse himself.
Of course,
if the language of the statute required such a construction, it
would be a different question, but it does not. The statute
says that the ﬁling of such a supersedeas bond “shall stay all
*
"‘
“
and save all rights.” Gen. St. 1894.
proceedings
It is Well settled as a general rule that staying all
§ 6142.
proceedings by a supersedeas bond does not release any levy,
restore the possession, or undo anything done in execution of
the judgment or order appealed from. Saving all rights sim
ply means that, if the appellant prevails on the appeal, then
(but not till then) shall everything which has been done in
execution of the order be, as far as possible, undone.“
18 Accord:
Catlin v. Baldwin, (1879) 47 Conn. 173; Heyman v. Heyman,
(1905) 117 Ill. App. 542; Wabash RR. Co. v. Dykeman, (1892) 133 Ind.
56; Cook v. Cole, (1880) 55 Ia. 70; Tornanser v. Melsing (1901) 106
Fed. 775; State v. Johnson, (1870) 13 Fla. 33 (discussing the subject at
length, including the point made by Judge Canty in the principal case),
supra); Buckley v. George, (1893) 71 Miss. 580 (in which the court
justiﬁes the operations of a supcrsedeas in compelling restitution where
the appeal is taken after the receiver has taken possession, by saying:-—
“It is hardly necessary to say that, in the great majority of cases of
receiverships, there is something more to be done than to hold an inert
8
mass of property in an unchanged and unchanging condition.
supcrscdcas
merely
paralyzes
actor,
the
receiver as an
and leaves
If the
the property, as it were, in mortmain pending the appeal, the strange
result will have been produced of changing the nature of the decree
originally made, of authorizing that to be done which never would have
been directed by any court, and of destroying the estate by enforcement
‘
in action and mere lapse of time”).
Contra: Baird v. Cumberland, etc., Turnpike Co., (1878) 1 Lea. (Tenn.)
394; Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Dutcher, (1896) 48 Neb. 755.
19 In many jurisdictions the common law rule that a supcrsedeas
does
not destroy the lien of a levy already made or prevent further proceed
ings upon it, no longer is followed, and a superscdeas not only prevents
a sale but discharges the levy.-Sa.m Yuen v. McMann, (1893) 99 Cal.
497; Keith v. Wilson, (1860) 3 Metc. (Ky.) 201; Parker v. Dean, (1871)

'
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Miss. 408; Hamilton v. Henry, (1844) 27 N. C. 218. In other states
is held only to prevent further proceedings based on the levy.—'l‘hai
helm v. Phosphate Co., (1904) 48 Fla. 190; Peterson v. Wayne Circuit
Judge, (1896) 108 Mich. 608; Tilley v. Washburn, (1895) 91 Wis. 105.
45
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HOME FIRE INSURANCE CO. v. DUTCHER.
Supreme

Court of Nebraska.
1,8

Nebraska,

1896.

7'55.

IRVINE, C. The Home Fire Insurance Company instituted
an action in the district court of Douglas county to foreclose
a mortgage executed by Warren Dutcher on premises which
he afterwards conveyed to defendant A. . Dutcher.
The peti
tion contained allegations to the effect that the present value
of the premises is less than the mortgage indebtedness, that
taxes on the premises to a large amount have been suffered to
become delinquent, and that waste was being committed.
There was a prayer for a receiver pendente-lite. The district
court, upon hearing evidence on the application for a receiver,
sustained said application, and appointed a receiver for the
From this order the defendants have appealed.
premises.
The district court, at the _time of “making the order, ﬁxed
the amount of the supersedeas bond at $500, and within the
statutory period the defendants entered into a bond in that
sum, conditioned according to the third subdivision of section
*
*
"‘
A motion was
677 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
made to strike this bond from the ﬁles on the grounds:
First, that there is no authority in law for superseding an
order appointing a receiver pendente lite; and second, "‘ * *
This motion the court sustained, and, an application having
been made by the receiver for a writ of assistance, the ap
pellants made application to this court for an order restrain
ing the district court and the receiver from taking any fur
ther steps pending the appeal.
The primary question presented is that stated as the ﬁrst
ground of the motion to strike the bond from the ﬁles, to wit,
is there any authority for superseding an order appointing a
receiver pendente lite? In considering the application we are,
therefore, not reviewing the order striking the bond from the

J
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ﬁles, because, if an order appointing a receiver can be super
seded as a matter of right, it must be under the third sub
division of section 677, as that is the only provision which
could possibly apply to such a case. In such event, the ﬁling
and approval of the bond operated as a supersedeas, and the
order striking the bond from the ﬁles was a nullity. If, on
the other hand, there is no authority for a supersedeas in
such a case, the bond itself was a nullity, and the district
court had authority to proceed in disregard of such bond.
The question so presented is by no means free from difﬁculty.
A supersedeas is now almost everywhere so much controlled
by statute, and the statutes are so different in their provisions,
that but little assistance can be had from the adjudications of
other states. After a severe struggle it became established
in England that an appeal of itself operated as a supersedeas.
Following the analogy of this practice, it is held in some
states that statutes providing special conditions, such as the
giving of a bond, in order to affect a supersedeas, are merely
restrictive in their character, and that the appeal itself works
a supersedeas where there is no statute requiring a bond or a
A different doctrine has,
compliance with other conditions.
however, been announced in this state; and it must be ac
cepted as the established rule here that a supersedeas can be
had, as a matter of right, only where it is affirmatively pro
Gandy 12. State, 10 Neb. 243, 4 N. W.
vided for by statute.
1019; State v. Judges of District Court, 19 Neb. 149, 26 N. W.
723; State 'v. Meeker, 19 Neb. 444, 27 N. W. 427; Cooperrider
*
"‘
*
A series of cases
2». State, 46 Neb. 84, 64 N. W. 372.
That
state
is
instructive.
has
a statute which
in Tennessee
provides that “the supreme court in term or either of the
judges in vacation may grant writs of supersedeas to an in
terlocutory order or decree or execution issued thereon as in
2 St. Tenn. § 3933.
It would seem
case of a ﬁnal decree.”
that the language of this statute was broad enough to author
ize, by a liberal construction at least, the allowance of a su
persedeas on appeal from an order appointing a receiver.
But the Tennessee court holds that it does not apply to such
Baird v. Turnpike Co., 1 Lea. 394; Bramley 12. Ty
an order.
ree, 1 Lea, 531; Roberson "v. Roberson, 3 Lea, 50.
The rea
that
for
this
construction
are
given
the
statute was in
sons
tended only to apply to orders adj udicating rights, and that it
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not extend to orders made pending litigation
preservation of rights, but not adj udicating them.
does

"

'

*

*

#

#
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*
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*
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The chapter relating to receivers contains no
special provision for the superseding of an order of appoint
ment; nor is there elsewhere in the Code any provision of
As pointed out already, to allow a superse
that character.
deas as a matter of right would, in many cases, defeat the
whole purpose of the order; and we think the obvious inten
tion of the legislature was that such purpose should not be in
that manner defeated, and for that reason no provision was
made for superseding such an order. Furthermore, the Code
provides protection to the defendant from the results of con
tinuing provisional remedies in the way of bonds which are
always required for that purpose.
In holding that a party may not, as a matter of right, su
persede an order appointing a receiver, we do not hold that
a supersedeas may not be granted in the discretion of the
court. This court has already held that a writ of ouster in a
quo warranto case and a writ of mandamus are writs which
may not be superseded as a matter of right; but it has also
held that the court may, in its discretion, allow a supersedeas
in such cases. Gandy v. State, 10 Neb. 243, 4 N. W. 1019;
State '0. Judges of District Court, 19 Neb. 149, 26 N. W. 723;
Cooperrider o. State, 46 Neb. 84, 64 N. W. 372. It is quite
clear from the record that the district court has been proceed
ing on the theory that there was no authority whatever for a
supersedeas in this case, and has not exercised, or been called
upon to exercise, its discretion in granting or refusing a su
persedeas. This court now has jurisdiction of the case on
appeal, and we have no doubt of its power to itself grant a
City of Janesoille v. Janesville
stay on proper conditions.
Water Co., 89 Wis. 159, 61 N. W. 770; Haught 12. Irwin, 166
Pa. St. 548, 31 Atl. 260. Inasmuch as the allowing of a stay
is wholly a matter of discretion, it follows that the court may,
in allowing the stay, afﬁx such conditions as, in its judgment,
are necessary for the protection of the parties.
A bond con
ditioned merely not to commit waste is, as we have seen, not
a sufficient protection.
We think the bond should be further
conditioned to pay the reasonable rental value of the property
to the receiver in case the order appointing him should be
affirmed.
The record discloses that the premises are now
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occupied by one of the appellants as a homestead. and this
state of facts demands that we should permit in this case the
order appealed from to be superseded.
In view of the evi
dence as to the value of the property and its probable rental
value, we think the bond should be in the penal sum of $1,000.
If a bond in that sum, and so conditioned, be ﬁled within 20
days, with sureties approved by the clerk of the district court,
the enforcement of the order will be suspended pending ap
peal. If not so given, the order heretofore entered staying
proceedings will stand discharged.
Ordered accordingly.“
14 Accord:
In re Epley, (1901) 10 Okl. 631; Board ot Med. Examiners
v. Kellogg, (1894) 14 Mont. 243; Boynton v. Church, Judge, (1910) 148
Many statutes declare that stays may be ordered in
Ia. 197 (scmblc).
the discretion of the court.—Gross v. Kelleher, (1887) 73 Cal. 639;
Devereau v. Katz, (1911) 22 N. D. 351.
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CHAPTER X.

DISPOSITION OF CASE UPON REVIEW.
SECTION

1.

HEARING AND REHEARING.

BRODIE v. FITZGERALD.
Supreme Court of Arkansas.
55

1892.

Arkansas, 460.

J

COCKRILL, C. . The case comes up on a motion to advance
it on the docket for hearing out of its regular order, upon
The mo
the suggestion that the public interest is involved.
following
state of facts:
“Alexander
tion sets forth the
Haker devised to Edward Fitzgerald, as bishop of the Cath
olic Church, certain real property in the city of Little Rock,
Arkansas, the rents and proﬁts of which were to be used in
maintaining a hospital in said city. Soon thereafter Edward
Fitzgerald obtained from the Pulaski chancery court an in
junction restraining John Brodie, as county clerk, from ex
tending the taxes against said property, which consists of
According
and is rented for store-houses and dwellings.”
court,
practice
of
this
no
case
can
the
numerical
be taken
to
up out of its order in the calendar, even by consent, where
private or local interests only are concerned, unless the stat
ute has otherwise speciﬁed. It is incumbent upon the court
to see to it that the unnecessary advancement of causes out
of their order does no injustice to other litigants, the hearing
of whose causes has already been delayed by the crowded
state of the docket. Vaught '0. Green, 51 Ark. 378, 11 S. W.
The fact that a case is of public importance or
Rep. 587.
interest, or that the interest of many persons in many local
ities depend upon it, does not, of itself, entitle the parties to
To make it a question of
have it heard out of its order.
meaning
of the practice which
public interest, within the
(1155)
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gives preference to such cases, the administration of public
affairs—that is, the government—must in some way be in
volved. And then only the party representing the govern
mental interest can be heard to raise the question. In such
a case the practice is to refuse to advance the cause unless
it is made to appear that the unsettled condition of the ques
tion will embarrass the operation of the state government
or of some one of the political subdivisions of the state. It
is accordingly the practice to refuse to advance a contest
about a county-seat, which is always a matter of great public
interest in the county where it arises, unless the controversy
has left the question of the location of the seat of justice in
doubt, and makes it probable that confusion will arise in the
administration of the law. In the annexation of new terri
tory to a city, the assumption of jurisdiction by the city over
the new territory before the right is ﬁnally settled might
create confusion in all departments of the city government,
Brinkley, 54 Ark. 372, 15 s. W. Rep. 1030), and
(Black
advanced to prevent it.
Contested election
the case
cases have been advanced upon the theory that they in
volve the due administration of the law, because the peo
ple have the right to have the law enforced by those whom
The only other class of cases to which
they have elected.
such as involves the public
the practice has been applied
revenue. Numerous cases under that head have been ad
vanced. But the reason upon which the practice
based
made to appear that the ques
to cases in which
limits
tion involved is such as to materially embarrass the opera
county or municipal government.
tion of the state or of
The present case does not present that state of things. For
aught that appears, the property involved is
small part of
the taxable property of the county and city, and the question
presented affects the taxation of that property alone. It is
not shown, then, that any department of the government
will be in any wise embarrassed by the delay. The motign
is denied.
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STURTEVANT.

Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
200 Massachusetts,

1909.

519.

J

KNOWLTON, C. . This is an appeal by the defendant from
an order of the superior court that judgment be entered for
The appeal is founded upon the fact that an
the plaintiﬂ’.
application for a rehearing, on account of a supposed error
in law in the decision of the case by the full court, had been
sent to the Chief Justice, and the receipt of it had been ac
knowledged, with a statement that it would be considered by
The ap
the justices at their next meeting for consultation.
plication was sent in July, and the next meeting of the jus
tices was to be on the ﬁrst Tuesday of September.
The defendant seemingly misapprehends the standing of a
case after a ﬁnal decision of it by the full court upon ques
tions of law. On this subject Chief Justice Gray said, in the
opinion in Winchester '0. Winchester, 121 Mass. 127-130:
“The practice of that court [the English Court of Chan
cery] affords no rule to govern a court of last appeal, whose
judgments have the strongest presumptions in their favor,
and cannot be freely reconsidered without unreasonably pro
tracting litigation and disregarding the claims of other suit
ors to the attention of the court.
“After ﬁnal judgment in the House of Lords or in the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, no rehearing is al
lowed, unless for the purpose of correcting mistakes in the
form of the decree. * "‘ " In the Supreme Court of the
United States no rehearing of a case once decided is granted,
nor even an argument permitted upon the question whether
a rehearing should be had, unless the court, upon inspection
*
of the petition for a rehearing, sees ﬁt so to order, “
and this court, for some years past, has conformed to that
practice as essential to the disharge of its increasing busi
ness.”
He supports his statements as to the practice in England
and in the Supreme Court of the United States by numerous
citations.
A similar practice prevails generally in the courts
of last resort in the states of this country, although there
are two or three, and possibly more, in which applications

'
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rehearing of questions of law are entertained and argu
ments heard upon them. The application in Winchester 1'.
Winchester, ubi supra, was on the ground that a decree had
been entered erroneously as by consent of the parties, when
The court received the applica
in fact there was no consent.
tion without hearing argument upon it, and announced a
In cases of applications for
decision refusing a rehearing.
a rehearing on the ground of a supposed error of the full

for

a

court, it has been the practice, for many years, not to treat
them as having any standing as a part of the legal procedure
in the case. They are not recognized by our statutes. They
cannot be made as a matter of right, and they are not entered
upon the records of the court unless the justices, in their
discretion, think they ought to be.
Of course there is a possibility of error in a decision by the
most learned and painstaking court in the world. The jus
tices of the Supreme Court of the United States, and of other
distinguished tribunals, are often nearly evenly divided in
opinion upon a difﬁcult question of law. But when a de
cision is made, after a court’s best efforts to reach a correct
conclusion, it ought not to be open to revision merely because
it seems to the defeated party to be wrong. On the other
hand, if by any accident, "oversight or inadvertence a wrong
conclusion should be reached in any case, the judges who
made the decision presumably would be more desirous than
any one else to correct the error. Accordingly, in such a
case they would welcome a suggestion in the interest of
justice, from anybody, at any time while they have power to
revise the decision.
The practice of the court in reference
suggestions
to such
from a party is stated in Wall v. Old
Colony Trust Company, 177 Mass. 275-278, 58 N. E. 1015,
1016, as follows:
“Such an application has no standing
under our laws as a recognized part of our procedure, but is
received only as friendly information to the justices of an
oversight or manifest error, which, in the opinion of the
justices, should call for correction or reargument.
Argument
is not heard upon such an application, nor should the ap
plication itself contain any argument, but it should suggest
the error relied on.” If such a suggestion indicates an error
the court, of its own motion, will do anything in its power
to accomplish justice and protect the rights of the parties.
But happily there is seldom occasion to do anything of this

I
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kind, and it would be likely to work injustice rather than
justice, to permit a party, by presenting such an application,
to postpone as of right the entry of ﬁnal judgment, after a
case has been through all the earlier stages of litigation,
and has been ﬁnally decided with due deliberation by the
If the justices, after receiving such an
court of last resort.
application, do not recall the rescript, or otherwise suggest a
postponement of action by the lower act, the action of that
court should be governed by the rule stated in Shannon 'v.
Shannon, 10 Allen, 249, in these words:
“The application
to the court, holden by a single judge, to postpone entering
judgment for the purpose of affording the party an oppor
tunity for a reargument upon a case already decided by the
full court, was a matter within the discretion of the judge,
and his ruling refusing such application does not furnish
any ground for a bill of exceptions.”
On the face of the
ripe
for judgment, and there was no
record the case was
error of law in making the order.

Judgment aﬂirmed."
15 Any party is entitled as of right to apply for a rehearing,-—Cum
mings v. Nielson, (1913) 42 Utah. 157; but there is no right to have it
granted in the absence of statute.
The matter is usually regulated by
rules of court.—Hanson v. McCue, (1872) 43 Cal. 178; Florida Land
Rock Phos. Co. v. Anderson, (1905) 50 Fla. 516; Columbia Min. Co. v.
Holter, (1872) 1 Mont. 429. Statutes or rules of court sometimes allow
a rehearing as of right in case of dissent in the oourt as in 3 Mich.
C. L. (1915) § 12010.
“A rehearing will not be granted unless a plain error appears upon
the record probably requiring a reversal."—De Bolt v. McBrien, (1914)

96 Neb. 237.

“The oﬂice of a petition to rehear is to call the attention of the court
to matters overlooked, not to those things which the counsel supposes
were improperly decided after full consideration."-—Louisville & Nash.
RR. Co. v. Fidelity Co., (1911) 125 Tenn. 658, 691.
“If rehearings are to be had until counsel on both sides are entirely
satisﬁed, I fear, that suits would become immortal.”-—Story,
J., in Jen
kins v. Eldredge, (1845) 3 Story, 181, 305. See further discussion of
the serious disadvantages of rehearings in Brown v. Aspden, (1852) 14

How. (U. S.) 25.
New points, not raised or argued on the ﬁrst hearing, cannot be availed
of on a rehearing.—Murphy v. Cooper, (1910) 41 Mont. 72; Gamble v.
Silver Peak Mines. (1913) 35 Nev. 319; Gardner v. City of Bluffton.
(1910) 173 Ind. 454; Mcwilliams v. Ry. Co., (1913) 172 Mo. App. 318;
Goo<‘.eve v. Thompson,
(1914) 68 Ore. 411; Van Dyke v. Cole, (1908)
81 Vt. 379;
Tazewell v. Herman, (1908) 108 Va. 416; State v. City of
Birmingham, (1909) 160 Ala. 196.
A rehearing cannot be employed merely as a
SCOIIC of Rehearing.
means of rearguing the whole case.—-Cummings v. Nielson, (1913) 42
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In some states.
157; Goodwin v. Goodwin,
(1874) 48 Ind. 584.
however, the practice allows the whole case to be re-opened on rehearing
unlcss the order granting it imposes limits.—Fish v. Poorman. (1911)
85 Kan. 237; Palmer v. Mizner, (1903) 70 Neb. 200.
It is not uncommon
tor the court in its order allowing a rehearing, to specify upon which
of the stated grounds it will be allowed.—Ivie v. King, (1915) 169 N. C.
261; Christy v. Burch, (1889) 25 Fla. 978.
Oral argument on petition or motion tor rehearing is permitted only
in cases of the greatest importa.noe.—Parker
v. State, (1912) 7 Okl.
Utah,

Cr.

238.

GRATIOT

v.

MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILWAY CO.

Supreme

Court of Missouri.
116

J

1898.

Missouri, 450.

BARCLAY, . This case reached the court in banc by trans
fer from the second division at the October term, 1891, after
steps shown in the report of the case in 16 S. W. Rep. 384,
and 19 S. W. Rep. 31. Our jurisdiction to review upon the
merits is seriously challenged by plaintiif’s counsel.
The
chronology of the material proceedings in the divisional court
is this: April term, 1891 :—April 23, 1891, cause argued and
submitted;
May 19, 1891, judgment aﬂirmed, opinion by
Thomas, J.; May 26, 1891, motion for rehearing ﬁled; Octo
ber 12, 1891, motion for rehearing overruled; opinion by
Thomas, J. October term, 1891:—October 14, 1891, motion
to set aside order overruling motion for rehearing ﬁled; De
cember 22, 1891, last motion sustained, rehearing granted,
and cause transferred to court in banc, (Thomas, J., dissent
ing.)
The April term, 1891, expired ‘after the motion for
rehearing was denied, and the steps to set aside the overrul
ing order were taken at a later (the October) term, 1891.
This last “motion to set aside,” etc., is based on grounds dis
puting the correctness of the legal propositions advanced in
It does not assert any irregularity
the divisional opinions.
of procedure in reaching the result in the case. The plain
tiff, on the other hand, insists that the motion was improvi
dently sustained, and that it was beyond the constitutional
powers of division N0. 2 to set aside its ﬁnal judgment of
the former term in that manner.
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is plain that there must be a stage of every cause at which
ceases.
The interests of
justice demand the establishment of some ﬁxed terminal point
to litigation.
That point is ordinarily understood to be the
close of the term of ﬁnal judicial action in the case. But it
may generally be moved further forward by appropriate
steps, taken at that term, if authorized by law.
Successive
review,
motions for
in indeﬁnite series, obviously cannot be
tolerated by any court, though it is not so easy to mark the
point at which they must stop. A standing rule here permits
the ﬁling of a motion for rehearing on-certain stated grounds,
(102 Mo. Append. Rule 20, 16 S. W. Rep. vii.,) and in many
instances those motions prove of great service and value to the
court; but when one is denied, and the term thereafter lapses,
we discover no authority on which to sustain further moves at
a subsequent term to rectify judicial errors in a judgment.
This court, some 40 years ago, said: “There would be no
end to litigation of county courts, or any other courts, could
they review their own acts from term to term, and correct
The matter is be
supposed errors in their past decisions.
(1851),
Redd,
14 Mo. 83.
To
yond their reach.” Peake 12.
justify action by this court, or either division thereof, in any
cause, at a later term than that at which the motion for re
hearing is overruled, something must be done at that term to
retain the jurisdiction to act upon it; otherwise no judicial
errors therein can be reviewed after the term lapses. It was
expressly so held by the second division of this court, with
reference to extending time for bills of exceptions in the
circuit court, in State v. Berry, (1890,) 103 Mo. 367, 15 S.
W. Rep. 621, following older cases; and the same principle
governs the case before us. 'The rule of this court permit
ting motions for rehearing to be ﬁled Within 10 days after
the decision of a case, it may be conceded, amounts, in effect,
to a standing order in each decided cause; but its force ex
tends only to one motion for rehearing, and obviously is not
intended to sanction an unlimited number of motions to set
aside orders as they may be made, after the ruling upon the
The United States supreme court and
motion for rehearing.
other courts of last resort have often ruled that a motion for
rehearing on the merits, ﬁrst made at a term subsequent to
ﬁnal judgment, cannot properly be considered.
Hudson v.
Guestier, 7 Cranch. 1; Brooks v. Railroad Co., (1880,) 102

further investigation of its merits
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U. S. 107; Milam Co. '12. Robertson, 47 Tex. 222; Daniels v.
Daniels, 12 Nev. 118. That proposition is ﬁrmly settled, and
beyond it We ﬁnd no authority in the rules of court or in any
order in this action authorizing the interposition of such a
motion as that made herein October 14, 1891, after the close
of the term at which the motion for rehearing was overruled.
We are hence of opinion that this cause passed beyond the
jurisdiction of this court to review, upon its merits, at the
end of the April term, 1891; and consequently that the re
hearing was erroneously granted thereafter.
The order
granting it should, we think, be vacated, and the “motion to
set aside order overruling motion for rehearing” should be
overruled.

'

*

"6

16 While courts
almost invariably adopt the practice ot refusing to
entertain an application for a rehearing after the term. they do not al
ways consider that there is an absolute jurisdictional prohibition upon
doing s0.—Att0rney General v. Joy, (1914) 181 Mich. 266 (application
considered after 30 years); Jones Stationery C0. v. Hentig, (1884) 31
Kan. 317.

SECTION 2.

DISMISSAL.

SARATOGA GAS & ELECTRIC LIGHT CO. v. TOWN.
Supreme Court of New York, General Term.
67

1893.

Hun, 645.

Argued before MAYHAM, P. J., and HERRICK,

J.

*
*
*
HERRICK, J.
As a general rule, it is a matter of right that a party who
has commenced a litigation may discontinue it, unless sub
stantial rights of the other parties have accrued, and injus
tice will be done to them by a discontinuance.
In re Butler,
101 N. Y. 307, 4 N. E. Rep. 518; Wina-ns "0. Wirum-s, 124 N.
Y. 140, 26 N. E. Rep. 293. In the case last cited, it was held
that an application to discontinue was addressed to the legal,
not the arbitrary, discretion of the court.
But in that par
ticular case it was held that the public must be regarded as
a party, and that, in the public interest, a discontinuance
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In the

case at bar the respondents to the
willing,
but ask, that the appeal be dis
appeal are not only
missed, so that we' have all the parties to the record uniting.
There is no claim that the rights of any persons not parties
to the record will be aﬁ'ected, and it is not an action or pro
ceeding like Wirums '0. Winans, supra, where the public can
The fact that the attorney for the
be considered a party.
appellants opposes the dismissal of the appeal, in the ab
sence of any claim of fraud or collusion, or lien upon the
matter in controversy, is of no consequence. Roberts 'v.
Doty, 31 Hun, 128; Root v. Van Duzen, 32 Hun, 63. This is
not a case where the attorney is in fact a party in interest,"

might be refused.

where he has a lien upon the claim, and where there has been
a collusive settlement in fraud of his rights; and, in the
absence of any such facts, it seems to me that it would be
very unseemly for the court to refuse, at the request of an
attorney, to grant the desire of all the parties to a contention,
that the litigation be settled. The purpose of courts is to
settle contentions and controversies, not continue them; and
they will aid parties, not embarrass them, in making ami
The motion to dis
cable adjustments of their differences.
miss the appeal is granted. N o costs having been asked, none
are allowed."
17“The attorney, however, even if he has a lien on the judgment,
' is not a party to the suit, nor does he stand in the place of
*
a party in interest.
He is in no way responsible for the costs of the
proceedings, and to permit him to control them would, in effect, be
compelling the client to carry on the litigation at his own expense, simply
tor the contingent beneﬁt oi‘. the attorney.”—Platt v. Perome, (1856) 19
How. (U. S.) 384.
18 “Usually the court will not allow it it the party intend
at some
future time to bring a new appeal, as the allowance under such circum
stances would be unjust to the detendant,"—Calcote
v. Stanton,
(1855)
A dismissal by appellant does not affect the appeal
18 How. (U. S.) 241.
based upon appellee’s assignment of cross-errors,—San
Pedro, etc., RR.
Co. v. Board of Education, (1909) 35 Utah, 13.
"
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DORE v. DOUGHERTY.
"

Supreme Court of California.
4

1884.

Paciﬁc Reporter, 1067.

MCKEE, J. The respondent moves to dismiss the appeal
taken from the order denying a motion for a new trial in
this case, principally upon the ground that the transcript
shows on its face that the proposed statement on the motion
was not served upon one of the “adverse parties,” as re
quired by subdivision 3, § 659, Code Civ. Pro.
It is conceded that the proposed statement was served on
all the parties except one, viz., the defendant Hallidie. Upon
him it was not served; but the court, as to the parties upon
whom it was served, settled and allowed the same, certiﬁed
to its correctness, and upon it, as certiﬁed, the motion for a
It may be that the
new trial was submitted and denied.
proposed
the
statement had
motion
because
court denied the
If that were so, or if
not been served upon all the parties.
cause
for
a
dismissal
of the appeal.
it were not so, it is not
An appeal is dismissible for some irregularities in taking it,
or for failure to prosecute it, or for want of appearance, or
for consent of parties; but where it has been perfected ac
cording to law, and the appellant appears, he is entitled to
be heard upon any question or fact involved in the merits.

Motion denied.1°

,

19 Grounds.
"Various defects in the proceedings for review constitute
grounds for dismissing an appeal or writ of error on motion, in the
absence of a sufficient excuse therefor or a waiver thereof.
This rule
applies to defects such as failure to obtain an order allowing an appeal;
failure of the record to show that an appeal was taken or a writ of error
issued; failure of the record to show that an appeal was ever granted
or allowed; failure of the record to show an application for an appeal;
failure to group and number the exceptions; failure to bring the appeal
*
"
"
within the time prescribed;
failure to number the pages of
*
'
*
the petition in error and of the record before ﬁling same;
failure to prepare the order appealed from in accordance with the stat
*
*
* failure to bring
ute;
failure to give notice of appeal;
"
up all the parties in interest;
failure to give an appeal bond
or undertaking when required by statute, rule of court, or valid order
‘
of court;
failure to ﬁle the transcript as required by law;
*
"
failure to specify errors; failure to ﬂle and serve briefs or points
and authorities; failure to appear at the call of the ea.se;" etc.-4 C. J.
565, citing a very large number of cases.
A motion to dismiss is the proper method of attacking a moot case,

'

'

' '

' '

' '
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Cardoza v. Baird, (1907) 30 App. D. C. 86; Mills v. Green, (1895) 159
U. S. 651; or raising the objection of want ot jurisdiction in the appel
v. Fowler,
late court,-—Hecker
(1861) 1 Black (U. S.) 95; Eustis v.
Want of prosecution is also a common
Bolles, (1893) 150 U. S. 361.
ground for dismissa.l,—-Bronson
v. Bank, (1910) 83 Conn. 128; 0'Mara
v. Wabash RR. 00., (1898) 150 Ind. 648; Perkins v. Perkins, (1913) 173
Mich. 690; Parsons v. Babson, (1906) 129 Wis. 311.
"The dismissal is a penalty for not taking the steps required,"—El
wood v. Sac County, (1912) 156 Ia. 407. An order of dismissal is often
v. Corneau,
made nisi, e. g., unless a proper bond shall be ﬁled,—Seward
Gridley,
King
161;
69
Mich.
84.
U.
v.
103
S.
(1888)
(1880)

MINOR
Supreme

v.

TILLOTSON.

Court of the United States.
1

1848.

Howard, 287.

TANEY, C. J. This is a writ of error from the Circuit
Court of the United States for_the eastern district of Louis

iana.

A motion has been made to dismiss the writ, upon the
ground that the record contains no bill of exception, nor
statement of facts by the court, according to the practice of
Louisiana, by which any question of law is brought up for
revision in such a form as to enable this court to decide upon
it; and that there is a mass of various and conﬂicting tes
timony in relation to facts, upon which no jurisdiction can
be exercised upon a writ of error.
Assuming this statement to be correct, it does not follow
that advantage can be taken of it upon a motion to dismiss.
The record shows that a judgment was rendered in the Cir
cuit Court, over which this court undoubtedly have jurisdic
tion upon a writ of error. The plaintiffs allege that there
is error in law in this judgment, and have brought it here
for the revision of this court. And upon the argument of
the case it will be incumbent upon them to show that the rec
ord presents, in some form or other, a statement of facts
upon which a question of law arose in the Circuit Court, and
which was there erroneously decided. And if he fails to do
this, the judgment must be affirmed.
But he is entitled to
be heard, in order that he may show, if he can, that the error
of which he complains appears in the record; and whether
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or not, is a matter which cannot be in
quired into in the form in which the case is now brought
l
does

so appear

before us.
The motion must therefore be dismissed.

iii.-ii

JOHN P. SHARKEY

CO. v.

CITY OF PORTLAND.

Court of Oregon.

Supreme

1910.

58 Oregon, 85.9.

J.

This is a motion to dismiss an appeal as to
MOORE. C.
some of the parties.
The defendants, the city of Portland,
municipal corporation, W. Scott and T. McDougal, partners
as Scott & McDougal, and M. J. Connelley, having been per
petually enjoined from trespassing on the plaintiff’s land
and required to pay him damages arising from the injury
thereto, jointly appealed from the entire decree.
The city of
Portland alone ﬁled a brief, and because its codefendants did
not join therein or ﬁle a separate brief this motion was in
a

'

terposed.
As the entire decree is attempted to be reviewed by all
the defendants, the appeal cannot be dismissed as to any
of them, for a reversal, afﬁrmance, or modiﬁcation of the
determination of the trial court will necessarily affect all of
them alike.
If the failure of the counsel for the codefend
ants to ﬁle a brief is so ﬂagrant that the omission should
subject their clients to discipline, the most severe punishment
that could be legally inﬂicted upon them would be to deny
them the right to ﬁle a brief herein, and to refuse them the
privilege of appearing in person or by counsel at the trial of
the cause in this court.
'¥

1

#

#

I

#

i I i

U
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MOORE
Supreme

v.

MCCOLLUM.

Court of Nebraska.
48

1167

1895.

Nebraska, 617.

NORVAL, C. J. At the present term a motion was sub
mitted by the defendants in error to dismiss the petition in
This cause was submitted
error for want of prosecution.
for decision upon its merits at the September term, 1893,
The motion to dismiss,
without briefs or oral argument.
therefore, comes too late. Such a motion, to be of any avail,
must be presented before the ﬁnal submission of the cause
upon the merits.
No brief having been ﬁled by either party,
and the judgment conforming to the pleadings and evidence,
it is accordingly aﬂirmed. * "‘ *”°
80

In general motions to dismiss must

be deemed to be too late.

be made

See many cases

cited in

promptly or they will
4

C.

J.

594-7.

DAVIDSON v. LANIER.
Supreme

Court of the United States.
131 U. S.

1861.

lxxii.

The case is stated in the opinion.
Motion to dismiss.
TANEY, C. J.
A motion has been made in each of these
cases to dismiss it for want of jurisdiction, on account of

certain defects, as it is alleged, in the process and proceed
ings made necessary by the act of Congress, in order to bring
'
it before this court.
It is the practice of this court to receive and hear motions
of this kind on the day assigned for business of that descrip
tion, before the case is reached in the regular call of the
docket. And the rule has been adopted, because it would be
unjust to the parties to delay the decision until the case is
called for trial, if the court are satisﬁed that they have not
jurisdiction, and that the case must be ultimately dismissed
without deciding any of the matters in controversy between
the parties.
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But in order to prevent surprise upon the plaintiff in error,
or appellant, the court have always, where the motion is
made in advance of the regular call, directed notice to be
given to him or his counsel, and required proof that it was
served long enough before the motion is heard to give him
an opportunity of contesting the motion if he desires to do
And the time required must depend upon the distance
so.
of the counsel or the party from the place of holding the
court, and must be suﬁicient not only to enable him to
make the journey, but to arrange business in which he may

For, when a case
stands so late on the docket of this court as to give no rea
sonable hope of reaching it during the term, it cannot be
expected that distant counsel will leave their usual place of
business, and attend here to guard against the possibility of
a motion to dismiss.
The motions in these two cases were made about three
weeks before the close of the term, but as soon as it could
be convieniently made after they were docketed, and the
court directed the usual notice to be given. We are satisﬁed
that the counsel for the defendant in error has used every
means in his power to comply with the order.
But he has
no proof that it was actually served. The counsel and client
both reside in Mississippi, and the case stands so late on the
docket that a trial could not be expected at this term.
Nor
could they anticipate that there would be any reason for
their attendance. Under these circumstances the court order
that the motion be continued, to be heard on the ﬁrst Friday
in next term, provided notice of the motions and the day of
hearing be served on the party or his counsel, thirty days
before the commencement of the next term.
be engaged when he receives the notice.

So ordered.“
The notice

should specify the grounds upon which the motion 15
v. So. Pac. Ry. Co., (1902) 137 Cal. 77; and the time of
hearing,—Glenny v. Langdon, (1876) 94 U. S. 604. The length of time
of notice is frequently ﬁxed by statute or rule of colirt,—R0gers v.
Trumbull, (1903) 31 Wash. 656; Commonwealth Ins. C0. v. Pierro, (1861)
Want of notice may be waived,——Smlth v. Hawley, (1899)
6 Minn. 569.
11 S. D. 399; Haggin v. Montague,
(1907) 125 Ky. 507.
21

ma.de,——Bell

—-- =

'
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DAKOTA COUNTY
Supreme

v.

GLIDDEN.

Court of the United States.
113

1160

1885.

United States, 222.

MILLER, J. This case comes before us on a motion to dis
miss the writ of error. The ground of this motion is that
since the judgment was rendered, which plaintiff in error now
seeks to reverse, the matter in controversy has been the sub
ject of compromise between the parties to the litigation,
which is in full force and binding on plaintiff and defendant,
and which leaves nothing of the controversy presented by
the record to be decided. The evidence of this compromise
is not found in the record of the case in the circuit court,
nor in any proceedings in that court, and it is argued against
the motion to dismiss that it cannot, for that reason, be con
sidered in this court. It consists of duly certiﬁed transcripts
of proceedings of the board of commissioners of Dakota
county, who are the authorized representatives of that county
in all its ﬁnancial matters, of receipts of the parties or their
attorneys, and of affidavits of persons engaged in the trans
These are undisputed on the other side, either by
action.
contradictory testimony or by the brief of counsel who ap
pear to oppose this motion. They leave no doubt of the fact,
if it is competent for this court to consider them, that shortly
after the judgment against the county in favor of Glidden
was rendered, the parties entered into negotiations to settle
the controversy, which, after due deliberation and several
formal meetings of the board of commissioners, resulted in
such settlement.
The judgment in the case was rendered on
certain coupons for interest due on bonds issued by said
county to aid in constructing railroads.
These bonds bore
interest at the rate of 10 per cent. per annum, and became
By the new agreement the county
due in the year 1896.
took up the bonds and the coupons on which judgment was
rendered, and issued new bonds bearing 6 per cent. interest,
These new bonds
the principal payable in the year 1902.
were delivered to plaintiff and accepted by him in satisfac
tion of his judgment and of his old bonds, and these latter
were delivered by him to the county authorities and destroyed
by burning.
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There can be no question that a debtor against whom a
judgment for money is recovered, may pay that judgment.
and bring a writ of error to reverse it, and if reversed can
recover back his money. And a defendant in an action of
ejectment may bring a writ of error, and, failing to give a
supersedeas bond, may submit to the judgment by giving pos
session of the land, which he can recover, if he reverses the
judgment, by means of a writ of restitution. In both these
cases the defendant has merely submitted to perform the
judgment of the court, and has not thereby lost his right to
seek a reversal of that judgment by writ of error or appeal.
And so, if, in the present case, the county had paid the
judgment in money, or had levied a tax to raise the money,
or had in any other way satisﬁed that judgment without
changing the rights of the parties in any other respect, its
right to prosecute this writ of error would have remained
But what was done was a very different thing
unaffected.
from that. A new agreement, on sufficient consideration,
was made, by which the judgment itself, the coupons on
which it was recovered, and the bonds of which these coupons
were a part, were all surrendered and destroyed, and other
bonds and other coupons were accepted in their place, pay
able at a more distant date and with a lower rate of interest,
with the effect of extinguishing the judgment now sought to
be reversed, so that the plaintiff in that judgment could not
issue execution on it, though there is no supersedeas bond
It is a valid compromise and settle
to secure its payment.
ment of a much larger claim, but it includes this judgment
necessarily.
It extinguishes the cause of action.in this case.
If valid, it is a bar to any prosecution of the suit in the cir
cuit court, though we should reverse this judgment on the
record as it stands for errors which may be found in it. To
examine these errors and reverse the judgment is a fruitless
proceeding, because when the plaintiﬂ’ has secured his ob
ject the relation of the parties is unchanged, and must stand
or fall on the terms of the compromise.
It is said that to recognize this compromise and grant this
motion is to assume original instead of appellate jurisdic
tion. But this court is compelled, as all courts are, to receive
evidence dehors the record affecting their proceeding in a
case before them on error or appeal.
The death of one of
the parties after a writ of error or appeal requires a new
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proceeding to supply his place. The transfer of the interest
of one of the parties by assignment or by a judicial proceed
ing in another court, as in bankruptcy or otherwise, is
brought to the attention of the court by evidence outside of
the original record, and acted on. A release of errors may
be ﬁled as a bar to the writ. A settlement of the controversy,
with an agreement to dismiss the appeal or writ of error, or
any stipulation as to proceedings in this court, signed by the
parties, will be enforced, as an agreement to submit the case
on printed argument alone, within the time allowed by the
rule of this court.
This court has dismissed several suits on grounds much
more liable to the objection raised than the present case, as
in the case of Cleveland v. Chamberlain, 1 Black, 419, where
the planitiff in error, having bought out the defendant’s in
terest in the matter in controversy, and having control of
both sides of the litigation in the suit, still sought for other
purposes to have the case decided by this court.
On evi
dence of this by affidavits the court dismissed the writ. Simi
lar cases in regard to suits establishing patent rights or hold
ing them void by the inferior courts, as in Lord v. Veazie, 8
How. 254; Wood Paper C0. v. Heft, 8 Wall. 336, have been
dismissed, because the parties to the suit having settled the
matter, so that there is no longer a real controversy, one or
both of them was seeking a judgment of this court for im
proper purposes, in regard to a question which exists no
longer between these parties.
It is by reason of the necessity of the case that the evi
dence by which such matters are brought to the attention of
the court must be that, not found in the transcript of the orig
inal case, because it occurred since that record was made up.
To refuse to receive appropriate evidence of such facts for
that reason is to deliver up the court as a blind instrument
for the perpetration of fraud, and make its proceedings by
such refusal the means of inﬂicting gross injustice.
The
cases and precedents we have mentioned are sufficient to
show that the proposition of plaintiff in error is untenable.
In the case of Board» of Liquidation 1;. Louisville & N. R.
Co., 109 U. S. 223, S. C. 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 144, a question arose
on the presentation of an order made by the authorities of
the city of New Orleans to dismiss a suit in this court in
which that city was plaintiff in error. The order was based
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on a compromise between those authorities and the railroad
company, which the board of liquidation, intervening here,
alleged to be without authority, and fraudulent.
The court
here did not disregard the compromise or the order of the
city to dismiss the case ; but, considering that the question
of authority in the mayor and council of the city to make
the compromise, and of the alleged fraud in making it, re
quired the power of a court of original jurisdiction to in
vestigate and decide thereon, continued the case in this court
until that was done in the proper court. But when this was
ascertained in favor of the action of the mayor and council,
the suit was dismissed here on the basis of that compromise

order."
In the case before us we see no reason to impeach the trans
action by which the new bonds were substituted for the old,
and for the judgment we are asked to reverse; and the writ
of error is accordingly dismissed.
I13 If the motion is based upon facts which should be but are not
on the record presented above, the appellate court may direct the
court to certify up any additional facts relevant to the point raised
may appear on the record below.—Keliy & Jones Co. V. Moore,

L-iii

125 Ga. 382.

TRUMBULL

v.

shown

lower
which
(1906)

JEFFERSON COUNTY.

Supreme Court of Washington.
60 Washington,

1910.

47.9.

J

.
This action was commenced by Thomas F.
CROW,
Trumbull and Lida P. Trumbull, his wife, against Jefferson
county and Harry Hart, its treasurer, to vacate a tax fore

closure judgment and set aside a tax deed affecting real
estate to which the plaintiffs claim title.
From a decree in
their favor, the defendants have appealed.
The present hearing is upon respondents’ motion to dis
miss the appeal. They contend that, since the commencement
of the action and prior to judgment, the county conveyed its
interest in the real estate to one P. M. Coyne; that the ap
pellants are not aggrieved by the ﬁnal judgment and cannot

_.-Q4-1-=
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prosecute this appeal. In support of their motion they have
and certiﬁed copies of records showing that,
when this action was commenced, they ﬁled a notice of lis
pendens with the auditor of Jefferson county, and that on
Jef
the next day the appellant Harry Hart, as treasurer
ferson county, sold to P. M. Coyne all the right, title and
The tran
interest of the county in and to the real estate.
script shows that the action was commenced on April 10,
1908. No suggestion of the sale to Coyne appears in any of
the pleadings, although the issues were not completed until
1910, the date of the trial.
March
From the statement of
appears that the cause was tried on the issues raised
facts
between the respondents and appellants; that no mention of
the transfer to P. M. Coyne was made during the trial, and
that no motion was made to substitute him as
defendant.
Respondents’ contention is that, "by reason of the transfer,
the county has no further interest in the subject-matter of
the _action, and that the controversy has ceased.
In support
number of cases from this
of their contention they cite
court, in which
appeared that some action such as
satis
faction of the judgment had occurred, which determined the
controversy.
Here nothing changing the situation of the
parties has occurred since judgment.
The deed upon which
respondents now predicate their motion to dismiss was exe
cuted and recorded almost two years before the trial. Not a
suggestion of the transfer was made prior to trial, judgment,
or appeal. The statement of facts has attached thereto the
certiﬁcate of the trial judge, under date of June 13, 1910,
that
contains all material facts, matters, and proceedings
theretofore occurring in the cause and not already
part of
the record. The appellants now support their motion by a
showing that the transfer was made prior to the framing of
the issues, after the commencement of the action, and long
prior to trial or judgment.
Matters outside of the record
occurring after judgment, which affect the right of an appel
lant to prosecute his appeal, may be shown to and considered
by the appellate court, on
motion to dismiss.
But no such
showing should be permitted as to matters occurring prior
They should be incorporated in the record by
to judgment.
proper procedure at the instance of the litigant who‘ intends
to rely upon them. In Merriam v. Victory Mining Company,
37 Or., at page 329, 56 Pac., at page 75, 58 Pac., at page 37,
a

a

it

a

it

a

a

it

9,

_of

ﬁled affidavits
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discussing this rule of practice the
court well said: “It is quite well settled that evidence of
facts outside of the record, occurring after the rendition of
the judgment in the court below, and which affect the pro
ceedings of the appellate court, when deemed necessary, will
be received and considered by such court for the purpose of
determining its action. Ehrman v. Astoria Ry. Co., 26 Or.
377, 38 Pac. 306; Dakota County v. Glidden, 113 U. S. 222
[5 Sup. Ct. 428] 28 L. Ed. 981; Elwell v. Fosdiclc, 134 U. S.
But the record of the
500 [10 Sup. Ct. 598] 33 L. Ed. 998.
court below, upon which the appeal is based, cannot be con
tradicted or varied by an ea: parte showing in the appellate
60

Pac., at page

998,

court.”

After the county transferred its interest to Coyne, he
either could.have been substituted as a party defendant on
his motion, or he could have consented to a continuation of
the action in the name of his grantors for his beneﬁt.
The
ﬁnal judgment would adjudicate his rights. Under the doc
trine of lis pendens, if he so elected, he should be permitted
to obtain in the names of his grantors, by appeal if neces
sary, any beneﬁt resulting from the litigation.
Had the

$

U

i

i

Ii

4'

1!

III

ii

=l=

county obtained judgment, the present respondents could
have prosecuted an appeal, and they cannot now insist that
rights of the appellants’ vendee cannot be protected by an
appeal prosecuted by his grantors for his beneﬁt.

The motion is denied.”

I

a

it

88 Thus,
cannot be shown by evidence dehors the record that the
judgment was really entered by consent,—Woodbury
v. Nevada, etc., RR.
Co., (1898) 120 Cal. 367; Fox v. City of Hinton, (1912) 70 W. Va. 6542
deposit with the trial justice in lieu
or’, that the appellant
tendered
of a recognizance on appeal which the justice refused to receive.—Tibbetts
v. Handy, (1888) 145 Mass. 537; or, that no assignment of errors was
presented to the trial judge with the bill of exceptions,—Thomas
Bros.
v. Price, (1908) 56 Fla. 694.

_i
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DUNTERMANN
Supreme

v.

STOREY.

Court of Nebraska.
40

Nebraska,

1175

1894.

1,./,7.

1

1

$

#

Ill

1

It

¥

*

1|!

RAGAN, C. On the 25th day of November, 1889, Joseph
Storey recovered a judgment in the district court of Adams
county, Neb., against John H. Duntermann.
On the 9th day
of January, 1890, Duntermann as principal, and Jacob Bern
hart as surety, executed and ﬁled in the ofﬁce of the clerk of
*
*
the district court a supersedeas bond. *
The bond was approved by the clerk of the district court
This suit was brought by Storey
on the day of its execution.
against Duntermann and Bernhart on said bond. Storey, in
his petition, alleged the recovery of the judgment against
Duntermann; the execution, delivery, and approval of the
aforesaid supersedeas bond by Duntermann and Bernhart;
its ﬁling with, and approval by, the clerk of the district
court of Adams county. The petition further alleged that
more than a year had elapsed since the making of the last
ﬁnal order and judgment in the case of Storey against Dunt
ermann in the district court of Adams county; that no bill
of exceptions had ever been settled in said case, “and that
no proceedings in error or appeal are now pending in the
supreme court of Nebraska from the said judgment, whereby
the same has been wholly affirmed, unreversed, and unmodi
*
*
*
The district court * "‘ * rendered a
ﬁed.
judgment for Storey for the amount of his judgment against
Duntermann, with interest and costs, and Bernhart brings
the case here on error.

a

The bond which Bernhart signed provided that he would
pay the condemnation money and costs in case said judgment
should be affirmed in whole or in part. So then we have the
question as to .whether the failure of Duntermann to insti
tute, or attempt to institute, in this court, any proceeding
for reversal of the judgment for more than one year after
its rendition, amounted to an afﬁrmance of it. We are cited
by the counsel for the plaintiff in error to Drummond v. Hus
son, 14 N. Y. 60, to sustain the contention of counsel that
such failure on the part of Duntermann did not affirm the
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In that case the bond signed by the surety was
judgment.
“Now we, the subscribers, here
in the following language:
by undertake that if the judgment appealed from, or any
part thereof, be afﬁrmed, the appellant will pay the,” etc.
This bond was said by Selden, J., who delivered the opinion
of the court, to be in the precise language of section 335 of
the New York Code. It appears from the opinion that the
appeal was ﬁled and docketed in the court of appeals, and
In the suit on the
was dismissed for want of prosecution.
bond the dismissal of the appeal from the appellate court was
made the sole ground of defense, and the court of appeals
“A dismissal of
sustained the defense made, holding that:
an appeal for want of prosecution is clearly not an afiirmance
This court has decided nothing whatever
of the judgment.
in respect to the validity of the judgment.” This case from
New York is in point, but We are constrained to say that we
do not think it sound. The opinion of the court proceeds on
the theory that, in order to the aﬁirmance of a judgment ap
pealed from, the appellate court must hear or examine the
case appealed, deliberate thereon, and reach the same con
clusion that the court below reached, and render a formal
judgment of afﬁrmance. This case, so far as we have been
able to ascertain from a somewhat extended examination of
the reported decisions, stands alone, and is certaintly not in
line with the weight of authority. The general rule is that
the dismissal of an appeal from an appellate court without
an examination of the case upon its merits operates as an
afﬁrmance of the judgment appealed, or attempted to be
appealed from. In McConnell 'v. Swailes, 2 Scam. 571, the
supreme court of Illinois said: “The dismissal of an appeal
is equivalent to a regular technical aﬁirmanceof the judg
ment of the court below, so as to entitle the party to claim
a forfeiture of the bond, and have his action therefor.”
In
Sutherland v. Phelps, 22 Ill. 92, it was said: “The dismissal
of an appeal is equivalent to an aﬁirmance of the judgment.”
In Clark 12. Milles, 2 Pin. 432, the supreme court of Wiscon~
“Where an appeal is dismissed, the party who
sin said:
brought it, with his sureties in recognizance, will be imme
diately liable thereon for the amount of the judgment ren
dered by the justice.” In Ell-is '0. Hull, 23 Cal. 161, it was
held: “Where an appeal is taken to the supreme court from
a judgment, by ﬁling notice of appeal and undertaking, and
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the appeal is afterwards dismissed by the supreme court for
failure of the appellant to send up the transcript, the sureties
are liable on the undertaking on appeal.” To the same effect
are Healey v. Newton (Mich.) 55 N. W. 666; Shannon v.
Dodge (Colo. Sup.) 32 Pac. 61; Pratt 12. Gilbert (Utah) 29
Pac. 965.
It is true that the contract of a surety is to be construed
strictly in his favor, but such a construction as the one con
Bernhart
tended for in this case would be too technical.
promised that, if the judgment rendered against Duntermann
should be affirmed in whole or in part, he would pay it. This
was, in effect, a promise on his part to pay the Storey judg
ment unless the supreme court should reverse it. Bernhart
cannot allege as a defense the failure of his principal to suc
cessfully and properly prosecute his petition in error. Pierce

Banta (Ind. App.) 31 N. E. 812.
By the execution and ﬁling of the eupersedeas bond,
5.
Bernhart took one step in the proceedings to have reviewed
on error the Storey judgment. He then abandoned all fur
ther attempts to reverse the judgment, thus leaving it in full
force.
The judgment, then, is in the same plight that it
would have been in had Bernhart ﬁled his transcript of the
record of said judgment and bill of exceptions in this court,
and then had neglected to have a summons in error issued
within one year from the date of the judgment, and this court
had dismissed such error proceeding.
We have already seen
that, had this court dismissed the error proceedings by rea
son of the failure of Bernhart to comply with some require
ment necessary to a review of the judgment on error, the
dismissal of the proceedings would in effect be an affirmance
of the judgment rendered. Is not the effect on the judgment
just the same whether proceedings in error be instituted, and
then dismissed without an examination of the case upon its
merits, or whether the judgment debtor, after taking one or
more steps looking towards reviewing the judgment on error,
abandons the proceedings?
A judgment debtor, by ﬁling a
supersedeas bond with the clerk of the district court and a
petition in error in this court, stays the execution of the judg
ment at least for one year from the date of its rendition, as
the ﬁling in this court of the petition in error does not invest
this court with jurisdiction over the person of the judgment
creditor. For this purpose it is necessary that a summons
v.
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in error shall be issued within a year from the date of its
rendition, although it may be served afterwards. Now, if
the contention of counsel for the plaintiff in error be correct,
a judgment debtor, by ﬁling a supersedeas bond with the
clerk of the court and a petition in error here, may stay the
execution of the judgment for a year, and then, by voluntar
ily abandoning the proceedings in error, or by failing to have
a summons in error issued, may thus deprive the judgment
creditor of the power of collecting his judgment for the
length of time intervening between its rendition and the dis
missal of the error proceedings, and at the end of that time
leave the judgment creditor with no more security for the
collection of his judgment than he had on the date of its
rendition. Such a construction of the statute would deprive
the judgment creditor of the very rights given him by the
statute; it would be, in effect, a judicial enactment of a stay
law without bond.

l

i i

F

8

8

l

1

i

Q

The judgment of the district court is aﬂirmed.

'

Aﬂirmed.“

24 But where the dismissal is made “without prejudice," to the right
ot the appellant to take another appeal, it does not operate as an atﬁrm
ance.—Garibaldi v. Garr, (1893) 97 Cal. 253; Long v. Sullivan, (1895)
21 Colo. 109.
So, too, ii the dismissal is tor want of jurisdiction in the appellate
court, it is not the equivalent of an aﬂirmance, for "it would be a non~
sequitur to say a court may aﬁirm a decree when it has no jurisdiction
to hear the case for any purpose,"—Blair v. Reading, (1882) 103 Ill. 375.
"The effect ot the dismissal is to leave the judgment appealed from in
full force and effect in the court in which it was rendered.
In other
words the status is the same as it no appeal had been prosecuted."
Calhoune v. Kidd, (1912) 150 Ky. 609. To same eﬂ'ect,—Johnson
v. Ford,
(1893) 92 G-a. 751.

am

HOWELL
The Supreme
31

v.

VAN NESS.

Court of New Jersey.

New Jersey Law,

1866.

445’.

Certiorari to set aside an order of the Court of Common
Pleas of the county of Warren, dismissing an appeal.
HAINES,
.
From a judgment recovered in a court for the
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trial of small causes by Howell, Van Ness, the defendant,
appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Warren. When
the appeal was regularly called for hearing, according to the
course of practice of the court, the appellant failed to appear
and move his appeal, and it was dismissed for want of prose
cution; and leave was granted to‘ the appellee to take the
appeal bond from the ﬁles, and it was accordingly taken and
an action upon it commenced.
At a subsequent term, on the allegation of surprise upon
the appellant and merits in his defense, the court granted a
rule to show cause why the appeal should not be reinstated,
and also a rule to take affidavits.
On hearing the rule to
show cause, the only evidence of surprise was, that the ap
pellant was ignorant of the time of hearing appeals, and
had neglected to inform himself on the subject.
In the attempt to show merits, the testimony disclosed an
entire want of merits; that the promissory note on which the
action was brought was made by the appellant; that he had
promised to pay and pretended to pay it, by giving a check
upon a bank in which he knew he had no funds.
The Court of Common Pleas, not upon the ground of sur
prise and merits, but upon some error, real or supposed of
the justice, ordered the appeal to be reinstated.
To set aside
that order the writ of certiorari was taken.
Of the power and duty of the Court of Common Pleas to
dismiss an appeal for want of prosecution, there can be no
question. One of the terms upon which the appeal is granted
is, that the appellant shall enter into bond to appear and
prosecute it.
The operation of the judgment is suspended,
until a new judgment is given or the appeal dismissed. On
failure to prosecute the appeal, the only proper relief to be
afforded to the appellee is to dismiss it. Read 'v. Rocap, 4
Halst. 347; Lum 11. Price, 1 Halst. 195.
The power to reinstate an appeal is equally clear. But it
must be for some good cause shown.
If it were dismissed
on a misapprehension of the law, as in Case v. Rowland, 2
Harr. 76; or on a mistake of the facts, as in Adams 12. Mathis,
3 Harr. 310, it is the duty of the court to reinstate; and if
it refuse, a mandamus will issue from this court commanding
it to be done.
So where the appellant has a meritorious defense, which
by some surprise, he has been prevented from showing, the
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only redress is by reinstating the appeal to afford him the
r
opportunitf.
But when an appeal has been properly dismissed, and there
is no error in law or mistake in fact and no surprise, the
Their jurisdic
power of the Common Pleas over it is gone.
legally
they
exhausted,
and
cannot
reinstate the
is
then
tion
Their decision in such case is as ﬁnal as if they had
appeal.
rendered judgment upon the merits, and they have no power
to reinstate or to grant a new trial.
It is suggested that the order to reinstate an appeal is the
exercise of a discretion, and not assignable for error; that
it is like the granting of a new trial in a common law court,
which no writ of error will correct. But it is not a matter
If the appeal had been improperly dismissed
of discretion.
the court was bound to reinstate it; and on refusal so to do
would, by a writ of mandamus, be required to do it.
The oﬁice of the writ of mandamus is to require to be done
some manifest duty, not the exercise of a mere discretion.
It never commands the granting of a new trial, nor the hear
ing or continuance of the trial of a cause, nor the allowance
of an amendment of a pleading. These and other incidental
orders in the progress of a cause, are so peculiarly subjects
for the exercise of the discretion of the court as not to be
assignable for error or affected by a Writ of mandamus.
But
the reinstating of an appeal is the subject of mandamus.
When proper to be done, it is a matter of duty and not of
discretion; and a mistake in the discharge of the duty may be
assigned for error.
In this case there was clearly an error in the Court of
The appeal was lawfully dismissed, and
Common Pleas.
there was no legal ground on which it could be reinstated.
Let the rule to reinstate the appeal be set aside and for
nothing holden."
Where an appeal has been dismissed through mistake, surprise, etc.,
reinstated by order of the appellate court, sometimes
under statutes. sometimes on common law principles,—Egan v. Ohio, em,
an. 00., (1894) 138 Ind. 274; Collat v. Ives, (1905) 141 Mich. 500;
Baldwin v. Rogers, (1881) 28 Minn. 68; State v. Foster, (1882) 44 N, J,
L. 378; Main v. McLaughlin, (1891) 78 Wis. 449 (after term by statute);
but it is often held that such reinstatement cannot take place after the
term at which the dismissal occurs,—Bleyer v. Distillery Co., (1883) 70
Ga. 724; Pisa v. Rezek, (1903) 206 Ill. 344; Jackson v. Ashton, (1836)
10 Pet. (U. S.) 480.
In The Palmyra, (1827) 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 1, reinstatement at a sub
25
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sequent term where the dismissal was on account of the misprision oi’
the clerk of the court, was held to be within the necessarily implied
powers of the court.

~1-1—

DECISION ON THE MERITS.

SECTION 3.

(a)

On Stipulation.

MANTLE

v.

LARGEY.

Supreme Court of Montana.
28 Montana,

1903.

38.

C. J. This action was brought for the purpose
of obtaining a decree in favor of plaintiff declaring the de
fendant, Patrick A. Largey, a trustee for plaintiff of a
one-sixteenth interest in the Speculator quartz lode mining
claim, situate in Silver Bow county, and requiring the defend
ant to execute to the plaintiff a deed for that interest, and to
render an accounting for a one-sixteenth interest in the ores
After the in
extracted from the property by the defendant.
stitution of the suit the defendant died, and Lulu F. Largey
The judg
was substituted in his place, as his administratrix.
ment in the court below was for defendant. Subsequently, on
motion of the plaintiff, the court entered an order granting
plaintiff a new trial. Thereupon defendant appealed.
The parties to the action have ﬁled in this court a stipula
tion wherein it is set forth that they have settled their differ
ences and controversies by a compromise of all matters in
volved; that they desire the order from which the appeal is
taken reversed, so that the judgment of the district court may
stand as rendered; that remittitur be issued at once; and that
this disposition of the appeal is desired because it is in ac
cordance with the terms of the compromise and settlement
made by the parties.
This court is asked to make the order
according to the terms of the stipulation. When the stipula
tion was ﬁled, and counsel moved for the order, we enter
tained doubt as to whether this court could, with propriety,
reverse the action of the district court upon an agreement of
the parties, without an examination of the record, and a de
BRANTLY,
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termination that the action of that court was in fact errone
ous. Upon consideration, however, we deem it the duty of
the court, so far as it may, when there is no question as to its
jurisdiction in the particular case, to assist parties to settle
their controversies by removing any obstruction which may
stand in the way of such settlement. This cause involves title
to valuable mining property, and, as the settlement between
the parties contemplates the existence of a valid and subsist
ing judgment in favor of defendant, we think that the order
desired may be made with propriety, though it is not apparent
that the plaintiff would not, upon examination of the record,
It is there
be found entitled to an afiirmance of the order.
fore adjudged that the action of the district court in the
premises be reversed, and that the cause be remanded, with
directions to that court to vacate the order granting a new
trial, and that it permit the judgment in favor of defendant
in stand as rendered.
Reversed and remanded.
HOLLOWAY, ., concurs. MILBURN,
., dissents.

L~
J

J

.

(b)

CHARLOTTESVILLE

By a Divided Court.
&

ALBEMARLE RAILWAY CO.
RUBIN.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.
107

v.

1908.

Virginia, 751.

The petition to rehear in this case proceeds
PER CURIAM.
upon the mistaken theory that the order of aﬁirmance is void,
inasmuch as the present statute (Va. Code 1904, § 3485)
makes no express provision, as did the former statute, for
judgments by divided court.
The contention is founded upon the misconception that the
origin of that procedure is statutory.
On the contrary, the
statute was merely declaratory of a well-settled pre-existing
rule of necessity.
“Where the court is equally divided, so far as the point of
division goes the judgment or decree of the court below is
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The Antelope, 10 Wheat. (U. S.) 66, 6 L. Ed. 268;
Washington Bridge Co. v. Stewart, 3 How. (U. S.) 413, 11 L.
Ed. 658; Durant v. Essex Co., 7 Wall. (U. S.) 112, 19 L. Ed.
154. Although, where the court is equally divided in opinion
upon a writ of error, the judgment of the court below is
Etting '0. Bank of
affirmed, no principle is settled thereby.
U. S., 11 Wheat. (U. S.) 59, 6 L. Ed.'419. On a point upon
which the judges are equally divided the Supreme Court will
pronounce no opinion. Benton v. Woolsey, 12 Pet. (U. S.) 27,
9 L. Ed. 987.
Where the court is equally divided, it cannot
change the decree of the circuit court, or exercise the discre
tionary power to allow interest, for this would be a new de
cree. Hemmenway '12. Fisher, 20 How. (U. S.) 255, 15 L. Ed.
799. A writ of error was dismissed by the Supreme Court on
a division of opinion as to jurisdiction, where a fugitive mur
derer indicted in Canada was arrested in Vermont under war
rant from the Governor upon demand for his surrender, and
the state court refused to release him on habeas corpus.
Holmes 'v. Jennison, 14 Pet. (U. S.) 540, 10 L. Ed. 579. When
the court is equally divided, the judgment will be affirmed,
with costs. Bauer u. Texas & P. R. Co., 131 U. S. 430, 9 Sup.
Ct. 795, 33 L. Ed. 209; Moﬂit 12. Miller, 34 L. Ed. 539. Equal
division of the court on motion for rehearing of a judgment
of reversal previously rendered, leaves that judgment in
force, and does not result in affirming the judgment of the
lower court. Carmichael v. Eberle, 177 U. S. 63, 20 Sup. Ct.
571, 44 L. Ed. 672.” Taylor on Jur. & Proc. of U. S. Sup. Ct.
aﬁirmed.

§ 441.

The other grounds assigned for a rehearing involve ques
tions already considered, and upon which the court was di
vided.

For these reasons, the prayer of the petition is denied."
of a majority of
86 Where by constitutional provision the concurrence
the members of the court is necessary for a decision, as in Florida and
California, the court will as a matter of policy, in case of equal division,
unite for aﬂlrmanoe.-State ex rel. v. McClung, (1904) 47 Fla. 224;
Santa Rosa RR. Co. v. Central St. Ry. Co., (1869) 112 Cal. 436.
have arisen over the question
Some interesting judicial discussions
as to the result upon the judgment below of a division of opinion such
that a majority of the court fail to agree upon any one ground of error
although a majority agree that the case should be reversed. See Will of
iVI<~.Naught0n, (1909) 138 Wis. 179, citing and discussing prior cases in
Where a. majority are for allirinance but on different
various courts.
grounds the case should be affirmed because a ease is always to be ai

.ﬁrmed
11

Kan.
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unless there

is a majority for reversal.

Foltz

v.

Merrill,

(1873)

479.

(c)

Prejudicial and Harmless Error.

JONES
Supreme

v.

STATE.

Court of Mississippi.
104

1918.

Mississippi, 871.

SMITH, C. J. Appellant, having been convicted of selling
intoxicating liquors, appealed to this court, and his conviction
was affirmed at a former day of this term. His counsel now
suggests that we erred in so doing, for the reason that the
court below committed manifest error in permitting the in
troduction of certain testimony offered by the state.
Appellant was convicted on the testimony of two detectives
employed by the sheriff for the purpose of ferreting out the
They testiﬁed that
commission of crimes of this character.
they went to the house of appellant, and were met at the door
by his wife, Carrie, and told her they wished to purchase some
whisky; that she returned into the house, and shortly after
wards appellant himself appeared with two half pints of
whisky, for which they paid him the sum of $1.25. A Mr.
Davis was then introduced by the state, and after he had
testiﬁed that he had requested these detectives to go to this
house, he was permitted, over the objection of appellant, to
answer the following questions:
“Q. For what purpose did

A.

I

sent them up there to catch
Carrie. Q. For what purpose; to catch Carrie doing what?
A. To get a sale of whisky or beer on her.” The “Carrie” re
ferred to is appellant’s wife. Appellant denied having made
this sale, he and one other witness testifying that he was at
a place other than his residence at the time these detectives
claimed to have purchased the whisky. Conceding, but not
deciding, that this testimony was incompetent, and ought not
to have been admitted, its admission can by no stretch of the
imagination be said to have resulted in a miscarriage of jus
tice.
Counsel for appellant very vigorously attacks the principle
you send them there?
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of harmless error here applied and embodied in rule No. 11 of
this court (59 South. ix), "' * "‘ the rule criticised comes
to us from the common law, and in slightly different language
is now enforced in many jurisdictions by virtue of statutes,
rules of court, or judicial decision, including the courts of that
country from which our jurisprudence is derived, and in ad
dition has been approved by various Bar Associations, includ
ing the American and our own State Bar Association.
The
rule referred to is as follows:
“No judgment shall be re
versed on the ground of misdirection to the jury, or the im
proper admission or exclusion of evidence, or for error as to
the matter of pleading or procedure, unless it shall affirma
tively appear, from the whole record, that such judgment has
resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”
Counsel does not advise us what, in his judgment, the rule
in this matter ought to be; but we presume that he approves
that rule which Mr. Wigmore terms the “Exchequer heresy,”
for the reason that it was ﬁrst announced in the English
Court of Exchequer, and which is “that an error of ruling
creates per se for the excepting and defeated party a right to
a new trial"; for part of the language quoted from this ad
dress by him with approval is as follows:
“The true rule
must be that a miscarriage of justice has already resulted
when the case has not been tried according to law, and the
only business of the Supreme Court of Mississippi has here
tofore been and ought to be to see that this error is corrected.
Any other rule will bring chaos and confusion worse con
founded.”
Prior to the decision of the case of Crease v. Barrett, in
1835. by the Court of Exchequer, reported in 1 C. & M. 918,
the orthodox common-law rule on this subject was that an
erroneous ruling of the character here under consideration
“was not sufficient ground for setting aside a verdict and
ordering a new trial, unless upon all the evidence it appeared
to the judges that the truth had thereby not been reached.” 1
VVigmore on Evidence, § 21, and authorities there cited, par
ticularly Tyrwhit v. Wynn, 2 Bar. & Ald. 637. In Crease '0.
Barrett the Court of Exchequer “announced a rule which in
spirit and in later interpretation signiﬁed that error of ruling
created per se for the excepting and defeated party a right to
a new trial. The new Exchequer rule was speedily accepted in
the other courts; and for something more than a generation
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it remained the law of England, until it was reformed away,
for civil causes, in 1875.” I Wigmore on Evidence, § 21.
This heresy also early obtained recognition in America, and
The
is probably still the rule in a majority of the states.
many miscarriages of justice, of which its enforcement was
undoubtedly the cause, have at last brought it into disfavor.
and it has now been repudiated in many jurisdictions, the
courts of which have returned to the orthodox English rule,
either voluntarily or by legislative command.

i i i

#4

#

i

ll

i i

F

however, this Exchequer heresy soon ob
tained a foothold here, and in 1855, in Jcwkson v. Jackson, 28
Miss. 674, 64 Am. Dec. 114, it was said “that the correct rule
is that, when error of law manifestly appears, the presump
tion of law is that it was to the prejudice of a party
complaining of it, and that the judgment will be reversed
by reason of it, unless it appear by the reqord that it did
not operate to the injury of the party complaining.”
This
of prejudice from the commission of error
presumption
seems gradually to have become more conclusive, as will
appear from Harper '0. Tapley, 35 Miss. 506, Josephine
'0. State, 39 Miss. 648; Solomon v. Compress Co., 69 Miss. 319,
10 South. 446, 12 South. 339, and Foster '0. State, 70 Miss.
755, 12 South. 822, and reached its apotheosis in Lipscomb
State, 75 Miss. 559, 23 South. 210, 230, wherein it seems to
have been held that this court has nothing whatever to do
with the correctness of the result reached by the jury in the
court below, but must in all cases reverse for the commission
of an error “of such character as that the jury itself might
have been inﬂuenced by it.” 75 Miss. 599, 620, 23 South. 221.
After the decision of this case, however, this court con
tinued to decline to reverse judgments, notwithstanding the
commission of error by the court below of the character here
under consideration, when it appeared from the whole record
that justice had been done; and in Rector v. Outzen, 93 Miss.
256, 46 South. 408, it seems to have returned to the earlier
and orthodox rule, for it is there said that “in order to secure
a reversal it must be shown that there was an error and that
Until it is shown that the party
the error was prejudicia1.”
against whom an error was committed has failed to obtain
justice, it cannot be said that he has been prejudiced--that
injured or damaged—by its commission.
\

is,
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The objections generally urged against the rule now under
consideration are that by acting upon it the court invades the
province of the jury, and that its frequent application would
cause the rules of evidence to be less carefully considered.
The second reason may have some foundation in fact, but we
must remember that the rules of evidence are not an end in
themselves, but merely a means to an end, and when the end
sought has been reached it is folly to reject it merely for the
reason that the jury arrived at it in a manner other than that
contemplated by the law. The ﬁrst reason is wholly without
merit, for by applying it an appellate court, instead of invad
ing the province of the jury, upholds it to the full extent in
its prerogative of determining what the truth of the matter
in controversy is, and declines to interfere unless it clearly
appears that it has failed to correctly discharge this duty.
This court is one of appellate jurisdiction only, and its sole
duty is to correct errors made in the courts below which have
operated to the prejudice of the parties complaining thereof,
and until both error and prejudice resulting therefrom are
shown by the record it should not and will not interfere with
the course of justice. It will continue to protect litigants in
all of their fundamental rights, and will see, so far as in its
power lies, that full and complete justice is administered to
them. Nevertheless it must be thoroughly understood, in the
language used by Judge Whitﬁeld in his dissenting opinion in
Lipscomb '0. State, 75 Miss. 617, 23 South. 228, “that this
*
"‘
*
tribunal is not a helpless prisoner, bound in the fet
tcrs of some supposed hard and fast rule requiring it to re
verse cases where, ﬁrst, erroneous instructions have been
given; or, second, proper instructions have been refused; or,
third, competent testimony has been excluded; or, fourth, in
competent testimony admitted; or, ﬁfth, improper argument
has been allowed; or, sixth, the trial court has erred in its
rulings on the pleadings—on the ground, merely, that such
action of the court, of the one kind or the other, constitutes
error in law merely,” and that for the commission of such an
error the judgment of a trial court will be reversed only when
it “affirmatively appears from the whole record that such
judgment has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”
"
Suggestion of error overruled.
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Court of the United States.
21 Wallace,

1874.

105.

'

‘ ‘
HUNT, J.
The objection to the evidence of the witness, White, in stat
ing the dates of delivery and the weight of the iron is not
practical. If we suppose the evidence to be stricken out, as
requested, the result of the case must necessarily be the same.
It would then stand thus: The witness, White, testiﬁes that
he knows of the delivery to the defendants of certain plates
of iron, forwarded by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Com
pany, in January and February, 1870; that the freight bills
were paid by the defendants, and that the defendants made no
complaint that the amount of the iron was less than it should
The plaintiffs then proved by other witnesses that the
be.
four bills of iron were shipped by them by the Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad to the defendants in pursuance of written or
ders from them, marked C. & J. Cooper & Co., a few days
prior to the dates mentioned in White’s deposition; that the
bills of lading for the iron were mailed to the defendants, and
that they never came back to the plaintiffs. This was prima
facie evidence of the delivery of the iron as speciﬁed, and, no
proof to the contrary being offered, it became conclusive.
The plaintiff's case is as well without White's evidence as
with it. The defendants suffer no injury by its retention, and
have, therefore, no legal cause of complaint.
Q

#

i

*

$

U

PANGBURN

IF

v.

Q

I

BULL.

Supreme Court of New York.
1

#

1828.

Wendell, 345.

Error from the Albany common pleas. The action in
common pleas was for a malicious prosecution, brought
Bull against Pangburn.

*

*

*
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The question of probable cause, is
Whether the circumstances
a mixed question of law and fact.
alleged to shew it probable or not probable, are true and ex
isted, is a matter of fact; but whether, supposing them true,
they amount to a probable cause, is a question of law.
(1 D.
& E. 545.)
The court observe, that upon this distinction pro
ceeded the case of Reynolds and Kennedy, (1 Wils. 232) .
The court below erred in submitting both the law and the
fact to the jury. This was necessarily the consequence of the
charge; for the court instruct the jury, that if from the testi
mony they should be of opinion that the prosecutions were
malicious and without probable cause, and the defendant
knew the facts to be so, they ought to ﬁnd damages for the
plaintiff. The jury found damages for the plaintiff. Prob
ably they had no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that
the defendant’s motives were malicious, after proof of the
defendant’s declaration that he would bring the plaintiff four
times to Guilderland for the same cause, and the course he
pursued to eifect the object in view, but they also passed on
the question of want of probable cause; and although the court
ought to have instructed the jury whether, on the supposition
that certain facts were established, they would show the want
of probable cause, still, if on a review of the case by this court,
it shall appear that, from the facts not disputed at the trial,
there was evidently a want of probable cause, the verdict
ought not to be set aside for the error of the court below in
this respect, because this court are called on to pronounce
on that question; and if they see that the jury have not erred
in point of law, although the charge was erroneous, no injury
has been done to the defendant below, of which he has a right
to complain.
In making this remark, however, it must be
understood, that if the evidence as to any material facts is
contradictory, or leaves the question doubtful whether the
fact existed or not, then the error of the court is good ground
for a reversal, inasmuch as this court cannot take upon itself
to draw inferences from conﬂicting testimony; this is the
exclusive province of the jury. * "
WOODWORTH,

.

'

'
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TWITCHELL
1910.

Maine, 286.

#

ii

=ll

Three actions of assumpsit on accounts annexed, * " *
The defendant ﬁled a general motion in each action for a new
trial and also excepted to several rulings of the presiding
justice.
SPEAR, J. These were three actions of assumpsit on ac
counts annexed, severally brought by Seth C. Gordon, James
B. O’Neil, and Herbert F. Twitchell, all of Portland, in said
county of Cumberland, physicians and surgeons, against Rose
A. Conley and trustees, to recover for professional services
as expert witnesses three days each in the case of Dr. Gordon
and Dr. O’Neil, and four days in the case of Dr. Twitchell;
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The jury rendered
verdict for the plaintiffs Seth C. Gor
don and James B. O'Neil each the sum of $112.50, and for the
plaintiff Herbert F. Twitchell the sum of $150. The defend
ant introduced no testimony.
During the course of the trial, the defendant ﬁled 43 ex
ceptions to the rulings of the presiding judge. In view of the
conclusion of the court upon the motion,
becomes immate
rial whether the rulings of the court as abstract principles of
law were right or wrong. We shall therefore not undertake
to discuss the exceptions. Upon the law and legal evidence,
whatever the errors in the rulings of the court, the result of
the trial was evidently right. It would seem like triﬂing with
the ends of judicial procedure to say that an erroneous ruling.
which did not affect the truth of the result, should be regarded
as a sufficient reason for the overturning of
fair and honest
If the court erred, the jury did not. They were
judgment.
right. If the exceptions were sustained and the case retried
along the lines of law laid down in the discussion of the mo
tion, the only possible difference in the result would neces
sarily be conﬁned to the amount of damages new jury might
But, as the damages are clearly not excessive, the
render.
case should not be sent back for
new speculation upon this
question.
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Motion and exceptions overruled.

MELODY

v.

DES MOINES UNION RAILWAY CO.

Supreme

Court of Iowa.

1914.

Northwestern Reporter, 466.

145

[Action at law to recover damages for personal injury al
leged to have been occasioned by the negligence of the defend
ant. There was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and de
fendant appeals. Aﬁirmed. 161 Iowa, 695. On petition for
rehearing the following opinion was given.]
.
PER CURIAM.

*

*

*

case, the trial court charged the jury that,
to ﬁnd the defendant guilty of negligence as alleged, it must
be found that by reason of its want of reasonable care “snow
and ice had accumulated at the place where plaintiff was re
quired to go in the discharge of his duty as switchman, and
that they further allowed snow and ice to accumulate on the
footboard,” and failed properly to remove such dangerous
conditions of the switch yard and footboard, and, if the jury
further found that “these conditions were the proximate
cause of the injury to plaintiff,” then he was entitled to re
cover. In other words, to charge defendant with liability the
jury were required to ﬁnd both the bad conditions of the foot
board and of the yard, and that the two together were the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Now, even upon
the narrowest and most technical construction of the statute
in the light of our prior decisions, there can be no reasonable
doubt that negligence of the defendant or its employes with
respect to the condition of the footboard is negligence con
nected with the operation of the railway, and injuries result
ing therefrom are clearly within the legislative intent as ex
pressed in this statute, and, under the instruction, the jury
could ﬁnd for plaintiff only upon the theory that such negli
gcnce was established.
The fact that the court went further and required the jury
also to ﬁnd a negligent failure to properly care for the yard

In submitting the
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only had the effect to cast upon plaintiff an additional burden
of which the defendant has no cause to complain.
1

#

1

Q

i I i
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87 "The rule is well settled that a party on appeal to this court cannot
assign error upon nor complain ot a ruling of the lower court as errone
ous which is in his favor."—Kime v. Vetter, (1909) 172 Ind. 317.

WEISELS-GERHARDT REAL ESTATE co.
PEMBERTON INVESTMENT co.
St. Louis Court of Appeals.
150

v.

1910.

Missouri Appeals, 626.

NORTONI, J.
This is a suit for commissions alleged to
have been earned by plaintiff under an express contract.
Plaintiff recovered, and defendant prosecutes an appeal.
There is but one question presented for decision, and that
relates to the fact the jury returned a verdict for just
one-half the amount sued for, when it appears that under the
terms of the contract plaintiff should recover, if anything, the
full amount therein stipulated. * * “‘
The instructions submitted to the jury the question as to
whether or not the contract for commissions was made. and
the jury were directed that in event of a ﬁnding for plaintiff
Though the jury found for
the verdict should be for $6,200.
plaintiff, it awarded him a recovery of $3,100, only, or, in
other words, precisely one-half the amount sued for. Defend
ant insists the verdict should be set aside for the reason it is
not responsive to the issue in the case, and for the further
reason that it discloses on its face the jury acted arbitrarily
in the premises and in utter disregard of the evidence and in
structions of the court. As a general rule, one is not entitled
to a reversal of the judgment, because it is more favorable to
him than the case asserted in the trial court justifies. 2 Ency.
Pl. & Pr. 527. In keeping with this general doctrine, it has
been several times decided in this state that a judgment
should not be reversed on appeal for the reason it appears to
be for a much smaller sum than the plaintiff insists was
The following
due or. the theory advanced for a recovery.

___,__i__._}

_

_

________..q-Q—~
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cases will illustrate:
Alderman o. Cox, 74 Mo. 78; Gaty 12.
Sack, 19 Mo. App. 470; Giﬁord 12. Weber, 38 Mo. App. 595;
Chinn '0. Davis, 21 Mo. App. 363; Crigler 12. Duncan, 121 Mo.
App. 381, 99 S. W. 61. But in all of these cases the issues
were such as to warrant the jury in reckoning with the equi
ties involved, and it seems the verdicts were awarded accord
ingly. There can be no doubt that a different rule prevails in
this jurisdiction, at least when the suit is on an express con
tract for a given amount, and the question presented relates
solely to whether or not the contract was made as in the case
now in judgment.
The Supreme Court has conclusively set
tled the question, so far as we are concerned, in Cole '0.
Armour, 154 Mo. 333, 55 S. W. 476. The case mentioned is
directly in point, and under the Constitution it is controlling
authority here. For another adjudication to the same effect,
see Powers v. Gouraud, 19 Misc. Rep. 268, 44 N. Y. Supp. 249.
In Cole v. Armour, supra, the Supreme Court based its ruling
on the ground that the verdict itself conclusively proved the
jury did not believe the testimony going to establish the al
leged contract.
It is said, if the jury had believed the con
tract was made as asserted by plaintiff, then its verdict neces
sarily would have been for the full amount; for if the contract
existed in fact, and plaintiff fully performed it, he was en
titled to recover its full measure.
On the other hand, in such suits on express contracts, if the
jury believes no such contract was made, then no recovery at
all may be allowed. The reasoning of the law in such circum
stances is that, instead of acting on the evidence and in con
formity with the instructions of the court, the jury proceeds
to administer equities when none whatever are involved, for it
is a clear issue of contract with all its terms and conditions or
no contract at all. It is said by the New York court, in ac
tions on contract in which the plaintiff is entitled to recover
his full claim or nothing whatever and the jury awards a
lesser amount, the verdict will be deemed to show that in de
termining the case the jury either wholly disregarded the
evidence, misapprehended its effect, or overlooked some im
portant fact, or necessarily found some fact in favor of de
fendant which is wholly inconsistent with the verdict for any
amount in favor of the plaintiff, and it should therefore be
Powers v. Gour
set aside even on the motion of defendant.
aud, 19 Misc. Rep. 268, 44 N. Y. Supp. 249. The reasoning
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in logic in those cases where the sole issue
is as to whether or not there is a contract between the parties
and, if so, stipulating a certain amount, which plaintiff is en
titled to recover, if at all. In such cases where the contract is
wholly denied, it seems to be a just doctrine which permits
the defendant to insist upon his right to have the jury re
spond to the precise issue, for, unless there is a contract for
the full amount, there is no right to recover at all.
The judgment should be reversed, and the cause remanded.
It is so ordered. All concur.
seems to be sound

PEOPLE

v.

SMITH.

Court of Appeals of New York.
172

1902.

New York, 210.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, rendered at
a Trial Term for the county of Monroe, November 10, 1898,
upon a verdict convicting the defendant of the crime of mur
der in the ﬁrst degree.
MARTIN,

J.

*

“‘
_*

Another class of exceptions argued by the appellant re
lates to the admission of the evidence of the witness Albert L.
Hall, who testiﬁed as an alleged expert as to the manufacture,
uses, and differences of pistols and cartridges, the chemistry
of burned powder and other substances, and to receiving the
speculative opinion of the witness, which was incompetent,
and subsequently stricken out by the court of its own motion,
without consent or objection. The court was occupied several
days in taking the evidence of this witness, to which there
were numerous objections and exceptions that were obviously
*
*
*
That this witness was improperly permitted
valid.
to testify as an expert to many matters material to the investi
gation, when he was obviously incompetent, can hardly be
denied. * * * It is obvious from the record that the court
struck out portions of the improper evidence which were spe
ciﬁcally stated, and followed this action by a general state
ment to the effect that all the testimony of that witness, ex
ceptpthat pertaining to his experiments with powder after
5.

__,__i_
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revolvers had been discharged, and with reference to the ap
pearance and condition of the fatal bullet, was stricken out,
and the jury directed to disregard it. Subsequently other por
tions of his testimony were directed to be stricken out. The
court likewise stated that it would direct all exhibits intro
duced on the examination of the witness to be stricken out if
there was any question about them, but that they were actu
ally stricken out does not appear. It may be fairly said that
it is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain, even from the
record, with any degree of accuracy, the particular portions
of the evidence of this witness which the court attempted to
withhold from the consideration of the jury. This difficulty
arises from the fact that it is hardly possible to determine
what evidence pertained to his experiments with powder after
revolvers had been discharged, what pertained to his testi
mony with reference to the appearance and condition of the
fatal bullet, to separate it from the other evidence which was
given by him, or to ascertain what particular portion of the
remaining evidence was subsequently withdrawn. The evi
dence which was competent and that which was incompetent
was so intermingled and woven together as to render it diﬁi
cult to separate one from the other, and it must have been
almost, if not quite, impossible for the jury under the rulings
of the court, to understand what portion of this evidence was
to be disregarded, and what portion it was to consider. ‘ * *
It seems to be settled by the decisions of this court that if
evidence is improperly admitted, the mistake is immediately
discovered, and the evidence promptly withdrawn, with in
structions to the jury to disregard it, or if it is stricken out
on the motion or application of the appellant, the error will
be deemed cured or waived, and the exception to its admission
deprived of its potency. Gall 12. Gall, 114 N. Y. 109, 21 N. E.
106; Holmes 'v. Moﬁat, 120 N. Y. 159, 24 N. E. 275; People v.
Schooleg/, 149 N. Y. 99, 103, 43 N. E. 536; Cole v. Coal Co., 159
N. Y. 59, 65, 53 N. E. 670; People v. Priori, 164 N. Y. 459,
469, 58

N. E. 668.

The theory of the decisions to the effect that errors in re
ceiving improper evidence may be cured when the jury are
clearly and plainly instructed to disregard certain speciﬁed
evidence so erroneously and recently received, and the evi
dence is promptly stricken out, is based upon the presumption
The circum
that the instructions of the court were obeyed.
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stances under which that rule has generally been applied were
widely and essentially different from those in the case at bar.
Here, many days had been employed in taking the testimony
of this witness, and many pages of evidence had been given
by him, which was so interwoven as to render it extremely
difﬁcult, under the rulings of the court, for a jury to under
stand or determine what portion of the evidence remained in
the case, which they were to consider, and what portion they
were instructed to disregard.
Under such circumstances, it
would indeed be very extraordinary to presume that the jury
in this case literally obeyed the instructions of the court, no
matter how much they may have intended to do so.
In the
recent case of Ives 12. Ellis, 169 N. Y. 85, 90, 62 N. E..138, in
competent evidence was received; the court at the time re
marking, “I shall instruct the jury that the letter and the
statements in the letter do not in any wise prove the state
*
*
ments therein contained, or any of them.”
In dis
cussing that question this court added:
“But before an ap
pellate court will hold that such an error has been cured, it
must feel sure that the effort of the trial court to correct the
error was necessarily effective with the minds of the jury.
Now, that cannot be said of the caution of the court in this
instance, for it must be borne in mind that this letter was
introduced in the early part of the trial, which was not only a
long one, but in its progress there Was an adjournment for a
period of ten days, during which the jurors presumably had
their minds occupied with affairs of their own; and in view
of that situation it Was necessary that the court should so ac
curately describe the letter which it wished them to disregard
as to make it apparent that there could be no confusion in
their minds as to what letter was referred to.” We think the
principle of that decision is applicable to, and decisive of, this
*
*
*
In view of all these circumstances, it seems
case.
quite impossible to say that the error was waived, or that the
court so accurately described the evidence to be disregarded,
or that its directions were at a time when they would be so
ﬁrmly impressed upon the minds of the jury, as to justify us
in holding that there was a presumption that the jury obeyed
the suggestions of the court, and the error in its admission
was cured.

5
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LEQUATTE

v.

DRURY.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
101

J

1197

1881.
/

Illinois, 77.

SCOTT,
.
The bill in this case was to have partition made
among the several heirs, of the lands of which it is alleged
Isaiah and Priscilla Drury were either the legal or equitable
owners at the time of their death. * ‘ "‘
On the trial of the cause before the court, complainants of
fered as witnesses in their behalf, Eli and Silas Drury, two
of defendants, who are heirs at law of Isaiah Drury, to prove
facts in relation to the creation of a trust in these lands, and
other facts occurring prior to the death of the 'common an
cestor, as set forth in the bill. To the admission of the testi
mony of the witnesses offered, defendant Stuart R. Drury ob
jected, on the ground the witnesses were parties to the suit,
and heirs of the common ancestor, and therefore directly in
terested adversely to defendant interposing the obj&tion, and
who defends as heir at law of Isaiah Drury; which objection
was by the court sustained.
That decision is the only error
insisted upon in the argument as a ground for the reversal of
the decree of the circuit court.
It may be conceded, that under the decision of this court
in Pigg 'v. Carroll, 89 Ill. 206, the witnesses called on behalf
of complainants to testify concerning facts alleged in the bill
as having occurred prior to the death of the common ancestor,
were entirely competent for that purpose. Exactly what com
plainants wished to prove by the witnesses is not deﬁnitely
stated. Assuming, however, the material facts alleged in the
bill as having happened before the death of the common an
cestor would be established by their evidence, still it is ap
parent no harm was in fact done complainants by the exclu
sion of the testimony, for the reason they have been guilty
of such laches in asserting the rights they now claim that no
decree could pass in their favor. Whatever rights complain
ants may have had in these particular lands came to them on
the death of Isaiah Drury, in 1854, and certainly as early
as 1858, when Andrews reconveyed the premises to Stuart R.
Drury. The bill in this case was not ﬁled until April, 1871.
“
*
" Equity will not assist a party who has not been rea
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those rights concerning

which

28 Conversely,
there is no prejudice in any action of the court where
the appellant succeeds in spite of the error on the matter in respect to
which exception is taken.—Good v. Knox, (1891) 64 Vt. 97; Dixon v.
Russell, (1914) 156 Wis. 161; Hamilton v. Mich. Cent. RR. Co., (1903)
135 Mich. 95; Brigham v. Morgan,
(1904) 185 Mass. 27; Greenleat v.
Egan, (1883) 30 Minn. 316.

JOHNSON v. FEATHERSTONE.
Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
1./,1

1911.

Kentucky, 793.

J

O’REAR, . Appellee brought this action of slander against
appellant, who had charged appellee with the crime of false
swearing committed in the course of a trial of a civil action
in the Hickman circuit court. * " "
It is insisted by appellant that the demurrer to the petition
should have been sustained because the petition did not al
lege that the testimony in question had been given in a judi
cial proceeding or trial in court. An amended petition was
ﬁled before the trial containing this averment. Although the
petition may have been bad, and the demurrer should have
been sustained, the amendment cured the defect. The error,
if one, was thereby also cured. * " ‘"9
89 So, error in sustaining a demurrer
to one defense is not prejudicial
where the same matters appeared in other defenses under which they
were litigated,-—Koch v. Story, (1910) 47 Colo. 335; and error in refusing
to permit an amendment is ha-rmiess where other counts suﬂiciently cover
v. Nat. Bank, (1888) 87 Ala. 644.
the same ground,—Sharpe

r
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A ﬂirmance.
&

GLESSNER

Supreme Court of Ohio.

CO.

v.

JACOBS.

1898.

58 Ohio State, 77.

MINSHALL, J. The action below was a suit brought by
Treca A. Jacobs against the defendant, Warder, Bushnell &
Glessner Company, to recover the possession of certain per
sonal property that had been taken in execution on a judg
ment that had been rendered in their favor against the hus
band of the plaintiff, the wife claiming to be the owner of the
property. The attorney for the plaintiff, in the course of his
argument to the jury as shown by the record, used the follow
The plaintiff‘ is a poor woman.
ing language:
“Gentlemen:
against
her will mean much, very much; but to
Your verdict
the defendants, with all their wealth, residing in their mag
niﬁcent castles in the city of Springﬁeld, a verdict against
them does not hurt them,”--to which remarks, as the record
says, the defendants “then and there objected and excepted.”
This is all the record discloses in regard to the matter, other
than that, after a verdict for the plaintiff, a motion for a new
trial was made on this among other grounds, which was over
A
ruled by the court, and judgment rendered on the verdict.
bill of exceptions was taken and made a part of the record,
showing the matters above stated. It also contained the evi
dence given at the trial; but, as nothing is claimed from the
evidence, it has been omitted in the printing of the record.
The judgment was affirmed on error by the circuit court.
The only ground for a reversal relied on in this court is the
misconduct of plaintiff's counsel in using the words to the
jury above stated.
Certainly these remarks were of the most reprehensible
character, and it is a matter of some surprise that counsel
should so far forget himself in argument to the jury as to
commit such a breach of his privilege as is shown by the
words used in this case. No heat of argument nor zeal for his
client, can be admitted as a palliation of" such an offense
against the fair administration of justice. But the question
arises whether, upon this record, anything appears from
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which this court can say there is error in the judgment for
which it should be reversed. It is a settled principle of prac
tice in all reviewing courts that the error for which a judg
ment may be reversed must aﬂirmatively appear on the face
of the record. From the record before us it simply appears
that these observations were made by counsel for the plaintiff
to the jury, and that counsel for the defendant then and there
“objected and excepted.”
From this we readily infer that
counsel “objected” to the remarks of the opposing counsel, as
But to what did he “ex
he had an undoubted right to do.
cept.” An exception is not to the act of a party, but to that
of a court in ruling on an objection. What the court did in
this matter is not disclosed by the record. The court may at
once have reproved the counsel and instructed‘ the jury, in the
most positive terms, not to regard the remarks of counsel in
arriving at their verdict.
To this the defendant could not
have excepted, or, if he did, the exception would be unreason
able and of no avail. If the court took no notice of the objec
tion, or overruled it, then the defendant might reasonably
have excepted, and such action of the court would have been
a clear ground of error, for which the judgment should be
reversed. But, inasmuch as the record is silent as to what
the court did, we are not permitted to assume that it did what
it should not have done. On the contrary, the only presump
tion we are permitted to make, in such case, is that the court
the counsel
performed its duty in the premises,—reproved
and properly instructed the jury at the time. If he did not,
and a review of its action is desired, the party excepting must
cause the record to show what the ruling of the court was;
otherwise it cannot be said to aﬂirmatively appear that the
court committed error.
*

IF

ll

*

#

#

Q

1'

I

#

The evidence is not before us, so that the question pre
sented is whether, where a record shows that improper re
marks were made by counsel of the prevailing party, to which
objection was made at the time, but does not show the ruling
of the court, should the verdict and judgment thereon be set
aside and reversed as a matter of course? We think not; for,
in such case, for aught that appears, the court severely re
proved the remarks of counsel, directed the jury not to regard
them, and the evidence may show a clear case for a recovery
on the part of the prevailing party, notwithstanding the of

Sec.

DISPOSITION

3]

or CASE UPON REVIEW

1201

fense of his counsel. As much as we reprehend such practice
in counsel, we are not prepared to say that the use of such
language may not be so far corrected by the court by the re
proof of counsel and instruction to the jury, as, in a clear case
upon the evidence, to warrant the court trying the case to
"‘
"
“
sustain the verdict rendered.
*
*
*
The judgment is therefore aﬁ"1rmed.*°
80 PRESUMPPIONS in support
of the judgment, in the absence of any
showing in the record to the contrary, are made by the appellate court
in a great variety of cases. Thus, every presumption is indulged in favor
of the jurisdiction of the lower court over the parties,—Hughes v.
Cumlng, (1900) 165 N. Y. 91, and subject matter-,—McFarland v. Stewart.
(1899) 109 Ia. 561; it is presumed that the parties had proper capacity,-—
Batchelder v. Baker, (1889) 79 Cal. 266; that proper pleadings were
ﬁled,--Seidschlag v. Town of Antioch, (1904) 207 Ill. 280; that amend
ments were duly allowed,—Hanchy v. Brunson, (1913) 181 Ala. 453;
that due notice of the application for an interlocutory order was given
and all objection to the order was waived,—Shore v. White City State
Bank, (1899) 61 Kan. 246; that depositions were properly taken,-—
Simonds v. Cash, (1904) 136 Mich. 558; that evidence admitted was
properly admissible,—Perkins v. Hayward, (1890) 124 Ind. 445; that evi
dence excluded was not properly admissible,—State ex rel. v. Maloney,
(1892) 113 Mo. 367; that instructions given were correct and sufficient,
Batchelder v. Home Nat. Bank, (1914) 218 Mass. 420; that the jury
obeyed the court's instructions,—Vasby v. U. S. Gypsum Co., (1912) 46
Mont. 411; that the court below found all the facts necessary to support
this judgment,—Halb0uer v. Cuenin, (1909) 45 Colo. 507; that the ruling
on a motion for a new trial was correct,—Santos v. Roman Catholic
Church, (1909) 212 U. S. 463; that the court was justified in directing
v. Atkins & Co., (1901) 157 Ind. 331.
a verdict,—Ra1ya

COOK v. GLOBE PRINTING CO.
Supreme Court of Missouri.

1910.
\

227 Missouri, 471.

The gist of the complaint of the plaintiff is that defendant
published that plaintiff had made a false affidavit under the
Corrupt Practices Act, and thereby charged the plaintiif
with the crimes of perjury and of making a false affidavit.
GANTT, . This is an action for libel. The defendant is a
corporation, and the owner and proprietor of the well-known
metropolitan
newspaper,
the St. Louis Globe-Democrat,
printed in the city of St. Louis. His action is founded on an

J
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alleged libelous and defamatory article, which appeared
that paper, and in its issue of February 12, 1905.
1

U

1

i
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We are ﬁnally brought to the last contention of the de
fendant that the verdict is so excessive that it was clearly
the result of passion or prejudice, or both. The jury returned
a verdict assessing plaintiff's damages at $75,000 actual, and
*
"‘
"‘
$75,000 punitive, damages.
Proceeding, then, to the consideration of the contention of
the defendant that the verdict in this case is so excessive and
unreasonable that it should be set aside, it is to be remarked,
ﬁrst, that we are all of the opinion that there was no error
in the instructions of the court, or in any of its rulings in
the admission or rejection of the testimony, or upon its con
struction of the pleadings in the case. That the publication,
which is a basis of the action, was libelous we think there can
be no doubt whatever, so that the sole question remaining is
Whether the verdict is so excessive as to indicate that it is the
result of prejudice or passion. In our opinion the verdict is
excessive and is unusually large, but it does not follow that,
because the verdict is too large, it is necessarily the result of
prejudice or passion.
*
"‘
*
The court said, in the case of Chicago Street Ry.
Wriwon,
150 Ill. 532, 37 N. E. 895, after an exhaustive
C0. v.
examination of the authorities in this state, it was said: “We
are committed to the practice of allowing remittiturs in ac
tions ex delicto, both in the trial and appellate courts, to such
sums as shall to the court seem not excessive, and conform
ing as to the balance of the judgment.” And the practice
therein referred to is now too well established to be ques
tioned. Railroad Company v. Musa, 180 Ill. 130, 54 N. E.
168; Railroad Company v. Lewandowski, 190 Ill. 301, 60 N. E.
7.

497.

The decisions of this court as to the power of this court to
require a remittitur in actions for unliquidated damages are
not uniform * * * The rationale of these late cases is that
the fact that a verdict is too large does not itself indicate that
the jury were actuated by passion or prejudice, where there
was no error in the admission or rejection of testimony or in
the instructions of the court, and no misconduct on the part
of the jury was shown, and the evidence established that the
plaintiff was entitled to a substantial verdict, and that in such
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the plaintiff would consent to a remittitur of a part
of his verdict, the defendant could not complain.
Accordingly it is ordered that, if the plaintiff shall remit
$50,000 of the amount assessed for actual damages, and shall
also remit $50,000 from the amount of punitive damages as
sessed in the verdict within 20 days, the judgment will be
affirmed for $25,000 for actual damages and $25,000 for puni
tive damages, aggregating $50,000.
Otherwise the judgment
will be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.

case,

J

VALLIANT, C. ., and Busosss, Fox, and Woooson, JJ., con
cur. LAMM and GRAVES, JJ., dissent in separate dissenting
opinions.“
81Aﬂirmance
of judgment on condition is frequently ordered where
the condition is simple and its performance
will entirely remove the
necessity for a reversal and new trial. Thus the appellee, as a condition
of aﬁlrmance, has been required to enter a release of a part of the judg
ment,-—-Baxter v. Baxter, (1910) 46 Ind. App. 514; or to deliver up an
instrument for canceliation,—Lustig v. McCulloch, (1897) 10 Colo. App.
41; or to consent to the correction of the verdict to show a proper de
scription of land,—Townsend v. Kreigh, (1903) 133 Mich. 243; or to ﬁle
a release of liability of a party not joined,—Culver v. Smith, (1899) 82
Mo. App. 390; or to stipulate against the use of the judgment as a bar
under certain circumstances,—Hartford v. Greenwich Bank, (1913) 157
N. Y. App. Div. 448.

JACKSON

&

SHARP

CO. v.

FAY.

Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.
20

Appeal Cases, District of Columbia,

A

1902.

‘

105.

motion on behalf of the appellant to modify the judg
ment of affirmance, was denied on the 23d day of June, 1902,
In this case, upon a demurrer ﬁled by the ap
MORRIS,
.
pellee Fay, as defendant in the court below, to the declaration
of the appellant as plaintiff, the demurrer was sustained; and
the plaintiff thereupon electing to stand by its declaration had
judgment rendered against it, from which it appealed to this
court.
Here the judgment was affirmed. Now the appel
lant comes and moves the court for a modiﬁcation of the
judgment of affirmance in such manner “as will admit of an

J
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amendment of the pleadings in the particular in which this
court holds them to be defective.”
Plainly this is an application which should not be enter
tained, except for very grave reasons and in exceptional
cases.
The ground of the application is that this court based
its decision upon a very different ground from that on which
the court below proceeded. But the demurrer was a general
demurrer to the plaintiﬂ"’s declaration, in which several
grounds of invalidity of the declaration were stated; and if
the court below preferred to rest its decision on one of these
grounds and this court upon another, it is not apparent
that the plaintiff was not duly notiﬁed of the imperfections
of its case as made by it. Instead of amending its declara
tion, as it was then duly notiﬁed to do, it deliberately elected
to standby that declaration and to try its fortunes in this
court, with the reservation, as we may assume, that it would
go back and try the case over again, if the decision against
it should happen not to be sustained upon the precise grounds
for it assigned by the court below. We ﬁnd no warrant in
law for this practice; and we do not think that it would be
in accordance with the requirements of justice.
Various cases have been cited in which appellate courts
have remanded causes for the purpose of amendment in order
that full justice might be done in the premises. Magruder v.
Belt, 7 App. D. C. 303.; Waite '0. Larocque, 12 App. D. C. 410;
Wiggins Perry Co. v. Railroad Co., 142 U. S. 396; Liverpool,
etc., C0. 'v. Phoenix Co., 129 U. S. 397; Jones '0. Meehan, 175
U. S. 1; Melville 'v. Railroad Co., 2 Mackey, 63; Merrick v.
Giddings, McA. & Mackey, 57. The majority of these cases
are of equity cognizance, wherein it is always proper to direct
amendment whenever the interest of justice seems to require
it. But we have no hesitation in saying that we think that
in causes at common law as well as in equity the power of
amendment conferred by statute may be freely exercised or
authorized by appellate courts, if such is the requirement of
justice in the particlular case. * * "‘ Here we have a dis
tinct notiﬁcation to a party that his pleading is defective and
that he should amend, if he would recover, and a ﬁnal re
fusal by him to avail himself of his right. If we were to
allow or direct amendment now, it would be impossible in the
future to have any ﬁnality in such cases, either in the court
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The motion for modiﬁcation must be

refused."
82 In the absence of appropriate statutes
of amendmentslsuch affirm
ance with permission to amend or plead over would probably be unau
thorized.—Piper v. Hoard, (1887) 107 N. Y. 67; Whiting v. Mayor, (1868)

37

N. Y.

~-A

600.

l

DUNTON
Supreme

MCCOOK.

Court of Iowa.
120

[Tyrrell conveyed

v.

Iowa,

1903.

/+44.

of land to McCook by a deed
absolute on its face. Dunton, a judgment creditor of Tyrrell,
brought an action in which he sought to have this deed de
clared a mortgage, and asked that his judgments be decreed
to be liens upon Tyrrell’s interest in the land and be satisﬁed
The court, on May 18, 1892 made the
out of that interest.
decree as prayed and found that $524.44 was still due to
McCook on Jan. 1, 1890, and that upon payment thereof
Tyrrell would be entitled to a reconveyance of the land. This
A rehearing was
was affirmed on appeal on Jan. 18, 1895.
denied June 1, 1895, a procedendo was ﬁled in the district
court June 22, and on Feb. 6, 1896, Dunton was given leave
to ﬁle a “supplemental petition” alleging that McCook had
been in possession of the premises since Jan. 1, 1890, and
had received more than enough in rents and proﬁts to cover
the balance due him, and asking for an accounting and that
Dunton’s liens be conﬁrmed and be satisﬁed by sale of the
premises.
The district court so decreed, and McCook ap
pealed.]

J

a parcel

'

LADD,
.
The original decree in this case was entered in
Upon appeal that court
the district court May 18, 1892.
As said in Levi v. Karrick, 15 Iowa, 444:
lost jurisdiction.
“When appeal is taken, all power of the court below over the
parties and subject-matter is lost until the cause, or some
part thereof, is remanded back, by order of this court, for its
McGlaughlin 12. O'Rourke, 12 Iowa, 459;
further action.”
Rosenberg,
12.
111 Iowa, 322, 82 N. W. 768.
Stillman
But
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pending such appeal the decree continued in full force for
all purposes.
Watson v. Richardson, 110 Iowa, 698, 80 N.
416,
80
Am.
St. Rep. 331. It was afﬁrmed in this court
W.
January 18, 1895, and petition for rehearing denied June 1st
of that year. That ended the suit. Thereafter it was pend
ing in neither court. The aﬁirmance was merely a ratiﬁca
tion of what had been done in the lower court, and left the
parties in precisely the same situation as though no appeal
had been taken.
U. S. v. Jones, 26 Fed. Cas. 638 (No.
15,492) ; Steinbaclc 'v. Stewart, 11 Wall. 566, 20 L. Ed. 56; 3
Cyc. 422; Werborn v. Pinney, 76 Ala. 291.
Under our prac
tice a new decree is not entered in the Supreme Court upon
aifirmance, but that of the court below conﬁrmed, with a
judgment for costs added. As the cause was not remanded
for any purpose, the district court did not acquire jurisdic
tion to retry any of the issues subsequent to appeal. The
suit having been terminated, the clerk could not revive or
The only purpose for
open it again by issuing a procedendo.
that process in such a case is to notify the district court
In Steel v. Long
that it is at liberty to enforce its decree.
677,
84
N.
W.
an
order
of
the
district
court striking
(Iowa)
ﬁled subsequent to the afﬁrmance of the
a cross-petition
original decree was approved, the court saying:
“Not a
thing remained for the trial court to do, nor was it directed
to take further action in the matter.
The original action
was therefore, at an end, so far, at least, as the district court
was concerned, and the defendant had no right to then ﬁle
If the position contended for by appellants
a cross-petition.
tenable,
there would be no end to a cause of action.
were
If
a cross-petition may be ﬁled and new parties brought in one
week after ﬁnal determination by decree it might, under such
circumstances, be permitted one, two, or three years there
after.” To the same effect, see McCall 1). Webb (N. C.) 36
S. E. 174; Greenwood Township 12. Richardson (Kan.) 62
Pac. 430; Herstein v. Walker (Ala.) 7 South. 821.
So far
as the questions at issue were concerned, the suit, upon af
ﬁrmance, became a part of the irrevocable past.
2.
But no attempt was made in the subsequent pleadings
to change or modify the decree.
The object sought related
solely to the enforcement of that already rendered.
True,
the pleading ﬁled by plaintiff is designated a “supplemental
petition,” and, as contended, was not such as is contemplated

—i
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Leach v. Germania Building
Ass'n, 102 Iowa, 125, 70 N. W. 1090; -Foote 'v. Burlington
Gaslight Co., 103 Iowa, 576, 72 N. W. 755; Allen v. Davem
port (Iowa) 87 N. W. 743. But the name by which it was
Though the court had lost jurisdic
labeled is not material.
suit,
of
it
had
not
of the decree.
It still retained
the
tion
the inherent power to enter appropriate orders for its en
In Hartley 12. Bartrujf, 112 Iowa, 592, 84 N. W.
forcement.
704, in approving an order extending the time ﬁxed in the
“The manner and time of
decree for redemption, we said:
carrying a decision into effect never rests upon evidence, in
These are
the sense that evidence controls these questions.
always to be determined by the court, unaffected by the
proof; and we can conceive of no good reason why, in a
proper case, a decree may not be modiﬁed in the respect pro
posed.”
One of the advantages of a court of equity is that
its decree may not only be so framed and molded as to pro
tect the relative rights and duties of the parties, but its
execution may be controlled, or even suspended for a time,
Formerly decrees were
as exigencies arising may require.
executed by the parties; their obedience being compelled
by proceedings in the nature of punishment for contempt,
attachment, or sequestration.
Statutes providing for other
methods of enforcement, as by execution, are not usually
construed to deprive the court of the power of general super
vision of the enforcement of its decrees. Moreover, our stat
“A defendant against whom a
ute expressly authorizes:
judgment has been rendered, or any person interested there
in, having matter of discharge which has arisen since the
judgment, may upon motion, in a summary way, have the
same discharged, either in whole or in part, according to the
*
"‘
*
The original decree determined
circumstances.”
that McCook held title as trustee, which might be divested
If, because
upon the payment of a ﬁxed amount by Tyrrell.
of matters transpiring subsequent to the entry of decree,
McCook had been partially or fully paid, either from rents
and proﬁts by him collected, or from any other source, plain
tiff or Tyrrell had the undoubted right to invoke the juris
diction of the court, either under the statute quoted, or by
virtue of the inherent powers a court of equity may exer
cise over its decrees, and have the demand, to that extent,
That this was done by a pleading denominated a
satisﬁed.
by section 3641 of the Code.
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of a motion, ought not to
U

1

Q

l

The decree of the district court is affirmed, with direction
that the cause be remanded only for the purpose of taking
an accounting between the heirs and -defendant for rents
and proﬁts from the date of the last decree up to the present
time, and thereupon entering judgment for the amount found
owing either party. Aﬂirmed and remanded.
SHERWIN,

J

.,

part

took no

(e)

Modiﬁcation.

IN RE FREDERICK.
Supreme

Court of the United States.
149

1898.

United States, 70.

This is an appeal from an order denying an application
a writ of habeas corpus addressed to the court below by
Albert Frederich, a prisoner conﬁned in the penitentiary of
the state of Washington, at Walla Walla, in that state.
See

for

51 Fed. Rep. 747.

The case, as made by the petition and accompanying ex
hibits, is as follows: On the 17th of June, 1891, the prisoner
was duly indicted by the grand jury of King county, Wash
ington, for the murder of one Julius Scherbring, and upon
said indictment he was subsequently arraigned, pleaded not
guilty, was tried by a jury, and on the 26th of September,
1891, was found guilty of murder in the ﬁrst degree. A mo
tion for a new trial having been overruled, he was sentenced
From this judgment of death, and the order
to be hung.
overruling his motion for a new trial, the accused appealed
to the supreme court of the state, which reversed the judg
ment of the trial court, and remanded the case, with a di
rection to set aside and vacate the judgment imposing the
sentence of death, but to let the verdict stand, and to enter
a new judgment thereon for murder in the second degree,

W~ —~
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that being, in the opinion of the state supreme court, the
proper degree of his crime, inasmuch as the evidence in the
case did not show such deliberate and premeditated malice
as would sustain a conviction of murder in the ﬁrst degree.
State o. Freidrich, 4 Wash. 204, 29 Pac. Rep. 1055, 30 Pac.
Rep. 328, and 31 Pac. Rep. 332.
This judgment of the supreme court was rendered under
and in pursuance of the following provision of Hill’s Code
of the state, (volume 2:)
“Sec. .1429.
The supreme court may affirm, reverse, or
modify any judgment or order appealed from, and may di
rect the proper judgment or order to be entered, or direct a
new trial or further proceedings.”
Pursuant to this order of the supreme court, the prisoner,
on the 16th of June, 1892, was again brought before the
trial court, and adjudged to be guilty of murder in the second
degree, and he was thereupon sentenced to imprisonment
in the state penitentiary for the term of 20 years. This
sentence having been carried into execution, and the pris
oner incarcerated in the penitentiary, he thereupon, on the
9th of August, 1892, made this application for a writ of ha
beas corpus, claiming that he was deprived of his liberty
without due process of law, in violation of the provisions of
the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United
States.
The grounds upon which this application is based are
that the supreme court of the state was without jurisdiction,
and did not have any authority, under said section 1429 of
the Code, or under any other law, to render the judgment
it did; that all that court could do was either to affirm the
judgment of the trial court outright, or to reverse it out
right, and, under proper instructions, remand the cause for
a new trial by a jury; that therefore its judgment was ab
solutely void, and the judgment of the trial court in carry
ing out the directions of the supreme court was, of necessity,
void; and that the prisoner ought therefore to be discharged.
The court below practically agreed with the petitioner
that the supreme court of the state had misinterpreted said
section 1429 of the Code, and that what it had actually done,
by its decision and judgment, was to modify the verdict of
the jury, which, under legal and proper proceedings, it had
no authority to do; that its judgment, and the subsequent
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judgment of the trial count carrying it into effect, were both
void; and that, therefore, the petitioner's imprisonment was
without due process of law, and in violation of the four
teenth amendment to the federal constitution. The circuit
court further ruled, however, that the petitioner’s proper
remedy was not by writ of habeas corpus in the federal
courts, in the ﬁrst instance, but that he should ﬁrst raise
the question of his illegal imprisonment in the state courts,
and, if it was ﬁnally decided against him by the state su
preme court, he could then have it reviewed and corrected
by the supreme court of the United States on a writ of
error; and it accordingly denied the application.
51 Fed.
Rep. 747.
JACKSON, J. At common law the general rule undoubt
edly was that where an erroneousjudgment was entered by
a trial court, or an erroneous sentence imposed, on a valid
indictment, the appellate court, on error, could not itself
render such a judgment as the trial court should have ren
dered, or remit the case to the trial court with directions
for it to do so, but the only thing it could do was to reverse
the judgment and discharge the defendant.
This rule was
recognized in England in the case of Rex '0. Bourne, 7 Adol.
& E. 58, where the court of king's bench reversed the judg
ment of the court of quarter sessions, and discharged the de
fendants, because the sentence imposed upon them by that
court Was of a lower grade than that which the law pro
vided for the crime of which they had been convicted.
Some of the states in which the common law prevails, or is
adhered to, have adopted the same rule; but in most of the
states it is expressly provided by statute that when there is
an error in the sentence which calls for a reversal the ap
pellate court is to render such judgment as the court below
should have rendered, or to remand the record to the court
below with directions for it to render the proper judgment,
and this practice seems to prevail in the state of Washington.
The whole subject is discussed in Whart. Crim. Pl. §§ 780,
927, Where the authorities are collected and cited.
But whether this practice in the state of Washington is
warranted, under a correct construction of said section 1429
of the Code, or whether, if it is, that section violates the
fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution, in that it
operates to deprive a defendant whose case is governed by it
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of his liberty without due process of law, we do not feel
called upon to determine in this case, because we are of opin
ion that for other reasons the writ of habeas corpus was
properly refused.”
*

#

IF

*

Q

1

#

Q

#

13$

33 The other reasons referred to relate to the use of a writ of error
as a more suitable remedy than a writ of habcas corpus.
These are
given in full in the portion of the case given in Chapter V, Sec. 5, supra.
It does not appear that the constitutional objection to the practice here
suggested has been approved by the Supreme Court of the United States.
84 Under modern statutes and rules of court modiﬁcation
of judgments
in actions at law by appellate courts is a common occurrence and takes
place in many forms.
Thus formal or clerical errors in th_e judgment
below may be corrected,—Belford v. Woodward,
(1895) 158 Ill. 122;
Hamilton v. Ames, (1889) 74 Mich. 298; the amount of the judgment
may be changed to correspond to the ﬁndings,-—Lewis
v. Sellick, (1887)
69 Tex. 379;
the judgment may be conformed to the pleadings,-—Weed
v. Lee, (1868) 50 Barb. (N. Y.) 354; a several judgment may be changed
Co., (1913) 65 Ore.
v. Beeman-Woodward
to a joint judgment,-—Wagenaar
109; a party defendant may be dropped where the record shows a dis
v. Saunders,
continuance as to him,—Stevens
(1909) 34 App. D. C. 321;
a judgment for possession of land will be modiﬁed to reduce the amount
of land covered,—Guilmartin v. Padgett, (Tex. Civ. App.) 138 S. W. 1143:
a mistake as to interest may be corrected on appeal by a modiﬁcation
v. Dorsey,
of the judgment,-—Fellows
(1913) 171 Mo. App. 289; the
amount of a money judgment may be reduced to harmonize with the evi~
dence.—Stuart v. Lumber Co., (1913) 66 Ore. 547.
The following examples will illustrate
Scorn or Smruromr PROVISIONS.
court.s:—
the wide powers which statutes have given to appellate
Pennsylvania. “The Supreme Court shall have power in all cases to
aflirm, reverse, amend or modify a judgment, order or decree appealed
from, and to enter such judgment, order or decree in the case as the
Supreme Court may deem proper or just, without returning the record
P. L. 1901, 101,
for amendment or modiﬁcation to the court below."
Construed in Smith v. Machesney, (1913) 238 Pa. 538.
sec. 2.
Missouri. “The supreme court, St. Louis court of appeals and Kansas
City court of appeals, in appeals and writs of error, shall examine the
record and award a new trial, reverse or aiﬁrm the judgment or decision
of the circuit court. or give such judgment as such court ought to have
given, as to them shall seem agreeable to law." R. S. 1919, § 1514.
"The Supreme Court may afﬁrm, reverse or modify any
C'alifornia.
judgment or order appealed from, and may direct the proper judgment
or order to be entered or direct a new trial or further proceedings to
Code Civ. Pro. § 53.
be had."
“The Supreme Court or Appellate Court, in case of a partial
Illinois.
reversal, shall give such judgment or decree as the inferior court ought
to have given, and for this purpose may allow the entering of a remit
titur, either in term time or in vacation, and remand the cause to the
inferior court for further proceedings, as the oase may require." St.
ch. 110, § 111.
New York. “In any action, on an appeal to the court of appeals, the
court may either modify or aﬂlrm the judgment or order appealed from,
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award a new trial, or grant to either party such judgment as such
may be entitled to." Civ. Prac. Act, 1920, 5 604.
“Where there is a case stated, or special verdict, the court of
must not only reverse the judgment below, it found erroneous, but
v. Bayne,
a correct and ﬁnal judgment."—Gra.l1am
(1855) 18

(U. S.)

party
error
enter

How.

60.

RICHMOND

v.

ATWOOD.

United States Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
52

10

1892.

Federal Reporter, 10; 2 Circuit Court of Appeals, 596

[Bill by Atwood against Richmond for infringement of

a

patent.
The circuit court sustained the patent, found in
fringement, and decreed a perpetual injunction and an ac
counting.
On appeal from the order granting the injunc
tion the merits of the patent were considered, and the order
granting the injunction was reversed. 48 Fed. 910. On a
motion for rehearing the appellate court raised the question
whether, in view of the want of merits in the complainant,
the mandate should be conﬁned to the order granting the in
junction, or should be made broad enough to dispose of the
whole case.]

Before Cour, Circuit Judge, and CARPENTER and ALDRICH,
District Judges.
ALDRICH, District Judge. "‘ * '
Section 7, of the act of March 3, 1891, creating the cir
cuit court of appeals, provides:
“That where, upon a hearing in equity in a district court,
or in an existing circuit court, an injunction shall be granted
or continued by an interlocutory order or decree, in a cause in
which an appeal from a ﬁnal decree may be taken under the
provisions of this act to the circuit court of appeals, an
appeal may be taken from such interlocutory order or decree
granting or continuing such injunction to the circuit court
*
“
"‘
of appeals.”
It will be observed, from an examination of the cases in
the supreme court of the United States, that a decree in
patent cases, declaring the patent in question valid, and
that it has been infringed, and for an injunction and an _a¢..

~
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counting, has uniformly been referred to as an interlocutory
decree.
*
*

*

"‘

*

We must assume that congress, in furnishing
equitable remedy by appeal, had reference to the equity
system as understood and practiced in England, and as
adopted and applied to our own institutions; and, in de
termining the power and the duty which result from this legis
lation, we must look to the English system, usage, and prac
tice, and to the decisions of our state courts, where a similar
right of appeal from such decrees has been conferred by
It is, of course, well understood that a court of
statute.
equity is to decide on the law and fact, (Le Guen '0. G0uven
eur, 1 Johns. Cas. 500, 506;) and that an appeal in equity
is an appeal upon the law and fact involved in the case,
(Adams, Eq. 375;) and that, “in absence of any restrictive
clauses, every appellate tribunal is clothed with all the pow
ers of the tribunal appealedfrom, and is bound to exercise
them upon the same principles,” (Briggs’ Petition, 29 N. H.
553;) and “ordinarily, from the nature of' judgments, the
decision of an appellate tribunal must have as great force,
at least, as the judgment of the inferior tribunal upon the
same matter would have had if no appeal had been taken,”
(Blake 'v. Orford, 64 N. H. 302, 10 Atl. Rep. 117.)
Unquestionably the circuit court upon the hearing therein
might have found the facts against the complainant and dis
missed the bill, and the question presented is whether this
court, having an appeal before it involving the same record
and the same facts, may, if error is found upon the general
question of right, proceed to do what the court below should
have done; or shall this court, although it has examined the
record, and determined the right under the patent the other
Way, simply dissolve the injunction, permit the accounting
to go on, and, after the useless expense and annoyance in
cident to such an investigation, upon re-examination of the
same record, by the same court, put in execution the right
which it had necessarily determined in the appeal thereto
In our view, the accounting could in no
fore considered?
way aid the ﬁnal execution of the right already ascertained,
by this court, and under such circumstances would be worse
than idle; and a rule which would permit such circuity and
circumlocution
is unnecessary, and would not be useful to
either the parties or the court. Now, this case must be dis
*
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from the class of cases where the injunction is
preliminary, and granted upon the bill, or where there is
only a partial hearing upon the merits, or where the record
is incomplete, or evidence is excluded which should have
We are not called upon to decide as to the
been considered.
scope of the mandate under such circumstances, but it is
probable that no one would contend that, as an invariable
rule, it should go to a ﬁnal disposition of the cause upon its
Deas 'v. Thorne, 3 Johns. 543; Huntington v. Nicoll,
merits.
Id. 566.
"‘
"'
"'
In the case under consideration, the hearing in
g
the circuit court upon the merits, as to the validity and the
infringement of the patent, was full and complete, and the
general property right was determined, so far as it could be
done by that court; and the perpetual injunction, the order
tinguished

In England, any person aggrieved by

a

#

ll

it

*

Ii

*

Q!

#

*

III

to account, and the appointment of the special master were
based upon such determination of the property right.
The
record before us is complete. Everything is here for our
consideration which was before the court below. We must
go to the full merits, as shown by the record, in order to
determine whether the interlocutory decree for a perpetual
injunction is founded in error, and, if we determine the
property right adversely to the complainant, the injunction
should be dissolved; and no suﬁicient reason has been sug
gested why the accounting—to which the complainant is not
entitled, and which would be an invasion of a right, and
therefore inequitable and improper, under our view of the
case—shou1d proceed.
decree

or order

§

&

6

a

is

entitled as
matter of right to
of the court of chancery
appeal to the house of lords, (2 Daniell, Ch. Pr., 4th Ed.,
1471;) and, in practice, this right extends to interlocutory
decrees,
How. 201, 205;)
(Id. 1492; Forgay v. Conrad,
right
68,
15 Vict. c.
and later (14
was extended
10) this
to decisions, decrees, and orders of the court of appeals. Mr.
Daniell, speaking of the right of appeal from interlocutory
says, (page 1492, Id.:)
“Appeals from courts of equity by petition differ from
appeals by writ of error from the judgments of the courts of
law, which will only lie where the judgment is ﬁnal.
The
reason for this distinction is stated to be that courts of
decrees,
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equity often decide the merits of a case in intermediate
orders, and the permitting of an appeal in the early stage of
the proceedings frequently saves the expense of further
prosecuting the suit."
See, also, 2 Smith, Ch. Pr. (2d Ed.) p. 40; McNeill v. Ca.

hill,

2

Bligh, (N. S.) 316.

Indeed, it seems to have been the practice, from an early
period, in the house of lords, to direct a ﬁnal disposition of
causes before it with a full record, upon appeal from inter
locutory orders and decrees based upon a hearing upon the
merits below, whenever it was found that there was no
*
*
equity in the complainant's cause.
_‘
This practice is by no means new in the equity jurispru
dence of our own country. In a very early case in New
York, involving interests of great magnitude,—Le Guen v.
Gouveneur, 1 Johns. Cas. 436, (1800,)—-and at a period
when Chancellor Kent was a member of the court of errors.
the question was under consideration as to the measure of
relief to be afforded upon an appeal from an interlocutory
order directing the trial of an issue at law. The appellate
court determined that the complainant had no equity, and
after much argument and full consideration, which involved
a review of the English cases and the practice of the house
of lords, proceeded to ﬁnal judgment, and dismissed the
bill. The question was one of new impression in the Amer
ican courts, and three judges rendered opinions in the cause;
Kent, J., in the course of a luminous opinion, (page 508,)

saying:
“It is the settled rule of the house of lords in England,
upon appeals, always to give such a decree as the court be
low ought to have given.
This is the great and leading
maxim in their system of appellate jurisprudence, and in
stances are, accordingly, very frequent, in which the lords,
on appeals from interlocutory orders in chancery, have re
versed the order, and decided fully on the merits.”

i l

$

ii

3
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$

#

#

#

Under the authorities, and the equity practice to which
we have referred, and upon principle, it seems to us clear
that, while the appellate court is not bound by an inﬂexible
rule so to do, it may in its discretion, and should, when equity
so requires, make full directions as to the manner in which
the cause shall be disposed of below. No special or peculiar
4
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conditions have been suggested as existing in this case, as
a reason why the mandate should not be as broad as the
decree in the circuit court; but, on the contrary, as it seems
to us, there are strong equitable reasons why an accounting
in a patent case, which is incident to and based upon a ﬁnd
ing and a decree which upon the record appears to the ap
pellate court to be erroneous, should not proceed; and it is
our conclusion, as the full record is before us, upon appeal
from an injunction granted by an interlocutory decree, after
a full hearing, and a ﬁnding which undertakes to ﬁnally dis
pose of the property right involved, that we should direct a
ﬁnal disposition of the cause in accordance with the view
which we hold upon the substantial merits. It therefore fol
lows that the ﬁndings of the circuit court are reversed, the
decree for an injunction and for an accounting is vacated,
and it is ordered that a mandate issue accordingly, and with
further direction that the bill be dismissed.“
86 In harmony with this case are cases in the second, third, seventh
eighth and ninth circuits, and opposed to it are cases in the ﬁfth and
sixth circuits. This conﬂict of authority was settled in Smith v. Vulcan
Iron Works, (1896) 165 U. S. 518, in favor oi! Richmond v. Atwood, after
a full consideration and citation of all the prior decisions.
No modiﬁcation oi.’ a character beyond the jurisdiction of the trial court
can be made by the appellate court.-—Cross v. Eaton, (1882) 48 Mich. 184.

(f)

STOTLER

v.

Reversal.

CHICAGO & ALTON RAILWAY CO.

Supreme

Court of Missouri.
200

1906.

Missouri, 107.

LAMM, J. Suit for personal injuries at a road crossing.
The defendant railway company is incorporated under the
laws of Illinois and operates a railroad running from Louis
iana, Mo., through the city of Laddonia, in Audrain county,
to Kansas City. Defendants Wiseman and Haines are resi
dents of Missouri and servants of their corporate codefend
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ant, acting respectively as conductor and engineer on the
" *
"
train doing the injury.
*
*
*
There was no evidence of any probative force
6.
tending to show that the conductor, Wiseman, was guilty of
*
*
"‘
negligence.
In this condition of things, we are
met with the contention on appeal that the judgment must
necessarily be reversed because there was no evidence to sus
*
“
"‘
tain a verdict against Wiseman.
We consider it established on reason and authority that we
may reverse as to one tort-feasor and affirm the judgment
as to others.
Rev. St. 1899, § 866.
The earlier doctrine
was to look on a judgment as an entirety, and to be reversed
as to all, if reversed as to one.
But the later and better
rule is to go deeper than the mere shell of the judgment and
look into the nature of the case itself, and, where the in
terests of parties to an appeal may be rightfully severed,
Where the errors do not affect the parties jointly, and where
the rights of one party are not dependent upon those of an
other, then it is not necessary to reverse the entire judgment.
Elliott on Appellate Procedure, §§ 574, 575. The case at bar
comes within the foregoing rule, and the doctrine of this
court is well established that in such case the judgment may
be reversed as to one party and affirmed as to the other par
*
"‘
“‘
ties.
We are of opinion there is no reversible error in the case
as to defendants Haines and the railway company, and that
the judgment should therefore be affirmed as to them, but
reversed as to the defendant Wiseman.
It is, accordingly, so ordered. All concur."
But this will not

be done where it will work an injustice.—Wash
Gas-light Co. v. Lansden, (1898) 172 U. S. 534.
See extensive note in 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 209, citing cases for and
against the rule of the principal case.
Where a strictly joint judgment, as on a joint contract liability, is ren
dered against two, it must be aﬁirmed or reversed as to both.—Schoen
berger v. White, (1903)_ 75 Conn. 605.
“The rule that a judgment against two or three defendants is a unit
and if erroneous as to one defendant must be reversed as to all, does
not apply to decrees.
But when the nature of the decree is such that
the same reasons apply, the same rule must be held applicable."—Pitts
burgh, etc., RR. C0. v. Reno, (1905) 123 Ill. App. 273.
88
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LEHIGH VALLEY RAILROAD CO.

Court of Appeals of New York.
208

New York,

1913.

.912.

The action was brought to recover the cost of lumber
which the plaintiffs, as shippers of produce over defendant’s
railroad, bought and used for the purpose of making certain
freight cars furnished by the defendant suitable for such
shipments.
At the Trial Term the court directed a verdict
for the amount of the plaintiffs’ claim, and denied defend
ant’s motion for the direction of a verdict in its favor.
IF

*

#

#

*

*

The defendant relies upon the assertion (1) that
it was under no common-law duty to furnish to the plaintiffs
cars equipped with grain doors, bin doors, or bulkheads, and
(2) that even if such a duty had ever existed, it had been
abolished by the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act
of February 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (U. S. Comp. St.
1901, p. 3154), and the Elkins Act of February 19, 1903, c.
708, 32 Stat. 847 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1309), and
the Public Service Commissions Act of the state of New
York (L. 1907, ch. 429), pursuant to which the defendant
had ﬁled tariffs of rates which contained no provision for
payments or allowances to shippers for grain doors, bin
doors, or bulkheads placed in cars by them.
WERNER,
The ﬁrst question to be considered
.
is
whether, independently of the federal and state statutes, the
defendant was subject to a common-law duty to its shippers
to furnish them cars equipped with bin doors or bulkheads
for the shipment of grain and other produce in bulk. This

J

question need not be discussed at length.
It is the settled
law that a common carrier must provide itself with vehicles
which are safe and suflicient for the purpose intended. * * *
As to the shipments set forth in the schedule annexed to the
complaint, the defendant refused, after demand by the plain
tiffs, to equip its cars with the necessary appliances.
With
out them the cars were practically useless.
We think that,
in these circumstances, the plaintiffs were justiﬁed in fur
nishing the necessary lumber, and that for the concededly
reasonable expense incurred by them they are entitled to

.

\
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from the defendant, unless the provisions of our
Public Service Commission Law or of the Interstate Com
merce Act have established a different rule.
In view of the legislation to which we have referred, the
subject under discussion naturally divides itself into two dis
tinct branches. The one relates to intrastate shipments, and
upon the common-law
the effect of our state legislation
obligations
parties,
rights and
of the
and the other refers,
of course, to interstate transportation, in respect of which
the effect of the federal statutes is to be considered.
recover

#

*

1!

*

#

#

ii

*

*

I

These views lead to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are
entitled to recover the money expended by them in equipping
with grain doors and bulkheads the intrastate cars set forth
in the schedule annexed to the complaint.
The view which we are to take of the rights of the plain
tiffs in respect of their interstate shipments is necessarily
entirely different from those
governed by considerations
which have led to our conclusion as to the intrastate ship
ments. Here we are upon different ground, for we are now
dealing with federal statutes and with the decisions of fed
eral courts in demarking their effect and interpretation. If
the subject is covered by the enactments of Congress, and if
the federal courts or tribunals are invested with jurisdiction
over it, our jurisdiction is at an end, without regard to what
it may have been at common law or under our own statutes.
*

IF

*

¥

*

*

has made it a question of rates over
which the Interstate Commerce Commission has exclusive
control, and in respect of which any justiciable controversy
*
*
"‘
is referred exclusively to the federal courts.
We have yet to consider whether we can divide the single
judgment recovered by the plaintiffs, so as to sustain that
part predicated upon the intrastate shipments, and to dis
allow for lack of jurisdiction that part which rests upon the
The general rule in actions at law is
interstate shipments.
that upon appeal from a single judgment the Appellate Court
must aﬁirm or reverse as to the whole of the recovery and as
Goodsell 22. Western Union Tel. Co., 109
to all the parties.
N. Y. 147, 16 N. E. 324; Wolstenholme v. Wolstenholme File
Mfg. Co., 64 N. Y. 272; Nat. Bd. of Marine Underwriters 12.
Nat. Bank or the Republic, 146 N. Y. 64, 40 N. E. 500.
The
Congress

IF-_
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reason of the rule is that it would produce endless confusion
and embarrassment in the administration of justice to per
mit single causes of action and judgments to be split up so
that different parts thereof could be in litigation in different
courts at the same time. We do not think this case is within
Although there is no separation of
the reason of the rule.
causes of action, either in the complaint or in the judgment,
there are manifestly two such causes if we are right in hold
ing that there is a distinction between intrastate shipments
They are easily separable. The
and interstate shipments.
result of our decision is that the plaintiffs are entitled to re
In these circum
cover upon one and not upon the other.
just
logical
and
to
make
an end to the
it
is
both
stances
litigation by directing that the judgment shall be reduced
to $64.45, and as thus modiﬁed affirmed, without costs of this
Wolstenholme '0. Wolstenholme File
appeal to either party.
supra;
Board of Underwriters v. Nat. Bank: of the
Mfg. Co.,

Republic, supra."
87

Accord,

see Seevers

.~

v. Cleveland

Coal Co., (1914)

166

Ia. 284.

STROTTMAN v. ST. LOUIS, IRON MOUNTAIN & SOUTH

ERN RAILWAY

Supreme

Court of Missouri.
228

J

CO.
1910.

Missouri, 154.

GRAVES,
.
This cause is here for a second time.
There
was at least an attempted adjudication of it in Strottman v.
Railway Co., 211 Mo. 227, 109 S. W. 769. We have purposely
used the word “cause” instead of the Word “case." The cause
when ﬁrst here came by appeal from Jefferson county.
Plain
tiff, the widow of an engineer in the employ of defendant,
sued for the alleged negligent killing of her husband.
The
negligence charged was the failure of a telegraph operator to
deliver a train dispatcher’s message, through which failure a
collision occurred and plaintiif’s husband was killed. VVhen
that case came on for hearing in this court, by majority Qpin
ion it was held that the deceased engineer and telegraph op.

1
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erator were fellow servants under the act of 1897 (Laws
1897, p. 96), but further held that such act of 1897 did not
give the widow a right of action. This court upon an exam
ination and hearing upon both the facts and the law entered
a simple judgment of reversal, in words as follows:
“Now
at this day come again the parties aforesaid, by their re
spective attorneys, and the court here being now suﬁiciently
advised of and concerning the premises, doth consider and ad
judge that the judgment aforesaid, in the form aforesaid, by
the said Jefferson county circuit court rendered, be reversed,
annulled, and for naught held and esteemed, and that the said
appellant be restored to all things which it has lost by reason
of the said judgment.
It is further considered and adjudged
by the court that the said appellant recover against the said
respondent its costs and charges herein expended, and have
(Opinion ﬁled.)”
execution therefor.
The present case was instituted in the circuit court of the
city of St. Louis by a petition containing two counts. The
two counts are the same save and except in the second there
is an allegation of wanton and willful negligence and a prayer
for punitive as well as other damages. Both counts of sairl
petition contain the following allegations:
“Within six
months next after said accident, injury, and death of the
plaintiff's husband, she brought her action against the de
fendant in the circuit court of Jefferson county to recover
damages therefor, and to recover upon the cause of action
sued for herein, and subsequently, on May 14, 1903, recovered
a judgment against the defendant therein, and said cause was
thereupon taken by the defendant to the Supreme Court of
Missouri, on appeal, and said judgment was by the Supreme
Court of Missouri on the 2d day of April, 1908, reversed.
1

#

i

To this petition, the defendant ﬁled a demurrer "‘ "‘ *
This demurrer the trial court sustained, and entered its
judgment for the defendant and from such judgment the
plaintiff has appealed. The cause was briefed and argued
here both upon the merits, and upon the question of res ad
judicata. Such suﬁiciently states the case.
In our judgment the present case is determined without a
The present case,
rediscussion of the merits of the cause.
whilst here upon petition and demurrer, is as if it were here
upon all the original facts with an answer pleading former

*

*

*

1*

Ii

*

It

*

*

III

l
l

adjudication. The petition was evidently so drawn as to
force this situation.
It avers all the facts necessary to be set
out in an answer pleading former adjudication, and the de
murrer raises the issue by conceding the pleaded facts. The
demurrer performs a further office by raising a clear issue of
law, i. e., that the petition upon its face shows a former ad
judication of the cause of action stated, and for that reason
discloses no right of action in the present case.
We are,
therefore, brought to the single question as to the force and
effect of a simple judgment of reversal in an appellate court
in a case where such court passed upon the entire cause, in
cluding both the law and the facts. The exact question is
here for the ﬁrst time. In all the history of the court, this is
the ﬁrst time a judgment of reversal in a case of this charac
ter has been treated as a nonsuit, and a suit reinstituted. car
ried to judgment and appealed to this court. It is therefore
interesting because of its novelty, if for no other reason.
The question must turn somewhat upon our statutory Pm‘
The various statutes are: Rev. St. 1899, § 639
visions.
(Ann. St. 1906, p. 658) which reads: “The plaintiff shall in
allowed to dismiss his suit or take a nonsuit at any time be
fore the same is ﬁnally submitted to the jury or to the court
'
sitting as a jury, or to the court, and not afterward.” ' '
Laws 1905, p. 138, which were enacted in lieu of Rev. St
“Every action instituted b_v virtue
1899, § 2868, read thus:
of the preceding sections of this chapter shall be commenced
within one year after the cause of action shall accrue: PW
vided, that if any action shall have been commenced within
the time prescribed by this section, and the plaintiff therein
suffer a nonsuit, or, after a verdict for him, the judgment be
arrested, or after a judgment for him the same be reversed
on appeal or error, such plaintiff may commence a new action
from time to time, within one year after such nonsuit suf
"‘
" *
fered or such judgment arrested or reversed.”
The real question is the proper construction of the new set
tion 2868 as enacted in 1905, when taken with section 639
Under such sections, in a case where this court has P-‘med
upon both the law and facts of a case and reversed the 11159‘
ment nisi, can the plaintiff bring and maintain a new suit-J1’
brought within the year speciﬁed in section 2868? V\’etl1ll1l‘
not, and for reasons which follow.

1
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The plaintiff contends that a judgment of reversal
That it amounts to nothing more
is equivalent to a nonsuit.
than a nonsuit, and that a new suit can be reinstituted within
In th_e Berning Case, 56 Mo.
a year after such judgment.
App. 449, Judge Rombauer does say that this court has said
that a judgment of reversal was equivalent to a nonsuit, but
he cites us to no case, and if it has been so held where the
question Was an issue, we have been unable to ﬁnd the case.
Nor is it equivalent to a nonsuit. It is true that at common
law the plaintiff could take a nonsuit at any time before ver
dict. 14 Cyc. 401. But this rule is modiﬁed by our statute,
section 639, quoted supra, by which the nonsuit must be taken
before the cause is submitted to the jury or to the court. A
judgment of reversal comes after a submission. Not only so,
but in many cases it comes after an investigation of both law
and facts, and after a judicial conclusion has been reached as
to the merits of the case under the law and facts. When we
consider section 639 along with section 2868, we cannot say
that there is any similarity between a nonsuit and a judgment
of reversal. Nor can we say, in all cases, that a judgment of
reversal is equivalent to a judgment on either a voluntary or
involuntary nonsuit. In nonsuits there is no adjudication of
the issues involved in the case, whereas in most of the cases
wherein the appellate courts simply reverse the case, there
has been an adjudication of the issues on the law and facts of
the case. There might be cases wherein we could reverse the
case without remanding, and yet leave the issues upon the
merits untouched. Thus in McQuitty '0. Wilhite et al., 218
Mo. 586, 117 S. W. 730, we reversed the case without remand
ing, and yet never passed upon the merits of the case at all.
By the ﬁrst count of her petition the plaintiff, McQuitty,
sued the administrators of W. R. Wilhite, deceased, for the
value of her services. In the second count, she sued for the
speciﬁc performance of a contract to convey real estate.
The
trial court found against plaintiff on the ﬁrst count, but she
failed to appeal. But the trial court found for plaintiff on
This
the second count and the administrators appealed.
plaintiff
had sued
judgment we reversed on the ground that
In other words, such action should have
the wrong parties.
been against the heirs and not the administrators. We have
no doubt in a case like this the plaintiff could sue again, but
where upon appeal we examine the facts and apply the law,

__
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and reverse the case for the reason that plaintiff upon the
merits is not entitled to recover, such judgment of reversal
is a ﬁnality. It ends the case for all time.
1

l i i I

O’

#

Q

i i

In the case at bar, it is not claimed that the plaintiff is re
lying upon any new facts, but is relying upon the same facts
adjudicated in the former case. But if she had new facts, she
has lost her opportunity. She might have asked for a modi
ﬁcation of the judgment, as such has been permitted in some
Thus in Rutledge 12. R. R., 123 Mo., loc. cit. 140.
instances.
24 S. W. 1063, 27 S. W. 327, this court thus spoke in an opin
ion on a motion to modify a judgment of reversal:
“On mo
tion to modify the judgment, it has been suggested that plain
tiff may have a cause of action upon further proof that the
signal on which the engineer acted originated with the yard
master. Plaintiff hence prays that the judgment be modiﬁed
so as to remand the cause; and thus give him an opportunity
to amend, and present that phase of the case to the trial court.
the statute of limitations having intervened as against any
new action he might bring. On consideration of this motion
Bowen '0. Rail
we are of opinion that it should be granted.
road (1893) 118 Mo. 541, 24 S. W. 436; Lilly 'v. Tobbein
(1891) 103 Mo. 477, 15 S. W. 618, 23 Am. St. Rep. 887. Ac
cordingly, the ﬁnal judgment of this court will be that the
judgment of the circuit court be reversed, andI the cause re
manded.”

It would

appear that both plaintiff and the court in that
case understood that the judgment of reversal was a ﬁnality,
and unless modiﬁed no further action could be taken by plain
tiff. Other cases of like tenor might be cited.
*

A

ll

*

*

$

ll

i

Q

l I

thought or two more and we dismiss the subject, save
and except to note some cases outside of Missouri cited by
An examination of our cases shows that we
the plaintiff.
have indiscriminately used judgments of reversal, and judg
For instance,
ments of reversal and dismissal of the petition.
in Gatewood v. Hart, 58 Mo., loc. cit. 265, we disposed of the
“The judgment is reversed, and as it is evident
case, thus:
that a new trial could be of no avail to the plaintiffs, their
petition will be dismissed; all the judges concur.” In Rat
ledge v. Railway Company, 123 Mo., loc. cit. 137, 24 S. W.
1057, 27 S. W. 327, at the conclusion of the opinions written
5.

l
l
l
1

1

7
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in Division 1
tiff’s injuries

we used this language:
“We hold that plain
cannot justly be ascribed to the want of such
a rule as their juridical cause; and that the trial court should
have given the defendant’s instruction in the nature of a de
murrer to the evidence. It follows that the judgment should
be reversed (Carroll v. Transit Co. [1891] 107 Mo. 664 [17 S.
W. 889] ) , and it is so ordered.”
Thus it will be observed that we have reached the same ob
ject, i. e., a disposition of the merits of the controversy
through different wordings of our opinions and judgments.
Other similar instances could be cited but these serve to il

lustrate.
There can be no doubt that a reversal of the judgment and
a dismissal of the plaintiff’s‘petition ﬁnally determines the
cause. So too may the simple judgment of reversal, if lit ap
pear that the merits of the cause were submitted and adjudi
cated. What was held in judgment does not always appear
from the judgment itself, but may be gathered from the
pleadings and whole record of the case. In the case at bar it
appears from the plaintiff's petition that we held in judgment
at the prior hearing both law and facts, and therefore the
'
merits of the controversy.
Plaintiff in addition to the cases in this state has cited
6.
following: Smith v. Adams, 130 U. S. 167, 9 Sup. Ct.
the
us
566, 32 L. Ed. 895; Gardner v. Railroad, 150 U. S. 349, 14
Sup. Ct. 140, 37 L. Ed. 1107; Bucher 'v. Cheshire R. R. Co.,
125 U. S. 555, 8 Sup. Ct. 974, 31 L. Ed. 795; Spring Valley
Coal C0. '0. Potting, 210 Ill. 342, 71 N. E. 371; Railroad v.
Bentz, 108 Tenn. 670, 69 S. W. 317, 58 L. R. A. 690, 91 Am.
St. Rep. 763.

I i i

_

1

I

Q

Q

I i

Q

It will

be observed that in each of the ﬁve cases the judg
under discussion was one wherein the judgment nisi
had not only been reversed, but the cause had been remanded.
The cases are therefore absolutely foreign to the question at
No one would contend that a judgment of
issue in this case.
this court which reversed the judgment nisi, and remanded
the cause, would be a ﬁnal judgment.

ment

II

l

It

#

#

#
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It follows
We shall not consume further time and space.
judgment
lower
the
of
the
said
that
court
what
has
been
from
is right and should be affirmed.
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It is therefore ordered that the judgment be
concur.

WHALEN

v.

J

aﬁirmed.

10

All

SMITH.

Supreme Court of California.
163

[Chap.
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California, 360.

This is a proceeding to compel the defendant, as
judge of the superior court, to render judgment in the matter
of the action to determine heirship in the estate of George
Roach, deceased, entitled “Martin Whalen et al. v. Joshua B.
Webster et al.,” in accordance with the decision of this court
on appeal therein, as reported in 159 Cal. 260, 113 Pac. 373.
and without taking further evidence upon the issue as to the
number of surviving children of Thomas Roach, a deceased
brother of said George Roach.
The contention of the petitioners is that the appeal in
Whalen 1/‘. Webster, supra, was from a part only of the judg
ment in the proceeding—a part which presented but one ques
tion, namely, whether the language of the will of George
Roach gave to the descendants of his brothers and sisters
one-half of his estate or only one-fourth thereof; that all other
matters determined by the judgment remained unaffected,
and are ﬁnally adjudicated, and, hence, that this court on
said appeal had no jurisdiction to reverse the whole judgment,
or any part. of it, except the part appealed from; and that the
mandate of reversal, although general in terms, can apply
only to the part appealed from. And, further, they claim
that, even if the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to reverse
the entire judgment on appeal from a part only, yet, in view
of the record in the case, the nature of the proceeding, the
judgment rendered, and the narrow question presented by
the appeal, the general mandate should not be construed to
apply to the whole judgment in the proceeding below, but
only to that part from which the appeal was taken.
There are doubtless cases of appeals from a part of a ju(1g_
mcnt where the part appealed from is so interwoven and con
nected with the remainder, or so dependent thereon, that the
SHAW,

.

I
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appeal from a part of it affects the other parts, or involves a
consideration of the whole, ‘and is really an appeal from the
whole, and if a reversal is ordered it should extend to the
entire judgment.
The appellate court, in such cases, must
have power to do that which justice requires, and may extend

its reversal as far as may be deemed necessary to accomplish
that end. The Code provides that a party may appeal from

a speciﬁc part of a judgment.
Code Civ. Proc. § 940. Ordi
narily such an appeal would leave the parts not appealed from
unaffected, and it would logically follow that such unaffected
parts must be deemed ﬁnal, being a ﬁnal judgment of the facts
and rights which they determine. The decisions are to the ef
fect that upon such an appeal, where the parts not appealed
from are not so intimately connected with the part appealed
from that a reversal of that part would require a reconsidera
tion of the whole case in the court below, the court upon such
partial appeal can inquire only with respect to the portion ap
pealed from. Thus, in Early v. Mannix, 15 Cal. 150, it was
said that a plaintiff in forcible entry could appeal from an or
der denying his motion for treble damages and, in the mean
time, enforce his judgment for
restitution of the premises. In
Fisher,
v.
106 Cal. 237, 39 Pac. 758, it
Paciﬁc Mutual L. I. Co.
was said that the Supreme Court is not at liberty to reviewa
part of a judgment which is not appealed from. In Estate of
Burdick, 112 Cal. 391, 44 Pac. 734, the court below made a de
cree, upon the executor’s petition, settling his ﬁnal account and
making distribution of the estate. He appealed from all of
the decree, except the part thereof settling his ﬁnal account.
Upon the appeal he applied to review the order settling the
ﬁnal account; but the court refused to consider the question
of its accuracy, saying: “We must not interfere with it. To
attempt to do so would be an arbitrary proceeding without au
thority.” In Ricketson v. Richardson, 26 Cal. 154, there were
several defendants, and one alone appealed. A reversal as to
all of the defendants was asked. The error consisted of a de
fective service of summons and affected the appellant only.
A reversal as to the other defendants was_refused; the court
saying that it was bound to presume that there was no error
In Kelsey o.
as to them, since they had not taken any appeal.
Western, 2 N. Y. 505, the court said: “It is \vell settled that
only that part of a decree which is appealed from is brought
before the appellate court for review.” In Bush v. Mitchell,
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Or. 92, 41 Pac. 155, the court referring to an appeal from
a part of a judgment, quoted the following language from
Shook 'v. Colohan, 12 Or. 243, 6 Pac. 503: “The trial of the
suit anew would be conﬁned to a trial of the case affecting the
part of the decree speciﬁed in the notice of appeal.” In that
state the appellate court had power to try the suit anew. The
following cases recognize and apply the general principle that
an appeal from a distinct and independent part of a j udgment
does not bring up the other parts for review in the appellate
court, and that a reversal of the part appealed from does not
affect the portions not dependent thereon, but that they will
Ilcerd v. Postlewhaite, 34 La.
stand as ﬁnal adjudications:
Ann. 1235; Nelson 12. Hubbard, 13 Ark. 253; Scutt’s Appeal,
46 Conn. 38; Ervin v. Collier, 3 Mont. 189; Hess v. Winder.
34 Cal. 270; Sands '0. Codwise, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 602, 4 Am.
Dec. 305; In re Davis’ Estate, 149 N. Y. 548, 44 N. E. 185;
Leavison v. Harris (Ky.) 14 S. W. 343; Meadow, etc., Co. 1:.
Dodds, 6 Nev. 261; Robertson v. Bullions, 11 N. Y. 245;
Moerchen v. Stall, 48 Wis. 307, 4 N. W. 352.
This principle is decisive of the case. If the decree ap
pealed from in Whalen 'v. Webster had been a decree distribu
ting the estate, it might plausibly be argued that the distribu
tion was the ﬁnal judgment, and that the decision as to the
persons who are the heirs at law was a mere ﬁnding of fact,
upon which the ﬁnal judgment followed as matter of law, in
which case a general order of reversal would open the Whole
But that proceeding
matter for a new trial as to the facts.
under
section
1664
of
the
Code of Civil Pro
was instituted
cedure. This section provides a special proceeding for the
purpose of ascertaining and determining, in advance of dis
tribution, the persons who have succeeded to the estate and
the portions inherited by or devised to each of them. Upon
the trial thereof, the court must “determine the heirship to
said deceased, the ownership of his estate, and the interest of
28

each respective claimant thereto or therein, and persons en
No other judgment is to be
titled to distribution thereof.”
rendered, and no disposition whatever is to be made of the
estate. It is a determination, ﬁrst, of the persons entitled as
heirs, devisees, or legatees, or as their successors, if any have
died; and, second, the interest of each one in the estate of the
decedent.
The will of George Roach gave an interest in his estate, af
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ter the death of his wife, to be equally divided among his
brothers and sisters or their descendants. The petition of
Whalen and others, plaintiffs in the ‘proceeding, alleged:
First, that the decedent had only one brother and one sister,
both of whom were dead, and that plaintiffs were the only de
scendants; and, second, that, as such, they were entitled to
one-half of the estate under the will. The heirs and success
ors of the widow of the decedent appeared and answered, de
nying that plaintiffs were descendants of the brother and sis
ter, and claiming that they, as heirs and successors of the
widow, were entitled to succeed to three-fourths of the estate.
The judgment therein declared, ﬁrst, that the plaintiffs were
the devisees and heirs at law of Roach, the descendants of his
brothers and sisters referred to in his will and the persons
entitled to take as devisees under his will; second, that each
of them was entitled to a speciﬁc interest, the aggregate of all
of them being only one-fourth of the estate; and, third, that
certain named defendants, as successors of the widow, were
entitled to the remaining three-fourths. There is nothing in
the record to indicate that there was any claim that there
were other descendants of the brothers and sisters. The prin
cipal dispute was upon the question of law whether the fourth
clause of the will gave the plaintiffs one-half of the estate or
only one-fourth thereof. The plaintiffs appeal only from that
part of the judgment which declared that they were entitled
to take only one-fourth, and that certain defendants were en
titled to three-fourths of the estate. No appeal was taken
from the part declaring that the plaintiffs were persons en
titled, as descendants of the brother and sister, to take as
The question whether or not said
devisees under the will.
brother and sister left other descendants, and whether or not
there were other brothers and sisters, was in effect deter
mined in the negative by the judgment.
The plaintiffs were
satisﬁed with that determination, no one appeared to dispute
or question it, and its accuracy was not reviewed, considered,
or discussed by this court in its opinion on the appeal; nor
was it presented for review by the record. The only question
discussed or decided was whether the fourth clause disposed
of one-half of the estate or one-fourth thereof. The decision
was that it gave one-half, and the judgment on that subject
was accordingly reversed. The mandate did not go into spe
ciﬁc particulars, but consisted simply of the words, “The
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judgment is reversed.”
The part of the judgment appealed
from determined no question of law, except the proper con
struction of the will. No question of fact was involved in the
appeal. The determination of the construction of the will did
not require any inquiry concerning the persons who were en
titled as members of the class described as descendants of the
brothers and sisters of the decedent. The court was therefore
without authority to consider the latter question, and it did
not make any attempt to do so. In view of these considera
tions, the words of the mandate should be understood and
construed to refer only to the part of the judgment appealed
from—the part which the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to
review—and to reverse that part only, without affecting the
It follows that the
other parts not speciﬁed in the notice.
court below has no authority to retry the question whether
there were other descendants of the brothers and sisters than
those included in the decree previously rendered.
The de
cision left no matter of fact to be determined, and the only
duty of the court below upon the going down of the remitt-itur
was to enter judgment in the proceeding in accordance with
the facts previously found and with the decision of the Su
preme Court on appeal.
It is therefore ordered by the court that a writ of mandate
issue, directing the superior court of San Joaquin county to
enter judgment in the proceeding of Whalen v. Webster upon
the facts found in accordance with the opinion of the Supreme
Court, and without proceeding to retry any issues of fact de
termined upon the former hearing in that court.
.; ANGELLOTTI,
.; SLoss,
BEATTY, C.
.;
We concur:
LORIGAN, J.
HENSHAW, J. I dissent. The power of this court to re
verse the whole of a judgment, when a part only has been ap
pealed from, is conceded by the prevailing opinion to exist.
The judgment delivered by this court in Whalen v. Webster,
159 Cal. 260, 113 Pac. 373, is in the following language, “The
Language so plain and so free from
judgment is reversed.”
ambiguity neither requires explanation nor permits construc
It
tion. It either means what it says, or it means nothing.
follows, therefore (the power of the court so to do being con
ceded), that this court deliberately reversed, not a part, but
the whole, of the judgment appealed from; for, as is said in
Glassell v. Hansen, 149 Cal. 511, 87 Pac. 200, where a similar

J
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question was presented:
“In reversing the case, this court
might have directed what issues should again be tried, and
what should be deemed ﬁnally settled by the ﬁrst trial; how
ever, it did not do so, and the judgment was merely in the
general terms, ‘The judgment and order are reversed.’ This
clearly left the whole case to be tried anew, as if it had not
been tried before. Falkner 12. Hendy, 107 Cal. 54 (40 Pac. 21.
386).” In Cowdery v. London, etc., Bank, 139 Cal. 298, 73
Pac. 196, 96 Am. St. Rep. 115, this court, in effect, refused to
put any construction upon a judgment such as the one here
under consideration, or to attempt to modify its plain mean
ing in any way. The judgment of this court in the Cowdery
*
*
*
“The judgment
is reversed and the
Case was:
cause remanded, with directions that the trial court enter
judgment in accordance with the views here expressed.”
Says this court:
“The legal effect of the order of the Su
preme Court was to reverse and vacate the judgment, and not
merely to modify it. Upon a decision of the Supreme Court
that there was material error in the action of the court be
low, that court may direct the character of the subsequent
proceedings in the lower court, and its mandate will vary ac
cording to its views as to the proper course to be pursued. It
may conclude not to reverse the judgment, but to modify it,
by eliminating some portion, or by adding something to it,
leaving the remaining part of the judgment below to stand
aﬁirmed and in full force and effect from the date of its origi
nal entry 01' rendition; or it may reverse the judgment, which
means to entirely vacate it, and may remand the cause for a
new trial; or, if a new trial is not necessary, it may upon the
reversal remand it, with directions to the lower court to enter
'

particular judgment.”
What this court is here doing is changing in essential par
ticulars a judgment which it hassolemnly given, which judg
ment by lapse of time has passed from its control and become
an absolute ﬁnality. It is doing this under the guise of con
struing language so plain as to forbid construction.
The di
rect consequence, the legal effect, of this is to impair, without
warrant of law, the stability and security of every judgment
which this court has rendered. If this court in one case can
say that its formal decree reversing the whole of the judg
ment of a trial court means merely the reversal of some por
tion of that judgment, it may say so in any case.
a
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The judgment which this court rendered in 159 Cal. 260,
or not mistaken. If it was
If it was
not mistaken, there is no need for its correction.
mistaken, this is not a legal method for its. correction.
Nothing but hopeless confusion in the law and a just contempt
for the law can follow, if its highest interpreters, under-con~
ditions such as those here present, shall be permitted to say
that their own deliberately chosen language does not mean
that which alone the words must mean to any comprehending
mind. I therefore dissent under the conviction that the pre
vailing opinion and judgment are not alone without the sanc
tion of the law, but are a dangerous innovation upon the law.
I concur: MELVIN, J."
113 Pac. 373, was either mistaken

_-l‘nl-

-I

l
l

as “Where
a decree is jointly binding on several defendants,
so that
each is liable for the whole, a. reversal on the appeal of one defendant
vacates the same as to all the defendants; but when the decree, in form.
is joint, but is several in its effect, it may be reversed as to a part of
the defendants."—Sy1la.bus in Pittsburgh, Fort W. 8: C. Ry. C0. v. Reno,
(1887) 123 Ill. 273.

DONNELL

v.

WRIGHT.

Supreme Court of Missouri.
199

1906.

Missouri, 304.

[Donnell brought an ejectment suit in the circuit court
against Wright and others, and defendants obtained a judg
ment on the ground of fraud in connection with Donnell's
On appeal the judgment was reversed on the ground
deed.
adjudicata,
it being contended that the issue of fraud
of res
was determined in Donnell’s favor in the prior suit of Lynch
v. Donnell, 104 Mo. 521. But although the supreme reversed,
it did not expressly remand, the following clause being shown
on the record to have been erased from the usual form of
“That the said cause be remanded for further pro
mandate:
ceedings to be had in conformity with the opinion of the court
Three years later, on the theory that the
herein delivered.”
case was pending in the circuit court, Donnell undertook by
scire facias to revive the proceedings against the heirs and
executors of one of the defendants who had died.]

r,_--:43-1"
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An order was made that said heirs and representa

tives appear and show cause. They did appear, and ﬁled a re
turn or pleading to- the writ of scire facias, wherein (for
First, that the suit was not pending
cause) it was alleged:
in that court, judgment having been rendered therein, from
which plaintiff appealed; that the judgment was simply re
*
"‘
"'
versed, and the cause was not remanded.
To the
foregoing return plaintiff ﬁled a plea, admitting the judgment
was reversed by this court, but denied the cause was not re
manded, and alleged that, in law and in fact, it was remanded,
and is now properly and legally pending in the circuit court
of Jackson county. * "‘
The trial court, “ “ * ad
judged as follows: “Therefore the court doth hold that plain
tiff was not entitled to have his suit as revived, and doth ﬁnd
and adjudge that the same be not revived, and the plaintiff
take nothing by his suit.”
"‘
"
*
Defendant’s learned attorney
seeks to sustain
the lower court on the theory the cause was not pending in
that court at the time the writ of scire facials was sued out,
and was not so pending because this court did not award a
new trial and remand the cause for further proceedings.
Plaintiff's learned attorney insists that the reversal of the
judgment in favor of defendants ipso facto, as a matter of
law, without more, itself operated as a remanding of the
cause, a procedendo under an award of a new trial, and that
the circuit court thereby become possessed of jurisdiction to
go on and try’ the case anew. The foregoing contentions of
counsel call for an adjudication of the effect and office of a
formal award of a new trial, with a remanding of a cause for
further proceedings in the lower court, and the single ques
tion presented may be stated in this way: If a circuit court
loses jurisdiction of a case on its merits, by an appeal from
its judgment, does it regain jurisdiction of the case on its
merits by a mere reversal here without an award of a new
trial and a remanding?
Theexact point, to wit, the effect of a reversal of defend
ant’s judgment on appeal by plaintiff without remanding,
seems new, while the kindred question, viz., the question of a
reversal without remanding of plaintiff's judgment on de
fendant’s appeal, is not new. The right of appeal being a
creature of statute, the duties and powers of appellate courts

'
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appeals in Missouri are referable to the same source.
Looking thereto, we ﬁnd the duty of such court in cases on
appeal is to “examine the record” and, ﬁrst. “award a new
trial,” or, second, “reverse,” or, third, “affirm the judgment
or decision of the circuit court,” or fourth, “give such judg
ment as such court ought to have given.” or as to this court
“shall seem agreeable to law.”
Rev. St. 1899 § 866; Laws
1903, p. 105. Each one of these four duties is a separate and
distinct step, though it is obvious that award of a new trial
and a reversal go together as twin steps to be taken on the
If, for instance, a new trial is awarded, the
same appeal.
judgment below is also reversed in order that a new trial be
had; but a reversal may be an independent step, complete in
itself, and not to be followed by a new trial. So, too, it is ap
parent that, in awarding a new trial, it may be on the whole
case or on a certain issue, or a new trial may be awarded,
with directions to eliminate pointed out errors, or to try the
case on a certain theory of the law, or with the exclusion or
inclusion of certain evidence; the award adjusting itself to
But it will be observed that in what
meet the ends of justice.
ever form it be made, whether with or without directions, yet
the statute contemplates it should be made, and also that the
judgment, standing in the way of a new trial, should be
brushed aside by reversal in order that one be had.
Take a case: A. sues B. and recovers; but his judgment
was the product of erroneous instructions, or improper evi
On that account
dence commingling with proper evidence.
the judgment is reversed here on appeal. In such case the
clear duty of this court, consistent with the inherent common
sense of the thing, was to award a new trial and remand for
further proceedings. But this court inadvertently neglected
only, without remanding.
In the sup
to do so—reversing
no
why
reason under the sun
the case
posed case there was
should not have been remanded, as well as reversed, so that it
might have been followed in subsequent proceedings below to
a ﬁnality. Take another case: C. sues D., and D. has judg
ment against C. C. appeals, and secures a reversal'of the
In that case there
judgment against him without remanding.
was no reason under the sun why the case should not have
been remanded so the circuit court could proceed with a new
trial to a ﬁnality. But the entry was not made. Now, while
in other supposable cases the reversal of a judgment in favor
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of a plaintiff might stand on a footing to itself; a footing en
tirely distinct in principle from the reversal of a judgment
in favor of a defendant; yet in the two hypothetical cases of
A. v. B. and C. v. D., we fail to see why they do not stand on
the same footing; and, if the court may not proceed below to
a new trial and judgment in A. v. B., because jurisdiction was
not handed back, by the same token the court below should
not proceed in the case of C. v. D., unless jurisdiction was
handed back by this court.
\
Let us approach the case from another standpoint.
At
common law, where a case came up on a writ of error, it was
the custom to hand back jurisdiction,‘ if at all, by an entry
and a mandate called a “procedendo,” or a “venire facias cle
Now, from the institu
novo,” or a “remittitur of record.”
tion of this court down to the present hour, for 85 years, the
same end has been attained by awarding a new trial, and
reversing and remanding the case, where defendant’s judg
ment was not allowed to stand. Thus, in Edwards v. McKee,
1 Mo. 123, 13 Am. Dec. 474, decided here at the October term,
1821, Edwards and another sued McKee, and the jury found
for defendant. Thereupon the plaintiffs appealed, and the
case was sent below for a new trial on the following entry:
“Let the cause bel remanded to the circuit court for a new trial
of the issue made on the ﬁrst count in the declaration, not in
consistent with this opinion.” From that case until Matlock
v. Wil., G. & St. L. Ry. C0. (not yet officially reported) 95 S.
W. 849, decided here June 19, 1906, wherein a judgment in
favor of defendant was reversed, and the cause was remanded,
there has been deemed a necessity for a uniform use of appro
priate phraseology which (in some plain form) grants a new
trial, and reverses and remands the cause, before the trial
court may go on. We are now asked to hold that, in the ab
sence of entry of such judgment here, with a formal mandate
remanding the cause, the trial judge may (or must) read our
opinion and judgment entry, and if he concluded, on the rea
soning of the opinion, the cause should have been remanded
by this court, or, to put it another way, that it was the clear
duty and intention of this court to remand the cause, but by
slip it failed to do so, then the trial court thereby became
If this be the
possessed of jurisdiction to proceed de novo.
law, then to the perplexing troubles now awaiting on a nisi
prius judge there is added a new‘ train of vexations hitherto
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beyond the ken of his philosophy—vexations which, putting
the boot on the wrong foot, lays upon him the duty of correct
ing (by avoiding the effect of) our errors, as we do his.
Hitherto, while a court nisi has been charged with the duty
of reading our opinion into the mandate, where the cause is
reversed and remanded to be tried in accordance with such
opinion, yet he has been relieved from any duty of laboriously
ascertaining by induction or deduction whether or not the
cause has been sent below for further proceedings; for that
fact has been set forth in our judgments and mandates in un
mistakable terms, so that one who runs may read.
Should we unsettle the practice, and now hold that a cause
is reversed and remanded, not because our judgment and
mandate say so, but because they should have said so, and by
such holding take a step to one side of the beaten path? We
l
think not. * "‘ *
*
"‘
*
It cannot be doubted, moreover, that during the
term this court holds in its breast its own judgments, and, on
a suggestion of error, it may recall its own mandate and see
to it that its judgment is amended so as to conform to its opin
ion. A judgment is the application of the law to the facts
found, “the sentence of the law upon the record,” the deter
mination of the cause, the act of the whole court to effectuate
If, through slip,
the reasoning and ﬁndings of the opinion.
our judgment be faulty, why may it not be corrected by a
nunc pro tune entry on seasonable application? In a lawsuit
one must certainly watch, and, withal, may proﬁtably pray.
When, therefore, this court, on the appeal of plaintiff, re
versed a judgment for the defendants, it should have re
manded the case for a new trial; but when it did not the bur
den was on Donnell to be alert, and to come here betimes and
pray us to correct our judgment and mandate. This he failed
to do, sleeping on his rights for three years in a slumber so
profound as to be likened (in ﬁgure) to that of Rip Van
Winkle, or to that in which our great ancestor lost a rib
(thereafter reconstructed in another and much more desirable

form).

*

#

I

;
#

Q

#
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Because there was no jurisdiction in the court below to try
the case at bar, the judgment of the circuit court on the issue
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raised on the scire facias and return was right, and is there

fore affirmed."

Some cases take a contrary view.
Thus in Becker v. Becker, (1878)
139, it was held that the reversal of a case which is retriable below
restores the case as pending there.
In Benzinger Twp. Road, (1890)
135 Pa. 176, it was held that a case properly requiring further proceed
ings should be taken up again atter reversal, notwithstanding the failure
oi’ the supreme court to award a procedendo, but the court calls attention
to the tact that its own opinion on reversal indicated the necessity of
In Gerard v. Gateau, (1884) 15 Ill. App. 520, the
further proceedings.
voluntary appearance ot the defeated party in the court below after an
aiﬁrmance of a decree dissolving an injunction, was held to be a waiver
of a remanding order to assess damages, in view of a statute making
it the duty of the court to assess damages after the dissolution oi any
39

50

Ia.

injunction.
Reversals may be self-executing

in their nature so as to require no
order of remand to authorize the trial court to go on with the case. See
Woodrut! v. Bacon, (1868) 35 Conn. 97, where an order striking a cause
from the ﬂies was merely reversed, and it was held that this was enough
to reinstate the case tor trial below, without a remanding order.

(g)

Final Judgment or Remand.

FIELDER

v.

ADAMS EXPRESS CO.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
69 West

J.

1911.

Virginia, 138.

Fielder & Turley brought this action
against the Adams Express Company, in a justice’s court, to
recover the value of certain goods shipped to them over said
company's line from New York and lost. In that court they
The defendant took an
recovered a judgment for $111.30.
appeal to the intermediate court of Kanawha county. There
a jury was dispensed with, and the case submitted to the court
on a statement of facts agreed to, and a judgment was ren
dered for $114.55, with damages according to law.
To this
judgment the circuit court of Kanawha county awarded a
writ of error, on which it was reversed and the case remanded
to the intermediate court for further proceedings and ﬁnal de
termination. Complaining of this, Fielder & Turley procured
a writ of error from this court to the judgment of the circuit
court, on which * * * the remand of the case to the inter
POFFENBARGER,
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mediate court, and reversal by that court are assigned as
grounds of error. * * *
The circuit court erred in refusing to retain and ﬁnally de
cide the case, and in remanding it to the intermediate court.
As it was fully made up and could not be in any respect
changed, since the facts had been agreed, there was no reason
for remanding it, and we think ﬁnal judgment should have
Though section 21 of chapter 25 of the Acts
been rendered.
of 1907 says “the circuit court may retain the case for trial
or remand the same back to the said intermediate court to be
further proceeded in and ﬁnally determined,” these general
terms must be so construed as to make them operate reason
ably and justly. It must be assumed the Legislature did not
After an ap
intend a useless and detrimental proceeding.
pellate court has ascertained what judgment should have been
rendered- in a case fully made up, a remand for judgment in
volves both delay and risk of additional error as well as double
work. Hence it is an idle. useless, and injurious proceeding,
which the Legislature cannot be deemed to have intended, if
the clause quoted can perform some other substantial purpose
or function. While some effect must be allowed to all words
in a statute, or other writing, if possible (State '0. Harden, 62
W. Va. 313, 58 S. E. 715, 60 S. E. 394), it is not always neces
sary nor proper to allow them effect to the full extent of the
letter thereof (Coal & Coke Ry. C0. 'v. Conley, 67 S. E. 634).
It is improper to do so, if such construction leads to an absurd
or unjust result. Hasson v. Chester, 67 S. E. 731; B. & L.
Ass’n v. Sohn, 54 W. Va. 101, 46 S. E. 222. Words may be re
ferred to their proper connections, giving each in its place its
proper force, in seeking the legislative intent. B. & L. Ass’n
v. Sohn, cited. Reversals take place in two well-known gen
eral classes of cases, one in which new jury trials must take
place, or additional evidence be heard, or further orders made
to carry the judgment or decree into effect, and one in which
none of these things are necessary. In the former class the
cases are remanded, under general appellate law, and, in the
latter, ﬁnally disposed of in the appellate court. The classiﬁ
cation and usual mode of disposition were, we must assume,
known to the Legislature, and it has dealt with both in very
general terms. Power to remand in both involves idle, use
less, and practically absurd action or procedure.
Hence we
may well say, “1'eddendo singula singulis,” under the rule de
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clared in B. & L. Ass’n v. Sohn, the power to remand is ap
plicable to the former class and the power of retention to the
latter.
Whether the act confers power to retain all cases we
do not say, that question not being involved, but we are clear
ly of the opinion that the circuit court must act ﬁnally in com
plete cases, requiring nothing other than the rendition and
entry of judgment.

-r##o\#=o==|=*=r#4o

A

ﬁnal judgment for damages will be rendered by the appellate court
the amount is ﬁxed by statute,——Hink v. Sherman,
(1911) 164
Mich. 352; or is undisputed,—Moore
v. Calvert, (1899) 8 Okl. 358; Lacey
v. O. R. & N. Co., (1913) 63 Ore. 596.
Where special ﬁndings cover all the issues, an erroneous judgment
entered thereon will be reversed but the case will not be remanded for
a new trial, but ﬁnal judgment will be entered or directed,—Fort Scott
So, where a judgment is erroneously
V. Hickman, (1884) 112 U. S. 150.
entered contrary to the verdict upon answers to special interrogatories,
it will be reversed and ﬁnal judgment ordered on the verdlct,—Brown
v. Ohio & Miss. Ry. Co., (1894) 138 Ind. 648.
But where it did not aﬁlrmatively appear that upon a new trial the
plaintiff might not be able to show a liability, the case was reversed
and remanded for a new trial,—Fuller v. Mining Co., (1908) 64 W. Va.
In Guernsey v. Miller, (1880) 80 N. Y. 181, the court said: “It
437.
is not suﬁicient that it is improbable that the defeated party can succeed
upon a new trial; it must appear that he certainly cannot, to justify
an appellate court in rendering a ﬁnal judgment against him.”
Where there are material issues which have not been passed on a new
trial, partial or entire. is the proper practice.—Phelan v. Quinn, (1900)
130 Cal. 374; Cullinane v. Bank. (1904) 123 Ia. 340; Bryan v. Straus
Bros. Co., (1909) 157 Mich. 49.
Remamling for partial new trial. The right to remand for a partial
new trial involves the same principles as the granting of a partial new
trial by the trial court.
See Simmons
v. Fish, (1912) 210 Mass. 563,
given in the text supra.
40
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ARHELGER

v.

MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE

Supreme Court of Arizona.
6

SLOAN,

this court

J

.

on

CO.

1899.

Arizona, 245.

This cause has for the third time been before
appeal.
At the January, 1894, term the

was reversed, and remanded to the court below for
Upon the second appeal the
new trial.
36 Pac. 895.
cause was reversed, and remanded to the court below with
cause
a

|
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instructions to enter its judgment in favor of the Mutual
Life Insurance Company of New York, appellee here. No
opinion was ﬁled by the court upon this second appeal. From
the judgment entered in accordance with the mandate of this
court, issued under the latter judgment, appellant has again
appealed.
It is contended by appellant that this court has no power
to reverse a cause without rendering a written opinion, or,
upon reversal, to direct the-lower court to enter a judgment
without awarding a new trial. Upon the ﬁrst contention,
it is sufficient to say that paragraph 948, Rev. St., provides
that “the opinion in all cases which are reversed and re
manded for a new trial, shall be in writing." So that, even
were this section to be regarded as mandatory and jurisdic
tional, inasmuch as the judgment of this court on the second
appeal reversed the cause, without remanding it for new
trial, the statute does not apply. The purpose, doubtless,
for requiring the written opinion in any cause that is re
versed and remanded for new trial is that the trial court may
be apprised of the rulings of the appellate court, and be
guided thereby upon the subsequent trial.
We may add,
however, that we see nothing in the statute which makes
the ﬁling of an opinion in any case a jurisdictional pre
requisite to the entering of a valid and enforcible judgment.
Upon the second contention, paragraph 949, Rev. St.,'pro
vides that, “when the judgment or decree of the court below
shall be reversed, the supreme court shall proceed to render
such judgment or decree as the court below should have
rendered, except when it is necessary that some matter of
fact be ascertained or the damages to be assessed or the
matter to be decreed is uncertain, in eitlrer of which cases
the cause shall be remanded for a new trial to the court
Under this section this court is granted full power
below.”
to enter its own judgment upon the reversal of the cause,
unless a new trial be found necessary or proper in order
that material facts affecting the judgment may be deter
Appellate -courts have almost uniformly favorably
mined.
regarded the practice of directing the trial court to enter
the judgment which the appellate court ﬁnds should be ren
This practice amounts to nothing more, in effect,
dered.
than sending a case down for the trial court to enforce and
carry out the judgment or decree of the appellate court. We
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section 949 as prohibiting this prac
tice, nor do we construe it otherwise than as directory.
That
this is the proper construction is indicated by the provisions
of paragraph 951, Id., which requires the issuance of a man
date on all judgments rendered by this court, and also by
paragraph 953, which requires that every judgment of this
court shall be certiﬁed down to the clerk of the court below
to be attached to the judgment roll, and a minute of which
is required to be by said clerk entered on the docket. These
provisions of the statute would appear to be without mean
ing or utility if the judgment of this court may not be en
forced and carried out by the process of the trial court.
We think this court had ample power to enter the judgment
it did on the second appeal, and to direct the trial court to
enter judgment in accordance with the order of this court.
The judgment is therefore affirmed.
do not regard, therefore,

~.

GILLEY
Supreme

v.

HARRELL.

Court of Tennessee.

1907.

118 Tennessee, 115.

SANSOM, Special Judge.
The complainant, A. T. Gilley,
appeals to this court from the decree of the Court of Chan
cery Appeals dismissing his bill.
The original bill in the
case was ﬁled in the chancery court at Murfreesboro to col
lect a note for $300 alleged to have been executed by the
defendant J. R. Harrell to one Robert B. Meeks, and by
and
Meeks transferred and assigne_d to the complainant,
seeking to foreclose a mortgage or deed of trust given to
secure the payment of the note and to set aside a previously
executed trust deed resting upon the property.
#

1

1

1

#

1

i

8

1

8

The third and fourth assignments of error, which go to
the point that the Court of Chancery Appeals was in error
in not having remanded this case for further proof, or, at
least, dismissed the bill without prejudice, may be treated
together; and upon this subject the Court of Appeals say:
“As a petition to remand the case for further proof or to
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#

#

#

1

Q

*

*

ll!

dismiss it without prejudice, we have to say that this is
not, in our opinion, a proper case for this course to be pur
sued, for two reasons:
(1) Under the undisputed facts as
sworn to by the complainant himself, we think he could not
recover, because he had not paid the revenue license author
izing him to deal in notes. (2) Because, on the question
as to whether or not he was an innocent purchaser, under
our view of the law, he could not be an innocent purchaser,
because the note was not, under the law as it now stands, a
negotiable note, and therefore he necessarily took the note
affected by all the equities that existed between the orig
inal parties. This part of the case could not be changed by
any proof that could be introduced, if the case were re
manded or a new suit were brought.
(3) It is not proper
to remand a case, nor to allow it to be dismissed without
prejudice, on the issue of there being no consideration for
the note, because this was one of the principal issues, plainly
formed and stated in the pleadings, and upon which the
The defendant, in his answer, ex
case was fought out.
pressly stated that the note was without consideration, and
positively swore to this fact; and this statement was not
overcome by any evidence offered on behalf of the com
plainant. There was a statement by complainant himself
that there was a consideration for the note; but this was
excepted to, and counsel's attention was plainly called to the
It will not do
point, and no better evidence was offered.
issue
that
had been
for
on
an
to remand cases
new trial
If this was
clearly made and fought out by the parties.
done, there never could be an end to litigation.”
Under the ﬁndings and statement of facts by the Court of
Appeals, we quite agree with that court in the conclusion it
has reached upon this branch of the case, and overrule
the third and fourth assignments of error.
#41

a

a

41 Where the parties
have fully presented their whole case, and it is
judgment for the plaintiff, ﬁnal judgment
legally insufficient to warrant
for defendant will be rendered upon reversal of plaintiﬁ‘s judgment,-—
Sanford v. Herron, (1900) 161 Mo. 176; Hutchinson v. Sperry. (1913)
158 N. Y. App. Div. 704; Wetherby's Adn1’r v. Twin State Gas. Co., (1910)
83 Vt. 189; Leﬁlngwell v. Miller, (1905) 20 Colo. App. 429; Brillion Lum
ber Co. v. Barnard, (1907) 131 Wis. 284.
So, where, in
negligence case, a verdict for plaintiff is supported by
no evidence of negligence on defendant's part,——R.obins0n
v. Tower Co.,
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(1910) 204 Mass. 191; Arlington Hotel Co. v. Tanner, (1914) 111 Ark. 337.
conclusively
shows a defense to plaintiffs action,
ﬁnal judgment will be entered for defendant upon reversal of plaintiff's
judgment,—Fisher v. Radford, (1908) 153 Mich. 385.

Where the evidence

FOSSETT

v.

TURK.

‘Supreme Court of Alabama.
171 Alabama,

J

1911.

565.

SOMERVILLE, . The bill of complaint was ﬁled by the ap
pellant for the enforcement of a vendor’s lien on certain
land. The appellees set up in their answer that they were
subvendees and bona ﬁde purchasers for value as to a one
half interest in the land without notice of the original ven
dor’s lien for unpaid purchase money. The testimony shows
conclusively the existence of a lien for unpaid purchase
money in favor of the appellant upon the entire interest as
It therefore devolved on the
against the appellees’ vendors.
appellees, in order to avoid the lien, to affirmatively show,
among other things, that they had not only purchased their
interest for value, but that they had actually paid value
therefor before they had any notice of the lien. Buford v.
McCormick, 57 Ala. 428; Masterson v. Pullen, 62 Ala. 145.
The testimony shows clearly that appellees purchased and
took title without notice of the lien, but there is nothing to
show that they paid anything of value therefor. It is ele
mentary law that the recitals of the deed are not even prima
facie evidence of such payment as against a remote vendor.
Buford v. McCormick, 57 Ala. 428. Nor do the several state
ments in the testimony of the appellee W. P. Turk that he
“purchased” or “traded for” the land even tend to supply the
missing element. The decree of the chancellor was there
fore erroneous in limiting the enforcement of the lien to a
one-half interest in the land, and must be reversed. It is in
sisted for the appellant that this court in reversing should
also render the decree which the chancellor should have ren
dered on the testimony before him.
In cases like the present it is always in the discretion of
this court to either render or remand, and there are numer

1244

y

TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE

[Chap. 10

ous cases in which upon reversal a ﬁnal decree has been
here rendered.
Gulf Coal & Coke C0. v. Appling, 47 South.
730; Ansley 12. King, 35 Ala. 2'78; Gentry v. Rogers, 40 Ala.
442, 450; Williams '0. Barnes, 28 Ala. 613; Edwards 12. Ed
wards, 30 Ala. 394; Flake v. Day, 22 Ala. 132; McKinley ‘U.
Irvine, 13 Ala. 681. These cases indicate that the policy of
rendering a ﬁnal decree without remandment is based upon
the fact that the ground of reversal was specially brought
to the notice of the appellee in the court below, or that re
mandment could not beneﬁt the appellee unless he were al
lowed to amend his bill or pleadings in the court below,
thereby making a new case, or for some similar and sulﬁ
cient reason. In some cases this court has simply dismissed
a bill without prejudice to the complainant so as to preserve
his cause of action if any he had. Munchus v. Harris, 69
Ala. 506, 510. As a general rule, the discretion of courts
should be so exercised as to advance justice and right, and
In the present case, we
not to promote their miscarriage.
infer from the record that counsel for appellees simply over
looked the matter of making direct proof of a valuable pay
ment, and that most likely the omission was not pressed
upon the chancellor's attention before he rendered his decree.
While, therefore, our action in this case is not to be taken
as a pledge of indulgence for the ordinary derelictions of
counsel, we think the cause should be remanded for further
The costs of
proceedings under the orders of the chancellor.
this appeal will be paid~by the appellees.
Reversed and remanded."
42 See Allen v. Parmalee,
(1906) 142 Fed. 354, 73 C. C. A. 402, where
the court was unwilling to refuse a. new trial even though the appellees
had an opportunity to put in their whole case but chose rather to rely
upon their motion tor the direction ot a verdict in their favor.

lie
I:

.

'\
~

.
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BENEDICT

v.

ARNOUX.

Court of Appeals of New York.
154

i245

1898.

New York, 715.

Campbell died seized of certain property
known as No. 64 S. 5th Ave., in New York City. His executors
were given a power of sale but not power to mortgage. They
conveyed the property by a deed absolute on its face to
George T. Arnoux, the defendant, who mortgaged it 'to the
plaintiﬁ"s testator Booth. This action was brought to fore
close this mortgage given by Arnoux to Booth.
There was
evidence on the trial tending to show that the deed from
Campbell’s executors to Arnoux was only a. mortgage and
had been made in the form of a deed in order to evade the
provisions of the will, and it was claimed that since Booth’s
agent knew these facts, Booth obtained no title under his
mortgage.
The trial court found that the transaction was
an actual sale and decreed foreclosure.]
*
*
HAIGHT, J. *
The appellate division reversed the judgment, both upon
the law and the facts, and directed ﬁnal judgment for the
It does not appear from the record that that
defendants.
court assumed to make any ﬁndings of fact; but it does ap
pear from.the opinion ﬁled that the conclusion was reached
that the deed from the executors to George T. Arnoux was
intended and understood to be a mortgage.
It is now con
the
case
comes
before
this
court
with all the
tended that
issues of fact raised by the pleadings found in favor of the
defendants, and that the sole question left for the determina
tion of this court is whether, upon the facts so found, the
determination
of the appellate division is erroneous. We
cannot assent to this proposition.
The power of the appel
late division to reverse upon the facts is limited to cases
in which the ﬁndings of the trial court are unsupported by
testimony, or are made against the weight of evidence.
Where the ﬁndings of the trial court are in accordance with
the conceded facts or the uncontroverted testimony, the appel
late division is not authorized to reverse upon the facts; and,
if it does, a question of law is presented which this court may
Otten v. Railway Co., 150 N, Y. 395-400,
properly review.
[One William
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N. E. 395. The appellate division may reverse or afﬁrm
wholly or partly, or may modify, the judgment appeale‘
from, and may, if necessary or proper, grant a new tria'.
But we think in this case the appe'
Code Civ. Proc. § 1317.
late division had no power to order ﬁnal judgment; that, in
case it saw ﬁt to reverse, its duty was to order a new trial.
The deed was absolute in form, and it could only be found to
be a mortgage where such was intended to be ‘its force and
effect. This intention had to be determined from the oral
testimony of the witnesses.
Evidence was given tending to
show that it was the understanding of the parties that, after
the money had been obtained from Booth, the premises were
to be redeeded to the executors; but this evidence was
sharply converted, and the trial court found for the plain
tiifs upon this issue, and it cannot now be said that other
evidence may not be found which will sustain the plaintiffs’
contention in the event of a new trial.
It is one of the fundamental principles of our law that
questions of fact are to be tried and determined in a court
of original jurisdiction, and it is not the appropriate func
tion of an appellate court to determine controverted ques
tions of fact, and render ﬁnal judgment upon such deter
It is only in cases where the facts are conceded or
mination.
undisputed, or are established by official record, or found by
the trial court, that such a court is justiﬁed in awarding
This subject was considered in the case of
ﬁnal judgment.
Edmonston '0. McLoud, 16 N. Y. 543, in which it was held
that when a verdict or the report of a referee for the plain
44

it appears that no possible
state of proof applicable to the issues will entitle him to

tiff is

set aside upon a case, and

judgment, the appellate court may render ﬁnal judgment for
the defendant.
This rule has been followed in analogous
cases, such as King 12. Ba./mes, 109 N. Y. 267-282, 16 N. E.
332; Brackett v. Griswold, 128 N. Y. 644-648, 28 N. E. 365;
Fischer 2». Blank, 138 N. Y. 669, 34 N. E. 397. In the case
of Schenck '0. Da-rt, 22 N. Y. 420, Comstock, C. J., says:
“Under the former system of procedure, where a judgment
in an action at law was reversed upon writ of error, a venire
In equity causes.
do no/vo, or new trial, was always granted.
on the other hand, the appellate court, if it reversed the
decree appealed from, proceeded to make a new and com
plete adjudication, such as the pleadings and proofs in the

i~
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According to the new code

of practice, actions at law and suits in equity are no longer
distinguishable as such; and the question has several times
arisen as to the power and duty of an inferior appellate
court where the judgment reviewed is reversed.
We have
followed the analogy of the practice in legal actions, and
have determined that in such cases a new trial must be
granted, unless, indeed, it is apparent, in the very nature of
the case, that the party against whom the reversal is pro
nounced can never succeed in the action.”
The recent
amendment of section 1022 of the Code of Civil Procedure
has not, in our judgment, changed the practice in this par
ticular. The provision that “the appellate division shall re
view all questions of fact and of law, and may either modify
or affirm the judgment or order appealed from, award a new
trial, or grant to either party the judgment which the facts
warrant,” should be considered in connection with section
The court may
1317, and construed in harmony therewith.
grant the judgment which the facts warrant. This has ref

i

#

ll

#1

ii

#

l

IF

ll

Ill

erence to facts conceded, uncontroverted, established by rec
ords, or found by the trial court.
It was never intended
to include controverted facts upon which issue had been
joined, and in which parties were entitled to a trial by a
jury. We are aware that this is an action in equity, but
actions at law and in equity under the Code are no longer
distinguishable as such, and the practice on review in such
This question was settled in the case
actions is the same.
of Schenck v. Dart, to which reference has been made, and
since that decision, has been the settled doctrine of this
court.

J

The judgment of the appellate division should be reversed
and that entered upon the decision of the special term af
ﬁrmed, with costs.
All concur, except O’BRIEN, ., not vot
ing. Judgment reversed.“
43

156

Accord,

Ind.

577.

as to same rule at law and in equity,—Mead

v. Burk, (1900)

1248

TRIAL AND APPELLATE

ELLIOT

v.

PRAcTIoE

[Chap. 10

WHITMORE.

Supreme Court of Utah.

1901.

23 Utah, 342.

»

ii

#

¥

l

*

It

*

ll

Ill

ROLAPP,_ District Judge. The appellant in this case invokes
the doctrine that this court “may go behind the ﬁndings of a
trial court, and consider all the evidence, decide on which
side the preponderance thereof is, ascertain whether or not
the proof justiﬁes the ﬁndings and decree, and make such
ﬁndings and decree as should be made in the judgment of the
appellate court.” Whittaker 'v. Ferguson, 16 Utah, 240, 51
Pac. 980. We reaffirm that doctrine, and assert that this
court has full power to review all questions of law and fact
in equity cases, and if, in our opinion, the judgment of the
lower court in such cases is not supported by the evidence,
we may and will set such judgment aside. Still, that doc
trine is governed by the further principle that “when such
cases have been regularly tried before a court of chancery,
and if it has found on all material issues, we will not disturb
such ﬁndings unless they are so manifestly erroneous as to
demonstrate oversight or mistake which materially affects
McKay v. Farr,
the substantial rights of the appellant.”
After a careful investigation of
15 Utah, 261, 49 Pac. 649.
the record in the case before us, we have, however, absolutely
failed to ﬁnd any reason for setting aside the judgment of
the lower court.
#49

it

appellate
“This is the usual rule in equity eases, and in applying
courts lay stress on the tact that the chancellor saw and heard the wit
nesses.-—-Watkins v. Watkins, (1909) 39 Mont. 367; Commonwealth
v.
Stevens, (1897) 178 Pa. 543; Milllnor v. Thornhill, (1912) 63 Fla. 531
(according less weight to decision below when evidence taken before a
master); Charbadjieff v. Grotf, (1912) 69 Wash. 699; Siﬂord v. Cutler,
(1911) 248 Ill. 340; Pallard v. Am. Freehold Land Mtg. Co., (1903) 139
Ala. 183; Herlihy v. Coney, (1905) 99 Me. 469; Reed v. Reed, (1874)
114 Mass. 372; Stevenson v. McFarland,
(1901) 162 Mo. 159; Stevens
v. Magee, (1902) 81 Miss. 644; ‘State Bank v. Barnett, (1911) 250 lll.
312 (hearing de novo on same evidence when it is taken before a master).
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BOSTON ELEVATED RAILWAY CO.

Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
.215 Massachusetts,

1913.

467'.

J

.
The plaintiff seeks damages for the death of
RUGG, C.
his intestate under St. 1907, c. 392, which authorizes recov
ery from a street railway company, whose servants in the
conduct of its business negligently cause the death of a per
son, not a passenger or an employé, “in the exercise of due
The point to be decided is, whether a ﬁnding was
care.”
warranted that the plaintiff’s intestate was “in the exercise
of due care” as required by the statute as a condition of re
covery.
It is not contended that there is any evidence of
active exercise of care by the deceased.
It has been settled
after elaborate consideration that the words “due care” in
this statute mean something more than a negative and pas
sive freedom from fault and require reasonably intelligent

and energetic attention to safety, and stand on the same
as if they were used in an indictment under the same
ute.
It follows that the defendant’s request should
been granted to the effect that a verdict be directed

favor.

It

basis
stat
have

in its

-

is urged by the defendant that this is a proper case for
this court to exercise the power vested in it by St. 1909,
c. 236, and to direct by its rescript that judgment be en
tered for the defendant.“ The case appears to have been
fully and fairly tried with an intelligent appreciation by
counsel on each side of the issues involved and of the prin
ciples of law applicable to it, and its merits on the ample
report of the evidence contairied in the exceptions seem plain.
Therefore it appears to be a case where the statute properly
may be invoked.
Archer v. Eldredge, 204 Mass. 323, 327,
90 N. E. 525; Grebenstein '0. Stone & Webster Engineering
Corp., 205 Mass. 431, 440, 91 N. E. 411; Newhall v. Enter
prise Mining Co., 205 Mass. 585, 91 N. E. 905, 137 Am. St.
Rep. 461; Burke 12. Hodge, 211 Mass. 156, 163, 97 N. ‘E. 920,
Ann. Cas. 1913B, 381.
This course would be followed without discussion but for
the decision of Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U. S.
364, 33 Sup. Ct. 523, 57 L. Ed. 879, which holds that “the
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right of trial by jury” secured by article 7 of the amend
ments to the Constitution of the United States does not per
mit the entry, after a verdict in favor of one party, of a
judgment for the opposing party under circumstances like
those in the case at bar.
The question there arose in review
ing the action of the Circuit Court of Appeals which, under
the conformity act (U. S. Rev. St. § 914 [U. S. Comp. St.
1901, p. 684]) and following a Pennsylvania statute, had
entered judgment in favor of the party for whom the trial
court erroneously refused to direct a verdict.
The sub
stance of that decision is that it is an unconstitutional exer
cise of the power of legislation to authorize the entry of
judgment in a case where a trial by jury has been had, ex
cept in conformity to the verdict, and that, although the
error’ committed by the trial court may consist solely in its
refusal to direct a verdict in favor of one party, yet after
a verdict wrongly rendered in favor of the adversary party
as the direct result of such erroneous refusal,
the only
method for correcting that error within the reach of the
legislative or judicial departments of government is to order
a new trial, and this because of the scope of the meaning of
“trial by jury,” as secured by the seventh amendment to the
federal Constitution. That decision is not a ﬁnal or bind
ing authority on this court for the reason that the seventh
amendment does not control the action of the several states
in abridging trial by jury within their own jurisdiction.
It
applies only to the courts and Congress of the United States.
Pearson v. Yeu-"da-ll, 95 U. S. 294, 296, 24 L. Ed. 436; Twin
ing 'v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 98, 29 Sup. Ct. 14, 53 L.
Ed. 97. The decision of Slocum v. N. Y. Life Ins. C0. was
rendered by a bare majority of a divided court, four of the
justices, among whom is a former chief justice of this court,
joining in a dissenting opinion.
But the deference due to a
decision by the highestcourt of the nation when it challenges
the constitutionality of our statutes (as it does because our
own Constitution secures the right of trial by jury) renders
necessary thorough consideration, even though it has been
acted upon heretofore in numerous instances without ques
tion of its validity.
*

1!

Ii

#

The essence of trial by
shall be decided by a jury.

IF

#

ii

Q

I

#

jury is that controverted facts
The constitutional right to trial
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jury is preserved in this regard when each party has
fair opportunity to present to a jury the ‘evidence on

which he claims to raise an issue of fact. If he fails utterly
to improve that opportunity, there is no constitutional guar
anty that he shall be given another chance. He has had his
day in court.
One feature of ideal administration of justice
by the jury system is that correct rulings of law shall be
If the record is so framed and
made by the presiding judge.
preserved that the same result may be reached at a later
time as would have been attained by such correct rulings at
the trial that end is attained by constitutional means. The
function of the jury is to pass upon the facts involved in an
The statute now under review does not infringe
action.
upon this province in any degree. A trial judge always has
had power to direct a verdict provided the law required it.
The statute simply permits that to be done by this court
which ought to have been done at the trial. The hypothesis
by which alone it permits the order to be made is that at
the trial no question of fact was in truth presented, but
only one of law which the court should have ruled as such.
It does not disturb the plain boundary between fact which
a jury must determine and law which the court must rule.
It permits the right ruling to be given at a time later than
that at which it should have been made when no substantial
rights have accrued in the meantime.
We are of opinion that the history of our practice as to
trial by jury both before and since the adoption of the Con
stitution shows that the trial by jury of our Constitution
has slightly more ﬂexibility in its adaptation of details to the
changing needs of society without in any degree impairing
its essential character than is ruled by the majority of the
court in Slocum '0. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. We are constrained
not to adopt the reasoning or the conclusion of that opinion
as correctly deﬁning the scope of legislative power under
our Constitution. St. 1909, c. 236, is not in violation of our
Constitution. This result is in harmony with the decisions
of many other courts.“ We do not rest this judgment upon
their authority, however, for we have not undertaken the
historical study of the several constitutional provisions un
der which they have arisen to determine their weight.
The defendant’s exceptions are sustained, and in accord
ance with St. 1909, c. 236, judgment is to be entered in the
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superior court for the defendant and rescript is to go to that
effect.

S0 ordered.

“The

statute here referred to, appearing as ch. 231, sec. 122, G. L.
is as tollows:—“When the justice presiding at a trial is requested
to rule that upon all the evidence the plaintiff cannot recover, and such
request is refused, and exception by the defendant to such refusal is
duly taken, and a ﬁnding or verdict returned for the plaintiff, then if
the defendant's said exception ls sustained in the supreme judicial court.
and the exceptions, it any, taken in said trial by the plaintiff are all
overruled, the supreme judicial court may, by rescript, direct the entry
in the trial court of judgment for the defendant, and thereupon judg
ment shall be so entered." Sec. 123 provides a similar procedure where
the plaintiff asks for a directed verdict.
46 The court cited:—Anderson v. Fred Johnson Co., 116 Minn. 56. 133
N. W. 85; Muench v. Heinemann, 119 Wis. 441, 448, 96 N. W. 800; Hay
v. Baraboo, 127 Wis. 1, 105 N. W. 654, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 84, 115 Am.
St. Rep. 977; Cornette v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 195 Fed. 59, 115 C. C.
A. 61; Bailey v. Willoughby, 33 Okl. 194, 124 Pac. 955; McVeety v. Harvey
Mercantile Co., (N. D. Jan. 1913) 139 N. W. 586; Fishburne v. Robinson,
49 Wash. 271, 95 Pac. 80; Roe v. Standard Furniture Co., 41 Wash. 546,
83 Pac. 1109; Cruikshank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 75 Minn.
266, 77 N. W. 958; Dalmas v. Kemble, 215 Pa. 410, 64 Atl. 559; American
Car & Foundry Co. v. Alexandria Water Co., 221 Pa. 529, 70 Atl. 867,
128 Am. St. Rep. 749, 15 Ann. Cas. 641; Manning v. Orleans, 42 Neb. 712;
Smith V. Jones, 181 Fed. 819, 104 C. C. A. 329; Fries-Breslin C0. v. Bergen.
176 Fed. 76, 99 C. C. A. 384; Carstairs v. American Bonding & Trust Co.,
116 Fed. 449, 54 C. C. A. 85; Richmire v. Andrews & Gale Elevator Co.,
11 N. D. 453, 92 N. W. 819.
See a very exhaustive and able discussion of Slocum v. New York Life
Ins. Co., (1912) 228 U. S. 364 by Ezra Ripley Thayer,——-Judicial Adminis
tration, 63 Univ. ot Penn. L. Rev. and Am. L. Reg. 585-608.
1921,

(h)

HORTON

v.

Mandate.

STATE EX REL. HAYDEN.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.
63

1901.

Nebraska, 34.

.~

POUND, C. This proceeding was brought to obtain a writ
of mandamus commanding certain ofﬁcers of the Greater
American Exposition to draw, issue, and deliver to relators
an unconditional warrant upon the treasurer of said corpo
ration for the payment to them of the sum of $10,000.
The
the
writ.
Error
was
court
allowed
taken
to
district
this
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court, which held that the proceedings below were unwar
ranted, and the writ improvidently allowed, reversed the
judgment, and remanded the cause.
Horton v. State, 60
N eb. 701, 84 N. W. 87. A motion for rehearing having been
ﬁled on behalf of relators, which was not disposed of until
the opening of the January, 1901, term, of this court, a
mandate issued on January 28th. This mandate was not ﬁled
Two
or docketed in the district court until March 23d.
days before, on March 21st, the relators appeared in that
court, and procured an order of dismissal.
When the man
ﬁled,
parte,
was
set
ex
date was
this order
aside
at the in
stance of defendant, on the ground that it had been rendered
prematurely; and on the same day, March 23d, on motion of
the defendant Horton, supported by an affidavit showing that
$10,000 of the moneys of the corporation had been paid to,
and obtained by, relators under and by virtue of said writ of
mandamus an order issued requiring relators to show cause,
on or before March 30th, why restitution of said moneys
and interest thereon should not be awarded.
The relators,
having been served with said order, appeared specially,
At the hear
and objected to the jurisdiction of the court.
ing, the district court held that it had jurisdiction to render
the order of dismissal on March 21st, that it had no juris
diction to set such order aside on March 23d, nor to enter
the order to show cause on the same date, and sustained the
objections.
Error is prosecuted from this ruling.
The argument made on behalf of relators is that as soon
as the cause was determined in this court, and a mandate
issued, the district court was reinvested with jurisdiction,
and might properly act without having the mandate before
it; that the right of a plaintiff to dismiss, in the absence
of some pleading, showing, or claim of the adverse party
on ﬁle entitling the latter to relief,_is absolute, and that the
order of March 21st was made with full jurisdiction, giving
effect to this absolute right of dismissal; that even if the
order was prematurely made, and the court had the power
to set it aside, in the absence of some application by the
defendants for relief, on ﬁle at the time, it should not have
done so, and hence, in any event, the ﬁnal action of the court
was right. We are unable to agree to these propositions,
under the circumstances disclosed by the record. While it is
true that the Code of Civil Procedure provides in express
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for a special mandate, which is to issue where a
judgment is reversed and a new judgment entered in the
supreme court, it does not follow that mandates are abolished
or rendered unnecessary in all other cases. Under various
names, “mandate,” “remittitur,” or “procedendo,” such pro
cess from the appellate court to the lower tribunal is in gen
Where a judgment
eral use in all common-law jurisdictions.
is aiﬁrmed, indeed, the mandate has no oﬁice to perform,
and may be dispensed with. State v. Sheldon, 26 Neb. 151,
But where a judgment is reversed a mandate
42 N. W. 335.
is the usual, and, it seems to us, the only, legal method of
communicating the ruling of the one court to the other with
authority. It is the judgment of this court which the lower
court is to look to, not its opinion, and it must be obvious
that some authentic and official notiﬁcation of the judgment
affords the only sure basis for further proceedings.
This
is furnished by the mandate, which is “the oﬁicial mode of
communicating the judgment of the appellate court to the
Such, moreover, is
13 Enc. Pl. & Prac. 837.
lower court.”
recognized
practice
in
this
state. State '11.
the settled and
Sheldon, 26 Neb. 151, 42 N. W. 335; State v. Omaha Nat.
Bank, 60 Neb. 232, 82 N. W. 850. As between the opinion
and such ofﬁcial statement of the judgment in a mandate,
Merriam
the district court must be guided by the latter.
v. Gordon, 20 Neb. 405, 408, 30 N. W. 410.
Hence we are
not able to assent to the proposition advanced by counsel
that, in the absence of an express statutory requirement of
a mandate, “any way in which the court can be satisﬁed of
the action of the supreme court will answer the purpose."
It has been held that, where no mandate is issued, the lower
court will not act on a certiﬁed copy of the judgment of the
Nauiga-Hon Co. v. Hertzberg, 26 Or. 216,
appellate court.
The statute recognizes a mandate as the
37 Pac. 1019.
proper legal mode of communication, and, assuming this,
provides for a special mandate in certain special cases.
The
very use of the term “special mandate” implies that for ordi
nary cases there is to be a general mandate. "The cases
which have been cited as leading to a contrary conclusion are
not inconsistent with this view, as we shall show in.another
terms only

connection.
The jurisdiction
ments and orders

as

of the supreme court over its own judg
is, in general, the same as that of any
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other court of record, and hence it may alter or modify such
judgments or orders .and correct its mandates accordingly
at any time during the term at which they are rendered,
unless its mandate has been ﬁled and acted upon in the lower
court prior to the end of the term. Bronson 0. Schulten, 104
U. S. 410, 415, 26 L. Ed. 797; People 0. Village of Nelliston,
79 N. Y. 638; Trowbridge 0. Siclcler, 48 Wis. 424, 428, 4 N.
W. 563. Obviously there must be some point of time at
which the jurisdiction of the one court ceases and that of the
other court attaches, and, while the subject is not free from
judicial conﬂict, we think the sounder rule draws the line
at the time when the mandate is acted upon and carried into
effect. Merriam 0. Gordon, 20 Neb. 405, 30 N. W. 410; Peo
ple 0. Village of Nellistcm, supra.
But it may be observed
that the weight of authority ﬁxes the transfer of jurisdiction
at the time when the mandate has been ﬁled in the court
below. Leese 0. Clark, 20 Cal. 387; Zorn 0. Lamar, 71 Ga.
85; King 0. Ruckman, 22 N. J. Eq. 551; Whaley 0. Bank, 5
Rich. 262; Ward 0. Insurance Co., 12 Wash. 631, 42 Pac.
And such rule would be equally consistent with the
119.
view we take of this case. Counsel in contending that the
issuance of a mandate terminates the jurisdiction of the ap
pellate court, and gives jurisdiction to the lower court, point
out what the practice in altering or modifying a judgment
is to recall the mandate. But we think the object of this is
to stay action thereon while the appellate court is consider
ing what modiﬁcation shall be made, and that the acknowl
edged power to recall the mandate before it is carried into
effect argues jurisdiction in the appellate court.
For these
reasons, and in order to prevent unseemly conﬂict of author
ity, we think that a district court whose judgment has been
reversed should defer action until the mandate of the su
preme court is before it. 13 Enc. Pl. & Prac. 837; Tro'w
bridge '0. Sickler, 48 Wis. 424, 4 N. W. 563; Wright '0. King,
107 Mich. 660, 65 N. W. 556; Barnwell 0. Marion, 56 S. C.
54, 33 S. E. 719; Layfferty 0. Rutherford, 10 Ark. 453; Navi
gation C0. 0. ‘He-rtzberg, 26 Or. 216, 37 Pac. 1019; McAlpin
If, however, both parties proceed
0. Bennett’, 21 Tex. 535.
without. objection in the absence of a\ mandate, if the pro
visions of the judgment of reversal are carried out, and trial
had, we do not doubt that the irregularity is not to be taken
advantage of by either party in appellate proceedings.
It is
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fundamental that no error is available in such proceedings
unless prejudicial, and such an irregularity would be tech
nical only, and without serious results. Many cases of that
character have been cited to us, and we fail to perceive that
they militate against our conclusion in any way. As the
time when the man
district court entered its ﬁrst order at
it,
and in the absence of any authentic
date was not before
record of what had been done in the supreme court, we think
would any other un
did right in treating such order as
aside at once.
advised and improvident action, and setting
All judgments and orders of the court are under its control
In ordinary
during the term at which they are rendered.
cases the proper, and perhaps even the necessary, course is
is manifest on the face
by motion and notice. But, when
of the record that the court has acted irregularly and unad
may and should, so long as its power over the act
visedly,
as soon as the facts come to
in question continues, undo
Alspaugh
0. Ionia Circuit Judge (Mich.) 85 N.
its notice.
may do this regardless of the form in which
W. 244. And
application for such action
Bradley '0. Slate-r, 58
made.
Neb. 554, 78 N. W. 1069.
We think the general rule that the court has full power
and control over its judgments and orders during the term
at which they are rendered applies to an order of dismissal
plaintiff, the same as to any
entered at the instance of
plaintiff to dismiss were abso
other order. If the right of
lute, and the action of the court following thereon ministerial
But this right
not ab
only, the rule might not apply.
solute, in the sense that the court has no power over, or
discretion with respect to, its exercise.
On the contrary,
court,
discretion,
may
the
in its
refuse to dismiss whenever
justice to the court or its oﬁicers, or to any of the parties,
requires imposition of terms, or retention of the cause upon
the docket. Sheedy 0. McMurtry, 44 Neb. 502, 503, 63 N.
W. 23; Beals 0. Telegraph Co., 53 Neb. 602, 74 N. W. 54.
In the case ﬁrst cited this court said: “The existence of the
right of
plaintiff to dismiss at any time during
pendency
general proposition, must be qualiﬁed, and
of
cause, as
not absolute, in the sense that
takes the subject without
the control of the court in which the cause
pending, so that
cannot, within its discretion, impose the condition of the
payment of costs as obligatory and precedent to
dismissal

n_ii._
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of the action.” This discretion has been exercised to require
payment of costs (Sheedy 'v. McMurtry, supra) ;_to protect
rights of attorneys under agreements as to fees (Byron 21.
Durrie, 6 Abb. N. C. 135) ; to protect a defendant in his plea
of estoppel from the danger of possible transfer of a lien
(Stevens v. Railroads [C. C.] 4 Fed. 97); and to enable a
defendant to obtain restitution (Lane v. Morton, 81 N. C.
38). Of course, there must be some real and substantial
right which has accrued to the adverse party in the very
Collateral consequences, such
cause sought to be dismissed.
as subjection of the defendant to further litigation, or pur
poses not connected with the action in question, will not be
allowed to interfere with the right given to plaintiffs by
statute.
Banks v. Uhl, 6 Neb. 145. Hence, ordinarily, the
dismissal will be allowed as of course. Beals '0. Telegraph
Co., 53 Neb. 602, 74 N. W. 54.
But we know of no case
appealing to a court more strongly for application of its
discretionary power than one in which money or property
has been taken under an unwarranted and improvident judg
ment, which has been reversed, and the adverse party is en
titled to restitution. It would require convincing argument
and strong weight of authority to persuade us that a dis
missal could be had as a matter of right in such case, before
mandate ﬁled, and without reasonable opportunity to direct
the court’s attention to the claim for restitution, and the de
fendant thus deprived of his summary remedy, and driven
to the difficult and expensive remedy of another action. The
discretion of the court in such cases is grounded on the
requirements of justice to itself, its officers, and the adverse
parties. It depends upon the existence of rights which would
be jeopardized by dismissal, not upon the manner in which
the court becomes cognizant of such rights. The absence
of a formal claim or assertion thereof upon the record does
not necessarily give the plaintiff advantage.
It was within
the discretion of the district court to refuse to dismiss the
cause in order to protect the defendant’s right of restitution.
That being so, it had power, during the term, to set aside an
unadvised

dismissal

for the same purpose.

Where a party to a cause has obtained money or property
under or by virtue of a judgment which is afterwards re
versed, the court has power to compel restitution by sum
mary proceedings in that cause.
Association v. Hier, 55
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Neb. 557, 558, 75 N. W. 1111; Fuel C0. v. Brock, 139 U. S.
216, 11 Sup. Ct. 523, 35 L. Ed. 151; Bickett 'v. Garner, 31
Ohio St. 28; Ea-mes v. Stevens, 26 N. H. 117. Such restitu
tion is a matter of right, and does not depend upon the merits
of the controversy between the parties, the probabilities of
another judgment to the same eﬁ*'ect, or the solvency of the
party entitled to the restitution. Hier '0. Association, 60
Neb. 320, 83 N. W. 77; Bickett v. Garner, 31 Ohio St. 28;
Hart,
B. Mon. 79. “The defendant having been
Morgan
put out of possession by an abuse of the process of the law,
the law must be_just to itself, as well as to the defendant.
by restoring him to that of which he was wrongfully de
restored to the possession,
prived.
When the defendant
then, and not until then, will the court be in condition in
which
can honorably to itself pass upon the further rights
Hier v. Association, supra. In the com
of the parties.”
mon-law practice, whenever the record showed that money
of, and applied upon, the re
had been collected by
virtue
writ of restitution issued as of course.
versed judgment,
writ
the facts were not suﬂiciently disclosed by the record,
of scire facias issued. United States Bank v. Bank of Wash
17,
L. Ed. 299; Gay 2». Smith, 36 N. H.
ington,
Pet.
435; Ma-1-tin o. Woodruﬁ,
Ind. 237. Under our practice,
the order to show cause entered by the district court would
In the case at
be the equivalent of the latter proceeding.
only
return of the sheriff that he served the
bar there
peremptory writ of mandamus upon the defendants.
There
is no further return, and the record does not disclose
whether the warrant was drawn, issued, and delivered, nor
whether
was paid in whole or in part.
Did the record
show compliance with the writ, and payment and receipt of
the money in obedience thereto and in consequence thereof,
restitution should be awarded as of course, and we should
judgment of that nature in the district
feel bound to direct
court. Association 12. Hier, 55 Neb. 557, 75 N. W. 1111. But,
as such facts are made to appear aliz1.nde, we think the course
entered upon by the district court, namely, the order to show
cause why restitution should not be made, was right, and
had
that the court erred only in not pursuing the path
taken.
It is recommended that the judgment be reversed, and the
cause remanded for further proceedings, under the order to
a

it

a
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show cause why restitution should not be adjudged not in
consistent with this opinion.
SE1>c'w1cK and OLDHAM, CC., concur.
For the reasons set forth in the foregoing
PER CURIAM.
opinion, the judgment of the district court is reversed, and
the cause is remanded for further proceedings under the
order to show cause why restitution should not be adjudged
not inconsistent with said opinion."
4'1 F0-rm of Mandate.
In Bali v. Rankin, (1909) 23 Okl. 801, the man
the Supreme Court of‘. the territory
date was as follows:-—“Whereas,
of Oklahoma did at the June, 1907, term thereof,.and on the 14th day
of June, 1907, render an opinion in the above entitled cause appealed
from the district court of Logan county, reversing the judgment in said
district court in said cause at the cost of appellee and remanding the
same thereto with instructions to proceed in conformity with said Su
Now, therefore, you are hereby commanded to
preme Court opinion:
cause a reversal of the judgment of said district court in said cause
to be entered of record therein, and take such other and further proceed
ings in the matter as shall accord with said Supreme Court opinion.”

.i~

WASHBURN & MOEN MANUFACTURING CO.
‘
CHICAGO FENCE CO.
Supreme

Court of Illinois.
119

V.

1886.

Illinois, 80.

SCHOLFIELD, J. The ﬁrst, in our opinion the controlling,
question arising upon this record is Whether, when the case
was here at the former term (109 Ill. 71) it was remanded for
a hearing, or only to modify the decree of the superior court
in conformity with speciﬁc directions then given.
In cases
where a modiﬁcation of the decree below is deemed necessary,
it is discretionary whether the court shall, by an order to be
entered on its records, make the modiﬁcation, or whether it
shall remand the cause to the lower court with speciﬁc direc
tions to that court to make modiﬁcations.
Section 81, c. 110,
Rev. St. 1874.
In either case it is proper that the order of
this court, be, ﬁrst, that the decree below be reversed. Hunter
But whether the effect of such order of
'0. Hatch, 45 Ill. 178.
reversal shall be to open up the case for rehearing will de
pend entirely upon the modiﬁcation of the decree made, or
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directed to be made; for the only purpose for the order of
reversal being that the modiﬁcation shall be made, the sub
stantial rights of the parties to the record, so far as con
cerns any question now before us, are precisely as if, from
the moment of the entry of the judgment of the court, the
decree actually read as it would read after making the record
entries in the different courts essential to the modiﬁcation.
And since the direction that one part of the decree be modi
ﬁed is, by necessary inference, an approval of that part omit
ted from that direction, the substantial rights of the parties
to the decree are not perceptibly different from what they
would be were it expressly ordered, in the formal entry upon
the record, that such omitted part of the decree is afﬁrmed.
No statute requires that the speciﬁc modiﬁcation directed
shall be embodied in the formal order of the court entered of
such record by the clerk of this court; and it is conformable
with our practice, and suﬁicient, if the modiﬁcation be spe
ciﬁcally directed in the written opinion of the court ﬁled in
the case; and so it is held that it is the duty of the lower court
to examine the opinion, and conform its action to it. Wad
hams 'v. Gay, 83 Ill. 253; Boggs 'v. Willard, 70 Ill. 315; Hough
The speciﬁc directions here given are
'0. Harvey, 84 Ill. 308.
all in the Written opinion of the court, and the meaning in
tended to be conveyed in the language employed for that pur
pose will be better comprehended by restating the questions
under consideration to which that language was applied.
The tenth condition in the license issued by appellant to
“And the royalty to be paid under
appellee has this clause:
this license shall not be greater than that charged to any other
party licensed after the ﬁrst day of January, A. D. 1881, un
der said several letters patent,” named in the license; and
that in case a license should be given to any other party at a
less royalty, that “then thereafter that royalty to be paid un
der this license shall be the same as such reduced royalty.”
The bill was ﬁled for the purpose of obtaining the speciﬁc per
formance of this condition, alleging a certain settlement made
subsequent to the ﬁrst day of January, A. D. 1881, by appel
lant with Jacob Haish, under the terms of which Haish was
licensed to manufacture barbed fence wire to the extent of
4,000 tons annually, free of royalty, under appellant’s patent;
and the bill prayed allowance to appellee of the beneﬁt of all
reduction of royalty made to Haish. The allegation was put
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in issue by answer.
Evidence was heard, and the court de-.
creed as prayed in the bill.
The opinion, after giving a history of the settlement with
Haish, proceeds thus:
*
"'
*
“but Haish was not bound to manufacture more
than 4,000 tons annually, and to the extent of 4,000 tons year
ly he had a free license. Whether he would manufacture in
excess of that was optional with him. The proof shows that,
up to the time of the hearing of the superior court, his yearly
manufacture did not exceed 4,000 tons, so that upon what he
manufactured he paid no royalty, upon the theory of the de
cree, and so far the decree was right in exempting appellee
from the payment of the royalty; but if in the future, subse
quent to the hearing, Haish should manufacture in excess of
4,000 tons yearly, he would have to pay royalty, under the
provisions of his license, which, if he manufactured to the
limit of his license, would be ﬁfty'cents per one hundred
pounds on the second two-ﬁfths of his manufacture,
and
seventy-ﬁve cents per one hundred pounds on the last one
ﬁfth. As respects, then, any future manufacture by Haish
which might be in excess of 4,000 tons yearly, we are inclined
to think appellee should be required to pay the same propor
tionate royalty as Haish would have to pay, so that there
should be the same ratio of royalty to tonnage manufactured
in the case of appellee as in that of Haish, and that in the re
spect of any such future manufacture the decree should be
modiﬁed accordingly.”
*
*
" We can add nothing to make more perspicuous the
language, “For the purpose of a modiﬁcation of the decree
in the manner above indicated, the decree will be reversed,
and the cause remanded,” etc.
We understand, and we do
not know that it is at all controverted, that this, under a
familiar rule of construction, clearly means that the decree
was reversed, and the cause remanded, only for the purpose
of such modiﬁcation, and thus excludes all interference for
Assuming that we are not in error in
any other purpose.
this, it was the duty of the superior court, in the performance
of which it had no discretion, to modify its decree as thus
* * "
7
directed;
*
*
*
We concede that directions by appellate courts to
trial courts, in particular cases, as expressed in written opin
ions, are ordinarily in general terms, giving the substance in

1-}:
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outline,—simply of what is required to be done,—and leaving
matters of detail to the trial courts; but we understood the
rule to be, when a case is remanded to the lower court with
speciﬁc directions to modify the decree therein, that the lower
court is not authorized to include anything in the modiﬁed
decree which is not either actually expressed in the language
of the opinion directing the modiﬁcation, or necessarily im
plied from that language. The reason is obvious. The lower
court is not acting on its own motion, but in obedience to the
order of its superior.
What the superior says it shall do, it
must do, and that alone. Where the doing of one thing neces
sitates the doing of others as necessary incidents, the order
that they shall be done is implied in the order to do that to
which they are incidents.
After the case, upon being remanded, was redocketed in the
superior court, appellant asked leave to ﬁle a supplemental
answer, setting up that “on or about the eighteenth day of
December, A. D. 1883, an agreement was entered into and
made by the parties to this suit, in and by which a new license
"‘
*
*”
was issued by the defendant to the complainant.

Q

i

*

¥

*
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The court refused to allow it to be ﬁled, and this ruling also
counsel insists was erroneous.
is

it

it

is

a

reversed, and the cause
decree
We concede that where
remanded, with directions to the trial court to proceed in
conformity with the opinion then ﬁled, and
appears from
the opinion that the grounds of reversal are of a character to
be obviated by subsequent amendments of the pleadings, or
is the duty
the introduction of additional evidence, or both,
of the trial court to permit the cause to be redocketed, and

a

is

a

then to allow amendments to be made, and evidence to be in
troduced on the hearing, just as if the cause was then before
state of facts,
the court for the ﬁrst time; and under such
upon the second hearing, new questions of law or fact may
arise, as to which no opinion was or could have been expressed
in the written opinion of this court, pursuant to which the
former decree was reversed and the cause remanded. But
where, as here, the cause
remanded with directions to make
speciﬁc modiﬁcation of the decree, not requiring any change
in the pleadings, nor the introduction of additional evidence.
but only with the view to have the decree conform to the case
made by the record, nothing remains to be done but to make
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1

that modiﬁcation,

and then execute the decree.

The decree is

affirmed.“
'18 “The opinion delivered
by this court, at the time of rendering its
decree, may be consulted to ascertain what was intended by its man
date; and either upon a writ of mandamus, or upon a. new appeal, it is
for this court to construe its own mandate and to act accordingly,”
'
In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., (1895) 160 U. S. 247.

MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE

CO. v.

Supreme Court of the United States.
198

J

HILL.
1904.

United States, 551.

BREWER, . A preliminary matter is this: When the case
was here before we held that, upon the record, there was dis
closed an abandonment of the insurance contract by both the
insured and the beneﬁciaries, and on that ground the judg
ment was reversed. It is now contended that “the only ques
tion left open by the mandate of this court was a submission
of this question ;” that our decision was substantially an ad
judication that the plaintiffs had a right to recover unless it
was shown that there had been an abandonment of the in
surance contract, and that upon this trial it was shown that
there had been no such abandonment, the insured having al
ways expressed a wish to continue the policy, the beneﬁciary
named in the policy having died before the second premium
became due, and her children, who became entitled thereafter
as beneﬁciaries, being minors and in actual ignorance of its
That decision was based upon the averments of
existence.
the pleadings, and these pleadings were amended after the
judgment was reversed and the case returned to the trial
court. Clearly, the contention of the plaintiffs is not sustain
able. When a case is presented to an appellate court it is not
obliged to consider and decide all the questions then suggested
or which may be supposed likely to arise in the further pro
gress of the litigation. If it ﬁnds that in one respect an error
has been committed so substantial as to require a reversal of
the judgment, it may order a reversal without entering into
any inquiry or determination of other questions.
While un
dcubtedly an afﬁrmance of a judgment is to be considered an
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adjudication by the appellate court that none of the claims of
error are well f0unded,—even though all are not speciﬁcally
referred to in the opinion,—yet no such conclusion follows in
It is impossible to foretell what shape the
case of a reversal.
second trial may take or what questions may then be pre
sented.
Hence the rule is that a judgment of reversal is not
necessarily an adjudication by the appellate court of any other
than the questions in terms discussed and decided.
An actual
decision of any question settles the law in respect thereto for
future action in the case. Here, after one judgment on the
pleadings had been set aside, on amended pleadings a trial
was had, quite a volume of testimony presented, and a second
judgment entered. That judgment is now before us for re»
view, and all questions which appear upon the record and
have not already been decided are open for consideration.
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‘It must be conceded
49Eﬂ'ect of am/rmanoe on plea of res adjudicata.
that, it there had been no appeal from the judgment ﬁrst rendered by
the Circuit Court, this action would not lie. It would have been a com
plete and ﬁnal adjudication of the plaintiffs right to the property in
The aﬂlrmance in this court
controversy.
left the
judgment and the rights of the parties precisely the same as though
no appeal had been taken."—Finch v. Hollinger, (1877) 46 Ia. 216.
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HARRISON, . Upon
former trial of this cause, the court
made ﬁndings of fact, and rendered judgment thereon in fa
vor of the defendants. This judgment and an order denying
new trial were subsequently rc
the plaintiffs’ motion for
court,
upon
the ground that certain ﬁndings of
versed by this
33 Pac. 496.
Upon
fact were not justiﬁed by the evidence.
cause,
the
the
court
made
similar ﬁndings
the second trial of
of fact, and again rendered judgment in favor of the defend
new trial,
ants. From this udgment, and an order denying
the plaintiffs have appealed. It was contended by the plain
also contended by them here, that the
tiffs at the trial, and
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evidence is substantially the same as upon the former trial,
and that the former decision of this court that this evidence
was insufficient to justify the ﬁndings then under considera
tion became the law of the case, and that the trial court was
thereby precluded from making the present ﬁndings, although
its own judgment concerning the effect of this evidence might
be contrary to the decision of this court. Both of these propo
sitions are controverted by the defendants.
An unbroken line of decisions, commencing with Dewey v.
Gray, 2 Cal. 374, has established the rule in this state that a
decision of this court upon any question of law in a case ap
pealed to it from an inferior court becomes thereby the law
of that case, and is thereafter, in all subsequent stages of the
case, binding, not only upon the inferior court, but also upon
this court if again brought before it. It has never been held.
however, that the decision of this court upon a question of
fact is subject to this rule. On the contrary, it has been fre
quently said that the rule is limited to questions of law, and
is not applicable to questions of fact. "‘ * "‘ In Mattingly
v. Pennie, 105 Cal. 514, 39 Pac. 201, the court said:
“It is
beyond
controversy
that
a
decision
of
this
settled
court on
appeal as to a question of fact does not become the law of the
case.” It frequently happens that the suﬁiciency of the evi
dence to justify the decision depends upon the competency of
the evidence, or the effect of an act or admission, or the con
If, in such a
struction to be given to a Written instrument.
case, the appellate court holds that the evidence was incom
petent, or received an erroneous construction by the trial
court, and that for this reason the evidence was insufficient
to justify the decision, such ruling of the appellate court be
comes the law of the case, since the sufficiency of the evidence
depends upon the question of law which is thus decided. See
Leese v. Clark, 20 Cal. 387. But, when the fact which is to be
decided depends upon the credit to be given to the witnesses
whose testimony is received, or the weight to which their tes
timony is entitled, or the inferences of fact that are to be
drawn from the evidence, the suﬂiciency of the evidence to
justify the decision must be determined by the tribunal before
which it is presented, and is not controlled by an opinion of
the appellate court that similar evidence at a former trial of
This
the cause was insufficient to justify a similar decision.
results from the relative functions of the trial court and the

Y
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appellate court, the former alone being authorized to deter
mine questions of fact, and the latter being limited to deter
mining questions of law. The appellate court cannot itself
make a ﬁnding of fact when the evidence is all before it, or
ﬁnd the ultimate fact from other probative ‘facts, unless such
ultimate fact follows as a conclusion of law therefrom; and if,
in the opinion which it renders, it assumes that the evidence
sustains any fact, it is only the opinion of the court, and not
a ﬁnding of that fact. Kimball o. Semple, 25 Cal. 455. “We
do not pass upon the weight or preponderance of evidence,
nor in a case where opposing inferences may be drawn can we
review a ﬁnding because, in our judgment, the inference de
duced by the trial court is improbable, or more unlikely to be
true than the opposite one.” Reynolds o. Robinson, 82 N. Y.
106.

'

Whether the evidence in a case tends to prove a fact is a
question of law which arises when the admissibility of such
evidence is questioned, or when it is relied upon for the pur
pose of establishing a controverted fact; and the decision of
the appellate court that such evidence does or does not tend
to establish the fact is a decision upon a question of law which
is conclusive upon the trial court; but whether the evidence is
sufﬁcient to establish the fact is a question of fact, which must
be determined by the tribunal to which it is submitted. _ A
declaration by the appellate court that it does establish the
fact would be outside of its functions, and would not be bind
ing upon the trial court. So, too, whether a particular infer
ence can under any circumstances be drawn from certain evi
dence is a question of law; but whether the inference shall in
any particular case be drawn from the evidence is a question
of fact. “An inference is a deduction which the reason of the
jury makes from the facts proved, without an express direc
tion of law to that effect.” Code Civ. Proc. § 1958.
Whether there is any evidence in support of a ﬁnding, or
whether there is a conﬂict of evidence upon a controverted
fact, must be determined by the appellate court when pre
sented to it upon an examination of the record. This includes
the right to determine whether any of the evidence tends to
support the decision, since that is a question of law; and, if it
determines that it has no such tendency, that evidence is ex
If, upon an examination of the
cluded from consideration.
record, the appellate court determines that there is no evi
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in support of the decision, it reverses the judgment, for
the reason that the court committed an error of law in ﬁnding
Domico ’L‘_.
a fact without any evidence in support thereof.
Lord,
1024;
12.
40 N. Y.
411,
Casassa, 101 Cal.
35 Pac.
Mason
484.
“When there is a total want of evidence upon some es
dence

sential fact, but the jury nevertheless ﬁnds such fact, the ﬁnd
ing is erroneous as matter of law; but, when there is slight
evidence in support thereof, a ﬁnding thereon would be one
of fact, upon which men might differ in opinion. But for a
court to attempt the correction thereof upon writ of error
would be but a correction of errors in fact, and not in law,
a power which this court does not possess.” Conely v. Mc
Donald, 40 Mich. 159.
A comparison of the opinion rendered upon the former ap
peal herein with the record upon the present appeal shows
that, in making its decision upon the evidence before it, the
superior court did not disregard the decision of this court
upon any question of law determined by it upon the former
appeal. Indeed, upon that appeal the decision of this court
was in the main in reference to questions of fact, rather than
questions of law. The question chieﬂy discussed in the opin
ion, and which is termed by the appellants the pivotal ques
tion of the case, was whether there was any contract relating
to Chinamen between Sisson, Wallace & Co. and the railroad
and construction companies, or whether Sisson, Wallace & Co.
had any contract right by virtue of the arrangement made
with Koopmanschap for bringing the Chinamen to San Fran
cisco. The statement in the opinion “that a written contract
was made between one of the construction companies, Koop
manschap, and Sisson, Wallace & Company concerning such
importation is clear, though such written contract was not
produced on the trial, nor shown to be then in existence”; and
the expression in the opinion, after giving the evidence in
support of the above statement, and that Douty’s testimony
was corroborated by the I-Iaswell letter, that “it is inconceiv
able that he (Douty) would direct the agent of the steamship
company to draw drafts upon Sisson, Wallace & Company
for each of the two contemplated shipments, amounting to
$40,000 each, without a contract right so to do,” can neither
of them be considered as a decision upon a question of law,
but, at most, only an inference of fact drawn from the other
evidence in the case. * * “ It was for the reason that in
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the opinion of this court the trial court had erroneously de
cided these questions of fact that its decision was reversed,
but this court did not assume to direct that court how it
And, as we have seer.
should again decide the questions.
above, that court, when the questions should again be pre
sented to it for decision, was authorized and required to exer
cisc its own judgment in determining the facts which were
justiﬁed by the evidence. If the evidence had been identical
with that given at the former trial, and the trial court had
still been of the opinion that it justiﬁed the former ﬁndings,
it would not be precluded from so ﬁnding merely because this
This court might
court had reversed its former decision.
again reverse the decision, but, before doing so, would con
sider whether it might not be that that portion of the evidence
which could not be reproduced in printed form—the demeanor
of the witnesses, as well as their credibility, the weight to be
given to contradictory testimony, the inferences to be drawn
from different portions of the evidence-was such as to sup
port the conclusion of the trial court. If it should appear to
this court that it was possible for the trial court, under these
considerations of the evidence, to so decide the issues, it might
deem it its duty to yield to that court, even though the decision
were contrary to its own opinion, since the trial court is the
ultimate arbiter upon all questions of fact.

475;

Phelps

-

50 Accord, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Enoch, (1906) 79 Ark.
County Ins. Co. v. Johnston, (1902) 66 Neb. 590.
Obiter dicta do not become the law of the ca.se,—Wixson

*

it

*

it

*

"

*

There was, moreover, at the last trial, additional
evidence before the trial court which was not before this court
be conceded, as is
upon the former appeal; and even if
claimed by the appellants, that this evidence was cumulative,
*
was not for that reason to be disregarded.
still
A careful examination of the record herein fails to show that
the evidence before the superior court was insuﬂicient to jus
tify its decision. The judgment and order are aﬂ‘irmed.°°

v. Devine,
Cal. 385.
case subsequently
overruled continues to be
“What was decided by
the law of the case as between the parties and those claiming under
v. Jack, (1884) 97 Ind. 570; and it on a second appeal
them/’—-I-Iabbits
the court should become dissatisﬁed with its former opinion, it never
v. N. Y. Lite
theless will remain as the law of the case,—Westerﬁeld
Ins. Co., (1910) 157 Cal. 339.
“In the absence of statute the phrase, law of the case, as applied to
80

a

(1889)
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the effect of previous orders on the later action of the court rendering
them in the same case, merely expresses the practice of courts generally
to refuse to reopen what has been decided, not a limit to their power,"—
Messenger v. Anderson, (1911) 225 U. S. 436.
Law 0] the case on second appeal. “The sole reasoufor the existence
of the doctrine is that the court, having announced a rule of law appli
cable to a retrial of facts, both parties upon that retrial are assumed
to have conformed to the rule and to have offered their evidence under
it. Under these circumstances it would be a manifest injustice to eitﬁer
party to change the rule upon the second appeal."—Allen v. Bryant,
(1909) 155 Cal. 256.
“An appeal will not be entertained by this court from a decree entered
in the circuit or other interior court, in exact accordance with our man
Such a. decree, when entered, is in effect
date upon a previous appeal.
our decree, and the appeal would be from ourselves to ourselves."—
Stewart v. Salamon, (1878) 97 U. S. 361.
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